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STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA JUSTICE ET DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, March 10, 1999

• 1539

[English]

The Chair (Mr. John Maloney (Erie—Lincoln, Lib.)): I'd like to call the meeting to order.

We have with us this afternoon, from the Department of Justice, Mr. David Daubney, who's the coordinator of sentencing reform; and from the Ministry of the Solicitor General, Mary Campbell, who's the director of corrections policy.

Thank you very much for being with us this afternoon. The routine is that we receive a presentation from you for roughly 10 minutes, to be followed by questions and answers from all sides. That's if you have a presentation to make. If you don't, if you've had an opportunity to look at the subject legislation, then provide us with some comments. Thank you.

Mr. David Daubney (Coordinator, Sentencing Reform, Department of Justice): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'll begin.

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I have some draft remarks that I've asked the clerk to circulate.

The department has a number of concerns with Bill C-251. Some of them relate to flaws in the drafting; some are more fundamental. I'll begin by speaking to some of the technical matters.

• 1540

Clause 1 purports to deal with repeat sexual offenders. That's certainly the effect one gets from reading Madam Guarnieri's speeches in the House and before this committee last year. If this is her intention, the clause goes both too far and not far enough.

It may go too far because it would capture a person convicted of sexual assault for the first time if that person commits another offence arising out of the same event or series of events or is serving another sentence for any offence whatsoever.

It may go both too far and not far enough because it refers to only one section of the code, section 271, commonly known as level-one sexual assault. As you know, Mr. Chair, the levels of sexual assault are distinguished by the level of injury and the presence or not of a weapon. Section 271 is the lowest level, and it covers a very wide range of conduct, from unwanted touching to what we used to know as rape. This is reflected in the sentencing as well, which indicates that despite a maximum 10-year sentence, a significant number of level-one sexual assault convictions do not result in prison as the most serious sanction.

Finally, the clause may not go far enough, at least from the point of view of its sponsor, because there are several more serious sexual offences in the code that aren't covered, particularly in section 272, level-two sexual assault with a weapon or causing bodily harm, which has a maximum penalty of 14 years; and section 273, level-three aggravated assault, which has a maximum punishment of life. My colleague will speak to some of these matters from a sentencing statistics point of view.

This bill has been before this Parliament and the last one in at least three different incarnations. Since the first one, Parliament has passed a number of pieces of legislation that relate to the scope of this legislation.

The first is Bill C-55, which targeted the kinds of predators about which the bill's sponsor seems to be concerned by introducing the long-term offender designation, which is now found in the code. If a court is satisfied that an offender who has been convicted of a sexual offence or who has engaged in serious conduct of a sexual nature in the commission of another offence is at a substantial risk of reoffending and there's a likelihood of him causing injury, pain, or other evil to another person in the future, the court may find the offender to be a long-term offender, and in addition to sentencing him to a period in the penitentiary, have him supervised in the community for up to 10 years.

Also, with respect to clause 2, the bill doesn't really reflect legislation passed in the last Parliament, which my colleague will speak to: Bill C-45. Nor does it reflect what has been the law for some time—that an offender serving a life sentence and still under the 25-year parole ineligibility period who receives a subsequent life sentence for first-degree murder will begin a new 25-year parole ineligibility period as of the date of arrest for that homicide. So if this were to occur after he'd served, say, 24 years, he would face another 25 years of parole ineligibility. Much of what clause 2 of the bill I think wishes to accomplish is already part of our law.

Finally I draw the committee's attention to important amendments contained in Bill C-41 in the last Parliament. They deal with comprehensive sentencing reform, but from the point of view of this bill, the important aspect is the sentencing principles, which Parliament for the first time codified in our code. I'm concerned that the thrust of this legislation would conflict with three fundamental principles: the principle of restraint in the use of imprisonment, the principle of proportionality, and the principle of totality. I've referred you to particular sections and given you copies of the sections.

The principle of totality confirms the long-standing jurisprudence that where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh. This notion is based on two rationales: one, that there should be proportionality between the crimes committed and the overall sentence; and two, that while each individual sentence might be appropriate, a total sentence should not be, in the words of the Supreme Court of Canada, “a crushing sentence” not in keeping with the offender's prospects and record.

I also draw the committee's attention to subsection 718.3(4) of the code, which codifies the discretion courts have to impose consecutive sentences in both the situations described in clause 1. I might add that words to this effect have been in our code since our first code was passed in 1892.

• 1545

The courts in Canada do have discretion, but the jurisprudence is clear that where there is no relationship between the separate commission of criminal offences, the court should, bearing in mind the total term, impose consecutive sentences. As a general rule, consecutive sentences are imposed for multiple offences that arise out of separate criminal transactions—the “string of offences” situations I describe in my remarks. Generally, concurrent sentences are imposed for multiple offences that arise out of one continuous criminal act or single transaction—for example, an offender convicted of several assaults arising from a fight in a bar.

I refer you to a quote from the Canadian Sentencing Commission pointing out that the principal rationale for concurrent sentences is to:

    permit the court to give proportionate sentences for related offences without disturbing the overall length of the total sentences imposed. Thus, they counter any need to reduce sentencing dispositions for individual offences in order to achieve an overall just result.

There's been a fair bit of jurisprudence in this area, as you might imagine. The most recent is the C.A.M. case in the Supreme Court of Canada, confirming that the totality principle requires a sentencing judge who orders an offender to serve consecutive sentences to ensure that the cumulative sentence does not exceed the overall culpability of the offender.

It's worth noting that in that case, the Supreme Court upheld a total consecutive sentence of 25 years for a number of sexual and other assaults, and said that would not be disproportionate. That's an example and a signal from the highest court that in fact courts have the power to impose consecutive sentences and that they do so.

Courts take repeat or multiple offences seriously, and the sentencing statistics demonstrate that a criminal record is the primary indicator of a more severe sentence.

I refer you to a quotation from the chief justice in that case, which relates to clause 2 of the bill in particular. I won't read it, but I'd just remind you that the court is reminding other sentencing courts that they must take into account the age of an offender in applying all the principles of sentencing, to ensure that the sentence passed is one that is capable of having some meaning within the scope of those principles.

In Luxton, which I also refer members to, the chief justice reminded us that even for murderers, there has to be some calibration in sentencing. The chief justice compared retribution and vengeance, and I've set out his language there.

I give these citations to the committee in the hope that they will be helpful to you as you consider how the Supreme Court might measure the changes proposed in this legislation, particularly the amendments to the Corrections and Conditional Release Act. The more they depart from these principles, the less likely they are to be upheld.

There's clearly a need to sentence murderers sternly, and without a doubt some multiple murderers are of such a dangerous character that they should probably never be released. Some of them never are, and some of them serving time now never will be. However, these amendments would automatically consign offenders to jail for terms that would in many cases exceed their potential lifespan. Doing so would remove any prospect of rehabilitation, and in the view of the department, would in many cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

A provision of this nature would operate so as to be grossly disproportional in a number of cases that one can reasonably think about. A young offender, over a span of a year, say, kills two persons. He's transferred to adult court at 14 to 18 years of age. He would be facing 50 years of prison, which would be, in the words of the Supreme Court, “a crushing sentence” for a person not yet having reached the age of maturity.

For a person who is older, say 30 years, the same type of sentence would likely keep the person in prison for the rest of his or her life, regardless of any rehabilitation that might take place. While this might be appropriate in some cases, it is difficult to say that it is so in all cases.

I'll end my remarks there, Mr. Chair.

• 1550

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Daubney.

As a matter of interest to the committee, Mr. Daubney was chair of this committee from 1987 to 1988. I'm sure it must be interesting to be on the other side of the bench.

Mr. David Daubney: I prefer to be in your spot.

Voices: Oh, oh!

The Chair: Ms. Campbell.

Ms. Mary E. Campbell (Director, Corrections Policy, Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'll try to keep my remarks equally short and I hope equally helpful. I've provided a handout in English and French, and I will simply amplify and highlight a few of the points from those handouts. Subsequently I will be quite happy to answer any questions about what is contained therein. I appreciate that a lot of numbers are contained in here, and I'll just try to, as I say, hit the main points.

I will speak first to sexual assault. You will see from the handout that much of what is in there supports Mr. Daubney's research that the current system addresses many of these concerns currently. I'll speak quickly to six main areas.

The first area you see on page 1 is sentencing statistics—sentencing laws and practices as they currently exist. Mr. Daubney indicated that the penalties are already quite severe.

We know that generally sentences are already more severe for sex offenders than for other offenders, and we know that within the category of sex offenders, the courts recognize the severity of escalating offences. So you see that by the time you get to sexual assault level three, fully 75% of the people who go to prison go to a penitentiary. It seems from these numbers that the courts do take sex offences quite seriously in general already.

The second area I would speak to is sentencing for multiple or repeat offenders, at the bottom of page 1. Generally speaking, for all offenders, courts already impose more severe sentences for multiple offences, and in the case of sex offenders in particular, the same pattern holds. Sex offenders with multiple offences on average receive more severe sentences than those offenders with single offences.

Turning to the top of page 2, the third area I would like to highlight is the other element of the system, parole eligibility. You'll see a reference to sentence calculation, and by that I mean the calculation of parole eligibility for multiple or repeat offenders.

In 1995 the government did undertake extensive consultations on this very issue, and legislative reform resulted from that consultation process. I would say parenthetically that the consultations were quite broad. We spoke of course to victims, police, and offenders. We also spoke to judges and to our provincial colleagues in the criminal justice system. That consultation process was extremely important in terms of the changes that resulted.

In a nutshell—and this is a complex area of the law—the system that was adopted as a result of those reforms means that an offender who is subject to a prison sentence and gets a subsequent prison sentence suffers consequences. If they are out on parole, if they get a new sentence, whether it is consecutive or concurrent, the parole is automatically revoked and they will be returned to custody. There's absolutely no choice; they will be back in custody.

If it is a new consecutive sentence, further, they will serve the new parole ineligibility period on that new sentence. If it is a concurrent sentence, it will be calculated in the normal merged fashion, and they may not necessarily serve an additional period. That's reflecting the fact that the judge chose to give a concurrent sentence. But they will be back in custody, they will have to reapply for parole, and they will have to persuade the parole board that notwithstanding this failure, they should be re-granted parole.

So there are significant consequences right now for repeat offenders in terms of parole eligibility.

As for parole board policy, when they look at offenders with multiple or repeat offences, they take this very seriously. They do not ignore any subsequent offences. There is no free ride if you get subsequent offences. The parole board policies are quite explicit, and I've noted some examples on that page.

Criminal history is, front and centre, a concern for the parole board. Criminal history is nothing other than all the offences for which the offender was convicted. There's no distinction between consecutive and concurrent; it's all the offences for which they've been convicted.

I won't go into detail. You can see there other implications for repeat offenders in terms of board policy.

• 1555

Board policy is borne out if you turn to pages 4 and 5 and look at the parole statistics for sex offences. Here I haven't been able to break out multiple sex offences. The distinction we have made here is sex offences versus non-sex offences. But you can see from this that sex offenders are treated more seriously than non-violent offenders by the parole board. So if you overlay on top of that the board's policy about multiple offences, it can lead you to the conclusion that the board already is quite serious about these people.

The parole grant rate for sex offenders for day parole is very similar to the rate for other offenders, but for full parole, the grant rate for sex offenders is much lower than the grant rate for non-violent offenders, for example. Non-schedule offenders means non-violent offenders, basically.

The other point I'd highlight there is that sex offenders on average serve a much greater proportion of their sentence in custody before they're granted parole. It's one thing to look at how many of them get paroled, but it's important to look at when they get it in the sentence. Across the board, whether it's day parole or full parole, sex offenders serve a longer period of time in custody than non-sex offenders.

Lastly, looking at page 5—and this may seem surprising to some—sex offenders in general do very well on parole, in terms of completing the parole without any incident and in terms of completing the parole without a further offence. As you can see, the day parole success rate is around 90%, and the full parole success rate is around 85%. I give you those figures without attaching any value judgment to them, other than to say these are very high rates of success, and they compare, as you can see, very favourably to other offenders who are released.

Turning back to page 2, I want to touch briefly on our best estimate of the impact of Bill C-251 in terms of the inmate population and associated costs, again simply to provide you with this information. We looked at sex offenders who we thought would be captured by these measures, and the best estimate was that it would add an additional 5.4 years to the sentence of each one. Overall the sentence length would increase in general by about 68%.

We've done a very quick calculation of the costs associated with that. The only point I would make here is to bear in mind that these costs do compound, which is to say it's not a straight mathematical addition. If you're keeping more offenders inside for longer, the numbers compound over the years, so the figures do become quite high.

The last point I want to make there is that we should not lose sight of the fact that there's an impact on the provinces and territories with this bill. It touches on all sexual assault convictions, and as you see in here, many of the prison sentences received are provincial sentences. Our best guess is that this could have a significant impact on the provinces and territories in terms of their inmate population. To date there has not been an opportunity to consult with them in terms of both policy and correctional management. It's just we should not lose sight of the fact that there is a provincial side to that part of the bill.

I'll turn to murder. I'm looking at page 1 of the bullet points. The first thing we did was try to get a fix on how many offenders we were talking about. We looked at trying to divide the population into offenders who have committed multiple murder as part of one series of events, if you like, versus those who have committed murders over a period of time—there's been a pause and there's no connection between the events. We called those the repeat murderers, simply to try to distinguish this population. Those are the numbers you see at the top.

I want to emphasize the points you see about the current sentencing for repeat murderers. Mr. Daubney has touched on some of this. It's very important, in the second bullet point there, to remember paragraph 745(b) of the Criminal Code. This is the law right now. It says if you already have a murder conviction and you get a second murder conviction, and that second one is for second-degree, you will be treated as though it's a first-degree murder. Your parole eligibility will go automatically to 25 years on that second murder conviction, even if in law it's a second-degree murder conviction. So the code already recognizes and treats very seriously any subsequent murder conviction.

• 1600

As Mr. Daubney has noted, the government excluded multiple murderers from the 15-year review process in 1997. Mr. Daubney has also touched on the fact that with a repeat murderer, bear in mind the parole ineligibility clock starts all over again each time, so in a sense the periods are added consecutively.

The second-last point on that page refers to Canada's sentencing scheme for murderers in relation to other countries. If I could ask you to turn to the table that is towards the back of the package, we looked at a number of countries, based on available research and those that would answer our phone calls.

You'll see on page 2 of the chart that in relation to first-degree murders, the average parole ineligibility in these countries is 9.5 years, whereas Canada's parole ineligibility is 25 years, so more than double. As the note indicates, there is the possibility of 15-year review for this category, so we shouldn't lose sight of that. We can talk about some of the numbers on that if you like, but you can see that the eligibility in law in Canada is already more than twice as tough as in most of these other countries.

In terms of the actual average time served by these people before they're released, again you see the average of other countries is 14.3 years, and in Canada it's 28.4. So Canada's system for first-degree murders is quite severe by international standards as it stands right now.

In terms of parole statistics for murderers.... I won't go into the parole board policies, because many of the same issues pertain. Again, they take repeat offences extremely seriously. Nothing is ignored. In terms of their parole statistics, on page 8 you'll see a very high grant rate for day parole for murderers and an extremely low grant rate for full parole for murderers. It's a little counterintuitive. These people are day paroled at a high rate. You'll see from the stats at the bottom of the page that they do very well on day parole. The board becomes very cautious when it comes to full parole for this group, though. That's one of the logical conclusions I have to come to, based on that very low grant rate when it comes to full parole.

On page 9, we've given as best we can some completion data—success rates, if you like—for murderers. It's a little hard to measure, because a murderer who's on full parole in a sense never completes it. He or she is on it for life. That's why I put at the top of the page “completions”, in quotation marks. That simply reflects the percentage who are out and doing fine, but they will be on that forever. There is no completion point.

In terms of estimated impacts of this aspect of the bill, I'd say a couple of things. First of all, on the first part of clause 2, which is on life sentences and definite sentences, I want to be very clear that the current law also covers this. This was, again, part of the reforms from 1995. A person serving a life sentence who receives a new definite term is required to serve the parole ineligibility period of that new definite term. By definition, that new definite term is concurrent, because as we know, you can't in Canada have a consecutive life sentence. But nonetheless, the lifer will serve the parole ineligibility of the new definite term.

In terms of the second aspect of clause 2, which is life on life for the repeat murderer, our best estimate is that the average length of incarceration for the repeat murderer, the sequential murderer, would jump from roughly 31 years in custody to 69 years, which is quite a significant jump. For those murderers who commit multiple murders as part of a single event, the average length of incarceration would jump from about 19 years to 45 years before they could be considered for parole. Again, when you look at these figures, you have to take into account that they do compound. It's not straight addition.

• 1605

The very last thing I'll say, with your indulgence, is about the very last page of facts and figures and some stats from the American system. The American system has very much adopted a non-discretionary mandatory sentencing and parole system. That's been their policy and law now for over a decade, and I think you'll see from that page the consequences of that: massive, massive incarceration and massive costs associated with that incarceration.

At the same time, the crime rates have actually been going down. I want to emphasize that based on the research literature, there is no direct cause and effect between crime rates and incarceration rates. One can be up and the other can be down. There is no logical connection for you to say crime rates are down because incarceration rates are up. That's just not the case.

In the American experience, certainly the research shows that mandatory sentencing and parole policies have been a tremendous failure, and it now seems that's becoming more broadly known in the popular media as well. I have copies, if people are interested, of an article in Time magazine in February entitled “A Get-Tough Policy That Failed”:

    Mandatory sentencing was once America's law-and-order panacea. Here's why it's not working.

I also have copies of a three-page article in the Sunday New York Times of February 28 on mandatory sentencing with respect to drug offences. Again, it makes the same point that the consequences have really been quite disastrous, with no benefit to public safety. That's the most important point.

Having said that, Mr. Daubney and I would be happy to answer any questions you have.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Campbell.

I'd also like to welcome to the table Ms. Guarnieri.

What I propose to do, Ms. Guarnieri, is we'll conduct our questioning, and then after all the members of the official committee have been exhausted, I would invite you to pose any questions you may like as well.

Ms. Albina Guarnieri (Mississauga East, Lib.): Actually, Mr. Chair, as we agreed, I won't ask questions, but I would like to reserve the right to respond in writing to their brief.

The Chair: As you like.

Ms. Albina Guarnieri: Thank you.

The Chair: Perhaps it might be helpful for us to have a copy of your response as well.

Ms. Albina Guarnieri: Oh, absolutely.

The Chair: Mr. Abbott.

Mr. Jim Abbott (Kootenay—Columbia, Ref.): Thank you.

The Chair: A seven-minute round, sir.

Mr. Jim Abbott: Mr. Daubney, taking a look at page 6 of your presentation, the second-to-last paragraph reads:

    These citations may give the Committee some guidance as to how the Supreme Court might measure the changes proposed. [...] The more they depart from these observations, the less likely they are to be upheld.

I suggest to you that to many people walking down Sparks Street, or Granville Street in Vancouver, or Yonge Street in Toronto, or indeed the smaller towns, this indeed is the problem. The problem is that there is a disconnect between where Canadians want to go and where the Supreme Court wants to go, and the Supreme Court's intimidation of the whole judicial system is really exceptionally unfortunate.

As for the concept of a crushing sentence, I suppose many Canadians see a crushing sentence as appropriate when they take a look at the crushed victims or the families of the victims.

There are just so many assumptions made here.

Ms. Campbell, at the bottom of page 2 of your presentation, you say:

    The additional time added to the sentences of these offenders would range from 17 days to 27 years, with the average increase per offender being 5.4 years.

I suggest, with the greatest respect, that that may be a very bad assumption, by virtue of the fact that a judge, being an intelligent person, would be able to take a look at the effect of this legislation and temper the individual sentences that will then add up to a total, in a totally different light from what they would presently do, if you understand what I'm saying.

You focus on the issue of costs. I focus on the issue of safety. I focus on the issue of the safety of the streets. I recognize that in terms of sentencing, we in Canada have to be prepared to take a look at non-violent offenders, people who clearly cross the border of criminal law and are found guilty of criminal acts. Well, there are those from whom society must be protected, and that is what this bill is about.

• 1610

I'm more than prepared to take a look at the issue of the appropriateness of sentencing and even at the issue of whether it makes sense to keep non-violent offenders incarcerated for extended periods of time. I'm absolutely prepared to take a look at that. But in the case of protection of society and those most vulnerable in our society, that, in very simple terms, is where this is going.

I ask you, please, to excuse the sense of frustration that perhaps I'm coming across with. Mr. Daubney, on page 3 of your presentation, you do make the point that this bill is a reincarnation of something that was in front of Parliament before. Indeed, I would suggest that all members of all parties—this is a non-partisan statement—as they sit in their constituency offices and are confronted with the concerns of their constituents, are coming to Parliament with private members' bills that are not getting the blessing or the sanction of the justice department or the Solicitor General's department, because they are bringing the common sense of the ordinary citizen to the floor of Parliament. To that extent, I compliment Ms. Guarnieri, and I also note the overwhelming response there was in the vote for this coming forward.

So with the greatest respect, I find the presentation that has been made on behalf of the department to be one of legalese and a disconnect with where the average Canadian citizen is coming from.

Mr. David Daubney: Mr. Chair, I'm sure the honourable member appreciates the difficulties we have, as officials, in engaging in a political debate, particularly as it relates to comments about the role of the Supreme Court of Canada. I'd simply point out in this regard that in the cases I referred the committee to, the court is interpreting what Parliament itself has now codified in the Criminal Code as the principles of sentencing. And they include that totality principle: when there is a series of consecutive sentences, the total sentence should not be unduly long or harsh. Parliament agreed in Bill C-41, as I said—I think after Madam Guarnieri's initial bill was introduced—that this would be the law of the land.

So in fairness, the member should recognize that this was Parliament's view in 1995. It became effective in 1996, and when the court handed down its decision, really the court was referring to language that's almost identical to the language that Parliament adopted.

Ms. Mary Campbell: Could I just add a couple of things, Mr. Chair?

In terms of courts being able to reduce the individual sentences in order to still comport with the proper overall total so that it wouldn't be contrary to the charter or otherwise in jeopardy, I would just add from my perspective that that's a very difficult thing to do. There are tariffs out there now. There's a tremendous amount of case law on sentencing, and it's well understood from province to province what the normal penalty would be for a particular offence. So to be able to somehow now start adjusting those and reducing them, that would not be an easy thing to do.

Second, you made reference to our focus or my focus on costs, and I do want to clarify that I'm absolutely not focused on costs at all. We could have a long discussion about that. I'm simply trying to provide the committee with the best estimate of what would be involved. How people use that, respond to it, or react to it.... And any policy decisions made on that basis are entirely up to Parliament of course. It's just, if it's of assistance, to give a basic idea of what the impact would be.

But absolutely, my department and I are completely focused on public safety as the number one priority in any circumstance.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Abbott. You're right on the mark.

Mr. Brien.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien (Témiscamingue, BQ): I would like to know whether consecutive sentences will make judges decide to reduce sentences and whether we'll wind up with a similar end result.

• 1615

In practice, is there a strong likelihood that shorter sentences will be handed down in order to arrive at a similar total sentence? Aren't judges now implicitly taking this into consideration?

[English]

Mr. David Daubney: The answer to that is probably yes. That is the practical exercise they go through every day in busy courtrooms. They really come up with a global sentence that they think is just and proportionate to the circumstances of the case before them. Of course they bear in mind the precedents and some cases in some provinces as starting points that appellate courts have suggested for certain kinds of sentences. But they do go through that kind of exercise, and really that's what the Supreme Court has said they should be doing.

I'm not sure if that was getting at the heart of your question or not.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: What would be the impact if we wound up with the same sentences? For example, this could lead to less serious individual penalties than previously. Would that have an impact on cases involving only one charge?

[English]

Mr. David Daubney: As I indicated in my written comments, not my oral ones, there's a risk that judges will try to get around any mandatory direction by maybe not giving the sentences for sexual assault that they might otherwise—and that they perhaps should, based on the facts—if they want to avoid what they would view as an unjust global sentence, particularly in a case where someone is already serving a sentence and the mandatory consecutive nature of the other is being added by reason of this amendment. So there is some risk that there would not be sufficient denunciation attached to sexual offences, for example.

That's my view. I don't know whether Mary has anything to add.

Ms. Mary Campbell: I would share that view. As I indicated a moment earlier, there are fairly well-established case-law guidelines for sentences, and I fear that because judges are very cognizant of their obligation under the Criminal Code to respect the totality principle in sentencing, they would either continue with the current individual sentences and potentially breach the totality principle in terms of the overall penalty, or in fact be forced to reduce the individual sentences so as to have a total sentence that would still comport with the principle of totality. So your question raises a fair concern.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: That's all for the moment.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. MacKay

Mr. Peter MacKay (Pictou—Antigonish—Guysborough, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I want to thank both of our witnesses for their presentation.

Please don't take my remarks personally. You've been giving us information and statistics. The difficulty I have with the information before us is that this is very sterile, far removed, dehumanized information that we have.

I have both defended and prosecuted murder cases. What we are talking about and what this bill is aimed at are the absolute guttersnipes and scumbags on the streets of this country. I don't want to be too animated here. I want to keep this on the issue.

One of the things that's been left out of your presentation is that anybody convicted of these types of offences is eligible for parole within a third to a sixth of their time. In terms of sentencing, we're talking about after-the-fact justice. We're talking about after the harm is done, the life is taken, and tears are shed. Due process has taken place in the courtroom, there has been a sentencing process for first- or second-degree, evidence has been examined, proof has been found beyond a reasonable doubt, and there has been access to all sorts of considerations in coming to a sentence, or if it's in the case of a first-degree, there is a maximum sentence of 25 years.

• 1620

A comment was made about suffering and denunciation. I don't think there can be enough denunciation for these types of offences. When it comes to murder victims and sexual assault victims, we all know—the statistics bear this out quite clearly—that women and children are most often the victims, the most vulnerable. The deep emotional scars in particular that come from sexual assaults are incalculable. You can't put figures on those. The families who are survivors of the victims, again, don't factor in to any of these statistics.

I think you can sense, from some of the remarks you're hearing, frustration. And as I said, I qualify these, because they're not aimed at you; they're aimed at a justice system that sometimes tries to categorize or put very narrow statistics before this committee, when the reality is that the effects of this legislation are so far-reaching.

Another thing has to be put on the record here. Sex offenders, when they are convicted, are in protective custody. They're treated differently from other offenders. They may be in maximum security and they may not be released as often, but I say damn straight, it's a good thing they're not released as quickly, because there's a higher rate of recidivism, there is less chance of rehabilitation, and they should be there longer.

I guess you're having a hard time distinguishing whether I support this particular bill. As I said, we are dealing here with the very top of the criminal food chain. The types of offenders who would be affected by this legislation are the worst, the absolute worst. I hate even bringing that despicable name, Olson, into this, but that's the type of person we're dealing with—the Bernardos; the Olsons.

So if we can keep people in jail and keep that accountability level there as a deterrent, and if that's the message that comes out of this type of legislative change, I am just at a loss as to why, as legislators, we wouldn't do that.

Mr. Daubney, you're right to say the courts have interpreted the legislation they have been given. That's absolutely their prerogative. That's what they are charged to do. Therefore it comes back to us to change the legislation.

Ms. Guarnieri is to be applauded for this initiative and for her courage and her stick-to-it-iveness, given the amount of backlash she's received from her own party. She's to be applauded for it, and I support her 100%, as do many Canadians and as do police officers.

The police perspective is very important here, because in all of our justice system, aside from the victims, it's the police officers who are that thin line between you and I, when we're safe in our homes, and those who are out there preying on the general population—the murderers and the rapists.

This is a bit of a rant, but I just find it very hard to express in any more adamant terms my support for this initiative. We should be trying to toughen the laws when it comes to this type of offender. All of the statistics in the world that suggest these people can be rehabilitated I just don't accept. I just do not accept them.

You've talked about how the statistics in the United States show that the crime rate has decreased, even though they've had to incarcerate more people. I say put the emphasis on the more violent and the more repugnant and despicable criminal acts. Although that desired effect may not show up in the statistics, for that one offender who's committed that act and has to serve the time, the effect is certainly felt.

The Chair: Is there a comment on Mr. MacKay's comment?

Ms. Mary Campbell: I wonder if I could just say a couple of things, Mr. Chair.

And don't take them personally, Mr. MacKay.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

• 1625

Ms. Mary Campbell: As Mr. Daubney says, I'm here as a public servant to help the committee in any way I can. Much of it sounds dry, but of course it is my role to simply provide facts and figures, and as I say, they're to be used as Parliament sees fit.

So if I may be incredibly lawyerly and dry, the maximum sentence for first-degree murder is life. I can never let this go by. The penalty is life with parole ineligibility at 25 years.

You mentioned that sex offenders are incarcerated in protective custody. I'm not sure anything much turns on this, but I would say, in fairness to my colleagues in the Correctional Service of Canada, that actually many of them are not in protective custody any more. There's been an effort to try to integrate sex offenders into the general population. That's seen as a better approach in the long run to protecting society and trying to reform some of these people where it's possible. So there has been a shift in policy.

You said the measures would touch the high-end offenders, and you then described them. Certainly that's true, but I would point out that, if I may say this in a way that won't be misinterpreted, it will affect all of the offenders who come under this heading, and they're not all high-end. Not everyone in the system is the worst offender. There are people in there who, yes, have committed horrible crimes; there's no question. I don't feel sorry for them, and I'm not asking anyone else to. But there are many gradations. There are many stories behind these events, these terribly sad events.

They're not all the worst offender. The problem with mandatory sentencing and parole provisions is that they treat everyone as the worst offender. That goes to the heart of the problem.

One of the other consequences of mandatory sentencing and parole in the United States has been the dramatic impact on minority groups. Mandatory policies unfortunately tend to reinforce systemic discrimination. That's something you need to keep in the back of your mind. In Canada, aboriginal Canadians are very sadly overrepresented in the custodial population generally, and sadly overrepresented in some of the categories of offenders that would be touched by this bill. Again, the evidence tends to suggest that mandatory policies reinforce that discrimination rather than allowing judges or correctional or parole authorities to tailor their decisions to the particular case.

I hope that's helpful. Again, we're here to be helpful, and there are certain things that are absolutely Parliament's business and not ours.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I think Mr. Abbott mentioned—

The Chair: Mr. MacKay, I think we'll have to come back in round two.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I'm sorry; sure.

The Chair: Mr. John McKay.

Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, thank you for your presentations.

Mr. Daubney, I want to go to the last paragraph on page 6 of your presentation, which you didn't spend a great deal of time on. It says:

    To make consecutive sentences mandatory for all sexual assault convictions would build a rigidity into the system that might well have unintended negative consequences.

Then you expand upon that. In fact you argue that discretion would be downloaded from the judiciary to the prosecutors if this kind of consecutive sentencing were in place. Can you amplify on that comment and on other things that you see as unintended consequences of this proposal?

Mr. David Daubney: Our system runs reasonably effectively on the basis of giving the discretion that Parliament has to our judiciary. I'm always concerned about taking that away from them, because it usually ends up being somewhere else, either in the hands of a police officer considering whether or not to lay charges or in the hands of a crown attorney deciding whether to prosecute them and deciding on the nature of the charges.

As I said in response to a member from the Bloc Québécois, I'm concerned with the fact that, particularly with level-one sexual assault, which is all this bill deals with, 48% of those sentences now don't get prison time. It reflects the—

Mr. John McKay: I'm sorry; I missed that. You said 48% don't get prison?

Mr. David Daubney: They don't attract prison now, according to the data from the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics. I don't think that necessarily reflects lenient sentencing. Rather, it reflects the fact that the situations cover a wide range of territory, and a lot of it is low-end stuff. They're not in fact all the absolute scum of the earth.

• 1630

Given that there is that sentencing pattern now, that could be exacerbated by a provision such as this, which would provide that were the judge to give a carceral term, it would have to be consecutive to other sentences.

Mr. John McKay: So what would happen with a crown attorney? Would there be a further emphasis then on plea bargaining—

Mr. David Daubney: Yes.

Mr. John McKay: —in effect taking it out of the public realm and putting it into a discretionary realm between the crown attorney and the defence attorney, and having some ironic effects out of all that?

Mr. David Daubney: It could, particularly with an offence such as sexual assault, to which society attaches so much stigma. The consequences to someone being convicted of that are severe. We know that defence counsel now go to great lengths to not have their clients convicted, including attacking the victim's credibility and so on. So I think we—

Mr. John McKay: So arguably it could even be counterproductive.

Mr. David Daubney: I think it could be. I guess that's really what I'm saying, bottom line.

Mr. John McKay: In your own obscure way, you're saying that.

Mr. David Daubney: Sorry.

Mr. John McKay: I have a limited amount of time, so I'd like to pursue that, but I'm not going to.

My honourable colleague frequently.... Her most significant phrase with respect to the promotion of this bill is that it's time to stop volume discounts, or phrases to that effect. On the face of it, that has an attraction. Who can be in favour of volume discounts? That doesn't make a lot of sense.

But I'm looking, Ms. Campbell, at the first page of your submission, where you say the median custodial sentence length is about 50% longer in multiple-charge cases. So I guess the question is, is it half full or is it half empty? There doesn't appear to be a volume discount in the case of multiple charges. Can you expand on that comment?

Ms. Mary Campbell: The statistics and the evidence show exactly this point. As you say, no one would be in favour of volume discounts, but the evidence doesn't support that there are volume discounts. The fact is, the numbers show that the median sentence is 50% longer in multiple-charge cases—that is, of all multiple-charge cases, on average, the median sentence is that much longer.

That's not to say there are not cases where there are multiple charges and a concurrent sentence is given, but I trust that's given based on the judge's appreciation of the entire situation, the circumstances of the crime, the victim, the offender, and everything else. I have enormous respect for and enormous confidence in judges, so I have enormous confidence in judges having the discretion to make these decisions.

The fact that the numbers show that with multiple-charge cases, the sentences are that much longer indicates that something is going on. Judges recognize that they're dealing with multiple charges, and they are responding appropriately by being more severe in those cases.

I would certainly share the concern—and this is what has happened in the United States.... Judicial discretion has been replaced by prosecutorial discretion, which does tend to be not as public as judicial discretion, and reduces judges, in many cases, to simply being a rubber stamp to what's put before them.

Mr. John McKay: But you all appreciate Mr. Abbott's concern that there appears to be a disconnect between the Canadian public's sense of what's fair and right and the sense that this is a closed shop among lawyers, judges, and people in charge of custody.

Ms. Mary Campbell: I wish we could get the public far more involved in the sentencing and parole process.

The polling we've done, both in Mr. Daubney's department and at the Solicitor General's, shows that any time the public has more information, they're far more understanding; they have a far greater appreciation of why decisions were made in particular cases. Far too often of course the public is reading about cases or hearing about sensational cases based on very limited information. As someone who works on the inside, when I read some of the things that are reported, with all due respect to the media, I would be puzzled too. I would be confused.

• 1635

Mr. John McKay: We have the same experience in politics.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. John McKay: How much time do I have left?

The Chair: You're out of time.

Mr. Reynolds.

Mr. John Reynolds (West Vancouver—Sunshine Coast, Ref.): Ms. Campbell, on the very last page, you say America spends approximately $100 billion per year. Is that federal, state, and everything—the total U.S. budget for the justice system?

Ms. Mary Campbell: Yes, I believe that is total, everything.

Mr. John Reynolds: What would the total budget be in Canada?

Ms. Mary Campbell: The federal corrections system is about $1 billion, the provincial corrections system is about $1 billion, and the grand total for the criminal justice system I think is around $10 billion. Anyone in the room can correct me on that. I'd be happy—

Mr. John Reynolds: I think that's accurate. I just wanted to confirm that.

What's interesting is that means we're spending about the same dollars per capita in Canada as they are in the United States. Yet in Canada we have 129 people per 100,000 in jail, and the Americans have 645 per 100,000 in jail. That's a massive difference. Where are we spending the additional money? Do we have three times as many bureaucrats and they have three times as many prisoners?

Voices: Oh, oh!

Ms. Mary Campbell: No.

Mr. John Reynolds: Where are we spending that money that they're not spending it?

Ms. Mary Campbell: I can tell you, based on my professional observations, some of the differences. I've had the opportunity to visit one of the more infamous American penitentiaries, Angola State Penitentiary.

By and large, the American systems spend far less on programming and rehabilitative efforts. That's a big difference. Canada does make an effort to do something with the offender while we have them, to make them not the same person they were when they came into the system. That's ultimately the best protection for society, if we can return the offender a better person than when he or she came in. So we spend more money on that generally.

Mr. John Reynolds: How much more? Do you know?

Ms. Mary Campbell: I would have to get those figures for you.

I would guess that we probably spend somewhat more on labour costs, but again, I would want to verify that before I would endorse that wholly.

Many American prisons are much larger, so your per-unit cost, if you like, can be less when you're operating a massive facility. Angola State Penitentiary, for example, has 5,100 inmates in it. A large penitentiary in Canada has 500 inmates. So there are different economies of scale.

Mr. John Reynolds: Yes. I went through every penitentiary in Canada and most of the ones in the States when we did a report for this committee back in the 1970s. But I find it astounding, when I read all this material, the differences. We spend the same amount of dollars per capita, and yet they have six times as many prisoners in jail. I would guess that if we could really find out the facts, they would show that there's a lot bigger bureaucracy here than they have down there.

Ms. Mary Campbell: But part of those numbers are not just custodial numbers. Those are the other—

Mr. John Reynolds: That was the total. I'm talking in the total justice system.

Ms. Mary Campbell: Yes, police and everything else. I can't speak to differences in terms of police and court costs.

Mr. John Reynolds: But it means we're spending the same in Canada as in the U.S., and yet they have a much bigger system for looking after that problem.

My last question is this. I want to speed this up. The sooner we get it back to the House, the better. I just want to ask David if he'd make the same speech he made today if he were sitting here as a member.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. David Daubney: I simply say—and I hesitate to say anything much—that when I did chair this committee, we spent a year visiting prisons and looking into the sentencing system. We produced an all-party report without any dissent that has stood the test of time reasonably well. It shows, and it certainly demonstrated to me, that the more people do learn the facts about how our criminal justice system works, the better they feel about it. It's part of the job of people in public life to help do that public education role, rather than contributing to myths that are out there now.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Daubney.

Mr. Brien.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: Thank you. I have nothing to add.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. MacKay.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Thank you.

Well, I don't know about myths. I do know there is a rumour going around that we're going to have 50% of the prison population back on the street by the year 2000. I'm hoping that's a myth. That may jade the statistics somewhat.

• 1640

You talked about proportionality, and the whole totality principle is something I have trouble with when it comes to violence. If an arsonist burned down a whole neighbourhood, 25 houses, and was charged a count of arson for each house that was burnt down, if they were given eight years for every house, they would do eight years total for all the houses that were burned down.

When it comes to human lives, what this amounts to is that if you kill a certain number of people and you get a 25-year sentence, that's it. That's a lot, but that's 25 years concurrent time for all the people you've killed.

A voice: [Inaudible—Editor].

Mr. Peter MacKay: You'll get your chance to ask the questions, believe me. I've seen how it works around here. You'll get your chance.

You get 25 years for each act, but it's served concurrently. What Ms. Guarnieri's bill would do is say no, there's accountability for each life you've taken—each life. The issue of overall culpability and the individual effect on each person who had a loved one taken away is not really calculated into the sentence if it's all served at one time.

There's a recent example. A gentleman by the name of Edward Samuel Schwartz was sentenced to 14 years in prison for choking a woman by the name of Wendy Carroll. He received 14 years for robbery, 10 years for assault, and three years for possession of a dangerous weapon. What's most disturbing is that he had been released from prison from a life sentence for two murders that he committed in 1973. In fairness, he's going to serve the remainder of that life sentence concurrently.

So he's going to serve 14 years in prison for this murder that he's committed, the assault, the robbery, and the possession of the weapon—14 years total. That's it; 14 years total. It's all stacked up. It's all counted at the same time, even though those criminal acts were committed separate and apart from the other two murders he committed.

So when you talk about cost.... I think the additional cost, on page 3 of your report, Ms. Campbell, is $47.7 million. I take it that's annual.

Ms. Mary Campbell: No.

Mr. Peter MacKay: No? It's $47.7 million over what period of time?

Ms. Mary Campbell: First of all, that pertains to sex offenders.

Mr. Peter MacKay: That's sex offenders only.

Ms. Mary Campbell: That's correct, and that is the additional cost that would be incurred for this group of affected offenders to serve the additional time that Bill C-251 would require. So it's not over a particular period of time. Collectively, this would be the additional cost, if applied on a snapshot basis to the current population.

Mr. Peter MacKay: My point is this. In terms of additional costs for incarceration and lengthier sentences, the 5.4-year average that it would bring about, I say terrific. If that's going to result in prevention and fewer Wendy Carrolls, I say let's spend the money. I'd far rather see the money spent there than on some of our other justice initiatives.

Ms. Mary Campbell: I have a couple of points.

It is a life sentence; it's not 25 years.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Okay.

Ms. Mary Campbell: You mentioned no accountability in terms of additional offences. Again, I don't think that's borne out by the legislation, the policy, or the practices. There is clearly accountability.

In terms of the scenario you've outlined, I don't have the judgments in front of me and I don't have the case particulars, but based on what you've said, this individual, if he has not already been, would be returned to custody. He would serve at least the parole ineligibility period on these new sentences. The fact that he incurred these new convictions while already subject to, not one, but two sentences would be viewed extremely seriously by the parole board at the end of that parole ineligibility period—extremely seriously.

Mr. Peter MacKay: That's 14 years for another life.

• 1645

Ms. Mary Campbell: I didn't understand that the 14 years was imposed for another life; I'm sorry.

Mr. Peter MacKay: He choked Wendy Carroll and received 14 years after having committed two other murders, so parole eligibility suggests that he's going to do fewer than 14 years.

Ms. Mary Campbell: No.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Yes.

Ms. Mary Campbell: He's been returned on a life sentence. Again, I don't have the facts of this case in front of me, but he has returned on a life sentence.

Mr. Peter MacKay: If it meant a life sentence, he never would have got out. Life does not mean life in this country, period. Show me somebody who's ever been in prison for life—served more than 25 years. I defy you.

Ms. Mary Campbell: Well, actually, there are many incidents of offenders who have served—

Mr. Peter MacKay: Well, dangerous offenders are in a different category.

Ms. Mary Campbell: —a lengthy period of time and many instances of offenders who have died in custody, but again, I can't engage in the discussion you would perhaps like to engage in, other than to say that someone who is subject to a life sentence remains subject to that sentence for their entire natural life. Where they receive a new definite sentence—in this case 14 years or whatever it might be—they will serve at least the parole ineligibility period on those new sentences and, as I say, will be viewed very seriously by the parole board should they ever choose to apply for parole again.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. MacKay.

Mr. Saada.

Mr. Jacques Saada (Brossard—La Prairie, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

If I may, I'll make two points very quickly, and then we'll get to the matter.

Mr. Abbott, you did state at the beginning in unequivocal terms that the people who are making the presentation today are motivated by financial management of these affairs, whereas you are motivated by public safety. Would you allow me, in all respect, to take exception to that? I take exception to that on a number of grounds, which I would not have enough time to elaborate on, but I would be pleased to debate with you any time on those, because it's an accusation that is very ill supported.

As for the second statement I would like to make, Mr. MacKay, also with all due respect, bringing in the issue of fifty-fifty around this table when we discuss these specific cases is very unfair. We have tried to explain numerous times in the House that no quota was set.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I'm sorry; I don't buy that.

The Chair: Order.

Mr. Jacques Saada: Excuse me. It's my turn now. Remember the comment you made? It's my turn.

Mr. Peter MacKay: It's not your time to lecture me.

Mr. Jacques Saada: It's my turn to speak. I'll use it the way I feel I should, okay?

In this case, the consideration was simply that when you have a chance to rehabilitate someone by offering him programs that are going to make him a better citizen, you in fact ensure public safety, and that's something worth looking into.

On the bill itself, isn't it true that as the Criminal Code stands now, there is a possibility for consecutive sentences?

Mr. David Daubney: Yes, indeed.

Mr. Jacques Saada: Isn't it true that as the Criminal Code stands now, there is a possibility of cumulative eligibility periods?

Ms. Mary Campbell: Yes.

Mr. Jacques Saada: Isn't it true that in the Criminal Code as it stands now, there is a possibility of sentencing to life, meaning life?

Mr. David Daubney: Yes.

Mr. Jacques Saada: So my question is, if you make it automatic, are you in fact trying to promote public safety by harsher penalties, or are you in fact questioning the ability of the judges to be devoted to public safety?

Mr. David Daubney: I don't know whether it's for us to look into the motivation of the sponsor of the bill really, but based on my experience with our criminal justice system, we can rely on our judiciary, governed by the purpose and principles that this Parliament has now set out in the Criminal Code, to look at all the circumstances before them and come to a fair and just sentence based on all those facts.

• 1650

When we take away their discretion to do that, it tends to be a negative experience. We base this observation in part on other countries that have done it, through rigid guidelines, systems, and so on. It does not result in just and fit sentences. The “three strikes and you're out” kind of regime does just the opposite.

Mr. Jacques Saada: Do I still have time?

The Chair: You're out of time, Mr. Saada.

Mr. Grose.

Mr. Ivan Grose (Oshawa, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all I'd like to correct some misconceptions. My honoured colleague here was under the assumption that sexual offenders are in protective custody in prison. They're not. And they have absolutely no problem at all if they can lift weights or play a good first base on the baseball team. They're accepted as nothing unusual.

About the life sentence and the fellow who violated his parole on the life sentence and then got 14 years, the 14 years is the least of his problems. He serves the time on that, he'll come up for parole eligibility—and I very much doubt he'd ever get it, but if he did on those sentences—he still has that life sentence hanging over his head. Any sensible parole board would say, “You violated it in the first place. We're not going to give you a second chance for another 10 or 15 years.”

And as for the claim that no one dies in prison, only last week I saw a facility where we are looking after poor old people who have been in prison for 30, 35, or 40 years. They're helpless. We'd rather let them go, but we can't; there's nowhere to put them. So the fallacy that you serve 25 years and out.... That is not true.

Before I become intemperate, maybe I should quit. I have a little time left, have I?

The Chair: Yes, you have a few minutes left, Mr. Grose.

Mr. Ivan Grose: As I think most everyone knows, I speak from experience when I speak about incarceration.

One of the things that skews our system is that we commit an awful lot of mentally unbalanced people to life terms. If you let them out after 25 or 30 years, they're still crazy. Someone who commits such a horrible thing as a murder in the commission of a crime where he intends to profit should serve a life sentence, but after 10 years, he doesn't even remember what the crime was or who he was. If you let him go, he may be rehabilitated or he may just be a different person altogether. But if you have a mentally unbalanced prisoner—and we have a lot of them—they are still mentally unbalanced when you let them out, regardless of when it is. They should be in a separate facility, and we should stop skewing the figures with them in the mix.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Grose.

Mr. Reynolds.

Mr. John Reynolds: I have just a short question. What year did we stop segregating all sexual offenders in our federal penitentiaries?

Ms. Mary Campbell: I'd have to check the dates in terms of the policies. I would say relatively recently, within the past five years.

Again, based on a lot of analysis and a lot of thinking, the goal always being to ensure the best possible protection of society, efforts started to be made to reintegrate the offender into, relatively speaking, a more normal environment, which can only be supportive of eventual reintegration. There's no question that there are still some sex offenders kept in protective custody, but there are many now who are integrated into the general population, men and women.

Mr. John Reynolds: So there still is protective custody for certain types of individuals all the time?

Ms. Mary Campbell: Oh, yes, absolutely.

Mr. John Reynolds: On Mr. Daubney's comments about judges and their discretion, I have a hard time accepting that, because I look at the case in Quebec last year where a judge took two men who brutally raped a woman and gave them a conditional sentence because they weren't from Canada originally—but they had been here nine and 11 years—and let them walk. I find that discretion is something that shouldn't be happening.

This committee will be discussing that somewhere along the line, on conditional sentencing. So I'm not totally supportive of what you say when you talk about the discretion of judges and the good job they're doing.

Mr. David Daubney: That's why we have courts of appeal, to deal with some of those what seem to be egregious decisions. I think that's what happened in that case, as I recall.

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Bakopanos.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos (Ahuntsic, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'm very interested in the recidivism rates, because that's the crux of what we're talking about, and those are the cases that usually make the front page of the newspapers and where there's the biggest public outcry, as to why they're let out.

• 1655

If I look at the document you've presented to us—and I'm reading from page 9 of Mrs. Campbell's document—I just want to make sure I have things straight and these are the right figures. You talk about full parole and successful completions. When you talk about successful completions at 93%, you mean people who have not reoffended at all once they're out.

Ms. Mary Campbell: That's correct. These are people subject to life sentences. They haven't completed in the sense that they're done, but they're out, there has been no breach of condition, and there's been no reoffence whatsoever.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Okay. On your second category—revocations, conditions, and others—which is 5.1%, would you elaborate a little bit on what you mean?

Ms. Mary Campbell: Those are people subject to murder sentences who have been released on full parole, but that full parole was revoked at some point during that time period because they breached the conditions. Every offender who goes out is subject to conditions, and they may be returned if they have breached the condition, for example, to not associate with certain people, to not consume drugs or alcohol, and that order of thing.

The “other” is in there rather mysteriously and simply to be precise. Some people in that 5% have been revoked because of old charges that were brought in. So it had nothing to do with their behaviour while they were on parole; these were old charges. It also, rather poorly perhaps, captures those people who have in fact died while they were out on conditional release.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Okay, and revocations and offences are people who have...?

Ms. Mary Campbell: —have actually committed a new offence.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Based on their parole conditions or both?

Ms. Mary Campbell: No, that's purely a new criminal offence while in the community.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: So that's 1.8%.

Ms. Mary Campbell: That's correct.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Out of.... It says here:

    1,677 offenders who have been convicted of a murder offence have been released into the community since January 1, 1974. Of these, 11 have committed another murder while in the community. These figures yield a recidivism rate of 0.66%; i.e. less than 1 in 100 murdered again. Ten of these offenders were on parole and one was on unescorted temporary absence.

So the 1.8% refers to the 1,677?

Ms. Mary Campbell: No, not necessarily. I would have to get the actual population number for the 1.8%. Those are murderers who have been released and have committed any new offence. So in that 1.8%, it may be something such as theft, assault, or anything.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Not necessarily the types of cases Mr. McKay was referring to?

Ms. Mary Campbell: No.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Okay.

Ms. Mary Campbell: The latter figure that you referred to, the 0.66%, is what we call murder on murder: an offender who's already serving a murder sentence is released and is convicted of another murder.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: How does our recidivism rate compare with that of the other countries you mention in your study? If I read properly the comparison table that you've made, we have a higher average, 25 years instead of 10—let's say 10 to round it off. How does our recidivism rate compare to that of other countries?

Ms. Mary Campbell: I don't have an easy answer for you.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: I'd like to have that.

Ms. Mary Campbell: I can try to see if I can get some international comparisons.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: I didn't want to put you on the spot, but it would be interesting to know that.

Ms. Mary Campbell: Absolutely. I'll see what I can get for you.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Are there any further questions? Mr. MacKay.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I would request that the committee also get figures as to how many people in this country currently serving time for murder would have actually served 25 years or more. Could we get a figure for that?

Ms. Mary Campbell: The chart that indicates average time served for first-degree murders indicates already 28 years. So there are already persons who are well beyond the 25-year point. That figure includes, of course, persons convicted of murder prior to 1976 and who are captured under the new regime. So some of them have served very long periods. There's one, apparently, who has served 45 years.

Mr. Peter MacKay: And would that include having been released and sentenced to more time for offences committed on the outside while on parole?

Ms. Mary Campbell: No, that 28 years reflects average time served before being released at all.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Okay, so continuous custody for 45 years.

Ms. Mary Campbell: Correct.

Mr. Peter MacKay: That's one that you're aware of?

Ms. Mary Campbell: That's one that sticks in my mind, because of the 45 years being so long. I could try to get the actual break-up for you, if you would like, for first-degree murders.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Okay, please.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. MacKay.

Mr. John McKay, very quickly, and then Ms. Guarnieri for the final word.

• 1700

Mr. John McKay: I just wanted to go to your chart again, the one on life sentences for first-degree murder and the international equivalents.

For better or for worse, our national superiority complex means we always compare ourselves to the Americans. Apparently, in the United States, life means life. I'm looking at your United States chart, life without parole, and life means life works out to 29 years. Is that a correct statement?

Ms. Mary Campbell: Yes. As you're pointing out, it's hard to compare to the United States, because some first-degree murder sentences result in execution, some result in—

Mr. John McKay: That's a nice phrase, “Exit due to death”.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Jim Abbott: They don't keep them around; that's what she means.

Ms. Mary Campbell: What we tried to do was roughly sort out the United States' first-degree murder population into a group that's comparable in terms of parole possibility. So you see they serve roughly 18.5 years before being released. And those subject to perhaps a more rigid regime, one might say, serve 29 years before their exit due to whatever factor.

Mr. John McKay: So gentle, compassionate Canada, mush people that we are, has a system where you serve life for a similar sort of offence and you're only eligible for parole at 25 years. We have a 0.6-year difference in the sentencing, the actual time served? Is that a correct statement?

Ms. Mary Campbell: That would appear to be, from these numbers.

Mr. John McKay: Really? That surprises me.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McKay.

Ms. Guarnieri.

Ms. Albina Guarnieri: I apologize for breaking my promise to you that I wouldn't ask a question, but I just have one very quick question for Ms. Campbell.

You stated earlier that the evidence doesn't support that there are volume discounts for murderers. If someone kills my entire family, and 10 minutes prior he's killed my neighbour, does the sentence change?

Ms. Mary Campbell: The individual will receive a life sentence for each of the offences for which they are convicted. Where the offences are committed that close in time, they're going to be subject to imprisonment for the rest of their natural life.

I'm trying to tell you in response that they receive a sentence for each of those offences. Where they're that close in time, the impact will be that they will.... You can't serve two lives. They will be serving one sentence for the rest of their life, because that's all they can live. They will have a record for multiple life sentences for multiple murders. Should they ever choose to apply for parole or any form of clemency, that full record of conviction for each offence will be there.

Ms. Albina Guarnieri: I have just one last quick comment.

Wendy Carroll didn't get her throat cut in prison. She got her throat slashed on the street while showing these two predators a house. So life sentences are a myth in this country.

The Chair: Ms. Guarnieri, we're getting into specific cases again, which is a little awkward for our witnesses.

Ms. Albina Guarnieri: Anyway, I promised I'd keep it short.

The Chair: There being no further questions, I appreciate the frankness and certainly the depth of your presentations and your briefs as well. Thank you very much for being here.

Members of the committee, I'm just looking for some direction from you before you leave. Going back to impaired driving, we're scheduled to start a little later tomorrow, at 4 o'clock, because of the anticipated new youth justice bill and then the comments of various opposition critics on it. Would your preference be to go from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. and then adjourn, or would your preference be to go from 4 p.m. until we're finished with the bill, keeping in mind that we've also reserved next Wednesday, because of the slow slogging on that bill so far?

You'd prefer 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. and then we will adjourn and take it up again on the 17th?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: Okay, thank you very much. I appreciate it.

The meeting is adjourned.