JURI Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA JUSTICE ET DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, February 25, 1998

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[English]

The Chair (Ms. Shaughnessy Cohen (Windsor—St. Clair, Lib.)): This is February 25 and we're still working on the DNA legislation, Bill C-3, but also Bill C-104 from the first session of the last Parliament on forensic DNA testing.

Our witness today is from the Canadian College of Medical Geneticists, Dr. Peter Bridge, who's a member of the board of directors. Welcome, Dr. Bridge. I know you have a few things to tell us, so we would like to hear from you and then we'll have questions.

Dr. Peter Bridge (Member, Board of Directors, Canadian College of Medical Geneticists): Thank you.

Last year we submitted a document to the policy analyst branch regarding Bill C-104. I have resubmitted this document for reproduction. I don't dwell unnecessarily on that because for the most part I think a lot of our comments were addressed, at least as far as I can see, in the revised version that has become Bill C-3. We are appreciative of that.

There are a few further comments, however, and there's an additional one-page document. I'm not sure if you actually have that yet or not.

The Chair: It will be distributed tomorrow when it has been translated.

Dr. Peter Bridge: In that case I will go through it verbally in detail.

First, to give background to the cause of the concerns and the nature of my professional background, the Canadian College of Medical Geneticists is the group in Canada that oversees medical genetic testing for genetic diseases. There are members of the college certified in what is called molecular genetic testing, which is to track DNA fragments through families, looking for genetic diseases to identify carriers of genetic diseases and so forth. These people have advanced skills in interpreting DNA patterns and in following them through families.

In regard to the DNA fingerprinting and a potential database, I should first say that we do support the bill and think it is a good idea in general. I have just a few concerns that I want to bring up, which I think are not whether or not the bill should pass but about its administration subsequently.

First, we tend to use the term “DNA fingerprinting”, and that in itself is misleading. The traditional fingerprints, of course—what you see on your fingertips—are the culmination of a random series of events controlling cell growth. Whether the cells grow or not at the end of this chain of random events, you get a particular pattern that is unique to you.

DNA fingerprints, on the other hand, are not random. They are unique to that person, but they certainly are not random; they are inherited. So you get half of your DNA fingerprint from your father, half of your DNA fingerprint from your mother, and when you reproduce you pass on half of your genes to each child. To a different child you will give a different permutation, but the rules of inheritance govern how the components of a DNA profile is transmitted through a family.

Therefore, if we obtain a DNA profile of an individual, we are obtaining a partial DNA profile of all blood relatives of that person. The closer the degree of relationship, the greater the degree of match and the number of genes shared. For example, if you determine a complete DNA profile of myself, you have 50% of my father's genes, 50% of my mother's, 50% of my children's, and so forth.

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So the DNA fingerprints, unlike the ones on the end of the finger, are unique to the person, but they are not random. They are inherited and they are transmissible.

What that means is that in the criminal setting we're talking about a bill where we would obtain a DNA specimen from somebody under investigation for a serious crime or convicted of a serious crime and obtain from that specimen a DNA profile. In essence, that will be a unique identifier of that particular individual.

It will, however, also contain some degree of match to many other individuals related to that person through common descent. So if you push it to an extreme and, say, do a DNA profile on myself and you happen to find three extremely rare variants in my profile—let's say each occurring in one in a thousand in the population—that will give you a profile that would be extremely unlikely to occur in anybody else. If at a crime scene you find a scene profile that has those same three exceedingly rare variants that does not quite match my complete profile, what you have just done is probably identified my brother, my father, or some close relative of mine as the potential source of that.

I want to make sure we understand that although the entire wording of the bill is talking about obtaining a specimen and a profile from an individual, in genetics you do not test individuals, you test families. If you obtain this type of information about one person, you will be concomitantly with that—and maybe unintentionally—obtaining information about other family members. That's not necessarily a bad thing, but you need to be aware that if you give me a DNA profile on one person, I have knowledge of relatives of that person as well.

If we're considering a criminal setting, if we're talking about a convicted person, that is, the person guilty of the crime, all of that person's relatives are not guilty of the crime—they are innocent citizens—yet we have some sort of information about them now through this process. I think we need to address issues on how you might safeguard that from inappropriate use, not on the person guilty of the crime but on the family members of that person.

The second issue I would draw to your attention, again somewhat in the technical nature of how these profiles are generated, is that we tend to study a large collection of different genetic factors. They're not necessarily genes; they're things that we call genetic loci, which means a place on a chromosome. These have to be very variable in order for the testing to work, so that if we study this particular position on the chromosomes in 100 different people, we will likely get a large number of different patterns. If we test many of these positions in 100 different people, we will get 100 different patterns. Technically, they must be what we call polymorphic, which means occurring in many forms.

Through medical genetic research, these have been isolated and tested simply because they were variable. They were randomly selected simply because they occur in different forms in different people. There are many medical applications of that. The majority of the ones currently used for profiling purposes we don't know and we have not described any particular function to them. But there is a large scientific project going on at the moment called the human geno project, which is actively engaged in mapping all of the human genes. It's not unreasonable to think that over the next five or ten years some of these genetic loci used for profiling purposes may have a function ascribed to them.

So we don't know what the DNA does today, other than that it is variable and useful for making a profile, but maybe in five years' time we will know that this is part of a gene controlling some specific function in the body.

If that is the case, we need to be careful that anything we record in this profile and database today does not inadvertently, let's say five years down the road, become predictive of that person's health.

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A large amount of effort is being expended to develop DNA tests that are predictors of people's health. Prediction of the future in preventive medicine is one of the great promises of DNA testing. But you don't want a DNA profile used for criminal identification purposes, and supposedly made up of random DNA segments, to suddenly become predictive of that person's health or maybe other family members' health. As I have already told you, you cannot test one person in isolation.

I'm not saying we should not obtain the profile or it should not be used for criminal purposes; we just need to be careful how the information is stored and to what additional uses it might be put. So it's not so much the issue of whether the bill should pass but the administration of the bill and the administration of the database where we are most concerned.

Having spoken about those theoretical things, let me give you a very specific example of the latter case. There is a gene called ApoE, which in the past has been tested for cardiovascular risk. This gene is involved in controlling the amount of lipids in the blood. There are a lot of people who have had this particular ApoE gene tested to see if they have any risks for elevated blood lipids and therefore, down the road, heart attack. This is present in many people's medical records, and at the time that was fine. The problem is that subsequent to that work, somebody has found out that if you have a particular variant of this ApoE that was tested for lipids in the blood, you have a very strong predisposition to Alzheimer's disease.

So now all of a sudden we have written over all these medical records something that is predictive of who is going to develop Alzheimer's disease maybe 10 or 30 years down the road. That sort of information is provided by medical geneticists when people ask for it very specifically and when they've received counselling such as: “Are you sure you want this information? Do you know what you will do with it? Do you understand thoroughly the implications of you finding out today at age 40 that you are very likely going to develop Alzheimer's disease after a certain period of time?”

This is the idea of predictive testing. DNA tests can be done at any stage in the life cycle—prenatally, at birth, as an infant, at age 20 or age 50. For events in your life that are controlled genetically, the same test will be predictive of that event regardless of what stage in your life cycle it is done.

The concern goes back to what types of genes are used to generate these profiles. I think some care needs to be put in that these are not known to be associated with any particular function, so it is less likely they would be predictive of disease status in the person for whom we have the profile or the family members.

As a suggestion, perhaps after passage of the bill the commissioner charged with administering the database should have some form of advisory panel with people who have expertise in tracking genes through families—the ex-poacher principle. Somebody like me, who has the training to track a gene through the family, is also somebody who could advise on how not to use this information in the way this bill did not intend.

So the bill intends to use the DNA profile for identification, and that is a wonderful concept and an extremely powerful tool.

I would also draw to your attention an excellent tool to exonerate the innocent, and DNA testing is perhaps the best friend of the innocent. But in doing that testing you may also have stuff recorded about the person and family members that may harm them down the road.

Administration of the database, access to it, and the nature of the information recorded are the primary concerns we have.

I would be pleased to answer any questions on that if you wish.

The Chair: Thank you.

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Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman (Surrey North, Ref.): I had three questions and he has answered every one of them, so I want to thank him very much.

The Chair: I like Mr. Cadman; he's a man of few words.

Mr. Lee.

Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.): Your testimony here, Mr. Bridge, raises at least a couple of issues for us.

Are you suggesting, then, that the provisions of the bill that restrict the use or dissemination of the DNA data bank data at this point are insufficient?

Dr. Peter Bridge: I'm suggesting that they're possibly insufficient. They are very well written if you are considering a fingerprint like the one on your finger, which involves you only. But the issue I'm pursuing is that because this information is also tied to other family members and possibly also tied with an unfortunate choice of which system to profile, to health, we need to safeguard those issues as well.

I don't think that when people drafted the mechanics of the bill, which is how to get the blood sample from somebody with a judge's warrant and so forth.... They're always thinking of one person, the criminal, as opposed to the DNA profile potentially being linked to a family group.

Mr. Derek Lee: It's one person, the suspect, perhaps.

Dr. Peter Bridge: Yes.

Mr. Derek Lee: But the core of data in the data bank would be accessible, and the product that would be disseminated or given out would be essentially, as I see it, a binary language type of thing. Either it's a match or it's not a match.

The profile can be lent, borrowed, conveyed, faxed, or whatever the heck it is they do with other agencies, and the profile, as you're indicating, contains more than the issue of whether or not there's a match. The profile is a bundle of a lot more data than it was originally intended to be used for.

Do you think we should in some way alter the definition of a DNA profile for purposes of this bill to ensure that the purpose of the profile is only for identification and matching and not for anything else?

Dr. Peter Bridge: Yes, for identification and matching, and that nobody will be permitted to look at it from the perspective of...you said binary. Most of the profiles I keep, which would be, let's say, for paternity testing, would be like a series of numbers, 120, 146. If it turned out, let's say, that everybody who anywhere in the profile has the number 120 is going to develop something, some sort of disease process, then you need to think of some means that you could convey that this is a match, without putting the specific number to it.

So conveying to another agency that “yes, this is a match” or “no, it's not a match”, could perhaps be done just in that sense, yes or no, without the exact binary code, as you phrased it, or numbers, as I phrased it.

We have a parallel problem in genetic counselling when we test families. For example, when somebody asks me if he or she is a carrier of cystic fibrosis, we do particular tests on them and on other family members, and when I report to that one person, I must report about that one person only, even though I have collected information about the rest of the family.

It's very difficult in genetics, actually, to write reports about a single individual, which is the sort of customary unit of medical care, and not give out collateral information about the rest of the family. What we try to do is give a yes/no answer—yes, you're a carrier or no, you're not—but not expand upon the reasons why.

Mr. Derek Lee: Concurrent with whatever is happening in the use of DNA for criminal identification, there will be a whole lot of other things going on in our society involving similar processes, in relation to which, at this time, as far as I understand it, there are no restrictions. If I get a DNA sample from you, as I understand it, I'm perfectly capable of testing it, selling it, and putting it on the front page of the Toronto Star, so I assume that your concern about the use of DNA profiles would cover all of these other uses as well, not just the DNA data bank.

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Dr. Peter Bridge: Oh yes, absolutely.

Mr. Derek Lee: Have you a suggestion for us as to how we might better protect the DNA profiles that are going to be stored in the crime scene index and the offender index? I think that is the right term for it. Is there a way that we can better nail down protections, just for our little piece of the action here?

Dr. Peter Bridge: I don't have an easy fix to it, and that's an ongoing problem in both medical genetics and what it refers to here.

For it to be useful for identification purposes you need two components: the name of the person, so it's an identified sample; and then some sort of coded information, whether it's a long binary thing or a table of numbers. I don't think in this case they're talking about a picture, but some sort of test results.

That can be used by whoever is managing the data base to answer yes/no questions. Does this sample match any crime scene sample or not? That can be done as a yes/no without going into all the details of why it matches.

You may wish to attach a probability to that, such as yes, it matches and the chances are 99.999%. We're still going to get to the stage, though, if it comes to courtroom proceedings, where the entire profile might be brought out in court. Once that's done, maybe components of that profile are then in the public record.

Again, there may be future disease predictions.

Mr. Derek Lee: An accused could certainly take up the issue of the alleged match in a courtroom and then get into the issue of all this other data.

Dr. Peter Bridge: Yes.

Mr. Derek Lee: If we had a provision in here, for example, that said no one may use a profile collected under the provisions of this statute for a purpose other than identification of an individual without the express permission of the commissioner of the RCMP, would that cover off a large part of what you're considering?

Dr. Peter Bridge: That would cover a large part of it.

What I think you need, though, is also the possibility of that being a moving target, in that the commissioner is kept apprised of research in DNA testing and the impact on medical knowledge, so that if there are changes that might mean there's more information to be derived from the profile or not, they can be advised of that as soon as possible so that minimal information is given out all the time.

Mr. Derek Lee: But we're only giving out binary match or not match. The system is only designed to give out “yes, it's a match,” or “it's not a match,” unless in a courtroom an individual is cross-examining or challenging the alleged match, in which case you have your whole life history in front of you.

Dr. Peter Bridge: Then the full information is disclosed, and I think at that point the suspect should be informed that full disclosure of this information may actually have some consequence to it.

Mr. Derek Lee: Okay, thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. MacKay.

Mr. Peter MacKay (Pictou—Antigonish—Guysborough, PC): Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Dr. Bridge. Your information is very helpful in looking at this from a scientific perspective.

I want to follow up on a couple of Mr. Lee's questions. On the use itself, I really hate to use this example, but we all remember the fiasco of the O.J. Simpson trial, and I do have memories of the prosecution holding up large bristol boards with DNA-type information. I guess this is the type of disclosure we're talking about, that this information would become public.

But my question is, aside from that information going public, and based on what you've told us today, giving somebody the ability to identify a future illness or disease of either the suspect or a suspect's family member, what other misuse is there? What potential personal privacy issues are we talking about here?

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Dr. Peter Bridge: I'm very comfortable with the idea of generating a profile for identification purposes. I think it's a good idea because it's a very powerful tool for prosecution and it's a fabulous tool for those who are not guilty. In that sense, I'm supportive of the bill.

As for the misuse in terms of things other than those addressed, like giving it to an unauthorized person—

Mr. Peter MacKay: But if it was given to a person who had some evil intent, what could that person do with it?

Dr. Peter Bridge: I'm not sure “misuse” is the correct term. It's a fact that this is a code for somebody's life. Today, we're using bits of it that we think are unimportant. All I'm saying is that we may know in a few years' time that these bits may not be as unimportant as we thought.

You mentioned prosecutors waving around stuff in the O.J. Simpson case. What if somebody from an insurance company said, “Oh, I recognize that pattern, and it means he definitely has some disorder or is going to develop some disorder”, and the company denies his children insurance as a result of that? The more information you wave around and that becomes public, the greater the risk of that.

I think this is very powerful information, and I'm in favour of using it for criminal purposes, but we have to be careful about keeping the lid on this. It has to be used only for the purpose intended, and in trying to use it we have to be very conscious of the fact that there could be other information coming out of this. It's not necessarily what we understand today but let's say in five years' time, which in genetic terms is a very long time. We're talking of an explosion in knowledge that might provide additional information that we have in some way harmed a person or innocent members of a person's family. Those are the big concerns, but if it's strictly kept in some database and nobody ever gets a look at the original data, just a yes or no match, that would be one way to minimize this.

I'm not sure it's an acceptable thing from the criminal side of the bill, which is obviously what this is addressing. As long as the people administrating this are aware of the potential...it's not abuse of the system; it's the fact that the system may contain information we don't understand today, but information that is easily decipherable after we've released it, and once you release it, it's gone.

Mr. Peter MacKay: So within the legislation you would emphasize the importance of safeguards pertaining to its use. One suggestion by Mr. Lee is that we indicate that profiles can only be released or can only be used for certain purposes endorsed by the commissioner. One other suggestion might be that in cases involving the use of DNA for identification purposes, there would always be a ban on publication, that at that point in a trial there would be some means to protect the accused from having that DNA used anywhere outside of the trial purpose.

Dr. Peter Bridge: That would be a reasonable idea.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I just have one final question with respect to the ability of a person to alter or somehow mess with the accuracy of DNA, and I guess I'm talking about the collection phase. Once in possession of DNA through various sampling methods, what is the ability to then alter it? Is it such an exact science that you would be able to detect that DNA has been altered?

Dr. Peter Bridge: If you took a DNA specimen from me and tried to physically alter it so that you changed its properties, that would be exceedingly difficult to do.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Difficult, but not impossible.

Dr. Peter Bridge: I think I would have to say it's impossible to do without damaging it such that none of the tests would work. The biggest concern for security would be that if you were going to enter it as a table of numbers or binary code in a computer, that could be changed. Obviously that therefore has to be under the control of people of suitable standing and calibre that you're satisfied they will not do that.

Mr. Peter MacKay: So, like anything else, it's fallible in that a person could intentionally alter the number pattern that was indicative or representative of DNA.

Dr. Peter Bridge: You cannot alter the DNA pattern, but you could alter the numbers you type into the computer database, yes.

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Mr. Peter MacKay: What about contamination? Is that a factor in the actual physical sample? Is contamination something that would skew the result?

Dr. Peter Bridge: For the convicted offender database it should not be, because you're dealing with fresh blood samples taken under ideal conditions from that person. The only contamination issues come when you're talking about crime scene specimens that have sat around on the floor somewhere.

Most of those contamination issues are going to generate a false negative. They are going to exclude somebody. They will not generate a false match, as in the famous O.J. case. You cannot generate a match by contamination of the floor, but you can certainly say he's not the man.

Mr. Peter MacKay: The DNA that was introduced in that trial and the trial itself seemed to make the point that it may not be the end-all to the prosecution of cases. It's part of the puzzle. It perhaps isn't going to have as big an effect on all cases as one might expect. Would you agree with that?

Dr. Peter Bridge: I would say in an ideal world where the samples are taken correctly and processed correctly it should be an almost infallible tool. As in any other sort of testing, you can do a poor job. You can do a cheap job. But presumably we're talking about serious criminal offences here, where somebody is going to put in the time and effort to do the job properly, and it should be virtually infallible. We're talking of numbers that nobody else on earth should match.

The Chair: Mr. Maloney.

Mr. John Maloney (Erie—Lincoln, Lib.): With DNA profile numbers, my profile shouldn't match anyone else's. But you've also indicated that you get half your profile from your mother and half from your father. How does that change with my siblings? Using that logic, why don't they have the same DNA profile as I do?

Dr. Peter Bridge: When the father reproduces, he passes on half his genes. When the mother reproduces she passes on half her genes. To different children it will be a different half.

Mr. John Maloney: It's not always the same.

Dr. Peter Bridge: No. On average siblings share half their genes, but.... You have two copies of each chromosome, one from your mother, one from your father. On average two brothers will share no copy one quarter of the time, one copy half the time, and both copies a quarter of the time. It works out to an average of a half between siblings.

Nevertheless—and this is why I was referring to cheap testing earlier—I'm talking about doing a thorough job on the testing. Siblings should always look different.

Mr. John Maloney: How do you do a poor job and a good job on testing? How is the test done?

Dr. Peter Bridge: It's a series of independent tests. A DNA profile will potentially look at 10 different genes and any one of those will give you a pattern that could be shared with, let's say, 10% of the rest of the population. If you and I were both tested, there would be a 10% chance of a match. If we test two genes, then it might be down to a 1% chance of a match between the two of us. If you test 10 of them, it might be down to a one in 10 billion chance of the genes having the same pattern. The more of these things you test, the better the numbers you come up with. If you're a private company in it for the money and you do just the minimal number of tests to maximize your profit, there is a possibility you could get a false match with a not-overwhelming probability, but if you do this properly you would test probably, let's say, 10 different genes, and the chances of a false match are going to be somewhere in the range of a billion to one.

If you want more than that, you just test more genes. You test 20 and you'll get odds of a million times a million times a million times a million.... You can go for whatever number you wish, if you're willing to spend the money.

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Mr. John Maloney: On that logic, if I had six people testing the same blood sample, technically they should all come up with the same answer.

Dr. Peter Bridge: If you mean we're talking about a standardized series of tests performed in similarly skilled labs, yes, they should come up with an identical answer. That is the power then of being able to communicate a profile to somebody else, saying “Does this match or not?”

Mr. John Maloney: In the taking of samples, you can do it by buccal swab, hair follicle, or blood sample, and there may be more as the technology increases. Currently, of perhaps those three, which is the best? Should we always be using the best? What are the drawbacks of using perhaps a follicle of hair as opposed to a blood sample? Are there shortcomings to any of those?

Dr. Peter Bridge: My personal preference when we're doing genetic testing for diseases is to always use blood.

Mr. John Maloney: But we're talking about identification.

Dr. Peter Bridge: Yes. I think blood is superior. Obviously, you have to stick somebody with a needle to get it, which is more invasive than getting a scraping of cells. My preference would be to use blood, which you know has to come from within that person. It's unlikely that you would contaminate a cheek scraping, but it's not impossible.

Mr. John Maloney: A hair follicle?

Dr. Peter Bridge: Hair follicles, again, should be unique to that person as long as you have to pull hard to get it out and it's not just a hair lying on the person. But you're limited in the amount of DNA from that, whereas if you have blood you get a much larger quantity of DNA from it and it's the superior specimen for that purpose.

Mr. John Maloney: If blood is the best, should we restrict it to blood samples?

Dr. Peter Bridge: I'm not sure you want to restrict it to blood, but I would certainly—

Mr. John Maloney: Limit it?

Dr. Peter Bridge: I think it should be left to whoever is administering it to make their choices. My preference will be that it should be done from blood. The evidence at a crime scene might be in the form of hairs. In addition to getting the cells off the hair root for DNA profiling, they may be comparing the morphology of the hair to a similar hair found at the crime scene. So in that sense it might be better material to compare to.

Mr. John Maloney: Should we be taking all three?

Dr. Peter Bridge: My guess would be if you took blood, that would certainly be sufficient. I find it very hard to think of anything that could not be answered from blood.

Mr. John Maloney: Thank you, Madam Chair.

The Chair: Do my brothers, who are identical twins, have the same DNA?

Dr. Peter Bridge: If they're identical twins, yes they do. The one selection that this profiling will not differentiate between is identical twins.

The Chair: They're both undertakers.

Mr. Marceau.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau (Charlesbourg, BQ): First, I would like to thank our Chair for asking that question because I was going to ask it myself; I find this subject fascinating.

I also found the presentation very interesting, especially the scientific side of the issue. The first thing that strikes me in your remarks is that it's possible to know a whole family's DNA by analysing one single person's profile.

Since this bill is intended to protect the privacy of individuals, I think we should go farther and protect the privacy of the other members of the family as well.

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Since privacy is my main concern, I would like to have your point of view as a professional medical geneticist. Shouldn't the DNA database be administered by an independent agency rather than by the police itself?

[English]

Dr. Peter Bridge: The DNA profile I mentioned is unique to that person, but parts of it are shared by relatives. It's not an exact match in my brother or in my child, but on average, 50% will match. So there is some degree of overlap.

On whether or not it should be administered by the police directly or by some other agency, I should refer back to my previous document. I know some fellows of the college I'm representing did address that.

Last year we wrote that if biological samples were retained, they should be held by an independent agency, but I think they've revised legislation now. It talks about destruction of the biological samples after the profile has been generated.

I'm sorry; I don't see anything in there. I will answer it personally rather than as a collective thing. If the written document differs from what I say, please go with that, because I'm here to represent an organization with a collective opinion on paper that I will not override with my personal views.

Personally, I have no problem with the police administering it. I think they're the obvious people, and very well qualified, to do so. All of my concerns today have been that they understand what it is they're administering and what additional information might be contained in it. I think the RCMP scientists would be very suitably qualified people to do that.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: The bill says that the files in the convicted offenders index should be made inaccessible if the conviction is quashed or if there is a discharge, for example. Don't you think those files should be destroyed, and not just made inaccessible since, as you have said, the information kept in them could be used for something else in a not so distant future?

[English]

Dr. Peter Bridge: Yes. I agree with you.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: We all know you are a health professional, and I would like your opinion on something else. For now, the bill says that the samples will be taken by a peace officer, a police officer. That means blood, of course, but it could also be samples of hair, saliva or other fluids. Do you think it would be preferable to ask a health professional to take those samples, rather than a police officer who is not necessarily trained to do so or doesn't have the same technical skills as a health professional?

[English]

Dr. Peter Bridge: My understanding was that the bill provides the capability for either the police officer to personally take the samples or to have a health professional, under his or her direction, take the samples. The police officer will be the witness to that.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: But do you think a police officer could actually take the blood sample with minimal training? Don't you think it should be done by a nurse?

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[English]

Dr. Peter Bridge: The type of sampling the bill refers to is, first, cleaning the skin, pricking it with a sharp instrument, called a lancet, and then taking blood from the surface of the skin. I think with minimal training a police officer would be able to do that.

If you're talking about sticking needles in people's arms, I think you would want somewhat more training, particularly if the person having the sample withdrawn was less than cooperative—although there might be some incentive to sit still if somebody has a needle in your arm. Obviously, though, you don't want to injure the person in the process of doing it.

For the things as described in the bill, I think police officers could certainly do it themselves, but there is provision made for a nurse or a professional phlebotomist to take the sample under the direction of the police officer, I believe.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Thank you, Madam Chair.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Marceau.

Mr. Telegdi.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi (Kitchener—Waterloo, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair. I guess now we know why your brothers got the best of you as you were growing up.

The Chair: They're adopted.

Voices: Oh, oh.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Actually, as you were talking about some of the possible abuses, it strikes me that we don't have any legislation on somebody misusing DNA as such. When you mentioned the insurance agent looking at this as a valuable tool to determine risk, I could see that being expanded to somebody looking for a new employee.

As the capabilities of science increase in an exponential manner, or an explosive manner, as you were saying, would it be wise for us to have some kind of privacy legislation on this? This could turn into a real horror show at some point.

Dr. Peter Bridge: Absolutely. I testified, about this time last year, before the travelling committee on privacy. It was some commission on privacy and human rights. I forget the exact name. They had three scenarios they sent out to people ahead of time for discussion. One of those was a DNA-related test where somebody lost insurance on the house and their job and so forth.

Yes, we very much need legislation to cover a lot of these issues. There has been draft legislation several times. The Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies put in a very excellent report, only small sections of which are being acted upon, usually on a crisis basis. We don't do anything until somebody clones a sheep and then all of a sudden we have to enact the recommendations made three years earlier.

Yes, we desperately need a lot of legislation concerning DNA and privacy. I've seen bits and pieces of that legislation in many different arenas.

If you're asking me what a government should do, it's actually to see through to completion some of these bits that have been started under several different jurisdictions so that we actually do have something in place as soon as possible.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Thank you.

For future reference, Madam Chair.

The Chair: Thanks, Mr. Telegdi.

Are there any other questions?

Dr. Bridge, thank you very much for your contribution. It was helpful. We're swimming in this a bit. It's been fascinating for us, and we're very grateful for your contribution. Thank you.

Dr. Peter Bridge: Thank you.

The Chair: The meeting is adjourned.