NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, November 19, 1997

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[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib)): I call this session of the committee to order. For the benefit of the television audience that is joining us today, this is the second hearing of the Joint Meeting of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs at the House of Commons, presently considering the question of whether or not we should retain the presence of our troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at least until June 30, 1998.

Yesterday morning we heard witnesses from various sectors in Canada. As the members of the committee know, eight members of the two committees—four members from the defence committee and four members from the foreign affairs committee—travelled to Bosnia last week to get direct evidence on the ground. Today we will be having a debate between members of the committee. You have before you a draft resolution, a draft report and resolution.

On behalf of Mr. Bertrand, our co-chair and chairman of the defence committee, we propose to have a debate on the general principles of the wisdom of staying in Bosnia. Following that debate we will turn to the specific terms of the resolution. If there is general agreement on the resolution with minor objections, we can adopt it quickly this afternoon. If there is some problem with the terminology of the resolutions, we can always adjourn for a few minutes to work that out.

Our objective is to have the resolution adopted by 5.30 p.m. Is that correct Mr. Co-Chair?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, BQ): That's correct.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Let me introduce those with us today, not as witnesses but as back-up. We're very grateful for the presence of Mr. Jim Wright, the director general for central, east and south Europe, from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, who travelled with us to Bosnia. We have Mr. Charles Court, deputy director for NATO, Department of Foreign Affairs. We have from the Department of National Defence and Veterans' Affairs, Lieutenant General Crab and Rear Admiral King. Thank you both very much for coming. From CIDA, we have Charles Bassett from the central branch.

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[Translation]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): To sum up what Mr. Blaikie just said, we will be discussing this afternoon whether or not to recommend that our armed forces remain in Bosnia on until the end of June 1998. If that is our recommendation, we will be examining the resolutions contained in the report and adopting said report this afternoon.

Before the meeting, Mr. Blaikie and I discussed the amount of time each member would be allotted to state his position and we agreed on a maximum of five minutes per member.

On that note, let's begin.

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Does anyone want to begin? Do you wish to go ahead, Madam Beaumier?

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): I'll be on the list first. Give me a minute.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): We can put your name down, but I'll start if you like. I had some observations from the trip, so maybe I'll make them now and get them out of the way.

I feel we should consider two things. First is the nature of the problem and second is the proposed resolution. The problem, as we all know, is enormously complex. If we look at Michael Ignatieff's book Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism, we know this is the result of a long and tragic history of strife over religion, with some people paying the price of hundreds of years of invasions, conversions and dictatorships.

The recent events must be seen as the latest result of a series in a long history. The question we have to ask ourselves is, are we to despair and say this will just go on and on, or are we to say no, we can create conditions that will prevent a reoccurrence? In either of those two questions, what is the role of our troops who are presently in the theatre?

Of those two camps, I am in the second one. I am a liberal and an optimist. I recognize Professor Cohen's wise counsel from yesterday that this is a very complex situation and that creating a democratic pluralistic state will not be easy or a quick fix. I also, however, subscribe to his conclusion that whatever we think about the long-term prospects, we should keep our troops there for the present. A withdrawal today would inevitably necessitate a more expensive and bloodier intervention in the future.

It was a great privilege for me, accompanied by Robert, our colleagues from the defence committee, and our colleagues from our own committee, to visit Bosnia and Herzegovina last week. We had the opportunity to see our troops. We all agreed they are of the highest quality, their professionalism and the task they face are extraordinarily complex, and they are achieving the results in very difficult circumstances. We noted their ability to act as go-betweens between other troops that were there. We also noted, and I think it's fair to say, Robert, they said they want to stay and finish the job.

We saw our NGOs, we saw CARE Canada, we saw Queen's University and we saw CIDA. We saw our mounted police and realized the nature of their task there. There were police there from Waterloo County. There will soon be police there from Metropolitan Toronto and, Mrs. Augustine reminds me, from Etobicoke—Lakeshore.

I hope they're going to be dressed in the same uniform you wore in your picture, Mrs. Augustine.

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We had the opportunity of seeing our SFOR commanders, who are sophisticated, knowledgeable, and capable of applying the Dayton accord.

In these circumstances, it seems to me that the resolution we have before us sets out the basics of what we have to do today. The report sets out factually what we saw. That's obvious, and it's before you.

Its recommendations are that we should continue our troops there until the end of the mandate. For the reasons I've stated above, I agree with that.

And it's for the reasons set out by John Graham before the committee yesterday. This was about the credibility of Canada in the European theatre. Our troops are gaining back for us, by what they are doing in Europe today, what many say we lost because of years of cutbacks and removals from the European theatre.

Think also of the effect this would have on other troops if we were to withdraw today. There are 27 nations engaged in that theatre. Think and reflect on the consequences that would affect the decision they must make by next June if we were today to say we were going to pull out before June.

Second, the resolution recommends that we should recommend to our government that it should authorize NATO to begin planning in the event there is a need for follow-on troops. That seems to me to be a logical recommendation. It doesn't mean we have to be there. It doesn't mean we have to send 1,200 troops. It doesn't mean we have to do anything.

But it does recognize that if something is going to take place next June—I'm sure we can ask our military colleagues here—then we can't wait until next May to start thinking about it; we must start thinking about it now. We must authorize NATO authorities to do so. We were told that in the meetings all of us had with the NATO authorities when we were with SFOR in Sarajevo last week.

Fourth, the resolution recognizes that there is a civilian reconstruction process taking place there, and that SFOR is playing its role in ensuring that this civilian reconstruction takes place. They're ensuring that television stations that preach hatred are being closed, and that police stations that are not acting as police stations but as military units for dictators or potential dictators there are being closed. They're ensuring that the conditionality we all believe is required to ensure the success of Dayton will enable us to make sure we can reward those who co-operate with us and punish those who do not.

So without in any way ignoring the enormity of the tasks, I believe we can take the steps that are set out in this resolution. I think they're responsible. I think they meet the needs of Bosnia-Herzegovina to continue the process for a stable, democratic society. They represent the only guarantee for peace. They conform to Canada's standards in international affairs and our tradition as peacekeepers, for which we have earned a just reputation.

That, members of the committee, is my personal opinion. But I thought it was appropriate, if that's all right, as your chair, to set out my results, my conclusion, as a result of our trip. I know that others will have different views, but I would at least like to start the debate by making those opening comments.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Madam Beaumier, Mr. Mills, and Mr. Turp.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): On condition number one, I would just like a clarification.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Yes.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: You say there's no need for the government to extend CF-18s. On June 18, 1998, it expires. So you're suggesting that CF-18s would be discontinued there after June 1998, but the mission would continue after that time. Am I right?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Yes. The mission will continue without the aircraft, because the agreement's already in place that the aircraft are coming back. So there's no suggestion that we would then recommit a new aircraft operation there.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: The air force section is being discontinued in June 1998.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Do we want to check that? Why don't we ask Admiral King? He could perhaps clarify that for us.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Just a clarification, sir.

Rear Admiral J.A. King (Director General, International Security Policy): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

When we went to the government for the authorization for the initial deployment, it didn't contain an aircraft element in it. That came up as a result of a request from NATO commanders, who asked us later on during the mission if we could help out by providing aircraft. We went to the government. The government agreed to an aircraft deployment of about three months. We have just completed that. The aircraft have returned. If there were another request we would go back to the government, but at present our planning does not include the idea that we would start off with an air element as part of the force but rather simply a land force.

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The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Mr. Mills.

Mr. Bob Mills (Red Deer, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have some opening comments I would want to make about this. This may lead us into successfully resolving some of the problems we might have.

The place to start, I think, is to look at the issue itself, as we've done very carefully. As you know, with Ms. Beaumier I looked at the election process and how that went, looked at the history of this whole issue. I come back to asking the questions that I think Canadians want answers for, not so much for six months but for the extension of this, for this motions kind of agreement we're going to look at to extend this. I really want to speak on that, because people are asking, are you making a difference, have you made a difference, what is this issue like, how is this different from Ireland, how is this different from other civil wars, what about all the problems in all the other parts of the world we might be faced with—Nigeria, Rwanda, Iraq, and so on.

I think we need to answer that question. Dr. Cohen and certainly John Graham yesterday pointed out very clearly that these are people who have been in the field, who know the place, and pointed out that Dayton was a bulldozer approach to a problem. It was a big stick approach, the power of the Americans: sign it, we have an election coming, get it signed, get it over with, and we'll make it work.

What Dayton didn't look at was the emotion, the history. It didn't look at the ethnic problem there. It didn't take into account that these people have been ruled by somebody for 1,500 years. It didn't really look at any of those issues. It said we will make this work by having a big stick there to make them go along with it.

I think all of us would agree...certainly all of us in our group, when we debriefed ourselves, decided that half an hour after we left, if we left now, there would be war again. I don't think any of us want that to happen.

I went into some schools and I got quotes from kids. I brought back these quotes from kids and I had them translated. These quotes from kids are like this: “Every day they are shooting my friends who I love.” “Unarmed children cannot return the fire.” “Children are dying from infections and disease.” “Many of my friends died on the way to school, crossing the roads, hit by sniper fire.” “We go to school because that's the only way we can fight against this war.” “On my way to school I run to escape snipers. They shoot at us with mortars. The front line is right behind my building.”

I could read the pages of little kids' quotes, kids 10 years old, 8 years old, 13 years old. We went to a number of high schools and talked to teenagers. I asked them what they thought. They said: There is hope for our future. We can make this country work, but we need time; we need lots of time. My parents cannot make it work. My parents talk about the killing of their sons and daughters, their aunts and uncles, their mothers and fathers.

That's the real truth and tragedy of places like Bosnia.

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I guess it's easy for us to sit here and say we'll extend this for six months and feel good, but are we really addressing what the problem is and are we really going to be able to make a difference? If we leave now or if we leave in six months, will the killings just be delayed for six months?

These are extremely hard issues. I think these are issues that on an humanitarian basis we have to ask. We ask the question of experts. We have more experts here that we can ask. How long would we have to stay so these kids won't face that future? I think we'll get an answer much the same as we got yesterday: maybe two years, maybe five years, maybe thirty years, maybe two generations, maybe forever. But we do need to ask that question and we do need to tell the taxpayers of this country how much it is going to cost. We need to convince them that this is a good investment, an investment of our soldiers who are doing a wonderful job over there, an investment they can feel happy they are committing to.

I don't think we've done that. I don't think we've told the Canadian public what we are doing in Bosnia or how we're doing it. I think this committee has a responsibility to do that and I don't think in the next two hours we are going to accomplish that. As part of our motion, I believe we have a further place to go.

How much more responsibility should Europe take? Why can't we ask them that question? What about the nationalism that exists in that country? Would partition be the best way to go? We haven't asked those questions. Should it be temporary partition, long-term partition, do the European states even want to have a Muslim country or a partitioned country within their midst? So it's religious, it's cultural, it's economic. There are a lot of questions. I guess when I get back to talking about this motion, what I really have trouble with is the last two parts of it.

On the first part, I don't know much about jet fighters and I think that jet fighters are.... If we don't need to commit them, that's fine.

I don't have much problem with the second one, that we should extend this to June 1998. But I guess I do have problems with indicating that we are somewhat endorsing the idea that if NATO planners decide we should stay on.... I don't want a repeat of what we have had this year, because on November 18 or November 19 we stood out in the foyer and were told by two ministers of this government that our guys will be home by Christmas 1997. That is 100% certain. Absolute. Positive. No question about it. I am just afraid that in May or June 1998 we'll be standing there again saying we will be out of there by December 1998 no matter what, for sure, for absolutely positive. That's not the way you build public understanding or acceptance of this major issue.

Therefore, I think we need to talk about how long we're going to go there for, how long a mandate. And I don't know that number three really adds too much to that.

As far as number four is concerned, reconstruction is occurring in the federation and reconstruction is occurring because the Americans have decided that one side, the federation side, needed to be strengthened but the other side, the Serb side, was already strong enough. When you make those kinds of decisions, to create peace by arming one side and training militarily one side...anywhere they have ever done that before, it hasn't worked.

Here we are, talking about reconstruction, when I understand that 95% of our aid goes to the Muslim Croat side and 5% of our aid goes to the Serb side. In effect, we are saying economically and reconstruction-wise and through CIDA that we'll help one side but we won't help the other to even the sides. The only problem is that now we're creating an imbalance the other way. Now this other side will see that they can take advantage of that other side.

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So when we talk about continuing reconstruction activities, what are we going to do to address the problem of equalizing that between the two sides? Will there continue to be two sides? Or will we end up with three sides? I'm suggesting that we need to look at the mandate, the cost, and the expected duration of this mission.

I'm going to defer to my defence critic and say that then we need to look at whether the armed forces can deliver what we might come up with as the mandate. Can they deliver? Are they downsizing any further? Can they deliver another long-term plan for this area, keeping in mind Nigeria and Rwanda and other hot spots? Do we need a Dayton part two? Or should we call it an Ottawa part one? Do we need a whole new initiative, with not bulldozer politics but constructive politics?

I'm trying to tell you, Mr. Chairman, that off the top here, we have a lot of questions before we simply sign our names to another document that really makes us feel good when we leave this room. We haven't addressed one problem from some of those questions that I've read. It's great to be a Boy Scout—then we hopefully can sleep at night—but I don't believe we should sleep very well when we know what's happening in Bosnia and when we're not really addressing the problem. I don't think we're serving the taxpayers very well by addressing it that way.

So that lets you know where we're coming from. I know it concerns everybody in this room. I don't believe it's a partisan political thing. I believe it's a human, caring position for all of us.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you, Mr. Mills.

[Translation]

Mr. Turp.

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, let me say how pleased I am to see here today some of the people who accompanied us to Bosnia, in particular Mr. Wright and Colonel Hug. Like the chairman, I too greatly appreciated the opportunity to travel along with other parliamentarians to Bosnia to observe the situation there firsthand.

Contrary to what my colleague from Red Deer just said, I appreciated this opportunity to observe the situation in Bosnia and to report back to Canadians and share with them our interpretation of events during the course of this debate, which will be public since our chairman and co-chairmen graciously agreed to allow the proceedings to be televised.

I think it is a very good for debates like this to be open to the people of Canada and Quebec to heighten their awareness of the importance of peacekeeping missions undertaken by the international community.

I have three series of comments to make today. Firstly, I want to talk about the process which has prompted this review and about the renewal of the committee's mandate. Secondly, I would like to make several observations about the situation in Bosnia. Finally, I would like to address the recommendations now before the committee.

First, some comments about the process. In my view, it was fundamentally important for us to travel to Bosnia and I think the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of National Defence made a very wise decision by choosing to initiate this review process by having parliamentarians make this trip. I commend those who made the arrangements and organized the visit, in particular Canadian forces personnel who ensured the safety of the delegation members and made sure they saw what they needed to see during their trip.

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In my opinion, it was also very useful for us to hear from a few witnesses, as we did yesterday, to get a more scientific overview of Bosnia's future. I have to say that I was especially impressed by Professor Cohen's vivid description and extensive knowledge and understanding of the situation in Bosnia today . Listening to such an objective presentation from a scientific standpoint and seeing the situation presented to us so critically proved very useful to the committee.

Today's debate is warranted and I hope it will enable the committee to achieve a consensus on this important question.

You may recall that while on the bus from Banja Luka to Sarajevo, we discussed a wish of mine, namely that when it came time to discuss renewing the peacekeeping mission or launching a new operation, the debate would not be confined to committee, but would extend to the House of Commons as well.

Since we are discussing extending this mandate for only a few months, perhaps confining the debate to this committee will suffice. However, if the times comes when we need to decide whether or not to end this mission, as we did in the case of Cyprus several years ago, or to commit to a new peacekeeping operation, I believe the issue should be debated in the House of Commons in a more public and open manner, despite the problems associated with holding an informative debate in the House of Commons.

I would now like to comment briefly on the current situation in Bosnia. We observed widespread devastation in all regions of the country that we visited. Property damage is considerable. Over 560,000 people died during this war and millions were displaced. It is important to convey the message to those who are listening to us that the situation in this country is desperate and that is the reason which prompted the international community to intervene.

We also observed that reconstruction efforts were well under way. Houses are under construction, some hospitals are open for business and schools are being repaired, by members of the military among others. Security measures have improved. We were able to move about freely in the streets of Sarajevo on Monday and Tuesday evenings and we observed a police, rather than a military presence, something which no doubt is less intimidating for residents.

The reconstruction and democratization process now under way has been fraught with successes as well as failures. The consolidation of the state brought about by the multi-ethnic Dayton Accord...

The Dayton Accord called for the establishment of a multi- ethnic state. It rejected partitioning as a solution and the international community, the United Nations General Assembly and the UN Security Council endorsed this course of action. The Accord was not merely a reflection of US objectives and views on the future of Bosnia.

The reconstruction, democratization and consolidation process has been made possible due to the presence of the SFOR. It has ensured the success of efforts in this area, albeit on a limited scale. We observed how important a role Canada's armed forces play, at least in one region of Bosnia, and the support they provide, particularly to one British general whose great qualities were mentioned this afternoon during question period by the Minister of Defence.

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With respect to the recommendations, it is my pleasure to inform you that the Bloc Québécois will be supporting the recommendations made to the committee. I consulted with my party's foreign affairs critics this morning and the Bloc Québécois caucus supports renewing the mandate of the Canadian forces in Bosnia. No doubt we will have an opportunity later to discuss the exact wording of the recommendations, but overall, the Bloc Québécois believes that Canada must extend its mission.

The Bloc hopes that this matter remains before the committee given that the question of renewing the SFOR's mandate or of launching a new peacekeeping operation will surely come up again in the near future. In my view, the committee must continue to monitor developments in Bosnia closely so that in a few months' time, it can call upon those who are familiar with the situation to enlighten it on events unfolding there.

What it comes down to is a matter of choice and priorities. Canada is proud, and rightfully so, in my opinion, of the legacy of Lester B. Pearson. Quebeckers, sovereigntists like myself, the Parti Québécois and the Bloc Québécois, embrace such fundamental values as peace and security and believe that the United Nations Charter and the principles of peacekeeping and security are principles which must be staunchly defended by the international community and by all states that make up this community.

For that reason alone, it is a worthwhile endeavour for a country to invest in peace and security; it is worthwhile for it to assign its armed forces to peacekeeping and security missions and I believe that in this particular instance, the SFOR is serving the interests of peace and security.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you very much, Mr. Turp. Mr. Richardson.

[English]

Mr. John Richardson (Perth—Middlesex, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to address the group and to look back at a few more tangible evidences since our visit there in 1994.

In 1994 there was very restricted movement; there was sniper, mortar, and artillery fire all around, on a 24-hour basis; and there was collateral damage to bridges and any kind of infrastructure that could be a target for Serbs, Bosniacs, or Croatians.

There was a fast build-up and a seeking of revenge, one side to another. There was indiscriminate killing, and in many cases mass graves full of people who were executed and dumped. There was fear everywhere; no one was trusted. Then the war broke out through the intervention of the Croatian army and moved down into the former area of Bosnia, and they took much of the land.

During that period of time, there was ethnic cleansing. Muslims moved out of long-standing Muslim areas, Croatians moved in; Serbs moved out, Muslims moved in. There was movement back and forth to overtake new homes or homes were destroyed. It was a society that was in disarray. There was no order and there was no forgiveness.

When we returned this year, yes, there were soldiers, but this time they were not Croats, they were not Serbians, and they were not Bosniacs. Even though they were allowed to keep their militias and to train, they were kept under the strictest conditions. We saw people moving on the highways. We saw and heard of people moving back to the villages where ethnic cleansings had taken place.

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There was sporadic firing, but not to the level of the 1994 visit. We saw a tremendous amount of infrastructure in place—new highways, new bridges, the opening of schools—and a trend back to normality. The realities of that change, between 1994 and the intervening period when the war took place, were there for those who had a chance to compare.

The ceasefire is in place at the moment. People are coming back to claim their homes. But the main thing is that they did have free elections. Free elections in Bosnia were the reality, and people accepted the results of those votes. We now have a second election in what we call Srpska, the second part of the confederation, and it will be taking place in the next two weeks or within the near future. Again, it will be a testimony to whether or not this exercise in democracy can take place and whether or not the forces of honest elections bear fruit in Srpska.

Within that state of Srpska itself, we have two different approaches among the Serbians in the north at Banja Luka and the hard positions taken by the Serbs in Pale. I think someone brought up the lack of infrastructure to the Serbs, and some of the reason they were held back was that conditions were not being met under the Dayton terms. Because they did not meet those terms, the infrastructure moneys were limited and were used as a carrot.

But for anyone else who was there, they could not help but see that there was change, and it was positive change. There are still problems, and there is a potential for a tremendous rebound if we take the lid off.

Each of the four presenters we had here all outlined the conditions. All realized there was some improvement. All realized, however, that to pull out would not be the right answer. We should stay the course, and see if we can continually work through some form of democratic process, see the institutions established, and monitor them during their early years.

The vote before us is to stay until June 30, 1998. Certainly, with the progress to date, the problem is that if we start the first pull-out, then others will follow. I'd hate to say that Canada was the first to turn tail and run in the face of strong needs in this area of Europe.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Thank you.

Mr. Brison.

Mr. Scott Brison (Kings—Hants, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Firstly, the PC Party is committed to and is supportive of the renewal of Canada's military commitment in Bosnia to June 30, 1998. Having been there last week, I share with the rest of the delegation our collective pride in the participation of Canadian peacekeepers, NGOs, and CIDA. Significant progress has been made since Dayton.

For those who have not been there, if you rely solely on the media, it would seem that very little progress has been made. It's terrific to see the progress made: the cessation of widespread bloodshed, reconstruction of homes, social infrastructure, democratization, and media reform. These are some of the examples of that progress. The biggest problems with Dayton were the unrealistic, ill-conceived, politically motivated, and electorally oriented deadlines set largely by the U.S.

It's very important that we use this time over the next year to engage Canadians in the discussion about our participation in Bosnia, and that we inform Canadians of the importance in this significant progress that our participation has led to. I believe we can make Canadians justifiably proud of our participation and supportive of its goals.

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Canadians will in fact accept realistic deadlines if they're part of the process, and again, if we engage them in the discussion, they will accept realistic deadlines. It would be a mistake for us in the future to not inform Canadians of what the realistic timeline for these types of initiatives would be.

As well, Mr. Graham, you and I are both members of the Canada-U.S. parliamentary association. As we discussed, it would be important that we appeal to our peers in Congress for continued U.S. support of this critical initiative.

Beyond that—and I would remind members of the Bloc of this—one of the things we do uniquely well as Canadians is our peacekeeping missions and our participation in international fora. One of the first casualties of a divided Canada would be our ability to participate in these international fora. So it's not only Canadians who need a strong and united Canada; it is the world that needs a strong and united Canada. We should take that responsibility very seriously, both within Quebec and within the rest of Canada.

Thank you very much.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Madame Beaumier.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to deal with a couple of the more negative comments about the situation in Bosnia. Certainly, as Mr. Mills has stated, it's an emotional situation. It's emotional in that even families were divided, not just along ethnic lines.

An example is my driver's next-door neighbours: the father fought on the Serb side; the son stayed and fought on the Bosniac side. So definitely it's emotional.

But the aspect that we have to look at history in order to make a prognosis for the future is so negative. If we were to take that approach, all we'd have to do is look back at our own history and the atrocities, although certainly less significant than internal war. There were times when Jews were not allowed to own property at public beaches, provincial beaches; they weren't allowed on the beaches in Toronto. There were signs, “Irish need not apply”. The Italians came, and there were ethnic divisions there because it was something new.

I believe today one of the reasons we have become more advanced is we have more access to the media. There's more communication. We're not as dependent on our own particular circle of friends and religious leaders to make these decisions for us. Therefore I believe that to say history will repeat itself is just a very negative aspect.

I've been told you can't count those elections, that people voted on ethnic lines and issues. Not true. In Tuzla, where I was, the man who ran for mayor was a Serb in a largely Bosniac-dominated population. He ran on the platform of a multicultural, multi-ethnic city and community. He won overwhelmingly, based on harmony amongst groups of different religions and ethnicity.

To say the Dayton agreement is a big stick is very unfair. It's not perfect, but no agreement drawn up by men is perfect, and anything that is enacted by us is not perfect.

The question has been asked many times: How long are we going to be there? The answer is we don't know. So it doesn't matter how many times we ask this question, we're still going to get the same answer. The answer is that perhaps six months, a year, two years, or five years down the road we may have a better idea of how long we're going to have to be there.

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SFOR is not only maintaining peace there; it is keeping the criminal activity down, the arms build-up on either side. When I was at the NATO meeting, the UN ambassador said SFOR does it because it can do it.

The fact that they're able to keep the criminal activity down, keep the arms build-up there, means they're keeping stability so that the forces of understanding have an opportunity to work. Tuzla is an example of how it can work.

The question of partition is not our question. That's not something we can deal with. We don't want them dealing with partition in Canada. I don't think we should even begin to be considering partition in their countries.

So I would hope that this committee votes overwhelmingly in support of our military in Bosnia and is prepared to wait for the answer to be clear on how much time we have to spend.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Thank you very much.

Mr. Blaikie.

Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg—Transcona, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I regret that I wasn't able to participate in the trip, but I've appreciated hearing the observations of people who were on the trip.

I've had the opportunity before to visit and/or work with the Canadian military in various peacekeeping situations in Namibia, the Middle East, Cyprus, and Central America. It's certainly a Canadian tradition that the NDP, and I personally, take a great deal of pride in and have extended a great deal of support to in the past. It is a tradition we continue to support.

We don't always agree with the government, as I'm sure various ministers of defence and foreign affairs will know. Over the years we've dissented from many elements of Canadian foreign policy and defence policy, whether it's first use of nuclear arms or low-level flying over Labrador—all kinds of things. But we've always stood firm in our support of the peacekeeping capability and the peacekeeping mission of the Canadian military. I see no reason at this time to depart from that tradition.

I can understand the worries when I think of how long we were in Cyprus, extended from mandate to mandate to mandate, until finally we were I think 25 years in Cyprus. That's a legitimate anxiety, but at this point it is only an anxiety and not reason enough, it seems to me, to be against this recommendation.

There may be a time when we might want to be more critical of the commitment in Bosnia, but I take it that the situation there is improving and that the Canadian participation there is helping. Therefore, the mandate should be extended at least until June 1998.

I want to say to Mr. Richardson, with his caricature of people who might disagree with him, that even though I agree with him, I don't think it's fair to say of people who raise questions about it that it's a matter of turning tail and running. There are legitimate points of view on both sides of this. When we come to this kind of debate I don't think it's productive to use that kind of language, which suggests courage over cowardice, or boldness over timidity, or whatever it was you were trying to do. You made a good argument for why we should have the mandate extended and probably should have left it at that.

I want to extend our support for the recommendation.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Thank you very much.

Mr. McWhinney.

Mr. Ted McWhinney (Vancouver Quadra, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This has been a very good debate. It is important that this committee go forward with a recommendation that encompasses all parties in Parliament, one they can all live with, because it is an operation that is difficult and dangerous in a political as well as a military sense. We want to be able to live with it down the line and not have a Somalia sort of situation, where all the blame is put on one party rather than another.

• 1630

We came into this situation without having participated in the key political decision-making involved, and under circumstances in which, if we applied the criteria we developed in the last Parliament, we would probably have chosen not to take part. In other words, when we pragmatically developed certain criteria for new peacekeeping operations, based largely on our experience with Somalia, we concluded there were some things we should go into and some we should not.

As I told you yesterday, I had given depositions as an invited expert witness to the United States Congress on the earlier part of this affair, the state's succession from Yugoslavia to the succession states, including rump Yugoslavia. It was very clear that flawed political decisions were made on an inadequate base, in particular the retention of Tito's internal frontiers, which were developed for internal Yugoslav reasons and didn't regard ethno-cultural divisions. You can see some of the roots of later conflicts in that.

It's also true that we were not part of the Dayton decision-making process. Criticisms have been made of that and they are criticisms that carry a great deal of weight, including something that we exercised, I think, in relation to the two UN commissions: people who don't have experience in multinational states imposing their own ideal forms of government on others. There are bound to be problems, as Professor Cohen reminded us.

But the basic thing here is that we did, in good faith, enter into an operation and we engaged ourselves. The key initiatives here—and it was the preceding government to the present one—probably came from UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

We have entered; we have made the commitment. And once you enter, you become a player, whether or not in retrospect you might say, “Maybe we shouldn't have gone in” or “We should have gone in with more conditions.” You become a player and you're involved in the process.

This issue of continuity takes place, which in a large sense is the principle of due process of law and which applies internationally as well as domestically. It's in that context that I look at the motion. I paid great attention to Mr. Mills' comments, which were very thoughtful. As for propositions 1 and 2, I don't really feel there is anything there that members of the committee should object to, and I think that is his position.

On the fourth proposition, again, one of the things that has been most popular with Canadians—and it came out very strongly in the evidence given by the CARE representative yesterday—is the Canadian contribution to civilian aspects of dealings with multinational states that have been torn asunder. An example is the contribution we're making in Haiti, with police forces and police training, and in many countries around the world, with training in judicial systems and medical systems. Proposition 4 is essentially a proposition that perhaps all of us of all parties can agree with.

Looking at item 3, I suppose there we can have some discussion. One of the things I would raise with you is that it seems to me our presence there will help all the options, including the apocalyptic style of options. If there were to be partition, it would be vital that it be done in an orderly way and not in the way it was done after Indian independence in 1947, when there was extraordinary carnage and extraordinary tragedy. A reasoned, balanced presence there, such as we would provide, would be very crucial if the apocalyptic options came into play. This is not to say they will, but we have to consider that possibility.

The case can be made for continuity. You will notice here—and I would invite our Reform colleagues to address that once again—that the time mandate is not extended beyond June 1998.

• 1635

I've had a look at the language of item 3 in the light of Mr. Mills' and others' comments. I would make the suggestion—and from talking to some of the people who drafted this motion, I think it accords with their view—that there was no intention in item 3, for example, to consider a military option, a military strike, force de frappe, those sorts of things. It was essentially that the SFOR arrangements might be dated; that alternative political, military, and administrative arrangements might be appropriate; and that it would be wise to allow the planners now charged with this to consider these options.

Therefore my suggestion—and I hope Mr. Mills would find it acceptable, if it would help his own party come onside on this—would be to replace “considering military options” with “considering alternative arrangements”. That would certainly include political and administrative adjustments, and it would certainly include attention to civilian government and its extensions. It would exclude the possibility of a too-exclusive implication here. It is not the intention, I've been assured by those who drafted it, that one would say, “If all is lost, we send in the fighter bombers”.

I'd offer that as a suggestion to Mr. Mills, and I hope he finds it acceptable. It is important, though, that we go back to the House with something that all parties can accept. It's not, in a legal sense, a prerequisite, but I think we'd be happier if he and his colleagues could accept something along these lines.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Art Hanger (Calgary Northeast, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I certainly listened to my colleagues with interest as they put forward their views in reference to this particular issue, as to whether or not our involvement with NATO and the peace agreement in Bosnia should continue.

I will state up front that I certainly do feel our troops have done a marvellous job there. I had the opportunity to view them firsthand and to look at their living conditions, and to say the least, I'm proud of what I saw. It was a marvellous effort on their part, and there is no question about their reputation in doing the job at hand in the region they have been given to patrol. I just wanted to convey that, because I know everyone here is as proud as I of their effort there. They've certainly built Canada's reputation.

I looked through the four resolutions, and on the first two, as Mr. McWhinney has pointed out, certainly there's no objection to our continued support, as a party, to keep its mandate going up until June 1998.

The other two resolutions certainly do need some adjustment, but I'd like to make these following comments first.

One thing I did observe in Bosnia, after we took a very intensive trip through, talking to a number of NGOs as well as the military, is there's no question that an enormous effort, an enormous investment, was made there by the international community, as well as Canada.

I sometimes toss around just what the results were. There were some positive results, no doubt, but there are some that aren't so positive, that leave one questioning where the process is going to go, and certainly where the Dayton agreement is going to go.

Looking at the positive contributions, certainly reconstruction is taking place, humanitarian efforts are being accomplished, and the severe fighting between the different groups has ceased. Literally there is a lid on that particular type of violence.

Canada, I know, has made contributions in the areas of health care, the media, and certain reconstruction within the educational system. But I don't think the big tests really have come yet for any of the interveners that are supporting this particular initiative, this Dayton agreement. I'm talking about the return of the refugees. What exactly is going to happen during that particular time?

• 1640

There is an unevenness in the property laws. There is still a restriction on freedom of movement. Another aggravating factor is the high unemployment rate. So you have this mix as it sits right now, and there is no question that to pull out would be devastating.

Along with that, of course, there's the corruption of war criminals and organized crime in these destabilizing political forces.

This question has been on my mind since I was there: should the international community, Canada included, be insisting that the people try to live together in this particular region, to bring them all together? If they insist on bringing them all together and insist that they live together, even though these animosities run so high with these aggravating factors, there's no question that we will be there forever. We will be there maybe until two generations go by. We heard that from the expert witnesses yesterday, that these aggravations are not going to just disappear.

So, reflecting on the two last sections of that resolution, I think that included in there should be some indication that there will be a review of Canada's position in that region, and that serious discussions should take place as to alternatives. There should even be discussion of the issue of partition, and why not, or some other process that will limit the action of the international community but still allow those individuals living within the different regions to at least exist in the areas where they presently are.

My suggestion—and I'm not necessarily making this in the form of a motion at this point in time—is to indicate to the committee or to the joint committees that a series of significant reviews should take place every few months and that mandate should be reviewed every few months.

I also got certain feedback from individuals we talked to over there, who were very much involved in the process, indicating that NATO is possibly looking for a way out too—that their reputation has been positive thus far, that they have made a significant impact in the world as a viable operational force to create stability, and that while some of us in Canada certainly are questioning the involvement of lengthy stays for our troops, other countries are as well, including the Americans, who really run the operation.

So I think we should be prepared and we should be debating these issues at length.

With that note, Mr. Chairman, I'm going to conclude.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Thank you very much.

Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: I have a very short comment, and I also would like to ask a question, if I may, to the witnesses. They have been very patient in listening to us.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Mr. Assadourian, we had originally thought that with the numbers on the list, we could conclude what we might call the debate session or the discussion session in about another 20 minutes, and then we would go to questions from various members. Mr. Mills has questions, and somebody else might have some questions of our experts. If you want to use your time to ask questions, go ahead, but we were going to have time for questions.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: I would appreciate it, because it relates to the briefing note we received from research.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I just wanted to draw committee members' attention to that. We are all going to be there and others may have questions they want to ask as well. We had Madame Guay and various other members on the list to speak, and once we finish speaking.... But go ahead if you want to ask a question now.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: I fully support the extension of our peacekeeping force in Bosnia, as most of us here do, but my concern was touched on by Art Hanger of the Reform Party.

• 1645

The last paragraph of this briefing note from the research branch of the Library of Parliament says there is considerable uncertainty because the U.S. may not approve extension of this mandate after June 1998. Correct me if I am wrong, but the U.S. provides more than half the military personnel on the ground, we only come in with 700 or 800 soldiers on the ground, and the Europeans come in with less than 50% of the soldiers.

If the U.S. Congress denies the extension of the mandate for peacekeepers in Bosnia, what are the chances we can do the job with the rest of the NATO alliance members? If you can't do the job, what do you need—tools or machinery, whatever the case may be—to continue the job to the level we have now? If the U.S. doesn't provide support, with 50% less ability there on the ground, I may be wrong, but I think it will be very difficult, frankly, for us to continue the job.

That's the question we have to ask ourselves before we decide whether we are going to go there or not, because if they don't come, you can do whatever you want, but it won't do the job, as far as I'm concerned. I may be wrong, but you have the information.

Lieutenant-General R.R. Crabbe (Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Department of National Defence and Veterans Affairs): If I may, sir, first of all, I think 30% would be closer to the mark on the numbers of troops the United States provides to the composition of SFOR.

The significant contribution, in my view, of the United States is in their command and control system—the communication system that goes with that. They have provided that, and some of the logistic capabilities to support the force in-theatre. A withdrawal of the United States forces in that respect would leave a fairly significant void in command and control capabilities within the theatre, which certainly could be replaced by other contributing nations.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: So the job can be done—is that what you're saying?

LGen R.R. Crabbe: The job could be done. It would be difficult, but it could be done, yes.

RAdm J.A. King: Another significant factor in this area and directly linked is the fact that a number of our allies have indicated that if the United States were not to be present on the ground, they would not wish to be so either, because of the importance of having the United States involved, not only because of their capability, but because of the moral fact of their being involved in European security. Clearly if other key allies, such as the United Kingdom and France, for example, were not there, that would further significantly dilute the capability we would be able to bring to bear.

Thank you.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Mr. Wright, I believe you had something else to add.

Mr. Jim Wright (Director General, Central East and South Europe, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Yes. Our sense at the present time, however, is that increasingly the U.S. administration shares our view about the need to remain with SFOR. We remain confident that the administration, in their upcoming deliberations with Congress, will be able to reassure Congress with respect to their concerns.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Madame Guay.

[Translation]

Mrs. Monique Guay (Laurentides, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be brief. I would like to begin by saying, as my colleague already stated, that we support this resolution.

I would also like to mention that I was a member of the Canada-U.S. delegation which attended last September's meeting at which time the Bosnian question was discussed. It was made very clear to us that they wish to remain over there for peacekeeping reasons. I saw no real concerns about peacekeeping operations.

However, as international affairs critic, I would like to share with you some concerns I have about CIDA's role in Bosnia. Since 1993, CIDA has had to absorb budget cuts of $617 million and additional cuts of $150 million are planned for 1998-99. Moreover, in view of the fact that the world's population is growing increasingly impoverished, I wonder if CIDA should be taking the place of the Defence Department when it comes to initiatives such as mine-clearing operations and whether it should be co-financing de-mining activities in Bosnia. Over $100 million dollars is being spent on these operations.

I wonder if perhaps this responsibility should not be handed over to the Department of Defence instead of continuing to take money from CIDA at the expense of other developing countries and those experiencing serious hardship.

• 1650

Clearly, we have a very important role to play on the international scene, particularly in Bosnia. It is impossible to say by how many days, weeks, months, or even years we will need to extend our mission, because it is not a question of days, weeks, months or years, but rather a question of maintaining peace and helping these countries embark on the path to democracy.

Thank you.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Thank you very much.

Mrs. Augustine.

[English]

Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke—Lakeshore, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I too have a bad cold, but I went to Bosnia. I was very pleased for the opportunity to be part of that delegation. It was my first time in an environment where there were troops and military people, where there were guns, where there were landmines, and where there was an opportunity to touch, to see, to experience. I'm very pleased I had the opportunity to do that.

I came away with a sense of pride, a sense that the men and women, the troops who serve us in that area, are exactly the kind of individuals every Canadian in this country.... When we talk about pride and peacekeeping, we saw that emanating from each and every one.

Many of my colleagues around the table have spoken about the very practical things we did and saw. I want to say we were given the opportunity to freely talk to individuals. In talking to individuals and asking them questions about Canada's presence and the work they're doing, whether they were NGO, CIDA, or CARE workers, or whether they were men and women serving in the military, we had the sense they were making a difference. I think because we were able to move around and see some semblance of the return of everyday life activities, we too got a sense that the presence of our force there was important.

I want to speak to the four motions before us and ask that we seriously consider staying the course, helping the democratic process, and giving peace a chance. It is important to note that when we see peace-building in that country, by making that country secure, by making sure the democratic process is at work, we're also ensuring that Canada and life in Canada is better as a result of what we do there.

We can begin to question mandate, cost, duration, or ability to deliver, but it's crucial and most important, as we come to the end of the year, that we make this decision without talking about cost. What is the cost of peace? What do we have to invest in order to ensure there is peace in that country and there is peace in our world? It's also important for the men and women who have invested so much of their lives in the activities of reconstruction, rebuilding, peacekeeping, and ensuring that individuals are able to go about their everyday lives. These men and women tell us they want to continue and that good work is going on.

I want to join with my colleagues of the Bloc, the NDP, the PC, and my own colleagues in supporting this and trying to say to our friends in the Reform Party that this is really not the time to talk about cost and this is not the time to talk about some of the issues that it seems to me are issues for later discussion. Let's get on with the business at hand, because it is important.

• 1655

We heard from the troops and from the commanding officers that it's important for them to know and to have time to plan, to have time to ensure that they're able to have the kinds of timelines on the ground that give them the capacity to do the work.

Let's get on with the resolutions that are before us. Considering all we've seen and heard, both from experts and from our own colleagues, we should support the motion. It is important that we stay the course.

Thank you.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Thank you very much, Mrs. Augustine.

I believe Mr. Bassett had a comment regarding Madame Guay's question.

[Translation]

Mr. Charles Bassett (Vice-President, Central and Eastern Europe Branch, CIDA): I will give you a very brief answer, Mr. Chairman.

The operations that we conduct in the poorest countries have not suffered because of our operations in Bosnia. There are two components to CIDA's budget. Official development assistance accounts for 95 per cent of CIDA's overall budget, while the remaining 5 per cent is earmarked for Central and Eastern Europe. We draw on this 5 per cent to finance our operations in Bosnia. Our activities in the poorest countries do not suffer because of this.

As far as mine-clearing operations are concerned, initiatives financed by CIDA involve experts who are not part of National Defence operations. We are dealing with independent experts. The money goes to pay for the services of these experts and to fund the activities of the de-mining centre in Bosnia.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Jim, you have time for a very short comment.

Mr. Jim Wright: When the delegates were in Sarajevo, they had an opportunity to visit the Mine Action Centre. They heard from Ambassador Eide, the UN Secretary-General's special representative, on the leadership role that Canada was playing on the issue of de-mining in Bosnia. That might be of note for the committee members who weren't on the delegation.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you. That's a very helpful reminder.

I must say we were all very impressed by the mine-clearing operations we're doing in that country, and by the risk of life that our troops are put to when they undertake that very dangerous task.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Mr. Grewal.

Mr. Gurmant Grewal (Surrey Central, Ref.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just put on the table, through you, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to compliment the general for the professionalism and the role of our brave men and women in Bosnia. Both of my colleagues earlier articulated very well our views and vision for the problem we are facing today, but there is more to our policing role in Bosnia, or for that matter, in any other country where we send our peacekeeping forces.

If we study the anatomy of the civil war, I would like to give an analogy of the domestic pressure cooker. There is water in the pressure cooker, and steam forms when we put heat to it. To press this steam, we put weight on the pressure cooker. The weight that we are putting on is our police forces. But if we look into the details of why the steam is formed, there are emotions and some sociological problems in the area. There are ethnic and religious problems that exist. Looking into the history, we need to understand the situation more in detail before we commit our forces or before we join the international community in solving the problems in Bosnia.

Children are under fear and mental stress. Their personalities are formed on the foundation of the situation they are facing. Sixty percent of the population is displaced. There is a shortage of homes. There is political obstruction in the system. There is red tape. People want to return, but they cannot return due to that red tape.

• 1700

Looking into the issue of justice and democracy in those war-torn countries, there is more to be done to resolve the issue. We cannot put more pressure and stop steam from coming out until we remove the heat from the pressure cooker. So we need to study the emotions, the history, and the ethnic and religious problems in those countries. We need to have a home-grown solution in Bosnia, we need to have all the parties understand, and we need to utilize the media in dispelling the rumours that are aggravating the situation.

There should be a desire among the population and the different war factions that should lead to a democratic solution. Desire leads to power, and that power should be restored by democratic means. Once that power is created, it should lead to justice, and that justice should lead to love and peace in those countries.

We need to go through that scenario.

To remove that heat, we need to look at the sociological problems. We should not only extend our mandate by a period. That will not solve any problem. As soon as we remove the weight from the pressure cooker, we are back to square one.

We need to look at the long-term solutions and implications of these solutions and use the media and look carefully into whether we have a peacekeeping role or peace-creating roles. Probably we can blend the peacekeeping and peace-creating solutions to the problems.

I join my colleagues. I think that not only extending the mandate will solve the problem, but we probably need to broaden the mandate and diversify our role so that we find long-term solutions to such problems.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Thank you.

Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly (Victoria—Haliburton, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing us to enter into this debate.

I certainly support the extension, based solely on humanitarian grounds, knowing full well that it probably isn't a solution and that the Dayton Accord is not a perfect accord, as none ever are.

I have some problems with item 3 and the word “military”. If it weren't in there, I would be more comfortable with it, because I don't think we have the circumstances to make that commitment to our military, beyond the extension we're talking about. So I am always questioning the length of the term for which Canadian forces are going to be required there.

Of course the leadership of the overall forces under the UN is something I wanted to get reconfirmed. If I were to use the analogy of the British general in the press today, indicating that Canadian forces aren't capable because they don't discriminate against women, I would have trouble dealing with a UN force that would be headed by anyone such as Lieutenant-General Pike of the British forces. As you know, he made a very derogatory statement in the British press, and it was picked up by the local press. It casts doubt in my mind as to exactly what we are committing our forces to.

Can I be assured that that type of leadership isn't going to have any interference in the command post of our forces? That is a question I'll have to ask, I suppose.

Being able to stand alone and have adequate coverage for our troops is another point that you always have to ask. Are we sending or continuing to send our forces to theatres properly equipped, mentally, physically, and with the proper equipment? That's always the question I want to ask, and I want to have that reconfirmed.

People read the committee meetings, they watch on television, they actually comment and draw news stories from the very event we're taking part in today. I need some reconfirmation that we are having the proper capability to carry out this mission.

• 1705

I realize we weren't at the table at the Dayton Accord. I would like to think it would be very important that Canada have a seat at any future negotiations, so if there is to be a further extension beyond 1998 we are in fact taking a proactive role in it, not sitting back and following the mandate and trying to make up for a package that isn't necessarily whole. We need to reassure Canadians that we are going to be included in the whole package, both the military and civilian package, and in the NGOs that operate in that theatre.

I know I have to keep it brief because we're going over time, but I would particularly like to ask the military to comment on my dissertation about a British general who says Canada can't fight. I found that extremely troubling and asked a question about it in Question Period today. Unless I'm putting them on the spot, of course....

An hon. member: Them is fighting words.

Mr. John O'Reilly: I felt those were very much fighting words and the military should have a chance to comment on that in this forum.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): You're not suggesting we should call him as a witness before this committee to answer for his statement, are you, Mr. O'Reilly?

Mr. John O'Reilly: I think if we had a long enough rope, it might work.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): We'll go directly to Mr. Clouthier and then maybe give time for the military to answer that question afterwards.

Mr. Hec Clouthier (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Lib.): I'll keep my comments brief, because many of my comments have already been reiterated by my colleagues.

I don't believe anyone sitting at this table would disagree that we should not continue with the SFOR.

I do perhaps have a problem or two with resolutions 3 and 4, although as I review them, there are some checks and balances, words in there such as, in resolution 3, “monitor the evolving situation”. I do agree with my colleague, John O'Reilly, that instead of “military options”, you could say “considering options”. In the fourth resolution the conditionality certainly leads one to believe there will be more dialogue about that question.

On the comments about the pressure cooker, I notice it's a kind of dialectical rationale. In response to that, everyone knows if you have a pressure cooker—and I see Mr. Hanger looking at me.... We were described as the top; the military as being the part that kept the pressure in, the steam. As you well know, if you don't have all components working together on that pressure cooker, nothing gets done. I firmly believe we need the military, we need the political will, we need the people of Bosnia, all facets, working together. If we did decide to pull our Canadian military out, I believe it would have a simply devastating effect on it.

That's basically it. Everything else has been said by my colleagues. I firmly believe the only way anything gets done in a pressure cooker is by keeping all components working together. We should try to resolve that situation.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): We could go to a question period with our witnesses. I know Mr. O'Reilly had a few questions about the worthiness of our Canadian military troops and what Colonel Pike, I believe, thought of our military troops.

LGen R.R. Crabbe: First, about the question on leadership, I would submit that the leadership that exists in theatre from a Canadian point of view is very sound, as is the chain of command to deal with Canadian issues.

As the commander of all forces abroad, on behalf of the Chief of Defence Staff, I can tell you I'm in virtual daily contact with the commanders in the field representing Canadians and Canadian soldiers in Bosnia and doing extremely well. The contingent commander is there to make sure our interests are looked after in every respect, and it's fair to say that in this particular case it's done very well.

• 1710

With respect to the equipment, the training, and the mental and physical preparation, I would say there are two types of training that occur before troops are deployed to Bosnia. One is combat-capable training. The second is mission-specific training, which deals with those issues unique to the mission in which the soldiers are about to be engaged. That lasts anywhere from three to six months, depending on the complexity of the mission.

If I can be diplomatic about replying to what I think Mr. O'Reilly is getting at, I would simply say that I would stack Canadians soldiers up against any soldier, anywhere in the world, anytime, notwithstanding any comments to the contrary.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Thank you very much.

I believe Monsieur Turp had a question.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: While we were in Bosnia, and I believe it was the first day that we visited the SFOR headquarters, we asked several high-ranking SFOR officials, one U.S. General and one French General, whether NATO needed a certain amount of lead time to prepare for a second operation, that is one that would be conducted after June 30, 1998. This explains the reference to NATO planners in paragraph 3.

Could you tell us if, in your opinion, it is very important, when preparing for a future mission, to have several months' lead time?

LGen R.R. Crabbe: Basically, this mission is an extension of the current mission to Bosnia. A unit in Petawawa is currently preparing for this mission which, depending on the government's decision, will commence in January.

Mr. Daniel Turp: In your opinion, to prepare properly for a future mission, that is one that will be conducted after June 30, 1998, is it very important for NATO to know in the next few months, and we are suggesting December because of the important NATO meetings scheduled, whether NATO will be participating in a new force after June 30, 1998?

For the purposes of NATO's planning requirements, do you think it is important that we know as soon as possible whether NATO will be participating in a new force?

LGen R.R. Crabbe: Certainly. It is preferable to know in advance which countries will be sending troops to participate in the force after January or June and even further on down the road.

Mr. Daniel Turp: I would like to know if Mr. Wright has an opinion on this subject.

Mr. Jim Wright: I fully agree with the general. As you know, every six months, a review is conducted at NATO in cooperation with the Office of the High Representative. Certainly, it is preferable to know in advance what the new mandate will be of a military follow-on force after SFOR. However, in reality, I believe that through the NATO process and the Office of the High Representative, along with the follow-up committee of which Canada is a member, it will be possible to influence the mandate as well as the level of participation of all countries.

• 1715

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you. Mr. Brison.

[English]

Mr. Scott Brison: I have one question, and it's a fairly simple question with probably a fairly complex answer. How important to the future of NATO is the success of SFOR, in your opinions? I'd appreciate your feedback on that.

Mr. Jim Wright: The exercise in Bosnia is extremely important to NATO. It represents the most creative and dynamic process that NATO has engaged in since the collapse of the former Soviet Union. It is engaging members of the former Warsaw Pact: Russia, Ukraine, Poland, and the Czech Republic. It sets new standards for peacekeeping and for security in Europe. So I would say that for the NATO leadership today, it is extremely important that our collective experience in Bosnia be a wholehearted success, and to date it has certainly been so.

LGen R.R. Crabbe: I would simply add, having been in on the front end of the planning a while back, that in the process of looking at the force requirements and support, this was very much an overarching factor with respect to the planning that took place to ensure success was achieved.

Mr. Scott Brison: Thank you.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Mr. Clouthier, I believe you had a question.

Mr. Hec Clouthier: I'd like to address this question to General Crabbe.

Before I ask you the question, General, I'd like to congratulate you on being named the deputy. I know you're worthy of the job. You and I go back a long way. I remember when you were base commander at Petawawa, we worked together on many occasions.

General, I believe the physical aspect of our troops is not in question whatsoever. What does concern me a bit, and perhaps you could elucidate on this, is there's certainly a dichotomy of emotions when they go to a foreign land. It's a different lifestyle and they're away from family and friends. Is any training given to our troops in that regard, in the emotional aspect? As you well know, on occasion, that's where some of the problems have raised their head. It's never with the physical end of it, because our troops are—I agree with you—among the best in the world, but I'm a little concerned about the range of emotions that must go through our young men and young women when they're doing peacekeeping duties throughout the world.

LGen R.R. Crabbe: Absolutely. There's no question that the mental preparation is very much a part of the pre-deployment training I was referring to earlier, and there are various parts and aspects of this that are very deliberately built into the training program prior to soldiers deploying.

There's been, as you can appreciate, a substantial switch in what soldiers are now being subjected to under SFOR versus UNPROFOR when I was serving there. In terms of what we heard in the earlier discussions about the ethnic cleansing, the killing, the shooting, the bombing, and the awful things that were taking place, these things have essentially ceased.

So the mental challenge for the soldiers now is the time away from home. It is the fact that they're now going back for the second, third, or fourth tour in some instances, and that requires a great deal of preparation for them, and equally important—and in my opinion, more important—for the families, to ensure they understand we can support their families back here in Canada while they're over serving on the part of this country.

• 1720

Mr. Hec Clouthier: As a follow-up, General, when the troops are on an actual peacekeeping mission, is there any person there, military or otherwise, available to the troops to discuss various problems with them, other than the military aspect?

LGen R.R. Crabbe: Certainly within the contingent in Bosnia right now they have their own chain of command plus the padres and social workers, and indeed access to people back here in Canada.

If there is a specific need, we will very quickly dispatch individuals to Bosnia for that very purpose.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Thank you very much.

[Translation]

Mrs. Venne.

Mrs. Pierrette Venne (Saint-Bruno—Saint Hubert, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, sirs.

I have to tell you that after seeing Canadian troops on site in Bosnia, we came to the conclusion that they were prepared to extend their mandate.

Having said this, I do have an additional question for you. Do you know if women will be part of the combat units embarking on next January's mission? Has there been any mention of this? Do we now know if women will be taking part?

I would have another question for you after that.

LGen R.R. Crabbe: There will most certainly be women in the next unit taking part in the mission.

Mrs. Pierrette Venne: This means that there is a likelihood that they will find themselves under Mr. Pike's command. I feel very sorry for them.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Mr. Pike is British.

Mrs. Pierrette Venne: Yes, I know. However, from what I have heard, he is stationed in the north-west sector of the country. It is my understanding that he is responsible for the north-west sector that we visited. Isn't that right?

LGen R.R. Crabbe: That calls for a technical answer.

[English]

I will try to answer your question in English.

General Pike will be the deputy commander for operations of SFOR, which translated essentially means he will be the deputy commander of SFOR.

Canadian troops are under Canadian command. That doesn't change. They're under operational control—I'll try to avoid getting too technical here—of a British officer, currently General Pringle, who is the commander of sector MND south-west, it's currently called, in Bosnia.

General Pringle will work for General Pike. The chain of command for operational control will be from Pike to Pringle to the Canadians—only, in other words, for the conduct of the operation in the Canadian sector. But Canadian command is still exerted from the Chief of Defence Staff and so on.

[Translation]

Mrs. Pierrette Venne: I see. However, I wonder if there may be some way of exerting more pressure so that this individual is not in the same vicinity. Do you think it would be possible to exert this kind of pressure?

LGen R.R. Crabbe: That's a political matter, I would think.

Mrs. Pierrette Venne: Perhaps. However, I would like to know who the players in this whole incident are. Normally, this kind of decision involves the military.

LGen R.R. Crabbe: I'm not certain that Canada has the power to influence the appointment of the commander. Perhaps the government has this power, but I really don't know. The decision as to the commander of the SFOR in Bosnia is certainly not a military decision.

Ms. Pierrette Venne: I understand that this is not a military decision, but I do certainly think that we can try to exert some pressure.

Mrs. Monique Guay: We will do that.

Mrs. Pierrette Venne: We're certainly going to exert some pressure, but I would imagine that as military officers, you will be trying to do the same thing. It couldn't have been a very pleasant experience to be treated in this manner. I would imagine that you are planning to react. Certainly there is nothing to prevent you from doing so. Or is there?

• 1725

Mr. Hec Clouthier: That's a good question.

Mrs. Pierrette Venne: I would like to ask that question directly at this time.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Perhaps you will not be able to get an answer here.

Mrs. Pierrette Venne: If an answer is not forthcoming, then let's move on.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Mr. Hanger.

[English]

Mr. Art Hanger: Thank you. I have two questions for either or both Lieutenant-General Crabbe and Rear Admiral King. The first is on deployment of troops and the second is on Canada's military involvement in the reconstruction side with the civilian authorities in Bosnia.

First, on the deployment of troops, if a demand for a Canadian contingent suddenly evolved out of the Middle East, could we send the same sized contingent of troops and equipment into the Middle East as we have in Bosnia right now?

LGen R.R. Crabbe: Are you asking if we have the capacity to do that within the current force structure?

Mr. Art Hanger: Yes.

LGen R.R. Crabbe: The answer to your question is yes.

Mr. Art Hanger: How long would it take to get that size of contingent to the Middle East if we had to do a similar type of process?

LGen R.R. Crabbe: Obviously that would depend on the requirements when they arrived in theatre, that is, the type of mission they would be required to undertake. If you're referring to the same kind of operation that's currently ongoing in Bosnia, I think it would be hard to put a day figure on that. Certainly it would take some days to prepare the force for that operation, with the training and that kind of preparation, plus the deployment time to get them from Canada to wherever that might be.

Mr. Art Hanger: So it would take a considerable amount of time.

LGen R.R. Crabbe: Yes, sir.

Mr. Art Hanger: If this engagement required us to be involved in a local, conventional, high-intensity war, would we have the capabilities and training, as the situation is right now in our military?

LGen R.R. Crabbe: Again, I'm trying to answer a hypothetical question. The future of our operations is certainly a coalition approach to that, which means we would be fighting alongside our allies and sharing the burden, if you like, on various combat functions and capabilities in order to accomplish that.

The short answer to your question is yes, we could do that. We have the capability and we have the troops trained in combat operations to be able to do that, with the adjunct that you would need the pre-deployment training that would prepare them specifically for the type of mission, the type of terrain on which they would be fighting on arrival, and so on.

Mr. Art Hanger: I was led to believe that keeping that number of troops in the theatre of Bosnia has really put quite a strain on our ground troops, because of the rotation and the frequency of the rotation. If another situation developed that required Canada's participation, would we be able to fulfil a commitment like that again and still maintain long-term troop rotation and equipment?

LGen R.R. Crabbe: Again, the answer is yes. The difficulty we had a few years ago, of course, was we were attempting to sustain around 5,000 troops at that time serving outside Canada. We had Bosnia plus Croatia, Rwanda, the Middle East, and Haiti. That has now geared down to essentially Haiti plus Bosnia, with our other UN commitments in the Middle East of 200 or 300. So the sustainment of another mission of about the size of Bosnia is very much within the capability of the Canadian forces today, yes.

• 1730

Mr. Art Hanger: Okay.

Finally, understanding NATO's commitment to SFOR and the Dayton agreement, which also involves assisting the civil authorities in the restructuring there, has that mandate been stretched beyond Dayton, involving our military in projects that really aren't specified in Dayton?

LGen R.R. Crabbe: Speaking specifically for the Canadian contingent?

Mr. Art Hanger: Yes.

LGen R.R. Crabbe: No, it has not, in the sense that the primary mission of the Canadian contingent is to provide a stable environment in which the civilian portions of Dayton can be implemented—that is, through the NGOs and the international organizations that are in-country.

In a perfect world, of course, the wind-down of the military would occur as those organizations took over those responsibilities. The security requirements—the security blanket, if you like—could be reduced and eventually eliminated. That would occur in a perfect world. Heaven knows Yugoslavia is not a perfect world. We all know that.

The humanitarian projects in which Canadian soldiers get involved are very much a hearts-and-minds type of thing, done secondary to the security aspects I referred to. They are involved in those types of projects on very much a planned basis, but only after fulfilling the initial commitment of providing the stability and security required within their own sector.

Mr. Art Hanger: So you wouldn't see these humanitarian efforts performed by the military as an expansion beyond what is required through the Dayton aspect, or as developing another reason to maintain our presence—a replacement, if you will—in Bosnia.

LGen R.R. Crabbe: If you're asking me whether the military should take on that role, the answer is no, we're not in that business. But as for the stability and security aspect of the reason they are in the Bihac area, part of that, as you can appreciate, would be to do what we can, with whatever resources we have, to fix schools, to fix bridges, to help in the hospitals, to fix roads, and those kinds of things, which of course contributes in a much broader context to the security and stability within that area.

Mr. Art Hanger: Thank you.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Mr. Mills.

Mr. Bob Mills: I have a lot of questions, but at this point, just three, really, that I'd like answered, very briefly.

One concern I have is the use of tendered ballots during the election process. Approximately 39 municipalities, I understand, used a voters' list in which where you lived in 1991 was what counted. It wasn't where you lived at the time; it was where you lived in 1991. As a result, there were an awful lot of tendered ballots. A lot of people living in other places had been ethnically cleansed to other places and so on.

It would seem to me this was a plan that could never work. Do you see any implementation of these elections or a change of the elections, with a new voters' list? How is that problem going to be addressed?

Second, for our military gentlemen, I want to tell you that I was pretty proud, as a Canadian, to go to a school with Canadian and Bosnian flags in it, and to have the local people tell me, “Canada did that”. That made me proud as a Canadian.

Another thing that made me proud as a Canadian, when we were out in a border town, totally lost, with mines and disaster all around us, was to see in front of me that Canadian flag and that Canadian troop carrier. I must admit that patriotism was at a very high level at that point in time, somewhere north of Bihac; I have no idea where.

• 1735

It really bothers me that we were not part of the contact group initially in Bosnia. Look at our commitment: we were first there, more or less, and we weren't part of the contact group. Then we weren't part of the Dayton Accord. I want to know what kind of input we have in what happens, from a military perspective, in SFOR. I really felt that as Canadians we were second-class citizens in our first two efforts.

There are two sides there.

RAdm J.A. King: I can't answer the question on the contact group as to whether or not we were actually invited and declined to participate at the time.

What is significant is that on the military side, of course we consult with our military representative in NATO, and since this has been a NATO mission under the auspices of the United Nations, we feel we have every bit as much say in the operation, and I think we've demonstrated that on a number of occasions. You may recall the incident over bombing some time ago, when Canada took a very active part in discussing this issue and forming opinion amongst the allies.

So in the day-to-day military operations and the planning that goes on for the future, we feel we have a very strong part to play. We consult widely, and in fact have been doing so recently about possible future options. We're quite comfortable in that regard.

LGen R.R. Crabbe: With respect to the contact group, way back when the United Nations was running the show there, I would share with you the frustration. As a Canadian fulfilling a United Nations senior position, I was frustrated at times, because we had, to be perfectly frank, individuals who simply did not know what was going on. Canadians did know what was going on, and it was unfortunate that we weren't able to contribute in that respect to the contact group.

I don't want this to sound pretentious, but I think we were able to influence it through the positions that I and others held when the contact group was in the throes of their deliberations.

Mr. Jim Wright: On the second question, Mr. Mills, the military decisions with respect to SFOR will be taken in NATO, and Canada of course is represented around the table and plays a leadership role there.

On the complementary side, the civilian implementation part of Dayton, we of course are on the steering board as part of the Peace Implementation Council. That council meets every month. Canada is represented at these meetings, and I think we play more than our part in guiding the civilian peace implementation process that complements very carefully what SFOR is doing on the ground.

With respect to the first question you raised on the issue of tendered ballots, refugees are a fact of life in the war in Bosnia. We're still dealing with huge populations of refugees, both inside and outside Bosnia. The process of tendered ballots was introduced to ensure that ethnic cleansing was not a fact of life, that we gave people the opportunity to vote in their original homesteads.

Whether those individuals decide to come back or not is still uncertain. We are seeing limited refugee returns to date. We are seeing refugees return where they are in the majority: Bosniacs are returning to areas where there are Bosniac majorities, Croats are returning where there are Croat majorities, and the same with Serbs.

Where we're running into difficulties, not surprisingly, is in situations such as the one in Drvar, where you have a minority group currently in control of a city council, and yet a majority from another ethnic group has gone ahead and ensured that their ethnic group has taken a majority position in the municipal elections.

• 1740

The implementation process is going to take time. It has only just started. We remain optimistic that given the right climate and with the important role SFOR plays in terms of backstopping the civilian peace implementation process, refugee returns will be facilitated.

The issue came up earlier about property rights, and that is a fundamental to Dayton. We need to ensure that individuals who want to return can return and that those who decide they will not return to their own homesteads are at least compensated for their old homesteads. That is a fundamental issue that the office of the High Representative, Mr. Westendorp, is actively pursuing right now with all of the parties in Bosnia, with the full support of the international community, including Canada.

Mr. Bob Mills: We still have that situation where we now have a 95% Bosniac population, a duly elected Serbian mayor, and the impossibility of ever implementing or carrying through on that election. I just wonder how that's going to be resolved.

Mr. Jim Wright: It's going to be resolved very slowly. The delegation that was on the ground in Bosnia had an opportunity to talk to the OSCE, which is playing a front-line role in the election implementation process.

One of the difficulties the OSCE had while we were in Bosnia was that their priority at that time was the preparation for the national assembly election in the Republic of Srpska, so not an awful lot of progress has been made in terms of implementing those important election results from the municipal elections across Bosnia. That will be a priority later in December or in January. It's going to take time and it's going to take a lot of effort on behalf of the international community, the OSCE, SFOR, and others to ensure that those who want to return have the opportunity to return.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I have one quick question. I'd like to follow up on an observation made by Mr. Mills during the debate, which was that in fact the amount of aid being given is totally skewed in favour of the Bosniac side rather than the Serbian side.

My understanding of the results of our trip is, while that might have been said in the beginning, that was a part of the policy to encourage at least those on the Serbian side who wanted to cooperate with Dayton and to cooperate with a framework of a political democracy and a pluralistic society. And those who weren't willing to cooperate of course wouldn't get it. There's no point in giving aid to Mr. Karadzic, for example.

But when we were there we saw our ambassador give money to Mrs. Plasvic for reconstruction of a police academy. We saw him give money for drugs or give actual drugs. So my understanding is that the current policy is to aid those elements within the Republic of Srpska that are cooperating with the peace agreement and cooperating with the democratization efforts.

I just wondered if my understanding is right, whether you or someone else could tell us, Mr. Wright, if the 95% to 5% ratio is changing, and if so, how much, in favour of a more equitable distribution amongst all the parties.

Mr. Jim Wright: Mr. Chairman, you're absolutely correct. There was a time in the first year after the war that a very small percentage of the reconstruction moneys coming in from the international community were being directed to the Republic of Srpska, in large part simply because of the recalcitrant attitude of the Bosnian-Serb leadership. They were not willing to support the spirit or the letter of the Dayton agreement, and a decision was taken by the international community, through the good offices of the High Representative, first Mr. Bildt and now Mr. Westendorp, to go ahead and exercise what we call positive and negative conditionality with respect to all communities in Bosnia, not just the Republic of Srpska.

• 1745

The Republic of Srpska comes to mind, given the scale of the problems we are running into with the leadership, but the examples you pointed to with respect to Canadian assistance recently with Mrs. Plasvic are very good cases in point.

We believe that the policy of conditionality is working. It was slow to start off with, given the scale of the economic assistance moneys that were flowing into Bosnia and the number of players on the ground, but the Office of the High Representative has devoted an enormous amount of time to work closely with the major international donors and the international financial institutions to ensure there is coherence in the technical assistance programs going into Bosnia.

Where we see support for the spirit and letter of Dayton, we are encouraging the international community to go ahead and provide economic incentives to those communities.

Certainly, Mrs. Plasvic is a very important player on the scene in the Republic of Srbska right now. We are hoping that her very pragmatic approach to Dayton.... When we met with her, she said she had not been at the signing of Dayton, but that she respected the agreement and wanted to see it implemented.

So by providing positive conditionality for individuals like Mrs. Plasvic and the communities she represents, we send a very clear signal to the people of Bosnia that if you work within the spirit and letter of Dayton, you'll be supported by the international community.

We think that's already starting to pay dividends. We saw it in the case of President Tudjman a little while ago in terms of the pressure that was brought to bear on him by the international community on the issue of war criminals. And prior to the delegation's visit to Bosnia, ten Croatians who were indicted war criminals turned themselves in voluntarily to the court. That was entirely as a consequence of the policy of conditionality that was being applied at the highest level against the Croatian authorities.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): That draws to an end both the debate and the questions. Our colleagues from the Bloc told us that they have an important meeting at 6 p.m., which gives us about 12 minutes.

I would propose this. Our colleagues, parliamentary secretaries, and various members around the table have been looking at an alternative to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution.

Paragraphs 1 and 2 have been accepted by all parties at the table. That's our understanding.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Yes.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Mr. Bertrand and I propose that I will read out the proposed changes, which have been shown to everyone, for an aid to translation. Then, if they're acceptable, we could proceed immediately to a vote, and hopefully we can terminate this prior to 6 p.m.

As proposed, alternative paragraph 3 would read:

Canada should monitor the evolving situation in Bosnia and discuss with allies the question of a follow-on force after SFOR.

That's the same as the previous one.

In the event that such a force proves necessary, permission should now be given to allow NATO planners to begin considering alternative arrangements. In the event of any further extension of the mandate, there should be a precise definition of that mandate, with provisions for regular review. The review should consider the exact terms of the mandate, the costs, and the ability to deliver on the mandate, any debate thereon should take place in the House.

That was Mr. Turp's recommendation during his observations.

Paragraph 4 would read:

Canada should continue its own reconstruction activities, with particular emphasis on progress to constitutional government, reconstruction, and accentuation of civilian peace implementation in all parts of Bosnia, with better account for ethno-cultural differences.

That, as I understand it, has been—

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Mr. Chairman, I can't really read this, and I'm not prepared to vote on an amendment that I can't have at least a minute or two to think about. If I can't read it, I can't think about it.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I had the advantage of having the clerk rewrite in a legible language. So maybe, Madam Beaumier, if others had some observations, I could have the clerk give you the more legible copy. I don't disagree with—

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: I think that most of the men understand what it is because it was discussed with them. Unfortunately, we—

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I'm sorry, that was an intention to try to move the process along among the various representatives of the parties. The parliamentary secretary for the Liberal Party has accepted the amendment on behalf of the government, so those were just the discussions that took place.

• 1750

But by all means, I certainly agree that you should read it before voting.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: There was no one who spoke to the official spokesmen of the three parties present, and the two parliamentary secretaries.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): It may be that other parties have an observation too. I think Mr. Turp had one as well. Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: I have a simple question which I hope will clarify matters. I fully agree that this issue should be debated in the House of Commons. However, this doesn't preclude in any way the holding by this committee or by the joint committee of a preliminary debate.

Am I correct in assuming that the debate could take place here in this committee and then continue in the House of Commons?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): The issue could be debated by each individual committee or by our two committees meeting jointly.

However, my understanding was that this time around, the five parties in the House agreed that the question should be debated by the two committees in this forum. Therefore, by mentioning in our resolution that any debate on this topic should take place in the House, clearly all five parties would be allowed to have their say. However, as Chairman of this committee, I'm certain that this matter will once again be brought to our attention.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Therefore, provided we haven't dismissed the notion that the debate could also take place in committee to allow for a more effective and thorough examination, I have no objections to holding a debate in the House of Commons, as we discussed in Bosnia.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Agreed.

[English]

With his usual consideration for everyone, Mr. Hanger has suggested that we might release our witnesses while we consider this. Depending on Madame Beaumier and Madame Longfield, however, I had hoped that we could.... We might be just a few minutes. Perhaps you wouldn't mind staying, because during the course of the terminology a question might come up that you might be able to shed some light on.

While the discussion is taking place, maybe I could just say thank you to our witnesses for having come here to inform us during this debate. We're grateful to you. Your observations have been extremely helpful and have informed the debate. I think your presence here, in the way in which the debate took place, illustrates the new role that parliamentary committees are taking in the process. In making sure that our own discussions are based on fact and proper deliberation, I think we can have more informed debates by having the advantage of the quality of representation that we've had here today.

I might also signal the presence in the room of Colonel Hug, who accompanied us on our trip to Bosnia and kept us safe from all harm. We're glad to see that he's also present with us, because he's still keeping us from harm even back here in Canada.

Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Mr. Chairman, I would like to say for the benefit of our committee and for those listening to us that I found today's meeting to have been somewhat disorganized. I think that we owe it to future witnesses to hear them in a more orderly fashion.

In order to achieve this consensus, we held a number of small group discussions and in my view, this is not the best way to proceed. If ever we are called upon again to draft a joint statement, I think that members of the steering committees should hold some preparatory meetings first. Then, a meeting like this one would hopefully not turn into a series of separate discussions, preventing us from truly appreciating the testimony and responses giving and from holding an in-depth debate.

I'm recommending this for the future, and for the sake of all those listening to us.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): For your information, Mr. Turp, these individuals were not here as witnesses, but rather, as far as I understood it, as resource persons whom we could consult if necessary.

Mr. Daniel Turp: I understand that, but I'm not alone in thinking that the approach we took this afternoon was not the best one. There were too many small group discussions which prevented us from focusing on the issues at hand.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I fully agree with your suggestion, particularly since the last time I proposed that a drafting committee be set up, Mr. Bergeron, your predecessor on this committee, flatly rejected my suggestion.

• 1755

Therefore, today's situation is a direct result of the rejection by the Bloc of the option I proposed last time.

Mr. Daniel Turp: You should have insisted, Mr. Chairman.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I heartily endorse your suggestion.

[English]

Madam Beaumier had an observation.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: “Better account for ethnic and cultural differences”: I'm not sure exactly what the implications of that are, or what it even means.

Mr. Bob Mills: Basically what we were trying to accommodate there is that the Dayton Accord did not consider history, did not consider religion, did not consider the ethnic backgrounds and the complexity of history. It went about it as if “we won't count on anything, they are all the same”. Well, you can't do it that way, because they have 1,500 years of history there and you must consider those ethnic backgrounds, those differences which exist between people, because that's the reality of Bosnia. I think Mr. McWhinney came up with the term, but it was a matter of let's consider all those historical, cultural differences which are there and make sure they are part of the decision.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: So are we actually saying we have to make changes to the Dayton Accord?

Mr. Bob Mills: The reality is that you may have to have a revision as it changes. But that's not up to us to do.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: All right. I understand.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): At the central meeting of NATO substantial changes were made to the obligations to be enforced under the Dayton Accord, for example. It's an evolving document. It will be revised. But I don't think that goes any more than saying that. I don't think it's saying we're going to throw the Dayton Accord out.

Mr. Brison, you had an observation.

Mr. Scott Brison: Yes. It's on Mr. Turp's comments. You may have noticed that our caucus today was united and there was very little distraction. We reach these types of decisions quickly. I would warn my peers, though, that this situation might change dramatically in about four years, so I can't always guarantee—

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Mr. Brison, there are moments when we try to be non-partisan in this committee, and there are moments when we are partisan. We're all very clever about it.

It's now 6 p.m. May I take it that we have consensus that the chairs be authorized to report our reports to the House, separately as each chair, as we are obliged to do?

Mr. John Richardson: I so move.

[Translation]

Provided the French version is reviewed by the...

Mr. Daniel Turp: There isn't one at the moment.

[English]

Ms. Jean Augustine: Are we satisfied with the wording on this?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Yes.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: If Jean wishes we could strike “...better made with due account”.

[Inaudible—Editor] There is no mention of the Dayton Accord. I think it's an anodyne formulation, acceptable to both ministers, but “with due account” would remove the evaluative element.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): “With due account”: is that all right? —Yes, that's accepted.

[Translation]

Agreed.

Briefly, Mr. Sauvageau has something he would like to say to the members of the Foreign Affairs and International Trade Committee.

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: We have received a note from the Clerk asking us if we would consider inviting Mr. Harry Wu to meet with the committee this coming November 27. I am formally requesting at this time that we extend an invitation to him.

• 1800

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): For the members of the foreign affairs committee, Mr. Sauvageau has drawn to our attention that we received a letter indicating that Mr. Harry Wu will be here in Ottawa and would we be willing to hear him before the committee. He is the prominent Chinese dissident.

Madam Beaumier, who's the chair of the human rights subcommittee, would it be the wish of the members that it be before the entire committee or before the human rights subcommittee? Could we discuss that in the procedures committee, as to whether it should be before the entire committee or the subcommittee?

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: It might be a good idea to have him before the full committee because of the magnitude of the APEC and other—

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): It will be in conjunction with the visit of the Prime Minister of China, who will be in town at the same time.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Sounds good to me.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Very well. I take it we have authority to report this to the House.

I'd like to thank all the members for their cooperation, and again thank our witnesses for coming.

The foreign affairs committee is adjourned until tomorrow at 9 a.m., when Mary Clancy will be our witness.