NDVA Committee Report

 

HOUSE OF COMMONS
CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES
OTTAWA, CANADA
K1A 0A6

 

 

REPORT ON PLANS AND PRIORITIES

 

            Pursuant to Standing Orders 81(7) and (8), the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs has the honour to present its

SECOND REPORT

            The Committee, after considering Part III – Plans and Priorities of the Estimates 2001-2002 of the Department of National Defence, has agreed to table the following report :

 

            For the Canadian Forces, the post-cold war era has proven something of a mixed blessing.  The war in Europe, for which we had prepared for so long during the Cold War, ceased to be even a remote possibility by the early 1990s.  Though still retaining our membership in NATO, we were finally able to bring our troops home since the safety of the “central front” was now guaranteed by the demise of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, our European allies had grown increasingly capable of defending themselves and became ever more inclined to define their security needs in European terms.  While NATO remained the most important alliance, there was increasing talk of a European security and defence identity with interests not always necessarily the same as those of its Trans-Atlantic partners.  However, Canada remains concerned about European security issues and will continue to play a strong role in NATO.

 

            Another important aspect of the new reality was that national decision-makers could focus on other urgent matters.  For many, including our own, this entailed the rebuilding of stagnant, debt-ridden economies.  If the Soviet threat was gone, it only stood to reason that our rather extensive military structures could be pared back.  The concern now was the “red” ink of annual deficits.

 

            All Allied militaries saw their budgets cut and troop complements reduced.  However, the Canadian Forces (CF) may have paid more than their fair share in their contribution to debt reduction.  Some have argued that Canadians had already reaped their “peace dividend” with reductions in the 1970s and late 1980s.  Reductions in the 1990s were seen by many as a burden that the Canadian Forces would not be able to shoulder – especially given what was being asked of them. 

 

            A particular irony of the post-cold war period, for the CF, was that life actually became increasingly busy.  As the defence budget was cut, Canadian troops were faced with increased deployments and casualties.  Canadians were still the preferred peacekeepers and invariably went when asked.  But, as the Medak Pocket operation clearly demonstrated, peacekeeping had taken on a new reality.  Deploying for peacekeeping might well mean deploying for combat. 

 

            In the last decade, the CF have twice gone into combat – first against Iraq and then during the Kosovo campaign.  During the same period they participated in numerous difficult peacekeeping operations and in domestic deployments such as the ice storm while continuing their day-to-day duties in search and rescue, the protection of Canadian sovereignty and, in partnership with the United States, the defence of North America. Throughout these years the CF were continually asked to do more with less. 

 

            In light of the problems faced by the Canadian military, our Committee decided to undertake a series of studies to ensure that the CF were properly prepared for the challenges facing them.  Our work was done in full recognition of the fact that cutbacks, in support of deficit reduction, were necessary.  But, once the deficit problem was solved, and the economy was again on a sound footing, it became reasonable to expect an injection of new funding for the CF. Some progress has been made in this regard, but more is needed.

            Our first major undertaking was the study on the quality of life of the Canadian Forces, tabled in October 1998.  As a result of budget cuts and wage limits, many serving members found it more and more difficult to tend to their families and to enjoy a reasonable standard of living.  The increase in operational tempo placed much stress on both serving members and their families, while post-traumatic stress disorder as well as physical casualties became increasingly prevalent given the fundamentally different nature of peacekeeping operations.

 

            We decided that the first priority was to ensure that our serving men and women would be guaranteed fair compensation for their work and sacrifice and that their families would be cared for.  Those injured were to be assured the best possible care.

 

            Our quality of life report accomplished much and we were all encouraged by the response of the Minister and his efforts to ensure the implementation of our recommendations.  The first stage in regenerating the CF was to ensure proper treatment, respect and care for our serving members and their families.  We are confident that the Government will continue its efforts in this regard.  It is a matter we have pledged to monitor on a continuing basis.

 

            We next dealt with the issue of procurement.  Over the years, we had heard much about the cumbersome nature of the procurement process and the unwarranted time delays in equipment purchases.  As a Committee we have always agreed that the members of the Canadian Forces deserve the best equipment available for the tasks at hand and that such equipment be provided in an efficient and timely manner.  As evidence of our commitment in this regard, our report on procurement recommended that the government move forward with a national shipbuilding policy.

 

            We are still awaiting the Government’s official response to our report on procurement and have every hope and confidence that the recommendations contained therein will be given proper consideration.  Procurement need not be a cumbersome process, and it is very much in the interests of all concerned that streamlining take place as quickly as possible.

 

            Our current project entails a thorough examination of the “operational readiness” of the Canadian Forces.  The third leg of our triad was undertaken to ensure that the CF are prepared and equipped to do what is asked of them.  Military personnel must be confident that they and their families are cared for, that they receive necessary equipment in a timely fashion, and that they are trained and properly equipped to perform the tasks they are asked to do.  We cannot afford to downplay the importance of any of these three elements. 

 

            The CF will have to be prepared to deal with a wide variety of situations ranging from providing assistance to humanitarian operations in the wake of natural disasters to full-scale combat operations.  Our multi-layered defence commitments require forces that are ready to operate anywhere in the world as well as at home. 

 

            In meeting these challenges, the CF must also deal with the demands of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and the need to be able to deploy with our allies, especially the Americans.  Interoperability is a major element of readiness, and our ability to perform in this regard will go a long way in determining the kinds of missions in which we will be able to participate.  Considerable resources will be required to ensure interoperability with our allies and to keep abreast of the demands of the RMA.

 

            Needless to say, questions have been asked with respect to the ability of the CF to meet these challenges.  Indeed, a rather fundamental question is increasingly being put forward, namely:  “Exactly what roles do we want the Canadian Forces to perform?”  Or, as the serving members of the CF have themselves stated: “Tell us what you want us to do and then give us the resources to do it!”  This refrain was heard countless times during our quality of life study.

            Official government policy in this regard is still the 1994 Defence White Paper.  Yet, some claim that, if called upon, the CF would be hard pressed to meet the commitments set out by official policy.

 

            We have also been witness to considerable debate over the question of whether or not the CF are as combat capable as they were ten years ago. We are still in the process of investigating this issue, but we can offer an observation.  When we speak about “combat capable forces” we have to make a distinction between the individual and the force structure of which he or she may be a part.

 

            There can be no question that CF personnel have gained much experience through repeated and varied deployments over the last decade which many of those who served during the Cold War never gained.  Today’s serving men and women have confronted challenges never envisaged by those that stood ready on NATO’s central front.  Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that today’s CF personnel – as individuals – are as combat capable, if not more so, than their comrades of earlier years.  However, this is not the same as arguing that the overall “system”, for lack of a better term, is as combat capable as it was ten years ago.

 

            We have also heard about the lack of resources for training and problems of unit cohesion because our deployed Land Force contingents often have to be cobbled together from whatever units are available.  Insufficient training, coupled with a lack of unit cohesion, can prove to be a recipe for disaster. If the CF are to continue to perform their duties with the skill and professionalism they have come to be recognized for, they must also be able to recruit and retain the requisite personnel.  Recent evidence suggests that the military faces both recruitment and retention problems.

 

            In order to be able to operate with our allies, we also have to be able to get to where we are needed.  “Early in – early out” makes little sense if we can only go by buying a ticket on someone else’s ride.  And, once deployed, we need to be able to sustain our commitment.  Adequate strategic lift is therefore something that we must have access to.

 

            It is in this context that we examined the Estimates for the Department of National Defence for 2001-2002.  It is the monies provided in the Estimates that, in the end, will determine whether we have adequate resources to ensure the quality of life of our personnel and to provide all the training and munitions required. 

 

            Given the urgency of the issues before us we have decided to take advantage of the Standing Orders that empower Committees to “…consider and report upon the expenditure plans and priorities in future fiscal years of the departments and agencies whose estimates are before it.”

 

            If there is one thing upon which we can all agree it is that our personnel deserve the best equipment available.  The risks involved in flying old shipborne helicopters in the North Atlantic or in the Pacific Ocean are well known and require no illustration here.  As well, the operational capabilities of our frigates remain limited in the absence of a modern helicopter.  In keeping with Recommendation 38 in our Procurement Study for the immediate tendering of a contract for the replacement of the Sea King helicopters, we recommend:

 

1.      That the government proceeds as quickly as possible with the Maritime Helicopter Project to ensure that the delivery of the replacements for the Sea King helicopters begins in 2005.

 

And furthermore:

 

2.      That the government explain why the current milestones for the Maritime Helicopter Project are now many months later than those indicated in the 2001-2002 Estimates tabled in Parliament.

 

If the Canadian Forces are to be properly equipped, there must be stability in the procurement budget.  We therefore recommend:

 

3.      That expenditures on capital expenditures be set as quickly as possible at a minimum of 23% of the departmental budget, but that this goal should not be achieved at the expense of other programs such as quality of life or by downsizing personnel levels.

 

4.      That in fiscal year 2002-2003, the Department be prepared to come before SCONDVA with a clear timeline for the achievement of this objective.

 

While adequate capital budgets are an essential aspect of defence planning and effectiveness, personnel are indispensable.  Recent trends suggest that there is a serious recruitment and retention problem in the Canadian Forces.  We have not yet studied this in detail, but our collective experience convinces us that a complement of 60,000 personnel is the minimum required for the CF to remain an effective force.  Despite the rhetoric about technology and the probability that RMA will increase our combat effectiveness, we need to remember that peacekeeping is done by individuals on the ground.  Since the onus of peacekeeping falls disproportionately on the army, it is imperative that their levels remain at full complement.  We therefore recommend: 

 

5.      That the Department make every effort to ensure that the total number of Regular Force personnel be restored to 60,000 by the end of fiscal year 2003-2004.

 

6.      That a special effort be made to avoid any decline in the number of Regular Force personnel in the Land Forces.

 

            Finally, the CF has always prided itself on having an expeditionary capability. In fact, we have never gone to war except in the company of allies and on the basis of shared values and goals.  However, today, when rapid deployment is an essential aspect of combat readiness, Canada does not have enough strategic airlift.  Nor do we have dedicated transport ships of the kind needed to move equipment overseas.  Here, we find ourselves in the hapless situation of either renting or relying on Allies.  This situation will be further aggravated when our replenishment ships (AORs) will reach the end of their service life later this decade.  When the lack of a strategic air-to-air refueling capability is added, one has a rather grim picture of our ability to “rapidly deploy”.  We therefore recommend:

 

7.      That the government accord a high priority to providing the Canadian Forces with the strategic sealift, airlift, and air-to-air refueling capabilities they require to fulfil the commitments outlined in the 1994 Defence White Paper.

 

            Providing the Forces with the capabilities they need to meet their commitments will require significant expenditures. Meanwhile, the importance of improving the quality of life of military personnel, of ensuring adequate funding for the equipment necessary to keep pace with the revolution in military affairs, and of providing all the required training are also making heavy demands on a defence budget still suffering the effects of the cuts made over the last decade. Yet, we notice that the 2001-2002 Estimates indicate that the planned spending for 2002-2003 is actually lower than the budget allocated for this fiscal year. The Estimates do indicate that the planned spending for 2003-2004 is higher than for the two previous fiscal years. However, this increase may not be enough given all the demands being put upon the defence budget. We therefore recommend:

 

8.      That the government re-examine its spending plans for the next two fiscal years with a view of increasing the budget for the Department of National Defence.

 

The ability to deploy on short notice and to sustain units for as long as necessary is an essential aspect of the “early in – early out principle”.  We need to be able to deploy rapidly if we are to maintain our role as one of the world’s leading peacekeepers.  The latter is not a self-ascribed title and it is not to boast. It is a compliment the men and women of the Canadian Forces have earned, and one granted them by peacekeepers of other countries who participated in the same operations.

 

Our recommendations in this short report are guideposts.  They reflect themes that we will continue to take up, and expand upon, as we pursue our study on the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces.  We may be setting only a minor precedent in our effort, but it is one upon which we hope to build.

 

 

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings (Meetings Nos. 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 20 which includes this report) is tabled.

 

 

Respectfully submitted,

 

 

 

 

David Pratt

Chair

REQUEST  FOR  GOVERNMENT  RESPONSE

 

 

 

            In accordance with Standing Order 109, the Committee requests that the Government provide a comprehensive response to the Report within 150 days.

 

 

            A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (Meetings Nos. 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 20 which includes this report) is tabled.

 

 

 

Respectfully submitted,

 

 

 

 

 

 

David Pratt

Chair