NDVA Committee Report
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HOUSE OF COMMONS
CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES
OTTAWA, CANADA
K1A 0A6
REPORT ON PLANS AND PRIORITIES
Pursuant to Standing Orders 81(7)
and (8), the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and
Veterans Affairs has the honour to present its
SECOND REPORT
The Committee,
after considering Part III – Plans and Priorities of the Estimates 2001-2002 of
the Department of National Defence, has agreed to table the following
report :
For the Canadian Forces, the
post-cold war era has proven something of a mixed blessing. The war in Europe, for which we had prepared
for so long during the Cold War, ceased to be even a remote possibility by the
early 1990s. Though still retaining our
membership in NATO, we were finally able to bring our troops home since the
safety of the “central front” was now guaranteed by the demise of the Soviet
Union. Furthermore, our European allies had grown increasingly capable of
defending themselves and became ever more inclined to define their security
needs in European terms. While NATO
remained the most important alliance, there was increasing talk of a European
security and defence identity with interests not always necessarily the same as
those of its Trans-Atlantic partners.
However, Canada remains concerned about European security issues and
will continue to play a strong role in NATO.
Another important aspect of the new
reality was that national decision-makers could focus on other urgent
matters. For many, including our own,
this entailed the rebuilding of stagnant, debt-ridden economies. If the Soviet threat was gone, it only stood
to reason that our rather extensive military structures could be pared
back. The concern now was the “red” ink
of annual deficits.
All Allied militaries saw their
budgets cut and troop complements reduced.
However, the Canadian Forces (CF) may have paid more than their fair
share in their contribution to debt reduction.
Some have argued that Canadians had already reaped their “peace
dividend” with reductions in the 1970s and late 1980s. Reductions in the 1990s were seen by many as
a burden that the Canadian Forces would not be able to shoulder – especially
given what was being asked of them.
A particular irony of the post-cold
war period, for the CF, was that life actually became increasingly busy. As the defence budget was cut, Canadian
troops were faced with increased deployments and casualties. Canadians were still the preferred
peacekeepers and invariably went when asked.
But, as the Medak Pocket operation clearly demonstrated, peacekeeping
had taken on a new reality. Deploying
for peacekeeping might well mean deploying for combat.
In the last decade, the CF have
twice gone into combat – first against Iraq and then during the Kosovo
campaign. During the same period they
participated in numerous difficult peacekeeping operations and in domestic
deployments such as the ice storm while continuing their day-to-day duties in
search and rescue, the protection of Canadian sovereignty and, in partnership
with the United States, the defence of North America. Throughout these years
the CF were continually asked to do more with less.
In light of the problems faced by
the Canadian military, our Committee decided to undertake a series of studies
to ensure that the CF were properly prepared for the challenges facing
them. Our work was done in full recognition
of the fact that cutbacks, in support of deficit reduction, were
necessary. But, once the deficit
problem was solved, and the economy was again on a sound footing, it became
reasonable to expect an injection of new funding for the CF. Some progress has
been made in this regard, but more is needed.
Our first major undertaking was the
study on the quality of life of the Canadian Forces, tabled in October
1998. As a result of budget cuts and
wage limits, many serving members found it more and more difficult to tend to
their families and to enjoy a reasonable standard of living. The increase in operational tempo placed
much stress on both serving members and their families, while post-traumatic
stress disorder as well as physical casualties became increasingly prevalent
given the fundamentally different nature of peacekeeping operations.
We decided that the first priority
was to ensure that our serving men and women would be guaranteed fair
compensation for their work and sacrifice and that their families would be
cared for. Those injured were to be
assured the best possible care.
Our quality of life report
accomplished much and we were all encouraged by the response of the Minister
and his efforts to ensure the implementation of our recommendations. The first stage in regenerating the CF was
to ensure proper treatment, respect and care for our serving members and their
families. We are confident that the
Government will continue its efforts in this regard. It is a matter we have pledged to monitor on a continuing basis.
We next dealt with the issue of
procurement. Over the years, we had
heard much about the cumbersome nature of the procurement process and the
unwarranted time delays in equipment purchases. As a Committee we have always agreed that the members of the
Canadian Forces deserve the best equipment available for the tasks at hand and
that such equipment be provided in an efficient and timely manner. As evidence of our commitment in this
regard, our report on procurement recommended that the government move forward
with a national shipbuilding policy.
We are still awaiting the
Government’s official response to our report on procurement and have every hope
and confidence that the recommendations contained therein will be given proper
consideration. Procurement need not be
a cumbersome process, and it is very much in the interests of all concerned
that streamlining take place as quickly as possible.
Our current project entails a
thorough examination of the “operational readiness” of the Canadian
Forces. The third leg of our triad was
undertaken to ensure that the CF are prepared and equipped to do what is asked
of them. Military personnel must be
confident that they and their families are cared for, that they receive
necessary equipment in a timely fashion, and that they are trained and properly
equipped to perform the tasks they are asked to do. We cannot afford to downplay the importance of any of these three
elements.
The CF will have to be prepared to
deal with a wide variety of situations ranging from providing assistance to
humanitarian operations in the wake of natural disasters to full-scale combat
operations. Our multi-layered defence
commitments require forces that are ready to operate anywhere in the world as
well as at home.
In meeting these challenges, the CF
must also deal with the demands of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and
the need to be able to deploy with our allies, especially the Americans. Interoperability is a major element of
readiness, and our ability to perform in this regard will go a long way in
determining the kinds of missions in which we will be able to participate. Considerable resources will be required to
ensure interoperability with our allies and to keep abreast of the demands of
the RMA.
Needless to say, questions have been
asked with respect to the ability of the CF to meet these challenges. Indeed, a rather fundamental question is
increasingly being put forward, namely:
“Exactly what roles do we want the Canadian Forces to perform?” Or, as the serving members of the CF have
themselves stated: “Tell us what you want us to do and then give us the
resources to do it!” This refrain was
heard countless times during our quality of life study.
Official government policy in this
regard is still the 1994 Defence White Paper.
Yet, some claim that, if called upon, the CF would be hard pressed to
meet the commitments set out by official policy.
We have also been witness to
considerable debate over the question of whether or not the CF are as combat
capable as they were ten years ago. We are still in the process of
investigating this issue, but we can offer an observation. When we speak about “combat capable forces”
we have to make a distinction between the individual and the force structure of
which he or she may be a part.
There can be no question that CF
personnel have gained much experience through repeated and varied deployments
over the last decade which many of those who served during the Cold War never
gained. Today’s serving men and women
have confronted challenges never envisaged by those that stood ready on NATO’s
central front. Thus, it is reasonable
to conclude that today’s CF personnel – as individuals – are as combat capable,
if not more so, than their comrades of earlier years. However, this is not the same as arguing that the overall
“system”, for lack of a better term, is as combat capable as it was ten years
ago.
We have also heard about the lack of
resources for training and problems of unit cohesion because our deployed Land
Force contingents often have to be cobbled together from whatever units are
available. Insufficient training,
coupled with a lack of unit cohesion, can prove to be a recipe for disaster. If
the CF are to continue to perform their duties with the skill and
professionalism they have come to be recognized for, they must also be able to
recruit and retain the requisite personnel.
Recent evidence suggests that the military faces both recruitment and
retention problems.
In order to be able to operate with
our allies, we also have to be able to get to where we are needed. “Early in – early out” makes little sense if
we can only go by buying a ticket on someone else’s ride. And, once deployed, we need to be able to
sustain our commitment. Adequate
strategic lift is therefore something that we must have access to.
It is in this context that we
examined the Estimates for the Department of National Defence for
2001-2002. It is the monies provided in
the Estimates that, in the end, will determine whether we have adequate resources
to ensure the quality of life of our personnel and to provide all the training
and munitions required.
Given the urgency of the issues
before us we have decided to take advantage of the Standing Orders that empower
Committees to “…consider and report upon the expenditure plans and priorities
in future fiscal years of the departments and agencies whose estimates are
before it.”
If there is one thing upon which we
can all agree it is that our personnel deserve the best equipment
available. The risks involved in flying
old shipborne helicopters in the North Atlantic or in the Pacific Ocean are
well known and require no illustration here.
As well, the operational capabilities of our frigates remain limited in
the absence of a modern helicopter. In
keeping with Recommendation 38 in our Procurement Study for the immediate
tendering of a contract for the replacement of the Sea King helicopters, we
recommend:
1. That
the government proceeds as quickly as possible with the Maritime Helicopter
Project to ensure that the delivery of the replacements for the Sea King
helicopters begins in 2005.
And
furthermore:
2. That
the government explain why the current milestones for the Maritime Helicopter
Project are now many months later than those indicated in the 2001-2002
Estimates tabled in Parliament.
If
the Canadian Forces are to be properly equipped, there must be stability in the
procurement budget. We therefore
recommend:
3. That
expenditures on capital expenditures be set as quickly as possible at a minimum
of 23% of the departmental budget, but that this goal should not be achieved at
the expense of other programs such as quality of life or by downsizing
personnel levels.
4. That
in fiscal year 2002-2003, the Department be prepared to come before SCONDVA
with a clear timeline for the achievement of this objective.
While
adequate capital budgets are an essential aspect of defence planning and
effectiveness, personnel are indispensable.
Recent trends suggest that there is a serious recruitment and retention
problem in the Canadian Forces. We have
not yet studied this in detail, but our collective experience convinces us that
a complement of 60,000 personnel is the minimum required for the CF to
remain an effective force. Despite the
rhetoric about technology and the probability that RMA will increase our combat
effectiveness, we need to remember that peacekeeping is done by individuals on
the ground. Since the onus of
peacekeeping falls disproportionately on the army, it is imperative that their
levels remain at full complement. We
therefore recommend:
5. That
the Department make every effort to ensure that the total number of Regular
Force personnel be restored to 60,000 by the end of fiscal year 2003-2004.
6. That
a special effort be made to avoid any decline in the number of Regular Force
personnel in the Land Forces.
Finally, the CF has always prided
itself on having an expeditionary capability. In fact, we have never gone to
war except in the company of allies and on the basis of shared values and
goals. However, today, when rapid
deployment is an essential aspect of combat readiness, Canada does not have
enough strategic airlift. Nor do we
have dedicated transport ships of the kind needed to move equipment overseas. Here, we find ourselves in the hapless situation
of either renting or relying on Allies.
This situation will be further aggravated when our replenishment ships
(AORs) will reach the end of their service life later this decade. When the lack of a strategic air-to-air
refueling capability is added, one has a rather grim picture of our ability to
“rapidly deploy”. We therefore
recommend:
7. That
the government accord a high priority to providing the Canadian Forces with the
strategic sealift, airlift, and air-to-air refueling capabilities they require
to fulfil the commitments outlined in the 1994 Defence White Paper.
Providing the Forces with the
capabilities they need to meet their commitments will require significant
expenditures. Meanwhile, the importance of improving the quality of life of
military personnel, of ensuring adequate funding for the equipment necessary to
keep pace with the revolution in military affairs, and of providing all the
required training are also making heavy demands on a defence budget still
suffering the effects of the cuts made over the last decade. Yet, we notice
that the 2001-2002 Estimates indicate that the planned spending for 2002-2003
is actually lower than the budget allocated for this fiscal year. The Estimates
do indicate that the planned spending for 2003-2004 is higher than for the two
previous fiscal years. However, this increase may not be enough given all the
demands being put upon the defence budget. We therefore recommend:
8. That
the government re-examine its spending plans for the next two fiscal years with
a view of increasing the budget for the Department of National Defence.
The
ability to deploy on short notice and to sustain units for as long as necessary
is an essential aspect of the “early in – early out principle”. We need to be able to deploy rapidly if we
are to maintain our role as one of the world’s leading peacekeepers. The latter is not a self-ascribed title and
it is not to boast. It is a compliment the men and women of the Canadian Forces
have earned, and one granted them by peacekeepers of other countries who
participated in the same operations.
Our
recommendations in this short report are guideposts. They reflect themes that we will continue to take up, and expand
upon, as we pursue our study on the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces. We may be setting only a minor precedent in
our effort, but it is one upon which we hope to build.
A
copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings (Meetings Nos. 11, 14, 15, 16, 17,
18 and 20 which includes this report) is tabled.
Respectfully
submitted,
David Pratt
Chair
REQUEST FOR
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
In accordance with Standing Order
109, the Committee requests that the Government provide a comprehensive
response to the Report within 150 days.
A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings
and Evidence of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs
(Meetings Nos. 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 20 which includes this report) is
tabled.
Respectfully
submitted,
David
Pratt
Chair