INST Committee Report
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CHAPTER 2: NATIONAL SECURITY AND
ECONOMIC SECURITY AT THE BORDER
Since September 11, an enormous amount of attention has been paid to the security and trade-facilitating aspects of the Canada-U.S. border. Increased security has led to long crossing delays at many points along the 8,895 km border. Waiting time at major crossings reached 18 hours following the events of September 11. Delays are shorter now but there is potential for further lengthy delays in the future if the procedures for security checks and customs clearance, coupled with the physical capability of some border crossings, remain unchanged.
Human security is the priority of both the American and Canadian governments: "First and foremost, the need of governments everywhere is to ensure the security of our citizens, to ensure the security of our borders as well" [The Honourable Brian Tobin, Minister of Industry, 44:8:35]. However, this public obligation comes with a cautionary addendum: "that security must not come at a cost of losing sight of the important agenda items before governments all around the world or detracting from the basic nature of our society or from our individual freedoms" [The Honourable Brian Tobin, Minister of Industry, 44:8:35].
One of the most important agenda items regarding the border is Canada-U.S. trade. Eighty-seven percent of Canadian exports go to the United States. Bilateral trade with the U.S. amounts to $563 billion per year. The volume of traffic crossing the Canada-U.S. border is very large; more than 200 million people and 14 million commercial vehicles cross the border each year. More than 12 million vehicles crossed the Ambassador Bridge between Windsor and Detroit, the busiest Canada-U.S. border point, in the year ending December 2000.
[T]he border between Canada and the U.S. was virtually paralyzed in the days immediately following the terrorist attacks. Then the delays were measured not in minutes, but in hours and often in terms of days. This unprecedented situation created serious problems for industries that rely on just-in-time shipments to keep their assembly lines running, as well as for truckers hauling perishable commodities and livestock. [David Bradley, Canadian Trucking Alliance, 47:9:45]If countries in Europe can figure out how to employ common standards without fear of eroding identity then presumably we can do better in North America. … Both Canada and the United States must have the confidence in the other [with respect to] safety and security at borders and airports. [Anthony Pollard, Hotel Association of Canada, 46:15:35]
As previously mentioned, delays are not nearly so onerous now as they were in the few days following the attacks. Several factors explain this improved performance: increased human resources on both sides of the border resulting from the transfer of staff from other locations, increased overtime, and the employment of contract security staff; additionally, traffic volumes are significantly lower than pre-September 11 levels. Commercial traffic is said to have returned to 92% of pre-September 11 levels, but passenger traffic is only at 60-65% of pre-attack levels. With normal traffic volumes, and without U.S. National Guard personnel inspecting vehicles at major crossings, lengthy delays could return. This Committee finds such a possibility disconcerting.
The Committee will offer extensive comments and suggestions below on how these looming problems should be resolved. We will propose a comprehensive plan for providing both human security and economic security to Canadians; balancing these competing objectives will be the order of the day. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, it was discovered that terrorists contemplated the use of crop dusters as a means of delivering their terror. Additionally, concerns were expressed about the vulnerability of Canada’s food supply to tampering by terrorists. The Committee, therefore, also addresses issues related to the safety and security of Canada’s food supply.
Border Delays: Cause and Effect
At best, border delays are an inconvenience; at worst, they destroy a business. The Committee heard testimony from many industry groups, and they were all very concerned about unexpected delays at the border. Delays lead to increased costs as companies are forced from a "just-in-time" inventory management system to a "just-in-case" system (i.e., additional inventories are carried to deal with unexpected delays at the Canada-U.S. border). "Just-in-time" inventory management requires precise control over the timing of production processes and the movement of intermediate products between plants. The Committee was provided the following anecdote:
Four hours after an engine leaves Windsor, it’s in a Michigan truck. So the border is so important for us because we again ship about a million engines from Windsor into the United States to eight of our fifteen assembly plants. So the four-hour window is a point that we use and when we did have a border issue on September 11, facilities were closed on both side of the border as a result of not being able to get those engines to the marketplace. [Michael Sheridan, Ford Motors of Canada Ltd., 44:11:15]
The "just-in-case" inventory system, on the other hand, might involve investments in additional warehouses on the opposite side of the border from the parts manufacturer. For example, U.S. auto parts manufacturers that supply U.S. auto assembly manufacturers derive a competitive advantage over Canadian auto parts manufacturers based solely on the inefficiencies in the operations of the border. Adding a warehouse on the U.S. side of the border can attenuate this Canadian competitive disadvantage, but this solution is not without cost.
If there’s a border delay, all of a sudden we need some inventory, and the customer says to us, you had better keep some inventory on hand just in case; you had better open up a warehouse on this side of the border just in case. We now have all these expenses. But our competitors on the other side of the border don’t have that expense, so slowly but surely we become less and less competitive. Or they say, maybe the border is going to close, so there’s a reliability issue. So slowly but surely again the export part of our production withers, and with that, 66,000 jobs in Canada are at stake. [Gerald Fedchun, Automotive Parts Manufacturers Association 44:10:30]
The automotive sector claims that these border delays have led to unplanned production losses resulting from parts shortages that have cost manufacturing facilities approximately $1 million to $1.5 million per hour or about $25,000 per minute. These facts clearly force managers to reconsider their business plans:
In response to concern over border delays, some manufacturers have taken the precaution of increasing inventory levels at their plants by up to 5% due to the cross-border uncertainties, which carry with them significant additional costs. These costs are now deemed a hard operating cost that Canadian plants did not previously incur, and will become one of several factors to be considered in future investment decisions. [Mark Nantais, Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers Association, 44:10:05]
The tourism industry is also hit hard by delays. In this case, it is believed that the uncertainty surrounding the potential for delays at the border has led many people to simply stay home. In fact, passenger traffic is down more than 40% from pre-attack levels and the reason is simple: "If you don’t know what the situation is, you’re less tempted to try to cross the border. For business it’s obviously vital, but even for people who are crossing the border to shop or dine or visit attractions, they’re not going to take the chance…" [Robert Keyes, Canadian Chamber of Commerce, 45:15:30].
Following the hijackings in September, many people fear the prospect of flying. Lingering psychological impacts of the attacks have reduced the number of people choosing air travel as a mode of transportation. Clearly, the government and industry stakeholders must work together to restore confidence in the traveling public. To this end, the Government of Canada has already dedicated more security resources to airports and is investing an additional $20 million to promote travel within, and to, Canada.
The causes of border delays are numerous. Some delays stem from the security focus in the aftermath of September 11; others are of a long-term nature, stemming from inadequate investment in access infrastructure, antiquated customs and immigration equipment and procedures, and insufficient personnel. The Committee will deal with each in turn.
Given that the United States was a recent victim of terrorism, logic dictates that it tighten security at its borders. Canadians would react in the same way "if the proverbial shoe was on the other foot." But increased inspection without a corresponding increase in border personnel, equipment and infrastructure is a recipe for disaster. New methods must be found to increase human security, while maintaining or improving the trade-facilitating capability of the border. Although this task is difficult enough, it is compounded by many American misconceptions about Canadian customs and immigration policies and procedures. These misconceptions must be corrected in order that they are not used by U.S. interests to lure business and investment away from Canada. An anecdote provided to the Committee illustrates one of these misconceptions:
Customs should be a 24-hour operation across the border. We all remember seeing the senator standing up in committee with his orange cone, basically stating to everybody, this is our protection after 10:00 p.m. Obviously that is engraved in the minds of a lot of viewers and the only way we can reduce that or address that would be to have 24-hour border operations across the entire border. [Serge Charette, Customs Excise Union, 49:17:10]
In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act. Section 110 of this Act called for the creation of an automated entry and exit system on the U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico. This section of the Act was repealed in 2000:
If section 110 [had not been] repealed in the United States, you would have seen backups at the border for over 100 miles on the Canadian side. It’s because section 110 was repealed that our border does run more efficiently and that’s the message we’re sending to Washington. Immediately after the September 11 attacks the press contacted us about section 110 because … our office played such an important role in its repeal and they were blaming that [decision for] … allowing the terrorists to come through our border, but that simply wasn’t the case. [The repeal of 110] makes the border more secure, as well as more efficient. [Daniel J. Cherrin, Detroit Regional Chamber of Commerce, 47:12:45]
In fact, problems do originate on the American side of the border:
You also have a disconnect between the Congress and the federal agencies where they’re not communicating with each other. Each agency is not communicating with each other as well. It’s like a territory. Everybody wants to maintain [its] territory. They don’t want to be seen as being weak or understaffed or under-resourced. As a result, information is not shared and it’s that lack of communication that is causing the problem. Once all the dots are connected, then we could begin acting on the solutions. [Daniel J. Cherrin, Detroit Regional Chamber of Commerce, 47:12:50]
The Committee expects that the new Director of the Office of Homeland Security in the U.S. will address these concerns.
At the same time, the problem of delays is not new. Prior to September 11, concerns had been expressed that something needed to be done to facilitate crossing the border given the large increase in traffic over the past ten years.
When one considers that the total level of two-way trade between Canada and United States has increased dramatically over the last ten years and that much of the infrastructure and systems put in place were built for another time, another era, business all across this country, indeed workers all across this country, are looking for a clear signal that the border problem will be addressed in a substantial way and that the fix will not address just the problems that arise in terms of extra security after September 11, but will address the more fundamental issues of an efficient, free flowing Canadian-U.S. border. [The Honourable Brian Tobin, Minister of Industry, 44:8:40]
The manufacturing sector, in general, and the automotive sub-sector, in particular, insists that long-term solutions must be found and acted upon immediately.
Aiming to achieve a pre-September 11 level of fluidity is simply not enough. All Canadian points of entry, including those of the U.S. border, … were already at capacity on September 10. More staff and infrastructure changes at these key border points were already needed, and now we [face] … the challenge and necessity of increasing the efficiency of low-risk goods passage while heightening security to ensure the safety of Canadians and Americans. [Robert J. Armstrong, Association of International Automobile Manufacturers of Canada, 44:10:25]
These September 11-related costs along with those imposed on industry for more than a decade now — since the implementation of the FTA — are unacceptable. Long-term solutions to mutual Canada-U.S. issues must be found. A bilateral forum for discussing and finding resolutions to these plaguing problems would be a first step in this direction. The Committee is pleased to hear that the government has already initiated discussions between top-ranking Canadian and American officials on these important issues, thereby conveying the sense of urgency and priority these issues justly deserve. However, the Committee believes that these meetings must be supplemented by formal negotiations and, therefore, recommends:
1. That the Government of Canada establish a high-level bilateral ministerial summit between Canada and the United States on border issues, spanning security, trade facilitation and immigration concerns, with the objective of developing a comprehensive and coordinated long-term management plan for Canada-U.S. border crossings.
Witnesses had many suggestions on what can be done to increase security and reduce delays at border crossings. These suggestions fell into three categories: Canada-U.S. cooperation; border crossing infrastructure and access; and customs and security resources and procedures. We believe that if progress is made in each of these three areas, security will be enhanced sufficiently and trade facilitated such that the pre-September 11 situation will be improved.
The major difficulty in dealing with these border issues will be striking a balance between national security and trade or, as the Committee calls it, economic security. Canada must be alert to challenges to its sovereignty that may arise from new border measures enacted by the United States. Thus, the Government of Canada must ensure any joint plan with the United States to manage border crossings provides balance to both human security and economic security issues.
Many of the border problems existed before September 11. The physical infrastructure of border crossings, as well as the infrastructure supporting customs and security checks, is — and has been for some time — unable to deal effectively with the large increase in border traffic that has occurred over the past decade. The Committee believes that procedures for customs and security checks can and should be changed to improve both security and trade-efficiency of the border. Increased efficiency of existing crossing facilities can be achieved in a number of ways, for example: the adoption of better methods of separating high- and low-risk travellers and cargo; the establishment of pre-clearance for low-risk goods and travellers; the provision of better access and security to existing off-site inspection areas and border crossings; the improvement, where necessary, of roadway connections; and the implementation of new technologies, including biometrics. The objective is to create a secure, but "smarter," trade-efficient border.
The bottom line is that both our countries need to work collectively to enhance border security and efficiency by exploiting more intelligent methods to process border examinations and to rethink the traditional models for border management. We both have much at stake in ensuring that our common border remains secure, while allowing for trade to flow freely and run smoothly. We need to make sure that both our countries have sufficient resources to make this happen and that we use those resources wisely. [Daniel J. Cherrin, Detroit Regional Chamber of Commerce, 47:12:20]
Canadian and American officials are, as we write this report, already engaged in talks concerning mutual security concerns. The Committee approves of these discussions and endorses the principle of cooperation on our common border interests and, therefore, recommends:
2. That the Government of Canada include, in its upcoming budget statement, plans with the United States regarding security, for example, the coordination of immigration and customs policies, procedures and information sharing, as well as the expected costs of such initiatives.
Border Crossing Infrastructure and Access
Many witnesses suggested that the physical crossing infrastructure at the border must be improved. The current infrastructure was built many years ago when the volume of trade and passenger traffic was not nearly as high as it is today. Many witnesses appearing before the Committee identified acute congestion areas as a problem. By way of example, consider the efficiency of Canada’s busiest link to the United States:
The Detroit-Windsor tunnel is a two-lane facility capable of facilitating over 5,000 vehicles per hour. Due to local infrastructure and resource constraints we have never even come close to 2,000 vehicles per hour. The Ambassador Bridge is a four-lane facility capable of far more … and they are severely hampered by infrastructure and resources. They in fact are Canada’s largest economic link. This story … is common at all of our busy border crossings. [Gordon Jarvis, Detroit Windsor Tunnel Corporation, 47:12:25]
The Committee will go into great detail on the matter of pre-clearance facilities or off-site inspection areas and customs procedures below, but, from an infrastructure perspective, access to existing border crossings, be it a tunnel or bridge, is a point of contention.
[A] lot of the clearance required at the border could be facilitated on properties away from the actual crossing. The traffic would then be facilitated through special lanes or roadways to the bridge which would then allow us to fully utilize the lanes that are crossing between Canada and the U.S. [Gordon Jarvis, Detroit Windsor Tunnel Corporation, 47:12:30]
Moreover, one overlooked issue by the media and the public is that of the potential for a terrorist attack on a key crossing point between Canada and the United States and its likely impact.
I ask you to imagine what would happen if we were to lose one of these important links. … Losing one of these facilities as a result of a terrorist act would be a terrible crime. Having that act cripple our economy when the resources to recover are in plain sight but not available would be an unnecessary catastrophe. [Gordon Jarvis, Detroit Windsor Tunnel Corporation, 47:12:25]
Thus, the security of these critical border crossings is an equally important matter for concern. The Committee agrees with these assessments and recommends:
3. That the Government of Canada develop and fund an infrastructure program to improve the highways linking Canada’s existing border crossings as well as modern off-site inspection areas and access roads, and that these facilities and crossing points be equipped with enhanced security technologies.
Customs and Security Resources and Procedures
The Committee also received suggestions regarding the infrastructure used to conduct customs and security checks on commercial and passenger traffic. Some suggestions involve the use of high technology equipment for identification purposes and for screening commercial loads as well as ideas for restructuring the border crossing and checking facilities in order to increase the efficiency of the clearance process.
We need electronic processing of customs and immigration forms prior to getting to the border. … When the truck leaves the Canadian supplier plant, there’s an electronic transmission of all customs information to the border point. When the truck arrives, it’s already pre-cleared in terms of customs, and it quickly crosses the border with appropriate security clearance. Again, the technology is there. We just need to use it. To make this happen, we need some infrastructure. We need some marshalling yards at the border crossing points that are secure so that things can be inspected there and then go across quickly. [Gerald Fedchun, Automotive Parts Manufacturers Association, 44:10:30]
If the technologies are already available, then all that remains is to determine how quickly these technologies can be acquired, put on-line and made operational:
I would guess that, if the technologies and the software required to do all of this are available, then you’re looking at a six-month implementation, just on getting the hardware and the technology in place and working, and then you’re looking at a period of time to actually get the customers using it, so you’re probably looking at one-year implementations. [Gordon Jarvis, Detroit Windsor Tunnel Corporation, 47:13:00]
Other suggested technologies include giant x-ray and gamma-ray machines that are capable of examining the entire contents of a truck without unloading, transponders that can identify and track a specific vehicle, and retinal scanners to identify drivers and other individuals crossing the border.
Currently, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) does not undertake detailed inspections of all travellers and truck operators and their vehicles that cross the border. This intensity of inspection is simply not feasible at any time. Typically, only a very small percentage of goods and individuals is subject to detailed inspections; i.e., undergoes a secondary inspection in the CCRA’s two-tier processing system that separates high- and low-risk travellers and shippers.
Greater separation of traffic based on some definition of high-risk and low-risk was also an idea voiced by several witnesses, particularly those from the automobile or auto parts industries which see themselves as low-risk traffic. They support the idea of pre-clearance before crossing the border. The idea is that with proper technology, individual trucks can be identified as they approach the border; based on that identification, they would be allowed to use a designated lane or crossing point in order to speed up their passage. The low-risk designation would be applied because the trucks are sealed, can be identified once they approach the border area, and all the proper documents can be transmitted to the border before the truck arrives. There could be varying degrees of clearance granted. The very low-risk traffic may be able to cross the border without any impediment. Other higher risk traffic may have to undergo some amount of checking at the border, or at an off-site inspection area — what witnesses refer to when they speak of a marshalling area.
Efforts to increase physical security and facilitate cross-border trade are best serviced by identifying the risk of the cross-border cargo movement or the traveller. We need to assign our collective inspection and enforcement resources to the higher risk cargo shipments and travellers, while ensuring that our low-risk shipments and travellers can cross the border unimpeded. … Prior certification of transport drivers and frequent travellers, on a coordinated basis, and linked databases would facilitate the efficient flow of goods in low-risk travellers. Dedicated lanes should be available for these pre-certified peoples and goods. Shared databases should form the basis from which automatic electronic clearance of low-risk goods and people can be facilitated and their border crossings expedited. [Mark Nantais, Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers Associations, 44:10:10]
Other initiatives such as the Customs Self-Assessment program (CSA) can facilitate the passage of low-risk traffic:
Initiatives such as the customs self-assessment program, which is designed to facilitate the flow of goods for those companies with significant cross-border traffic, are positive. The CSA provides the opportunity under specific conditions, to obtain pre-arrival clearance privileges and self-assessment customs duties payable. The CSA knowledge about the importer, driver and the carrier ensures that we can designate these shipments as low risk. [Mark Nantais, Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers Association, 44:10:10]
However, some believe that the CSA has run into problems:
Unfortunately, the CSA has been delayed in its implementation and a number of alterations have been made that would make it unnecessarily complex and a potentially costly process … [Mark Nantais, Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers Association, 44:10:10]
The Committee also believes that other pre-approval pilot projects for "just-in-time" commercial services should be ventured. One project would attempt to reduce congestion at the border and speed up low-risk "just-in-time" shipments by having customs documents processed prior to the commercial vehicle’s arrival at the border. The Committee, therefore, recommends:
4. That the Government of Canada immediately implement, using the best available technology, a comprehensive paperless pre--approval system for all "just-in-time" commercial shipments.
Another suggestion was for a "reversal of inspections," whereby the U.S. customs agency would inspect persons and vehicles on the Canadian side of the border and Canadian customs inspections would be conducted on the U.S. side; this procedure would help reduce congestion at the border, as it has for many of Canada’s international airports. Many witnesses appearing before the Committee proposed such a change. Indeed, it was the number one point in the seven-point plan advanced by the Bridge and Tunnel Operators Association (BTOA), an association of bridge and tunnel operators across Ontario, Michigan and New York.
On the issue of reversal of customs and immigration, while it is a popular concept for the crossing authorities, from our standpoint I think it is something that is easy for everybody to visualize. If it becomes the pressure in the pipe to make things change so that we do find the right solution to make these borders work properly, then we’re all for it. [Gordon Jarvis, Detroit Windsor Tunnel Corporation, 47:12:30]
The Committee takes note of the U.S. House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee that has just recently passed a bill to amend the U.S. Customs Border Security Act of 2001, containing Section 131 Report Language defining "Reverse Customs" procedures. The bill authorizes and encourages the Administration, and the Customs Service in particular, to explore an agreement with Canadian officials to increase cooperation at border crossings and to station customs officials from each government on the opposite side of the border for the purpose of inspecting and clearing vehicles before they cross the border.
The Committee agrees that there is merit in this proposal. Whatever sovereignty problems could be associated with this change, they have certainly been overcome at Canada’s airports. The Committee, therefore, recommends:
5. That the Government of Canada, as part of its discussions and negotiations with the United States, include the proposal to conduct Canadian customs inspections in the United States and U.S. inspections in Canada ("reversal of inspections").
A pre-clearance program, CANPASS, was already in use prior to September 11. The CANPASS program allowed frequent, low-risk, pre-approved travellers to enter Canada through a dedicated lane. The program was suspended on September 11 and has been reassessed in light of the new security-conscious environment; it has been reinstated in certain locations.
Another program, NEXUS, is a joint Canada-U.S. pilot project that was in operation at the Sarnia-Port Huron Blue Water Bridge crossing; this program was also designed for low-risk, pre-approved travellers entering Canada and the United States. NEXUS used common eligibility requirements, common identification card, etc. between the two countries, but it too was suspended September 11, 2001. Canada’s Industry Minister was positive that the NEXUS program, along with the next generation of technologies, may be the best way to get a free-flowing efficient border crossing. The Committee recommends:
6. That the Government of Canada expedite discussions and negotiations with the United States to reactivate modern customs and immigration procedures, such as NEXUS, CANPASS and other pre-approval programs, which may include biometric technologies and the creation of shared-information systems.
With respect to the development of these new technologies and systems, some members of the Committee are concerned about privacy issues related to the sharing of personal information about Canadians with U.S. authorities. These members are concerned about the opinion that the Privacy Commissioner may have on this issue.
More human resources will be needed to implement the proposed increase in security measures. One witness suggested 1,600 new positions at an annual cost of $80 million would be needed to properly staff all border crossings. To the Committee, this seems to be merely an extrapolation of current staffing without due consideration to substitutions in favour of newer advanced technologies and for a different managerial approach to joint security and customs issues and procedures. However, the Committee recognizes the amazing increase in border traffic over the last decade and, therefore, recommends:
7. That the Government of Canada’s upcoming budget provide for an increase in customs and immigration personnel.
Security and Safety of Canada’s Food Supply
Immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, the biggest impact on the Canadian agriculture sector was felt at Canada-U.S. border crossings. As security at border crossings was tightened, the time necessary for Canadian exports to clear U.S. customs increased. Canadian agriculture exporters faced some special problems relating to the perishable nature of many agri-food products and to concerns about the welfare of live animals in shipments. The medium- to long-term effects on agriculture and the food supply are less obvious:
[F]armers are concerned in a number of areas, including changes in import and export regulations … increased demands on producers in terms of food safety and security, and the effects of a declining economic climate on the agriculture sector. [Brigitte Rivard, Canadian Federation of Agriculture, 47:11:45]
Concerns have been expressed about the security and safety of Canada’s food supply following the events of September 11.
[A]griculture is vulnerable … after September 11th there was a lot of speculation that there could be use of crop dusters [for biological or chemical warfare], or that to get to a number of people quickly, it would be through the food chain … [but] we have the processes in place to ensure that the food is being produced safely … and Canada has one of the most stringent regulatory systems in place in the world … it has, and deserves, the reputation of [having] the safest food supply in the world. [Brigitte Rivard, Canadian Federation of Agriculture, 47:12:05]
At the level of the producer, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture (CFA) and federal, provincial, university and industry partners are collaborating to develop commodity-specific, food safety plans as part of the "On-Farm Food Safety Program." The CFA is also encouraging the federal government to cover the costs associated with the development and implementation of product identification and tracing initiatives, which are other important tools in ensuring food safety.
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), in partnership with other federal and provincial agencies and other agri-food stakeholders, helps to protect the food supply. It enforces food safety and nutritional quality standards (established by Health Canada in accordance with the Food and Drugs Act), and, for animal health and plant protection, sets standards and carries out enforcement and inspection. It has strategies and systems in place to protect the food supply from animal and crop diseases, environmental hazards and contamination of food products at various stages of production.
The CFIA also has established emergency response procedures aimed at protecting food, plants and animals from accidental or intentional events. In addition, the agency has an emergency food recall system. The Office of Food Safety and Recall carries out food safety investigations and provides a coordinated approach to food recall decision making to enhance the Agency’s food emergency response capability.
The Agency is currently evaluating its emergency response plans to ensure that they are sufficient and appropriate in the event of a threat to the agricultural sector. Since September 11, the CFIA has taken the following measures:
- Increased inspection activities of food products, plants and animals at Canada’s airports, seaports and land borders;
- Intensified linkages with the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA), other border authorities, the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, provincial and territorial partners, local police and public health authorities;
- Increased investigations of livestock feed mills and animal auctions to enhance protection of the livestock industry;
- Enhanced biosecurity at labs and initiated stockpiling of materials for testing; and
- Initiated enhanced awareness and security for CFIA staff.
Although all of these measures are essential in light of the events of September 11, they do carry extra costs for members of the agricultural sector. Additionally, the agri-food sector has economic problems that are unrelated to the events of September 11 that still need to be addressed:
While everyone is more aware of the importance of security, issues that were pressing before September 11 have not gone away. The agri-food sector has been facing a number of challenges, including the effects of this year’s drought, and the cumulative impact of a number of years of extremely low prices in certain commodities …
In Whitehorse, federal and provincial agricultural ministers signed onto an action plan to lead agriculture out of crisis management and provide long-term stable funding to safety nets, as well as for environmental and food safety issues. It is a plan the CFA endorses … we cannot lose sight of the issues and concerns facing Canadian industry [Brigitte Rivard, Canadian Federation of Agriculture, 47:11:45-11:50]
The Committee wants to make sure that Canada continues to have a safe and secure food supply, and as such it recommends:
8. That the Government of Canada ensure that the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, and other stakeholders responsible for ensuring the safety and security of the food supply, receive adequate resources to carry out their work. Resources should be directed at all levels of the supply chain from production through inspection and delivery of food. The expenditure associated with these resources should not be subject to cost recovery.