FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, March 28, 2000

• 0937

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto-Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): Colleagues, let's get going. We have a busy morning. We're lucky to have Mr. Sinclair, Mr. McNee, Mr. Forsythe, and Mr. Horak here with us this morning.

How did you think you would do it? Is one of you going to make an opening statement and then the rest are available for questions? I'm going to ask you to do the opening statement.

Then, members, since we'll have a quorum, I'm going to pass to...wait, we have a quorum now. Madame Debien always saves us from ignominy. So perhaps before I do pass to the opening statement—

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien (Laval East, BQ): [Editor's note: Inaudible]

The Chair: Was it good? The Senator was not too difficult?

[English]

Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance): I heard the Prime Minister is about to appoint new senators. Bob, are you going to the Senate?

Mr. Bob Speller (Haldimand—Norfolk—Brant, Lib.): No, not yet.

The Chair: Look, colleagues, we have a quorum. Diane Marleau isn't here, though, with her motion. We'll have to put that aside.

Have members seen that motion?

Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke—Lakeshore, Lib.): Diane Marleau's motion?

The Chair: Yes, about the Red Cross. Many of you were there when that issue was served. Madame Debien was there. Look, we all agreed with it. Can somebody else move it and we'll pass it?

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance): Can we see the motion?

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Could somebody read the motion so we have an idea about it?

The Chair: Basically, we had a hearing. I don't believe the Reform was able to be there, but I know the Bloc was there.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: The Canadian Alliance.

The Chair: The Canadian Alliance, sorry.

An hon. member: It was the Reform then.

• 0940

The Chair: It was at that time the Reform. You're going to have to give me a moment. The present Canadian Alliance, then known as the Reform, was not there, okay?

Basically, we had a meeting about the Red Cross. Because of the legal situation it's in in the country, the Red Cross is not in a position to meet its obligations to the international organization of which it's a part. So Canada is one of the countries that is totally deficient.

Mr. Keith Martin: I know what it is. We'll submit it.

The Chair: Okay. So the recommendation is that we recommend that the Government of Canada consider the advisability of providing support to the Canadian Red Cross to enable it to meet its international statutory obligations? Is that acceptable, members?

(Motion agreed to—[See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chair: Diane, we just did your motion on the Red Cross.

Ms. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.): Thank you.

The Chair: Colleagues, the next one is the Burma resolution, and you've had that before you too. We approved of this in principle, but it required some small terminological changes to fit the reality of the situation. Obviously we have to recognize a committee. We couldn't recognize governments, etc. So, anyway, with the help of the department, it has now been changed.

I'd like to get approval. Let's approve it and get on with the Burma thing. Everybody agreed with the resolution before; all we're doing is agreeing now with the terminological changes.

Some hon. members: Agreed.

[Translation]

The Chair: Ms. Debien.

Ms. Maud Debien: Mr. Chairman, I have the resolution in English only. I would like to read it. I was probably given a copy in French, but....

The Chair: It is in both languages. You have the resolution from the Red Cross in front of you.

There was just a change in terminology and nothing more. So, in theory, it is the same resolution. Okay?

[English]

(Motion agreed to—[See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chair: I'll report that to the House.

Now we have the notice of motion by Mr. Obhrai.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I hope all of you have received a copy of the motion. This has to do with EDC. As you know, we studied EDC, but that was the report on the EDC act and its review of the mandate of EDC. It did not go deeper into the understanding of how EDC's internal mechanism is working. Being a government crown corporation, EDC is ultimately accountable to Parliament, and a tremendous amount of questions have arisen on how EDC's internal mechanism is put in place.

We do understand that EDC does have some challenges to its lending practices. Nevertheless, Canadians and everybody here, I'm sure, are interested in how EDC's internal mechanism is working. The Gowlings report also talked about the environmental aspects, and I think it is quite critical for us to understand how EDC's mechanism is in place and how it will work.

• 0945

So that's why I put this motion in here, with the specific idea of understanding how EDC approves its loans, of how its internal mechanism works. That is the reason for this motion.

I don't think we are duplicating at all the work we did prior to this, when we were studying the EDC and issued the EDC report. I think they're on totally different tracks here, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: I will go to Mr. Speller and Mr. Paradis.

Mr. Bob Speller: Mr. Chairman, I tend to disagree with Mr. Deepak in terms of what it is this committee actually looked at. Not only did this committee study in depth the workings of the EDC, but we also had groups from across the country who were interested in coming in and talking to us about their views on the EDC.

Prior to that, we were given a report done by Gowlings, an independent group who did a study on the EDC. They explained very clearly in the report how the EDC works, what its functions are, and the role it plays in Canadian society in terms of promoting exports for both small and medium-sized enterprises in this country.

With our heavy agenda, I can't see going back once again and doing it, after we've just completed months of study of the EDC. I can understand the member's concerns; he has opportunities in question period to bring these motions forward. There's other information that he can't seem to get. I'd be pleased to help him out in getting any of the information he needs to get a better understanding.

I just think this committee has taken an awful lot of its time in studying the EDC already. I don't see really any necessity in going back at it again. If the honourable member has questions he can't get answers to either through the Order Paper or in question period, I'd be pleased to help him out.

The Chair: Mr. Paradis.

M. Denis Paradis (Brome—Missisquoi, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

[Translation]

My colleague mentioned

[English]

that he tends to disagree with that, but I completely disagree with that. I do think that the right forum for that would be the public accounts committee. All the terms that he is referring to here,

[Translation]

all of the words used in his notice of motion—and I'm wondering whether we should be discussing this matter here, because this is, after all, only a notice of motion, if I understand correctly—for the review of administrative, operational and other decisions that, in my humble opinion, are matters for the Public Accounts Committee.

Mr. Chairman, the Public Accounts Committee was chaired by a member of the opposition; a member of the Reform Party, or what is now known as the Canadian Alliance, if I understand correctly. This committee operates in a special way. The Auditor General is present. Members can ask the testifying officials questions and then they can verify with the Auditor General if everything is as it should be. This is the appropriate forum for analyzing the issue raised by the member from the Canadian Alliance.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Ms. Debien.

Ms. Maud Debien: Is this simply a matter of tabling a motion? I understood that a 48-hour notice was required. However, I was told that our offices had already been sent this motion. Does the 48 hours' notice still apply in that case? Are we merely talking about tabling a motion or are we discussing it for the purposes of a vote? We need to come to an agreement on the procedure. We could start discussing the matter for half an hour and then postpone the vote to another time. I would like things to be clear.

The Chair: We have always had a 24-hour notice rule and not a 48-hour rule, and this notice was tabled two or three days ago, on Friday. This notice goes well beyond 24 hours. Accordingly, we are dealing with the substance of the resolution, not the form.

Ms. Maud Debien: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

Mr. Gurmant Grewal (Surrey Central, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In light of the context of the sustainable development strategy for Foreign Affairs and International Trade, this is the only committee that will be the most effective in listening to and understanding the witnesses and in probably making some appropriate recommendations with respect to the EDC's role.

Mr. Chairman, the other fact with respect to the EDC is that some of the EDC loans in many countries have some implications on environmental assessment. As you know, and I'm sure you will agree, the political geography of countries or politics has boundaries, but the environment doesn't. Particularly in light of the environmental assessment, it becomes more important that we discuss the role of EDC and talk to the minister, as well as the president and chairman of EDC.

• 0950

I urge all the members to forget partisan lines, focus on the issue, and pass this motion so we can hear from these people first-hand.

The Chair: Perhaps, Mr. Speller, you can give a response. Then I think we'll just move along.

Mr. Bob Speller: Just in response, the honourable member might not have been around, but we heard from over 40 witnesses. Most of these witnesses gave their views on how EDC affected the environment. We've heard from the president of EDC, labour, and all kinds of different groups already. If he could read the report, it has the list of witnesses there. He might read that first before we try to open this door once again.

The Chair: Mr. Obhrai and then Mr. Patry.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Of course I listened to the responses from both my colleagues. They were quite interesting in reference to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts, but I still think the mandate falls here. As the parliamentary secretary said, we did a review, but it did not go into the internal mechanism and specifically how loans are approved. We talked also about the Canada account that falls under EDC.

The review we did was on EDC's impact on globalization—what EDC's mandate is. I agree that, as you said, it has to do with export and EDC's success. I'm not in here at this time at all questioning EDC's success. We want to know—and every Canadian is concerned about this issue—how the mechanism of EDC works to approve loans, and in what.

You have told me I can contact you about questions on this thing, but that stonewalling is going on, Bob, as we know. We cannot get answers on the internal mechanism from EDC because they hide behind confidentiality.

What you're saying is not true. I suggest you look at the minister's answers. Let's be honest about it—I mean to say what we're trying to do here. We're not questioning the profitability of EDC or this thing; we are questioning how EDC goes about approving its loans. That is what we're trying to do with this motion. If not, then it will come to me that the government or EDC is trying to hide something. Let's be more transparent. I think it would also work well for the government to have more transparency.

All we're asking for is more transparency over here. Based on that, you are always talking about transparency. I think it's a dandy idea, so here's your chance.

Mr. Bob Speller: I think you'll remember that the committee actually recommended that in its report. We've already dealt with those issues. We made recommendations. The government is now formulating a response, which it will give back to this committee. That's the process we've gone through. We made those recommendations as a committee, with stronger recommendations regarding the environment, and stronger recommendations regarding transparency. This committee has reviewed that and already made those recommendations.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: So what's the problem with the motion?

The Chair: We're trying to get this to the point where we can maybe vote on the resolutions.

Dr. Patry has a quick observation, then Mr. Martin and Mr. McWhinney. Then we'll cut it off.

[Translation]

Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.): With all due respect, I disagree with my colleagues completely. As Mr. Speller just mentioned, we did a complete study on the issue.

[English]

I just want to let you know, Mr. Grewal, we even had the first nation from Columbia come before this committee. It was a good example of the problem with the environment.

We have made a lot of recommendations. We should wait for the report of the Commons regarding the recommendations. On this I totally disagree with you. We've done our job and it was well done. We have recommendations, and I think we should pass to some other matters. That's it.

The Chair: Mr. Martin, and then finally, Mr. McWhinney.

Mr. Keith Martin: My colleague has said what I was going to say.

The Chair: Okay. Mr. McWhinney.

• 0955

Mr. Ted McWhinney (Vancouver Quadra, Lib.): I just have some concerns. This is a high-quality committee; in fact I suggested the other day it's probably the best of the parliamentary committees. It has interesting and diverse expertise. But what's proposed here requires detailed expertise in international administrative law. I would say it's well beyond the special competence of most of the members here.

There must be another forum in which this sort of detailed discussion should take place. I think it would divert us from the high policy issues, including the one this morning, that we want to report urgently to the government on.

The Chair: Okay, I think that's pretty well....

[Translation]

Ms. Debien, are you raising a point of order?

Ms. Maud Debien: I am a bit annoyed.

The Chair: Pardon me?

Ms. Maud Debien: I am a bit annoyed with Mr. McWhinney, who said that we did not have the expertise to assess....

Mr. Ted McWhinney: The special competence. There is a difference.

Ms. Maud Debien: Special competence or not, I think that your comments denote a certain lack of respect to the members who are here, who are working, who are educating themselves, who study and analyze their files. In my opinion, your comment is quite strong. I would just like to raise this issue, at the outset.

The Chair: Yes, but Mr. McWhinney....

Ms. Maud Debien: That is all I wanted to say. It was a comment.

The Chair: Mr. McWhinney made these comments while saying that, in his opinion, this was the best parliamentary committee. It is only in the area of special expertise where we would have a problem.

Ms. Maud Debien: We have officials who inform us and who are in fact, specialists.

The Chair: I recall certain debates with Mr....

Ms. Maud Debien: I think that we are all able to understand the officials, even the specialists.

The Chair: Very well.

Ms. Maud Debien: Mr. Chairman, I have a substantive question with respect to the motion tabled by the Canadian Alliance. This resolution contains several requests to review various items. If I understand the motion correctly—perhaps someone could provide some clarification—we have already reviewed decisions pertaining to operations and management criteria, as Mr. Speller pointed out. So much for that part of the resolution.

However, the funding decisions were never reviewed. I know what our friends from the Canadian Alliance are getting at. They want EDC's funding decisions to be reviewed, perhaps on a case-by- case basis. I'd like to ask our friends from the Canadian Alliance this question. I would imagine that I can ask this question. I am not making an affirmation.

The Chair: You can ask the question, but I thought that we had concluded the debate on the topic in order to vote on the resolution.

Ms. Maud Debien: I see.

The Chair: But if there is an answer... Have you finished?

Ms. Maud Debien: Yes, I have finished.

[English]

The Chair: Do you want to answer that question, Mr. Obhrai?

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Yes, I do. Thank you, Madam Debien, for asking that question.

While you may say the examination, operation, and criteria were studied, I don't think they were studied in depth. The concern coming out of the whole thing is that we can't seem to grasp what criteria EDC uses to give out the the taxpayers' decisions, especially in the Canada account over here. We are hitting the block on confidentiality all the time EDC is hiring, and we all know that EDC is a crown corporation.

So here we have a problem as to how the money is being spent. That's what we want this committee to study. That's the whole purpose behind it. I think it will bring transparency. It may even help EDC, and it'll bring transparency to you too.

Mr. Bob Speller: The minister will be coming, as you know, under estimates. That would probably be the best place to get those sorts of answers.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: He's going to say no.

The Chair: I just want to reiterate about one thing, however. I think we have to recognize, in terms of the time limits of the committee, that we've spent a good month or more on EDC. I'm rather terrified by Mr. Obhrai's suggestion we didn't do it sufficiently in depth, so we're now going to do it in depth and take two months to do what we've already done. That just isn't there, guys, so I just draw that to your attention.

• 1000

We did make recommendations, by the way, on environment, Mr. Grewal. There is a recommendation in the report on environment, and I personally wrote a letter to the minister about concerns at the OECD on the environment, which I'll forward to you, and you could have a look at it.

I totally support Mr. Speller's point. The minister is going to be here next Wednesday, April 5. If the Canadian Alliance party wants to use their question period time to go after him on EDC, that's legitimate. Go and ask him any questions about EDC. You can maybe—

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: That's for estimates, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: That's your choice. We're going to get the written response to the report in the House. There will be amendments to the EDC act, perhaps, so there'll be other opportunities to discuss this. But I just think it's way beyond what we should be doing to relaunch into a study of that subject, which we did in such depth so recently. That's just my personal opinion.

But we'll put the question, shall we?

Mr. Gurmant Grewal: May we have a recorded vote, Mr. Chair?

The Chair: Sure. We'll have a recorded vote.

(Motion negatived: nays 8; yeas 4—[See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chair: Colleagues, we have the issue of petite cuisine before we go to Iraq. We keep our witnesses waiting.

We're trying to get the Kosovo resolution in form so that we don't have to spend five hours debating it, because we don't have that time either. We asked you to send in writing your observations or to meet with Jim. If anybody has some substantial concerns with the present form and can help him by putting those concerns, we would appreciate it a great deal.

[Translation]

Ms. Debien, I believe that you wish to make certain observations, that you could at least share them with Jim, not necessarily to bring things to an end, but to move the debate further ahead.

[English]

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Is there a new version of the Kosovo resolution distributed?

The Chair: No, we're waiting for members to give their input to—

Mr. Ted McWhinney: I've already given mine.

The Chair: Yes, you've given yours, and some other members have given theirs, but we're still waiting for the Bloc and a few others. We'll get you a revised version once that's in.

While we're all here and we're doing petite cuisine, is there any problem with passing our budget, which is in front of you? You all have this budget for $96,000.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: For what?

The Chair: For witnesses, no travel. This is not a travel budget, colleagues, this is just witness expenses and printing reports, the usual thing.

Ms. Jean Augustine: So moved.

Mr. Denis Paradis: So moved.

The Chair: That way it can go before the budget subcommittee at 12 o'clock today and we can get it approved. It's standard; it's just to prepare us for witnesses in April, May, and June. It's operating expenses to take us up to June, okay?

Some hon. members: Okay.

The Chair: Okay, I take it it's approved. Thank you very much.

Again, my excuses to our colleagues from the Department of Foreign Affairs. Thank you very much for coming.

Mr. McNee.

Mr. John McNee (Director General, Middle East and North Africa Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Mr. Chairman, we would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to review with you Canada's policy toward Iraq.

This policy is based on two key elements: first, the government's deep concern about the humanitarian situation; and second, the need to remain vigilant as regards regional security, weapons of mass destruction programs in Iraq, and the question of Iraqi disarmament. These two issues are key to any complete understanding of the situation in Iraq, and both are central to the approach Canada and the international community have taken and continue to pursue regarding Iraq.

The Government of Canada fully recognizes the hardships that the people of Iraq have endured. As Mr. Axworthy recently noted, Canada has never forgotten the plight of the millions of Iraqi citizens who have borne the brunt of their country's self-imposed isolation. From the outset, the international community recognized the risks and sought to mitigate the hardships being faced by the people of Iraq as a result of sanctions. Food and medicine were always exempt from the embargo, and the oil for food program was designed to provide the revenue necessary for Iraq to meet its essential needs.

• 1005

While the record of the oil for food program is impressive, we know that it is by no means perfect and that the people of Iraq have continued to suffer. In November Mr. Axworthy sent a mission to Baghdad of Canadian officials to review the humanitarian situation in the country. While those officials who had visited Baghdad on previous occasions noted some improvements, they also concluded that the people of Iraq continue to face a very difficult time dealing with the impact of a deteriorating physical infrastructure and the resultant economic, medical, and social problems.

The finding of this mission came as little surprise. The Security Council was at the time already working on a new resolution, largely based on the panel reports launched by Canada and aimed in part at improving the humanitarian program in Iraq. The final draft of Resolution 1284 contained a substantially improved humanitarian package, pushed by Canada and passed with the support of 11 members of the Security Council.

The resolution provides for fast-track approvals for humanitarian items, a two-day turnaround for approvals, improved monitoring of the humanitarian program on the ground, local purchasing and a cash component, a study of the state of the Iraqi oil industry, and above all, a lifting of the ceiling on Iraqi oil exports. We have prepared a one-page summary of these changes, which we have attached to copies of the resolution for your information.

Overall, Resolution 1284 delivers significant positive changes in the way the program is run and provides for a substantially improved system for the most vulnerable segments of Iraqi society.

Iraq has said it does not accept the resolution and has demanded instead an immediate lifting of sanctions. Implementation of the humanitarian program changes, however, does not require Iraqi cooperation on disarmament or any other concession by Baghdad. The UN and the members of the Security Council, including Canada, have already begun the process of putting these changes into practice.

[Translation]

The new resolution is an important achievement and we are optimistic that the people of Iraq will soon feel the benefits. This view is shared by others.

In his report to the Security Council on March 10, UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, noted that he was "hopeful that effective implementation of the provision of section C of the Resolution (the humanitarian section) will enhance the impact of the program in alleviating the humanitarian situation in Iraq". In a briefing to Security Council members last week, the Head of the UNICEF office in Baghdad also appeared optimistic in noting the Resolution's "potential to improve the humanitarian situation".

Our optimism on this score, however, is tempered by a heavy dose of reality based on the experience of the past nine years. To illustrate, Saddam Hussein's refusal to permit implementation of the Oil for Food Program clearly delayed much needed relief. The government consistently refused to accept UN recommendations to spend money set aside for targeted nutrition programs for children and lactating mothers, bowing finally to international pressure only last September and then only partially.

Iraq, which is responsible for compiling the distribution plans for the program, namely, determining how much money will be spent on various items, has under-ordered food supplies, again ignoring UN recommendations on daily caloric intake. Iraqi ships have been stocked exporting humanitarian goods.

This is the same government which has diverted scarce resources towards the construction of 48 palaces and a luxury resort for the Iraqi elite and which spent hundreds of millions of dollars draining southern marshes which destroyed the way of life for the Shiite marsh Arabs who lived in the region.

Canada is not content to leave the people of Iraq at the mercy of Saddam Hussein and his regime. We continue to work within the Security Council to ensure that the improvements to the humanitarian program envisaged in Resolution 1284 are implemented fully, in letter and in spirit.

• 1010

[English]

But there is another side to the Iraq coin that cannot be ignored, and that is the question of security and disarmament. This element has always been, and remains, a key part of the Iraq equation for Canada and the international community as a whole.

The only way to resolve the Iraq problem finally and bring an end to sanctions is for Iraq to comply fully with the terms of all UN resolutions, as laid out in Resolution 1284. Iraq knows, as it has always known, that sanctions relief could come very quickly if it chose to cooperate fully and comply with its disarmament obligations. Iraq has, however, to date been unwilling to do so. From the very start of the disarmament program, Iraq placed obstacles in the way of international inspectors, obstructed their activities, harassed them, and lied about the state and nature of its weapons programs.

We will all recall that it wasn't until after Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamal, defected to Jordan in 1995 that Iraq was forced to acknowledge and turn over the required documents providing the details of a biological weapons program. Until that time, Iraq had denied that a biological weapons program had even existed.

UNSCOM's records are filled with similar stories of deception. While the inspectors did an unprecedented job of ferreting out Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs in the face of Iraqi obstruction and deception, the disarmament job was not yet completed when UNSCOM left in December 1998. No independent disarmament organization has declared that the disarmament job called for by successive UN resolutions has been finished. Even Russia, China, and France, who abstained on Resolution 1284, acknowledged that there is work still to do to verify that Iraq has met its disarmament obligations.

The new resolution calls for the establishment of a clear and precise road map for the disarmament program. As weapons inspections have not taken place in over one and a half years, considerable effort will be required to determine the current state of Iraqi disarmament and the remaining steps needed to complete the disarmament program. With the full cooperation of Iraq, however, the job can be completed, and very quickly.

As noted previously, Canada considers the disarmament problem to be an essential part of the Iraq equation. A weapons of mass destruction capable Iraq would be a threat to its neighbours and the security of the Gulf region. Iraq, we should recall, is a country that has already started two deadly wars against neighbouring countries and has a record of using chemical weapons against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War and against its own people, the Kurds of Halabja, in 1988.

The international community cannot afford to ignore this reality. The Gulf region is too important, and the threat of escalation throughout the Middle East is too great to leave to chance or to faith in the redemption of a man like Saddam Hussein. Continued vigilance is required.

We believe that sanctions can be effective in both pressing Iraq to comply with disarmament obligations and in restricting Iraqi access to dual-use items and the capital needed to rebuild its military capability. Sanctions have made it harder for Iraq to continue with business as usual.

Canada, as a member of the UN Security Council, has an obligation to factor these realities into our assessment on how best to proceed with Iraq. Moreover, Canada has a clear and unambiguous interest in the continuing stability of the Gulf and the wider Middle East region. It is a responsibility that we take very seriously and cannot ignore.

The Iraq challenge has been one of the most complex Canada has had to manage since beginning our term on the UN Security Council in January 1999. The panel reports, which Canada launched, broke the council impasse and resulted in a new resolution, which we firmly believe holds out the hope of a final satisfactory conclusion. All council members are now working to see its terms implemented.

• 1015

Ultimately, the key to any final resolution of this situation rests, as it always has, with the Government of Iraq. Iraq must meet all of its obligations. While Baghdad's initial reaction to the passage of Resolution 1284 was not encouraging, neither was it unexpected. We remain convinced, however, that Iraq will ultimately accept the resolution, provided the international community remains firm and united in denying Iraq any other way out. That is the lesson from the long effort to secure Iraqi acceptance of the oil for food program.

[Translation]

Canada and a number of other countries have begun a process of re-engagement with Iraq to urge them to comply fully with the Resolution. Canadian representatives have met with Iraqi officials in Ottawa, New York and Baghdad to press Iraq to accept the terms of the Resolution and allow the return of international weapons inspectors. We will continue to do so.

[English]

In the meantime, Canada will continue to press ahead to ensure that the infrastructure is in place to implement all aspects of the resolution. We will press to have the humanitarian elements put in place as soon as possible and we will provide whatever help is needed to ensure that UNMOVIC has the tools—personnel and otherwise—to fulfil its mandate as soon as Baghdad gives it the green light.

Maintaining the profile and the integrity of both the humanitarian and disarmament elements of Canada's approach to Iraq has not always been easy, but we firmly believe that our policy constitutes a mix of compassion and prudence, which is realistic and appropriate to the circumstances Iraq has created. As Mr. Axworthy has said, “Canada hopes to bring an end to a situation which has gone on for too long. Too long for regional and international security. Too long for the Iraqi people.”

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We'd be pleased to try to answer any questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. McNee. We appreciate that.

From the Alliance, Mr. Obhrai.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for coming here today. Your analysis was good, but I think the doubt, the question, that remains among all of us, to which you have alluded, is that the sanctions have not worked to change the policy of Saddam Hussein. Nobody here likes Saddam Hussein, so we know the Iraqi government is uncooperative and they will continue to be so. My estimation is that the the guy's ego, after losing the Gulf War, is probably the reason he's doing this.

So now we know we have this element on top there that is not going to change, but we know that the Iraqi people are the ones paying the price for this guy's ego. The international community has taken a position that as long as that guy's ego...that as long as that guy on top does not change there, we're going to remain with the sanctions, and the concern is growing that those sanctions are having a devastating impact on the Iraqi economy.

The oil for food aid program, in my view, is a small relief, not a big relief. At the end of the day, it's not going to make the Iraqi people able to carry on with their lives in prosperity.

In your closing statement, you say Mr. Axworthy said that Canada hopes to bring an end to the situation. Frankly speaking, unless something else is done, I don't see any resolution in sight. I don't know if that's your view too. Is there a resolution in sight for Iraq? What is the way, in your view, aside from the food program, that things can move at a faster pace, taking into account that we aren't going to get any concessions from Saddam Hussein?

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chairman, we're not so sure about the future. Our view is that sanctions have not led to a resolution of the problem, but that if you look back, they were effective. Iraq initially did accept the inspectors mandated by the UN, who worked for many long years and who worked effectively in Iraq. They didn't finish their job but did a lot of very good work.

• 1020

We tend to look to this new resolution as a new vehicle that offers a lot to Iraq. Yes, Saddam Hussein has proven very stubborn. Yes, his ego is legendary. But we think the best hope is to try to make this resolution work and, with the concerted efforts of the international community, to make it clear to Iraq that this is the only way to go ahead. We hope to win Iraq's acceptance.

It may not be immediate and it may not be overnight. It took a long time for him to agree to the oil for food program, but our hope is that this resolution, which brings in a lot of humanitarian relief immediately and, I think, on a pretty big scale.... If you look at the fact that the oil ceiling is lifted, that will bring in something like $7 billion in revenue every six months, which will be available for the oil for food program. That's pretty considerable.

We don't pretend to suggest that it's a panacea or that it will solve all the problems. It's not a development program and it won't restore the Iraqi economy, but overall, I guess, we're hopeful that there is a way forward that can be persuasive with Iraq.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Is there no other way? I mean to say, let's say the sanctions were lifted.... And I think our concern here is for the Iraqi people, so let's not worry about the government. Is there no other way? Say the sanctions were lifted, and let's presume that other kinds of sanctions, technological barriers and all that.... Really, would that not go a longer way towards saying that Iraq would not become a threat in the region?

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chairman, I'll ask Mr. Sinclair to address this, please.

Mr. Donald Sinclair (Director, Middle East Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Thank you.

I'd like to answer your question from a slightly different perspective with respect to the sanctions question. Nobody likes Saddam Hussein, and you've said so. Nobody trusts him. That's important. He's not a benevolent dictator; he's a ruthless dictator, which leaves the question.... There's a fundamental question we have to look at, that is, would we, Canada, or the international community be responsible if it allowed the unchecked production of weapons of mass destruction by someone who has used them against his own people?

He is a brutal, ruthless dictator. That is a scenario you have to be prepared to entertain if you lift sanctions without having completed the disarmament job. That's a fact. It's a worry. No one can predict the future, but it's one of these questions of the future that are still there, and we have the past indication of Saddam's behaviour that he's quite willing to pursue this path.

One other fundamental aspect of this situation is that when Canada joined the council in January 1999, full of vim and vigour and ideas, we were faced with a situation where nobody except Iraq was calling for the immediate lifting of sanctions. Everybody in the council agreed that the disarmament task was not finished and that this moral question I raised was still an important question—and it still is. It still is part of the conundrum: how to deal with a man who, if left unchecked, would continue to produce weapons of mass destruction and would be prepared to use them.

When we joined the council, we were faced with a situation where the permanent five were very much split on how to proceed. Some members of the council felt that the current existing resolutions, Resolutions 687 and 981, were absolutely fine in terms of dealing with the situation, because they called for full Iraqi compliance with those resolutions before there was a lifting of sanctions.

I think there is a misunderstanding, a basic misunderstanding of what Resolution 1284 is and how dramatically different it is, and Canada modestly takes some credit for this sea change in the offer that's on the table.

• 1025

Instead of Iraq having to fully comply with all the terms of the resolution—in other words, there had to be complete certification of the destruction of the weapons of mass destruction program—all they have to do now is cooperate with weapons inspectors. Then there's a suspension of sanctions.

But what is a suspension of sanctions? It's clearly a lift. You remove them. Sanctions are not a light switch. They don't go on and off, on at midnight and off at six a.m. Thousands of people are involved in a sanctions implementation regime in Iraq.

The trigger for the suspension of sanctions is simply Iraqi cooperation. With the passage of Resolution 1284, a whole raft of humanitarian benefits occur. They're occurring now.

Before we joined the council, one way the permanent members thought to deal with the problem of oil for food was simply to raise the level. If $3 million in six months was too low, maybe $4 million was the right number. Well, that ceiling is gone. Whatever Iraq can produce, it can sell. The prices are high. Revenues are high. It can use this revenue to import and buy a whole range of goods.

It cannot buy weapons and tanks. It cannot buy the gold bathtub faucets, if you like. Countries will see an Iraqi application to buy gold bathtub faucets, wonder how that helps the children of Iraq, put a hold on it, and say, no, we don't think spending $7 billion for gold bathtub faucets is useful. But everything else, including food, medicine, and pharmaceuticals, will be fast-tracked. There's an entire list of products that will go through completely unchecked, in almost free-market conditions, if you like.

So there's a whole sea change in the way the international community has dealt with Iraq and the offer that's now on the table to Iraq. In order to deal with this fundamental moral, ethical, and political problem of how to cope with an unreliable dictator who has the scientific capacity to continue to produce weapons of mass destruction, in order to deal with that, all of the members of the council, without exception, agreed that the weapons inspectors had to go back and finish the job.

You've heard Ron Cleminson say, in terms of whether sanctions work, that the weapons inspectors have probably done 80% to 90% of their work, and in another 18 months they could be finished. There are still some questions on the biological weapons file, basically, but on chemical and nuclear, the weapons teams are pretty much satisfied that they've done a good job. I mean, it's the effect of sanctions that the weapons inspectors were able to go in there and end the production of weapons of mass destruction, of chemical and nuclear weapons.

What we're saying is that over the course of the very difficult 12 months of 1999, while we were on the council, Canada was in the middle, if you like, trying to bring part of the P-5 to recognize the need to provide humanitarian relief to the Iraqi people. At the same time, we had to take into account the moral question about an end to a situation we were not satisfied with, on the weapons of mass destruction side.

The result is a very complicated, difficult-to-read resolution, which we've passed on to you, but one where humanitarian benefits accrue immediately to the people of Iraq. We have to wait and see what effect that really has. I mean, this resolution was only passed in December.

So the sea change I'm talking about is in terms of the humanitarian benefits accorded by this approach and, at the same time, the tremendous reduction in the offer put to Iraq. They only have to cooperate with weapons inspectors and we can get the job done. Then we can suspend sanctions. Suspension is a lift. Now, it's a lift with, if you like, a recall button. It's a lift where if, for whatever reason, they change their minds and start to do the wrong things, the council can push the red button again and sanctions are reimposed. But it's very difficult to do this. As I say, it's not a light switch.

• 1030

That's the conundrum we face. That was the situation we were faced with. It was the effort of Canadian diplomacy in New York, in terms of negotiating the new resolution, to force the international community through the acceptance of a new resolution—and let me repeat, there wasn't even a basic understanding that there was a need for a new resolution—to open up on the humanitarian side.

We believe both that we were very successful and that the resolution is very successful in that it maintains the two essential elements of our policy, which John mentioned. The first is to provide instant, immediate, effective, and rather dramatic humanitarian relief to the people of Iraq and, at the same time, to try to finish the job on weapons of mass destruction, because we fear a brutal and ruthless dictator who might use them again.

I'm sorry my answer was so long. I apologize.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Okay. Thank you.

The Chair: Madame Debien.

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien: Good morning, gentlemen.

First of all, I'm going to talk about Resolution 1284 and the lifting of sanctions. We know, with respect to Resolution 1284, that the ceiling established for oil has, indeed, been lifted. However, as a result of this resolution, the UN senior humanitarian coordinator resigned, as well as two coordinators from the World Food Program, stating that Resolution 1284 was just about useless, that it boiled down to about the equivalent of 50 cents per day per Iraqi citizen. Do you think that 50 cents per day is enough to survive on in Iraq?

My second question deals with what you said about disarmament. Last week, some witnesses told us that approximately 95%, even 97%, of Iraq's weapons had been destroyed. Of course, there have been no inspections since 1998. So we do not know what has happened since that time, but it is pretty hard to imagine that Iraq could have got its weapons production up and running again since 1998 and rearm itself to previous levels.

We also talked about biological weapons. They may have done something there, since biological weapons are very easy to produce. Any country can easily produce biological weapons. With respect to disarmament, you know that the neighbouring countries have drastically increased their arms levels since then. So when you say that the conflict can spill over to other parts of the region, it would not be just because of Iraq, since the countries all around have also stockpiled large amounts of weapons since then as well.

You say that all we need to do for Iraq is to cooperate. That would, of course, be the ideal solution, but there is the food aspect. Iraq has refused the food part, saying that it is inadequate. That is one of the reasons for its opposition.

The second reason is the 120-day monitoring. Resolution 1284 says that continuous monitoring would take place for 120 days after sanctions were lifted. Does that not amount to keeping Iraq subservient for those 120 days? I can easily understand why Iraq would refuse such a violation of its sovereignty. It is easy to understand, even if one does not agree.

The third thing that I would like to hear from you about is the irrational obsession by the United States in this conflict, obviously because of its strategic interests in the Persian Gulf. Do you not think that one of the roles that Canada could play would be to try to serve as an intermediary to get the United States to understand the immoral role that they are playing right now in Iraq?

• 1035

[English]

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chairman, perhaps I could start with Madam Debien's second question.

[Translation]

On disarmament, we would point out that the Saddam Hussein regime has used its weapons against its own population. It has not just taken action against Iran and other neighbouring countries. One of the basic reasons for our policy is to protect the minorities in Iraq who have already suffered at the hands of the Hussein regime. So we learn as much about the internal situation as about the regional one.

As you said, or perhaps it was Mr. Cleminson, who was here last week, we have four concerns with respect to disarmament: nuclear weapons, missiles—and in these two areas the work is very advanced, nearly finished—chemical weapons and biological weapons, where there was still quite a lot of work to do. As you said, the fact that there had been no inspections since 1998 leaves us in the dark.

The second part of Ms. Debien's question dealt with the 120- day period. It is difficult to predict the future, but at first glance, we feel that that is a very reasonable approach to ensure that the task is properly completed. However, it is not impossible that there might be another resolution after all that to put an end to the sanctions.

Regarding Canada's role in influencing the United States, we cooperate closely with all our allies in the Security Council to try to reach the best consensus possible, because that is what will work. The greater the consensus in the international community, the more we can influence the Iraqis. In that context, we are carrying out our own policy.

I will now ask Mr. Sinclair to answer your first question, Madam, with respect to the food program.

[English]

Mr. Donald Sinclair: This is a difficult question because it gets into the area of what Iraq, the regime, has been doing from our perspective to impede effective distribution of essential goods to the Iraqi population. And they have done so. It's quite clear.

With the lift in the oil production ceiling, Iraq can sell as much oil on the open market as it can produce. That now is in the range of $7 billion every six months, or $14 billion a year. That's a very significant amount of money.

In the former oil for food programs, where there were limits, the limits were at $3 million and then at $5.2 million. Once we joined the council, one of our objectives was to remove that limit. Iraq is now exporting more oil than it ever has before. I'm not an expert on the price of oil, but I just know that at my local gas pump it's very high. I would expect that the revenue they're getting for the oil is probably more than they've ever had before.

The question is, what can they spend this on? The sanctions provide limits on what he can buy. He can't buy guns and tanks, he can't buy dual-use items, and he can't buy frivolous items. It's very difficult to set up this control system. It's not an easy thing to do. What can he buy?

The resolution will allow for the instant, immediate, free-market movement—unimpeded, if you like—of pharmaceuticals, foodstuffs, medical supplies, agricultural equipment, educational items, and everything the international community felt was needed, in humanitarian terms, for the people of Iraq.

• 1040

So the $14 billion has to be spent on these items. If you remove sanctions, that $14 billion can be spent on anything whatsoever, and we have serious doubts as to how that $14 billion might be spent. He's not a benevolent dictator; he is a dictator. So we keep coming back to the essential question.

Is that enough money for Iraq? In the circumstances, probably not. Then you get into questions of how we can help redevelop, rebuild Iraqi society and social infrastructure, which will be a very important and difficult task requiring international assistance. There's no question of that, after the imposition of sanctions for such a period of time. There's been enormous devastation of Iraq, and it will be necessary for the international community to contribute to this rebuilding effort. The question is when, how, at what point, and under what circumstances we do that.

Our argument is that there's a new offer on the table and it puts the onus on Iraq to cooperate with weapons inspectors. For us, that's very reasonable. It's a very reasonable offer to cooperate with weapons inspectors, and it fulfils the moral need for the international community to assure itself that he will not use these weapons against his own people.

What if we lifted sanctions today, he reconstituted his weapons program tomorrow, and next week he were to use them again in ways he's used them in the past? That's a very serious issue.

Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much.

I think the issue is that 500,000 children died during the last 10 years—since 1990. I understand the UN used a figure of 500,000 children who died because of the sanctions somehow. That's the main issue for me.

Coming back to the resolution passed by the UN, we were told last time we had a discussion on this subject that the problem with the resolution was that it used the wording “fully and completely” in regard to compliance. They didn't say “has to comply”; they said “fully and completely”. That meant 100% compliance. If you say “has to comply”, you could go with 97%, 98%, or 99%; but when you use the phrase “fully and completely”, you lock yourself in forever not to lift the sanctions. That's my first point, if you could comment on that.

The second point is that we mentioned earlier that all Iraq has to do is accept the UN inspectors. I recall, correct me if I'm wrong, the inspectors were kicked out of Iraq because they were not working for the UN, they were working for a U.S. government agency. They were caught spying for the U.S. government, not working for the UN. Correct me if I am wrong on that subject too. We heard that news at a time when they had cameras working there—a sample of what their case may be.

The other issue is, I don't recall any sanctions in the world in the last 50 years since the UN that allowed the killing of 500,000 children. I compare Saddam Hussein with, say, Nicolae Ceausescu and the North Korean dictator. They are no better than Saddam Hussein, let's face it. I'm not defending any one of them, but why can't we put similar sanctions against North Korea? And why didn't we do similar sanctions when Nicolae Ceausescu was stabbing his own children? We saw the orphans in the TV documentaries.

The other point I want to make is how about the neighbours of the Iraqi regime—Syria and Iran? Iran has no objection for lifting the sanctions. They've had a fight for the last 10 years. They've killed each other—a million people on each side. I don't understand the logic of the sanctions any more, because they're not having the effect we'd hoped for. They didn't remove the regime, didn't weaken it, and he can still fight a war if he wants to. The guy is that kind of person.

Can you comment on those questions?

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chairman, on the question of the deaths of children, I think there are a couple of things to make clear.

• 1045

First, we don't minimize the suffering of the people of Iraq over the past 10 years. But I think the UNICEF report that Mr. Assadourian is referring to doesn't ascribe the reasons for this, but notes infant mortality rates over the period of time that are caused by a number of factors.

I think it's instructive in this regard to look at the same report's conclusions on the child mortality rates in the three northern provinces, where UN sanctions apply fully but the humanitarian program is administered by the United Nations. In those areas, the mortality rates have actually improved over the last 10 years, suggesting that the sanctions in themselves are not necessarily the responsible element. It's a much more complicated situation than that.

In regard to the related question that Mr. Assadourian put about why the imposition of sanctions on Iraq and not on some other regimes around the world—reprehensible as they may be as well—the sanctions were imposed by the Security Council pursuant to chapter VII of the UN charter, that is to say in response to a threat to international peace and security. It was that assessment by the international community, given voice and effect by the Security Council, that led to the sanctions on Iraq. So it's in the context of the invasion of Kuwait and the perceived continuing threat to international peace and security that sanctions were imposed.

Perhaps Mr. Sinclair could address the question about Resolution 1284 and the degree of cooperation required by Iraq.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: It's a tough situation.

Mr. Donald Sinclair: On the question of compliance and verification, you're absolutely right that the early resolution called for the full and complete compliance by Iraq with the terms of the resolution.

Like beauty, full and complete compliance is in the eye of the beholder. We have inspections in Canada by the IAEA of our nuclear facilities, and the IAEA does not guarantee 100% verification to the international community. It does not guarantee 100% that Canada is not diverting nuclear material to a weapons program, but it does guarantee the highest possible standards of verification that it can muster to assure that Canada is not diverting nuclear material to a weapons program.

I use that as an example because it shows that even in our own country, as a member of a non-proliferation regime, under the terms of that treaty we open our own facilities to inspections. They're not necessarily bad things.

Now the new resolution, Resolution 1284, uses a different concept from full and complete compliance, and part of the reason it uses the word “cooperation” is precisely because we felt that some countries might hold too high a standard on the words “full and complete compliance”.

The word “cooperation” again is in the eye of the beholder. What is cooperation and what isn't? But Resolution 1284 says that the respective chairmen of the IAEA and UNMOVIC will provide reports to the council on the nature of this cooperation. Those two reports will have a tremendous impact on the determination or definition as to whether Iraq has cooperated or not.

You're quite right about the old resolution in terms of pointing out the words. But I would just turn you to the new resolution, paragraph 33, which has been distributed. The new phrase “cooperation” is a very significant difference, and it stems from the very argument you are addressing about whether 100% verification is possible. No, nobody says it is. But it is possible to achieve the highest standards attainable of verification and the highest levels of confidence with respect to the methods used in terms of the objectives set for the verification or inspection teams.

On the question of UNSCOM, it did have some difficulties, there's no question. And there were lots of stories about the methods used by UNSCOM. From its perspective, it was using all available means at its disposal to try to find out what Saddam was up to, what it was he had hidden, what was being hidden from the international community, from the inspectors. Perhaps in some cases they went too far in terms of utilizing those means.

• 1050

Again, the new resolution calls for a clean sweep: a new chairman, a new inspection team, a new way of putting the team together. It's a determined attempt to correct some of the mistakes of the past and to create a new inspection team that will go in there and do the job that's necessary on the verification side.

The Chair: Thank you.

[Translation]

Ms. Picard.

Ms. Pauline Picard (Drummond, BQ): Good morning, gentlemen. First of all, I would like to make a comment. I wonder why it is not being said clearly that the United States does not want to lift the sanctions. Everyone knows that they are refusing to do it because they have strategic interests in the Gulf. I do not know why we are always turning a blind eye to that.

My question is on the Oil for Food Program. You mentioned that $13.5 billion had been set aside to purchase humanitarian aid, including $1 billion for medical supplies and enough money to buy 12 million tons of food.

As my colleague indicated, groups that testified here last week told us that the Iraqis really cannot feed themselves properly on 50 cents a day. It was pointed out that most of the medical supplies delivered to Iraq were past their expiry date and that tons of supplies had been sold on the black market. There was a kind of street mafia controlling food products and commodities, who were doing business in these supplies along Iraq's borders. So there was a problem with black-market activity. I wonder if you have looked into these issues. If so, what can be done about this situation?

This is the first time a document has referred to Kuwaiti prisoners of war, and I would like to hear a bit about their situation.

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chairman, I would point out that the Oil for Food Program is only one facet of the situation in Iraq, since there is still a local economy and farmers producing food in the country. The program is very important, but it is not the only source of food. We are aware that black-market activities affect the local economy. We do not agree with those who say that most of the medical supplies are past their expiry dates. The Secretary General of the United Nations, 10 days ago, I believe, published a very detailed report on all the humanitarian aspects of the situation.

Mr. Chairman, I will just quote one excerpt, which deals with the health sector. I will quote it in English, if you will allow me:

[English]

In the health sector, the increased arrival of supplies during phases IV to V meant that the range of treatment expanded...

[Translation]

He gives considerable detail on the medical supplies:

[English]

...as drugs became more widely available at all levels of health facilities, patient attendance increased by 46 per cent, and some 90 per cent of the essential drug needs of hospital in-patients were met.

• 1055

[Translation]

Things are not perfect, but the Secretary General of the United Nations says that 90% of the medical supplies required by Iraqis in hospital are available at the moment.

You mentioned the prisoners of war. There are still quite a large number of prisoners of war and solutions are being sought, but 10 years later. The figure...

[English]

Dennis, do you remember?

Mr. Dennis Horak (Deputy Director, Middle East Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): There are about 600 Kuwaiti missing and about 55 or so other nationalities who are still unaccounted for.

There is a commission that is supposed to meet to discuss this. Iraq has not offered full cooperation to that, so this is obviously a major concern. One of the three main panel reports prepared was on the POW situation. In the new resolution there are a couple of provisions in there to try to relaunch that process.

[Translation]

Ms. Pauline Picard: You say that they have disappeared. Is that because there is no news of them and we do not know if they are alive, or do we know that they are in prison?

[English]

Mr. Dennis Horak: That's the question.

[Translation]

We do not even know.

Ms. Pauline Picard: All right.

[English]

Mr. John McNee: Missing in action

[Translation]

like in Vietnam. They are not even identified. No one knows if they are really dead.

[English]

Mr. Donald Sinclair: An important element of the prisoner-of-war situation is that Iraq denies there are any. It's Kuwait that says there are 600. Iraq denies there's any problem whatsoever. The UN has continued to maintain that there's an obligation on Iraq to cooperate on this issue and to cooperate with the International Red Cross as well in examining this humanitarian situation. And Iraq has refused to do so.

The Chair: Are you suggesting that there have never been any inspections whatsoever of any detention centres in Iraq during the course of the last 10 years, or any access to jails or prisons or anything?

Mr. Donald Sinclair: I don't think so, unless the Red Cross has been able to see some detention centres, but it would all be controlled by the Government of Iraq. They would take the Red Cross to whatever detention centres they wanted to show them. So it's a very difficult problem. It's a very difficult one for Kuwait, in particular.

The Chair: Mr. Paradis.

Colleagues, we have five or six members who want to speak. If we keep it all to five minutes, we can actually finish in half an hour and perhaps take 10 minutes to discuss what types of things we'd like to see in the resolution, and then we can get out of here a little early.

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Paradis: I will start by saying a few words about Resolution 1284. I believe that it represents a step forward. Some people will say that it is too little, too late, but it is a step in the right direction that was made a while back and now we are seeing the results.

I would like us to talk about the future rather than the present or the past. All the witnesses we have heard from have talked about how ineffective the general sanctions are against the regime of Saddam Hussein. The sanctions do not penalize the regime, but rather the people. They target the people and enable the regime to carry on. You put it well in your text when you say that it is the same government that channels scarce resources into the building of 48 palaces and a luxury resort for the Iraqi elite. But that will continue. Saddam cares little about the people and we have clear indications of that. Sanctions against the people as a way of getting Saddam to change are not working. We are caught up in that situation to some extent. Everyone agrees that sanctions should be imposed on Saddam Hussein and everyone agrees that there should be sanctions against his regime, but how could we implement sanctions against Saddam, against those we want to target and his regime, without those sanctions hurting the people, who are suffering terribly? We have seen that children are dying, etc. We are seeing something new in international humanitarian rights with Kosovo, where, for perhaps the first time, humanitarian rights, or the right to carry out humanitarian interventions, have taken precedence over State sovereignty. That is a new development.

• 1100

It seems that in Irak change takes time. Our idea is that the old approach is to impose sanctions and that he will eventually listen. That is more or less what you say on page 6 of your statement, when you say that you are convinced that Irak will ultimately accept the resolution, provided the international community remains firm and united.

But this situation has been going on for about 10 years. So I am wondering what we should do. What could Canada do? We are going to be chairing the Security Council as of early April. Should we not be demonstrating some new leadership? Should we not be demonstrating some ingenuity and imagination? Should the international community not be inventive, when we see that something is not working, such as the sanctions that are targeting the people, when they should be targeting rather the leaders of the regime, and its President, Saddam Hussein? What can we do to take action against Saddam and his regime without penalizing all the people of Irak which is what is happening at the moment?

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chairman, we are very open to any new ideas that you might suggest. We would be most grateful. Within that context, the answer to Mr. Paradis's question is that we feel there has been significant change in the sanctions over the last 10 years. The last step in this process, namely the new resolution passed in December, is in itself a considerable refinement of the initial sanctions. It is designed to do exactly what you want—namely, minimize the impact on the people, but maintain a fair mark of control and obligations in order to apply pressure to the regime.

In our view, the fact that there are no longer any limits on oil exports, the revenues from which are used to pay for food and drugs and to maintain the country's infrastructure, the fact that the purchase of many items by Irak will automatically be authorized, which was not the case...

Mr. Denis Paradis: Mr. McNee, perhaps I would just like us to go one step further, and perhaps other committee members would like to see that as well. What can we do to de-link the sanctions that are targeted at the people from inspections, disarmament, and so on. At the moment, the two issues are closely linked. The two key aspects of our policy that you mention are extremely closely linked. How can we de-link these two key aspects while retaining both of them, so that they are not independent and so that Canada can play a leadership role in this matter? There is room for someone to play a leadership role in the international community. How should we go about this?

Mr. John McNee: The major issue, Mr. Chairman, is to determine how to exert effective pressure on Saddam Hussein in order to get him to change his behaviour. This challenge has been facing the international community for 10 years, and no progress has been made. Earlier, reference was made to the significant progress made by inspectors over a long period of time.

We have no magic solution to this problem. Some people ask why we don't replace the sanctions with a program that would apply to military items only.

• 1105

For us, the problem is that Saddam Hussein has built his weapons of mass destruction by importing a whole range of materials, chemical and industrial products known as dual-use items, products which are completely legal for making... [Editor's Note: Inaudible]... or whatever, but which can also be used to produce chemical weapons. How do we deal with such a challenge? It is a tremendous problem and one that causes us to maintain a broader range of sanctions to ensure we cover products of this type, which were vital in the past, and which, we are convinced, will appear again in the future.

In short, that is what leads us to support...

Mr. Denis Paradis: Mr. McNee, I do not want to go over the time allotted to me.

Mr. John McNee: Of course, Mr. Paradis. That is where we stand.

Mr. Denis Paradis: Thank you very much.

The Chair: Ms. Beaumier, and then Ms. Debien.

[English]

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): I find this whole issue very frustrating. I don't know how we get past the propaganda. It appears to me that much of the propaganda is just being sent back—the U.S. propaganda.

One question you didn't answer is one that Mr. Assadourian brought up. The Iraqis were complaining about the CIA being a big part of the UNSCOM inspection team, and of course there were great denials until at one point there was an acknowledgement. How is Iraq going to be sure that...? Do they get to pick the members of the inspection team this time? That's one question. I'm not sure how Iraq is going to prove a negative, and the hypocrisy of all of this bothers me a little bit.

I'm not saying I support Saddam Hussein, by any means. However, we know that Saddam Hussein had a comprehensive health care plan for his country, we know that women enjoyed rights there that they didn't in many other Arab countries, and we also know that Saddam Hussein had a hospital and school system for the Kurds.

Now, you talk about the protection of minorities, and I would think that basically you're talking about the Kurds, because I know that the Christians in Iraq were feeling some sense of security while Saddam Hussein was there—less than perfect, but.... We attack Saddam Hussein about the Kurds; however, we're considering selling a nuclear reactor to Turkey. It seems that it was all right for Saddam Hussein to use chemical weapons on Iran when that was part of the U.S. agenda; however, now we're going to make sure—and I don't know how we're going to make sure—that he has no traces left of what was originally supplied to him by our allies.

The other question is, we basically feel that Saddam Hussein has to go; however, who's going to replace him? We thought we were all-knowing. Even though the involvement in Afghanistan wasn't an open one, there was acknowledgement that the U.S. was helping to fund the rebels, and wow, look at what we have in Afghanistan now. I believe, and I think many believe, that Saddam Hussein is only one of dozens who would be more than happy to replace him and who in fact would be much worse.

I think that right from the beginning even the motives for the war were very, very unclear. It concerns me a little bit when I listen to Mr. Sinclair using the word “moral” to justify what we are taking part in right now.

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chairman, if I could—

The Chair: Take a stab at that?

Mr. John McNee: I'll start perhaps with the question about Canadian policy vis-à-vis Saddam Hussein and the future. While Canada would not at all be distressed to see him leave the scene, it is not our policy to seek the overthrow of the regime either. Our view is that change has to come somehow from within the country.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: It's also illegal to take part in the overthrow of a foreign government.

Mr. John McNee: Indeed. So that's a point of clarification in terms of our own policy.

• 1110

The second question Madam Beaumier raises concerns the motives for the war in the first place. I think they were pretty clear. You had the invasion by Iraq of a neighbouring state.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: We also read the letter from the U.S. ambassador saying that they were not endorsing this, but....

Mr. John McNee: Well, we're here today to try to respond to questions about Canada's policy and, going back, why Canada supported and participated in the coalition, whose aim was to roll back that invasion. The principle of the international community intervening to prevent that sort of aggression is a very important one.

On the question of the Kurdish minority and their treatment, I think it is important, as I mentioned before, to take a look at the way things are currently working out in the north of Iraq, in those three provinces that are under UN administration. Again, in the latest report of the Secretary-General of the UN, which was ten days ago, under almost all the headings it shows that substantial improvements are achieved there, outstripping the situation in the south. The moral of that story, as far as we're concerned—

An hon. member: Moral?

Mr. John McNee: The lesson to be drawn, if you will, is that the framework offered by the humanitarian program is one that can and does make a difference. In certain respects, you've had the Iraqi government now agreeing to approaches that were used in the north that should help in the south.

On the question of the new inspection regime, it will be differently constituted than was the last one. Its chairman, Dr. Blix, is a person of high integrity and great experience in the nuclear field. I think, though—and I stand to be corrected by my colleagues—Canada would not think it was reasonable to grant Iraq a veto on those from the international community who would be able to participate in those inspections. I think we'd take the view that it's the Security Council who should determine who would go in there. Correct me if I'm wrong.

Mr. Donald Sinclair: I would just like to add a comment. My use of the word “moral” was with respect to the question I had asked at the beginning about responsibility. I had asked would Canada or the international community be responsible if we knowingly allowed unchecked the production of weapons of mass destruction by a dictator who had already shown he was prepared to use them against his own people? Because you're looking into the future, there are no guarantees one way or the other, and it becomes an issue that you have to satisfy yourself on. If you're prepared to lift sanctions, you have to accept that possibility.

Our position and the position of all of the members of the Security Council is that we must tidy up this weapons of mass destruction issue first. We're almost there. There's a new offer on the table, and all it requires is cooperation. Why don't we finish this and get this issue behind us and suspend sanctions and the issue is over? To us, it is very simple.

Lots of other issues have been raised today on which maybe we haven't explained ourselves very well, but I'm not sure I answered the 50¢ one very well. I would just make the point briefly that the $14 billion that is now available to Iraq is based upon its oil production capacity and its ability to sell oil. That $14 billion will be there whether there are sanctions or not sanctions. That's the amount of oil that Iraq can currently produce. It doesn't have many other ways of raising money. It doesn't produce much else, and there's no internal tax system. So the $14 billion, divided by the population of Iraq, will be there no matter what. It's a question of the distribution of that money, and it's a question of, if you lift sanctions, how much of it would be spent on rearmament and weapons and tanks and God knows what else. That's the problem we have.

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Thank you.

The Chair: Madame Debien. Sorry, Madam Beaumier.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: I'm not sure why they didn't answer my question, and with due respect, it was a very good question. I wanted to know about the double standards that we have—the policy towards one regime on something that is allowable by another regime. I have a problem with all of this. I have a problem with the hypocrisy of all of this.

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chairman, I don't think I answered one other aspect of Madam Beaumier's questions, and that concerns Canada's position on the use by Iraq of chemical weapons in the war with Iran. Canada never condoned or supported that in any way and was vehemently critical of that. So I don't think that's fair. We've never been in support of it, and indeed it's inconceivable to me that Canada ever would.

The Chair: Okay.

[Translation]

Ms. Debien.

Ms. Maud Debien: First of all, I will comment on something Mr. McNee told us a few minutes ago. You said, Mr. McNee, that between the initial resolutions imposing sanctions on Iraq and Resolution 1284, there had been enormous progress and some refinement. I agree with you: the suffering has progressed and been refined by 100%. That is not what you intended to say, but that is how I interpret it.

You provided us with a document on Resolution 1284. I asked a question last week—or, rather, it was my colleague that asked it—regarding the so-called the escrow account that is mentioned in the last paragraph. I read quickly through paragraphs 23, 24 and 25, which deal precisely with this escrow account that we hear so much of. It is a little abstract for us lay people.

In terms of Resolution 1284 and the escrow account in question, how will this aid be channelled? How will the whole thing work? This money must absolutely not end up in the hands of Saddam Hussein. That is what I understand from reading paragraphs 23, 24 and 25 of Resolution 1284. What is the mechanism, then, for channelling these funds deposited in an escrow account?

Mr. John McNee: If I understand correctly, Mr. Chairman, the procedure is the same; namely—and my colleagues know more about this than I do—Iraq is allowed to export oil, but the revenues are not paid directly to the government.

Ms. Maud Debien: No, they are deposited in an escrow account.

Mr. John McNee: That is correct, and then...

Ms. Maud Debien: That is my question. This escrow account is administered by the Secretary-General. I have no problem up to that point. But afterwards, how is the aid delivered?

Mr. John McNee: Every six months, the Iraqi government must submit a purchase plan to the Security Council, outlining the number of tons of grain, the amount of medicine...

Ms. Maud Debien: Okay.

Mr. John McNee: The lists are huge: Iraq is a big country. Next, these plans, which are referred to as distribution plans, are approved by the Security Council and the contracts are authorized; once they are authorized, the suppliers are paid by the United Nations out of this account. Naturally, there are certain expenses. If I remember correctly, there are costs involved in the administration of the fund by the United Nations, amounts earmarked for compensation for Kuwait. There are certain expenses that are involved.

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Ms. Maud Debien: I understand fully and I thank you for these details, but I will give you a very concrete example. Suppose that on the list of products that Iraq submits to this much-vaunted United Nations committee, one of the items is 2,000 tons of wheat—a figure that is completely arbitrary. Two thousands tons of wheat is required. So, a contract is signed with a supplier to deliver 2,000 tons of wheat, or medicine or something else, to the Iraqi people. At this point, who receives 100 tons of wheat? Who receives boxes of medicine? Who receives these products and who distributes them? That is my question.

[English]

Mr. Donald Sinclair: It's an excellent question because it gets to one of the problems, which is the distribution of these goods once they arrive in Iraq.

Once they arrive in Iraq, there's a UN inspector at the ship to make sure there are no guns hidden in the wheat. The wheat is off-loaded, the contractors paid, and it's in the hands of the Government of Iraq. That's it. It's on the dock. They can do with that whatever they wish, and one of the problems is the distribution of it.

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien: This is a real problem, because at that point, the government can resell it on the black market or to another country. Does Resolution 1284 not provide a mechanism for redistribution? We are going around in circles.

Mr. John McNee: I think that part of the answer, Mr. Chair, is found in paragraph 21 of the Resolution. Here, I have it in English. They talk of enhancing or improving the UN observation process in Iraq to ensure that all supplies are used as authorized. Otherwise, they will have to sound the alert. This should improve the situation.

Ms. Maud Debien: Okay. From what I understand, this is the problem.

The Chair: There is a slight problem, but all we can do is to verify. We can't replace the entire Iraqi administration. This would cost the UN a fortune and we're not ready to pay for that.

Ms. Maud Debien: Okay. Thank you.

The Chair: It would be similar to Kosovo, but the situation is entirely different. In any case, it would be impossible.

Mr. Patry. Then Ms. Augustine and Mr. McWhinney.

Mr. Bernard Patry: You said, this morning, when talking about the Iraqi equation, that disarmament was an essential and inescapable element. That is what you said. In your statement, you also said this morning, and I will quote you in English:

[English]

“While the oil for food program is impressive,” and the Canadian mission to Baghdad last November “noted some improvements”. This mission didn't talk about impressive improvements; they said “some improvements”.

You talk about medication and you really didn't answer the question of Madam Picard regarding outdated medication. I think it is a shame to send outdated medication to Iraq.

We have reached the point now where Iraq cannot buy chalk, de la craie for the tableaux for education because—I don't know, maybe they can use it for the production of weapons. It was in the paper this week. I can't believe this.

Mr. McNee, you stated that in the northern provinces of Iraq the rate of infant mortality has decreased. I would like you to provide to this committee all your statistics, because all the witnesses we have had before this committee have told us 300 to 500 Iraqi children are dying on a monthly basis. To me this is impressive.

Let's talk about the military and the threat from a realistic perspective. When Iraq went to war against Iran, as was noted by my colleague, Madam Beaumier, Iraq was fully supported by the U.S. and western countries. If we're realistic, how threatening and modernized is it now, considering it has been years since Iraq was able to import any new technology weapons, and considering their inability to even remotely defend themselves during the bombing they sustained from the western countries? Would you agree that the sanctions and embargo are exaggerated punishments that mainly affect the people of Iraq?

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Second, you just said that weapons inspectors examined Iraq's nuclear chemical weapons and were satisfied. Now they have to examine the biological weapons. Therefore. isn't the threatened power of Iraq's military highly exaggerated?

In conclusion, I have another small comment. Why are the United States and Britain still bombing Iraq on a daily basis? We were told that 30,000 sorties were done, either in 1998 or 1999. I don't understand this. I'd like to get an answer on this, because we're part of this.

In conclusion, Canada will start to chair the Security Council next week. I think it's time to find a solution and evaluate all these sanctions.

Those are my comments. Thank you.

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Patry has raised a lot of different points. I would like to try to hit them fairly quickly.

On the question of infant mortality rates, I was commenting on the report by UNICEF. We'd be very pleased to provide that. I think it's probably the best single document there is.

On the import of chalk, that's not our understanding. We understand there's no problem with chalk. There's a new list of—

Mr. Bernard Patry: I read chalk this week. It's like a paranoia.

Mr. John McNee: There's a whole new list of educational materials that are permitted to go in without any difficulty on that score.

On the question of prescription drugs that are past the limit date, Dennis, are you—

[Translation]

Mr. Bernard Patry: They are expired.

[English]

Mr. Dennis Horak: There have been reports of that in the past. I don't know the extent of it. I know that certainly in the Secretary-General's most recent report it's not discussed. As Mr. McNee said, 90% of the in-hospital medical needs in the centre of the country are being met, and I believe he would have mentioned if there was a problem with outdating.

I'm not denying it hasn't happened in the past, by any stretch of the imagination. Certainly it has, and it's not something we would support. There are procedures in place to deal with that. There is inspection. Iraq can reject a contract, and if it doesn't off-load it, they don't get paid. These are things that happen commercially. These are commercial deals that get made. A company will sign a contract, and if the contract isn't met, they don't get paid. If the stuff is inspected and doesn't get off-loaded, the company doesn't get paid. That's a fact.

Mr. John McNee: On the Iran-Iraq War, I don't think it's fair to say that Canada fully supported Iraq at all. That wasn't our policy.

Mr. Bernard Patry: The United States.

Mr. John McNee: The question of the bombing is an important one. It's very important to understand that what occurs now is very frequent, perhaps daily—my colleagues will correct me—aerial patrols of specified zones between certain latitudes in the north of Iraq and the south of Iraq by U.S.A. and U.K. aircraft. These so-called no-fly zones were established to protect Iraqi civilians from assaults by the Iraqi army and air force, under the direction of Saddam Hussein. Their whole purpose is to protect civilians and prevent attacks upon those minorities.

You'll remember, Mr. Chairman, on the upshot of the Gulf War there was a real question of armed revolt in the north and south. So they are there to protect. They are not bombing runs; they are patrols. When challenged by Iraq, the coalition aircraft do retaliate, but Canada's position is one of support for the enforcement of those no-fly zones as a means to protect the civilian minorities in the north and the south. It's really a misunderstanding to suggest that there is a campaign of bombing.

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I've written down “chairmanship of the council”. I confess I've forgotten the question, Mr. Chairman. The question was what Canada might do...?

Mr. Bernard Patry: It's not the time for Canada to be a leader and to try to do an evaluation of all these sanctions all across the world, on a humanitarian side, because it doesn't work. We have had sanctions against Iraq for 10 years. People are dying and the children are dying on a daily basis. It just doesn't work, period. We should find another way.

We should, as my colleague just mentioned, split nuclear and humanitarian factors. It's very important. I just want to know if you really feel that it's right now—that was my question—that Iraqi military is not exaggerated. I mean to say, there's no power right now in Iraq. I mean nuclear and chemical; they say there's no more nuclear or chemical weapons. You're just talking about biological weapons, and I think if you go to the Internet you could find a way to produce biological weapons.

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chairman, I guess what we would say is that given the past history, the terrible past history of the behaviour of the Iraqi regime, both in launching these two very destructive wars and in its behaviour against its own citizens, we don't think it would be prudent or reasonable for the international community to give Saddam Hussein the benefit of the doubt. That's what it would boil down to, in our view, if the international community doesn't maintain some kind of framework that hems him in.

We haven't come here today to say that we have found the perfect solution, not by any means. We recognize that the situation is grave for the people of Iraq, and that is very much in our minds. If we had a better or more magic solution, we certainly would have advocated it.

The Chair: Thank you.

Madam Augustine, then Mr. McWhinney.

Ms. Jean Augustine: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We've heard heart-wrenching evidence. We've heard about starving children. We've heard witnesses say to us that as Canadians they just can't understand how starving Iraqi women and children are in Canada's national interest.

I just want to express a little frustration or disappointment, especially in regard to the final page of your document, simply because I think that as a department you are advising the minister and you are having input. It seems to me that as we grapple with a resolution and some way in which this committee could advise or put something forward, you have not really given us what I would consider something that's substantial in terms of your conclusion: “Canada hopes to bring an end to a situation that has gone on for too long. Too long for regional and international security. Too long for the Iraqi people.”

I think we understand that. What is it, then, that we can do? What suggestions...? Over and over in your last few paragraphs, you say “Iraq knows what it needs to do to bring about an end to its isolation and the hardships of its people”, and you go on to say that we have “begun a process of re-engagement” and that we have to “press ahead to ensure...”. At the same time, I'm saying, but how?

Do we have the capacity or the wherewithal to make an independent foreign policy decision as to the sanctions in Iraq? If we do have the capacity or the wherewithal to make an independent foreign policy decision, what, in your expertise, can you, as officials, suggest that this independent foreign policy decision could possibly be?

• 1135

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chairman, to take up a couple of those points, I've frequently referred to the recent report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and we'd be very pleased to make this very detailed report available to the committee. It's on the UN web page and so on and so forth. It does suggest, on the question of nutrition of children, a reduction in acute malnutrition in children under five years of age, from 3.1% in 1997 to 1.8% in 1999. In the same period and for the same age group, chronic malnutrition fell from over 30% to about 18%. This isn't to say things are good, but this is the Secretary-General pointing to improvements on this front in the last little while.

Stepping back, Canada's foreign policy, as members of the committee know as well as we do, has always carried a very strong multilateral emphasis. Canadian policy, going back to Mr. Pearson, has been one of searching for collective approaches to bring about changes for the better in the world. In that context, as my colleague said, when we joined the UN Security Council just over a year ago now, we didn't try so much to take an independent approach but to find common ground amongst the members of the council, amongst whom there were very different views on many of these questions.

So I think the Canadian contribution was one of trying to find a way to break a log-jam amongst the other members of this body, who are the ones who have the responsibility for dealing with this situation, the only ones who can do so effectively. Without tooting our own horn too much, I think Canada did play a very useful role with the idea of these panels, which then really were the genesis of this new resolution.

Insofar as Iraq is concerned, our view is that the United Nations should press on as quickly as possible in implementing all of the streamlining, the easing, and the amelioration of the humanitarian program that's promised in this resolution. It should do it just as quickly as possible in order to get as much of these goods as possible into Iraq as quickly as possible.

We support the idea now coming to the council, a new idea of doubling the amount of money available for spare parts for the Iraqi oil industry, to permit Iraq to keep pumping oil to earn the export revenues to pay for food and medicines for the people. That's the kind of new initiative that we think can make an important contribution.

But in Iraq we're in the middle of a current, and we think we have to see this through to a conclusion, whether or not there are bigger conclusions to be drawn with respect to other crises in the future—and with the lessons to be drawn from the Iraqi experience, there may well be. But insofar as Iraq is concerned, we think this is the way to go.

Ms. Jean Augustine: So is the bottom line that there is nothing we can do in terms of our own resolution?

Or our own resolution would be to do what, Mr. Chairman?

The Chair: I think we'll have a chance to discuss that after if we ever get through this panel. This panel threatens to take as long as the sanctions have, when you think about it.

But I think we're free to recommend what we want as to whether or not.... We've heard evidence about de-linking, and I think we'll have to discuss those issues once we've had the benefit of the expertise that we have from our colleagues. I have some questions and I'll get them in after Mr. McWhinney, but I have to tell you that I have the same sense of frustration that I think a lot of the members here have.

We seem to be getting two completely different stories from two completely reputable.... From what you've told us this morning, and what Mr. Halliday told us the other day, it is so night and day different. I just don't have any means of understanding who's right, who's wrong, who's on first, and who isn't. I really don't.

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From Mr. Sinclair it's simple. Resolution 1284 is going to solve all the problems. All Iraq has to do is be a decent person, a good citizen, and it will all be over. Mr. Halliday says Resolution 1284 won't solve anything; people are still going to be starving, the economy is going to be in a shambles, you guys are doing nothing, the UN has been dishonest in the way in which it applies them. What we should do is de-link and get that settled.

Here's a guy who is a world expert on the thing, who's been watching it for years, who has a huge international reputation. Frankly, I'm sorry, I don't mean to scream at everybody, but I'm completely and utterly puzzled. I look around and I think my colleagues feel the same way. We don't know what to recommend, because we don't understand.

I don't understand the situation, what it was for, how Resolution 1284 changes it, what Saddam Hussein has refused to do to put Resolution 1284 in, and who's right or wrong. Anyway, that's just me mumbling.

Mr. McWhinney.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. By the way, our witnesses should know that we really value their work and their testimony. Perhaps a nice side of vibrant democracy in Canada is that the really tough questions have come from the government side. I'm surprised in some respects by the toughness of some of my colleagues. So I'll try to continue in the same tradition.

One of the problems here is that the Supreme Court of Canada has said that a war ends at a certain time, and although it may continue into the post-war period, it's not indefinite. The Supreme Court of Canada decision was two or three years at the most.... The Gulf War has been over for nine years, and yet we find Britain and the United States.... One of the witnesses referred to the supervision of the no-fly zones, but the evidence we're getting suggests indiscriminate dropping of bombs since Operation Desert Fox occurred in 1998.

I suppose the one very nice thing in this is that other countries were approached, including Canada, and we decided not to participate in Operation Desert Fox in 1998.

Again, this Resolution 1284 cites as its legal base that chapter VII.... Chapter VII is really a war provision. Again, the problem is that it was over nine years ago. When do these things come to an end?

The other thing that's troubling—and I'd have to stress it to you—is that the witnesses we've heard and also our own contacts with the diplomatic community and internationally...the lack of regional support. When the issue of a moral judgment was raised by Madam Beaumier, I think you adequately answered it, but in a certain sense there's a feeling of Eurocentrism at work here, which is the technical term that was used. On Resolution 1104 in the Security Council, on Resolution 1284...Russia, China, France abstaining, but we hear very strongly the French objections. In the Middle East, Iran was the victim in this 10-year war with Iraq, and the Iranians are not asking for sanctions.

So something is wrong in the fact-finding. The trouble is we've had devastating evidence on the effect of the blockade. It reminded me, and I quoted it to the chairman, of the kinder blokade, one of the black marks on the victorious Allies in World War I. They continued the blockade of Germany until 1919-20. You have the same evidence of the mortality of children and the crippling of a generation. It's considered one of the factors that created the hatred that helped accelerate the rational forces in Germany in World War II. This is much worse, according to the evidence that Dr. Patry and others have discovered.

So I'll raise a fundamental question here. I don't know what this committee will recommend. We've been the polite people; we have not been part of Operation Desert Fox. Would it ruin Canadian policies if we separated economic sanctions from military sanctions, and if, for example, this committee were to suggest the possibility of ending economic sanctions forthwith? That's the fundamental macro-political question, and it's implicit in the chairman's musings, which seem to have a lot of thought behind them, and the comments of my colleagues, Madam Augustine, Madam Beaumier, and Dr. Patry. Even the parliamentary secretary here has to be very diplomatic.

• 1145

Would it help you in your discussions with powerful associated countries if that sort of suggestion were to come out? Has the time not come really to end the economic sanctions? Would it change the situation in geopolitical terms?

I thought Dr. Patry made this point very strongly. Even with enormous covert and overt American help, Iraq was brought to a standstill by an Iran that was supposed to be a walkover because they'd killed all their generals in the aftermath of the revolution of 1979. Would it really be the end of our foreign policy if that sort of situation were to be considered bias? Should we end the economic sanctions, and not twenty years from now or five years from now, but immediately? Would that be a signal, or would it be the wrong signal?

We haven't made up our minds. These ideas are floating around, but they're very substantial ideas and they react to this devastating evidence we've had of the human effects. There's a stage at which humanitarian international law takes over and it operates in certain ways. This issue of the children, the kinder blokade, is the one that has most shattered us. It's devastating, and it's coming from Canadian witnesses as well as other people.

So it's almost a hypothetical question. Would it hurt you if that sort of suggestion came? You operate within the guidelines established by long-range policies. Has the time come to consider, as the Americans finally had to consider getting out of Vietnam, getting out of these sanctions here?

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chairman, to pick up on—

The Chair: Will you answer that here?

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. John McNee: Perhaps I could start with one of the other questions that Mr. McWhinney raised, and that's the question of regional support. There is immense concern that we share in this committee, amongst the Canadian public, over the situation of the people of Iraq. That concern is shared across the Arab world, in Europe, and beyond. And that gives rise to these kinds of debates on what should be done, which is a problem that has proved so intractable.

Mr. Chairman, it's not accurate to say that the Iranians are asking for the unconditional lifting of sanctions. They have expressed their concerns about the humanitarian situation, but fall far short of calling for the lifting of sanctions, and I stand to be corrected on this.

Within the region, of course, within the Arab world, there are different views. In the Gulf there is a sympathy for the people of Iraq, a very strong view of the necessity of great rigour, and probably much more rigour than Canada would advocate. And the debates within the Security Council suggest that there is no lack of concern, and neither is there unanimity of view there.

On the big question that Mr. McWhinney put, it has to come back to two points. One is that this latest United Nations Security Council resolution, which is only now being put into effect, to our mind, represents a very considerable modification and improvement to the comprehensive regime of sanctions first introduced at the time of the invasion of Kuwait.

The Chair: I just have to get it into my head or I'll never understand this. Before it can come into effect, though, Iraq has to do certain things, right?

Mr. John McNee: No, Mr. Chairman, on the the humanitarian side, which is the first focus—

The Chair: It's coming into effect anyway, notwithstanding.

Mr. John McNee: Exactly.

The Chair: What is coming into effect?

Mr. John McNee: A lifting of the ceiling on oil exports, so Iraq can sell as much of the oil as it can produce on the world market. And previously there was a limit. It was only up to so many billion dollars a year, so there was a limit.

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There are extensive lists of humanitarian goods, the approval of which will be automatic by the UN. No one can challenge them, no one can quibble with them, no one can query them, no one can place a hold on them. There will be a two-day turnaround in the approval procedures that will expedite them. All this is going ahead whether Iraq thumbs its nose at the international community or not.

There will be a greater monitoring of the humanitarian program on the ground to make sure it's not abused. This question was raised earlier on. There has been a study of the oil industry determining that more money has to go into the refurbishment of that industry so that Iraq can continue to pump oil. There will be, as part of the program henceforth, a cash component that will boost the local economy.

All these things were immediately effective on December 12, when the resolution was passed, or are being put into effect now regardless of.... Where Iraq has to cooperate, Mr. Chairman, is on the other side of the equation, accepting the return of weapons inspections. Of course, that can't happen without their concurrence.

What I'd say in response to Mr. McWhinney's question is that if only we could think of a way to do what he and other members of the committee have suggested, we would be all for it. As we said earlier on, this whole problem of dual-use items, of industrial and chemical supplies that can be so easily turned into the creation of biological and chemical weapons, is one that we don't know how to get a hold on except through this kind of approach.

The Chair: That's helpful. I understand what you're saying there.

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien: That's very important, what these gentlemen said. It raises another equally important question.

The Chair: These are all important questions. It's one more question.

Ms. Maud Debien: That is what I want to understand. According to you, whether or not Iraq accepts or rejects Resolution 1284, the things you mentioned, whether it be raising the ceiling, the list of supplies or the two-day waiting period, will be done anyways.

Mr. John McNee: Yes.

Ms. Maud Debien: But it is conditional. This is all conditional, all this is on the condition that there be observations on disarmament. Is that not correct?

Mr. John McNee: No, Madam, not at all.

Ms. Maud Debien: So they're not linked at all. Thank you.

Mr. John McNee: No. Why is that? Because the members of the Security Council, including Canada, are very worried about the effects of the current situation on the people of Iraq. The Council decided to improve the situation before changing the procedures, before streamlining them, before accelerating and making them more efficient in bringing aid to the population.

Ms. Maud Debien: Thus, the 120 days is not an issue either?

Mr. John McNee: No, not at all.

Ms. Maud Debien: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. John McNee: You bring up something which we think is very important.

Ms. Maud Debien: Okay.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Martin.

Mr. Keith Martin: My apologies if my question has been asked before. I had to go to the House.

Thank you all for coming here today.

The issue of sanctions versus security perhaps hits at the root of what we're all trying to grapple with here today. Some of the people prior to you had mentioned that there's a way of ensuring that we can accomplish the removal of certain sanctions for basic needs such as water purification, food and all that entails, medical equipment, to enable the Iraqi economy to move forward. That's the only way these people are going to get on their own two feet and indeed be able to replace Saddam Hussein, which is perhaps our unstated objective.

Can that be accomplished? Is there a way to provide a face-saving manoeuvre that would allow some sanctions to be removed while allowing the weapons inspectors to get in there to accomplish the security objective? They mentioned the subtlety of the face-saving issue in there.

Mr. Donald Sinclair: The answer is that Resolution 1284 does try to do this bottom-up approach by exempting certain goods from the sanctions regime itself. In other words, they would go through automatically.

• 1155

In some respects, it's sort of the partial lifting of economic sanctions. What is in this package of goods that henceforth will automatically go through relates to foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, agricultural equipment, educational textbooks, and pencils. Those will go through automatically. How does that happen? The UN itself, the Office of the Secretary-General, develops lists.

Here is one of the lists of goods that will be automatically exempted. These are goods that will go through automatically. If Iraq asks for—and I have no idea what this word is—nifedipine caps, 20 mg, that goes through automatically. There are great pages of—

Mr. Keith Martin: Would those be nifedipine tablets?

Mr. Donald Sinclair: You know what they are, Doctor.

Mr. Keith Martin: Yes, it's for blood pressure.

Mr. Donald Sinclair: It was a random choice, but...

The Chair: I fear we might all need some of those.

Mr. Donald Sinclair: There are pages and pages of these goods that, if Iraq asks for them, will go through automatically. If this is what Iraq wants to spend part of its $14 billion on, they go through automatically. I think this is just the pharmaceutical lists, but there will be lists done up by the UN itself of what don't constitute threats. They're not dual use; they're humanitarian goods. These goods will be exempted from the sanctions regime, if you like, because there's no review. If Iraq wants them, they get them.

What they do with them in terms of distributing is another question. Whether anybody actually gets these tablets is another question, but that's the way, from the bottom up, the UN and the Security Council have chosen to deal with this question of how we exempt certain necessary humanitarian goods from the sanctions regime. They are in these fields.

Mr. Keith Martin: Thank you.

The Chair: I'm afraid we're going to have to wrap this up, because it's now noon. I thought we'd get out at 11.30.

We might have some further questions to ask you as we're drafting something, in which case we could maybe write you or something.

Really, if I leave you with my frustration to some extent with your position, Mr. McNee, particularly, you're right and you've put your finger on it: de-linking military and humanitarian is impossible in a modern age of modern war, where humanitarian goods can be turned into military goods in the area of chemicals, particularly chemical and biological warfare. So a beer factory can make biological weapons—all those problems. But we'll have to see how we can pursue that issue. We'll have to see if the committee can come up with something useful or not. We'll work on that together.

Thank you very much. It was helpful this morning. I'm sorry we didn't have a better understanding in our heads before we started of exactly what the effect of recommendation 1284 was or was supposed to be, or we might not have gone this far.

Thank you very much.