FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, March 23, 2000

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[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order the joint meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs and the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

Before we welcome our two ministers, I would like to acknowledge two people. First of all, visiting from the Parliament of Westminster is Mr. Gerald Howarth. He's the handsome man next to Mr. Earle. He is the secretary of the Conservative Party parliamentary defence committee at Westminster, and he's also vice-chair of the parliamentary aerospace group. We had a chance to exchange some interesting views over dinner last evening.

[Editor's Note: Inaudible]

Hon. Arthur C. Eggleton (Minister of National Defence): ...a conservative.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): That's right. We had to import one.

Welcome. We're pleased to have you here, Mr. Howarth.

Our colleague Jacques Saada has joined us for this meeting on this particular topic. He is the chair of the Canadian section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. Jacques, we're pleased that you're able to join us today.

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Of course the two ministers, Minister Eggleton and Minister Axworthy, really need no introduction, so I'll simply turn it over to you, Ministers, and ask you to introduce whatever staff you'd like to introduce.

Bill, did you have an opening comment?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): My only comment is that I know the ministers have to be out of here at 4:30, so we have only one hour. Colleagues, just bear that in mind when you're asking your questions and making your interventions. We're literally restricted to an hour, and we're going to hold to that.

Ministers...

Hon. Lloyd Axworthy (Minister of Foreign Affairs): Thank you, co-chairs.

I would say, in addition to that, if the committee wishes further discussion, of course, officials would be available and willing to come back to the committee for any further consultations that would be required.

Let me begin by saying I'm very pleased that both Minister Eggleton and I are able to meet with this joint committee to discuss the extension of the existing NORAD agreement for five more years. I think everybody knows NORAD has been the foundation of Canada-U.S. defence cooperation since 1958, and it has provided an ongoing framework for cooperation in aerospace defence for North America.

While there are very many constants in the Canada-U.S. relationship, the environment, the context in which that relationship unfolds, is an evolving one. The end of the Cold War, the evolving trends of globalization, and a process of rapidly increasingly connections among peoples, businesses, and economies has set in motion changes that are affecting global relationships.

[Translation]

In particular, from a military perspective, the old priorities of mutual defence against nuclear attack or a massive conventional aggression from an ideological adversary have been replaced by new concerns.

New and diffuse threats to security have emerged, including increasing numbers of intra-state conflicts like Bosnia and Kosovo, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, regional security problems, terrorism, drug trafficking, international organized crime, and threats to the security of technology, information and critical infrastructures.

NORAD has changed too, in response to this evolution in the international security environment.

[English]

It's very important that any discussion we have respect and respond to that. In particular, it's important to note that the 1996 renewal of the NORAD agreement was the first major rewriting of the text since 1981. We transformed NORAD from a Cold War defence arrangement to one appropriate to the new security environment I've just described.

You will recall from the foreign defence policy reviews in 1994 and 1995 and the debate in the House in 1996, when the current agreement was last renewed, that public and parliamentary support for our participation in NORAD has been strong.

Continued aerospace defence cooperation through NORAD reflects the special relationship we enjoy with the United States. The tradition of bilateral cooperation to defend North American security interests dates from the Ogdensburg agreement of 1940 and is a natural complement to the extensive political, economic, cultural, and social ties that link our two countries.

We no longer face an imminent threat from ballistic missiles and long-range manned bombers. However, our continued participation in NORAD will provide a comprehensive warning capability against ballistic missiles, while also providing a level of defence against intruding aircraft and cruise missiles.

In addition to its role in the military aspects of North American security, the maintenance of the aerospace defence capabilities through NORAD has important implications for Canadian sovereignty. NORAD enhances the ability of the Government of Canada to ensure that its will is respected throughout all areas of Canadian jurisdiction by providing, in a very cost-effective manner, the capability to monitor and control developments within our airspace.

These considerations led the parliamentary committees that reviewed Canada's foreign and defence policy in 1994-95 to recommend the renewal of NORAD at that time. These considerations remain valid.

Because we revised the agreement extensively in 1996, it remains, in our view, an adequate basis for NORAD to conduct its assigned missions.

The current agreement does not expire until May 12, 2001, and in the normal course of events the issue of the renewal of the agreement would not arise until late this year or early next year. So why do we bring it forward now?

One reason, in particular, is the presidential election in the United States. You are all familiar with the election process in the U.S. It's an intensive, extensive, and oftentimes turbulent period of time. It will reach its climax at just the time when, in the normal course of events, we would need to consider renewal of the NORAD agreement.

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Options for the renewal of the NORAD agreement were considered by the Canada-U.S.A. Permanent Joint Board of Defence, comprising senior civilian and military officials from the relevant government departments of Canada and the U.S. I would like to pay special tribute to our colleague Jacques Saada, who is the Canadian chair and who has provided very distinguished leadership in this very important committee.

What the permanent board pointed out is that to ensure the stability for planning and budgeting, and to avoid the risk of complications associated with the U.S. presidential election period, the board considered it prudent that the extension of the agreement be initiated well in advance of the expiry date of May 12, 2001. It recommended that the current NORAD agreement should be extended unchanged for a period of five years from May 12, 2001. No changes to the current agreement are proposed. The intent is to extend the existing agreement without change for a further five years.

Another reason for extending NORAD now is the emerging debate on the national missile defence proposal. You're not unfamiliar with this issue. The foreign affairs and defence committees have both heard a number of witnesses on the subject recently in your deliberations. We're not here to address the issue in detail, but I do wish to make a few points at this time.

A fundamental point is that the national missile defence program is a U.S. program, and the United States has not yet taken a decision to deploy such a system. Nor has it invited Canada to participate in it. Under the existing agreement, NORAD does not have a national missile defence mission. Extending the agreement without change preserves that status.

Any decision to use NORAD as the command-and-control agency in the event the U.S. decides to deploy NMD could not be made unilaterally. Canada is a full partner in NORAD, which means that the U.S. would need to seek agreement from Canada in order to change NORAD's mandate.

The national missile defence question raises very large issues for Canada, and our endorsement or non-endorsement would have far-reaching consequences. There are a number of serious questions that need to be addressed before Canada establishes its position.

Does national missile defence deal with a real threat? Many think it does not. Many think that an attack on the U.S. is least likely to be made using ballistic missiles, and much more likely to be made with cruise missiles or other delivery mechanisms, none of which are covered by the NMD.

Another question is whether it works. As you know, the Americans have had to postpone the next national missile defence test, and major technological challenges remain in what the U.S. military itself describes as a high-risk development schedule.

Another issue is whether our NATO allies are in agreement. Many are expressing strong reservations. In recent NATO discussions just before Christmas there was the beginning of a serious examination, but it is by no means complete, nor has it in any way fulfilled its purposes.

Another question is would deployment require a unilateral break of the ABM Treaty, and if so, might it spark an arms race with Russia? Even if the Americans are able to come to an agreement on amending the ABM Treaty, deployment of an NMD system could still have implications for China's position, or set up an arms race with rogue states as they race to build offensive weaponry that could break through the NMD shield.

Most importantly, what are the consequences of national missile defence on the global nuclear proliferation architecture that we have built up over the last fifty years? I can say, Mr. Co-Chair, that this is an architecture that Canada has played a major role in constructing. It has been a major commitment of Canada since 1946 to develop a multilateral approach to the restraint of the spread of nuclear weapons. Therefore, we feel, particularly as we enter into a review conference that begins next month, that we must maintain that stewardship very actively.

This system of non-proliferation is based on the fundamental bargain between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. Essentially, the bargain is that the nuclear-weapon states will disarm in exchange for a commitment from the non-nuclear-weapon states not to build nuclear weapons. This regime, which provides a basis for strategic stability, has already suffered a number of body blows over the past year—the nuclear test in India-Pakistan, the failure of the U.S. Congress to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the paralysis of the conference on disarmament in Geneva. There is a concern that the NMD could further weaken it if deployment is taken as further evidence that the U.S. is putting its efforts primarily on building its capabilities, rather than dismantling them.

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We're not in a position at this time to answer these and many other questions. Yet they raise serious concerns that must be addressed, will be addressed, and should be addressed, and that go to the very heart of our security interest here in Canada.

We will address these NMD issues on their merits at the appropriate time, when the information is clear and many of these questions can be answered. However, a decision to extend the current NORAD agreement will in no way prejudge any position the government may wish to take on this issue when it is ready to take such a decision.

While the national missile defence debate runs its course, we want to ensure that the mutually beneficial bilateral defence cooperation under the umbrella of NORAD is preserved. NORAD renewal at this time would achieve this end.

Thank you very much.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister.

Mr. Eggleton, did you have an opening statement as well?

Mr. Art Eggleton: Thanks very much to the co-chairs. I'm here with Dr. Ken Calder, our head of policy, and General David Jurkowski.

I'm also happy to salute Jacques Saada and his joint board. That board has a long history. It goes back to 1940 in Ogdensburg, New York, when Prime Minister Mackenzie King and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt established that beginning of a great relationship between our two countries. NORAD, which came about in 1958, is indeed the cornerstone of U.S.-Canada defence cooperation, and it's a very successful cooperation we have had.

[Translation]

In the broader context of Canada-US relations, NORAD is a natural complement to the important ties that link our two countries in many areas.

[English]

At the last renewal of the agreement in 1996, NORAD was transformed by mutual agreement of our governments from a Cold War defence partnership into one responsive to the current and future geostrategic environment. NORAD continues, as it has since 1958, to provide detection, validation, and warning of intrusion into the North American aerospace, whether it's by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles.

Its other major area of responsibility is aerospace control. This is comprised of two parts: air sovereignty and air defence. Surveillance, warning, and control capability over Canadian airspace is a basic defence requirement with important implications for Canadian sovereignty. NORAD tracks aircraft that could be heading for or entering Canadian airspace.

Once an aircraft enters North American airspace, NORAD cooperates with civilian air traffic control authorities until positive identification of the aircraft has been made. When necessary, NORAD can dispatch interceptor aircraft to confirm the identity of an aircraft that may be entering our space.

NORAD has a more limited capability to detect and destroy cruise missiles. Improving defence against these missiles has been identified as a priority issue. Surveillance and warning, however, do not stop at aircraft and cruise-missile monitoring only. NORAD provides early warning of ballistic missile launches and tracks their paths through the atmosphere, and for intercontinental ballistic missiles, through space.

Early warning by NORAD of any ballistic missile launch anywhere in the world makes an invaluable contribution to strategic stability. From test missile launches to tracking man-made objects in space, NORAD has the capability to monitor such activities and provide timely information about their location and nature.

Just to give you some idea of the scope of man-made objects in space, NORAD currently tracks over 600 active satellites. Over the next 10 years, the prediction is that 1,500 to 1,800 satellites will be launched, and this is not counting the myriad pieces of space debris, some of which are as small as 10 metres in length. Yet any of these pieces could cause severe damage to orbiting satellites, commercial and scientific as well as military, not to mention the space shuttle.

So given the size of Canada's airspace and our comparatively small forces, NORAD remains for Canada an effective and cost-efficient means to meet the basic national objective of surveillance.

Moreover, NORAD helps track drug smugglers—a role that was added in the 1991 agreement—and it also aids in search and rescue efforts. Other activities include environmental observation and weather tracking from space. So you can see it has a wide variety of benefits.

The current NORAD agreement was last renewed for five years in May 1996. It comes up for renewal next year, but as Lloyd mentioned, we want to keep away from the time the American system goes into a recess for its presidential election and get this done now.

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What's at stake in extending this agreement? Let us start with Canada's contribution, Canada's costs. The North Warning System, for example, includes 11 long-range radars as well as 36 unattended short-range and four coastal radars located in Canada. That's part of our contribution and cost.

We have 1,080 Canadian military personnel working for NORAD. Of these, 800 are in Winnipeg, North Bay, Bagotville, and Cold Lake. The remaining 280 are in the United States, including more than 100 of them at NORAD headquarters in Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado. What does this cost us? Well, we foot about 10% of the operating bill of NORAD. It means for Canada about $320 million annually. In contrast, the U.S. pays almost $3 billion annually.

Thus, the cost of Canada going it alone without NORAD would be prohibitive, even for a portion of what is required. To have the autonomous capability, for example, to detect, track, and respond to aircraft or missiles that might enter our airspace would cost Canada close to an additional $1 billion annually, and that doesn't include the start-up or the capital costs.

There would be other non-economic costs were we to try to manage alone the activities that we currently undertake cooperatively with the U.S. through NORAD. For example, Canada's ability to inter-operate—that's an important word—with our U.S. forces would certainly be affected negatively. Integrated military command, control, and communications links with the U.S. military would be lost. This would jeopardize our ability to cooperate with our main ally.

Cooperation with the U.S. air force in NORAD provides Canadian fighter pilots with unmatched experience that can prove essential to their ability to play a full role in operations. That was very evident in Kosovo.

Losing access to U.S. space-tracking information and military space programs would have a direct impact on our efforts to modernize the Canadian Forces. We would have to invest significantly more than the $600 million we are already putting into this joint space project.

That Canada has benefited and continues to benefit from the NORAD agreement is indisputable. The facts and the figures confirm this. NORAD should continue to evolve in response to new and anticipated developments in the geo-strategic environment. It is simply a matter of prudence that our joint institution is capable of responding to new security challenges.

For example, some would like to see NORAD take on critical infrastructure missions. Such missions would focus on ways and means of protecting our communications, our computer-operated infrastructure systems, from hostile attack. These are very important matters that we are exploring. Of course, another possible mission envisioned by some people for NORAD is to become the command-and-control centre of a U.S. nation-wide ballistic missile defence system.

In July of last year President Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Bill, a bill passed by the Congress committing the United States to build and deploy such a missile defence system “as soon as technologically feasible”. Such deployment would thus require renegotiation with Russia of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Technological and diplomatic challenges notwithstanding, the legislation and the concept of NMD are strongly supported in the United States Congress.

Later this year the U.S. administration plans to make a deployment readiness review decision. This could precipitate a decision by the President to deploy or perhaps to delay or perhaps to not deploy the planned NMD system later this year, perhaps in the early fall. The administration has set out four considerations that will guide their decision. They are: technological feasibility, as I've just mentioned, which is the requirement of the legislation; the persistence of the missile threat; the costs of a deployed NMD system; and other national security issues, such as the impact on international arms control regimes, relations with Russia and China, and relations with NATO allies, which my colleague has mentioned.

To date the Government of Canada has not been formally asked nor have we made any decision with respect to any participation in national missile defence. As the SCONDVA committee has heard... SCONDVA has had a number of people come before it because it is a timely issue, an issue that needs some public hearing. You've been doing that. As you've heard from expert witnesses, the proposed NMD system does not require Canadian territory, doesn't require Canadian technology, doesn't require Canadian money or our personnel. However, they've been making it quite clear, including the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who recently went to Calgary to make it quite clear in his speech, that they want Canada's understanding and they want Canada's support.

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The government's 1994 white paper, our policy on defence, speaks to this whole question of national missile defence when it in fact involves us in having a better understanding of missile defence through research and consultation. Any judgment about further Canadian involvement in a limited ballistic missile defence system would have to be based on information that today is simply not available.

We need to know, for example, what the system would do for Canada. Could we influence the design of the system if we became involved? What role would we play in the operation of the system? Would it in fact be NORAD-related? What would participation cost us? Perhaps most important of all, Canada would also want to gauge the impact of national missile defence on arms control, particularly the ABM Treaty, which also was mentioned specifically in the white paper.

For these good reasons, the prudent course of action is to seek extension of the NORAD agreement as it exists today. We're not proposing any amendments to the agreement. It would give us more time to answer some of the questions relevant to national missile defence, as well as to discuss further with the U.S. government how it perceives the evolution of the program. The extension of the NORAD agreement does not commit us to national missile defence, nor does it presume any future decision of the Government of Canada on that matter.

I might add, however, that in addition to the issues my colleague has correctly outlined, we must also look at it in the context of overall Canada-United States relations.

To conclude, NORAD has for four decades been the cornerstone of our bilateral defence relationship with the United States. Over these years NORAD has not remained static. Rather, as I think we've both demonstrated, it's evolved as the strategic environment itself has changed over time.

[Translation]

NORAD serves Canada's interests well, as its primary aerospace monitoring, alert and control instrument.

Thank you very much.

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister Eggleton and Minister Axworthy, for your opening comments.

We'll go to questions. The ministers have a tight timeline of 4:30. As Minister Axworthy mentioned, officials are available and will continue to be available. And perhaps if we would like to meet with the ministers again, we might invite them. Let's go right to questions.

My co-chair and I have conferred. We're going to use the SCONDVA seven minutes per party for the first round, so apportion it among yourselves how you want, questions and answers. I'm going to have to be rigid to be fair to all the parties, and that should get all the parties at least a seven-minute opportunity for questions.

Let's start right away with the Reform Party. Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Art Hanger (Calgary Northeast, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Ministers, for appearing before our committee.

I would like to go to a comment that both of you made, and that comment was basically that we haven't been formally asked to participate in the national missile defence system. It's a rather interesting statement. Yet when the defence committee listened to General MacDonald, he stated that he believed that if Canada opted out of the national missile defence, his own position as deputy commander would become non-viable. He also stated that the Americans are starting to look on Canadians at NORAD with suspicion, and may be unwilling to share information. It sounds like this national missile defence program really plays a significant role in Canada's position in NORAD.

Minister Axworthy, you have stated just how important NORAD is to Canada's security. In 1996 you related to several points, I think five of them in all, and yet our defence committee clearly heard from witnesses that this relationship Canada has in NORAD is under threat. Minister Axworthy, since this project of the national missile defence has been underway for years, would it be fair to say that the reason we haven't supported the national missile defence system would be due to your ideological position in this whole affair that you don't really want to be involved in it?

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Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: No, Mr. Hanger. I think my concerns, as I just expressed to the committee, are based on what is the best security interest for Canada. That's the fundamental issue that I, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, have a mandate to represent.

As I pointed out very clearly, Canada has seen for at least four or five decades that the most important way to control the risk of nuclear weapons is to engage in an active program of arms control and disarmament to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, to limit the potential for their use, and to begin to provide for, as much as we can, the disarmament of nuclear weapons. That's the security interest of Canada. The security interest of Canada therefore must be looked at through the perspective of what can be done to strengthen the regime we have so meticulously worked at, over many years, to build up.

If there are concerns raised... For example, if you put a priority on a unilateral defence system, it is not a static system, Mr. Hanger. It has huge implications. The laws of physics say that every action has a reaction. If you put a unilateral system in place, I can assure you, other countries will not simply stand still and say, well, that's it. They will undertake alternate and optional actions.

The Russians could stop being involved in the START process. They could stop deploying their commitments to the MIRV issue. They could provide for a number of delays in disarmament efforts. The non-proliferation treaty is a very delicate balance between nuclear and non-nuclear states. A bargain was struck. Nuclear states have to show that they are living up to the bargain. If they don't live up to the bargain, states can withdraw.

What would happen if China withdrew from the NPT? What would happen if Brazil—

Mr. Art Hanger: A lot of ifs.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: —decided to restart its nuclear proliferation? What happens when there are repercussions in Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world and all of a sudden you have a world filled with nuclear weapons?

So, Mr. Hanger, take my concern—and I would share it with you—that we have to look at this in the broad issue of what's in the security interest of Canada. My view is that the best security is to make sure we reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation and the nuclear threat that is out there all the time.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Mr. Martin, three minutes.

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Ref.): Thank you.

Thank you, gentlemen, for coming out to the committee.

I would suggest that opposite reaction has already taken place with respect to not Russia but China. China's foreign policy objectives in Spratly Island, in Taiwan, and in Tibet have clearly demonstrated that they are anything but a shrinking violet. So I'd suggest that if we are going to be soft on the national missile defence system, we're going to be soft on our security.

The second point I want to make is that with respect to CIDA, it needs some focus. It needs to develop in-house experience. It needs to measure its outcomes and it needs to get back to its primary health and education activities.

I just put it to you, Minister Axworthy, that you commission an external review of management and financial practices of CIDA. We put this forth in this committee, and there was—

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Mr. Martin, I'm having trouble seeing the relevance of CIDA to this particular meeting.

Mr. Keith Martin: I just want to finish my comment, if I could.

The third point, Minister Axworthy, is that Ambassador Fowler will be sitting at the Security Council head. Will you ask Ambassador Fowler to put forth a comprehensive plan, or at least start a plan, within the P-5 to get the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank to start developing a comprehensive plan of action to address conflict prevention, as opposed to dealing with the post-conflict situation?

Lastly, Minister Eggleton, I'll just put the plea to you, for our beleaguered soldiers, that if you're prepared to institute the cost-of-living allowance before the end of this year... It's been sitting on the back burner for a long time. They can no longer put up with this. I would humbly submit to you that you speak with the Treasury Board and get that COLA out there for our soldiers as soon as possible.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Ministers, with due respect to my colleague, most of those comments didn't have anything to do with missile defence or NORAD. There is one minute for anything you'd like to comment on, either minister.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: I'd say to you, Mr. Martin, that using soft or hard language or whatever you want to do is not the issue. The issue is what is the security interest of Canada.

I am concerned that if other countries... China is a member of the NPT. It's signed up to it. It accepts the inspections and the rigours of that treaty. If they see that one other country who is a member of that is taking action that would affect the strategic balances, then they could very easily withdraw. Then the NPT becomes fragmented. It comes apart. All of a sudden we're into a world where there is an enhanced and aggravated arms race. I don't think any of us want that.

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Mr. Art Eggleton: Even though I don't see the relevance of it, I always like to come to the defence of our troops, so perhaps I can just mention that the COLA clause has not been sitting on a back burner. We've been developing the framework of the system, the design of the system, and we're within weeks of implementing it.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you very much.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Maybe you'd like to comment on CIDA, Minister, since you're here.

Mr. Art Eggleton: Well...

Voices: Oh, oh!

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): And who do you think will win the Stanley Cup?

[Translation]

I now recognize the Bloc Québécois for seven minutes.

Mr. René Laurin (Joliette, BQ): Mr. Axworthy and Mr. Eggleton, Canada has often been criticized for reacting to US policy decisions, instead of taking a proactive stand.

This time around, Canada has a golden opportunity to act even before the United States makes a decision. I'm referring here to the deployment of the missile defence system. The United States have yet to ask Canada to come on board, and that's a good thing because I have the feeling that when they do get around to asking us to participate, we won't be able to say no. However, since they have yet to extend an invitation to us, wouldn't it be appropriate for Canada to make its position known right now, with a view to influencing the US decision? How do you feel about the re-opening of the ABM Treaty? Is Canada favourable to the idea which would pave the way for the US to deploy its system? Why doesn't Canada state its position on the matter right now in order to influence the Americans' decision, instead of waiting until they have made their move and merely reacting to the announcement?

[English]

Mr. Art Eggleton: Excellent point.

I think we need to be engaged at an early stage in terms of our discussion with our—

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: I'm sorry, but I also have a question about threat assessment. First of all, are Canada and the US of the same opinion in terms of assessing the existing threat? Secondly, how do you feel about the possibility of re-opening the ABM Treaty?

[English]

Mr. Art Eggleton: In terms of your question about being proactive, both my colleague and I believe we need to be engaged with our counterparts in the United States on this matter and we need to get answers to the questions we have raised.

The fact that the SCONDVA committee has been active in the matter and has heard a number of experts I think is also an indication that we need to be engaged. We need to further study and try to get an answer to the questions that both of us indicated are very important in the context of looking at this. If the United States decides to deploy this system, it's going to affect us. We're part of the same continent. It's going to affect us one way or the other.

So I think we need answers to these questions. Indeed, we said in the 1994 white paper that we needed to.

As far as evaluation is concerned with regard to the threat, it depends on what you base the evaluation on. The Americans tend to look upon the existence—the “capacity”, in other words—as being equal to threat. The fact that the North Koreans have developed a system and have a capacity that could be further expanded and further developed and also exported... They see capacity as equal to threat, whereas others tend to look upon threat as whether or not there is a likelihood of such an attack to occur. What are the possibilities? Is it really something that's very remote? Is it reasonable to assume that there is some possibility of either an attack or the threat of such an attack?

This evaluation is in fact underway. We are looking at this matter ourselves, as Canadians.

With respect to the ABM Treaty, I'll turn that over to Minister Axworthy.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: In this case, I agree with what the Minister of Defence has said. We are counselling patience, not being passive. But that means we have to be careful, I think, that we make the right choices, that we don't simply sit back and let it happen to us.

We've already been very active in a number of fronts. Both the minister and I have been very actively engaged in NATO, where this discussion came up in the fall during briefings. We have a very constant level of communication with both Russia and the United States about the ongoing discussions on the ABM Treaty. We're asked for opinions and we give them. We're continuing that kind of dialogue, because what happens with the ABM Treaty is clearly an essential element.

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I would say further that the initiatives we're taking in New York next month at the NPT review conference are a sign of being very active. We're putting forward a new action plan for the NPT and proposals by which we can try to universalize it. We've offered to take leadership on the missile control technology regime, which would put a real limit on the spread of missile technology. Those are not being passive or sitting back; those are active areas to try to reinforce the arms control regime.

I would just make one other comment. Again, as I say, there is nothing static in this business; things change, but your own actions can help bring about alterations in behaviour. I think that back four or five years ago no one would have anticipated that Argentina, Brazil, or South Africa would have given up their nuclear capability. They surrendered it. They had it, and they gave it up. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine had a nuclear capacity. They surrendered it for economic reasons. Does the same thing happen in North Korea, Iran, and Iraq? Just look at the politics of the last month. You've had a parliamentary election in Iran, a change in view, an attempt to look more outward to the world, an invitation. The United States just changed its policy toward Iran three or four days ago. With regard to North Korea, there's now an opening by the European Union.

So to say that what was perceived as a threat even a year ago will be a threat a year from now is simply a good guess. What I would suggest to you is that there are no fixed rules in these matters. In fact, threats that are currently anticipated might also be constrained through other means or changed in ways that make other forms of defence more appropriate.

That's where I think we both agree that we have a very active file to follow to see what we can do to help alter some of those risk assessments that were made in the Rumsfeld report two or three years ago.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): There's one more minute remaining for the Bloc, please.

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien (Laval East, BQ): Good day, sirs.

The powerful US military-industrial complex is currently lobbying the US government hard to go forward with the mini Star Wars system. In turn, the US government is putting fairly strong diplomatic pressure on Canada and other countries in an attempt to influence their decisions. At least, that's what the media has reported, and what you yourself, Mr. Axworthy, have stated.

Last week, witnesses informed the members of the Foreign Affairs committee that tests could be completed by the year 2005 and that the system could be operational. The year 2005 is not that far off and as we know, the US could decide to act unilaterally.

Mr. Minister, does the Canadian government intend to consult with Canadians as soon as possible, even though apparently it has not received a formal invitation to participate in the missile defence system?

[English]

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Of course. I think in fact that consultation has already started through the vehicle of the two committees. The foreign affairs and defence committees have already started a series of hearings. They've asked witnesses to appear. I think it's very useful to get that initial airing of a point of view.

But as Minister Eggleton has said, so many other unknowns are still there. In the meantime, we will be pursuing a number of initiatives with the United States, our NATO allies, and members of the NPT conference. So a lot of things are in play at the present time. We will certainly be very committed to making sure there's a very serious public discussion of these matters. By the way, as you probably know, the United States has put off its technical trials for another couple of months, which may force it beyond the presidential election. There is now consideration for holding back.

My point is that I don't think one should rush to judgment for something that has such fluidity and so many variables to it that could be altered within a matter of weeks or months.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Did you have a brief comment, Mr. Eggleton?

Mr. Art Eggleton: I just wanted to pick up on your comment about mini star wars. That reference has been made a number of times. I don't think the facts bear that out. Whether you think this is a good idea or a bad idea, it should be pointed out that what they are talking about here are land-operated interceptor defensive missiles, non-nuclear missiles, missiles that would intercept a limited number of weapons, and they were talking about deploying about a hundred of them. It would not in any way address the kind of massive attack that would happen if you go back to the Cold War thinking. It wouldn't address any massive attack by a country that has a large arsenal of nuclear weapons and that would launch them by missiles.

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The deterrence factor there has never been a defence, but it has always been the issue of there have been as many on either side to carry out massive destruction, which, as my colleague has said, is a terrible thing for the world to have endured, and which it still does. That's why non-proliferation, the ABM Treaty, and all these things are very important. What they are talking about is a limited land-based defensive interceptor system.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you very much.

Now we come to the Liberal Party, seven minutes, starting with Mr. Proud, please.

Mr. George Proud (Hillsborough, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, gentlemen.

As has been said here earlier today, the 1994 white paper recognizes the relevance of the ballistic missile defence to Canada, but we have limited our participation. The white paper states that negotiations on the renewal of NORAD agreements must preserve the benefits that result from our relationship with the United States and that we must meet the evolving challenges to our continental security. What do you people see as some of the evolving challenges to our continental security?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: I'll take it first, and then Art can follow on.

As I said in my opening remarks, I think they are multiple. As you know, Mr. Proud, we have advanced in a number of fora the importance of a human security approach to our foreign policy that recognizes the incursion of organized crime, terrorist activities, and drug trafficking. Those things, which affect individuals, are clearly a major threat to our security, because they undermine our communities, our people, and our institutions. They are a very crucial part of it.

Another part of our security is the spread of knowledge of mass weaponry and the technology that goes with it. One of the negative effects of the breakdown of the Soviet Union was that it released a number of people, weapons grade materials, and various know-hows to smaller states so that they could acquire a certain ability to deliver. It can deliver it in a junk steamer, a cruise missile, a drone airplane, or an ICBM. There's a wide variety of those things that must be taken into account.

The question is, how big a screen do you put around? How high is your wall? Do you get more value added by developing the international systems to control them, to restrain them, to limit them, to inspect them, and to verify them so that people can't use them with the kind of freedom or licence they would like? That is one of the ongoing debates we must face.

I agree with what Art said. The American approach is to say we can have a missile defence system that could screen out some limited nuclear attacks through missile systems by a rogue state. As I said, who will be the rogue state of the future? Is North Korea going to continue to be a rogue state if in fact it collapses economically? If you have a choice, are you going to deliver it through an ICBM, a cruise missile, for which we have no defence at the present time, or in somebody's suitcase? Those are the kinds of concerns we have to raise. Going back to Mr. Clinton's statement about cost-effectiveness, is that the most cost-effective way of ensuring security within North America and within Canada itself?

In the meantime, still at the base of this, and until proven substantially wrong, I think the Canadian approach, going back to the very time, Mr. Proud, when Canada disavowed itself of the use of nuclear weapons... When we came out of the Manhattan Project in 1946, we could have become a nuclear power. We had all the capability of doing it. But at that time the Government of Canada and Parliament disavowed its use, because we felt that if you added to the proliferation, you would add to the danger and risk. That's why we've been following that line of thought ever since.

Mr. Art Eggleton: And an appropriate decision that was.

Let me also pick up on your question. NORAD quite simply brings Canada and the United States together to ensure the sovereignty of our airspace and space beyond. With continuing activities in space, this is becoming an increasingly important factor in the NORAD agreement. It ensures our sovereignty. It gets us information not only of any aircraft or missiles that might come near our airspace, but also in other parts of the world. NORAD was able in fact to detect the launch of Scud missiles during the Gulf War, again a very valuable military piece of information.

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Also, in terms of drug dealers, terrorists, or anybody else who may try to come into our airspace by airplane, it's a valuable way of dealing with this, and also being able to provide defence measures against any of these, whether they're Canadian aircraft or American aircraft.

The fact that we are becoming involved with the joint space project as well will help to provide additional information on what's happening in space and what's happening on the ground, being viewed from space. These are valuable in terms of ensuring the sovereignty of our collective airspace, and I think it's important that we do it together.

It's important that we develop through NORAD a perimeter around North America, as opposed to having the United States just doing it itself and we just doing it ourselves. As I said, we couldn't afford to do the same thing ourselves, so I think the agreement is extremely valuable, and we pay 10% of the cost.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you.

Two minutes go to Mrs. Longfield.

Mrs. Judi Longfield (Whitby—Ajax, Lib.): Thank you.

Picking up on the strengths and benefits of NORAD and the cooperation and interoperability we have had with the United States, certainly the uncertainty surrounding the NMD project is already beginning to cause some uneasiness with particularly Canadian folks who are down at Cheyenne Mountain. We're hearing that this is not going to be resolved in the very near future, and it could actually be quite protracted.

What steps are we taking to ensure that our folks down at Cheyenne Mountain are not further marginalized? I think part of what makes this whole operation work so well is that they've been working so closely together.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: We're not at a point where NORAD has even been designated as an organization to deal with it. I asked the Secretary of Defense when I saw him just a couple of months ago, and he had not entertained the question. So what discussions may be going on in NORAD are going on informally. There is certainly no decision on the part of the United States government.

Remember, we still have a long way to go. This hasn't been proven technology-wise yet. They still have more testing to do. The President hasn't decided to deploy it yet. We have all sorts of questions that we've talked about here at today's meeting. I think we both are saying let's get engaged with these issues, but we're a long way from being able to make a decision one way or the other as to Canada's participation.

So I don't think anybody is being marginalized. What its future might be in terms of NORAD if Canada didn't get involved is something that will have to be examined as one of these questions. That's an important question: What happens to NORAD if the U.S. deploys and we're not a part of it? But it's premature to suggest we're being marginalized, certainly at this point in time.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: I would make this comment to Mrs. Longfield: I have learned in the four and a half years I have been in the job that we need to develop a certain tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty. That's the way life is.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mrs. Longfield.

We come now to the New Democratic Party for seven minutes. Mr. Earle.

Mr. Gordon Earle (Halifax West, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First of all, I want to thank both ministers for presenting to us on this very important topic. I was pleased to hear that both of you agree that you have a very active file to pursue with respect to this NMD.

I want to pursue that a bit further, because I must say, off the bat, I do like the words that have been attributed to Mr. Axworthy, and what I've heard him say today as well, but particularly the words that were ascribed to him in the media:

The impulse to build walls, to retreat, to shut the world out... should be resisted. The answer lies instead in creating a multilateral approach to stop missile proliferation in the first place, and to make this a key part of a strengthened global non-proliferation regime.

I agree with you that this certainly is a Canadian approach, and we talked about this a bit earlier today. But what I've also noticed coming out of this is that there seems to be—and it was affirmed today by some of the people who were presenting to us—a bit of a leaning in different directions as to whether or not this system should be supported. The Department of Foreign Affairs is taking the approach you outlined, Mr. Axworthy, but the military are perhaps leaning more toward supporting NMD.

I'd like to ask the ministers, are you in one accord with respect to the direction in which you're leaning on this? Despite the comment on ambiguity, I think we have to be clear on an issue this important.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Don't believe everything you read in the newspapers.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: That's for sure.

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Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Look, we both think this is a very serious matter that has to be dealt with in a number of contexts. Lloyd is quite involved in areas that deal with non-proliferation, the ABM Treaty, and he has quite correctly pointed out that these are areas that are of serious concern and must be addressed.

At the same time, we have to look at our defence relationship, and of course it's natural for people in defence to look at that perspective and note the fact that we have this ongoing relationship with the United States. We have people who work side by side down at Cheyenne Mountain. There's an American in charge. The deputy commander for all North American aerospace is a Canadian—that's something when you consider the assets that are involved here.

Naturally they're looking at it from that standpoint and how it fits into a system, because the NORAD system already involves early warning and detection of any missiles. Naturally, if one of the partners is looking at the possibility of deploying a defence system, then the other party, as represented through the people who work there on a day-to-day basis, is obviously interested in seeing how that might fit in.

But let's make it quite clear that this is a Government of Canada decision. It's one that has to be made with the people of these two committees, the people of the House of Commons, and the people of Canada, as to what is best in the Canadian interest. Both Lloyd and I are dedicated to determining the best Canadian interest and taking that position forward to the cabinet.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you. I appreciate that answer.

A little while ago Mr. Axworthy was talking about the Canadian approach being that of disavowing the nuclear approach, moving away from that. Mr. Eggleton, I notice you said in your answer, “And an appropriate decision that was”. Do you still feel that's an appropriate decision? It was appropriate back around the time of the white paper, but do you still feel—

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: What was an appropriate decision?

Mr. Gordon Earle: The disavowing of the nuclear approach, the buildup of nuclear arms.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: The decision that was made that the minister referred to, in 1946?

Mr. Gordon Earle: Yes.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: You bet, it was the right decision.

Mr. Gordon Earle: It was then, and in your opinion is it still the right decision?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Absolutely. We're not talking about nuclear weapons here. NORAD doesn't have responsibility in that respect, and we don't have any nuclear weapons on our soil.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Right.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: In terms of national missile defence, we're not talking about any missiles on our soil to start with, and they're not nuclear; they're defensive interceptors. That's what's being proposed by the United States.

Mr. Gordon Earle: It has also been mentioned that the final decision on this has to be made based on information that's not yet available, that there are a lot of unknowns at this point, and some of these have been pointed out.

But I think it's also probably true that there are a lot of knowns available as well, one of which I think is very important—that is, the concern being expressed by Russia and China with respect to the development of this system by the U.S., the fact that perhaps even though it's classed as a defence system, it does set the stage for offensive tactics as well. That's a very much known feature, that it is being resisted by China and by Russia. Has any consideration been given to that known factor from the point of view of trying to move this to an international forum and perhaps having the UN look at this whole issue and come forth with some kind of opinion on this matter?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: What's at issue in the first level is the Russia-U.S. ABM Treaty. There are no other parties to the ABM Treaty. They're the two signatories. They are engaged in an active discussion on whether or not they would accept amendments. That discussion is by no means completed. There's still lots of active engagement on it. We have been kept informed; we are constantly apprised of the nature of the discussion and how it's developing. So I would put that also in the column of the unknown at this point in time as to what the outcome of those discussions would be.

If in fact there is an agreement by Russia and the United States for some form of amendment to the ABM Treaty that maintains not only its law but its spirit, then I think that would have quite a constructive bearing on the broader issue of an arms control regime. It wouldn't have the same fracturing effect that you might have if it were a unilateral abrogation. So those are still in the columns of the unknown.

The position of China has a particular regional context because of the proximity of India and Pakistan, who have just acquired a limited nuclear capability. If they decide to respond to an NMD by increasing their missile capability, MIRVing some of their missiles, that might then cause chain reactions with India and Pakistan and you simply up the ante further. So it has a particular regional focus, although I think all of us are implicated.

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I was very encouraged, and I think we should all be, about the very strong stand President Clinton took during his recent visit when he addressed the Indian parliament, simply saying that non-proliferation is still the best means we have to deal with this matter and encouraging the Indians to join in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and become part of the NPT. I think we should all be very pleased that the American President is taking that leadership.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mr. Earle.

A final brief question, Mr. Hanger, and one to this side.

Mr. Art Hanger: This is to Minister Axworthy.

If Canada is invited to participate in the national missile defence, this would seem to be an ideal opportunity to repair our relations with the U.S. in the area of trade and security cooperation. Given that the changes to the ITAR—that is, the International Trade in Arms Regulations—have resulted in loss of sales for Canadian companies, would our commitment to participate in the NMD not serve to strengthen our economic ties with the U.S. and mitigate some of these effects of the narrowing of the Canadian exemption?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Again, Mr. Hanger, I don't agree with the premise of your question. In fact I think our relations with the United States are in very good shape. On the economic front, our trade has increased substantially. We've just signed a number of new agreements resolving our conflicts.

As far as the ITAR is concerned, as you know, we signed an agreement in principle last October during the visit of President Clinton and we've been working very actively with the United States now to implement that agreement. I'm hoping we will be conducting a series of very crucial negotiations in the next week to try to bring it together. In fact we've had, in a very good Canadian-U.S. fashion, a willingness to resolve those questions. They are being resolved, Mr. Hanger.

I'm afraid that the premise of your question doesn't support the conclusions you've drawn.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mr. Hanger.

I had a chance this morning to ask a number of questions to Mr. Heinbecker, so I'll simply say this. I'm pleased to hear both ministers expressing your support for our two committees being seized and engaged in these very important issues.

I'm going to give the last question to my colleague Mr. Graham, and then he's going to wrap up.

Thank you very much, Ministers, for being here.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): It's one question, and it would be really to Mr. Eggleton.

I preface it by saying that I understand you've very carefully laid out the difficulties and length of time and parameters around which any decision will be made, but assuming we were to go ahead on any such program, I would assume that our American colleagues would expect some financial input from us. Even at the 10% rate you suggested earlier, it would seem to me that 10% of this operation would knock a hell of a hole into your budget. Maybe the next time we have a meeting we'd better bring Mr. Martin along to the table as well to see where we're going to go.

A voice: With his pen.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Is anybody doing anything about the financial implications of this if we were to go ahead?

Mr. Art Eggleton: That's one of the outstanding questions. Certainly I don't think there's any expectation that we would be involved in paying for missiles or the installation of them. Perhaps some other part of the system...

For example, we're already involved in the joint space program. That's quite independent of national missile defence, but it also is part of detecting what goes on, coming in or going out, and what's happening in the aerospace.

One doesn't really know the full parameters of all of this, but that's just some of the speculation that's been around and about. I think what the United States is looking for at the moment is support, as opposed to money.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you very much.

On that note, on behalf of our colleagues, I'd like to thank you both for coming. Both our committees are concerned about Canada's security. We're looking at this. I think Mr. Earle put it well when he said sometimes we have a different perspective because the problems we have to deal with are different. It's very important to bring those two perspectives together and it's been very helpful to have both ministers here to consider it together. Thank you both very much.

We're adjourned until next week.