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37th PARLIAMENT, 3rd SESSION

Subcommittee on National Security of the Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, May 6, 2004

0900

The Chair (Mr. Tom Wappel (Scarborough Southwest, Lib.))

Mr. Ward Elcock (Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service)

0905

0910

The Chair

0915

Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, CPC)

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward Elcock

0920

The Chair

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Yvan Loubier (Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, BQ)

Mr. Ward Elcock

0925

Mr. Yvan Loubier

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Yvan Loubier

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Yvan Loubier

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Yvan Loubier

Mr. Ward Elcock

0930

The Chair

Mr. Yvan Loubier

The Chair

Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.)

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Derek Lee

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Derek Lee

0935

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Derek Lee

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

Hon. Lorne Nystrom (Regina—Qu'Appelle, NDP)

Mr. Ward Elcock

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

Mr. Ward Elcock

0940

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

Mr. Ward Elcock

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

Mr. Ward Elcock

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

Mr. Ward Elcock

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

Mr. Ward Elcock

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

Mr. Ward Elcock

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

0945

Mr. Ward Elcock

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Catterall (Ottawa West—Nepean, Lib.)

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Ward Elcock

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Ward Elcock

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Ward Elcock

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Ward Elcock

Ms. Marlene Catterall

0950

Mr. Ward Elcock

Ms. Marlene Catterall

The Chair

Right Hon. Joe Clark (Calgary Centre, PC)

0955

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Ward Elcock

Right Hon. Joe Clark

Mr. Ward Elcock

Right Hon. Joe Clark

The Chair

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

Ms. Anita Neville (Winnipeg South Centre, Lib.)

The Chair

Right Hon. Joe Clark

Mr. Ward Elcock

1000

Right Hon. Joe Clark

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

1005

Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, CPC)

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Rob Anders

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Rob Anders

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

1010

Hon. Paul DeVillers (Simcoe North, Lib.)

Mr. Ward Elcock

Hon. Paul DeVillers

Mr. Ward Elcock

Hon. Paul DeVillers

Mr. Ward Elcock

Hon. Paul DeVillers

Mr. Ward Elcock

Hon. Paul DeVillers

Mr. Ward Elcock

Hon. Paul DeVillers

Mr. Ward Elcock

1015

Hon. Paul DeVillers

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Yvan Loubier

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Yvan Loubier

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Yvan Loubier

Mr. Ward Elcock

1020

Mr. Yvan Loubier

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Yvan Loubier

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

Hon. Yvon Charbonneau (Anjou—Rivière-des-Prairies, Lib.)

Mr. Ward Elcock

1025

Hon. Yvon Charbonneau

Mr. Ward Elcock

Hon. Yvon Charbonneau

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

Mr. Ward Elcock

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

Mr. Ward Elcock

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

Mr. Ward Elcock

1030

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

The Chair

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

Mr. Ward Elcock

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Ward Elcock

1035

The Chair

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

1040

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

Ms. Anita Neville

Mr. Ward Elcock

Ms. Anita Neville

Mr. Ward Elcock

1045

Ms. Anita Neville

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

Right Hon. Joe Clark

Mr. Ward Elcock

Right Hon. Joe Clark

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

1050

Mr. Derek Lee

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Derek Lee

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Derek Lee

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Catterall

1055

Mr. Ward Elcock

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Ward Elcock

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Ward Elcock

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Ward Elcock

The Chair

CANADA

Subcommittee on National Security of the Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

NUMBER 002

3rd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Thursday, May 6, 2004

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0900)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Tom Wappel (Scarborough Southwest, Lib.)): Good morning. It's 9 o'clock, so we'll get started.

I'd like to welcome our witness, Mr. Ward Elcock, director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

Mr. Elcock, I see you have a prepared statement, which you're going to give, which is great.

Before you do, I just want to recognize that I believe it's at the end of this month that the second of your terms of appointment is up. You may or may not want to comment on what's going to happen in the future, but I just want to say on behalf of the committee and on behalf of parliamentarians, thank you for your service to our country. I'm sure it has been very interesting and challenging, and I guess we'll get into some questions in that regard. But whatever you do in the future, best of luck to you, and Godspeed.

Please go ahead.

Mr. Ward Elcock (Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Just to respond, what's the old saw about the rumours of my demise? The rumours of my retirement are somewhat exaggerated. This is simply the end of a term for me, and what lies ahead will unfold, I guess, at some point, but exactly where I'll be and what I'll be doing is entirely up to the government and the clerk.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as the chairman said, I'm appearing here today for what may be the last time as the director of CSIS, as the second statutory five-year term in the position I've held since 1994 will expire at the end of this month.

Today in my opening remarks I'd like to first focus on the most durable and I think reliable foundation of the organization, the CSIS Act, and then I'll talk about what is still changing and what challenges may lie ahead.

This year, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service observes its 20th anniversary. The CSIS Act was passed in 1984 in a very different global security environment than exists today. During extensive and lengthy debate, parliamentarians developed a framework in which we have evolved, and one that has allowed CSIS to continually adapt to a changing threat environment while protecting the rights of Canadians.

Over the past two decades, the CSIS Act has survived a number of major operational tests. Today CSIS is a vastly different organization from the one that existed in 1984. CSIS has evolved into an experienced, highly disciplined, and effective intelligence service.

Lawmakers of the day confronted a number of options and choices in designing the act. The need for collective security to ensure the safety of the state and its institutions from threats of espionage and terrorism while protecting individual rights to privacy, to dissent, to be politically active, and to hold and express unpopular or radical opinions was perhaps the most important balance that had to be struck. Tension between collective and individual security requires the existence of a directly proportional relationship between these two concepts at every stage in the intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting process. It's also central to the role of Parliament in the deliberation of matters of national security and public safety.

The McDonald commission summed it up by saying: “Canada must meet both the requirements of security and the requirements of democracy; we must never forget that the fundamental purpose of the former is to secure the latter.”

To accomplish this, civil liberties considerations were built into the CSIS Act's definition of threats to the security of Canada. These underlie the design of the Federal Court warrant system and are fundamental to the role of the review agencies that were given the responsibility to monitor the report on CSIS's investigative activities.

The balance between individual and collective rights was also reflected in the choices of lawmakers who understood what skills sets and special training are required to do security intelligence gathering. Both the Mackenzie and the McDonald commissions had recognized that while there are similarities, there are distinct differences between the orientation of police work and intelligence collection.

Parliamentarians determined that a civilian organization would best assure the necessary political control and accountability of security intelligence that a democratic society demands. When CSIS was created, more than 80% of its employee base was comprised of former RCMP officers. Today, less than 20% of the organization's employees are former police officers. By the turn of the millennium, in other words, the vision of a civilian security intelligence service was largely fulfilled.

The Mackenzie and McDonald commissions recommended that Canada's intelligence service be governed within a strict regime of political accountability. Accountability took the form of more direct control by the minister, who is accountable to Parliament. It took the form of procedures requiring approval by the CSIS director, the minister, and a Federal Court judge before intrusive activities are undertaken. More importantly, it took the form of review agencies, as prescribed in the legislation, which have access to all employees and documents except for cabinet confidences.

Over the years, the relationship with the review agencies has not always been easy, but the results of what is now a healthy tension are clear. The act's accountability features have made CSIS a more disciplined and competent service and have ensured that investigators deal with threats in a way that protects the rights of Canadian citizens.

The right legislative mandate sets the framework for the operation of a security intelligence organization, but to address today's threats, an intelligence agency needs, in essence, three characteristics.

First is the adoption of an intelligence model that is able to understand the world of modern terrorism and that is equipped to forewarn and prevent terrorist acts. CSIS operational employees require expert analytical skills. They also need knowledge and understanding of the politics, culture, history, geography, and issues of nations all over the world and how those local issues fit in the context of global patterns and trends. They must have respect for legitimate political dissent and be trained to respect civil liberties, as well as in operational ways and means.

¿ (0905)

Today the service's workforce is more representative of the Canadian population than at any time since 1984. Diversity of backgrounds, knowledge, and skills, together with a blend of experience and new energy, has made CSIS one of the most effective intelligence organizations anywhere.

Another requirement of an effective intelligence-gathering organization is a capacity to manage information, since success is rarely a coup that reveals all but is rather a piecing together of separate bits of information to create what is often, even then, an incomplete picture. In the computer age, that means a unified, centralized database. Since the 1980s, all operational reporting of the service has been contained in one database available to all intelligence officers with a need to know from coast to coast.

Very few security and intelligence organizations in other jurisdictions match it or have the tools that CSIS has to exploit it. In particular, it allowed us in the late 1990s to identify, monitor, and report to government on a series of suspected Sunni extremists, resulting in a number of successes. However, the increasingly diffuse nature and technological sophistication of the targets and threats means that the service must continually upgrade its capacity to lawfully intercept the communications of its targets in order to stay ahead of the curve.

The third element of an effective intelligence agency is a centralized organizational structure that can ensure investigations are run in a tightly disciplined manner. Legislators insisted on this form of management to ensure that operations were run according to strictly defined government requirements and clear policy guidelines. Centralized decision-making imposes discipline on the balance between individual and collective rights that is inherent in all CSIS operations.

Central control of investigations also encourages consistency of actions and judgments between investigators who may be separated geographically, and also helps to ensure that information moves from the field to those who need it while it is relevant and useful.

So far I have focused on what has served Canada best about the legislative framework and the organization that it has spawned. Now let me talk a little about the changes in the threat environment and the challenges that have resulted for the public safety of Canadians and for the service.

First, a brief look at the current threat environment. Canada's history is not free of terrorist violence, and neither will be its future. Both indigenous and foreign terrorists have long been active in Canada, pursuing domestic objectives or using Canada as a staging ground for overseas operations. Some religious extremists purposely seek refuge in our country in order to conduct their religious wars free from the pressure of the security forces in their countries of origin. These terrorists are out there, they're active, they're represented in Canada, and they are being investigated by CSIS.

The service's top-priority Sunni Islamic terrorist target is al-Qaeda. This is an umbrella organization that consists of a network of individuals and organizations who share the common goal of creating a new Islamic caliphate purged of all non-Muslim elements. One declaration from an al-Qaeda spokesman encapsulates the essence of what terrorism has become in the age of Islamic terrorism: “You love life, and we love death.” And al-Qaeda operatives have proved themselves as good as their word on many occasions.

Since September 11, 2001, the frequency and number of countries targeted by al-Qaeda-inspired attacks has increased. To date, Canadian victims have been the result of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. But as al-Qaeda directly threatened Canadians twice in as many years, the last time only a month ago, it is safe to assume that it is no longer a question of “if” but rather of “when” or “where” we will be specifically targeted.

In the early days of CSIS, the majority of operational resources were dedicated to threats from espionage, clandestine foreign interference, and subversion. While operations were conducted abroad in response to unique and specific circumstances--for instance, in relation to an east bloc defector or an existing human source with access to unique information abroad--that type of activity was the exception rather than the norm.

Over time, however, CSIS has shifted its operational priorities to meet the requirements related to public safety, most notably exemplified in the growing threats of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. By 1989-90, the service's operational priorities, on which ministers are consulted on an annual basis, specified public safety as the number one requirement, a ranking that remains valid to this day.

Given that virtually all of the current threats to the security of Canada either have their origins abroad or operate across international boundaries, CSIS has increasingly had to look outside Canada's borders, both to understand the threat and to build strong, cooperative relationships with intelligence services around the world. As a result, the number of liaison arrangements with foreign security and intelligence organizations has grown from around 50 in the late 1980s to nearly 250 today.

¿ (0910)

In addition to overt liaison activity, foreign covert operational activities have also been expanded and changed. In the mid-1990s this often meant cooperating with a sister service from another country and establishing joint operations to obtain information of mutual security concern. Such operations remain an important part of the service's repertoire.

Since the late 1990s, however, always subject to resource considerations and a careful risk assessment, the service has increasingly engaged in covert foreign operations. This change was due in part to the changing nature of the threat; it was also a logical development of the service's growing expertise in carrying out such operations. Lastly, it has come about because of our country's often unique access to sources who are able to provide information about threats to the security of Canada.

Our centralized information holdings, which include all intelligence, whether it's collected domestically or outside of Canada, or received from liaison partners, enable the service to fully analyze that information, all subject to full access by our review agencies.

The accelerating international dimensions of the terrorist threat have seen foreign collection techniques employed more frequently. As expertise has grown, CSIS has expanded the range of foreign operations to include tasking human sources to travel abroad, recruiting foreign sources, and meeting those sources in third countries.

Increased budget allocations provided to the service after September 11, 2001, have allowed us to ramp up to meet the challenges, but it takes years to bring a new recruit up to full operational capacity, a state of readiness that has still not been fully achieved with the supplementary resources we received in 2001.

The Government of Canada announced in the 2004 budget that additional funds would be made available for public safety. For CSIS, this means an additional $30 million will be available to improve information-sharing among elements of the federal security and intelligence community. This will be accomplished with a consolidation of the federal Integrated National Security Assessment Centre at CSIS headquarters. However, the pressure for CSIS to extend its international reach and the race for technological superiority are exponential. Subsequent directors of CSIS will need to rely on risk management techniques, constantly reviewing and reordering target priorities, to cover the full spectrum of resource demands.

Members of the committee, Mr. Chairman, as director of the service for half of its existence, I think I'm qualified to say that the pressures will be continual. I am confident, however, that CSIS employees and the service will be able to meet those challenges and continue to fulfill the service's mandate. That will be the context for the service and for the committee's deliberations on national security and public safety.

Twenty years ago, a group of parliamentarians tackled the national security environment of the day and came up with what I believe is an enduring solution, the CSIS Act. I wish the members of this committee as much success in finding a balance between the imperatives of collective security and individual rights as you move ahead with your deliberations in the future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Elcock.

Before we move to questioning, just for the purposes of the record, I want to remind everybody that, pursuant to a motion of the Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, adopted on Tuesday, March 30, 2004, and pursuant to Standing Order 81(4), our subject matter is the main estimates 2004-05, votes 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60, 65, 70, and 75 under Solicitor General, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, referred to the standing committee on Tuesday, February 24, 2004.

For our first round, we'll start with Mr. Sorenson, for seven minutes.

¿ (0915)

Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, CPC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We welcome you, Mr. Elcock, to our committee. You've come in the past, and we've appreciated your input. We appreciate your taking the time again today.

It appears from your brief that there is again this sense of urgency. You say things like, “...it is safe to assume that it is no longer a question of “if” but rather of “when” or “where” we will be specifically targeted”, but to be frank, that's not the first time we've heard this. You've been very upfront in the past. You've come forward and said, listen, we're always believing that anything could happen at any time. So we've heard you give that kind of testimony before.

Again, it's not an entirely new message, but in the last page of this report, I would say there's an expanded sense of urgency here as you talk about risk management, and resources, and prioritizing, and constantly reviewing and reordering. But the history of CSIS is that we've gone from about 2,800--I don't know if you call yourself agents or personnel--down to close to 1,800. And now we're working up, I realize.

What number are we at right now in terms of people who are involved in CSIS, those who analyze and help disseminate some of the information that's garnered?

Mr. Ward Elcock: We screen about 2,300 or 2,400.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: So we've gone from 2,800 down to 1,800. Now we're working back to 2,300.

Over the last two years, how has that number increased?

Mr. Ward Elcock: It's increased by about 280 or 300 as a result of the resources provided in 2001, with some numbers on top of that as specific programs have been approved that added additional resources for CSIS or specific requirements for CSIS to do additional activities.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: One of the things you said last year when you were here--I think it was probably last year--was that when you rehire CSIS agents or personnel, it takes approximately five years to really bring them on stream. It's a highly technical position. You try to get as many experts as possible, professionals in the field, ex-RCMP, people who have some history with intelligence gathering, but it's still a five-year deal.

In Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy, the government announced that they are committing an additional $167 million in this area. How much of the new money that's been announced in this document here will go to training additional personnel?

Mr. Ward Elcock: There are resources mentioned in that document for the creation of an integrated threat assessment centre, which will be in CSIS, so some of those resources will be of assistance to CSIS in creating that, and there will be funding contributions from other ministries to that integrated threat assessment centre. There will also, I believe, be some additional resources, though I don't at this point know exactly what that number will be, for CSIS operational purposes.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: What would be your optimal level? What's your attrition rate over the next three years? Are we having to bring these people on really quickly? Are we trying to be out there hiring people all the time?

Mr. Ward Elcock: As you said, it takes us a while to bring people on stream. People who join the service are on probation for five years. To correct one comment you made, we don't generally hire from other organizations, police forces, the military, or the RCMP. We generally hire first-time employees of the government. It's a very long, substantial training period, so it does take us a while to bring people fully into the organization and get them to the point where they are fully able to contribute to the operations of the service, although the reality is that given the quality of the people we hire, they're in most cases able to make a contribution from the time they join the service. It's just that they will not really peak until they're five, six, seven, eight years into their time with the service. In the intelligence business it's hard to offer a precise number, to say what the right number is for an intelligence service. We are roughly about the same size as many other services proportionally around the world.

Intelligence services, to be frank, never have enough resources to do all the things they think they need to do. By definition, it is always risk management for intelligence services, and we will always have to do that. I've used the example, I think, before this committee of the Stasi, the old East German intelligence service. They had half the population watching the other half of the population, and I'm sure they went forward with an annual budget request to their government seeking additional resources. That is true of almost any intelligence service. You're always looking for more resources, you always apply the resources you have to the highest-priority risks. That's what we do and that's what other intelligence services do.

Could we use additional resources? Certainly, but the reality is that there are other requirements the government has to meet, and the essence of government is having to make decisions about the distribution of resources.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: We know over the next five years there's going to be a huge number of people retiring from the RCMP. Attrition is going to be high. What about in CSIS?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Most of the employees of the service are post-1984 employees. We will in the next few years begin to lose some of the more senior officers, baby-boomers, people, in essence, of my vintage. We will have slightly higher attrition than normal, but our attrition, generally speaking, has been well below that of most other organizations and will probably stay pretty much in the ball park. The reality is that the younger officers coming on, in my view, will have the experience to take over those responsibilities.

¿ (0920)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Sorenson.

Mr. Elcock, you said the attrition rate will stay in the ball park. What ball park?

Mr. Ward Elcock: The attrition rate has generally been about 4% to 5%.

The Chair: Thank you.

Monsieur Loubier.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Loubier (Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Mr. Elcock. I would like to ask you two questions that seem important to me. We know that terrorist networks often get their funding from the proceeds of drug trafficking throughout the world, and it is a well-known fact that terrorists and drug traffickers occasionally work together, particularly when we look at drug production in Afghanistan. The same goes for the Golden Triangle, as recent events in Thailand have shown. In other words, the proceeds of drug trafficking are often used to fund terrorist networks. They always end up in the same places to launder the money, including tax havens.

Are you managing to establish a good working relationship between CSIS and the RCMP, so that you can cut off the main source of funding for terrorists?

Secondly, have you already suggested to the government that they cease to support what we commonly call tax havens, which is exactly where money is laundered, and which may be the first link in the funding chain for terrorists?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: I think the association between terrorist organizations and drug producers is somewhat overbuilt. There are some organizations that clearly do have such connections. FARC in Colombia is clearly an organization that has had extensive connections in the drug business. There are other organizations that may from time to time benefit from moneys from drugs, but in most cases the connections are much fewer than is imagined. We do work closely with the RCMP. If we have any information with respect to any individuals who may or may not have terrorist connections and are involved in the drug business, we provide them with that information. So those connections exist, but as I said, I think they're much less frequent than is generally imagined and, in some cases, believed by some organizations.

As to tax havens and so on, the flows of terrorist money, while important for the terrorist organizations, are generally speaking much smaller than those normally associated with money laundering. It costs very little to undertake a terrorist operation. I can't remember the exact number, but I think somebody at one point figured out what it might have cost al-Qaeda to undertake the World Trade Center attack, and it was a couple of hundred thousand dollars, which, in the scheme of things, is relatively small.

¿ (0925)

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Loubier: I am asking the question because when the Taliban regime in Afghanistan fell, it appeared that Al-Qaeda and the Taliban were receiving considerable funding originating in the proceeds of drug production in Afghanistan. I believe that this terrorist funding mechanism was more extensive than you just suggested.

I have another question for you, which concerns a statement made on page 2 of your brief. I am thinking about the national situation. I know that we have come a long way since the McDonald Commission, but when you talk about "respect for legitimate political dissent", do you include in such legitimate dissent the Quebec sovereignist movement, or do you still take the same view of sovereignists that the McDonald Commission did? In other words, could party lists still be stolen as they were in the 1970s? Is the sovereignist movement legitimate, in accordance with the statement you made in your brief?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: The only part of the act that allows us to undertake counter-subversion investigations, which is, I guess, where that might fit, is paragraph 2(d), and we have no investigations under paragraph 2(d). It would require the minister's direct approval for us to begin such an investigation.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Loubier: Yes, but I'm thinking about surveillance here. Is the sovereignist movement under surveillance? Are you still collecting information on members of the sovereignist movement? Are sovereignists considered members of an illegitimate political movement? I am not talking about taking measures or taking action, I just want to know whether CSIS has members of the sovereignist movement under surveillance, as the RCMP did in the 1970s?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Mr. Chairman, as I said, we have no investigations under paragraph 2(d). It would be the only authority under which we could begin such an investigation as the one the honourable member describes.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Loubier: So there is no ongoing surveillance? You can have people under surveillance without initiating an investigation. You can conduct surveillance without taking action, such as stealing a list of members.

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: No, it wouldn't happen, Mr. Chairman. It doesn't happen.

Under our process, we would have to start an investigation before any activity was undertaken, including surveillance or any other intrusive measures.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Loubier: If you initiate an official investigation, which to some extent will be conducted in secret, since you are a security and information service, who gets told that you wish to begin conducting surveillance of the sovereignist movement? Do you tell the minister, or a federal court judge? What would the process be to initiate information collection and surveillance activities?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: There's a fairly long process for doing that, Mr. Chairman. First of all, within the service, we have a process called the TARC process, a targeting process, essentially. The process requires the development of a case that justifies an investigation of an organization or an individual as a threat to the security of Canada.

In the case of paragraph 2(d), which is one of the defined threats of security to Canada, it would also require the minister's approval were we to begin such a counter-subversive investigation. As I said, we have no such investigations.

¿ (0930)

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Loubier.

Mr. Yvan Loubier: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Lee.

Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.): Thank you.

I wanted to thank Mr. Elcock for a whole lot of years of public service through some challenging times. I don't know whether he is thanked a lot.

In my early years here, there were times when he and I didn't agree on things, and when he and the committee didn't see eye to eye, but he has toughed it out and served well. We have made some progress--a lot of progress, actually.

Your opening remarks, Mr. Elcock, were actually quite good. I would also thank you for noting the foreign gathering of security intelligence, on the record, which has been a very slow striptease over the years. It's good to have the record, which barely states the albeit limited, but existing need to gather security intelligence from foreign sources. That's not to say it is always foreign intelligence. I think you've adequately described it, and described it well enough.

Monsieur Loubier broached the subject, and I guess you have answered it. In light of the growing complexity of the security threat, over the last few years, have you undertaken any paragraph 2(d) investigations?

You've said that you're not doing any now. I don't know if this question has been asked over the past two, three, or four years. Have there been any paragraph 2(d) investigations undertaken by the service within the last two, three, or four years?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I'm not aware of any paragraph 2(d) investigations in ten years.

Mr. Derek Lee: Good. Not that it's a good or bad thing, but thank you for putting it on the record.

I also wanted to address an area that is somewhat new. It's not new to you, Mr. Elcock, or to the service. At certain points in time, the service will have been asked about, and may have engaged in, intelligence gathering in relation to what I, as a layman, will call organized crime. Organized crime is not specifically enumerated in our CSIS statute as a threat to Canada, but it is arguably, if it is foreign based, within paragraph 2(b) or 2(c) of the statute.

Can I ask you to confirm that from time to time the service may have assisted the Government of Canada or other forces in gathering intelligence in relation to organized crime, falling within the definitions? Is it a growing envelope, or in fact, is it your view that we might need to tweak the definitions in the CSIS Act to more fully allow for appropriate intelligence gathering in that envelope?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I don't see any particular need, Mr. Chairman, for a change in the legislation. For the most part, the investigation of organized crime is the responsibility of the police, and properly so. They have considerable experience in doing so, and rarely, if ever, do they require any assistance from us—although we have, on occasion, provided assistance to the police forces, where they have warrants, because we do have access to some more specialized techniques.

Having said that, we do pursue investigations, as the honourable member said. There are cases where organized crime comes within the definitions of section 2, and we do pursue investigation of some organized crime—individuals and groups.

Mr. Derek Lee: Okay, thank you.

Since the tragic events of 9/11, there have been the creation and evolution of what are called integrated national security enforcement teams, INSETs, in a few of our large urban centres. I know that CSIS is a partner of some sort in the INSETs.

You're shaking your head, but anyway, I'll ask the question.

Can you confirm that CSIS has a role of any nature in them? Does CSIS have a role of any nature in the work—intelligence gathering and analysis of the intelligence gathered—of these INSETs? Let's get that answered first.

¿ (0935)

Mr. Ward Elcock: Mr. Chairman, the INSETs are a police investigative tool, if you will. We have, on a number of occasions, seconded officers to INSETs. For the period they are a member of the INSET, a member of the RCMP or whatever force they're seconded to, they are there simply to provide analytical assistance, if you will, because that's the kind of expertise they can bring to the table.

But we are not part of the INSETs. We do not participate in INSET investigations. There are obviously discussions between us and police forces about making sure our investigations do not conflict with each other, but it is entirely a police investigative tool and not a CSIS tool.

Mr. Derek Lee: With a focus on civil liberties—and I used to call this issue subcontracting—CSIS runs a pretty tight ship and has a lot of controls over it. Have you any sense from the evolution of the INSETs, which were a quick response to the 9/11-type threats, and perhaps a necessary construct, that they are potentially posing a problem for CSIS in terms of leakage or subcontracting? In other words, CSIS might rely on a local police authority to do something where the local police were not so constrained as CSIS, and who thereby might derive information from the street in a way that CSIS itself wouldn't, either because it hadn't approved an operation through TARC or it just wasn't ready to allocate the resources yet. In other words, is there a risk that CSIS will do some subcontracting through the INSETs, and have you detected any organizational problems in working with them?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Mr. Chairman, by definition, if you have two investigations going on, from time to time there are conflicts that have to be resolved. Therefore, we do have mechanisms between us and the police forces and the INSETs to ensure that we minimize any conflicts and work out any conflicts there may be in any particular investigation.

In point of fact, in most cases, the focus of our investigation is not law enforcement, but security intelligence gathering, and our techniques are different from the police's, in most cases. From time to time, there is information that may be shared between police forces and CSIS, and back the other way, but we manage that process very carefully and do our own investigations, if you will.

We don't subcontract.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Nystrom, for seven minutes.

Hon. Lorne Nystrom (Regina—Qu'Appelle, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First of all, I want to welcome Mr. Elcock here. It may be your last time, as you said. You're near the end of your second term as the director of CSIS.

I wanted to ask you about the Auditor General and a criticism that she made in her report of March 2004 about the way intelligence is managed. I'll quote her: “...in the way intelligence is managed across the government. A lack of co-ordination has led to gaps in intelligence coverage as well as duplication” of that intelligence coverage. In addition, Mr. Chair, Ms. Fraser pointed to “...gaps and inconsistencies in the watch lists used to screen visa applicants, refugee claimants, and travellers seeking to enter Canada”.

I just wonder whether you can make a comment on what she was saying and respond to her criticisms of CSIS and how valid they are. Have you done anything to rectify what she is criticizing?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I don't think most of those comments had anything to do with CSIS. In most cases, CSIS is coordinated rather than coordinating. So for the most part, we don't do coordination; we are the subjects that get coordinated from time to time.

That's the Auditor General's opinion. I can't comment on the basis for it.

Hon. Lorne Nystrom: Maybe I could ask you a question, then.

My understanding is that you've been involved in intelligence work for a long time, even before your present appointment--a very senior person, probably the most experienced in the country. CSIS is part of it, but what's your response to her general criticism in terms of intelligence in the country?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Coordinating intelligence is, by definition, always complicated. There are different organizations. We do have different responsibilities. It does require a continuing effort to do it.

The problem with coordination is that you can always do coordination better. The reality is, however, that trying to have simply one organization that does everything probably doesn't work any better, so coordination is an imperfect practice. It is always going to be subject to criticism, and one can always do it better.

Her comments may be fair, but they may not have interpreted some of the activities accurately. I haven't looked at what she said. As I said, we're not the coordinating agency, so--

¿ (0940)

Hon. Lorne Nystrom: She talks about a gap in intelligence. In her words, it “led to gaps in intelligence coverage”. Do you have any idea what she means by that?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I haven't any idea what she means by that.

Hon. Lorne Nystrom: I wonder if you can explain to us the level of information sharing between Canada and the United States. How can we prevent tragedies like Mahar Arar's arising again?

This is something on which we now have a major inquiry going on in this country, and whether that increased cooperation with the United States could endanger more Canadian citizens. Could you enlighten the committee as to the level of information sharing between the two countries, and comment on how we can prevent Arar cases from arising again?

Mr. Ward Elcock: The Arar case is the subject of a commission of inquiry at this point that will specifically look at what indeed happened in the case of Mr. Arar. Until that's concluded, it's hard to know precisely what did in fact occur.

As I've said before, CSIS didn't in fact play a role in that issue one way or the other. The reality generally, however, is that the service does have an important set of relationships with the American agencies. We do, at the end of the day, protect the same piece of North American turf, or attempt to protect the same piece of North American turf, a collective turf, if you will.

The essence of a successful intelligence relationship is to share information. As the honourable member probably knows, we have strict policies with respect to the sharing of information. Any sharing we do is subject to review by SIRC to determine whether in fact we have shared appropriately or inappropriately, and we manage that very tightly. Any information we share with any organization, the Americans or any other, is subject to strict caveats as to its use.

Hon. Lorne Nystrom: Can you elaborate a bit more on what the level of information sharing might be between the two countries?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I can only speak to the sharing between the service and the services we work with in the United States. That's obviously extensive on a day-to-day basis. There's a lot of information that flows back and forth, but as I said, all of that information is subject to the policies and practices of the service and subject to review by SIRC and the caveats we put on the information when we share it.

Hon. Lorne Nystrom: Another question, then, would be, do we in this country have the resources and capabilities that we need to prevent terrorist attacks on Canada? Also, what role does CSIS play in terms of prevention of terrorism?

I guess another question would be, how do you know when we do prevent terrorism? Do you know that CSIS has played a role in preventing a terrorist attack?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I believe in some cases we have prevented terrorist attacks or the preparation for terrorist attacks. In some cases, you're right, you may not be aware of it, but you may nonetheless have disrupted it. But in some cases, we are aware of having successfully disrupted terrorist attacks or participated in the disruption of such attacks.

The whole purpose of CSIS is, in essence, to try to identify specific threats to security of a potential attack, even before the attack happens. In some sense, when an attack happens, it is by definition an intelligence failure. It may be an unavoidable intelligence failure in that there may have been no possible way to secure the intelligence, but the whole purpose of the service is to seek to collect intelligence by the means we normally use or that we have at our disposal to try to identify the people and organizations that would like to mount an attack in Canada or elsewhere.

Hon. Lorne Nystrom: On the same question, before I get cut off, do you think you have the resources needed to prevent attacks? Can you give us an example, without jeopardizing anything that may harm anyone?

We can't keep what you're saying confidential in this room, obviously, but can you give us an example of a terrorist attack that was prevented?

Mr. Ward Elcock: No, I can't.

Hon. Lorne Nystrom: I'm not talking about something that one of the Liberals did in the House of Commons.

¿ (0945)

Mr. Ward Elcock: That might get me onto partisan political grounds, Mr. Chair.

No, I can't provide you with an example. I would like to, but unfortunately, I can't provide you with a specific example.

Hon. Lorne Nystrom: Can you not do so because it might jeopardize something, because you can't remember, or because you don't know of one?

Mr. Ward Elcock: No. It would either jeopardize ongoing court processes or it would jeopardize sources and individuals.

Now I've lost track of where I was.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Elcock,

Mr. Nystrom, on the other aspect of the question about resources, I believe Mr. Elcock addressed it when he was talking to Mr. Sorenson.

We'll go to the second round.

Ms. Catterall, five minutes.

Ms. Marlene Catterall (Ottawa West—Nepean, Lib.): The first question, frankly, is to you, Mr. Chair. You rhymed off a series of votes that we were expected to deal with, at the beginning, but I don't see them in front of me, and I don't see precisely what they deal with. I don't how we can vote on them. Can we have some information on what the votes are?

The Chair: We will be able to provide that. There won't be any votes today.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: Mr. Elcock, this is more a request than a question. Given its ongoing work, I think the committee would be very interested in seeing the “strict policy” with respect to information sharing and the kind of caveat you're required to put on that information sharing. I trust it's not secret information.

Mr. Ward Elcock: To the extent they're not classified, we'd be happy to release them, but some of it is classified.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: Thank you.

I wanted to ask something more related to your resources. One of the things all of us around here deal with on a continuing basis is immigration and citizenship applications. Obviously, CSIS is quite closely involved, first at the stage of immigrant approval or refugee approval for landing, with security checks on the individuals and then again at the citizenship stage. I think all of us have been experiencing the fact that those applications are taking much longer.

What proportion of your resources, both human and financial, go to that kind of work? Do you regard it as an appropriate distribution? Obviously, the priority has to be on public safety and security, but how do you make those decisions, and what is the division of resources?

Mr. Ward Elcock: The largest part of our resources is for investigative analytical resources in respect to the work we do on counterterrorism and counter-proliferation, counterterrorism in particular. It's where a large part of the resources go. Some of it, of course, feeds back into the process of security screening, in the sense that information collected may allow you to identify that a refugee claimant or a prospective immigrant is indeed a member of a terrorist organization, or whatever it happens to be.

It's hard to draw a specific line. In most cases, I think we deal very expeditiously with the requests we receive from individuals about status and with the requests we receive from members of Parliament about the status of individuals. For most cases that I've seen coming across my desk or coming into the organization, in fact, it's not the service that is causing the delay.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: Okay. The normal answer, frankly, is “we can't tell you anything, it's in security”.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Frequently, it's not in CSIS. It may be somewhere in someone else's security file, but it's not in ours.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: Is the role you play there helpful to, consistent with, or a drain on, in some way, resources that would be better going somewhere else?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I think we see the security screening there and the security clearances people get from the government, which allow them access to classified information, as important screening mechanisms. In the case of immigrants and refugees, it's a first screen to try to identify individuals of concern.

It will not catch all cases. It will not stop all people entering Canada. In some cases, there may not be sufficient information about an individual to allow us to make a judgment at the point of entry. It may be it's only later that connections with an organization develop. They may have had no connections before coming to Canada, but connections may develop later.

Screening is not, by definition, the salvation, but it is an important screen.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: This brings me back to the question you were asked earlier about your relationship with security functions in different departments. For instance, Immigration and Foreign Affairs each have security functions within them. What's the connection?

¿ (0950)

Mr. Ward Elcock: In what sense, Mr. Chairman? Most of those organizations have an element they describe as an intelligence group. That's not an intelligence group, or whatever they describe it as, in quite the same way as the service is. They're not intelligence officers in the same way. They're not an intelligence collection organization in quite the same way as the service is. They are, more often than not, a group of individuals whose responsibilities are analytical. They may do some collection, but in many cases their responsibilities are analytical and/or are responsibilities to be the conduit through which information frequently flows.

The problem with classified information is it's classified; therefore, by definition you are generally speaking relying on people who either have the right kinds of clearances or understand the right kinds of procedures to manage that flow of information. So more often than not, the organizations we deal with are the intelligence groups in another department.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: Do I have one more minute? Okay, let me join in the second round.

The Chair: Yes.

By the way, just for the benefit of committee members, in answer to your previous question, we're dealing with the estimates that are found in parts 1 and 2 of the book I'm holding. Although I did rhyme off a series of votes, because that's the nature of how the orders of the day have to be phrased, it's vote 30 we're dealing with, which is on page 1-56. It's one sheet of paper, which is no surprise when you're dealing with CSIS. It is in front of you. Also, chapter 24 is in front of you; it is also just one line. That's specifically what we're talking about, and the information is in front of you.

We'll go to Mr. Clark for five minutes.

Right Hon. Joe Clark (Calgary Centre, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We're very fortunate to have the opportunity to call upon Mr. Elcock's extensive knowledge here.

I'm interested in the institutional issue of balancing a responsibility to Parliament with operational effectiveness. I have to say that, in terms of balancing conflicting values, I think you have one of the toughest jobs in government.

I also think the issue of parliamentary control is one of the toughest issues for Parliament. The way this was dealt with when SIRC was established, after the McDonald royal commission, was in effect to make Parliament's role indirect. I'll describe what I mean by that.

SIRC was set up following a recommendation of the McDonald royal commission. Then there was a responsibility through the minister, who would then be questioned by members of Parliament in normal processes. But usually the members of Parliament would not be precisely informed on confidential matters, so there was a tenuous reporting relation to Parliament.

It's interesting, when you go back to the McDonald royal commission report, that they did not want SIRC to stand alone. They also recommended a parliamentary committee. They had considered, before recommending a parliamentary committee, a very special parliamentary committee—smaller, perhaps composed of leaders of parties, a joint committee—so that there would be a durability and memory wouldn't be lost.

They also said they had looked at the possibility of a committee of parliamentarians, such as exists roughly in the U.K., that would not expire with the end of every Parliament. The reason for not going that route and for going for a parliamentary committee was interesting. They said that a committee of parliamentarians would “go too far toward detaching this parliamentary committee from Parliament”, which is to say they saw a very active role for Parliament in oversight. That didn't happen 20 years ago.

What I wanted to do today was, first of all, go to the very end of your statement. You always choose your words deliberately. You said, “Twenty years ago a group of parliamentarians tackled the national security environment of the day and they came up with an enduring solution in the CSIS Act”. One question is, should we read that as your recommendation that the status quo, broadly speaking, with regard to reporting relationship should be as it is; in other words, through CSIS, through the minister, rather than through a committee of Parliament?

I then want to proceed, if I can, to how things work now and have worked over your experience. I don't want to get into what was discussed in the cabinet committee on security intelligence, because I know you can't deal with that. But I think you could tell us how often—and let me break this into two categories—before 9/11, in an average year, the cabinet committee on security and intelligence would meet.

Second, typically, would those meetings entail a briefing on a specific issue that arose, or was there an attempt to keep the cabinet committee informed on a quite regular basis of the substantive issues—not simply the procedural issues—that were before the intelligence and security arms of the Government of Canada?

¿ (0955)

Mr. Ward Elcock: Just to refer back, Mr. Chairman, the first question...?

The Chair: It was whether that sentence was your recommendation for the future of our country.

Mr. Ward Elcock: No, Mr. Chairman, it was not. It was solely in respect of those portions of the CSIS Act that in essence define our operational mandate, etc. I wasn't making a recommendation as to how the future should unfold, in terms of how parliamentarians or CSIS should relate to each other. That will unfold in a way that is, as some of my military colleagues are wont to say, beyond my pay grade. That's ultimately for Parliament and ministers to decide. I wasn't making a recommendation with respect to that.

Right Hon. Joe Clark: How do we get to the views of informed people like you, who have worked from the inside out and who would have a perspective different from those of us who by and large work from the outside in, on the question as to whether the status quo is at all adequate? You can't testify, or won't.

Mr. Ward Elcock: In the current set-up, if you will, of the relationship of public servants to ministers and ministers to Parliament and even public servants before parliamentary committees, I think that goes beyond where I can go as a public servant—which isn't to say that at other times there aren't occasions where there are more general discussions, as I'm sure the honourable members are aware. But generally speaking, and certainly in a parliamentary committee, it would be hard for a public servant to have that kind of conversation.

Right Hon. Joe Clark: Which is a dilemma for us. Could we go to the questions about—

The Chair: I'm sorry Mr. Clark, your five minutes flew by.

But what about that question Mr. Clark asked? How often, before 9/11, would the cabinet committee have met yearly?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Before September 11, the cabinet committee would have met two to three times a year, probably, and I'm sure Mr. Clark will remember the context of some of those meetings as well as I do.

The Chair: Ah, these people who are in the loop.

Ms. Neville, you have five minutes.

Ms. Anita Neville (Winnipeg South Centre, Lib.): I don't know whether this is appropriate or not, but I'm prepared to defer my five minutes to Mr. Clark, because he has the institutional memory that I think we all need.

The Chair: Is the committee content with giving Mr. Clark another five minutes?

Go ahead, Mr. Clark.

Right Hon. Joe Clark: I don't want to get into matters you or I are not free to discuss in detail. But I am interested in how well the.... Let me put it this way.

My experience with that committee would suggest that ministers are quite well informed when a particular issue arises—apart from the directly responsible minister of security, the Solicitor General at that time—but that there was not a practice, as I recall it, of being kept advised in any detailed way of an overview of security and intelligence activities. The Solicitor General may have been; the cabinet committee was not.

What I'm looking for here is where people who come from Parliament exercise an informed capacity to direct security and intelligence activities. I'm interested in knowing, as much as we can, what the previous record was, because that may help us define what the future arrangement should be.

Mr. Ward Elcock: I think, Mr. Chairman, it would be fair to say that prior to September 11 the degree to which ministers would receive briefings on the broad security situation would be general, rather than to any specific depth. I think that's probably a fair comment. Since September 11 that has changed. There is a broader understanding probably now than perhaps in the past.

Having said that, one thing I think has been important from the beginning.... I think one of the failures, if you go back to the time of the McDonald commission, was the understanding between ministers and the security service as to what each was doing and what each meant by the words each used. One can argue endlessly about who was responsible for what, or who did what to whom. To me, that's not so important as the fact that there was a misunderstanding on both sides about what each was doing and what each meant by what each said about what they were doing, with the result that there was confusion.

We have since then always sought to ensure that ministers were clearly advised as to the nature of the work of CSIS. While not necessarily in a precise detail, we have always sought to ensure that ministers are advised broadly as to the work of CSIS and the nature of the targets CSIS is investigating.

À (1000)

Right Hon. Joe Clark: I want to thank Ms. Neville and the committee.

One of the reasons I'm interested in this is that events in the U.S. and the U.K. in particular have indicated just how inherently imprecise the world you have to work in is. When we're talking about accountability in this case, what's really germane is not just the dollars and cents accountability, but the sense in the service that somebody outside the loop is able to look in. That kind of knowledge outside the loop imposes a discipline, it would seem to me, upon people doing your very difficult work, upon the way they operate. I think that as we're designing something for the future in a world that has changed dramatically, we want to be sure there is that kind of discipline among people whose job it is to carry this out. That's the reason for my question here.

I'm a little concerned by the reality your earlier answer exposed, that in normal circumstances we don't have access to the off-the-record experience of people who know this issue from a side other than Parliament's side. Even were you to move on to other responsibilities, you would be limited in the frankness you could show to this committee, unless we met in camera. The less important comment, I think, is on the discipline, unless you think I'm fundamentally wrong. The more important would be how this committee might have access to people who have the kind of knowledge from the inside that you do, so that we can make more informed recommendations on the shape of institutions in the future.

Mr. Ward Elcock: There is no other intelligence service in the world that is reviewed as much as CSIS. As I think I said in the speech, that review has made us a more competent and, in many respects, more disciplined organization than some other organizations I can think of. So is review beneficial? I think most people in CSIS would say it is and has been. Whether additional review would help CSIS or not is another question, since we already have a considerable dose of it.

On the second issue, the government has, in the national security policy and elsewhere, indicated that it wishes to move to a committee of parliamentarians. That's an issue that will be discussed in the future and may provide some answers to those questions. Obviously, parliamentarians will have to consider what the options are and come to a conclusion, but that may answer some of the questions you're raising.

The Chair: Mr. Clark, I'm sorry. Thanks.

I think, even if we were to move in camera, Mr. Elcock would likely be very constrained, could not be as frank as he would like to be. I think, short of taking an oath of secrecy, in the usual course, he could not be frank to the extent he would like to be, because of the nature of the political system and potential leaks, even from in camera meetings.

Mr. Anders, five minutes.

À (1005)

Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, CPC): Thank you.

I have two questions. First, do you feel CSIS has the required level of personnel language skills and other types of expertise to thwart terrorism and protect us effectively?

Mr. Ward Elcock: We certainly have the skills we need at this juncture, but we're always trying to hire more people with broader language skills and always seeking to increase the expertise of our people. That's a continuous demand.

Mr. Rob Anders: Second, we're having this new portfolio created with a minister in my province responsible for national security. I'm wondering how CSIS changes as a result of this new portfolio. Questions have been raised with regard to foreign intelligence gathering and what not. How do you feel CSIS changes? Does this new national security portfolio take into account some of these foreign intelligence gathering components, and are there other questions raised?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Mr. Chairman, the authority for CSIS to conduct operations abroad with respect to threats to Canadian security is in the CSIS Act. It is part of our mandate. It has always been part of our mandate. The fact that it has evolved over the last 10 years or so is simply a recognition (a) of the nature of the threat, and (b) the development of greater expertise. By definition, running an operation in Afghanistan, or Iraq, or somewhere else around the world is more complicated than running an operation in downtown Ottawa.

In most businesses on most occasions one tries to walk before one runs, so we walked a lot before we ran. The fact that we can actually run is something that happens over a period of time. But the creation of the new ministry doesn't affect that one way or the other. The mandate is in the CSIS Act, it's within the law of the CSIS Act, and we do operate abroad to collect information with respect to threats to Canada's security.

In terms of the wider implications of being in a different kind of ministry from that of the Solicitor General, there are advantages in having a more senior minister and there are advantages in being part of a larger whole. Some of the organizations with which we are now in the same ministry, for example the Canadian Border Agency, are ones we would have had to cooperate with before, but they were in another department. Now they're in the same ministry. In theory and in practice, it ought to be easier for us to do some of the things we do together because we're in the same ministry.

Those are the kinds of things that will affect CSIS rather than an issue of what is within our mandate or what is not within our mandate.

Mr. Rob Anders: As a final part to that first question, are there things you wish you had responsibilities for, or tools to go ahead and use? In a sense, I'm looking for the what and the why. What would you like to have that you don't have now and why?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Mr. Chairman, one of the problems for intelligence organizations is the proliferation of technological solutions, whether they're new means of communication or new means of moving information, or whatever it happens to be. All of those offer a considerable challenge to the service. One of the issues that I think the government has said it will bring forward, probably in the next Parliament--who knows?--is amendments to the law to deal with the issue of access to new kinds of communication. It is not to increase the ability of the service to collect information but simply to ensure that in new kinds of communication, new ways of managing information flows, the same opportunities exist to collect information as exist now. That's one of the largest challenges for the service, for any intelligence organization and, indeed, for the police as well.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Anders.

Mr. DeVillers, then Monsieur Loubier.

À (1010)

Hon. Paul DeVillers (Simcoe North, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Elcock, in your presentation you mention that al-Qaeda has directly threatened Canadians twice in as many years and it was therefore safe to assume that it's not a question of if but, rather, when and where we would be specifically targeted. For the record, what were the two specific threats?

Mr. Ward Elcock: The most recent one was the mentioning of Canada as, I think, number five on the al-Qaeda list. The previous one was about two years ago, and I've forgotten exactly what the context was, but Canada was included in one of the statements from elements of al-Qaeda. I think it was bin Laden, in fact.

Hon. Paul DeVillers: So it's from those specific references that you say it's safe to assume that it's not if, but when and where.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Yes.

Hon. Paul DeVillers: That's obviously something that would be of very serious concern to Canadians. What can we do about that? What are we doing about that?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Mr. Chairman, it has been the focus of our operations, as I said, for some considerable time. Our job is to try to identify any specific threat that comes from those statements. There are a lot of other organizations in the Government of Canada that either provide us sometimes with information that assists in that or, indeed, are responsible for ensuring that the kinds of security arrangements are in place to prevent those things from happening.

To give you an example, go back to a case like the Ahmed Ressam case. The prevention of an incident is not always simply the function of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service or the intelligence gatherers; it may be the result of appropriate action by a border guard, it may be appropriate action by an immigration inspector or a customs inspector. There are a whole lot of people--including, for example, the guards and the people around this building who are here to ensure the security of Parliament--in any area that we rely upon to ensure that an action is prevented. Our job is to try to provide them with some warning about a specific incident or a specific attack that allows them to be forewarned if, indeed, we can find the specific incident.

Hon. Paul DeVillers: So it's the cooperation between--

Mr. Ward Elcock: Between those gathering the intelligence and those who are actually providing security.

Hon. Paul DeVillers: It's because there's a sense of inevitability in your statement, that it's just--

Mr. Ward Elcock: I didn't mean to convey inevitability in the sense that there would be a successful attack; what I said was that there would be a specific threat. What we have said generally is, there is a threat from al-Qaeda to Canada. Al-Qaeda has said that specifically. What they have not announced and what we have not yet seen is a specific threat.

Hon. Paul DeVillers: Let's go back to Mr. Clark's point on the relationship between CSIS and parliamentarians. I know from my time on the justice and human rights committee that there has been some frustration for us to try to get a handle on.... We've enjoyed your presentations and your many visits to us, but frankly, we are left none the wiser on many of these occasions.

I'm interested in exploring other possibilities. I know the chair mentioned oaths of secrecy. Do you see, with the benefit of your 10 years' experience now, a way of coming up with a heightened security level for a potential committee or subcommittee of parliamentarians where we could have a more meaningful exchange?

Mr. Ward Elcock: The government has indicated that it wants to move forward and have considered the option of some kind of parliamentary committee or committee of parliamentarians. However it is ultimately defined, that may provide a way of doing that.

I think the proposal is to put forward a paper that may catalogue some of the issues that would have to be considered in doing that. Clearly, one of the issues is the degree to which any information provided to such a committee remains secret. The reality is that in many cases information I have and you may want to know is information that might threaten somebody's life or damage the security of Canada if it were released. How do you manage that information? How do you protect it? How do we ensure that it doesn't leave the sanctity of whatever group is considering it?

À (1015)

Hon. Paul DeVillers: If it's information that is within CSIS and is not getting out to the general public, then it would be possible to devise a similar method so it could be information parliamentarians would have. Now, you might question the benefit of having it in the sense that if you can't use it, then of what value is it? As to what parliamentarians do with it, at least there's the security of knowing they are aware of it.

Mr. Ward Elcock: There is a question as to what use parliamentarians could in fact make of such information; that's always going to be an issue.

In terms of CSIS officers, they are permanently bound under the Security of Information Act. Only we and a limited number of other organizations and individuals in government are specifically bound under the legislation. In essence, the burden of proof in dealing with a CSIS officer who has revealed secret information is much lighter for the government than it would be in respect of any other individual.

That's one of the questions: how do you manage that? Do you have the same requirements for parliamentarians as you do for a CSIS officer in handling that information? People in my organization are polygraphed on a five-year basis as to what they may have done with information. I'm not suggesting that parliamentarians would want to be polygraphed, but there are different levels of security for that information, different requirements for some of the individuals who handle it. How far can you go in lowering those, and what can you provide to parliamentarians if they have a lower classification?

There are a whole lot of questions I just don't have the answers to.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. DeVillers.

There was a paper tabled by the government, the consultation paper, “A National security Committee of Parliamentarians”. As I understand it, the government is in the process now of putting together a committee to in fact discuss all of these items. It's problematic as to when that will take place, as it depends on other events.

We'll go to Monsieur Loubier.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Loubier: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Elcock, I would like to come back to the question I asked earlier. I did not receive a clear answer from you.

In your presentation, you talked about legitimate political dissent. Does this category of legitimate political dissent include or exclude the sovereignist movement, be it the Bloc Québécois, the Parti Québécois, or the Mouvement national des Québécoises et des Québécois?

In a democracy, political dissent is acceptable in every respect, except of course when it involves violence and terrorism. Do you consider the sovereignist movement to be engaged in legitimate political dissent?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Mr. Chairman, the only cases in which we essentially deal with this—any other answer from me is essentially hypothetical—are in the context of deciding whether or not to target a specific individual or group. Under the legislation, we don't target any individual or group engaged solely in legitimate political dissent. We don't have any targets--and, as I said, we have no targets in any case under paragraph 2(d) of the legislation, and haven't had in the 10 years I've been director of CSIS.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Loubier: Earlier on, in answer to Mr. Lee's question, you said that you had not used subsection 2(d) of the CSIS Act for 10 years, and I know that you have been at the helm of CSIS since 1994.

To your knowledge, before 1994, were there any security investigations or investigations to collect information on the Bloc Québécois or the Parti Québécois or any other group or person representing the sovereignist movement?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: I'm not aware of any, Mr. Chairman. I've forgotten the exact date, but before I arrived at CSIS there was in fact a decision made that any such investigation would require ministerial approval, and I'm not aware ministerial approval was ever given for such an investigation.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Loubier: Is that the approval of the minister alone or the approval of a minister and a federal court judge?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: No, we're confusing two different issues. Before we can undertake intrusive activities such as using an interception of communications or performing an entry in somebody's property, we would require a warrant from a judge to do that. The decision to undertake an investigation is a decision of the service, except in the case of an investigation under paragraph 2(d) of the statute. In that case we need the minister's approval as well as the decision of the service to have such an investigation.

À (1020)

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Loubier: But if it's just to get information on members of some movement, do you need the minister's approval? I'm not talking about a search or any other intrusion. When it comes to intelligence activities, do you need approval? Or do you operate independently?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Mr. Chairman, to begin an investigation essentially requires a decision of the targeting committee to target that individual or organization. This requires a submission that justifies viewing that organization or individual as a threat to the security of Canada. As I said, there have been no such investigations under paragraph 2(d) that I'm aware of, and as I said earlier, we don't target organizations that are solely engaged in legitimate political advocacy and dissent.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Loubier: If, under paragraph 2(d), any information was gathered or any investigation was carried out in relation to the sovereignist movement, would you be in a position to provide us with that information, as director of CSIS?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: I wouldn't be in a position to provide that information to you. If I was aware of a paragraph 2(d) investigation, I might be able to say that there had been an investigation under paragraph 2(d), but I would not identify the target of that investigation. I couldn't confirm for you or anyone else whether any particular organization was a target of a paragraph 2(d) investigation or any other investigation.

The Chair: We have two questioners left under the five-minute round, Mr. Charbonneau and Mr. Nystrom, and then we'll go to three-minute rounds. Please identify yourself to the clerk if you wish to be put on the list for the three-minute round of questioning.

Monsieur Charbonneau, s'il vous plaît, cinq minutes.

[Translation]

Hon. Yvon Charbonneau (Anjou—Rivière-des-Prairies, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask two questions.

The government has just released a comprehensive national security policy. Apparently, this is the first time that it has undertaken to put forward an integrated and global security policy.

There are two things that I'd like to know. Does CSIS think that its role will be affected by this policy? Do you have any particular point of view on the consequences of this policy?

I'd also like to know whether CSIS was consulted in the development of this policy.

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: CSIS, as a major part of the Canadian intelligence community, of course made a contribution, and I hope a useful one, to the development of the policy. On its impact on CSIS, for the most part the policy does not necessarily change what CSIS does or its mandate. CSIS's mandate comes from the CSIS Act, from the law rather than from the policy, and we continue to operate within the four corners of our legal mandate.

The reality is that for CSIS to be part of a larger ministry within the structure of the national security policy, there is a much bigger pond than there used to be, and there are a lot of big fish swimming around in the pond. So it's a more complicated world, with some benefits for CSIS and perhaps more difficulties in complications over time. But that's mostly the interrelationships of government institutions, which is a normal part of government business.

There are a couple of specific things in the national security policy that do have implications for CSIS. One is the possibility of additional resources, which is discussed in one of the sections in terms of enhanced collection. As I said earlier, I'm not sure exactly what the amount of those resources will be.

Second, we took a decision a year or so ago to create an integrated threat assessment organization--which I think the Auditor General commented on--called INSAC. ITAC will be built on the foundation of INSAC. It will be a larger organization and will probably bring in more institutions, but it will be situated from the beginning in CSIS. That will obviously have an impact on us as an organization.

À (1025)

[Translation]

Hon. Yvon Charbonneau: I'd like to ask another question, on some of the things in your brief. On page 3 of your English text, you indicate that your service considers Sunni Islamic extremism to be one of its top priority targets. By way of illustration, you refer to Al-Qaeda, and you also quote some of their statements, which in your view encapsulate the essence of what terrorism has become in the age of Islamic terrorism.

I'd like to ask you, first of all, to explain your decision to target Sunni Islamic extremism. The Muslim world is made up of over a billion people, including hundreds of millions of Shiites, living in several Muslim countries.

You appear to be specifically targeting Sunni Muslims. Is that why the decision was made to put Hezbollah on the list of banned organizations?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: I think I said the priority of the service is counter-terrorism. The priority within counter-terrorism is al-Qaeda and Sunni extremist terrorists. The reality is, however, as the member is pointing out, there are other terrorists organizations, some of which are Shi'ite, such as Hezbollah. The fact that I didn't list all of those doesn't mean we don't investigate them. We do have a large number of other targets, but because of the nature of the threat, the highest priority is Sunni terrorist groups.

[Translation]

Hon. Yvon Charbonneau: You know that there are some questions that are asked more specifically and pointedly in relation to Sunni Muslims. They feel targeted in a very particular way within this universe of over a billion Muslims.

I'd like you to explain further why you are so adamant about singling out Sunni Muslims from all other Muslims.

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: We have said repeatedly that the focus of our investigations is not a specific culture, creed, ethnic group, or whatever; our focus is terrorists. But there is no question there are terrorists of different descriptions. There are Irish Catholic terrorists in organizations such as the real IRA and PIRA. There are Shi'ite terrorists in organizations such as Hezbollah.

The nature of extremist Sunni terrorists is unfortunately undeniable. It is also, however, absolutely true to say that most Sunnis around the world are not terrorists. That is something we have said clearly and repeatedly. The reality is that the current priority threat for us is from Sunni terrorist organizations.

The Chair: Merci, Monsieur Charbonneau.

Mr. Nystrom.

Hon. Lorne Nystrom: This may be just a supplementary

[Translation]

Further to Mr. Charbonneau's question about Sunni Muslims,

[English]

I want to ask you whether or not the CSIS investigation of Sunni Islamic extremism predated September 11, 2001.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Yes.

Hon. Lorne Nystrom: Did you find any information that indicated a possible terrorist attack on North America at that time?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I think the broad perception of many of the Sunni terrorist groups before that was that their focus was not North America; indeed, their focus was elsewhere, whether it was Europe or North Africa in particular, or Chechnya or Afghanistan.

Hon. Lorne Nystrom: Mr. Elcock, in your opinion, does Canada need a separate foreign intelligence agency? Why do we need one, or why not?

Mr. Ward Elcock: The decision on whether or not Canada should have a foreign intelligence agency is for those at a higher pay grade. The reality is that the service has a mandate to operate outside of Canada on threats to the security of Canada. We have done so, and we continue to do so.

There are advantages to us in being able to do that, in the sense that there is no division between the information collected abroad and information collected in Canada. As I'm sure the committee has noted, in some other places in the world that division has sometimes led to complications. In our case that division doesn't exist, and that is advantageous.

Without commenting on whether it's a good or bad idea, there is a reality associated with the creation of a foreign intelligence agency. A new foreign intelligence agency would likely not give you any results for 10 to 15 years, because it takes a long time to train people to do this kind of work. Foreign intelligence collection is by definition--because we do it in some cases in respect to threats to the security of Canada--difficult and complicated work, so it takes time to create a new organization to do it.

This is a time when resources are scarce--both money resources and human resources. To move to create a new foreign intelligence organization at this juncture, in the context of scarce resources, would perhaps complicate our existence in the sense of either stealing--not stealing, but borrowing human resources from the service or other resources we rely on.

À (1030)

Hon. Lorne Nystrom: I'm glad you made that correction.

Can you tell us roughly what percentage of the resources of CSIS is now involved in foreign intelligence? It's a rough ball park figure that I'm looking for.

I'm not sure if I have a bit more time. I have one more question.

The Chair: Yes.

Hon. Lorne Nystrom: I'll just throw it in this time as well.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Do you mean independent foreign intelligence?

Hon. Lorne Nystrom: Yes, that's what I'm asking.

Also, what kind of work are you now putting into industrial espionage in this country? What level do you think it's at, where does it come from, and the like? But the first one is what level of effort do you put into independent work on it?

Mr. Ward Elcock: To take them in reverse order, because the second one is in a sense easier to answer, we don't do industrial espionage. We would undertake an investigation only in respect of the activities of a foreign state carrying out intelligence collection in Canada, not one company trying to steal another company's secrets--unless the company was, in fact, a part of a foreign government. So we don't do industrial espionage.

I'm not sure exactly what you're referring to. In terms of what is referred to in the CSIS Act as foreign intelligence, we do have a responsibility, at the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of National Defence, to collect foreign intelligence in Canada. We do undertake operations to collect such information to assist the Department of Foreign Affairs or the Department of National Defence. That information is in respect of the conduct of international affairs--foreign policy in other words--and/or the defence of Canada, broadly writ.

Under sections 12 and 15 of the CSIS Act, our mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada is not territorially limited. We operate outside of Canada, and you can call it, if you will, notionally foreign intelligence or just call it security intelligence, which may make it simpler to understand.

We collect security intelligence wherever it is appropriate for us to do that. When I say “appropriate”, I mean when one has looked at the risks and the benefits of collecting that information. If you could get that information in downtown Ottawa, why would you go to Baghdad to get it, if that's where you wanted to go?

It's an assessment of the costs, the risks, and the operational benefits of any particular operation that would cause us to conduct an operation outside of Canada. Where it's appropriate and where we see real benefits to doing that, we do, in fact, operate outside the country.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Nystrom.

Mr. Elcock, I believe I might be able to put it in different words and get the answer that I think Mr. Nystrom was looking for. You said that the service had increasingly engaged in covert foreign operations.

What percentage of your work is covert foreign operations?

Mr. Ward Elcock: It would be impossible to assign a percentage to it, because any particular investigation may generate an operation outside the country. It isn't, well, here is a block, and we are going to do foreign collection operations with that block of people or whatever. We do have investigations of a large number of terrorist groups and countries engaged, for example, in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If in any of those investigations there is an advantage to running an operation outside the country, then we will consider that as part of the operational tactic we're going to use to investigate that particular target.

So a precise percentage of the resources dedicated to foreign collection is not really a number we have.

À (1035)

The Chair: However, you're able to identify that--

Mr. Ward Elcock: We're doing more of it.

The Chair: And in your testimony today you said you've noticed that trend during your time there. So if you've noticed the trend upward, can you give us an idea of even ballpark percentages? You must be noticing something. There has to be some graph somewhere.

Mr. Ward Elcock: It's not a statistic we've collected. We do more operations abroad, but each one is justified in the context of a specific investigation, rather than in a broad collection of operational tempo statistics.

The Chair: Thank you.

Now we're into the lightning round-- three minutes.

Mr. Sorenson.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: In answering one of the questions from the other side, you brought up the name of Ahmed Ressam.

One of the concerns that people have had about CSIS--and just about the way intelligence gathering is--is the dissemination of information, not only the gathering and analyzing of it, but also the dissemination, passing it out. In your answer, you said there are many different branches of intelligence and enforcement, whether it's a border guard or whatever. But I'd like to get a grasp on how this would work--the disseminating of the information.

Ahmed Ressam had been here for a number of years, lived in Montreal, lived with someone else. He brought up all these plans, planned to bomb different places, yet we never really do see much that CSIS was involved in it.

Did CSIS have a role in the arrest or the holding of Ahmed Ressam? Did they play a role? It wasn't a Canadian border crossing; it was American. You brought up the name, and then you mentioned that there are many different branches in terms of how these guys are captured. Did CSIS play a role in that?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Mr. Chairman, I brought that up in the context of trying to make a point, that the protection in any society from acts of terrorism is not only intelligence but also the activities of organized border guards, police organizations, customs agents, immigration agents, whatever. In other words, it's security in depth.

What protects Parliament is any intelligence about the possible threats to the security of Parliament, the security guards around Parliament, and the procedures that require people to go through turnstiles and x-ray machines and so on. All of those things in depth protect the security of Parliament and parliamentarians. The same is true for broader society, and that was the context in which I brought it up.

Ahmed Ressam obtained a legitimate Canadian passport using false documentation. He left Canada and went to Afghanistan, where he was trained in a camp. He subsequently returned to Canada through the United States using that legitimate Canadian passport in a false name. We were aware that Mr. Ressam had entered Canada. We had not yet found Mr. Ressam.

Would I have liked to find Mr. Ressam? Absolutely. But we did not find Mr. Ressam before he went to the United States with his bomb.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Okay.

Very quickly, again, on this foreign intelligence, we've had deputy clerks of the Privy Council...I think his name was Richard Badden, but I can't recall offhand--

À (1040)

Mr. Ward Elcock: Richard Fadden.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: He came forward--I don't have the quote here--and he said it's time to revisit the gathering of foreign intelligence. Here is a guy who was in charge of intelligence, really, at the Privy Council, who put up a little bit of a red flag, perhaps. We know the former Deputy Prime Minister has said that we may need to look at enhancing foreign intelligence gathering. We also had a former CSIS...again, I don't know who he was, but he came out and said that he did not believe we had the legal capacity to gather and analyze foreign intelligence.

So we keep getting these mixed messages. How are we to determine whether or not we are really upholding our level of what's required? We depend on other foreign intelligence. How do we know we're holding up what's required of us, expected of us, by other countries around the world if we do not have that extra agency? Because we don't have a big commitment to gathering foreign intelligence in CSIS. How do we analyze what's required and what's expected?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Mr. Chairman, the activities that CSIS undertakes...and there are lots of people who have expressed doubt about whether we have the mandate to do it. Let me assure you that our authority to collect intelligence outside of Canada in respect to threats to the security of Canada is, in law, unquestionable.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: What about threats to the States?

Mr. Ward Elcock: That would fit within the definition of threats to the security of Canada and has historically been accepted as fitting within the definition of threats to the security of Canada. If it is in respect to threats to the security of Canada or indeed of our closest allies, that would fit within the definition.

There is no question that in respect of information in relation to the foreign policy of Canada or in relation to the defence of Canada--although in some cases information that is related to threats to the security of Canada may also fit within the definition of information in respect of the defence of Canada--those are two categories where CSIS operations can't take place abroad. That information, however, is generally speaking information that is more important to Canada than to our allies.

In a sense, it's information of benefit to Canada, rather than in respect of threats to the security of Canada. That was the inherent division in the CSIS Act between information with respect to threats.... Really, there are three categories of information that are described in the act. There is information with respect to threats to the security of Canada, and there is information in respect of foreign policy and the defence of Canada. Those three categories are represented in the sections in the act.

One, under section 12, we have the authority to investigate whether it's in Canada or outside of Canada. It is a broad definition and it would include a threat to our closest allies. In respect of the other, we don't have authority to collect outside of Canada. We do have a mandate to collect inside of Canada when we are so requested.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Elcock.

Ms. Neville and then Mr. Clark.

Ms. Anita Neville: Thank you, Mr. Elcock.

I'm not sure my question is a lightning question. I want to follow up on Mr. Charbonneau's and Mr. Nystrom's questions about the Sunni terrorists or the Islamic extremism, and I'm not sure whether you can answer the questions in this forum or not.

Mr. Clark referred to the fact that you have to balance a whole host of conflicting values, and I'm interested in the parameters of your investigation and how you balance the conflicting values of individuals and the large numbers who are in no way involved in terrorist activities and those who are, and what kind of techniques do you use?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I'm not sure I'm answering your question exactly, but that may be because I'm not understanding it exactly.

The reality is that we don't investigate anybody who is not a threat to the security of Canada. For us to investigate anybody, we have to suspect that the individual is a threat to the security of Canada.

Ms. Anita Neville: How do you determine that?

Mr. Ward Elcock: We do that by assessing any information we have, or have received, that allows us to come to a conclusion as to whether that individual is a threat. If we have information that somebody may have been connected to a terrorist organization or has had involvement in a terrorist organization, then we would look at that information and then come to a conclusion as to whether there is sufficient information there to warrant the investigation of that individual as a threat to the security of Canada, as a result of which we may be able to demonstrate that the individual is a threat to the security of Canada or that they're not a threat to the security of Canada, in which case we would discontinue the investigation.

But our threshold for beginning an investigation is different from that of the police in the sense that we begin an investigation when we suspect that someone is a threat to the security of Canada. Concomitant with that is the fact that we're not an enforcement agency. We're not actually going to move to arrest somebody as a consequence of whatever we do, and whatever we do--the information about that individual--is obviously not going to be publicly divulged and the fact that there was ever an investigation is never going to be publicly acknowledged or divulged. So as for any individual who is investigated and is found not to be a threat, we're unlikely to interfere with their existence at all.

À (1045)

Ms. Anita Neville: When you're doing these kind of investigations, what kinds of techniques do you use? Can you speak to that in this forum?

Mr. Ward Elcock: We have three levels of investigation, one of which is simply checking available public indices. The second one becomes more intrusive, and a third is much more intrusive, which would allow us to seek a warrant for the interception of communications, or entries, or whatever. Level three is more intrusive than level one.

The Chair: Mr. Clark.

Right Hon. Joe Clark: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To go back to the earlier issue, one way of course to have secrets respected would be to have a parliamentary committee of privy councillors who are already sworn and the number of privy councillors has now increased with the practice of the swearing of parliamentary secretaries, so that is more reliable than an in camera meeting.

Mr. Elcock, to your knowledge, is any other country urging Canada to establish a more explicit foreign intelligence agency?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I'm not aware of anybody doing it, certainly publicly. I suspect there have been people who, from time to time, have suggested it.

I think the reality at the present juncture is that the greatest pressure on all intelligence organizations is the collection of information with respect to the security of those nations that are participating, in particular on things like the war on terrorism, to use that phraseology for the purpose of the discussion. So in that respect the service participates broadly with a number of other intelligence organizations, as I said, occasionally in joint operations, and obviously in many cases we provide the benefits of what we receive in our operations to other services from time to time when it's important for us to provide that information we've received.

I haven't had any complaints lately that we're not doing our job.

Right Hon. Joe Clark: No, and that wasn't the point of my question. I'm interested in where the drive is coming from for an independent foreign intelligence agency. Canadians may want to have one, as we want to have a lot of things.

My understanding of what you have said today, and I don't want to put words in your mouth, is, one, if we were to have one it would take quite some time--I think 10 or 12 years, you said--before it would likely mature to the point.... Secondly, I assume there would be quite a high cost, because the establishment of any new agency involves a high cost. That would either involve diversion of funds from some other security intelligence-related destination or new funding.

Mr. Ward Elcock: I think, in terms of the service, it took some 10 years for the service to move from its previous existence to creating a new and consolidated organization. So to create from scratch a brand new foreign intelligence agency would take some considerable period of time. You could perhaps shorten that by taking some resources from CSIS, but at this juncture we're still busy trying to hire resources to deal with what is an existing threat. Indeed, as you said--I like your word better than the one I used earlier--diversion of resources from other security intelligence issues, you would have to do that in order to establish a foreign intelligence organization. How much you'd have to divert, however, would depend on how big an organization, and how active an organization, and whether it was focused or broad. There would have to be some definition of what Canada's interests were.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Clark.

We have Mr. Lee, Mr. Sorenson, Mrs. Catterall. Three minutes each brings us to one minute to 11. There's another committee coming in here at 11 o'clock and I have to be a witness at another committee at 11, so three minutes exactly each, starting with Mr. Lee, including the answer.

À (1050)

Mr. Derek Lee: Thank you.

Everyone would agree foreign intelligence gathering does not come cheap. Having said that, Mr. Elcock, CSIS is all the time asked for what we call security checks, security clearance, or information that would allow a department to do security clearance, for immigration purposes, for government employment purposes. That's one of CSIS's functions.

Can you tell us the general category or principle on which information is retained or reported on back to the departments, or to those who legitimately request the security clearance, the rubric under which the information is retained?

When Parliament reviewed the CSIS Act 12 years ago, if I recall, the general principle was loyalty to Canada. But the world has changed since then, so obviously CSIS will retain information on people that goes beyond the principle of loyalty to Canada. So can you tell me if there is currently a statement of the basis on which information is retained and reported in this category of security clearance or a request for a security check on people?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I think we're talking about apples and oranges, Mr. Chairman. The service collects information and is permitted to retain the information that's strictly necessary for the purposes of its investigations. Those investigations frequently allow us to have some information about an individual that allows us to identify them as a security threat, either when they're coming into the country as an immigrant or a refugee or, potentially, as an applicant for a clearance. In some cases, we also do a specific investigation of an individual who is particularly at a higher classification level. For a top secret clearance, we do a separate specific investigation in respect of that top secret clearance.

Mr. Derek Lee: What constitutes a security threat? Have we moved away from loyalty to Canada?

Mr. Ward Elcock: No, Mr. Chairman. The government's security policy, in respect of clearances, says specifically that loyalty is one of the things we accept.

Mr. Derek Lee: One, all right.

The Chair: Mr. Sorenson.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We just had, again, this document released by the government on security. In this it sets up this Integrated National Security Assessment Centre, which will be part of CSIS.

Were you consulted in how that would be formed and the mandate of it? What resources are going to be put into that risk assessment centre specifically? Does it cover the same mandate that, basically, the intelligence gathering and risk assessment of the Privy Council was doing before?

Mr. Ward Elcock: No, Mr. Chairman, this is different. The analytical section in the Privy Council Office is very different from what ITAC will do. ITAC is there to provide a more strategic look at specific threats, rather than to do strategic analytical pieces on subjects of concern or interest to ministers or to the government. So they're very different functions. And, yes, we were consulted on ITAC and, indeed, are still in the process of discussions about exactly what it will look like and how big it will be and so on.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: What kinds of resources are allocated to ITAC?

Mr. Ward Elcock: That's still under discussion. As always, there will be a balance between the kinds of things you have to spend money on to build the structure, if you will, as distinct from how many people you can actually afford. So there will be a balance there.

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Catterall.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: Is there a protocol or guideline or policy, whatever, guiding your relationships with other internal agencies, government agencies? For instance, the Border Agency, CSE, the RCMP, the intelligence units within Foreign Affairs, within Citizenship and Immigration, is there any kind of a protocol outlined on what the relationship is, what information you may share, what the caveats on that information are?

May you ask the Border Agency, for instance, to try to gather information for you on somebody you have under surveillance, or try to gather intelligence on? Are there any limits on what they may do as a border agency with respect to intelligence gathering, as opposed to their core function? Is there anything around that we could have a look at?

À (1055)

Mr. Ward Elcock: With a number of those, there are some memorandums of understanding that exist between us and other organizations. Most of those are classified and, therefore, would not be accessible. In most cases, however, our relationships with those other institutions are on the basis of the law: what the Privacy Act provides, what the authority of any particular department or agency provides, what our statute provides. Each of us has a number of legal burdens, legal rights and legal responsibilities that will govern any exchanges we have with them or any processes we do with them.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: So as this committee pursues its broader work on the security agenda and wants to get any kind of a handle on those relationships, do we have to go to many different sources, then? Is there no central way of--

Mr. Ward Elcock: There is, in fact.... No. There is no sort of central clearing house for those kinds of things. For example, if we're working a specific case with another agency, it will depend entirely on the general legislation that applies to both of us and on our specific pieces of legislation. Each agency would have to explain what its responsibilities were and what its rights and duties were.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: I guess in one way I'm particularly interested in the relationship with the RCMP, given their new responsibilities, but in general would it be desirable from the point of view of democracy, I guess, in the broadest sense, that there be some known guidelines?

Mr. Ward Elcock: There is a memorandum of understanding between us and the RCMP.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: But that's not something Parliament can know about, or this committee.

Mr. Ward Elcock: I'm not sure how much of that document is classified, but you are certainly welcome to have any portion of it--and it may be a large majority of it, but off the top of my head I can't remember how much of it is classified.

The Chair: Would you like us to ask for that, Ms. Catterall?

Ms. Marlene Catterall: Yes, I would. I guess I see that as we proceed with our work, we have to get a better understanding of this whole network of intelligence gathering that may go back and forth between different departments and agencies of government. While CSIS has an oversight mechanism, I'm not sure that overall there is such a mechanism.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Certainly, the government has announced it's considering one and has asked the O'Connor commission to make some recommendations with respect to the RCMP.

In respect to CSIS, the memorandum of understanding between us and the RCMP doesn't change as a consequence of Bill C-36.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Catterall.

Mr. Elcock, there won't be time for you to answer this question now, but I wonder if you could prepare or have someone in your office prepare a memo for the committee, to the extent that it's not classified, about the degree and method of control of your people operating in foreign environments.

Mr. Ward Elcock: They're subject to the CSIS Act and review by SIRC.

The Chair: But I mean specifically when they're in the foreign fields. I'd be interested in knowing how you're able to control somebody who's in the mountains of Afghanistan, for example. We'll leave it at that, and you can think about that question. I don't want to hold up the next committee.

Mr. Elcock, thank you very much for your usual disguised candour, if I can put it that way, and good luck to you in your future endeavours, whatever they may be.

Thank you, committee members.

We're adjourned.