Tashi Delek, Anee, hello, I'm Chemi Lhamo.
Before I begin, I want to acknowledge and express my gratitude to the original caretakers of this land, the elders of the past and present, and to any who should have been here, or may be here physically, mentally and spiritually.
My immigrant parents came from the land of snow—Tibet—which, according to Freedom House, is the least free country alongside Syria. A recent Human Rights Watch report stated that children as young as three years old are having their cultural identity stripped away, which to me is another repeat of the horrors of Canada's and Australia's residential schools where indigenous children were killed or forcibly assimilated into the settler society.
Time and time again, we’ve seen the Chinese government silence voices of Tibetans, Uighurs, Hong Kongers and southern Mongolians. There's no doubt that Chinese government intimidation and geopolitical bullying through aggression and expansion across borders from the South China Sea to the India-Tibet border presents a clear threat to both regional and global security.
However, today, let me share with you my experiences of the CCP attempting to silence and infringe upon my right to freedom of speech and expression, even in an open and democratic society like Canada.
In 2019, I became the target of wrath, most likely crafted by the Chinese Communist Party, when I ran for student elections at the University of Toronto Scarborough. Before the election had even begun, or results had even come out, my phone had started going off with notifications. There were over 10,000 comments on my social media posts and then an online petition against me for simply being a candidate because of my Tibetan identity—not because of my work or my capabilities.
The comments were harsh. They included rape and death threats targeting not just me, but my family. There were comments saying that the bullet that would go through me was made in China, or things like if they saw me, they would punch me. There was even one that I still recall to this day that said that my mom was dead. I kid you not. I recall having to call my mother to check in on her without frightening her.
Throughout my presidential term, although things slowed down on social media because of the international support I received, I continued to receive occasional threats and dehumanizing and degrading comments until this day. Additionally, prior to COVID-19, students on my campus who threatened to kill and rape me roamed freely around my campus and pointed, stared, followed and took photos of people whom I communicated with. This resulted in friends actually escorting me to the washrooms.
Community members of the allied nations who are subjected to the CCP’s colonial violence aren’t alien to these tactics. We have witnessed China’s interference and influence not just on our university campuses, but also in our communities.
The long-arm tactics of the CCP is also affecting Chinese international students who are paying four to five times more for an education, but are having to become incognito spies for the embassy or who get bullied to follow party lines and protest initiatives that are deemed threatening, instead of focusing on their education. Anonymous Chinese students have written to their student unions saying they're terrified by the presence of organizations like Canadian CSSAs, which are reporting campus activities to the Chinese government.
We’ve seen this overt influence in our academic institutions, but the threat is widespread. The CCP propaganda is infiltrating our communities and insidiously placing itself in progressive spaces, conflating anti-CCP sentiments to be part of the rise of anti-Asian hatred.
To this day my mother worries way more than required for my well-being because of these threats.
No Canadian on Canadian soil who wishes to serve their community should have to check if they're being followed. No student leader should have to see active groups on their campus self-censoring themselves because of the fear of going through what I had to go through. No mother should have to worry about their child being punched, raped or killed for standing up for something they care about.
Many Canadians, including my parents, were stateless refugees because of the illegal occupation of their countries and they had to move several times to find a safe home for their kids. Eventually, after long years of being transnational families and being displaced, they found a home in Canada, only to be intimidated and subjected to the long-arm tactics of the CCP. Canada is meant to empower youth, not embolden and support, through their silence, the ones who kidnap children and strip them away from their parents.
There's no doubt that the Chinese government ruthlessly tries to crush all dissent. I’d like to encourage the honourable members here today and our government to please listen to your Canadians and follow up with concrete actions.
I can tell you more through a report.
Thank you.
:
Good evening. My name is Rukiye Turdush. I am an ethnic Uighur Canadian and a Canadian citizen. I would like to testify today on my personal experience and my community's experience regarding China's threat in Canada.
On February 11, 2019, I was invited by McMaster University's Muslim Students' Association to give a speech about the ongoing genocide in East Turkestan. During my speech, a few Chinese students tried to disturb me. One of them filmed the whole presentation and verbally assaulted me with foul language.
I later received from someone leaked screen shot evidence of those Chinese students' group conversation during my speech. They discussed how to disturb me and send recorded video to the group. The guy who recorded me said, “I have all the materials if anyone needs them.” This was clearly intelligence gathering.
Another one said, “How come there are lots of people in this event? We have been told by the embassy to report this event to the Chinese student association and the school.” That means the Chinese embassy informed those Chinese students about the event in advance and instructed them what to do. He also said, “Find out who is her son”, so they can look for my son for whatever purpose. I suspect this person could be a Chinese diplomat or a covert agent.
McMaster's Chinese Student's Association and academics published a joint statement on February 13, and the language of the statement exactly echoes the language of the Chinese Communist Party's false propaganda line. The statement also mentioned that they have reported the incident to the Chinese embassy and sent a complaint letter to the school administration. Later, the embassy of China in Ottawa published a statement praising the so-called patriotism of these students who attacked my freedom of speech.
In fact, my speech was about evidence of China's well-planned, organized, ongoing genocide in East Turkestan. What is clear is that the Chinese Communist Party has encouraged a large number of Chinese students who study in our country to export their propaganda and China's autocratic values to our Canadian soil. They actively tried to undermine Canadian democratic values and freedom of expression.
Chinese police also threaten Uighur Canadian students from 5,000 miles away. Those Uighur students are constantly harassed through video calls that ask them for their school address and information about their status in Canada. Some had no choice but to officially disown the parent-child relationship to protect their parents back home.
Chinese cyber espionage was also very active for many years. They used to keep sending me viruses to destroy my computers and email, especially my blog. For many years, Chinese trolls threatened me through Twitter and YouTube, saying “be careful” and “you are looking for your own death”. I used to ignore them and block them.
Since the McMaster incident attracted huge media attention, they have changed their tactics. They have started to claim that I am a CIA agent funded by the NED and creating fake news, despite the fact that I am not getting any funding from any organization.
I am giving this testimony here today not only because of my personal safety or other human rights activists' safety, but also and most importantly because of the tremendous danger that China poses to the democratic world order, to human rights and to Canadian sovereignty. It is about future of our kids.
That's why the Canadian government should charge covert Chinese agents working for the United Front and pushing the Chinese community to manipulate and influence the Canadian democratic system for the benefit of the CCP. Bring them to court and pass new legislation to define their activity as a crime.
The Canadian government should expel the Chinese diplomats who investigate and encourage the Chinese community and Chinese students to gather intelligence.
To block the CCP's influence and espionage activity in Canada as well as to deal with the digital authoritarianism that enables Uighur genocide, the Canadian government should hold hearings that focus on the potential complicity of Canadian universities. Universities should be required to report all co-operation with Chinese research institutes and companies in fields such as artificial intelligence, big data, smart policing and smart cities, biotech and others.
The Canadian government should support Canadian academics, students, journalists and activists. At the same time, it should crack down on China's illegal espionage activity and China's funding of fake Canadian NGOs. It should also crack down on individuals who deny China's Uighur genocide, attack human rights activists and spread fake news and Chinese state party propaganda on Canadian soil.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify.
In my remarks, I didn't refer to some of the concrete actions that folks can take, because I've done multiple testimonies and spoken to various officials, including Global Affairs twice in meetings. We have submitted an official report, with Amnesty, on harassment and intimidation specifically faced by human rights activists speaking against Chinese colonial violence.
To your question, MP Genuis, I've personally spoken to Toronto Police, RCMP, CSIS. Folks, I've just been pointed from one direction to the other.
I've spoken to multiple parliamentarians, and until this day, I can guarantee you that I have not received a single piece of paper that has said, “Here you go, Chemi. These are all the threats you've received. These are all the criminal offences.” These are death threats and rape threats, and folks who have personally messaged me and told me, “No, b-i-t-c-h. I am here”, when I said, “Oh, are these just online?” These are personal messages.
I don't know how many times I have to tell you this again and again. As a psychology student, let me tell you, these times when I have to tell my story repeatedly are triggering and traumatizing.
First of all, I'd just like to say thank you so much to the witnesses for coming to the committee today.
As a female politician and parliamentarian, I too have been the subject of many threats and death threats, harassment and misogynistic social media posts to the point that it's been very difficult to handle. I know how you must be feeling, and it is not a pleasant thing at all.
I want to acknowledge that nobody should have to go through that. For women, they often use the same threats, believe me, over and over again. It's regurgitated, like bots or something like that. They just say the same thing over and over again.
So, you're not alone. That said, I want to ask you about the threats that families or activists are receiving back home.
Could you both perhaps expand on that a little bit? Chemi, could you go first, and then Ms. Turdush? Thank you.
:
This is a very good question. I would like to answer it.
I really suspect it was organized by the Chinese embassy or consulate, because I received a screenshot of those Chinese students doing a WeChat group. Somebody took a screenshot and sent it to me. All of them were Chinese student association students, and some people had no names.
When the guy recorded my video speech and sent it to the group chat, somebody asked, how come there are a lot of people in this room? The Chinese embassy already—he said in Chinese, yijing—told us to report this event to the Chinese student association and the school. They don't want a lot of people coming to this space. They don't want this event to happen. So the Chinese embassy told those students and instructed them what to do in advance. That's why I heavily suspect they were instructed by the Chinese embassy.
I didn't do anything. I didn't give media.... I didn't do anything. These students, right away, published a statement on February 13. They said that they told the school and sent a letter to the Chinese embassy. They say [Inaudible—Editor]. So they have very close contact. They report everything to the Chinese embassy. And the Chinese embassy instructed them in advance of many things—that's very obvious. That's why I think this is not organized by patriotic Chinese students. There is the Chinese embassy's hand in this event.
:
I can give you two short examples.
One, personally, is an account of people within my circle who flipped 180 degrees when it became international news, folks who wanted to actually be part of my slate—I'm sure you folks are aware, with elections—because I was running for president. So there was a 180-degree turn, asking me for actual statements about what my stance was on Tibet. That was my personal experience, knowing that they, themselves, were facing intimidation of their families back home.
Number two, in 2017 I organized an event at the U of T downtown with Lobsang Sangay, who is the former CEO of the Central Tibetan Administration. Overnight we had students show up, protesting against the event. But then when I questioned them and welcomed them inside the event, they chose not to and said they had no information about why they were there. It was as simple as that.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Let me first echo what Mr. Genuis said at the beginning of the meeting. I feel it's very important to dispel or at least not foster the confusion we sometimes see arise between the policies and actions of a country that doesn't care about international law, its people, or its nationals, Asians, for example.
We have seen anti-Asian bias rise in this country, and it should not be happening. We need to work hard to suppress this bias that may well apply to the Chinese regime, but it also applies to all countries that commit acts violating international law, which we sometimes have to criticize from a moral standpoint. So I echo his sentiments, as we all should.
I thank the witnesses for their courage and for testifying before the committee tonight.
Ms. Turdush, my first question is for you, and I am sorry if I'm mispronouncing your name. You have already spoken of the difficulty some Uyghur nationals have experienced being harassed by the Chinese state when they contacted Canadian authorities because they feared retaliation against their family members in China.
Do you have any suggestions as to the best way to report violations or harassment to Canadian authorities without the Chinese authorities finding out?
:
Thank you very much for the very straight answer.
My next question is for Ms. Lhamo.
Ms. Lhamo, you said in a recent podcast that prevention is better than cure, and in fact, we should strive for prevention. We should also investigate incidents when they occur, but we should prevent them.
Do you have any suggestions as to the best prevention measures?
You were talking about Australia's foreign interference legislation, among other things.
For the benefit of the committee and so we can include it in our report, could you explain how these measures might help us better combat Chinese foreign interference?
:
Ladies, once again, thank you very much for your answers.
In your opinion, which of the following two scenarios best describes reality?
People of Tibetan or Uyghur origin living in Canada can be left alone, have a nice life and not worry about anything if they don't say anything against the Chinese Communist Party.
Everyone is under surveillance, which can increase and intensify. For example, the closer national get to a place of power and become prominent, regardless of whether they talk about the Chinese Communist Party, the more surveillance increases, and they may be subject to harassment and threats.
Which of the two scenarios applies most?
:
Thank you for inviting me again to speak to the committee.
Before I start, I want to make clear that the diasporic communities are not a monolithic group. With heightened geopolitical tensions, we need to prioritize the protection of the diaspora and dissident communities from CCP surveillance and intimidation and to be critical while not fanning xenophobia.
I was asked to speak about harassment and intimidation today, but what I'm about to tell you may not be what you're expecting.
Dissidents are not safe—not in their own homes, not in civil societies, not at work, and not in Canada. This is because threats, censorship and intimidation will continue as long as companies, non-profits, academia, politicians, media and other institutions with vested interests are fearful of angering Beijing and are doing its bidding.
Beijing is effectively exporting its authoritarianism overseas. From previous meetings, witnesses from Canada's intelligence and enforcement agencies have assured the committee of their collective effort in combatting foreign interference. With my lived experiences, I can tell you that the existing institutions and legislation are not working. Beijing's foreign influence cannot be addressed with blanket policies, as the CCP operates across sectors and often within legal grey areas, making bans or criminalization largely ineffective.
Last time I spoke about Beijing's global expansionist authoritarianism, their blatant disregard for international rules-based order, their influence and interference operations in Canada, and I included my own experience of surveillance and intimidation. Beijing's capabilities, capacities and ambitions already pose a dangerous threat, but few countries fully see their global strategy of influence. The CCP has been testing the tolerance of liberal democracies with their authoritarian over-reach as international norms are being rewritten.
The current approach to China lacks the comprehensive view from the diasporic communities that speak the language and understand its history, culture and intentions. Activists have witnessed these influence efforts since the 1990s. It's not new, but only newly realized.
In ACHK's most recent report and recommendations, we covered service-level examinations of seven aspects of the CCP's foreign interference in Canada: political influence; elite capture; surveillance and intimidation; information and narrative discursion warfare; academic influence and vulnerability of intellectual property; national security; and the United Front Work Department. We found similar tactics, strategies and operations throughout the various sectors.
We need a whole-of-government approach to how Canada engages with foreign authoritarian powers such as China. We need to invest in the proper tools, infrastructures and resources to protect Canadians and our national interests. Canada has an important role to play on the international stage, as multilateral actions are an effective way to confront Beijing collaboratively, but it is imperative to expand Canada's foreign and domestic policy toolbox to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
Our recommendations are as follows.
Create legislation for foreign influence transparency schemes, a public registry of individuals, of organizations and representatives who are acting on behalf of foreign states in Canada. The transparency scheme should be paired with a public commission with investigative and enforcement powers, serving as a centralized point to coordinate the different levels of government and Canadian institutions, public agencies and the general public.
Support Canadian research and intellectual property with a cohesive federal policy to regulate research collaborations with foreign actors, while increasing funding for Canadian innovation.
Invest in resources and infrastructures for ethnic communities in Canada.
Protect Canadians by placing restrictions on foreign actors from the collection, purchase or export of Canadian personal information and data.
Harassment and intimidation of Canadians need to be understood from the perspective of dissidents. We need an approach to foreign interference that centres the community's needs while addressing the issue holistically and strategically.
Thank you again for having me. I am happy to answer your questions.
I'm pleased to join you this evening. I will do my presentation in English, but afterwards I will be able to speak both languages.
[English]
Dear esteemed members of Parliament, thank you for the invitation to give testimony to the Special Committee on Canada-China relations. I lead the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies at Concordia University. I applaud the committee for studying issues related to the national security dimension of the Canada-China relationship, including cyber-enabled influence operations, espionage, cybersecurity, foreign interference and harassment. I think many democracies around the world are dealing with this right now and no one quite has an answer.
The rise of authoritarian China poses an existential threat to Canada's values and interests, including the respect for human rights, the rule of law and the future of democracy. That can't be said enough. In March 2019, my institute hosted Dolkun Isa, leader of the World Uyghur Congress. The Chinese consul general contacted me by email the day before the event, seeking to urgently discuss the event. I ignored his email only to find out that the next day the Chinese consulate in Montreal had put pressure on the mayor of Montreal to have our event cancelled. Thankfully, no one succumbed to this foreign interference. I had follow-up with Canadian officials, Global Affairs Canada and CSIS, and the event was covered by the U.S. State Department in its annual reports on human rights in China.
That incident that happened to me and my colleagues follows other examples in Canada and around the world where the Chinese government has purposefully attempted to curtail academic freedom, while simultaneously stomping upon our fundamental human rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of opinion, and privacy, to name just a few of those human rights.
Since 2019, Canadians have seen two of our citizens locked up for over 900 days, a deadly pandemic killing over three million people across the planet, disinformation campaigns targeting democracies in an attempt to foster mistrust in our own democratic institutions in the media, as well as to sow distrust about western-developed COVID-19 vaccines. We've also seen economic warfare against our ally, Australia, for having the audacity to call for international investigation into the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.
We have seen similar blowback and retribution against Canadian politicians and U.S. and European officials, for labelling abuses against Uighurs as genocide. We see a very aggressive China that we haven't seen four or five years ago. These actions by China—I don't mean the people, but the CCP—reveal that the government there is a hostile actor with far-reaching implications for Canada and our allies.
While this committee is tasked with the immense challenge of what Canada should do about China, let me offer a few insights. China is trying to win the global competition to be a tech leader and is exporting these technologies across the planet, as well as to Canada. It is imperative that a more robust response be taken to limit the export of Canadian technologies to China and for us to work with our democratic allies to counter digital authoritarianism. We must not allow Huawei to establish Canada's 5G network. Both the Czech Republic and the Netherlands are examples that we cannot ignore of where privacy cannot be guaranteed.
I'd like to talk about genocide and surveillance. All Chinese companies that have been found to have assisted Beijing in the surveillance and persecution of the Uighur Muslim minority should not be allowed into the Canadian market or to provide financing and co-operate with Canadian universities. Tencent, Hikvision Huawei and iFlytek are all documented as having offered their services to Beijing's genocide and are complicit in these crimes. This past weekend, the Globe and Mail reported that iFlyTek is funding projects at Queen's University and York University. This is unacceptable. The same concept should be applied to the Canada pension plan contributions that are being invested in companies involved in Uighur genocide. This is not a good look for us.
Last but not least, Facebook recently announced that it had taken down a coordinated cyber harassment campaign targeting Uighurs living in numerous western countries, including Canada. We must develop operational capabilities to protect Canadian citizens from surveillance and online harassment and to expose who is behind these actions.
Thank you for having me today.
:
Long before I was executive director of ACHK, I was a local organizer in Ottawa, where I organized a couple of protests, and we were invited to speak to the press. I found that soon after I had spoken to the media, I would get hundreds of messages on my social media. These were very explicit messages, anywhere from calling me “democrazy” a pun on democracy—to [
Technical difficulty—Editor] to rape me and my mother like pigs and slaughter us in our sleep. It's been very tough being an activist and speaking about Hong Kong issues when these are the kinds of threats I face online. Despite this, online harassment, as we know, is not widely addressed by the police agencies.
The last time I was at committee, I also spoke about when I travelled to Vancouver, where a teammate had booked my hotel room. However, two days after we had done the launch of Alliance Canada Hong Kong, a strange man called my hotel room, identified me by name, identified me by my room number and said they were “coming to get” me. Those were the exact words being repeated. I did what I was supposed to do. I called the Vancouver police and said, “I feel in danger, and I don't feel safe.” They said that they would send officers to my location. They did. I never met the officers. They were dismissed at the hotel lobby because it was not a real threat; it was not an issue they would address because it was not criminal. I called again, and there was no follow-up.
Even today, I cannot forget those words that were said to me on the phone: “We are coming to get you.” It was very explicitly a form of intimidation, but it was very carefully crafted because it was not criminal in intent, and that is how they're able to get away with it.
:
Yes. We have some threats being made against [
Technical difficulty--Editor] and also [
Technical difficulty--Editor] humanitarian crisis in Hong Kong.
Recently, a Toronto Star article featured an individual who faced that death threats and reported it to the RCMP, and no action was taken.
These are very real harassment and intimidation tactics, but there are also intimidation tactics that are a little more subtle. For example, if someone went to a protest, their boss would ask them why they went to the protest, saying that if they went again, the boss might have to fire them.
It's not necessarily the boss being a Chinese state agent, but they're afraid that, in association, their employee who chose to side with Hong Kongers might anger Beijing and might threaten their business relations.
That is why I said that it is not safe for them at work and in civil societies, in academia and so many various sectors, because this kind of harassment and intimidation happens not only through explicit threats but also implicit and lateral surveillance and policing.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I'd also like to thank our two witnesses, who I am glad to see again.
Ms. Wong, we met at the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration.
My questions are for both of you, and I invite you to jump in whenever you want.
First, in general, I'd like to hear from you about how organized the response is to your activities and activism.
What makes you think that it can't be something organic coming from small groups in civil society, but that the response is really organized by the state?
:
I saw a finger being held up there, so I'm not sure whether I'm allowed to talk or not.
The Chair: It means we have one minute.
Mr. Kyle Matthews: One minute?
Listen, this is playing out on the Internet across the globe, but today I read that the Jamestown Foundation shows that the Chinese government has two million paid Internet commentators and 20 million part-time volunteers to engage in Internet trolling. When people express something online—or even make a comment—in a Canadian Internet sphere, there are people swarming them, trying to stop them from speaking. The harassment becomes so bad that they just no longer comment on it.
It is, then, about freedom of expression. You can weaponize social media—bots and real people—to silence others. This is also a big problem, and there are discussions about why the Chinese authorities get to use social media platforms that their own citizens aren't allowed to use.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and the witnesses.
My first question is for Ms. Wong. I'm very sorry, first off, to hear about your experiences of threats that you've encountered both to you yourself and to your family.
We have a situation similar to that in Vancouver, in the sense that a concerned group came out to criticize and call for the resignation of a former judge, who happened to be an adviser to the premier, a genocide denier for the Uyghur people.
After that group came out and spoke publicly, one of the members received death threats; in fact, at least two death threats. They reported this to the RCMP, and there seemed to be very little follow-up with respect to it. The RCMP, of course, did not deem the threats to be of a sufficient level to require follow-up, even though the group wanted the RCMP to look further into the background of the person who made at least two threats. That request was never responded to.
I wonder, then, Ms. Wong, what your thoughts are about that. What role should the federal government play, if any, in those situations? Those who are elected will say, don't talk to me; go talk to the RCMP. The RCMP, though, is not following up.
What should be done?
In the section named “Information & Narrative Discursion Warfare”, which is around page 13, your organization covers the diaspora media, the ethnic Chinese media, in Canada.
I happen to understand that June 4 is coming, the anniversary of what happened 32 years ago, in 1989. A few years ago in Vancouver, one of the two radio stations broadcasting in Cantonese and Mandarin started to refuse promotion activities for commemorating June 4. For example, last year's newspapers have turned down advertisement countering support for Hong Kong's national security law. What's your view on that?
Your report had only one very small section on it. Have you heard about that, and what does your organization think? Perhaps after you answer, Mr. Williams can respond too.
:
Yes, thank you for the question.
Yes, unfortunately, it was a very small blurb, but there are a lot of ways that the information and narrative discursion warfare is being conducted here in Canada and other western liberal democracies.
To answer your question, I notice the same kinds of issues, where the Chinese language media here in Canada—whether in Cantonese or Mandarin—have been refraining from covering certain topics. It is part of the larger warfare against Canadian media, not only through harassment and intimidation of certain journalists who carry out these stories, but also systemically buying up Chinese ethnic media as a way to silence the information that is going out to the community.
It is a systemic problem. It's not only for June 4, but it is an ongoing concern of the community to see that the only access we have to Chinese language media is now in danger because it has been bought up by CCP affiliates.
:
All around the world, even in Canada, you can see that most people don't look favourably on China anymore.
[English]
Public polling of companies and citizens across the world, Canada included, shows that populations have totally unfavourable views of the Chinese government. It's partly COVID. It's partly the Uighur genocide, where concerns about it have really exploded, including as a result of campaigns against the fashion industry using slave labour.
There's a combination of factors, and you see this everywhere—in Western Europe, in Asia. It's a dangerous time for the Chinese authorities because they've been acting in a way that's very authoritarian, and they're making many enemies, not just among governments but among individual citizens.
On the issue of genocide, I'm not sure if the average Canadian knows the details of everything that's going on, but it's pierced people's conscience, and the attack against journalists and politicians is not a good look for Beijing.
:
Thanks, Chair. I appreciate it.
Thank you to both of the witnesses for being here. It's overwhelming, isn't it? One hardly even knows where to start with questions.
Cherie, I'm struck by your repeated point, and, Kyle, by yours too, that this state infiltration by China's communist regime is not new and has been going on since the 1990s—the intimidation and and threatening of people in China and around the world. It must feel like authorities and governments don't grasp the seriousness of this when, as individuals, you're sent between the variety of law enforcement agencies and different offices and offered a tip line. You see events like in the U.S. where they've made arrests under Operation Fox Hunt, and our government says that it needs to do more, but it's hard to identify if those things are happening.
Cherie, can I ask you a question about the discussion of all of this? Like others have said here, I think this is really new to a lot of Canadians—and shamefully, maybe for all of us—but I think it's really our obligation as members of Parliament to be asking hard questions about this and getting to solutions like you have proposed.
Do you have any comments about what could be the conflation of legitimate questions about the safety and security of individuals and national security threats posed by the communist regime with anti-Asian racism? Do you have any views on what that does to the conversation or to efforts to try to get at the facts and to solutions?
:
As someone who is Asian, who is a dissident of the CCP and who is a Canadian, I have often been asked to choose sides and told that I can only do one and not the other.
I think, first and foremost, that we need to draw a difference between the Chinese communities, the ethnic Chinese communities, versus Hong Kongers, Tibetans, Uighurs and so on. They have often been conflated as one, and it's really harmful.
Put a difference between these communities and the CCP. In fact, the Chinese people are victims of the CCP regime. We are living such a horror because of the CCP, so holding the CCP accountable needs to be a separate discussion from conflating it as an anti-Asian racism issue.
This geopolitical tension has definitely triggered a rise in anti-Asian racism, and this why we have to be very careful in the terminologies that we use and the intentions, but also know that intention is not everything. Sometimes the action itself will be enough to hurt the community, and that's why always [Technical difficulty—Editor] centre the communities' needs, centre the dissident communities' needs in all of your policy decision-making, because we're the ones who have been bearing the brunt of these kinds of attacks, harassment and influence.
I'll ask questions of Mr. Matthews. Before I do, though, I didn't think I'd need to put this on the record, and perhaps I don't as it should go without saying, but I will put it on the record.
Every MP I've had the privilege to work with over the years is loyal to this country. That, of course, includes MPs of Chinese heritage. I think it's a privilege to work in this place, Mr. Chair. I defend colleagues across the aisle. This isn't only about Liberal colleagues I have the chance to work with; it's about all MPs and all parties. We hold a loyalty to Canada and everything we do is for our constituents. I put that on the record this evening, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Matthews, thank you very much for your very interesting presentation. You used the term “digital authoritarianism”. I don't think you're the first to use it, but it's still something that piques my interest. Can you expand on what you mean by that when you say that China is pursuing exactly that type of an agenda?
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and honourable members of the committee. Thank you for your invitation for me to appear this evening.
[Translation]
It is my pleasure to tell you about the work of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP).
[English]
In English, it's known as NSICOP.
As this is my first time before your committee, I will provide a brief overview of NSICOP and proceed with outlining our 2020 annual report, as well as our 2019 review of foreign interference. I will also touch upon the recommendations we made about ensuring the integrity of our elections.
As you know, NSICOP was established in 2017 and is composed of parliamentarians from both houses. All members hold a top-secret security clearance and are permanently bound to secrecy under the Security of Information Act. We cannot, under any circumstance, claim parliamentary privilege in a case of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
[Translation]
The primary responsibility of the NSICOP is to conduct reviews of the national security and intelligence community and its constituent agencies. NSICOP reports are unanimous and non-partisan.
Our 2020 annual report focused primarily on threats to our national security, including an attempt to answer the following two questions. What has changed in recent years? How has the pandemic contributed to these threats?
[English]
Security and intelligence organizations described five main threats to Canada's national security when the committee began its work in 2018. They were terrorism; espionage and foreign interference; cyber-threats; organized crime; and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
I will focus on espionage and foreign interference, and cyber-threats, as likely being of most interest to this committee, but I encourage you to consult the full report.
Espionage involves the theft of information, while foreign interference involves the use of clandestine means, or threats to promote a certain objective. However, the perpetrators often pursue them in tandem.
The committee conducted a review of foreign interference in Canada in 2019. It found that foreign interference posed a significant threat to the security of Canada, and that continues to be the case today. The pandemic has also created opportunities for foreign states to target Canada's health sector, most notably in the area of vaccine development.
Turning to malicious cyber-activities, there are a wide array of threats facing Canada. I note that the committee is currently conducting a review of the government's cyber-defence. Russia and China remain the most significant, sophisticated and state-sponsored threats, targeting government and non-government systems. State actors also conduct online disinformation campaigns in Canada and among our allies.
Let me now turn to our review examining the threat of foreign interference in Canada and the government's response to that threat, presented in 2019.
The committee agreed to focus its efforts on traditional, person-to-person foreign interference. Of particular interest, we highlighted China's Operation Fox Hunt. It involves clandestine and coercive repatriation activities targeting apparent economic fugitives and corrupt officials, including in Canada. Chinese security officials carry out the campaign in a number of ways, including police and prosecutors working with the RCMP to arrange to meet fugitives to purportedly gather evidence and discuss their cases.
In response to Fox Hunt activities, Global Affairs Canada established an interdepartmental working group that met regularly to discuss the campaign. The RCMP imposed increasingly stringent criteria on PRC investigators, yet activities continued.
[Translation]
We found that the government's response to the threat of foreign interference, which is significant and sustained, was ad hoc and that our engagement with other levels of government and the Canadian public was limited. The NSICOP recommended that the government develop a comprehensive strategy to counter foreign interference and build institutional and public resiliency, which is described in paragraph 297.
With specific reference to the risk of foreign interference in our democratic processes, let me turn to the report of James Judd, prepared pursuant to the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol.
States that attempt to interfere with Canada's electoral processes use a number of methods, including attempts to influence constituency nominations and to promote one candidate or undermine another. They may also include efforts to spread hate or inflame partisan differences.
[English]
Mr. Chair, this happens to all parties, across all orders of government.
The committee supported recommendations to re-establish the public protocol well in advance of the next federal election and to extend this mandate to the pre-writ period.
The committee also believed that the government should consider ensuring that the mandate of the protocol include all forms of foreign interference, consider including prominent Canadians as members of the panel, ensure that all parties understand the purpose of the protocol and the process for raising a potential issue, and consider how the panel would inform Canadians about an incident of foreign interference.
Mr. Chair, to conclude, threats to the security of Canada are fluid. They change. These are all things that we, parliamentarians from across the political spectrum, should continue to pay attention to and seek ways to address through our hearings, our work, our work on legislation and our engagement with Canadians.
Finally, Mr. Chair, before going forward, hopefully to questions, I want to remind you and members that these reports, both hard copies that were sent to the members, are 230 pages in length. They comprise 456 paragraphs in one report and 125 paragraphs in another, and all of this work is predicated on 28,000 pages of documentation and dozens of witnesses and experts.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Good evening, Mr. McGuinty. Thank you for joining us today.
The report is quite clear. Also, the public report clearly does not contain the highly secret information. To help you shed some light on this for us, I would like to draw a parallel with what happened in Australia, since you mention it in your report.
The Australian Parliament and political parties were victims of cyber attacks. In addition, a paragraph in your report states that there was a large-scale direct attack, in the middle of the pandemic, in June 2020, against companies, hospitals, schools, and even government officials.
Can we draw a parallel with Canada? Can Canada respond to what happened in Australia?
Could we be exposed to exactly the same sorts of attacks?
My next question is about the role of international allies. Ms. Brady recently appeared before our committee and we talked about the situation in Australia.
Could you tell us what you think about the situation in the United Kingdom, which has just released a very robust report entitled the “Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy”? Nothing like it has been done since the Cold War. The report seems to be very interested in the resilience of national infrastructures.
As we know, among the Five Eyes, only Canada has been perhaps a little more lax on the Huawei issue. The U.K. seems to be perhaps a little more concerned about who owns some of the technologies used by the government.
Is this something that the NSICOP is concerned about, or are they concerned enough to do a study on it?
:
Thank you very much, Chair, and thank you, Mr. McGuinty, for coming to us tonight. I appreciate your work on NSICOP.
I'd like to talk a little bit about foreign influence in Canada with respect to criminal activity, particularly things like money laundering as it affects the activities in Canada of criminalized gangs, some of them with foreign influence connections. The estimates that you quote in your report indicate that there's an upper estimate of $100 billion of investment in Canada through money laundering. I would call it “investment” using the term loosely. It's most prominent in real estate and casinos.
These are the most publicly discussed domestic examples, but it's also been looked at by CSIS and the RCMP, and referenced of course in your 2018 and 2019 reports regarding a project called “Sidewinder” that was referenced in the paper that was produced by Anne-Marie Brady, who has appeared before us. She relied on the 1997 draft report between CSIS and the RCMP with the code name “Project Sidewinder”, which aimed to gather and analyze intelligence about efforts by the Chinese government and Asian criminal gangs to influence Canadian business and politics. That's a very serious subject, of course.
This leaked report, a 1997 draft, was in fact discredited by SIRC itself in 1999 and 2000, which said it didn't really meet the standards of professional and analytic rigour. They also noted that they revised the report, and a finalized version was issued in January 1999. For some reason, NSICOP in 2018 or 2019 doesn't refer to the finalized Sidewinder reports. Is that report available to NSICOP for its review? Was it aware of it? Did it ask for it?
Hi, Mr. McGuinty. It's nice to see you again on this committee now.
Certainly, as you have pointed out in your comments today, as well as in the the 2020 NSICOP report, “[t]he threat from espionage and foreign interference is significant and continues to grow” and “China and Russia remain the primary culprits” and “the most significant long-term threats to Canada's sovereignty and prosperity.”
I guess I noted, though, that the 2018 NSICOP annual report also said:
China is known globally for its efforts to influence Chinese communities and the politics of other countries. The Chinese government has a number of official organizations that try to influence Chinese communities and politicians to adopt pro-China positions....
It cites wealthy Chinese businessmen, Chinese students, mobilized diaspora populations, political donations, demonstrations, and influencing Chinese language media. Certainly, Canadians are hearing more and more about the implicit, explicit and multi-layered threats to academia, to the political sphere, to research and technology, to science and to the scientific sectors.
I guess it's fair, I think you would say, for us to draw a conclusion that it's evident that threats to Canadians from China's Communist regime have continued to grow and to evolve.
Could you, for all of us, just highlight the highest priority measures that the government should implement to combat foreign interference from China and to protect the safety and security of Canadians? Even on the example of Operation Fox Hunt, you probably know that I have asked multiple questions about this issue. The United States has made several arrests, yet still in Canada, neither officials nor Canadian elected representatives can say that any of that is happening.
What are the highest priority things that the government should implement right now to protect Canadians?
:
That's an excellent question, Ms. Stubbs. Thank you for that.
In the report in 2019 we lay out each of those really core areas—media influence, academic circles influence, political campaigns and politics influence. We've tried to break it down by sector, almost as you've enumerated, but we've also kept the number of recommendations in our 2019 report's review on foreign interference to a very small number—in fact, really two.
The recommendation is about this comprehensive strategy to counter foreign interference and build institutional and public resiliency. On page 109, in paragraph 297 of the 2019 report, we break it down. We talk about what has to be dealt with, sector by sector by sector: how it might be dealt with, including what the short- and long-term risks to Canadian institutions and the rights and freedoms posed by foreign interference are, and what the range of institutional vulnerabilities targeted by hostile foreign states is. It goes on to give a bit of a work plan for this pan-Canadian approach, which would be core to upping our game in this area.
The second major recommendation that I want to come to, with your forbearance or patience, is a recommendation that we've made twice in a row now to the government and the . That is that members of Parliament and senators should be briefed in detail on foreign interference activities to which they may be subject, immediately upon their swearing in and regularly thereafter. This is because, as one of your witnesses said in an earlier panel, many of us in elected public service life don't always understand what might be happening around us.
We've kept the recommendations down to two, and recommendation number 5, as it's called, is really a key breakdown, sector by sector.
Given that Australia has passed a rather multi-pronged, concrete policy approach to this issue, I'm wondering, and I don't know whether you can comment, whether you have any insight as to what the holdup is for Canada. Why is this taking, it seems, an extraordinarily long time, given that this has been going on since the nineties?
Also, in your work, for the people who say, as we've heard and you've said, that they feel they have no place to go—they go to the police, and they refer them to CSIS, and they go back and forth—do you have any insight into what exactly the barriers are and what the specific solutions are?