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CHAPTER 5 - TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA FOR PRESERVING THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT

The next decade will be crucial to determining the future of the Arctic. Whether we can proceed into the next century with a healthy, intact Arctic ecosystem with abundant wildlife populations that can support traditional indigenous social and economic structures or whether the Arctic is degraded due to short-sighted economic interests will be determined in large part by the ability of Arctic nations to cooperate and coordinate their activities. [27:11]

Sarah Climenhaga, World Wildlife Fund

Defining Environmentally "Sustainable Development" in a Circumpolar Context

Having described the historical transition from the old security-dominated agenda, the report will now concentrate on affirming sustainable development as the centrepiece of future circumpolar cooperation. According to Oran Young, sustainable development in the Arctic is "the search for ways to achieve socio-economic development and protect the environment simultaneously under the cultural and ecological conditions characteristic of Arctic systems."119 The Committee agrees, viewing sustainable development as: development which seeks human well-being through an equitable and democratic utilisation of society's resources, while preserving cultural distinctiveness and the natural environment for future generations. As discussed in Chapter Three, Dr. Young told the Committee that sustainable development should be the overarching concept for the Arctic Council, which can play a "generative" role in helping develop a common understanding of it. He believes that the Council should first set out an integrated set of sustainable development principles, such as subsistence preference, co-management and subsidiarity and then move ahead on a small number of specific projects based on these principles. As Dr. Young argued before the Committee, "I think the meaning of sustainable development is more likely to emerge as an outgrowth of practice" [40:18].

Building a common understanding among the Arctic states of the concept and implications of sustainable development will take time, and in the interim Arctic governments must ensure that the Arctic environment is protected (see Box 7 ``Arctic Sustainable Development Principles''). This means that they must ensure that the critical work already well advanced under the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) does not suffer as it becomes part of the Arctic Council. The states must go further through a variety of both "soft" and "hard" legal-institutional instruments at the global, regional and national levels (see Box 8, "International Environmental Agreements Relevant to the Arctic").

Box 7 - "Arctic Sustainable Development Principles"

Governments around the world have agreed to pursue sustainable development, but little progress has been made bridging the gap between the definition of the concept popularized by the Brundtland Commission in 1987 - "development to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" - and the 40-chapter blueprint Agenda 21 agreed to in 1992. Sustainable development cannot be implemented in the Arctic in isolation from the rest of the world; however, the Arctic peoples' long sustainable development and utilization traditions, together with the region's simpler ecosystems and smaller population, makes the results of unsustainability more obvious there, suggesting that progress toward sustainability may be more easily achieved in the Arctic than elsewhere. The Inuit Circumpolar Conference has played a key role over the years in ensuring that the Arctic sustainable development agenda goes beyond narrow environmentalism to reflect the knowledge, consciousness, needs and concerns of the indigenous peoples of the region; the relevant political declarations of the past several years have benefited from this challenging linking of environmental sustainability and human development principles.1

As Dr. Oran Young told the Committee, an important first step in addressing the "overarching theme of sustainable development" in the Arctic would be to articulate a set of sustainable development principles. As he noted, "Principles in this sense are not really the same as policies of the ordinary sort. Principles are general framework guidelines. . .general guiding themes people should pay attention to." He continued:

Some principles that might be interesting in the Arctic context are things such as the principle of subsistence preference: with living resources, when there are not enough stocks to satisfy the demands of commercial, recreational, and subsistent users, subsistence users should get preference. Another principle could be the principle of co-management. With respect to decision-making regarding living resources, the user groups or communities should have a recognized voice in the decision-making process. Another principle could be the principle of subsidiarity. That is to say, decisions about Arctic issues should be made at the lowest level at which the competence to make these decisions exists, a principle that many of you will know has been widely developed and articulated in the European Union context. [40:5]

In addition to subsistence preference, co-management and subsidiarity, other useful principles of sustainable development in the Arctic might include: a long-term perspective, to ensure that the rate of use of renewable resources is compatible with the best knowledge of the rate of regeneration, and that the extraction of non-renewable resources takes into account the expected rate of discovery of new resources or substitute commodities; the precautionary principle, to ensure that all resource development is based on available scientific and local knowledge, and that, where such knowledge is insufficient, development should either be postponed until better knowledge is available or proceed only with extreme care; the primacy of prior rights and clear responsibilities, to ensure that all development programs and decisions in areas traditionally used by or claimed by indigenous peoples should be planned and undertaken with due regard to the rights, practices and responsibilities of the former or present inhabitants, and with their participation as appropriate. Any compensation for the disruption of traditional lifestyles and resources, for environmental liabilities, and responsibility for rehabilitation or alternate uses in the future should be clearly set out in advance, and there should be prior agreement about the period for which the various parties can be held responsible for "sustainability"; true cost accounting, to include both the direct and indirect economic, environmental, health, and other costs and benefits of development over short and longer periods; and use of environmentally appropriate technologies and practices, to ensure that the technologies and practices employed are suited to the environmental conditions of that part of the Arctic, compatible with the socio-cultural values of the residents, and have adequate monitoring and feedback so that they can be changed or improved with experience.

Box 8 - "International Environmental Agreements Relevant to the Arctic"

The post-war period has seen the creation of numerous multilateral environmental agreements, with a related tendency toward globalization of arrangements to address problems that cannot be controlled without global cooperation. Few specific binding agreements relate to the Arctic environment, but the Arctic is included within the scope of many broader international arrangements. The most significant of these agreements include:

A. Legally-Binding International Agreements

1. Prevention of Pollution

Protection of the Seas: (1982) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; (1972) Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and other Matter (London Convention); (1972/78) International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL); (1992) Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention).

Air Pollution: (1992) Framework Convention on Climate Change; (1985/88) Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, including the Montreal Protocol; (1979) Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) and Protocols.

Radioactive Pollution: (1994) Convention on Nuclear Safety; (1986) Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident; (1986) Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

2. Protection of Wildlife and Habitats:

(1992) Convention on Biological Diversity; (1973) Agreement on the Conversation of Polar Bears and their Habitats; Convention and International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES); (1971) Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (RAMSAR)); The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling; (1991) Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (ESPOO).

B. "Soft Law" Agreements

In addition to such "hard law" or legally-binding mechanisms, an increasing number of "soft law" political instruments have relevance to the Arctic, particularly: (1991) the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy; (1996) the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council; (1993) the Kirkenes Declaration; (1992) the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and Agenda 21; (1995) the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities.

The protection of the environment is the sine qua non of sustainability. Accordingly, after briefly looking at major environmental threats that can be addressed only through global responses, this chapter will look at the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, the principal international mechanism for environmental cooperation in the Arctic, and the broader environmental stewardship objectives of circumpolar cooperation. Chapter Six addresses circumpolar approaches to sustainable economic development that will benefit Arctic communities. Chapter Seven focusses on the human actors who must be the agents of such future development, which must therefore affirm the roles of indigenous peoples and provide for democratic participation and public accountability.

The growth of understanding of the environment in the late twentieth century has been one of the most significant processes in human history; nowhere is the environment more unique than in the Arctic. This uniqueness must be understood if policies are to be formulated for the region. As Fred Roots put it in a submission to the Committee, "the formulation and implementation of appropriate policies for the Arctic requires a knowledge of the environment and of the environmental consequences of alternative actions to a greater degree than is ordinarily required for policy decisions in other areas."120 While the Arctic environment is of most immediate concern to the residents of the region, it is also of concern internationally because the Arctic is an important world commons which will be affected first and hardest by such threats as global climate change.

Fortunately, environmental protection is already the most developed area of Arctic cooperation; in the words of Peter Prokosch of the World Wildlife Fund, "As a result of the Rovaneimi Process, the Arctic is the largest region in the world where environmental protection is the primary basis for international cooperation."121 This work must continue as a priority but, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, the new demands and opportunities in the region mean that environmental protection in itself is not enough. The challenge will be to use the Arctic Council and other mechanisms to continue the environmental protection work already begun through programs such as the AEPS, while linking it to broader economic, social and cultural progress through sustainable development. While the concept of "sustainable development" has been widely hailed as the paradigm for the future of the planet, a debate still rages over its exact meaning. The most widely used definition remains that of the Brundtland Commission, which argued in 1987 that "sustainable development" is development "to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."

The UN's 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development produced a blueprint for sustainable development in the form of AGENDA 21, which called on governments to prepare national sustainable development plans; by 1996 some 117 governments had begun this process. A UN Commission on Sustainable Development was also created in conjunction with Rio to review national implementation of AGENDA 21 and coordinate UN action. Beyond national plans, work is beginning on sustainable development plans for specific regions. In Stockholm, Committee members were briefed by Canadian Nicholas Sonntag, Executive Director of the Stockholm Environment Institute, on work now underway to develop a BALTIC 21 plan for the Baltic region. As he pointed out, this experience could be very useful in formulating sustainable development plans for other regions, including the Arctic. Also useful will be the ongoing work of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, in particular its 1996 publication Agenda 21 From an Inuit Perspective122.

Global Environmental Issues Affecting the Arctic

"The Arctic is an environmental early warning system for our globe."
Hon. Sergio Marchi, Environment Minister, Ottawa,
Statement at the Inauguration of the Arctic Council
19 September 1996

Given the interdependence of global and regional environmental issues, Arctic challenges can be fully understood only as part of the global environmental agenda. At the broadest level, in order to protect the environment the Arctic states must first address the global issues that affect it. In the past quarter century, humanity has come belatedly to realize that, far from controlling the earth, it is only one part of the living environment or biosphere. Environmental concerns emerged first in individual countries; the realization that global environmental challenges demand global responses did not come easily to states used to unilateral action. As Donald McRae told the Committee, "If you ask how states have been able to deal with environmental issues through multilateral agreement, the answer is not very well and very slowly" [21:20]. The early 1970s saw important milestones in the development of global environmental awareness, with the holding of the UN's Stockholm Conference on The Human Environment and the creation of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the major international institution dealing with environmental issues.

Understanding of the interdependence of environmental concerns deepened over the next quarter century, and the 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and Development saw a number of achievements, such as the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, a Framework Convention on Climate Change and a Convention on Biological Diversity, and "Agenda 21," which will have implications for generations to come. Progress on the broad agenda of sustainable development has been much too slow since Rio, but advances on the narrower issue of environmental protection provide some hope for future action on such critical issues as global climate change, the long-range transboundary transport of pollutants, and the loss of biodiversity.

The most significant and promising international environmental achievement in recent years has been action through the 1987 Montreal Protocol to reduce the production of gases that deplete the ozone layer. The success in this case is proof that states can deal effectively with global environmental problems and a valuable lesson for action on other issues. Speculation that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) could harm the earth's protective ozone layer began in the mid-1970s; by the end of the decade, even before the scientific case was completely proved, popular pressure led to a ban on the use of CFCs in aerosol sprays in the Arctic states of Canada, the United States, Sweden and Norway. As research continued, governments began to develop mechanisms for addressing the problem, such as the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. After a large "ozone hole" was discovered above the Antarctic in 1985, citizens demanded action, and governments responded quickly with the Montreal Protocol.

In the opinion of one observer, this protocol was "a landmark in international environmental diplomacy," whose subsequent success in reducing global CFC production "offered the first clear example that countries can work together to head off shared threats." By 1995, the success of the Montreal Protocol was clear, as global production of CFCs was down 76% from its peak in 1988. An important point was that, although there was still some scientific debate over the exact role of CFCs in creating the ozone hole, states moved ahead even without conclusive proof of environmental damage. According to Hilary French,

Their actions represented the first significant application of the "precautionary principle" - an emerging tenet of international environmental law that stipulates that lack of complete scientific certainty is insufficient reason to delay an international policy response if such delay might result in serious or irreversible damage.123
The ozone case provides other lessons for future environmental action. The Montreal Protocol stipulated that the parties should reconvene periodically to determine if its provisions were adequate, and, as research continued and new information emerged, the Protocol was strengthened three times over the years. The Protocol also set new precedents in North-South relations, including the establishment of an Interim Multilateral Fund to reimburse developing countries for "all agreed incremental costs" of complying with it. In many respects, this fund was the model for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) established in 1991. The establishment of an intergovernmental panel pooling the expertise of independent, unbiased and knowledgeable scientists working on ozone issues also proved very useful.

Following the success on ozone, the international community must now address such major environmental challenges as human-induced climate change, long-range pollutants and the loss of biological diversity, and it must do so using the lessons of early and coordinated action learned from the ozone experience. Both climate change and biological diversity were the subject of Conventions at Rio and are now going through the slow process of scientific debate and government negotiations. As well, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has made significant progress in establishing a scientific consensus on the issue. Its Second Scientific Assessment Report, which involved more than 2,000 scientists from over 130 countries and took more than two and a half years to complete, concluded that "the balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate." The 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change has begun to address the issue by requiring all states to prepare full inventories of greenhouse gas emissions and set out a national climate plan, with OECD countries and those in transition to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. Unfortunately, global carbon emissions are still rising, and, according to one observer, "roughly half" of the states that signed the Convention are likely to miss their targets for emissions in the year 2000.124 Canada acknowledged in December 1996 that it would be one of those states; while its emissions are declining, estimates are that they will still be some 8% above the baseline 1990 level by the year 2000.

Meeting in Berlin in April 1996, the parties concluded that the measures in the Convention were not sufficient; work is now underway to conclude by December 1997 a Kyoto Protocol to outline emissions targets beyond the year 2000; it is hoped that this will accomplish for climate change what the Montreal Protocol did for ozone depletion. In fact, in order to fully address the problem, the parties must also begin to negotiate reductions for developing countries, including such important states as China and India.

In the case of transboundary air pollution, the major international treaty is the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), signed by Canada and 19 European states in 1979, primarily to deal with the challenge of acid rain. Several protocols are already in force under this Convention, and work is underway to negotiate others on persistent organic pollutants (POPs), such as PCBs and dioxins, and heavy metals. The Convention does not apply to states outside Europe and North America, however. Given this limitation, work is now underway through the United Nations Environment Program to negotiate a global and legally binding POPs protocol.

The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity recognizes the "intrinsic" value of biodiversity. It provides the first comprehensive framework for preserving diversity across the globe and encourages the "sustainable and equitable use" of those resources. As a framework document for regional and national programs, the Convention lacks timetables, targets and enforcement mechanisms. It does, however, contain provisions that should assist implementation, such as a permanent secretariat, conferences of the contracting parties, technical cooperation measures and reporting requirements.

The Arctic Environmental Agenda

Noting the sensitivities and vulnerabilities of Arctic and northern terrestrial and marine ecosystems to chemical contaminants from both near and distant sources; the threats presented by such contaminants to the health of present and future generations, and the extreme difficulty, imposed by Arctic environmental conditions and biological processes, of removing such contamination or counteracting its effects once it has become dispersed in the Arctic regions;
That these sensitivities and vulnerabilities, and the challenges and opportunities presented by Arctic resources of many kinds, emphasize the continued need for protection of the environment and preservation of biological diversity in the Arctic region, and for respect for the principles of sustainable and responsible development in the utilization of its natural resources
Conference Statement, Second Conference of
Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region,
Yellowknife, March 1996

The environmental challenges facing the Arctic region are particularly difficult, given that its unique environment, at the heart of the lives of Arctic peoples, is challenged in specific ways by global and regional threats. It must also be remembered that, while the Arctic is affected by global changes, the Arctic in turn significantly affects the global environment. The Arctic is in many respects a living laboratory, a cooling system for the planet, and, as Jørgen Taagholt of the Danish Polar Centre told the Committee in Copenhagen, an archive within whose ice sheets are stored thousands of years of vital environmental and other information. Although the 1992 Rio Summit itself did little to address the Arctic directly, Maurice Strong, the Canadian chair of that landmark conference, told the Committee in February 1997 that, "The Arctic regions of the world represent one of the most important pieces of the ecological structure of our world community. They have a very major bearing on our future out of proportion to the number of people living there" [65:10].

As it began its hearings, the Committee benefited from the testimony of Fred Roots, who pointed out that of all the realities that underlie Arctic issues, those related to the environment are the most fundamental. According to this witness,

The climate and geography of the North cause its low biological productivity. And this of course causes very limited and, more importantly, very fluctuating living resources from place to place and from time to time. Stability is not characteristic of low biological productivity, but rather fluctuation is. This leads, of course, to sparse and scattered human resources. . .the indigenous cultures adapted to the environment are small scale. [10:5]
Threats to the Arctic environment come from two main sources. The most serious threats come from outside in the form of man-made pollutants such as POPs, heavy metals, and radionuclides, carried mainly by air but also by water from lower latitudes. As a Norwegian researcher observes: "Anywhere in the world can be a source region for contaminants in the Arctic."125 Other threats come from within the region, from increased human activity, particularly that associated with the exploitation of oil and other non-renewable resources. Environmental concerns in the Arctic can therefore generally be grouped into three areas: global environmental change and its effects; the increase and spread of pollutants; and habitat alteration and destruction.

Towards Multilateral Cooperation: The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS)

The Arctic countries realize that the pollution problems of today do not respect national boundaries and that no state alone will be able to act effectively against environmental threats to the Arctic. . . The implementation of an Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy will therefore benefit the Arctic countries and the world at large.
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy,
Chapter 1, 1991

Arctic nations such as Canada, the United States, and the Scandinavian countries were among the first to see the emergence of national environmental concern, and, since the end of the Cold War, the Arctic states have made significant progress on regional environmental cooperation. While such cooperation in northern Europe continues as one element of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region process, its centrepiece in the Arctic is the six-year-old Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, whose work will be integrated into the Arctic Council after the final AEPS Ministerial, to be held in Tromsø in June 1997. The AEPS is not perfect, with criticism focussing over the years on the facts that it is non-binding, underfunded and too narrow. Nonetheless, as Oran Young told the Committee, "a remarkable amount has happened under the auspices of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy" [40:2], both in terms of progress on scientific research and assessment and lessons that can be applied to the broader Arctic Council.

Attempts to launch Arctic environmental cooperation initiatives during the 1950s and 1960s failed because of the Cold War. In an atmosphere of improved East-West relations and increased awareness of the deterioration of the Arctic environment, Finland in 1989 officially launched what would become known as the "Rovaniemi process" to examine the possibilities for circumpolar environmental cooperation, including, where appropriate, action based on legally binding agreements.126 Over the next two years, the more ambitious aspects of the initiative were pared back for a number of reasons, including some that resurfaced during the negotiations to establish the Arctic Council.

The Arctic states finally agreed to formalize the Finnish initiative and at Rovaniemi, Finland, in 1991, the first ministerial meeting on the Arctic Environment resulted in a Ministerial Declaration on Protection of the Arctic Environment and an Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). The text of the Strategy was drafted mainly by Canadian officials and "strongly reflects Canadian thinking," according to Robert Huebert.127 It consisted of a set of objectives and principles; identification of six main types of pollutants and priority areas for action (persistent organic pollutants, oil pollution, radioactivity, heavy metals, acidification and noise); identification of the existing mechanisms for the protection of the Arctic environment; and proposed action for countering the pollutants. In an omission later criticized, the Strategy did not address systemic global environmental change, noting that "other environmental problems including the depletion of the ozone layer and global warming were not addressed because they were already being addressed in other fora."

In order to implement the Strategy, the states agreed to meet on a regular basis at ministerial level, to involve indigenous peoples, and to establish four working groups of experts to concentrate on specific areas. The working groups were based on the main programs of the Strategy: the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP); the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME); the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR); and the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF). The working groups operate through a system of lead countries. As Ambassador Simon acknowledged in a 1996 interview, "There is no legal obligation for the governments to contribute to these programs so any funding committed is on a voluntary basis. That has been a weakness, however at the moment it is the only way in which the countries are willing to cooperate."128 In terms of their operation, the working groups allow the representatives of the various Arctic states to coordinate their work in specific areas, and, as Robert Huebert notes, "For the most part these working groups and task forces have two main objectives, to determine the nature and extent of the problem and to examine options to remedy them."129

The AEPS has expanded significantly since Rovaniemi, broadening both its participation and its agenda. As Saami Council representatives told Committee members in Tromsø, the second AEPS Ministerial, held in Nuuk, Greenland, in 1993, increased the participation of indigenous peoples in the AEPS. Pressure from the Inuit Circumpolar Conference also resulted in the broadening of the AEPS agenda. The Ministers at Rovaniemi had considered the establishment of a working group on sustainable development; however because the United States and others were suspicious of the concept, preferring the more limited term "environmental protection," no agreement was reached. Over the next two years, the ICC criticized the AEPS for its narrow focus on conservation, and Canada finally convinced the other states to expand the agenda beyond pollution and conservation and establish a Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization (TFSDU) that would propose steps the states should take to meet their commitment to sustainable development in the Arctic. Finally, although the Rio Summit in the previous year had conspicuously ignored the Arctic, the Nuuk ministerial stressed the links between the AEPS and Rio and emphasized the importance of adopting the principles of the Rio Declaration, even calling the Nuuk Ministerial document The Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development. The Ministers also pointed to the need for "precautionary approaches" to environmental protection, and for strong national legislation in the Arctic states.

At the third AEPS Ministerial, held in Inuvik in March 1996, just days after the Yellowknife Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, the Ministers reflected the new broader agenda of the AEPS by issuing an Inuvik Declaration on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development (see Box 9 "AEPS Objectives and Commitments: Rovaniemi to Inuvik and Beyond"). The Ministers also upgraded the TFSDU to a working group and expanded its mandate to include sustainable economic development; however, given the uncertainties surrounding the role of sustainable development in the Arctic Council, this change was made "pending the expeditious creation of the Arctic Council." With the creation of that Council in the fall of 1996, the Working Group on Sustainable Development and Utilization effectively ceased to function, although its preliminary work in such areas as creating a plan for the regional application of Agenda 21 in the Arctic will be presented to the final AEPS Ministerial, and can serve as a basis for future work.

Box 9 - "AEPS Objectives and Commitments: Rovaniemi to Inuvik and Beyond"

Finland launched the "Rovaniemi process" in 1989 and, following two years of discussions, the First Ministerial meeting on the Arctic Environment, held at Rovaniemi in June 1991, resulted in a Ministerial Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment and an Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). The objectives of the latter are:

(i) to protect the Arctic ecosystem, including humans; (ii) to provide for the protection, enhancement and restoration of environmental quality and the sustainable utilization of natural resources, including their use by local populations and indigenous peoples in the Arctic; (iii) to recognize and, to the extent possible, seek to accommodate the traditional and cultural needs, values and practices of the indigenous peoples, as determined by themselves, related to the protection of the Arctic environment; (iv) to review regularly the state of the Arctic environment; and (v) to identify, reduce and, as a final goal, eliminate pollution.

As noted in the text, the second AEPS ministerial meeting, in Nuuk, Greenland, in September 1993, saw the adoption of The Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic, which recognized the special role of indigenous groups in the protection of the Arctic environment, established an AEPS Task Force on Sustainable Development and sustainable use of renewable resources and stressed the links between the AEPS and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development the previous year. The third AEPS Ministerial, held in Inuvik in March 1996, resulted in the Inuvik Declaration on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development in the Arctic. At a joint meeting of the Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and Environment and Sustainable Development held in May 1996, the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development, Charles Caccia, compared the Inuvik Declaration with that of the Second Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, held in Yellowknife only weeks earlier. In his words, "the Yellowknife declaration is strong, very action-oriented and very little process-oriented. It has a very precise sense of mandate, so to speak. The ministerial instead, you will see, is very much process oriented. Also, it speaks about environmental protection of the Arctic and that's all it says, nothing more, very little." [18:11]

Apart from accepting reports from and mandating the AEPS Working Groups and committing ministers to the earliest possible establishment of the Arctic Council, the following excerpts from the Inuvik Declaration highlight points which remain central to the Arctic environmental agenda:

1. We reaffirm our commitment to protection of the Arctic environment as a priority, and to the implementation of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), as outlined in the Rovaniemi and Nuuk Declarations.

* * *

5. We recognize that a strong and vibrant AEPS is an essential component of a sustainable development approach in the Arctic, and emphasize the importance of integrating the AEPS Programmes with Arctic economics and social initiatives to uphold the principles of sustainable development. In view of this we agree to establish a Working Group on Sustainable Development and Utilization (SDU).

6. We set the following priorities for Senior Arctic Affairs Officials (SAAOs) and the AEPS Programmes.

For SAAOs, the priorities are directing the AEPS process and providing integration, policy and management direction to the AEPS programmes and the AEPS Secretariat, as well as conducting an assessment of the present organizational structure of the AEPS with a view to ensuring cost-effective and well coordinated programmes; developing a framework and estimate for common-cost sharing, including in-kind contributions for our consideration at the next Ministerial Conference; and exploring opportunities for obtaining funds from other international programmes and international financial institutions. The SAAOs, with the assistance of the permanent participants, will also undertake to develop revised Terms of Reference for SDU and an initial workplan for the Arctic Council's sustainable development work, to be presented for discussion to the Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs).

* * *

For SDU, the priority is for the Working Group to continue to operate with the current terms of reference of the Task Force on SDU and with specific direction from the SAAOs, pending the expeditious creation of the Arctic Council.

* * *

7. We note with satisfaction the establishment of the Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat and the support it has given the AEPS permanent participants to facilitate their participation in the AEPS. We further note the success of the Seminar on Integration of Indigenous Peoples' Knowledge held in Iceland, and its useful recommendations, and express our thanks to the governments of Denmark and Iceland for moving forward this major component of the AEPS.

8. We recognize and affirm the right of all Arctic indigenous peoples to be represented in the AEPS. We acknowledge the contributions of the AEPS permanent participants, and encourage them and other indigenous peoples' organizations to participate actively in the work of the AEPS. We emphasize the importance of indigenous peoples and their knowledge to the AEPS and its programmes.

9. We affirm the need for a clear statement of ethical principles for research, data gathering and dissemination, agreeable to all countries, to Arctic indigenous peoples and to other northern residents and to the scientific community; we note the work underway by the AEPS and the International Arctic Sciences Committee (IASC). We urge that this work be completed and presented at the next ministerial meeting.

10. We support the efforts of the Russian Federation in addressing the environmental problems in the Russian Arctic bearing in mind the Declaration of the Pan-European Ministerial Conference in Sofia, October 1995 in which matters concerning environmental financing in the central and eastern European countries for reducing current levels of pollution and the risk of environmental degradation are given particular attention

11. We support the continuing negotiations and collaboration in relevant international fora to integrate the AEPS with local, regional, circumpolar and global environmental protection activities such as: the work currently undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to prepare for the negotiation of a global legally binding instrument for controlling emissions and discharges of persistent organic pollutants (POPs); the protocol negotiations on POPs and metals under the framework of the UN ECE-LRTAP Convention; the International Atomic Energy Agency's International Arctic Seas Assessment Programme; and highly value the contribution being made by the AEPS countries in the evolution of new international agreements.

* * *

13. We agree to cooperate with the Russian Federation in searching for investments required for implementing programmes and projects aimed at the conservation and restoration of the traditional habitats of the indigenous peoples of the North of the Russian Federation.

14. We agree to ensure implementation of the priorities as listed in the present Declaration and to make every effort to provide and maintain the necessary resources to enable each country and indigenous peoples to participate fully in the activities of the AEPS.

The fourth and final AEPS ministerial will take place in Tromsø, Norway, in June 1997.

A good example of the significant scientific work done by all the AEPS working groups is that of AMAP, the "cornerstone" of the AEPS, according to Robert Huebert. As a Department of Foreign Affairs publication noted in late 1995, "The work of AMAP is a good example of the AEPS in action. Backed by scientific evidence and combined political strength, the Arctic countries have brought the issue of persistent organic pollutants to the attention of the international community."130 AMAP is also to produce its long-awaited State of the Arctic Environment report immediately before the Tromsø Ministerial. While the AEPS itself will not meet again after Tromsø, the working groups will be given a plan for future work by the Ministers there. Thus the work of the AEPS can continue as the Arctic Council decides whether it wants to recreate its own system of standing working groups to continue working between ministerial meetings. A minority view would prefer the abolition of the standing working groups in favour of a more project-oriented approach; however, the majority of states are likely to prefer a system which can continue work between ministerial meetings, although this might require more flexible task forces or expert groups.

During its travel in Europe, the Committee was repeatedly warned of the importance of not allowing the work of the AEPS to be diminished under the Arctic Council, either by being marginalized within the new broader agenda or because of the failure of the Arctic Council itself. In particular, David Scrivener told the Committee in Cambridge that the results of the AEPS self-assessment currently being undertaken by Norway will yield valuable lessons for the functioning of the Arctic Council. Accordingly:

Beyond the AEPS

Those of us who have looked closely at the documents that have come out of the AEPS acknowledge that it has played a major role in our understanding of Arctic environmental issues. But the two major focusses of the AEPS have been on the examination of existing international cooperative measures and how bad the problem is. The question now that will be facing the Arctic Council is what steps will be taken? [15:13]

Robert Huebert

As a mechanism, the AEPS has been criticized from a number of perspectives over the years. For environmentalist NGOs, the principal flaws of AEPS have been its non-binding nature, the fact that it has addressed issues in a piecemeal fashion, and the fact that it has been slow to link itself to broader global issues.131 For others, the AEPS has been both underfunded and too rigid, with working groups seemingly taking on lives of their own after formation. As Chaturvedi concluded,

The Rovaneimi process is no doubt a concrete and relevant step in the direction of realizing environmental protection for the Arctic. However, given the linkages between economic development and conservation practices, and the need for proactive (rather than reactive) management of increasingly diverse exploitation of the Arctic natural environment, a far more comprehensive and legally binding regime is required. Arctic-specific realities require such a regime to be based on the principles of sustainable development. . .Treating the symptoms of unsustainability only, while the fundamental causes remain more or less untouched, may not lead the Arctic countries far enough on the road to sustainable development. Even the former require far more specific commitments of both a political and a financial nature from the Arctic states than has been the case so far. 132
In fact, while the "soft law nature" of the AEPS may not be ideal, it allowed cooperation at a time when the Arctic states were unwilling to commit themselves to formal agreements, and such mechanisms can often set the stage for more binding ones later. Nevertheless, the witnesses and others whom the Committee met recognize the need for the Arctic states both to preserve the core work of the AEPS, and to move beyond it, through the Arctic Council and other mechanisms, to address the important environmental issues identified by the AEPS. While binding mechanisms are obviously preferable if they can be negotiated, the success of the AEPS shows that the Arctic states should not limit their cooperation only to those areas where binding agreements are possible.

Oran Young also suggested to the Committee two complementary approaches to the broad ecological problems of the Arctic. The first would take advantage of the fact that a number of global agreements - such as the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1973/78 Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) - include the Arctic, and can perhaps be adapted to better suit its specific needs. As Dr. Young argues "At this stage, it would make sense to initiate a systematic review of existing global environmental agreements in order to see which ones contain provisions authorizing special supplements designed to deal with the needs of individual regions to determine which of these seem particularly relevant to the Arctic."133 Nigel Bankes, past chair of the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee and currently of the University of Calgary, pointed out to the Committee that taking advantage of such agreements also means taking responsibility for their success; Canada should accordingly ratify existing agreements such as the Law of the Sea Convention.

Sarah Climenhaga, of the World Wildlife Fund, agreed that existing agreements should be used to further Arctic environmental protection. She told the Committee that the Arctic states should use the information gained under the AEPS and "take action through other existing international agreements" [27:13]. As we will see in Chapter Nine, the same broad strategy of employing existing mechanisms in novel ways led Nigel Bankes to advocate joint Canada-U.S.World Heritage Designation under the UNESCO World Heritage Convention as a way of solving a bilateral issue and providing long-term international protection of the calving grounds of the Porcupine Caribou herd.134

Accordingly:

Oran Young's second suggestion would involve adopting a strategy of "mitigation" and seeking to alter behaviour that causes environmental problems in the Arctic. The most promising mechanism for doing this is through Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs). As Dr. Young told the Committee:

There's an effort under way now to see whether we could come up at the Arctic level with some mutually agreeable set of environmental assessment guidelines that would be shared by all the members of the Arctic Council. I think that's an interesting initiative, not only to deal with transboundary and cumulative types of impacts but to share experiences on what kinds of practices in environmental assessment seem to have produced good results in environmental protection in different countries. [40:18]
By working toward such a common set of standards, the Arctic states would be protecting both the region as a whole and the territory of individual states like Russia. Observers agree that the Russian North is desperately in need of strong environmental standards, especially given the likelihood of increased resource extraction there in the near future. As Alf Håkon Hoel told the Committee at the University of Tromsø, the current fear in northern Europe is of future oil and other development carried out with a combination of U.S. capital and Russian environmental standards. As mentioned earlier, Northern Forum Director and former Alaskan Governor Stephen Cowper also argued that common environmental standards are necessary in the region. Nicholas Poushinsky argued before the Committee in Whitehorse that environmental standards in the Arctic must be harmonized "up" to prevent mining and other companies from fleeing to jurisdictions (such as Russia) with lower standards.

Major pollution sources within the Arctic region are largely limited to the industrialized Kola peninsula and White Sea region. As noted in Chapter Four, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Mikhailov told the Committee in Moscow that contamination by heavy metals and chemicals was a more serious and imminent threat to health and the environment in the Murmansk region than nuclear contamination. Significant damage has already been done in the Russian North by oil and gas extraction, with an estimated six million hectares of reindeer pasture destroyed in the Yamal-Nenets region alone over the past two decades. The Komi oil spill in 1994 was another warning of the scale of the danger, and, as Committee members heard at the World Conservation and Monitoring Centre in Cambridge, the Internet quickly helped researchers understand and communicate the scale of the damage. George Newton and Garrett Brass of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission agreed that oil was a major concern in Russia. According to Newton,

Last spring, on the Senate floor, Senator Murkowski provided our country with a very grim picture of the Russian oil infrastructure. The pipelines and the system that transport oil were leaking oil onto the Russian soil at a rate equal to one Exon Valdez a day. A day! The degree of severity of that problem is astounding. We tend to worry about radioactivity - and indeed we should - but the oil contamination is almost overwhelming when one thinks about it. . . Oil is Russia's largest cash crop. Unfortunately they don't have the means to deliver to the market at the present time. It's a real dilemma. How do you control it to enable them to survive, prosper, grow, develop and convert to an enterprise-based, democratic way of life, yet at the same time not rain havoc on the rest of the world in their efforts to do so? [62:10]
As Professor Peter Williams of Carleton University pointed out to the Committee during meetings at Cambridge University, these problems will also put a premium on soil remediation expertise, such as that developed at Carleton in collaboration with the Scott Polar Research Institute and others. Some Canadian assistance is being directed at raising environmental standards in Russia; CIDA announced in 1996 that it would help establish a centre for Arctic environmental assessment in Moscow. Given that further resources development will take place in the Russian Arctic, as Garrett Brass argued, "perhaps the most promising avenue is that future developments will probably be done in a major way with joint venture developments. The developed country companies that engage in those joint ventures will bring their environmental standards to bear" [62:14].

While the Russian case is the most striking, the need for a strong system of Environmental Impact Assessment applies equally to all Arctic states. It has been underlined in Canada in the past two years as a result of the controversial BHP plan to mine diamonds in the Northwest Territories. As Sarah Climenhaga put it to the Committee, "Current environmental assessment procedures are not adequate to protect the vulnerable Arctic environment. Proposals for a diamond mining project in the central Arctic illustrate this inadequacy, as they are being considered without regard to the cumulative impacts of the mining initiatives that are likely to be launched in the Northwest Territories over the next few years" [27:11]. The Committee was briefed on the proposed BHP mine in Yellowknife by BHP, CARC and others. Kevin O'Reilly of CARC, who appeared before the Committee in Yellowknife, has pointed out that Canada set a high standard for environmental assessment in the North with the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline (Berger) inquiry in the mid-1970s. Following a debate in the early 1990s, the current Canadian Environmental Assessment Act was proclaimed in January 1995.

After extensive public hearings in the North, the four-person panel charged with the environmental assessment of the BHP mine issued its report in mid-1996. Most have welcomed the subsequent socio-economic and environmental agreements that will allow the BHP project to begin; however, Kevin O'Reilly and others remain critical of the environmental assessment process itself, arguing that it was "fundamentally flawed; the process was neither rigorous, comprehensive nor fair." Mr. O'Reilly stated that the Government's decision to give conditional approval to the mine had been taken despite the environmental assessment panel's "superficial report and over-general recommendations" and not because of it.135 In January 1997, the World Wildlife Fund announced that, following their discussions, the Government had agreed to strengthen its environmental assessment procedures so that any future project subject to the Act must take into consideration the impact of the project on existing protected areas throughout Canada, and on the opportunity to complete a network of protected areas for the natural region in which the project is located.136

Some progress has already been made in developing common environmental assessment standards in the Arctic. As Garrett Brass told the Committee, the AEPS Working Group on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment has developed a draft set of voluntary guidelines for offshore oil development using the best modern standards and technologies. He explained, "once again, not to be coy about it, it's aimed primarily at the Russian experience so that they'll understand what best practices in the West are"[62:15]. Finland argued at the Nuuk Ministerial in 1993 for an Environmental Impact Assessment expert group; however, Canada and the United States argued that as the first priority all the Arctic states should ratify the 1991 ESPOO Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, although this, by definition, does not cover activities that take place solely within states. In the end, the issue was given to the existing Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization. Finland has continued to lead work in this area, and has produced draft Guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in the Arctic. While these are only voluntary guidelines and not perfect, they do provide a basis for further work. Accordingly:

As the Arctic states move beyond the AEPS, then, they have at their disposal a solid and growing body of scientific knowledge and, in the Arctic Council, a new higher-level mechanism for coordinating regional action and putting regional priorities on the global agenda. These resources will be challenged immediately as the states are being forced to respond to such broader challenges as climate change, pollutants and related health concerns, and the loss of biodiversity.

Climate Change and the Arctic

While debate over the details will continue for years, the Arctic will be the part of the world affected first and hardest by global climate change. As Louise Comeau of the Sierra Club of Canada put it to the Committee, all the "laudable goals" of circumpolar cooperation are at risk from climate change [27:8]. According to Fred Roots, while climate models differ in detail, "all of those accepted for serious discussion indicate that the effect of global warming will be most dramatic in Arctic regions." According to him, an average of the more "conservative" models indicates that the increase in the Arctic is likely to be two and a half to four times greater than that in lower latitudes.137 Often unrecognized in the South is the fact that the Arctic, rather than being simply a passive victim of global warming and likely to experience increased snowiness, the disappearance of sea ice, and problems of permafrost stability, will go on to affect the rest of the globe. The region contains large quantities of carbon and methane gas trapped in its permafrost which will be released into the atmosphere if the permafrost melts and further hasten global warming. The melting of glaciers and ice sheets will also contribute to a rise in the sea level and the possible flooding of coastal areas.

A six-year study initiated by Environment Canada in 1990 concluded that climate change has already been observed in Canada's Mackenzie Basin region, which includes parts of the Yukon and Northwest Territories as well as northern British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan. There has been a warming trend of 1.5º C this century, and there is evidence that this has lowered lake levels and thawed permafrost. Kevin Jardine of Greenpeace pointed out to the Committee that, while northerners may not often speak about "global warming," they are already observing significant climate changes, and are concerned about such things as increased drought, dropping water levels and forest fires [27:18].

Regional action by the Arctic states can obviously be only a partial response to this global threat, but regional coordination of action will be very important, given that, in the words of the Worldwatch Institute, the United States and Russia are two of the eight "environmental heavyweights" ("E-8") which "disproportionately shape global environmental trends."138 While Russia faces grave ecological and other challenges, after a hiatus of several years the United States now seems to be resuming the environmental leadership role it played through the later 1980s. Louise Comeau told the Committee that a coordinated circumpolar policy could actually help the Clinton administration in its struggle with Congress over environmental issues. As she put it, "As the Committee knows, the U.S. administration has not received much support from Congress for action on environmental issues. Support from the Arctic Council could strengthen the U.S. administration's hand in climate negotiations"[27:7]. Increased support from Congress would also help improve U.S. environmental performance and cooperation in general, since, as Garrett Brass of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission told the Committee, budget cuts had already affected the U.S. contribution to the AEPS. In his words, "We had already been doing what, in our own self-criticism, we considered to be a rather inferior job in AEPS because of the budget restrictions we're all going through. We didn't want to do a worse job in the Council than we had already been doing in the AEPS if its responsibilities were larger" [62:13].

At the same time, according to Louise Comeau, another major role for the Arctic Council would be to show the world the extent to which the Arctic is affected by climate change. As she argued:

Under the climate change convention there's a global environment facility. If northern communities were in developing countries, they could apply to that fund for financing to help them adapt to climate change. . .Canadian northern communities cannot apply to that fund, and they are just as affected by these issues, through no fault of their own, as any of the countries in the Caribbean or in Africa. [27:14]
The Arctic Council, in Ms. Comeau's view, could help to make the South more aware of its impact on the North, and accept some responsibility.

The hope I have for the Arctic Council is that it will establish itself as a presence in defence of the Arctic, a political presence - and that's what we're lacking. You don't see either Arctic representation or indigenous representation. . .demanding that the South take responsibility, demanding that we have international protocols on persistent organic pollutants, sulphur dioxide, and greenhouse gas emissions. We need a political presence.
So while it's very important that local issues be dealt with, issues related to contaminants and existing problems, the real role of the Arctic Council, for me, is a political presence that gets the issues on the agenda and starts to articulate those interests in every form possible. That's what I'm lacking. That's what I'm not seeing yet. [27:14]
Nigel Bankes agreed that Arctic issues should be more closely related to the global agenda, arguing that "Canada should give Arctic issues prominence in global and multilateral treaty negotiations. . .Canadian negotiators and this Committee should always be encouraged to ask `what are the implications of such and so convention for the Arctic' "?139 The Arctic states must also understand their own share of responsibility for global environmental problems and solutions. According to Kevin Jardine,

The Arctic Council has a unique role to play, because it's not only representing the North; it's also representing the South. We have to remember that the eight countries on the Arctic Council, whether it's Russia, the United States, Canada or various representatives of the European Union, are also the countries creating the greenhouse gas problem, primarily. They're the countries emitting the persistent organic pollutants and so on.
So one of the reasons Greenpeace is very interested in the Arctic Council is that it's not only an organization that can represent the interests of an area that has been very much affected by global environmental destruction, but it's also made up of the very countries that are causing most of the problem. [27:17]
While the greatest impact will come from a coordinated approach to climate change and other issues, the Arctic states must begin by developing their positions at the national level. As Louise Comeau pointed out to the Committee, the Canadian Government has created a nongovernment Stakeholders Advisory Group to facilitate the development of Canada's position in the climate change negotiations. This Group is chaired by the Departments of Environment and Foreign Affairs, which lead the Canadian delegation at international climate negotiations. Given the importance of the issue to the North, however, Louise Comeau recommended the inclusion of a northern perspective in the Advisory Group, either from DIAND, the Canadian Polar Commission or the office of the Circumpolar Ambassador.

Accordingly:

Long-Range Pollutants and Health Concerns

As we have seen, pollution originating within the Arctic is largely limited to northern Russia. The rest of the Arctic was long thought to be protected from pollutants by its distance from the centres of human activity. Over the past two decades, however, scientists have realized that the Arctic is in some senses a "sink" for chemicals originating in the southern latitudes and carried North primarily by air, but also by water. One obvious manifestation of this pollution is the brown smog known as "Arctic haze," in the words of Oran Young, "a seasonal soup of pollutants originating in the mid-latitudes, [which] rivals the air pollution over Los Angeles or Mexico City during peak periods."

The 1986 Chernobyl disaster highlighted the degree to which what Dr. Roots described as a "comparatively small amount" of radioactivity could find its way into the Arctic. Saami representatives in Norway told the Committee of the lingering effects of Chernobyl on their reindeer herds. The Arctic region has seen ozone depletion (though not to the same extent as the Antarctic); reduction of CFC production under the Montreal Protocol has been particularly welcome, although Arctic peoples may still be threatened by the enhanced intensity of ultra-violet radiation in the North due to reflection from snow or ice.

Among the most far-travelled pollutants found in the Arctic are chemicals such as DDT, PCBs and toxaphene, and heavy metals such as mercury. Although many of these have been banned in northern states for years, they are still used in the South, and may travel to the Arctic from as far away as India, China or Guatemala. The amount of these pollutants in the North may actually be lower than in the South, but the chemicals are very persistent and collect in fatty tissue; as northerners eat more fatty "country foods" than southerners, the health threat to them may be much more significant. As an example, the highest known concentrations of PCBs have been found in the breast milk of women in the Canadian Arctic who eat large quantities of local fish and wildlife. As one member of the Committee told witnesses "Personally, I was nearly stunned in Resolute Bay, one evening as we attended a graduation ceremony, when I saw mothers giving the bottle to their infants. I was very shocked to see that. We were told that breast milk is very contaminated with chemical pollutants, mercury and some other mineral" [27:12].

As mentioned above, all Arctic states and a number of other European nations are already parties to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP). This Convention commits the contracting parties to broad principles and objectives and provides a framework for coordinating pollution control measures and common emission standards; however, only two protocols are in force, one for nitrogen oxides and one for sulphur. Two more have been developed but are not yet in force, and three more are being considered. From an Arctic point of view the most significant of these relates to POPs, and it now seems likely that a POPs protocol under the LRTAP Convention will be negotiated by the end of 1997. Work is also taking place under the LRTAP Convention to negotiate a protocol on heavy metals, but this will take longer. While the work through the UN Environment Program (UNEP) to negotiate a legally binding global protocol on POPs is welcome, it will take some time to complete. Meeting at Inuvik in March 1996, AEPS ministers agreed "to engage non UN-ECE countries in the reduction of global pollution." Arctic states cannot afford to wait until a legally binding global instrument on POPs is negotiated.

Accordingly:

On the national level, Canadian scientists began realizing that high levels of pollutants were entering the Arctic ecosystem in 1980, and work began seriously with the establishment of an interagency technical committee in 1985. In 1989, this committee was expanded to include indigenous groups, and became known as the Northern Contaminants Program, delivering advice to northerners on the health aspects of their traditionally harvested foods and pursuing contaminant emission controls in the international arena.140

In 1991, as part of its Green Plan initiative, the Canadian Government launched a six-year Arctic Environmental Strategy (AES) to look at four issues: environment/economy integration; action on waste; action on water; and action on contaminants. While significant progress has been made in all these areas (including the clean-up of former military sites described in Chapter Four), the $25- million Northern Contaminants Program has been a particular success, giving Canada the most comprehensive set of data on Arctic contaminants in the world, which it has shared with other states through the AEPS. Since the AES was initially funded for six years, it is due to end in the spring of 1997; however, the Government has announced that it will continue funding at least the contaminants element of the AES, which currently costs some $ 5-6 million per year. In 1996, DIAND published The Arctic Environmental Strategy: Five Years of Progress. A more comprehensive Canadian Arctic Contaminants Assessment Report, summarizing the work carried out under the AES and suggesting areas for future priorities, will be released in April 1997. While this report will deal primarily with contamination and health issues in the Canadian North, it will also address the circumpolar situation.

Testifying before the Committee in February 1997, Whit Fraser, the Chairman of the Canadian Polar Commission (CPC), argued strongly that simply refunding the existing Northern Contaminants Program was not enough. According to the recommendations of the Commission's October 1996 conference For Generations to Come, what is needed is a new national program (to include northern Quebec, Labrador and the northern portions of some provinces) which would focus more clearly on the links between human health and contaminants. The Commission also proposed the creation of a small blue-ribbon panel to look more closely at these issues and advise the Government on future priorities.

The presence of contaminants in food is a major health concern in the North, and one about which the Committee heard much throughout the Canadian Arctic. The dilemma is that, although significant studies now exist on the effects of contaminants on animals, there is still not enough information on the effects of long-term exposure on human beings. It may seem logical to advise northerners to limit traditional diets that include "country food," but the choice is not easy if the alternative is highly processed food that may put them at risk of such diseases as diabetes. Such questions have been dealt with by McGill University's Centre for Nutrition and Environment of Indigenous Peoples (CINE), whose board is composed of six aboriginal organizations and which has been funded by the AES since 1992. Even after its six years of work, a draft of the Canadian Arctic Contaminants Assessment Report concluded that, "At this time, the known risks are not adequately quantified to recommend or warrant a change in the diet of northern residents, in particular aboriginal northerners. Further studies are required to evaluate these risks."141

According to John Fraser, Canada's Ambassador for Environment and Sustainable Development, and a co-chair with Mary Simon of the For Generations to Come conference, "The uncertainty that many northerners feel about contaminants in their environment and their concerns about how research had been done in the past came through clearly." The uncertainty stems in large part from the fact that scientists have traditionally not paid enough attention to how to communicate often technical findings to indigenous northerners and others. The Committee met in Kuujjuaq with the members of Nunavik Board of Health and Social Services, several of whom - Jean Dupuis who also chairs the Kativik Regional Development Council, and Minnie Grey, the local hospital director and former ICC executive member - had just returned from the Tenth Congress of the International Union for Circumpolar Health (IUCH), in Anchorage, Alaska. They were encouraged that scientists and health researchers are now focussing on areas of concern to aboriginal peoples as well as learning more from them, though most of the funding still goes to southern-based institutions. In Grey's words, "people that are the subject of research [should] be more involved." Regional organizations as in Nunavik could be involved in the evaluation and monitoring of research proposals and in looking to apply benefits from research locally. For example, in regard to the serious issue of contaminants, there is a need to utilize the results of scientific research and to communicate findings to people in ways they can understand and then be able to act on accordingly. Instead of just spreading general fears about the risks from eating country foods, "what they lack is practical knowledge and advice about appropriate responses." Dr. Gary Pekeles, of McGill University's Baffin Project, an IUCH Vice-President, reported to Committee members at a roundtable in Montreal that there had recently been progress with health researchers learning to work collaboratively with aboriginal communities; an "indigenization" process in terms of health means that local people are taking over more responsibility for their own health service delivery.

As John Fraser concluded,

Action to reduce the impact of . . . pollutants on the people of the North is more than a question of environmental and human health. It has a strong moral quality. The preservation of aboriginal cultures in the Arctic depends in large part on the preservation of the traditional food supplies, so much a part of those cultures. These people want to maintain their traditions. They deserve to be heard as the world sets its environmental priorities.142
Accordingly:

Biodiversity and Wildlife Management

The Arctic is home to hundreds of unique species and habitats which are threatened by all the issues discussed above, from global climate change to pollutants and increased human activity. Conservation of species such as the polar bear is central to the indigenous cultures of Arctic peoples. The challenge goes beyond the region, however. Observes one recent report by a Canadian expert: "It is among birds, however, that the importance of the Arctic from a global perspective is truly spectacular. An estimated 15% of all of the world's species breed in the Arctic."143 Activities such as those described above have already resulted in habitat alteration and destruction and have exterminated some Arctic species. As Chaturvedi points out, "In Alaska, massive oil development at Prudhoe Bay has destroyed thousands of acres of wildlife habitat and left hundreds of open pits containing millions of gallons of oil-industry waste."144 According to the World Wildlife Fund, at least 35 species are at risk in the Canadian Arctic alone.145 Although some environmental NGOs have argued that Bill C-65, the Canada Endangered Species Protection Act should be further strenghtened, its provisions would give the federal Government responsibility for species protection and management on all public lands, which includes both Yukon and the Northwest Territories.

On the broadest level, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity provides a framework for regional and national programs for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. According to Chaturvedi, "The Convention. . .is based on an ecosystem approach and therefore is of exceptional significance in the Arctic." Other relevant global conventions are the 1973 Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) and the 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals.

Specific management regimes have also been adopted by the Arctic states over the years. The successor of one of the earliest examples of multilateral cooperation to protect the Arctic environment, the 1911 Convention on the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals, lapsed in 1984 when the U.S. refused to allow its extension. The most successful example of cooperation is probably the five-nation 1973 Polar Bear Convention, which is the sole legally binding conservation agreement in the Arctic. As Milton Freeman of the Canadian Circumpolar Institute at the University of Alberta informed the Committee, "Under this treaty, Canada has pursued quite different actions (yet fully consistent with the treaty's objectives) compared to those of the U.S., Russia and Norway. Despite the diversity of action allowed treaty signatories, treaty goals have been more than successfully achieved [Submission of 3 June 1996, p. 5].

Other examples of international agreements include some specific to caribou and whales. After a decade of negotiation, in 1987 Canada and the United States signed an Agreement on the Conservation of the Porcupine Caribou herd, although, as Chaturvedi points out, the agreement "represents only a formal commitment to cooperate between the two parties rather than a resource-management agreement."146 After years of dissatisfaction in Scandinavia with the International Whaling Commission, in 1992 Iceland, Greenland, Norway and the Faroe Islands established as an alternative the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO) for states interested in the management, utilization, and conservation of whales and other marine mammals. As the Committee was told in Oslo, Canadian scientists already participate in the work of NAMMCO and while Canada and Russia are currently observers there is a standing invitation for them to become full members.

The AEPS has also addressed Arctic biodiversity through the Working Group on the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), established, according to Robert Huebert, at the suggestion of Canada. Significant progress has been achieved in terms of Protected Areas (national parks or reserves) in the Arctic, which do much to protect species and habitats. Some 14% of the Arctic was already protected in 1994 and CAFF has been working on a Circumpolar Protected Areas Network (CPAN) Strategy and Action Plan, which it plans to accelerate. By February 1997, each Arctic state was to have submitted a summary of measures taken to implement CPAN; CAFF plans to present a progress report to the June 1997 AEPS Ministerial in Tromsø. In June 1996, Canada formally established Tuktut Nogait, its fifth-largest national park, in the Inuvialuit settlement region of the Western Arctic. This park is particularly important in that it encompasses the calving grounds of the Bluenose Caribou herd. In October, the Government announced the withdrawal of land for two more proposed northern national parks, one at Wager Bay on the western coast of Hudson Bay, and the other on northern Bathurst Island near the magnetic North Pole. In January 1997, it was announced that the Government of the Northwest Territories and the Canadian Government would by 1998 have jointly developed a Protected Areas Strategy for the whole of the Northwest Territories, to be implemented by the year 2000.

An important feature of the AEPS has always been its integration of western scientific knowledge (such as that Canada has compiled under the AES), and traditional indigenous ecological knowledge (TEK). One example is the work done under CAFF on Indigenous Knowledge and Conservation, which includes reviews of co-management systems, projects on beluga whale mapping and a TEK data directory. A very important element in the protection of habitat and wildlife in the North is what Oran Young calls the "institutional innovation" of co-management, which the Committee learned about at several locations in the Canadian Arctic. According to Oran Young,

Although many variants are possible, all forms of co-management feature an approach to resources management that involves joint decision-making and implementation on the part of local users whose actions are at stake and representatives of agencies of regional or national governments possessing the legal authority to promulgate regulations and make managerial decisions about the resources in question. Handled properly, co-management offers a means of incorporating traditional ecological knowledge into resource management and giving users a sense of ownership that alleviates problems of non-compliance.147
Canada leads the world in resource co-management regimes. In Calgary, Michael Robinson of the Arctic Institute of North America explained to members of the Committee that the Institute was then engaged in a co-management mapping project with the Saami of Russia's Kola peninsula. Traditional ecological knowledge enhances the management of living resources and is also an important element in engaging aboriginal Canadians in the North and elsewhere in the protection of their cultures and futures. As the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples put it in November 1996,

For aboriginal people, environmental stewardship is more than a question of politics, it is a matter of cultural and economic survival. The long-term effects of global pollution on the residents of the entire circumpolar region present a challenge for the affected nation-states, as well as the communities and people who live within their borders. Concerted multilateral efforts will be required. Environmental management regimes offer a different kind of challenge, and the promise - just beginning to be realized - of effective systems that make the best use of the knowledge and skills of aboriginal and non-aboriginal science.148
Significant examples of co-management regimes in the Canadian North include the Porcupine Caribou Management Board, on which Chair Joe Tetlichi briefed the Committee in Whitehorse. Another example is the Alaska and Inuvialuit Beluga Whale Commission, created in 1988. In light of this experience, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples recommended in its consideration of Environmental Stewardship in the North that:

4.6.8 The Government of Canada recognize the contribution of aboriginal traditional knowledge to environmental stewardship and support its development;
4.6.9 The Government of Canada make provisions for the participation of aboriginal governments and organizations in future international agreements concerning environmental stewardship;
4.6.10 The federal department of health continue the close monitoring of contamination of northern country food by atmospheric and other pollution and, given the importance of these foods to northern people, communicate the results of this work quickly and effectively to users of these renewable northern resources.
4.6.11 All governments in Canada support the development of co-management regimes along the lines of those already established in the North.149
The Committee agrees with these recommendations. Accordingly:

Arctic Environmental Cooperation and the Future

Since 1991, the Arctic states have cooperated in learning to understand the issues threatening the Arctic environment. The success of the Arctic states in pushing beyond the gathering of knowledge to put the issue of persistent organic pollutants on the global agenda shows the sort of concerted action they must take to address other regional and related global environmental challenges. The Committee agrees wholeheartedly that the scientific work pioneered under the AEPS must continue as part of the Arctic Council, but the Council must go beyond preserving the AEPS if it is to succeed.

As the first chair of the Arctic Council, Canada must have a clear vision of the extent of Arctic environmental cooperation it would like to see at the beginning of the next century. In this case, the issues are not primarily scientific, but depend on political will. As Canadian Paul Samson concluded in his recent study of international environmental cooperation in the region, "It is likely that politics, even more than science, will continue to set the environmental agenda in the Arctic."150 The Arctic Council creates an opportunity to bring circumpolar environmental cooperation to a new level by both deepening and broadening current environmental protection activities and making substantial progress on such broader issues as sustainable development. While a comprehensive binding international environmental regime for the Arctic is a long way off, strong measures can still be pursued when these are possible and softer measures when they are not. Following the lessons of the ozone experience, the Arctic states must act more quickly to address environmental challenges before they become crises.

More than a quarter century after the Stockholm Conference, the Arctic Council must build on the AEPS work led by environment ministers in shouldering the task of integrating global, regional and national actions on Arctic environmental protection and sustainable development into the mainstream foreign policy of all circumpolar countries. Whether Canada is able as the inaugural chair to show an example in this regard may well be the ultimate test of our resolve and record. With a priceless natural heritage at stake, future generations of Canadians are owed nothing less than the Government's best efforts to achieve the optimum circumpolar environmental cooperation possible today.

119
Oran Young, The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations (1996), p. 56.

120
Dr. Fred Roots, Environmental Issues in the Arctic - That Are Important to Policies and International Relations, submitted to the Committee on 23 April 1996.

121
Peter Prokosch, "Arctic Council Established - What's Next?," WWF Arctic Bulletin, No. 4.96, p. 3.

122
Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Agenda 21 from an Inuit Perspective, 1996.

123
Hilary F. French, "Learning From the Ozone Experience," in State of the World 1997, Worldwatch Institute, Washington D.C., 1997, p. 154-155.

124
Christopher Flavin, "The Legacy of Rio," in State of the World 1997, p. 11.

125
Dr. Frank Wania of Norway's Institute of Air Research quoted by Andrew Nilsiforuk, "Arctic Pollution: Poisons for a Pristine Land," The Globe and Mail (Toronto), 20 July 1996, p. D8. For a useful survey see Hajo Versteeg, "Environmental Contaminants in the Arctic," Theme Paper for the Second Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Yellowknife, March 1996.

126
David Scrivener, Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic (1996), Library No. 1/1996, Oslo, p. 6.

127
Robert Huebert, "The Canadian Arctic and the Development of an International Environmental Regime," Draft paper prepared for the 1995 Canadian Political Science Association Meeting, Montreal, June 1995, p. 12.

128
Interview with Canada's Arctic Ambassador Mary Simon, "Ensure that Environmental Protection in the Arctic is Secured," WWF Arctic Bulletin No. 1.96, p. 8.

129
Robert Huebert, "The Canadian Arctic and the Development of an International Environmental Regime" (1995), p. 15.

130
"The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," Global Agenda, Vol. 3, No. 3, Ottawa, December 1995, p. 5.

131
Paul Samson, Thin Ice: International Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic, Pacific Press, Wellington, New Zealand , 1997, 69-70.

132
Sanjay Chaturvedi, The Polar Regions (1996), p. 245-246.

133
Oran Young, The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations (1996), p. 63.

134
Nigel Bankes, Notes For Remarks to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade , 31 May 1996.

135
Kevin O'Reilly, "Diamond Mining and the Demise of Environmental Assessment in the North," Northern Perspectives, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, Fall/Winter 1996.

136
Canada Withdraws Court Action on BHP Diamond Mine, World Wildlife Fund News Release, 13 January 1997.

137
Fred Roots, Environmental Issues in the Arctic (1996).

138
Christopher Flavin, "The Legacy of Rio" (1997), p. 6.

139
Nigel Bankes, Notes For Remarks to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 31 May 1996.

140
Robert Huebert, "The Canadian Arctic and the Development of an International Environmental Regime" (1995), p. 13-15.

141
Canadian Arctic Assessment Report, Chapter 6, "Conclusions and Knowledge Gaps For Future Directions," Draft, December 1996, p. 24.

142
The Honourable John Fraser, "Looking North For Answers," Global Agenda, Vol. 4, No. 3, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, December 1996.

143
Jay R. Malcolm, The Demise of an Ecosystem: Arctic Wildlife in a Changing Climate, World Wildlife Fund Climate Change Campaign, November 1996, p.1.

144
Sanjay Chaturvedi, The Polar Regions (1996), p. 243.

145
WWF's Species At Risk: Focus on Arctic Canada, Spring 1996.

146
Sanjay Chaturvedi, The Polar Regions (1996), p. 250.

147
Oran Young, The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations (1996), p. 30-31.

148
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Minister of Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1996, Volume 4: Perspectives and Realities, p. 459-460.

149
Ibid., p. 460.

150
Paul Samson, Thin Ice: International Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic (1997), p. 70.

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