EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, November 8, 1995

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[English]

The Chairman: Order, ladies and gentlemen.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the committee will commence its study of the report of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves.

Today we have with us the commissioners of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves. As members know, it is now our duty to examine the findings of the commission and to report our views back to the House.

I'm assuming everybody has had a briefing from them. I myself have had the opportunity to give the report a quick read. I found it to be both thorough and interesting. It certainly will give members of our committee much to ponder.

Let me on behalf of the committee welcome our guests, starting with the Right Hon. Brian Dickson, who as we all know was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada from 1984 to 1990. Mr. Dickson is a veteran of the Second World War, having served with the Royal Canadian Artillery from 1940 to 1945. In addition to a long list of distinguished honours, Mr. Dickson is the honorary colonel, retired, of the 30th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, as well as the honorary president of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute.

As well, Lieutenant-General Charles Belzile served as platoon commander in Korea and after a distinguished career retired from the Canadian Forces in 1986. Since 1992 he has been president of Belzile Consultants.

Finally, we have here a face very familiar to our committee, Professor Jack Granatstein. Professor Granatstein is well known to us through both his writings and previous committee appearances. Professor Granatstein served with the Canadian Forces from 1956 to 1966, and only recently retired from York University as a distinguished research professor of history.

I welcome you, gentlemen. I now would like you to make your presentations. As we previously discussed, after five to ten minutes we'll go to questions. I presume there will be several.

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Mr. Dickson.

Right Hon. Brian Dickson (Commissioner, Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ladies and gentlemen, we commissioners are very pleased to have the opportunity to discuss the findings of our commission with your important committee.

For the past seven months we have been totally immersed in the study of our reserves. We have heard over 300 witnesses. We have received over 50 technical briefings and have studied well over 800 submissions and documents. We've had lengthy and candid discussions with a large number of reservists and other persons across the country.

This has provided us with a firm foundation from which to present the Minister of National Defence with what we think are solid recommendations. We firmly believe these would significantly improve our reserves and make our reserves stronger, more effective - better trained for their peacetime and wartime roles.

We found the naval, air and communications reserves to be in good shape. We have asked that air reservists be employed in greater support of other elements and that the signals component of the communication reserve be returned to the militia.

The militia was a much tougher problem. We have recommended that the district headquarters, 14 of them, be disbanded and that the districts be reconstructed into 7 brigade groups. Brigade group headquarters provide an excellent staff and command training environment. This structure would not have to be completely overhauled to be made operational. We have also recommended that the units be amalgamated or otherwise reduced in numbers to provide 9 to 11 units per brigade group.

I just want to mention that the diagram on page 29 of the report is incomplete in that it does not mention a medical unit. So when you're looking at that diagram please bear that in mind.

The larger units we have envisaged will provide leaders with the opportunity to develop their expertise in command and control at a level more appropriate to their rank. This will be a much better training platform, we believe. It will increase retention and will allow more advanced training to be conducted, therefore further reducing attrition. In time they will be able to perform more meaningful operational roles.

We have recommended that the mobilization plan be based on the formation of a corps and that units be assigned a niche in that structure. In that regard we believe the supplementary reserve can make an essential contribution, and we have presented recommendations to make it an even larger and more useful component of the reserves. To make the total force work, movement between the regular and the reserve components must be made easier.

We also have recommended that headquarters and units have an adequate mix of regular and reserve personnel. Our improved reserves should be treated as full members of the Canadian Forces. As such, we recommend that pay, compensation, benefits and pension inequities be addressed.

Our final main recommendation, which stems from the virtually unanimous opinion of the reservists, is that job protection legislation be introduced. This would enable Canada's reservists to participate in training and operations.

Finally, let me state that we have appreciated the cooperation given by the Canadian Forces as well as the voluminous and candid testimonies we have received. They have enabled us to make recommendations that we firmly believe are good for the reserves, good for the Canadian Forces, and good for the nation.

We welcome now the opportunity to respond to your questions.

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The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Dickson.

I will now go to questions. Mr. Leroux.

[Translation]

Mr. Leroux (Shefford): I'm very pleased to welcome you to the committee. I am going to ask my first question, and whichever one of you feels more comfortable answering it can respond.

The Auditor General and others have noted that the Department of National Defence has had trouble determining the actual costs of maintaining the reserves. Did the lack of information with respect to current costs in any way detract from your ability to successfully complete this review?

[English]

Professor Jack Granatstein (Commissioner, Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves): Sir, I don't think it matters very much what the reserves cost. Our conclusion was that there had been an enormous amount of fighting between regulars and reservists on whether it was $1 billion or $100 million or something in between. The only question that matters to the reserves is how much money is available for training.

We tried to get around that fight on the total cost of the reserves by standing the question on its head. Instead of saying there is a total budget of x hundred million dollars, we said that what matters is that a militia unit, for example, gets four days of training for its effective members each month. That's in fact what we recommended. Our recommendation suggests that if we can get 36 days of training time for a militia unit from the period of September to May, that will be sufficient to allow it to train to a high standard.

We also suggest that the unit should get a quantified sum to handle its administration, its command and control. Moreover, the unit should be able to count on its two weeks of summer training in the field being paid by the higher headquarters. We think this will resolve the disputes between the reserves and the regulars on finances.

The overall budget does not matter to the ordinary reserve unit, and certainly not to the ordinary reserve airman, sailor or private soldier. That's a matter for the accountants. What really matters is how much money is available for training. That's what we tried to deal with.

[Translation]

M. Leroux: Some people have said that members of the Regular Force and reservists have often been at loggerheads in the past. What is your view of their relationship? Do you agree with that allegation, and do you see any solution to the problem, even a partial one? Perhaps the two forces should be merged. What do you think?

LGen Charles Belzile (Commissioner, Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves): We arrived at the conclusion that one of the reasons for this antagonism is that we're dealing with two different mentalities here.

We have been told that at many levels of the organization, the Regular Force has been absorbing much of the funds allocated for reserve force training, particularly as a result of people taking on responsibilities that were not rightfully theirs.

Furthermore, reservists have always believed - rightly or wrongly - that this kind of manoeuvring was totally calculated and premeditated. After speaking during our public hearings with reservists who had worked with Regular Force units in places such as Yugoslavia, we realized that the greater the integration, the less antagonism there was likely to be between the two.

The Commission naturally recommended greater integration of headquarters, regular and reserve unit personnel.

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We hope that as the gulf between the two narrows as a result of greater integration, this kind of division will pose less and less of a problem.

Mr. Leroux: During the referendum campaign, I had an opportunity to meet with two of my former students who had just returned from the former Yugoslavia. They were Land Force reservists. As we all know, Canada plays a major role in peacekeeping efforts. Is it your feeling that it is becoming increasingly important to assign a larger percentage of reservists to the army component, rather than to the navy or the air force, since Canada may again be asked to provide troops, particularly if a U.N. contingent is formed?

We have discussed this before, and I know the Minister of Foreign Affairs has alluded to this possibility. Perhaps we should consider making the army our priority rather than the other two components. I would be interested in hearing your views on the subject.

LGen Belzile: When we began our study, we predicated it on the financial data and budget ceilings provided to us by the Department.

As you saw in our report, we have recommended that some duties currently performed by a reserve unit, such as the Communication Reserve, be returned to the army in the short term, thereby making it possible to increase the size of the Land Reserve Force.

Indeed, the Land Reserve Force, even after the cutbacks advocated in the 1994 White Paper on Defence, is quite a bit larger than the other reserves put together. If our goal is a total of approximately 23,000 reservists, some 14,500 or 15,000 personnel - between 60 and 65 per cent - could then be assigned to the Land Reserve Force.

I would just like to make a comment regarding the availability of reserve personnel that meet U.N. criteria, for instance. We have no doubt whatsoever that many fine reservists have served the U.N. well, but as for actually replacing certain units with others composed solely of reservists who cannot guarantee their services, who are less available... Let's just say that we have some serious concerns about such a plan.

We definitely believe there is a need to integrate a certain proportion of reserve personnel, because it would likely bring about a major improvement. There would be more personnel, thereby making it possible to send fully trained sub-units whose members would be from the same area and thus be well acquainted.

We do hope that sort of thing will be possible in the future.

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Mifflin was next.

Mr. Mifflin (Bonavista - Trinity - Conception): I want to thank the commissioners for really an excellent report. It was well put together and easy to read. The recommendations are clear. They're not necessarily simple recommendations, but they are clear recommendations. I think some of them are implementable with no difficulty and some of them, things like pay and the integration, I think will take some considerable challenge to the department.

If I could, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to zero in on the legislation issue, which I think will be of primary concern to us as parliamentarians. I did read the chapter on the legislation.

What we found as a special joint committee...many of the members - and I think most of them are here, certainly from the House side - was strangely enough that some of the reservists.... We went into this thinking we would get almost 100% support from reservists that we should go forward with the legislation. We were somewhat surprised to find that some of the senior reservists were not quite in accord with that. The reason they gave was that they were not sure they wanted to have themselves in a position where employers may not want to hire reservists because of this legislation.

So I'm somewhat heartened to see your approach to this. Obviously this must have come up in your deliberations as well.

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It was also suggested - I'm not sure you really meant this, maybe you did, I don't know - that whether the legislation was passed or not, the fact that it was being debated would be of use.

Personally, having looked at your 51 recommendations - and we really haven't decided how we're going to go about writing our report yet - I think one of the things that will be a challenge to us as members of Parliament will be exactly how we treat that particular recommendation and whether we go forward with it or whether we may want to give some reservation to it.

Could I ask the commissioners, Mr. Chairman, perhaps to speak to that, and to address the reservations some other people had regarding that particular issue.

Mr. Dickson: Mr. Mifflin, I'd be pleased to lead off. The issue...and we're well aware is a sensitive one...which is debatable, virtually unanimously recommended by the junior reservists in particular, who I think without exception said they would like to have job protection to give them a break in the summer so they don't use their two weeks of holidays in military training and leave their families without any holidays.

They thought some form of legislation should be implemented that would require some of the more senior employers, for example, those with over 50 employees, to give a break to permit military service for the benefit of not only the people concerned, the reservists, but also the employer, who would have a better Canadian at the end of the training.

As I'm sure you know, the Americans do have legislation like this. We're told that it is effective. I think there were two reasons advanced against it. One was that at the present time there are more applications for people to join the reserves than there are vacancies. The second was the point that you made. If an employer has two possible candidates for a job and one carries a burden by reason of job legislation, the employer will probably choose the one without that burden. But we've considered these matters and in our view we think the legislation is supportable.

My colleagues may have something more. We realize this is perhaps one of the most contentious recommendations we have made.

Prof. Granatstein: I'll say a word, if I may. We don't, for example, permit discrimination against pregnant mothers in employment. We don't permit discrimination against people on grounds of race, religion or colour. I don't think the country should be seen to be saying that discrimination against someone who wants to serve in the Canadian Forces is permissible. I think to suggest that is really quite shocking. We should not get into that bag. We should very much say that to serve in the reserve forces is a positive good and the state wishes to encourage it.

Now, that doesn't mean we need punitive legislation so we can crack the whip over employers. What we've suggested is in fact very gentle legislation, something that tries to encourage as much as it does to admonish and I think that we have come up with an approach that.... If any approach to this subject is workable in this country it's the one we've suggested.

I think it would be very useful, as we do suggest and mean seriously, if this were discussed in the House of Commons. It would be very interesting to have members debate the value of reserve service. When confronted with that I doubt very much that many members will stand up and say this is not something that should be encouraged.

I think it needs a bit of will on the part of government to take the step forward, and I think once that step is taken we will have legislation.

Mr. Dickson: I think that completes our comment on that particular issue, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mifflin: Mr. Chairman, that was my main issue. I'll give others the benefit of the time.

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The Chairman: Thank you, gentlemen.

That is an issue, of course, that will probably be one of the top priorities - for or against - within our committee. This was debated a lot across the country.

As I said the other night, when we went across on our joint committee we had one side of the spectrum saying there should be legislation. The Alberta Chamber of Commerce put through through a resolution, and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce said this should be compulsory. Then you go to the other side, which says it's going to discriminate against people.

Prof. Granatstein: May I add one thing to my previous remarks? We're not talking about 100,000 or 500,000 people in the reserves. We're talking about a reserve force that at the present moment is 29,000 people, many of whom are students. It's going to be reduced, in the terms of the white paper, to 23,000. Many of that group will still be students. This is not a very major burden on very many companies. I think that should be remembered.

The Chairman: My personal opinion is that I have to agree with what you people have put forward on this issue. I think it's going to be one we'll always be talking about.

There's just one other question that I might ask, as the chairman. I'll take the prerogative to do this.

You talk about the demographics of the cuts. I've had an interjection already from somebody from the largest province who said that Ontario will be the area that will take the biggest cuts.

Can you give me some explanations and qualifications? As I understand it, no one should really suffer because of this; we should have a more efficient and effective reserve force.

Mr. Dickson: Dr. Granatstein will be glad to respond.

Prof. Granatstein: We have suggested that the cuts should be parcelled out on an equivalent basis, particularly for the militia. The cuts should be in the order of 25% across the board by land-force area.

Ontario has 5,500 people in the militia. That is comparable to that of Quebec and the west. It is a little more than eastern Canada has in the militia, but I do not think Ontario is going to suffer in straight personnel terms.

There are many units in Ontario. Some of those may carry a heavier share of the burden of amalgamations and possible closures. But I think the net result will be effective units.

I should say that one of the major reasons we came to the conclusions we did about the way to proceed was that the junior ranks, particularly those to whom we spoke, were very clear that they wanted to serve in effective units. It meant a great deal to them to be a sergeant in a full-strength platoon or a lieutenant commanding a full-strength platoon, rather than at present, in which a section is 2 men, a platoon is 10, and a company is 50, at best.

We're trying to lead to a situation, in Ontario and elsewhere, that has real units in the militia with a real strength approximating - it's not 100% - the kind of strength that regular units might have. That way, they can get effective training.

LGen Belzile: If I may, I would also like to bring up the point that within these rough equivalences, if you wish, between the different regions of Canada, you still would wind up in Ontario, for instance, with the two brigades we proposed of somewhere around 2,700 to 2,800 people each, with sizeable units as described by Professor Granatstein.

In this day and age of modern technology, the command and control of units that are not capable, most of the time anyway, of being grouped together, except during two weeks in the summer, is considerably simplified. This is with the advent of better communications systems that exist.

I know that we use the argument in Canada many times that it's our geography that makes it difficult. This is true. As a Canadian who has travelled all around this country, I know how large it is and how different and varied it is.

But having said this, somebody who has a unit with perhaps a headquarters in Winnipeg that may have, say, a subunit in northern Ontario, would not find it much more difficult than in the past. If anything, these things should have been eased up by modern technology.

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In a number of units that we advocate to still leave those units to a viable standard so they are a good training platform, with at least two subunits in each one, as we propose...then we don't see any problem. We don't see any reason, for instance, to go for more headquarters in a place like Ontario on the basis perhaps of a demographic strength in their units, which may be 300 or 400 greater than, say, Quebec.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Mr. Hart.

Mr. Hart (Okanagan - Similkameen - Merritt): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congratulations, gentlemen, on a difficult job. I have a couple of questions. Actually, I would like to follow up on Admiral Mifflin's question with regard to the legislation.

When we were hearing witnesses during the special joint committee, the Chief of the Defence Staff told the committee at one point that probably the largest offender of not allowing employees the time off to go to their reserve service is actually the federal government.

Wouldn't it be wise for the federal government to lead by example and show that their employees can go off on training and commitments in the UN and things like that before legislation is actually put in place?

Mr. Dickson: We would certainly be in favour of that. I believe the lead has been now taken, if I read the papers correctly, in New Brunswick within the last couple of weeks. As I understand it, the employees in the service of the New Brunswick government will have the right to have job protection as we understand it.

Mr. Hart: Let's hope that this government will act as well and move quickly on that.

I would like to talk about the guidance document for a minute. As I said when I started, you had a very difficult task. One of the things that concerned me was the fact that the minister basically shackled you in many ways by giving you some numbers, such as 23,000. You were to do a complete look at the reserve, but how can you come to a conclusion when you have the constraint of that number already fixed in the document? Did that concern you at all?

Prof. Granatstein: I think it concerned us. There's no doubt that in an ideal world we would all prefer to see reserves that are larger than what the white paper mandated. We would like to see regular forces that are larger than what the white paper mandated, too. But our job was to try to make what was there as effective as it could possibly be.

This is what we found. The navy is in very good shape. It has specific roles. The militia, to us, seemed to be blessed with too many units that were too small, which could not properly train.

So given our task, which I grant was to work within the numbers that were laid down for us, we still think it is possible to produce a system - it's what we've tried to suggest - that will give real units real tasks and capabilities, and the real financing to prepare for those tasks.

There's no doubt that we would much prefer to have a reserve force of 50,000 in the primary reserves. We've been told that's not on; we have to work with 23,000. Maybe we can make that 23,000 more effective than the current 29,000 have been. I think what we have suggested will give us that.

Mr. Hart: Consider some of the suggestions the commission has made with regard to rank structure, for instance. You are saying that maybe we don't need a lieutenant-colonel or a colonel at a reserve militia unit. Maybe that person should be a major, which will free us up and give us more ``pointy-enders'', such as privates, corporals and other ranks in that scenario.

Do you believe this is also a recommendation for the regular force to be looking at? We're in a situation right now in which we have the downsizing of the regular force to some 60,000 people. One example would be the Chief of Defence Staff himself. Maybe he doesn't need to be a general any more; maybe he should be a lieutenant-general.

LGen Belzile: You may, Mr. Chairman, have a very valid point, but as you fully realize, at the outset, when you wondered about the contents of our mandate, this was not in our mandate. This is not in any way, shape or form looking for a crutch to defend ourselves, but -

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Mr. Hart: General, if I could for one second, though, as I understand it the militia or the reserve is not a junior partner in this thing we call defence for our country. Therefore, it would make sense to me and to most people, I'm sure, that some of the recommendations you've made should also apply to the other partner in this thing we call national defence, which is the regular force.

LGen Belzile: I think we made that point very clearly in our closing arguments in the whole document. We say that effectively, although we had what we felt was a fairly broad mandate, we also found it somewhat restrictive in the sense that whether one liked it or not, we were effectively studying a slice of a much larger and undoubtedly much costlier apple. Since we did not have the time nor the resources nor the mandate to study the rest, as you will have noted, we have suggested as opposed to making it a formal recommendation that the minister and the government should consider studying the whole thing together.

It does not matter how the regular force is eventually structured, because it's going through a lot of internal studies on command and control. It will impact on the reserves. As we are suggesting in most of our recommendations, it is impossible that they will not impact on the regular force in one form or another, either through integration or joint headquarters. That is a very true statement. I think we have made the point clearly enough that if somebody wants to pursue it, we certainly feel it should be pursued.

One point perhaps should be made, if I may be allowed to come back to some of Professor Granatstein's points. When you start talking about numbers, the numbers, as restrictive as they are, are a funding ceiling. They are not intended to mean to us, in our interpretation, the number of people. They are intended to be the number of people that you can pay and that participate in training effectively on a part-time basis, perhaps only 75% or 80% of the time, freeing the other 20% or 25% of money to allow for a quarter of another person, if you want.

So we can see those numbers, as restrictive as they sound, growing to a considerable extent. Instead of 23,000 you may very well see a primary reserve strength of 25,000 or 26,000 and still meet the government's mandate that the funding ceiling be 23,000. That point must not be forgotten.

On the question of rank structure and freeing money and whether it applies to the regular force or not, I think some of it should apply to the regular force. But having said this, the fact remains that for a lieutenant-colonel, you buy two captains or four private soldiers. Somewhere in the structure you have to decide which ones you need most. I don't think we felt that this, other than in general terms, was our mandate to pin down too precisely.

Mr. Dickson: If I could just add this, the final sentence in the report reads:

Accordingly, we urge the Minister of National Defence to consider the creation of a special commission with the widest possible mandate to examine the administration and structure of the Canadian Forces and the civilian component of the Department of National Defence.

We recognize the interaction.

The Chairman: Is there anyone else?

Mr. Richardson (Perth - Wellington - Waterloo): Mr. Chairman, I'd like to thank the three people who headed up this commission.

I think the rationalization was first-rate. I think the proposition upon which you built the reserves, giving it a focus in the sense.... From the Second World War, when it was a huge reserve, until now it has really been drifting. Periodically when there was a commander of FMC who took a strong interest in it, it was a bit of a shot forward, and it didn't. It drifted, at tremendous cost both from the sense of relationship with the community and with the army and the regular army.

One of the generals at the time who took an interest was General Belzile, who recognized the point. He finally got them out of the uniforms of the past and got the rifles changed over. They were wearing uniforms that looked like they were the same as the regular army's. So I was glad to see General Belzile on the commission.

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The ex-Chief Justice and the hon. colonel, with his wisdom, having been part of the force, and Professor Granatstein being part of it, gave it balance and credibility. What's come forward here...you've given those people who are serving as citizens in the reserves, whether it be the navy, army or air force....the navy had rationalized role, bought the equipment and set training in place. The air force had equipment in place, relied heavily on ex-air force pilots and technicians, and worked up as well, which is not a bad idea. It's implicit in your recommendations here that we do the same thing with the supplementary reserve in the militia.

But without that focus for the militia, it could continue to drift. With augmentation you have set forward something that the forces have not seen, particularly the land forces - a simplified form of mobilization culminating in some series of events that would take the place of crises.

I think those highlights - one, the rationalization of the militia, giving the militia a focus, a purpose.... You weren't able to write in the training program. That will be the commanders of each of the environmental commanders to set up the training program and see that it's executed. I'll be damn sure this committee will follow through and see that it is done, because the study commission was put forward and drifted. There was no follow-up. I think you've given the kind of targets we can follow up on and see that they are met.

I would just ask you, with the last question...I don't think we're interested in really going back and visiting national defence headquarters at the moment, since this is current. There will be some wrinkles that we won't be able to get through; they will be bones of contention of this committee. But certainly, I think 90% of what you have here we hope to see in place, and strongly recommend it from this committee, because the rationalization, the focus and commitment to see that they are used in a manner.... I thought the fact you recognized junior officers to command their own soldiers, not to go over as liaison where their platoon is taken one place and given a regular force officer, was an excellent recommendation and comment in the report. It's very tangible evidence that this did happen in Bosnia.

I would like to see that. If they're going to be partners with the regular force, and equal partners, with the same focus, that kind of professional respect, one for the other, has to be in place. So I'm glad to see you made that comment.

Having been in the regular and the reserve forces, I see the merits of both sides of the story, and I don't think three people with the different perspectives could have come to the table at this time.

I just think you have it there; the problem with us is to see that we can deliver the goods, that it's in place, and that we see that the commanders of the navy, army and air force - if I can be so bold as to use those terms...and I hope this committee will continue to see that they are following through, as we work through this special commission, to see that it's executed in the manner in which it's laid out.

Thank you. There was no question in that. It was a statement.

Prof. Granatstein: I'd be happy to settle for 98% of our recommendations going through.

Mr. Richardson: That's what we've worked for, but we may not get that.

Mr. Frazer (Saanich - Gulf Islands): Gentlemen, once again I would like to commend you on your report. I haven't had the opportunity to read it as thoroughly as I intend to, but I have been through the summary.

I seldom differ with the parliamentary secretary to the Minister of National Defence, but I do think redressing the pay situation is one of the most vital things needed to put some morale back in the militia. Everywhere we went we heard that this was one of the prime problems that bothered people, and COs were put in the unenviable position of having to misuse canteen funds and so on to pay their people. If there is a prime thing that should be addressed early in the game, surely it is to make the pay system work properly.

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I have to admit now that I am going to grind an axe a little bit, but this does go to a question that I want to put to you. It is the government's decision to close CFB Chilliwack. My personal involvement at Chilliwack was that I had the honour to command the Canadian Forces Officer Candidate School there. I contend that the location, terrain and climate cannot be matched anywhere else in the country, and that the Canadian Forces will have suffered a degradation by virtue of being denied the use of this facility for that purpose.

Chilliwack was the last regular force unit in British Columbia. Were you able to measure the impact this closure will have on the militia and the support it could provide to those units?

Prof. Granatstein: I don't think we could measure the impact, but we knew there would be a major impact. I don't think we had any doubt about that. The militia and air people we talked to in British Columbia made the point that B.C. would be left without a regular unit, that the move of the helicopters to Edmonton so they could be with the brigade would mean that there would not be a helicopter capacity in British Columbia. Both of these things concerned us, as naturally they would.

On the other hand, we weren't able to come up with recommendations to tackle them. When you read the report you will see that we make a gesture - not a recommendation - in the direction of saying some consideration should be given to having a helicopter squadron in British Columbia. But that is a lot of cost at a time of shrinking resources, and we did not feel that we could make it a recommendation.

There is no doubt that this is a serious problem. I wish we had an answer on how to resolve it. Maybe the answer is a bigger defence budget.

Mr. Frazer: It strikes me that when they are in desperate need of facilities and expertise and so on, it has been denied to them.

Prof. Granatstein: I grant that.

Mr. Dickson: Mr. Chairman, if there was one issue on which there was no debate, it was the fact that the pay system for the reserves is appalling. They are late, they are paid too much, they are paid too little, and it has had an affect on attrition. It is a very serious matter, and I think that is recognized by those in control.

There has been a very unsatisfactory situation on the Atlantic. There is a new program being mooted, which we have described in our report. It seems to have a very energetic group sponsoring it and working on it. One can hope that will solve matters.

The Australians told us that their pay system for reserves is just as efficient as it is for regulars. So we hope the changes proposed and under way will remedy the matter, but it is not an easy issue.

Mr. Frazer: Mr. Chairman, I concur completely with your recommendation that the two pay schemes be integrated and made more efficient. I think that is an excellent one.

You've required that the militia provide 36 days of training time in the September to May period. Are the summer courses and various extended periods during which people train over and above that, or would they be subtracted from those 36 days? If so, how many days do you recommend be added to the 36 to accommodate this?

LGen Belzile: The 36 days that we are recommending is exclusive of summer training. We call for summer training to be an additional component that may be provided by one of the levels of headquarters that actually control that training.

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The normal expenditure of summer training is 14 days, so if you were going to put all that together, it would seem to me that pretty close to almost exactly 50 days is what should be guaranteed for the training of the people on the ground.

The rest of it, which is above, covers a whole bunch of trade schools, militia staff courses, special tasking such as the guard on the Hill, and a variety of other tasks that are given to militia units. We have also recommended, you will remember, that any additional tasking that comes to a militia unit or a militia brigade comes with the funds to actually execute it. So really, it is over and above the 36.

Mr. Frazer: So if an individual were to be given a course with the regular force, not in the summer, but during the year - say he got two weeks to go on a six-week course but he does it in three segments - is that going to be subtracted from his 36 training days, or is that additional as well?

LGen Belzile: It's not our intention. That should be also financed at the time that the course nomination goes through, and the headquarters, which controls that level of training, should provide the money for it.

Mr. Frazer: Okay.

You have recommended that when the militia forces are put in with the regular forces they move, wherever possible, as unit size. My question is, did you determine a minimum unit size that was appropriate? For instance, would it be a platoon in the case of an entry unit, or is it a company? Just how far down did you think you'd go to make this a viable proposition?

LGen Belzile: Mr. Chairman, we did not. We talked about the desirability of building it up to subunit capabilities. Right now I don't think there is a militia unit in Canada, for instance - if I'm going to use the militia as an example as opposed to naval or air reserves - that could accomplish this sort of task right now in availability, in level of training and in standard of training. So we are recommending that a platoon or even a section, for that matter, under the normal leadership of the individual NCOs, is what should be assigned to a regular unit.

When you get a chance to look at the details of the text, you will see in our recommendations that we recognize this would be difficult. Perhaps initially it may have to be done on a regional basis or on a district or brigade basis. Even so it would still be a step forward, in our opinion, not to have the reinforcement or the augmentation always totally dependent on individuals. The more that you can do to move that unit's collective training to the capability of supplying sub-subunits, you should do it. Ideally, I would think nothing much below platoon; it would get a little difficult under the level of platoon.

Mr. Frazer: I would think there would be a difficulty in retaining identity if it were much smaller than platoon size.

LGen Belzile: That's right.

Mr. Frazer: With regard to equipment, which is another complaint that we heard across the country - that insufficient, antiquated equipment was relegated to the reserves - you're talking basically, as I understand it, about centering the reserve units more, to take advantage of gathering them together. Have you considered whether you would position the necessary equipment with those units, or would they be centralized, say as brigade group areas, or what?

LGen Belzile: We talked, Mr. Chairman, about equipment in two fashions primarily, the first one being that we recognize and support what the land forces right now are in the process of establishing, that is, the militia training support centres such as the one that's been built in Meaford. There are three others planned: one for Valcartier, one for Gagetown, and one for Wainwright. We have also urged that these continue to be funded and established.

Those centres will hold a set of army equipment capable of looking after a total force of, say, a battalion battle-group size, which is much more than most units in the militia would initially require. You'd probably need one of those militia brigades to really challenge that equipment load.

On the second point, we have also stated that where it is practical, smaller equipment, such as weapons systems like perhaps a Carl-Gustaf - we used that specific example in our text - should be grouped, if there are not enough to have in every armoury still operating, in such a way that they can at least be circulated. This can be done right now without the procurement of any additional equipment. It's a question of distributing it, putting it in the right place, and making it more accessible to the units.

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Ideally, as time progresses and the militia units' training gets more collective, there may be arguments to increase the equipment load, but we think most of this can be done with the existing equipment load.

Mr. O'Reilly (Victoria - Haliburton): Gentlemen, it's quite a report to try to follow through to deal with some of the problems people deal with in the present set-up.

There's a distinct disadvantage for remote rural areas. I just want to give you an example. I don't know if you've dealt with it or not, but let's look at the case of a male reservist who takes a tour of duty and is paid - very poorly, by the way, in my estimation - for the work he does. He returns after the tour of duty and goes back to his job and does not continue with his training because of the distance he has to travel for training, even though he is well qualified and has a higher rank.

He drops out, works at his job, looks after his family and then goes back for another tour of duty and finds out that because he hasn't attended once a week or whatever, 100 miles from where he lives, he loses his rank and has to start all over again. It's maybe six months before he gets his rank back. The job he is returning to may be shift work that doesn't allow him to attend training sessions. The job may also be call-back, where he has to be available, so it's not easy for him to be a reservist.

It's not easy for him to retain his family status and job and still do a tour of duty. Maybe he has a particular talent. In this particular case it is medical. I notice medical was left out of this equation, so another question is why there is no medical equation in the forces.

Were those types of problems given to you to solve, and are they solvable - or is there a way around them? Those are two questions.

My third question is on funding for cadets. You recommend an increase, but to what level? I think the cadet corps in Canada is one we can expand on. It creates an avenue to train youth and provide discipline. It probably kept me out of jail when I was a youngster, so I certainly appreciated it.

There is never enough in the budget for the cadet training field. Lots of times a commitment is made from a great distance to establish a cadet corps and keep it going with little or no money, yet that's an avenue we should expand upon as a government to give our youth something to do that they can take pride in and to actually learn some discipline.

Those are the three scenarios.

Mr. Dickson: On the matter of the reservist who is 100 miles away, I don't recall any particular instance of somebody coming before us to discuss that problem. Perhaps General Belzile or Dr. Granatstein have something further on that.

LGen Belzile: I'll attack this particular one at the outset and then get on to the other two.

We recognize that this is a problem. In the more rural areas units are a little farther apart, and this applies all over this country. It is unfortunate that the reserves, or even a very capable regimental system in the army with a lot of history, is unable to have a complete footprint everywhere. There are two reasons for that.

First, in certain cases the recruiting base may be so small you cannot justify the viability of even detached sub-units. We also realize that the forces lose a lot of talent that way. I'm not sure there's a practical answer to it other than a very broad spreading of little penny-packeting, which makes it very difficult to train the other way.

.1630

So it's a problem, and I think we've addressed it in the sense that we realize it. However, as the Chief Justice has just stated, nobody has presented it to us as a particular problem. That doesn't mean we're not concerned with it - I think we recognize it - but we're not sure there is a very practical way to cover the complete footprint across the country.

To touch on the medicals briefly, I'd like to point out that when we say it seems they've dropped out, they haven't really dropped out. In the text we talk about medical companies and how perhaps some of them can be united with or merged into larger organizations. It's in the diagrammatic form of a typical brigade, which is hypothetical. Quite honestly we forgot to add the box that should have said ``medical capabilities''. For this we can only apologize. I guess my graphic artistry wasn't working at 100% that day.

I have a very personal stake in cadets, and I'm happy to address that one. I agree with you that the cadet movement is probably the finest - it's certainly the oldest - youth program in this country and it deserves to get the support of the Canadian government. It has always received it, and I would hope that it continues to receive that support.

We have specifically made three recommendations with regard to cadets, one of them having to do with the statement in the white paper that indicated the cadet program merited even a modest increase in the support it has now. We urge the government in one of our recommendations not to back down from that very laudable position.

Of the other two aspects we recommend, one of them has to do with command and control or the administration of the cadet program. That applies to all cadet programs, whether they are navy, air force, or army. The more bases we close, such as the one mentioned by Mr. Frazer, in Chilliwack, the more difficult it will be for regular forces and indeed militia units to continue to provide the same level of support that they have always provided to the cadets. We continue to urge that this support not be allowed to be backtracked, to slow down, because we firmly believe this is a program the nation simply cannot do without.

The third aspect had to do with a report that was produced recently by the chief of review services of the Department of National Defence, which advocated that consideration be given to removing from the classification reserve the CIC, the Cadet Instructor Cadre, the officers responsible for the administration and the training of the cadets, because they're not considered totally mobilizable as is the primary reserve, and to creating a new organization within the National Defence Act to encompass them as a special category of service.

We have objected to that suggestion and strongly recommend that they remain a component of Canada's reserve forces. We have also recommended that we consider including in the CIC a non-commission component, whereby former regular sergeants and sergeant majors can be useful as trainers to these young cadets without our having to commission them. That's an endeavour, incidentally, some of them are very uncomfortable with anyway, but they accept it because they see it as the only way they can work with cadets.

Mr. Dickson: Mr. Chairman, for the benefit of those who are not aware of it, General Belzile is the colonel commandant of the cadets, so he should perhaps declare his interest.

Mr. O'Reilly: I noticed that I certainly touched on something when I asked that question. He handed me the question, of course.

I just wanted to comment on your report where you talk about the never-ending recruitment process because of the number of drop-outs. This scenario was given to me by an ambulance operator who works in the medical corps but has to go back and earn his living when he finishes his tour of duty. Then he loses his rank and has to come back in.

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I think when people in the military are working in the field they're going to work in, they should be able to retain their rank. I see that you're suggesting that when people leave, they keep their uniforms. When they come back in they may well be better trained than if they were to go to an armoury and march around a square twice a month. I hope you do expand your thoughts on how you can retain people who do have a specific talent to give.

Prof. Granatstein: We do talk about that, Mr. O'Reilly. We are concerned with the question of civilian qualifications and how they can be adapted to the military. The military ordinarily has said that it must train everybody from the ground up. It won't accept the idea that someone has qualifications from the outside. We think that's probably more than a little rigid and that efforts can be made to adapt civilian qualifications so they become more accepted in the forces. I think the case you're making is one that probably has substantial merit in that direction.

The Chairman: Thank you.

I'll go to Elsie Wayne. Then I'm going to start the second round, and I hope everybody will keep their questions as short and succinct as they can because I assume we'll be getting a bell around 5 or 5:15 p.m.

Mrs. Wayne, please.

Mrs. Wayne (Saint John): Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, when you were in Saint John, New Brunswick, there were many people who shared their concerns. Some of them, such as Judge Logan, didn't come before the committee, and others have since talked to me. They have major concerns about what is happening now.

In reading the document, I note that you refer to some of the older armouries. Of course, right off the bat, in Saint John, New Brunswick, they have major concerns about theirs. Then I see that you mention that not necessarily are the older ones not as cost-efficient as some of the newer ones, so I'm hoping that you didn't recommend that they close the Saint John armoury. I'm hoping that doesn't happen. I have to tell you it plays a major role in our community.

They're also concerned about the cutbacks. They're of the impression that the militia itself will decide which units will live and which units will die. They were wondering just how that decision-making process is going to take place.

Prof. Granatstein: On the question of armouries, we have made no decisions on armouries. We're not crazy.

Mr. O'Reilly: Yet.

Prof. Granatstein: We were very careful to say that any decisions on armouries had to follow decisions on unit restructuring. It follows from what units are left in the militia which armouries are going to close.

With regard to the question on cutbacks and how the militia would do that, Land Forces Atlantic Area...this summer the militia colonels gathered and in effect produced a plan based on the assumption that there would be a 20% cut in the militia. They, as near as I can tell, produced a plan that is sensible, practical, realistic, and takes account of the various local concerns. This may not be the only plan, it may not even be the best plan, but it does suggest that when the militia gets together, sits down, and tries to rationally look at the problem involved in restructuring, it's capable of doing this.

The same kind of process was undertaken in Land Forces Western Area, this summer as well. Again, they were able to come up with a plan.

We therefore think it's very likely the militia can do this, produce something they can live with. That certainly was our object, and that was why we suggested that the militia must be involved in this process.

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Mrs. Wayne: I just have to say, Mr. Chairman, I am one of those advocates, not of cutbacks, but....

I have to say to the parliamentary secretary that I'm always in favour that young people, once they graduate, spend a couple of years in the reserves. When I was mayor for 12 years, if a young man or young woman had been in the reserves, automatically when they were having their interview for a job they got 10 points. We knew they were taught respect and discipline. We saw the difference between those who had been involved and those who had not.

I think it's sad that we are.... I know these are difficult times and difficult decisions, but I have to say, for the youth of our country it's a wonderful thing when they're involved with the cadets. It's a wonderful thing when they are involved with the reserves and the military. We could have saved a whole lot of problems and costs in the justice system and with UI as well if we had put them all in there for a couple of years. Then you'd see a different Canada.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mifflin: Mr. Chairman, I'm not a member of the commission, but I was addressed as parliamentary secretary.

Mrs. Wayne: I thought you were on this one, Fred.

Mr. Mifflin: Well, I was in my heart, but....

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

Mr. Mifflin: I think that's a fair statement, Elsie. I just want to say the real reason for the commission was that when we were doing our special joint committee, we found there were things about the reserves - such as the legislation, the way the units were put together - that really disturbed us. But we didn't feel we had the time to focus on that without taking away from the overall report, which after all was our mandate.

The purpose of the commission in effect is to take what we now have and to make the best use of it. I think the commissioners have made that point. I think we all agree with you. I was never in the reserves myself, but I'm totally committed to them because I've seen what they can do. I speak mostly of naval reservists, but air force reservists and many militia people.... We have units in Newfoundland.

I just wanted to reinforce that the job the the commissioners have done will allow us, if we so decide, depending on how we want to write our report, to say they have made recommendations to make the best use of what we now have.

Mrs. Wayne: We have a new HMCS Brunswicker. We just cut the ribbon on it a few months ago and I have to tell you it's beautiful. I hope to see the armouries. I know the new one will be there and I hope the old one is too, I have to tell you.

Thank you very much.

[Translation]

Mr. Bertrand (Pontiac - Gatineau - Labelle): In your report, you say that we should ask municipalities to play a greater role in supporting local reserve units. Do you really think municipalities would be in a position to become actively involved, given the current financial climate?

[English]

Prof. Granatstein: Obviously, the municipalities have the same financial problems the provincial government and the federal government have. I don't think anyone doubts that. But we were quite struck in our hearings by the number of municipalities that sent representatives before us, not least in Saint John, New Brunswick, where people came before us and said the reserves are very important to their town. They are their history. They provide the kind of training and value-for-money Mrs. Wayne was referring to. They really are very useful, and they want them to stay.

Some towns said they want them to stay so much that they are prepared to try to find ways to share some of the costs, maybe by providing facilities, maybe by giving a break on utilities, maybe by offering various sharing projects to the unit. That's one thing.

The second thing is that the air force has been very creative in creating some new units in what they call their ``support wing'', where they are trying very hard to go to areas of high unemployment. They've created one unit in Nova Scotia and one in Newfoundland at the moment, where they have worked out arrangements with the towns, with the municipalities, to share facilities and equipment and to provide a measure of employment for people who might not otherwise have it.

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The air force has picked its places carefully and has tried very hard to do it in such a way that it will assist the town and assist the air force. While it's probably too early to judge on the basis of only two units that are now up and running, it does seem as if this might be the way of the future for the reserve forces, a way that might work to benefit both the forces and the municipalities. So there are ways of doing this that benefit everyone.

[Translation]

LGen Belzile: I would like to elaborate on two specific points. First of all, as Professor Granatstein pointed out, many municipalities and communities did in fact express their support. We cited the example of the City of Montreal, where one city councillor acts as liaison officer between city and military authorities, so that when a military issue arises, the same people handle it every time. This same sort of arrangement may well exist elsewhere.

Secondly, provinces and municipalities sometimes require the direct assistance of the Canadian Forces when natural disasters, such as forest fires, occur. I am not necessarily talking about the Search and Rescue Unit that is already in place. What I'm really talking about is the kind of assistance provided in places like Medicine Hat, Alberta, where some very serious flooding occurred this summer. The only military personnel capable of responding quickly to the disaster were British military personnel stationed at Suffield. That is extremely unfortunate, because people were left with a negative impression.

Municipalities and provinces can be extremely helpful in convincing government authorities to establish procedures that will facilitate the use of military personnel in such cases.

Right now, the process is extremely complex. We are currently reviewing that process, however. Municipalities should be able to play a liaison role and try to make whatever arrangements are required before a disaster occurs. So, we very much support close links between communities and reserve units.

[English]

Mr. Hart: In the general answer to the cadets, it raised another question and I'd just like to explore it a little bit.

You pointed out the white paper did say there would be an increase to the cadets, which is true. The problem, as I see it, is that the cadets really aren't much unlike the problem we have facing the militia and the regular force. When we say we are committing extra dollars, they're not getting to the right people, to the units, to the place where they do the training.

What we tend to do in Canada is build bureaucracies. We have a tremendous bureaucracy over here in Ottawa at NDHQ. The militia is the same and so is the cadet movement. When I was involved with cadets, I watched over a five-year period the headquarters go from being commanded by a major to a lieutenant-colonel with a staff of majors and captains and so on and so forth.

So, yes, the white paper said we had an increase to the cadets, but go talk to the units. The units aren't getting any more money. As a matter of fact, the units are saying they're still struggling and they're getting less money.

When we look at this, we can't just make a nice fuzzy statement to make everybody feel good, saying there's going to be an increase in commitment to these areas because it's not getting there. We have to address the problem of the huge bureaucracy and make sure those unit commanders are getting the dollars to train the people, whether it's cadets or militia or the regular force.

LGen Belzile: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to comment briefly. I fully agree with Mr. Hart that this is a problem. I can only hope that the suggestions we are making with regard to the primary reserve and the way the moneys are going to be stovepiped down to the levels where it counts will in due course be emulated by the cadet organization.

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We have not gone into this in great detail. Our mandate was to look at cadets and the Canadian rangers, for instance, but quite understandably as a peripheral issue; the major concern was really the primary reserves. This is what we placed most of our emphasis on.

I have no doubt that your remarks are very cogent and I have no doubt that I have seen some of this also. Perhaps at the right opportunity this committee can do it if we have failed to do it; they could indicate that this is an aspect that must be looked at with great care so that the different levels of bureaucracy do not completely grab all the resources.

Mr. Hart: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Leroux.

[Translation]

M. Leroux: I would like to ask you about the job protection legislation that you propose in your report. We have travelled right across the country talking about this very issue, and it seems to be an important one.

Do you think it could actually prompt a future employer to hire a young militiaman? It's one thing to hire an employee who is in the militia, but that means giving him a leave of absence if he has to go off to Bosnia or some other place. Isn't there something we can do to encourage employers to hire these young people, say some form of incentive program?

LGen Belzile: We made some specific comments on that very issue along the lines of providing an incentive to employers. We attempted to show the value of military training and the special qualities of young people who have received such training. We also say that other options that are not part of our mandate, such as tax incentives, could also be valuable as a means of convincing employers to hire them. We believe it's a matter of educating the public and that it will take some time to convince everyone of the value of this kind of program. We still believe we're on the right track, however. We hope that employers will support this initiative and will in fact come forward with convincing arguments in support of an incentive program.

[English]

Mr. Mifflin: I wouldn't want the session with the commissioners to go without making reference to their chapter on the rangers.

When I travel around, people ask me about the rangers: what are the rangers, and what do they do? Are they a secret force? What do they do? With the exception of cadets, where I believe we get the best Canadian value for the money we spend - it's hard to prove, but I think we all know it...next to them I believe it's the rangers. I read the whole report, but the chapter on the rangers I found very interesting.

Did you find when you talked to some of the senior rangers that they are spreading the word that...? Let me go another way. I fear that they like what they do and they love what they do, and sometimes I don't believe they talk enough about it in the communities. I wonder if the commissioners found that in their hearings.

Mr. Dickson: Admiral Mifflin, the rangers, as the general has pointed out, along with the cadets, were more or less peripheral. But everything we heard about the rangers was to their credit.

If you'll note, they have this project in connection with some of the native people and we recommended that if it did not survive, then the rangers should take it on. But the matter of making them better-known in the community, particularly perhaps the southern part of Canada, was not something we had any representations on.

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Prof. Granatstein: Of course, the ranger enhancement program is under way now, which for peanuts, in terms of dollars, will provide some direction-finding equipment and provide some accoutrements almost in lieu of uniforms. I think they will be issued some kind of combat jackets and something to go along with the armbands that I think are their present identifying mark.

I think between those two things, the junior ranger program, which will bring in young people in the communities, and the better identification as members of the rangers, the place in the communities will in fact be substantially enhanced. I think it's already very high in most places. I think there's high status to be a member of the rangers in northern communities, and the measures that the department has under way, and had under way before we were set up, will I think go a long distance to making that even more so.

Mr. Mifflin: Thank you very much.

Mr. Frazer: Mr. Chairman, with impeccable penetration, Mrs. Wayne and Mr. Bertrand have got into two of the subjects that I wanted to cover. I would like to go back to one of them, if I may. This has to do with the reduction in the number of units in the militia. This is part statement and part question - or maybe I'm looking for support.

It strikes me that there is an awful lot of goodwill and interest out there in the present militia units that are operating, and when they're reduced there's the potential to create a lot of resentment.

I received a call at 7:30 p.m. last night in my office from a couple, both of whom had been in the militia. They asked me, ``How are they going to cut units? '' I explained that this would be left to the militia.

It strikes me that it's almost vital that the decisions, and the rationale for taking them, be made public, that it be open and out in the public so that they know it wasn't just done on a whim; there was a rationale as to why these units were chosen for relegation to the dustbin and the other ones were not.

Prof. Granatstein: I think you're undoubtedly right, that the public must know how it was done and why it was done.

We've tried to help in that process by laying down a series of criteria that should be followed in determining which units are to be retained and which not. They're very sensible requirements. They deal with operational capabilities. They deal with the ability to recruit. They deal with the unit's demonstrated capacity to train. They deal with their ability to make use of regular-force support, their cost-effectiveness, their historical performance and their link to the community.

Those things are, if not quantifiable, then at least things that one can identify and one can make a very clear case with. I think units will have to make their case, and these things tell them what they must use to make that case. To my mind, at least, they're very sensible things with which a unit can put together a very effective argument - if it has a very effective argument.

Then we recommend a restructuring process, which directs that the area commanders will in effect convene a gathering of their militia units. We understand there must be cuts. We understand...or at least we're proposing these militia brigade groups, which will be organized and which will provide a template into which the existing units will be fitted, with some discretion. We don't say that every area must have the same organization.

If, for example, in British Columbia, because of earthquake danger there's a greater need for engineering units - and there may well be - then maybe you have a brigade group that's heavy in engineering units in British Columbia.

You try to set up a system that restructures the units to accord with the total army establishment proposals that are out there, which in effect say not that every militia unit should have only the same officer ratio as every regular unit but that there should be built in some extra officer strength and senior NCO strength to take account of the fact that they're not full-time people.

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So if you have, as we do, a 1:6 ratio, officer to men, in some militia units, and a 1:15 ratio in the regular, then maybe somewhere in between, either 1:8 or 1:9, would be preferable.

That restructuring process we've suggested should begin about the beginning of April 1996. It should be concluded - concluded in the sense that area submissions will go forward to land forces headquarters - about July 1, 1996. In other words, we think a six-month timeframe should suffice for this process to take place.

Mr. Frazer: My concern is that the military has a propensity toward keeping things under its hat, and toward the authoritarian style. I think it would be a dramatic mistake in this instance to just announce that these units are being closed down without telling people why. There has to be a communications strategy. It may be in your report. If it is, I haven't seen it yet. If it isn't, then it should be in our report.

LGen Belzile: I don't know if time permits, but I have one additional point. We've also made it fairly clear that we consider the links to the community and the historical background - the battle honours and all of that - as very important. In our parameters we have not dictated that units should disappear. We have said that there are options, such as amalgamation, such as mergers, where perhaps the units that may not be viable now could continue to exist - with its own insignia and what have you - as a subunit of a larger composite organization.

We have not excluded any of this. In a lot of ways a lot of your combat arms units with long traditions may very well all survive this.

Mr. Richardson: [Inaudible - Editor]...General Belzile, said he served in a regiment such as that. There were regiments in Hanover. They were called the 1st Battalion Canadian Infantry, or the 2nd Battalion Canadian Rifles. They could be the Eastern Ontario Battalion, and it could have locations in Brockville, Kingston and Cornwall. They would be a battalion, but the company may be wearing the SD and G badge, the badge of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa or the Princess of Wales' Own Regiment.

I'm giving that just as an example. It would be one battalion but it could have different cap badges under it. That's not unprecedented in the Canadian Forces.

The Chairman: Mr. O'Reilly, do you have a quick question?

Mr. O'Reilly: I'd like to see you expand once more on the reserve pay system, chapter 13. I can remember that if you missed the envelope you went for another month. Now we have three systems and people are still not getting paid. Is that a correct statement? If so, what was your solution to it?

Mr. Dickson: Talk to your member of Parliament.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

Mr. Dickson: We didn't have any clear-cut solution. We made it very clear - we do in our report, and we also did it orally - that this is perhaps one of the major items that should be addressed, and addressed immediately rather than waiting two or three or four years to come up with a solution that might or might not be workable.

So I'd much rather...we had any particular solution to offer but simply to emphasize the importance of the issue.

The general may have something further to say.

LGen Belzile: We have suggested that if the present system cannot be fixed quickly we would see nothing wrong with going back to what some of us knew as ``the old days'' and have everybody carry what is known as a paybook. Your attendance is recorded in it. Once a month you march yourself up to the paymaster, who counts out the $20 bills in cash.

Until an automated system is properly set up, if I were asked to indicate a possible recommendation that's what I would tell a unit CO to do.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Dickson, Mr. Granatstein and Mr. Belzile. It has been a very useful exchange, with a lot of good questions and answers and a lot of flow. From here we continue on; whether we'll have you back again will be decided at a later date.

Thank you very much for both your report and your presentation here today.

Mr. Dickson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We wish you well in your deliberations. If there is anything further we can do to assist, you have only to give us a call and we'll be available.

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The Chairman: I have one final housekeeping item, if I might. We have to adopt the seventh and eighth reports of the subcommittee on agenda and procedure.

Mr. Richardson: I so move that the reports be adopted.

Mr. O'Reilly: I second the motion.

Motion agreed to

Mr. Frazer: I don't have time to disagree. You need a speed-reading course here.

The Chairman: One other item - and we don't have to decide today - is from the minister. The Chief of Defence Staff has asked that the Council of Honorary Colonels, land force reserve advisory groups and colonels commandant...are meeting in Ottawa December 5 to 7. They'd like to meet with us on December 7 at around 10:30 a.m. at the Chateau Laurier. If they do that, it will have to be an informal meeting, which it probably will be by that time. When it's December 7 we'll have a week left to make a report.

I wonder if everyone would agree to that - or should we have them at a formal meeting?

Mr. Mifflin: I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, we go over and see them. The Council of Honorary Colonels needs to give some kind of blessing to what's going on. As Jack would say -

Mr. Richardson: They'll carry the message back and support it or not support it.

Mr. Mifflin: Yes.

The Chairman: Is that agreed?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

Mr. Mifflin: So it's informal?

The Chairman: Yes.

I have another item, but don't worry; I'll get you tomorrow.

Mr. Richardson: Should we bring our paybooks with us?

The Chairman: Meeting adjourned.