NDDN Committee Report

Dissenting opinion of the New Democratic Party

To the Standing Committee on National Defence

Respectfully submitted by:

Dawn Black, MP

INTRODUCTION

Given the complexity, the severity and the stakes of the armed conflict in Afghanistan, the New Democratic Party does not see counter-insurgency warfare as the solution to Afghanistan’s problems.  We believe that the strategy being pursued by NATO and allied forces in Southern Afghanistan is endangering our forces, endangering the Afghan people, and damaging Canada’s credibility. 

The New Democratic Party asks for a withdrawal of Canadian Forces from the counter-insurgency mission in Afghanistan.

Consistent with the mandate of the Committee’s Study the following points are addressed below:

BACKGROUND

In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the US and allies under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) supported an anti-Taliban coalition of armed groups (the Northern Alliance) to overthrow the Taliban.  The legal justification for the invasion was a series of UN Security Council Resolutions in the days and weeks following the 9/11 attacks.  The resolutions refer to sections of the UN Charter pertaining to self-defence and the preservation of international peace and security.  

Following the collapse of the Taliban Government, the United Nations oversaw the political transition and the establishment of an interim government in Afghanistan, and facilitated talks between key Afghan actors and key donor states in Bonn, Germany.  The resulting Bonn Agreement established an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help the new government provide security, and to train police and the Afghan National Army.    

From 2001-2003, ISAF was concentrated in Kabul, the capital, and managed by lead nations.  In 2003, the management of ISAF was taken over by NATO, but countries outside the Alliance continue to play roles in the NATO mission. The mission is authorized by the United Nations annually (through a Security Council Resolution passed every fall).  When Prime Minister Stephen Harper presented a motion before the house to extend the mission to 2009, he was asking Parliament to extend the mission regardless of who authorized it, regardless of the partners. 

In spite of the establishment of ISAF under UN mandate, the US has maintained its anti-terrorism coalition forces of approximately 8000 soldiers, which have no official UN mandate, nor any public agreement with the Afghan government, to this day.  The Americans have focused on the ongoing search for al-Qaeda and fighting Taliban in the East and South of the country.  Recently, reconstruction activities have also been part of US military strategy. 

CANADA’S ROLE

Canada’s involvement in the mission dates back to 2001, when the Liberal Government joined Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to remove the Taliban.  Canada continued to fight in OEF, particularly with the rotation of the PPCLI into Kandahar in 2002, during which four Canadians were killed in a “friendly fire” incident involving a US warplane, and by providing air transport and navy support.

In August 2003, Canada became heavily involved in the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul.  Six thousand soldiers in total served over a five rotation period, and they handed over their camp to Afghan forces in November 2005. 

Shortly before this hand-off, in August 2005, the Liberal government took on a role in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism in the South of Afghanistan with OEF.  The mission in the South has now been transferred to NATO control, but approximately 8,000 US troops remain active in counter-terrorism and US Special Forces are still conducting operations in Afghanistan outside of NATO or ISAF[1].   Throughout the mission, Canada has consistently been in the top 10 of troop contributing countries, and often in the top five. 

CIDA’s current development strategy in Afghanistan is targeted at supporting the Karzai government.  The major programs include security sector reform, governance training, and counter-narcotics operations.  Building on earlier allocations of $100 million per year, a 2006 decision extended that allocation for ten years to total $1 billion in aid to Afghanistan.  This makes Afghanistan by far Canada’s largest aid recipient in history.

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Canadian Forces are currently deployed in a complex and increasingly unstable security environment.  The year 2006 was characterized by increased violence, a growing insurgency, and a correspondingly dire humanitarian and human rights situation.  Afghanistan is more violent now than it was in the post-invasion period.  As we heard from Norine McDonald from the Senlis Council in her testimony, “Kandahar is now a complete war zone. The Taliban are not only winning militarily but, more importantly, they have begun to win the battle for the hearts and minds of the local Afghan people.” [2]

The United Nations reports that in 2006, there has been a “marked increase in insurgent forces”, with more than twice as many violent incidents in January 2007 than in January 2006.  According to US military estimates, there were 139 suicide attacks in 2006, up from 27 in 2005.   The International Crisis Group reports that 3700 people were killed in the conflict in the first nine months of 2006 – already a four-fold increase over the year before. Human Rights Watch estimates that more than 1,000 of those killed in 2006 were civilians.  Attacks on Afghan teachers and schools, especially girls’ schools, doubled from their already high levels in 2005[3].   High profile assassinations are on the rise, making it hard for the Government to do its job and recruit people, particularly women. 

Much of this rise in violence can be attributed to the two “tap-roots” of the growing insurgency: 1. the growing number of Afghans who are joining or otherwise supporting the forces of the Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and other armed groups, and 2. the safe haven for these groups in neighbouring Pakistan. 

1. Afghans joining insurgency

Civilian deaths – from insurgent, US and NATO attacks alike – are fuelling discontent among Afghans and increasing support for insurgents. US aircraft dropped more bombs in the first six months of 2006 than in the first three years of its campaign against the Taliban, according to figures released by the Pentagon[4].  Coalition air strikes have continued despite the high civilian death toll and the clear strategic disadvantage that they represent.  According to the Christian Science Monitor, “the devastating air offences are undermining support for the Afghan government…and are turning public opinion in the four southern provinces of Afghanistan against NATO forces…”[5]  President Karzai has called repeatedly on NATO, US and Taliban forces to stop killing Afghan civilians.[6]  

As General Andrew Leslie, now Chief of the Land Staff, said in the summer of 2005 "Every time you kill an angry young man overseas, you're creating 15 more who will come after you."[7]

The benefits of reconstruction and development have not reached large portions of the Afghan population.  Six years into a major international engagement in Afghanistan ― in which $12 billion has been spent on aid ― Afghanistan remains one of the world’s poorest countries.  Under these circumstances, the salaries offered by Taliban forces are drawing many young Afghan males into the insurgency. 

Monopolization of power in the new Afghan government, and marginalization of those outside the dominant social and political groups, has further intensified popular alienation and support for the insurgency.  Ernie Regehr, one of Canada’s leading experts on armed conflict, suggests that the growing strength of the insurgency is partly explained by the “broad Pashtun community that is sufficiently disaffected with Kabul to be susceptible to the Taliban’s offers of attractive pay envelopes”. [8]

The aggressive poppy eradication strategies of the American and the British soldiers are further fuelling the alienation felt by Afghans.  As Norine McDonald from the Senlis Council reported to the Committee, the people of Kandahar are almost entirely dependent on poppy crops for their livelihoods.  Yet the US continues to push crop eradication, without adequate or appropriate alternative livelihood programs.  The impoverished farmers left behind are ripe for recruitment by insurgents.   Ms. McDonald was unequivocal in front of the Committee: “Eradication is generating support for the Taliban. The U.S.-led forced eradication of poppy fields that took place in Kandahar meant that many farmers lost their livelihood and they are now struggling to feed their families.” [9]

2. Safe Haven in Pakistan

The safe haven in Pakistan has further emboldened Taliban and other armed leaders.  Pakistan views the Karzai government as pro-India and therefore a threat to their security.  They have been supporting and/or tolerating the regrouping of Taliban in Northern Pakistan.  While there is some difference of opinion over the extent to which Pakistan’s aid to the Taliban is ordered by the highest levels of Musharaf’s government, there is consensus among senior Western military and intelligence that the leadership in Pakistan could “disrupt the senior levels of Taliban command and control” but have chosen not to[10].  According to Barnett Rubin, “failing to address Pakistan’s support of the Taliban amounts to an acceptance of NATO’s failure”. 

Combined, these forces have heightened the conflict in Southern Afghanistan over the past year, diminishing the prospects of peace and stability in Afghanistan, and making the situation more dangerous for Canadian soldiers. 

DURATION

Despite the absence of government sponsored parliamentary debate on the duration of the mission past 2009, the Conservatives have alluded to a longer-term commitment past February 2009. Access to Information documents show that the Department of National Defence has plans for rotations of soldiers until at least 2011.

As outlined above, the key issues fuelling the insurgency are linked to the safe haven in Pakistan and the growing number of Afghans joining the insurgency.  None of these issues – from the civilian deaths, to popular alienation, to poverty, poppy eradication and Pakistan’s safe haven - will be resolved militarily. 

While the primary victims of insecurity in Afghanistan are Afghans themselves, and this insecurity is undermining the rebuilding of Afghan society, it is our conviction that the current military-focused counter-insurgency strategy will not solve Afghanistan’s security problems. 

Afghans need a resolution to the war and sustained support to peacefully rebuild their society, not more warriors.  Rather than fighting the growing insurgency with weapons, Canada should work for practical solutions to end the violence. 

THE STATE OF PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL

The current mission is taking a tremendous toll on the men and women of the Canadian Forces.  The Kandahar mission has been difficult for members of the Forces and their families.

The high tempo of foreign operations during the 1990s along with stagnating pay levels had a deleterious effect on the quality of life of members of the Forces and their families. The Kandahar mission and its extension have increased demands on the CF. The Committee has noted the problems members of the Forces and their families have had in seeking counselling and Post Traumatic Stress related treatment.

Forces’ members must now serve up to nine month rotations, and multiple tours in Afghanistan. The Government has also discussed “re-rolling” members of the Air Force and Navy to meet the needs of the mission.

On the ground in Afghanistan, members of the Forces have had to deal with two problems: 1) Old equipment such as utility trucks that are proving difficult to maintain in the harsh conditions and 2) An escalation of fighting, which has had a negative impact on the psychological health of the Forces.

On February 22, 2007 Lieutenant Gen Andrew Leslie, Chief of the Land Staff testified before the Standing Committee on National Defence that “it is projected that by the middle of the summer, the inside temperature for tank crews could be in excess of 60 degrees Celsius.”

Because of this the Government has started down a path of “mission creep” with respect to acquisition and our role in Afghanistan. This creep threatens to change the doctrine and disposition of the Canadian Forces quickly and irrevocably.

In March 2007 the Government announced it would lease 10 Leopard 2 A6 tanks from Germany for use in Afghanistan as well as purchase 100 Leopard 2 tanks from the Netherlands at a cost of $1.3 Billion[11]. This was a significant purchase by the Government, and was accompanied by a signal from the Minister of National Defence that Canada would be involved in heavy combat operations for the next ten to fifteen years.

This was an enormous announcement, with a huge effect on the future of the Canadian Forces. It prompted me to request an emergency debate with the Speaker of the House on April 16, 2007. As was said in the House:

I believe that the announcement made by the Minister of National Defence that Canada should expect to be involved in heavy combat with armour for the next 10 to 15 years in different parts of the world is actually momentous, historically significant and without precedent. The Minister was talking about an undertaking three times longer than the great war or than World War II.

The Afghan mission has launched Canada into a massive change in the role of our military without a White Paper, a policy review or even a publicly available capabilities plan. In the past, when great changes were made to defence policy, such as the build-up in World War II, the peace dividends of the post war period, the re-arming for Korea and the end of the Cold War, the government directed policy and doctrine changes within the Forces. This Government has not undertaken a major policy review of defence. What changes are being contemplated seem to be under the Rumsfeld-like language of “transformation” and have been confined to the military, and not the civilian side.

The lessons learned by the United States in Iraq have not been heeded in Canada. A continuous push for more armour and more firepower as part of a counter-insurgency campaign will inevitably lead to more sophisticated weapons such as Improvised Explosive Devices by insurgent forces. We are already seeing evidence of this Afghanistan.[12]

Without a review and plan, it will be members of the Forces who bear the brunt of change.

RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS

After 5 years of a major international engagement, Afghanistan is still one of the world’s poorest countries.

• It ranks 173^rd out of 178 countries on the UN Human Development Index;

• One in four Afghan children do not live to the age of five;

• 70% of the Afghan population is malnourished;

• Maternal mortality of 1900 per 100,000 births.[13]

In the January edition of the journal Foreign Affairs Afghan expert Dr. Barnett Rubin catalogued the failures of Western countries in Afghanistan. There is less electricity in Kabul now than there was five years ago, the need for such basics as clean water, health centres and sanitation remains acute, crime and corruption is rampant, and the local economy (despite the infusion of billions of dollars in Western military and aid money) has flatlined.

Despite the dire situation of most Afghans, there have been development successes, some of which have been supported by Canadian aid.  The National Solidarity Program, in particular, has brought much-needed assistance to many Afghan communities.  Other projects focused on women’s rights, livelihoods and governance have also yielded results. 

Generally, the reconstruction and development efforts that are led by Afghans and clearly separated from the counter-insurgency have been the most successful.  The projects that have been overtaken by military strategy, or instrumentalized by NATO forces, have failed and/or put Afghan civilians and Canadian troops at risk. 

Throughout this war, development advocates have argued that reconstruction by, or in close co-ordination with, coalition forces will put the beneficiaries and the deliverers of aid at risk.  When assistance strengthens the military objectives of one side in the war, it becomes a weapon, and those who use it become targets. 

Marc Andre Boivin of the Montreal research group, Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix, made this point in his testimony before the Committee. 

NGOs were present in Afghanistan long before any foreign military personnel were there, and the NGOs' concern at seeing their efforts so politicized is a serious one, because if they're seen as biased to one party or to the other, the Taliban or whichever insurgent will say, well, the grain you're providing is for the international effort, so we'll shoot you up. And that's it. You will not be able to provide any aid at all.[14]

In his comments before the Committee, Gerry Barr of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation re-enforced this message.  He drew the Committee’s attention to a statement, signed by 34 non-governmental organizations in Afghanistan.  “Their message was unambiguous” he said, “The deliberate confusion of military and humanitarian actors in Afghanistan is seriously hampering the ability of NGOs to deliver aid to all communities in need”[15].   

One cannot expect to systematically link the reconstruction of the country to the military offensive against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban without making targets of those who benefit from and deliver the assistance.

Development must be a priority, not a tool to soften the counter-insurgency blow.  Genuine development programming is essential to the future security of Afghanistan.  The effectiveness of development programming will be compromised if it is perceived as a public relations exercise to win the support of Afghans. 

MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS

The criteria for assessing effectiveness of the mission have not been spelled out by Liberal or Conservative governments.  Clearly the number of insurgents killed or the number of foreign soldiers deployed are not indicators of success. 

In the view of the New Democratic Party, the military mission should be judged by its capacity to protect Afghans and decrease violence against them.  Support for the establishment of a viable, law-abiding and civilian-controlled Afghan National Army should also be a central component of the mission’s effectiveness. 

The diplomatic mission should be judged by its capacity to support, facilitate and catalyze efforts towards the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan.  Specifically, the diplomatic mission should be measured by progress in building international momentum for comprehensive peace negotiations at three levels: within Afghanistan, with international players, and in the regional context.  Such international momentum might take the form of a UN Security Council resolution, the appointment of a UN special envoy, and/or the establishment of a safe space for negotiations to occur.

The development mission should be judged by its capacity to support the development of a vibrant Afghan civil society and deliver meaningful results to Afghans.  The Afghan Compact has many good benchmarks in this regard, addressing governance, social, economic and security goals. 

While these three missions are clearly related, the NDP acknowledges their distinct roles in Afghanistan, and sees the effectiveness of each mission as distinct but related. 

CANADA’S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

The enormous burden of operations in Afghanistan has limited the Canadian Forces ability to act both at home and abroad.

When the Minister of National Defence assumed his responsibilities in February 2006, he was told, in writing, that the Canadian Forces had the capacity to deploy a second land task force of 1,200 personnel.  Since that time the Minister has denied being told this, and has claimed no such capacity for a second task force exists.  Irrespective of the Minister’s comments, it seems plausible that the capacity of the CF to deploy another large contingent has been reduced by the extension of the mission in Afghanistan.

The Minister was also briefed on the obligations the 2010 Vancouver Olympics would place on the CF.  He was told that the requirements would be large and that it would place significant obstacles in the way of any foreign deployment at that time.  The Government needs to explain to Parliament and to the people of British Columbia how it would maintain a battle group in Kandahar beyond February 2009, while simultaneously providing security for the Olympics.

DETAINEES

Time and again, it has become clear that the Government of Canada simply doesn’t get it when it comes to handling detainees: Canada must not turn detainees over to authorities who have a self-admitted record of torture. DND and Foreign Affairs officials refused to believe that Canada has a responsibility to ensure the fair and proper treatment of detainees once they leave our custody. This is an appalling failure on the part of the Government.

When the first agreement signed by the Liberal government with respect to detainees was finally revealed it was clear that it was a flawed document. The original arrangement had no right of access for Canadian or UN officials to Afghan prisons and no veto over the onward transfer of detainees to third countries. The Minister of National Defence was asked for over a year to amend and strengthen this agreement, but he steadfastly refused.

The Minister insisted that the agreement was adequate, since International Committee of the Red Cross workers were monitoring the detainees and would report violations to the Canadian Government.

Subsequently the Minister of National Defence had to admit that he had mislead the House of Commons regarding the role of the Red Cross in monitoring detainees. He confirmed that the ICRC does not inform Canada of mistreatment at the hands of the Afghans.

Canada has a legal and moral obligation to ensure that our actions do not lead to abuse or torture.  It is a mark on our country that we did not learn this lesson after the public inquiry into Maher Arar's deportation and torture. 

Following the detainee abuse scandal of late April, precipitated by reporting in the Globe and Mail by Graeme Smith and Paul Koring, the front benches of the government were paralyzed: inconsistent stories, contradiction and cover-up become the order of the day. The Minister of National Defence quickly lost the support of the House and the support of the Canadian people.

Other NATO countries had sought assurances from the Government of Afghanistan, and ensured a right of access to individuals transferred. Since the detainee transfer arrangement was signed by General Hillier under the Liberal watch on December 18, 2005, the government had steadfastly refused to revisit the issue. Faced with the largest scandal the minority Government had ever dealt with, and a lawsuit from Amnesty International and the BC Civil Liberties Association, the Government was shamed into action just hours before appearing in Federal Court.

While the new agreement gives us hope, we have not received strong assurances from the Government on how it is actually being implemented on the ground. Until those assurances are enshrined, no more transfers must occur.

The Government has weakened Canada’s long-standing position against the use of torture with a “no questions asked” policy of handing detainees over to the Afghan security forces.  It is known that NATO is looking to create an Alliance-wide policy on the handling of detainees, and the Government should examine the possibility of jointly building a detention facility with NATO and the Afghan government.

Canada has been at the forefront on human rights. Now the world asks: “what happened to Canada on human rights?”.

AFGHAN WOMEN’S RIGHTS

Afghan women are not being adequately protected or supported by the international military presence in their country.   Women’s rights have not been made a central priority by either the new Afghan government, or the broader international community in Afghanistan. 

There is little evidence of sustained progress in critical areas over the past five years in the situation of Afghan women.  In spite of changes to the laws regarding women’s rights, women remain subject to arbitrary imprisonment, rape, torture, forced marriages and honour killings.

In spite of frequent references to the severe oppression of women’s rights as justification for the ISAF strategies in the South, Afghan women are not being protected by the international military presence.  In the effort to fight the Taliban, ISAF and American forces have made alliances with local police and warlords, who have been implicated in human rights abuses against women. These figures are part of the machinery that continues to persecute women in their every day lives, arresting and imprisoning them for what are now, under new Afghan laws, legal actions. 

The lack of real commitment to Afghan women’s rights by this Government was made clear on the Prime Minister’s May 2007 visit to Afghanistan. During his visit, one of the most outspoken promoters of human rights in Afghanistan and one of the youngest female Parliamentarians, Malalai Joya, was expelled from the Afghan Parliament for denouncing corruption. The Government of Canada has lodged no protest with the Afghan government, and our Prime Minister made no statement on the issue.

As Ariane Brunet, of the human rights organization, Rights and Democracy, commented before the Committee, “We are talking about women's rights and it is not by concentrating on terrorism that the security problems of women can be solved in the towns, villages and schools.”[16]

CONCLUSION

In this context, the New Democratic Party believes that the safe and determined withdrawal of our troops from the counter-insurgency mission, in consultation with our allies, is now required. 

The Conservative position is clear: they have an open ended commitment to whatever is requested by NATO or the United States regardless of the cost to members of the Forces and their families. The Liberals and Bloc have publicly stated that they are open to continued Canadian deployments after 2009. While they criticize the way the mission is being administered, that criticism is undermined by the fact that they too would commit the Canadian Forces to this counter-insurgency mission regardless of the financial and human costs.

Many other NATO countries, mostly notably most of the European partners, have taken exception to the counter-insurgency mission and have shown no intention of participating.

Canada has wandered into an international conflict in the middle of Central Asia, with little control over the direction of the mission, or with much influence on its strategy. The outcome of this conflict will almost certainly be determined in Washington, Kabul, Islamabad, Tehran and points in between.

In the meantime we should not ask the Canadian Forces to be sacrificed for a mission with no clear opportunities for success or completion.