NDDN Committee Report

Dissenting Report from the Bloc Québécois on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan

Report authors

Robert Bouchard

and

Claude Bachand

June 13, 2007

Table of contents

                                                                                                                                   

Preamble

The two recommendations from which the Bloc Québécois wishes to distance itself

First dissenting recommendation

Second dissenting recommendation

The three supplementary recommendations that should be in this report

First supplementary recommendation  

Second supplementary recommendation

Third supplementary recommendation

Other comments on the text of the report

Dissenting Report

Preamble

After hearing many witnesses, the members of the Standing Committee on Defence worked for several months to present an impressive report on the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. While a real and laudable effort was made to produce a unanimous report, the Bloc Québécois cannot endorse two of the report’s recommendations. We also believe three other recommendations should have been in the report, and we will present them briefly. Finally, we will take the opportunity to point out some inconsistencies in the report.

The two recommendations from which the Bloc Québécois wishes to distance itself

First dissenting recommendation:

The first recommendation we cannot support is the 8^th recommendation in the report, which reads:

Recommendation 8

Recognizing its moral responsibility, the Federal Government should strongly encourage the Provincial and Territorial Governments to provide the resources needed to address the mental health support required by military families. (Page 128 of the report)

At present, the federal government is responsible for the mental health of Canadian Forces members, but the same is not true of the health of their families, for which Quebec and the provinces are responsible. Since combat operations in Afghanistan create psychological stress for the families of Forces members, the number of mental health problems is increasing in provincial hospitals located near military bases, greatly increasing the wait times for military families and others.

Since these new mental health cases are negative externalities created by the military activities of the federal government, it seems natural to us that the federal government would assume the costs of legitimate requests for mental health care from military families. A direct effect of this would be to make it possible to offer adequate services to military families and other families.

Dissenting recommendation proposed by the BQ

That the federal government fund, in whole, the care provided by Quebec and the provinces to members of military families suffering from mental health problems related to military operations.

Second dissenting recommendation:

The second recommendation we cannot support is the report’s 9^th recommendation, which reads:

Recommendation 9

The Government should accelerate its effort to procure medium-heavy lift helicopters to support combat operations of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan and ensure that the helicopters acquired are effective in both domestic and international operations. (Page 133 of the report)

We feel that parliamentarians need the overview of the government’s broad intentions with respect to defence and the procurement of military equipment that a comprehensive plan provides. We do not feel that piecemeal purchases are very wise when we are talking about sums as great as those involved in this purchase. 

As well, the question of the military equipment procurement policy should be dealt with in an upcoming study from the Standing Committee on Defence, for which a specific report should be tabled in the House next session.

Finally, the Canadian mission in Afghanistan would be over before Canada took possession of the lift helicopters; so, it is not possible to invoke the urgency of the situation, since these aircraft will not serve in that mission.

Dissenting recommendations proposed by the BQ

That the government modernize its defence policy and that it submit a defence capability plan that will define the major orientations with respect to the procurement of military equipment so that parliamentarians can assess military procurements in the context of a plan, not piecemeal announcements.

That all purchases of military equipment over $100M be submitted for review to the Defence Committee.

The three supplementary recommendations that should be in this report

First supplementary recommendation

The Bloc Québécois notes a delay in the establishment of a competent and honest Afghan national police force. For the Bloc Québécois, the creation of an effective professional police force is an absolute necessity.  The police must take the lead in combating insecurity in Afghanistan, with NATO providing support. That is the opposite of what is currently happening.

We are thus pleased that the government recently announced assistance for the creation of the Afghan Police Force.

Supplementary recommendation

Creation of the Afghan Police Force

Canada’s current contribution to the creation of the Afghan National Police Force must be increased so that that force is able to carry out its role.

Second supplementary recommendation

We think that Canada should convene an international conference on Afghanistan. While it is true that an international conference was held in London little more than a year ago, the context is changing quickly and we feel that another conference would be appropriate.

The issue of the poppy crop should be discussed as a priority, since it is now clear that trying to systematically eradicate the poppy crop is not the solution. It is also clear that the drug trade is closely linked to the insurgency.

Canada could also take this opportunity to propose the creation of a UN High Representative in Afghanistan, as was done in Kosovo.

Supplementary recommendation

International conference:

Canada should convene an international conference on Afghanistan specifically on the urgency of rebalancing the mission.  At that time, Canada would propose creating a UN High Representative in Afghanistan.  This person would be responsible for coordinating the diplomatic, military and reconstruction efforts. He or she would work to facilitate relations among the foreign powers involved in Afghanistan, the neighbouring countries and all levels of Afghan government. The problem of the systematic eradication of the poppy crop, as currently administered, would also be raised in order to debate conceivable alternatives to this policy, which has already demonstrated its limitations.

Third supplementary recommendation

The fate reserved for prisoners is an issue of capital importance to the Bloc Québécois.  That is why the Bloc Québécois likes the idea of prisons co-managed by NATO and the Afghan authorities. This solution would allow Canada to respect the major international conventions of which it is a signatory without infringing the sovereignty of the Afghan state, which would remain responsible for these centres.

Supplementary recommendation

Co-managed prisons

The Government of Canada should undertake discussions with NATO to assess the possibility of establishing co-managed prisons to meet the needs of all the prisoners, in accordance with the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Third Geneva Convention and other relevant instruments of international law.

Other comments on the text of the report

Virtually no changes were made to the main text on which the Committee worked for several months, and the urgency with which we adopted it before the summer requires us to note some passages with which we disagree.

A) Since Canada supports the Afghan government and that government’s “pace” is rather slow, it is natural that reconstruction is not going faster.

Canadians do not do the work for Afghans, they help Afghans build the capacity to do the work themselves, giving development and reconstruction an ‘Afghan face.’ A corollary is that improvements come only as fast as the emerging capacity will allow — an ‘Afghan pace,’ so there is no advantage in simplistically throwing Canadian money, people or equipment at problems faster than they can be absorbed and used effectively.

Pages 10-11

Political position

Recommendation 10 underlines the importance of rebalancing the reconstruction and diplomacy aspects of the mission in Afghanistan. It is thus inconsistent for this report not to stress the evidence that talked about doing so.   

B) Opposition to this war is attributable to poor communication efforts by the government and media.

[T]he Canadian government and media have been less than wholly effective in providing ordinary Canadians and Parliamentarians with adequate information. Page 12

Political position

While it is fair to say that the government has not done an adequate job of communicating with Canadians and Quebecers, it is unfair to accuse the media of not doing their job. On the contrary, we should be praising the work of reporters without whom we would have been kept in total ignorance by the Conservative government.

C) The mission should not be rebalanced at the expense of security.

Nearly everyone we met (…) agreed that more development was needed, but they pointed out that security trumps development and until an adequate degree of security existed, development aid could not flow to the degree desired. Page 12

Political position

It is true that the mission must not be rebalanced at the expense of security, but the only way to vanquish insecurity is to convince the Afghans that peace is the best solution, and only reconstruction will allow us to demonstrate that.

D) Opponents of the mission have simplistic arguments.

[C]ritiques of imbalance have usually been based on simplistic assumptions (…) Page 12

Political position

This counter-attack often used by the Conservatives shows they are afraid of being criticized by their opponents for their poorly planned decisions in Afghanistan. They should instead use this report to thank everyone who has taken an interest in this conflict, because the time they take to learn about the in and outs shows that they sincerely want the mission in Afghanistan to end well.

E) The Committee hails the improvement in the military equipment procurement process.

[T]he national defence procurement process has been dramatically successful in delivering new, important operational equipment quickly. Page 14

Political position

The acceleration of the military equipment procurement process is based on the government’s improvisation and its disdain for elementary rules of commerce. Not only is there no military equipment procurement plan, but the Conservatives are crowing about buying military equipment worth billions of dollars without a competitive process. The government is paying a premium to thank its friends with taxpayers’ money, but when the time comes to tell the industry that it must respect our industrial base in aeronautics, the Conservatives rediscover the market laws they are constantly breaking.