NDDN Committee Report

Supplementary Report (Addendum)

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(1)a), we include this brief complementary statement.

The members of the Liberal Party of Canada on the Standing Committee approve all of the recommendations in the report produced by the Standing Committee on National Defence. We believe, however, that it is important to clarify certain points and reiterate some of our positions in an addendum to the report on the assessment of our Canadian troops in Afghanistan and other issues relating to the international mission in Afghanistan.

We therefore present this supplementary report.

You will note that there are some discrepancies, even contradictions, between the text of the report and its recommendations. We believe that the report references should not come solely from the evidence. The recommendations could also reflect the conclusions of the intense discussions, reflections and expert opinions obtained from additional consultations. We have some difficulty with some of the statements in the text of the report. Some of the unconditional assertions and the superlatives used to define a situation (or give it a certain slant) may lead to confusion and imbue the report with a perspective that is too partisan or too “governmental”. We prefer to throw light on certain points, considering that the recommendations helped to get the issues back on track. However, we reserve the right to have our say and express our own views.

It is also important to mention that there is no “all or nothing” approach to assessing the mission. We contest the simplistic interpretation sound throughout the report. Despite the mission's complexity, there may be good reason to agree or disagree with it. There is not just one single path to the truth. We understand that we can support the mission and our troops while at the same time being critical of the government’s management of the situation. We also believe it is not enough to give the impression that Canadians want an immediate withdrawal or a specific date (February 2009) for it just because we do not want to assume our responsibilities.  Some reservations are necessary, in our view.

As for the rest of the text, we support the spirit of the report, its orientations and its recommendations.

The Liberal Party of Canada supplementary report has five parts:

1)     Compliance with the commitments for the combat mission in southern Afghanistan until February 2009: Interpretation, rotation strategy and the role of parliamentarians in the decision-making process.

2)     The importance of a balanced 3-D policy (Defence, Development and Diplomacy): Imbalance and the “à la carte menu” syndrome, poppy crop eradication (opium), assessment of the decision-making process used by the Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan, or SAT-A.

3)     The military equipment procurement policy: Interpretation, the matter of tanks.

4)     The issue of Afghan detainees and compliance with the Geneva Convention

5)     The role of the media in the international mission in Afghanistan

1)      Compliance with the commitments for the combat mission in southern Afghanistan until February 2009

It is always a good idea to remember that the current Afghan mission was the outcome of the intervention by the international community. As a NATO ally, Canada plays a leadership role. We have been in Afghanistan since the beginning. We should be proud of what we have accomplished to date. We believe Canada has reason to be a full participant in this mission. It is normal that there should be some rotation because this is a NATO mission. We must respect our international commitments but we should be able to expect, without shame, that we would be replaced by another NATO member.  And necessarily so. The Liberal Party of Canada believes that Canada must end its combat mission in southern Afghanistan by February 2009. We can always play a role in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and in monitoring, but we believe that another NATO country must take over our current role. In any case, Canada will still be active in development programs and at the diplomatic level.

On April 17, 2007, an official opposition day, we tabled a motion that clearly reflects our viewpoint on the possible extension of the combat mission for Canadian troops in Afghanistan:

(1) whereas all Members of this House, whatever their disagreements may be about the mission in Afghanistan, support the courageous men and women of the Canadian Forces;	(1) attendu que tous les députés de la Chambre, peu importe les désaccords qu’ils peuvent avoir au sujet de la mission en Afghanistan, appuient les hommes et femmes qui servent avec courage dans les Forces canadiennes;
(2) whereas in May 2006, the government extended Canada's military commitment in Southern Afghanistan to February 2009;	(2) attendu qu’en mai 2006 le gouvernement a prolongé l’engagement militaire du Canada dans le Sud de l’Afghanistan jusqu’en février 2009;
(3) whereas it is incumbent upon Canada to provide adequate notice to the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of our intentions beyond that date;	(3) attendu qu’il incombe au Canada d’aviser de façon adéquate les autres membres de l’Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord (OTAN) de nos intentions au-delà de cette date;
(4) whereas by February 2009, Canada's military mission in Southern Afghanistan will represent one of the largest and longest military commitments in Canadian history; and	(4) attendu que, d’ici février 2009, la mission militaire canadienne dans le Sud de l’Afghanistan représentera un des engagements militaires les plus importants et les plus longs de l’histoire du Canada;
(5) whereas Canada's commitment to the reconstruction and security of Afghanistan is not limited to our combat operations in Southern Afghanistan;	(5) attendu que l’engagement du Canada à l’égard de la reconstruction et de la sécurité de l’Afghanistan ne se limite pas à nos opérations de combat dans le Sud de l’Afghanistan;
this House call upon the government to confirm that Canada’s existing military deployment in Afghanistan will continue until February 2009, at which time Canadian combat operations in Southern Afghanistan will conclude; and call upon the government to notify NATO of this decision immediately.	la Chambre demande au gouvernement de confirmer que le déploiement militaire actuel du Canada en Afghanistan se poursuivra jusqu’en février 2009, date à laquelle les opérations canadiennes de combat dans le Sud de l’Afghanistan prendront fin; et demande au gouvernement d’aviser immédiatement l’OTAN de cette décision.

The motion emphasizes the importance of immediately informing NATO of our intentions and preparing ourselves accordingly. General Raymond Hénault, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, pointed out that this is normally how things are done and that countries often work in rotation in this type of mission (comments made during a scrum after giving his evidence to the Standing Committee on National Defence on May 31, 2007).

It is wrong to claim that, in rotating out of Afghanistan in February 2009, we are in some way abandoning the country. We will be making other kinds of contributions. It is important to have an open and democratic debate on the issues and the consequences without laying blaming. It is also essential to inform the authorities as soon as possible to ensure that there are no last-minute transition problems. There must be clarity and transparency throughout the entire process. Like the Dutch, we believe it is necessary to hold a debate in Parliament now to make a final decision about extending our combat operations. Finally, we believe, like many others, that the lack of cohesion between the NATO countries (primarily with regard to the various roles played in the field) and the inequitable contributions made by the various allies are a source of concern. We must bring further pressure to bear on NATO in this regard.

2)      The importance of a balanced 3-D policy (Defence, Development and Diplomacy)

Canada's primary goal in Kandahar is to win over the hearts and minds of Afghans. We must remember this when preparing our mission for the next two years.

It is not absolutely necessary for a military intervention aimed at re-establishing security to come before reconstruction and economic development in Kandahar province. Nor do we have to wait until the region is completely safe and peaceful before we take steps to promote development. It is true that reconstruction work cannot take place without the protection of the troops, but reconstruction will be impossible if we wait until the situation is totally under control before we begin. In fact, reconstruction is a step toward security: the inhabitants of this unstable region will be more likely to stop supporting the insurgents if they see a substantial improvement in their living conditions.

Our troops have reason to believe that, if the Afghan people are to feel secure, they must develop a trusting relationship with them. Therefore, more than ever before, there is a need to balance the economic, diplomatic and military aspects of our mission in Kandahar. At present, the Coalition's total expenditures on military operations in Afghanistan are 900% higher than the amount they are spending on development and reconstruction, and only 20% of the development aid sent by Canada to Afghanistan is destined for Kandahar province. This imbalance must be corrected.

The local population must be able to associate our troops and our country with the reconstruction efforts. Afghans must be able to see new schools, new hospitals and new government buildings, not military tanks.

However, as we attempt to reconcile military assistance, humanitarian aid and diplomatic efforts in Kandahar, there is one error we should avoid: we must not encourage the local people to believe that the fight against the Taliban, the protection of villages, the construction of schools and road repairs are solely the responsibility of foreigners. As much responsibility as possible must be conferred on the police and elected Afghan officials. Canada should provide much more training and support to the members of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan police. We must never forget that the main way of measuring whether international operations in Afghanistan are successful is to find out whether or not they are contributing to the establishment of a stable and operational government.

Our objective must be to improve security, quality of life and autonomy for the Afghan people. We disagree with a statement in the report which says that the current 3-D approach followed by the Canadian government is not exceptionally unbalanced: recommendation 10 provides a correction.

Poppy crops

Afghanistan will not be a stable, functional state as long as over half of its economy is dependent on the illegal drug trade. Canada should take the next two years of its mission to make significant progress on this front. The illegal revenue generated by the growing of poppies partly finances the Taliban, but also common criminals. To improve security for Afghans, an effective strategy needs to be found to combat this plague. The current policy by some of our allies of attempting to destroy the crops is ineffective. It raises opium prices and creates further incentives for growing poppies in other regions. Its main impact on security is negative, by generating hostility among the farmers against the Afghan authorities and against foreigners who are destroying their main source of income, which consequently forces them to go back and support the Taliban. We need to find better solutions.

We propose two strategies that NATO and the international community should seriously consider. First, a form of poppy control that would avoid harming the local farmers and destroying their crops, but would target only the processing laboratories and transportation networks, perhaps purchasing the product in some regions, and certainly encouraging different crops, through loans to farmers, or creating a marketing infrastructure for their products at prices guaranteed by a public agency.

Second, over the long term, we propose that Canada helps fund the latest pilot project from the Senlis Council to use the poppy crop for medicinal purposes. This new proposal calls for the transformation of the poppy into morphine or codeine in the villages where the crops are grown to then be sold legally in the international market. Such a licensed cultivation would ensure that profits from medicine sales remain in the village and offer farmers a real and profitable alternative to the heroin trade.

Although we are aware that this matter is outside the scope of this report, we note that it is inescapable and intrinsic to the very success of the Afghan mission.

The assessment of the decision-making process used by the Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan, or SAT-A

We believe that the Department of Foreign Affairs should further examine the issue of governance. More study is needed on the role of the SAT-A, which reports directly to military command, to determine whether this team could work under Foreign Affairs. We applaud the team’s initiative, but in order to have a balanced 3-D policy, governance and staff structure should not be under military command. However, the military could help out in certain sectors by partnering with CIDA and Foreign Affairs.

We need to reassess the team’s decision-making process from a comprehensive Canadian perspective.

3) The military equipment procurement policy 

The Standing Committee on National Defence is set to release a report on the military equipment procurement policy. We will make concrete recommendations to Canadians. We believe that the Canadian Forces must have the equipment needed to carry out their missions, as is currently the case in Afghanistan. However, we need to ensure that taxpayers get value for their dollar. It is imperative to strike a balance between the needs of the Forces, financial ability and economic benefits for Canada.

We must guarantee that a truly open, effective and competitive process based on verified and verifiable criteria is put in place to meet these needs. We do not share the report’s more optimistic outlook on the current process or on certain purchases. It is worth noting that most purchases were made on the back of the Afghan mission. We now realize that they cannot be used fo this purpose. We will have the opportunity to make our recommendations in the upcoming report on military procurement.

We agree with the emergency concept in procurement. However, it must be viewed as an exceptional measure and used as a last resort. We are keeping a close eye on this issue. In the meantime, we urge the government to cover the immediate needs of troops and the Canadian mission in general.

Nonetheless, we fully oppose the needless purchase of tanks as an offensive weapon. Many civil and military experts disagree about the practicality of the purchase, including our own Chief of Staff, and the tank’s use. Furthermore, we need to question the soundness of our approach; since we are perceived as invaders when we send in tanks (the Soviet occupation is still fresh in Afghans’ minds).

4) The issue of Afghan detainees and compliance with the Geneva Convention

The events of the past few months have shown us the extent to which compliance with international conventions, specifically the Geneva Convention, is just as important as the Afghan mission itself. It is clear that, were it not for the watchful eyes of various organizations, academics and journalists and the constant pressure of the opposition parties, Canadians would never have found out about this unacceptable situation. The never-ending duck-and-dodge tactics of the current government and the Minister of Defence have led only to trouble and confusion.

It is important to clarify and explain the nature of the second agreement on transferring detainees to Afghan authorities. It is especially appropriate to point out the facts surrounding the origin of this agreement. We support a framework agreement between NATO and the Afghan government. Failing such an agreement, we must ensure that a rigorous follow-up by Canadian authorities is also done after detainees are transferred by Canadian Forces so as to comply with the Geneva Convention to the letter. We also want to find out the truth about the allegations of torture in Afghan prisons. We cannot be satisfied with the promise of an inquiry and increased vigilance.

It is also important to ensure that the current agreements cover all operations in which our troops are involved, at every level. We are concerned about a legal void regarding the application of agreements in combined operations. We believe there are two types of processes that could override the application of Canada-Afghan agreements on the transfer of detainees. For example, in an operation conducted by the national Afghan army, Canadian troops could immediately—on the field—return detainees. This is a hand over, not a transfer.

We are concerned about the interpretation of the report’s text on this matter. However, we are satisfied with Recommendation 18 on Afghan detainees, compliance with international agreements and the desire for a comprehensive agreement between NATO and the Afghan government.

5) The role of the media in the international mission in Afghanistan

We believe it is critical to have an open and transparent communication strategy to help Canadians better follow and understand developments in the Afghan mission. This strategy must be inclusive, systematic and above all factual so that it does not border on propaganda.

We do not believe it necessary to point the finger at the media for its reporting on the Afghan mission. The media reflects the environment it works in. We cannot dictate our message to the media. It is up to Canadian authorities, among others, to give them the tools they need to do the job. Let’s not forget that these are professionals. The ball is in the government’s court; everyone must assume their rightful responsibilities.