INST Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE L'INDUSTRIE, DES SCIENCES ET DE LA TECHNOLOGIE

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, March 27, 2001

• 1531

[English]

The Chair (Ms. Susan Whelan (Essex, Lib.)): I'm going to call the meeting to order.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the committee proceeds to the statutory review of the Lobbyists Registration Act.

We have two different sets of witnesses here this afternoon. From Grainger and Associates we have Mr. Brian Grainger, and from Democracy Watch we have Duff Conacher, the coordinator, and Aaron Freeman, board member.

I propose that we have opening statements from both parties and then proceed to questions together, if that's okay. With that, I'd like to begin with the witnesses as listed, unless there's a different agreement. That being said, I will start with Mr. Grainger.

Mr. Brian Grainger (Grainger and Associates): Good afternoon, Madam Chair. Thank you very much. And thank you to all the members for the opportunity to share a few thoughts this afternoon specifically on the Lobbyists Registration Act and the lobbyists code, but in general on the importance, the perhaps hidden importance, of education and training around values and ethics in today's workplace, be it private or public sector.

I've had the great pleasure for almost ten years to be in this field around the development of professional codes and workplace values and ethics. In the last decade this area has gained a great deal of interest. The last couple of weeks have proven that again. But in the private as well as the public sector, issues of good governance, conflict of interest, and ethical conduct seem to have become the object of the public debate. The reasons for this growth are diverse and complex, but may be explained by one phrase: today there is a widespread desire to ensure that the playing field is level in both private and public sector activity. One such tool, in the public sector at least, as you well know, is surely the Lobbyists Registration Act, which you are now reviewing.

There are other tools at work in the private and public sectors to level the playing field, and perhaps in discussion we can talk about some of those strategies, which have been actively in place for almost a decade now throughout the world.

Nevertheless, the Lobbyists Registration Act has in the Canadian context brought discipline, indeed structure, and certainly some transparency to the lobbying field. It generally reflects a Canadian approach. It seems to me that it's respectful, balanced, and, by and large, simple. The electronic registration is very contemporary, indeed perhaps state of the art, and is a tool that is easy to use and to reference.

If I had as a result of my decade in the field of values and ethics and consulting one thing to recommend, it would be that we set aside in private and public sectors much greater resources to the actual education of private as well as public users of such tools. What I'm saying is that in the private and public sectors we all need a greater ounce of prevention in order to avoid some of the pitfalls that all of us, including members of this House, can fall into.

In essence, we need to explain clearly and earlier in our professional development as lobbyists, or in other categories and many other places, the importance that ethical conduct plays in ensuring there is a level playing field and the integrity of our democratic values and institutions. We don't have to look farther afield than other parts of the world to see how difficult it is to achieve that without integrity and trust, honesty and transparency in government—in other words, educating at all levels our citizens to do the right thing the first time.

What I mean by that, Madam Chair, is that I am very good at doing the right thing the fourth time, the fifth time, the sixth time. We have to get a little better doing it the first time, both as a prevention strategy as well as to build a stronger democratic foundation. As a result, we increase transparency, which we all seem to desire, and certainly accountability, which we all deserve, in our enterprises, both public and private.

Madam Chair, these opening remarks are meant only to situate the review of the Lobbyists Registration Act and the lobbyists code into a somewhat larger framework that touches good governance and ethical conduct in our private and public sector institutions.

Thank you. And I look forward to discussion.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Grainger.

I'm now going to turn to Mr. Conacher from Democracy Watch.

Mr. Duff Conacher (Coordinator, Democracy Watch): Thank you very much, Madam Chair and the committee, for the invitation to come and speak to the subject of the Lobbyists Registration Act and related measures.

• 1535

I'm the coordinator of Democracy Watch, and with me today is a board member of Democracy Watch, as you mentioned, Aaron Freeman. We will be splitting our presentation time and we also welcome questions to either of us on the recommendations we are making.

Today we are sitting here representing the government ethics coalition, and you should have in front of you a list of the 30 groups from seven provinces and the Northwest Territories.

The Chair: Mr. Conacher, we don't have a copy of this statement. It's only been presented in English.

Mr. Duff Connacher: It was submitted last week to the committee. My statement has not been submitted. We will be submitting a fuller brief later.

The Chair: I'm sorry, what was submitted last week to the committee?

Mr. Duff Connacher: The list of the groups and the two-page list of the recommendations.

The Chair: You didn't receive anything last week?

The Clerk of the Committee: No.

The Chair: Somehow it wasn't received by the clerk. We apologize that we can't circulate it till everything is translated.

Mr. Duff Conacher: I understand.

We will have to go through the recommendations and hope you can take notes so that you can follow what we are saying.

We have been working on this issue since May of 1994, when we released this report entitled “Spring Cleaning: A Model Lobbying Disclosure and Ethics Package for Those Hard to Reach Places in the Federal Government”. The model still stands, because we subsequently appeared before a subcommittee of the industry committee in October 1994 and submitted this brief on changes to the Lobbyists Registration Act, and almost all the changes we proposed were not made by the committee at that time, other than putting the lobbyists registry on the Internet, which has certainly been a great step forward for citizens' ability to track what is happening—at least to the extent the registry does track what is happening.

I am going to be reviewing later today and this week the new lobbyists registration bill that's just been introduced in Nova Scotia and I'm going to have to conclude that if it matches the federal law, then it leaves a lot of gaps and loopholes. But before we turn to the act specifically, let me set out what we believe are the six reasons for significant revisions to the act and related measures. And we believe the committee should keep these reasons in the front of its mind as it reviews various proposals.

The six reasons:

First, to fulfil citizen rights and to fulfil the responsibility of the government to involve citizens in decision-making.

Second, to inform public office holders and the public to help ensure that they can participate in government decision-making.

Third, to inform the public so they can judge whether public office holders are making decisions based upon merit.

Fourth, to inform public office holders and the public so that they can distinguish between genuine and manufactured representations.

Fifth, to inform public office holders so that they can judge the merits of arguments presented by lobbyists.

Sixth, last but certainly not least, as we have seen over the past seven years, to ensure the integrity of the system of lobbying and government decision-making in particular.

We hope you'll keep these reasons in mind for significant changes to the act and related measures as you continue your review.

I would like to note that there are two previous committees, the Cooper committee in 1986 and the Holtmann committee in 1993, that have examined the issues before the committee. And both committees proposed measures that go beyond the measures in the current act and also beyond the recommendations of the industry minister as he has referred the act for review to you. So the committee has the opportunity to acknowledge the deliberations of these previous committees and incorporate the proposals they made into recommendations for changes to the act.

As well, of course, there are many promises that stand from 1993 that were made during the Liberals' election campaign and in the campaign document, Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada, pledges that have still not been upheld, particularly with regard to this act and the enforcement measures. These are pledges such as bringing lobbyists out of the shadows, and also, of course, the promise to appoint an independent and fully empowered ethics counsellor.

The last recommendation in the list our coalition has set out—and this is a list of 19 recommendations, which you will receive—is a general recommendation, but we're going to start with it, because it does set the context of the problem, we believe.

• 1540

Free and open access to government is an important matter of public interest, and the act notes that in the preamble. But there is a wide gap between the statement of this right and the ability of citizens to exercise it. The existence of lobbyists in Ottawa, the fact that almost all federal lobbyists are located in Ottawa, and the existence of an act, one of the public purposes of which is disclosure, all point to a gap between the citizen's right of access to government and the meaningful exercise of those rights. This gap mirrors the current credibility gap of governance in Canada as reflected in several polls, including those by Ekos Research and by the Institute for Research on Public Policy. Citizens have realized that although government officials and lobbyists never say it in public, if you're not inside Ottawa, you're outside the sphere of influence.

The right of access is not enough to close this credibility gap, nor is simple disclosure through the act. The federal government must take steps change current government decision-making processes so that citizens can easily exercise their right to participate in these processes.

We recommend that the government go beyond this draft policy statement and guidelines on consulting and engaging Canadians, which is currently being considered and finalized by Treasury Board, and make them binding and require government departments to involve citizens in decision-making in meaningful ways. If you do so, then you will help close this credibility gap that currently exists where many Canadians feel that politicians help themselves and their friends and ignore citizen concerns.

Turning to what we believe to be a very important issue, enforcement, we have several recommendations in this area. The main one, of course, is that the current ethics counsellor be replaced by an independent ethics commission. That commission should have full powers to investigate government officials and lobbyists, and if a violation of a lobbyist or ethics rule has been confirmed, to recommend penalties to Parliament in a publicly available report. Most Canadian provinces and territories have such an independent ethics enforcement system. Only the federal system lacks these key characteristics.

We also believe there should be a requirement of anyone covered by a federal government code of conduct, which will include ministers and other appointees, civil servants, and lobbyists, that they all be required to report any wrongdoing to such an ethics commission and that the identity of any person who reports such wrongdoing, a so-called whistle-blower, not be made public without their consent, and they should be fully protected from retaliation or disciplinary measures.

So we urge you to do that at least with this act, but we believe it is such a related measure that you should include in the amendments of this act a blanket whistle-blower protection measure so that people who are blowing the whistle on government wrongdoing can be protected from retaliation.

And finally, we believe, should a person blow the whistle to such an ethics commission when it is created—and I hope it is a “when”, not an “if”—if the commission does not investigate within a specific time period, that person should have a right to go to court to obtain an order forcing the ethics commission to do so.

I mention that last recommendation particularly because we have filed three complaints with the ethics counsellor involving lobbyists breaking the lobbyists' code of conduct and ministers breaking the federal ethics code. One of those we filed last April 13, and we have been waiting over a year for a ruling from the ethics counsellor. The other was filed September 25, and the final one in November. In all of the cases, we have been waiting several months for the ethics counsellor to rule. We have provided very clear evidence of at least apparent conflicts of interest, which is all that is needed to find the lobbyist in violation of the lobbyists' code of conduct and the minister or senior public officials in violation of their code, yet the ethics counsellor has found himself somehow unable to rule in any of these cases. It shows how he is lacking independence and effective powers to watch over the affairs of lobbyists.

I will now turn to Aaron Freeman, who will give you more details on specific changes to the act.

• 1545

Mr. Aaron Freeman (Board Member, Democracy Watch): Thanks very much, and thanks again to the committee for allowing us to appear on a piece of legislation that's really at the cornerstone of the democratic process in Canada, because more and more what we're seeing in various areas of the federal government is that lobbyists have tremendous influence over the processes of government and are even actually undertaking some of those processes themselves when the government contracts out, for example, to a lobbyist to undertake a particular function. We've highlighted many examples over the past year.

In order to tighten up the system of registration and close many of the loopholes, we think the following provisions should be put in place. The first would be that instead of the current system, where lobbyists disclose their meetings with government officials, we feel that ministers and senior public officials should be required to disclose their meetings with lobbyists so that you have a better way of tracking lobbying activities.

There is considerable anecdotal evidence that many lobbyists simply decline to register. One possible example would be that of Matthew Johnston, the former executive assistant to Rahim Jaffer, who, while being executive assistant, was the executive director of a property rights lobby group based in Alberta that was lobbying the federal government on a variety of issues, including species at risk, animal welfare legislation, and other issues.

The second set of loopholes that we would like to see closed would be tied to the revolving-door provision for former public officials currently acting in the lobbying industry. We feel that if they communicate on an issue with public officials after receiving a written request, they should still be required to register. Currently, if they do receive a written request, under paragraph 4(2)(c) they do not have to register. We feel that this is a fairly blatant loophole that should be closed.

They should be required to register if they are obtaining or providing information that's not readily available to the general public, and they should be required to register if they're lobbying over a time period that exceeds a specific threshold.

The third area would be that lobbyists should be required to disclose how much they and their clients are spending on a particular lobbying campaign. This is a requirement in 33 U.S. states. It gives the public an idea of how much is being spent to try to influence the democratic process.

Fourthly, lobbyists should be required to disclose past or current work with governments, political parties, or candidates for federal public office. This is another thing that the Johnston example illustrates quite clearly, someone who both ran the campaign and served as executive assistant to Rahim Jaffer.

Fifthly, lobbyists should be prohibited from serving in senior positions on campaigns of political parties or candidates. This is prohibited in two U.S. states.

Lobbyists should be prohibited from doing work for the government departments that they are lobbying. This creates certainly an obvious appearance of conflict of interest and invites very real conflicts of interest.

The business deduction for lobbying expenses, which is a public subsidy for wealthy special interests to influence the democratic process, should be ended. Contingency fees, whereby lobbyists are only paid based on whether they succeed in their lobbying effort, should also be banned.

The government has tried to ban these four when a lobbyist is trying to obtain contracts, by submitting a clause in the contract that says the contract was not obtained through the use of a contingency fee lobbyist. There is substantial evidence that this rule is breached, but also the rule doesn't apply to federal loans, grants, policy changes, or any other lobbying effort.

I'm going to switch back to Duff Conacher for further explanation.

Mr. Duff Conacher: One of the issues that the minister has raised is the two-year statutory limitation period on laying charges under the act for offences committed under the act. We believe it certainly needs to be clarified, although the minister says he doesn't think there's a problem in this area.

• 1550

If you look at the wording, it says charges may be laid “not later than two years after the time when the subject-matter of the proceedings arose”. If we look in the dictionary at the meaning of “arose”, it means when something occurred, but also when notice was received of its occurrence. As you can see, there can be a huge gap between the time something occurs and the time we become aware of it. So it's not drafted very well, plainly, unless somehow—and we don't believe it is so—“arose” has a very definite legal meaning and only means when notice has been received of something.

A case that raises that is the case we have filed with the ethics counsellor today for investigation. In addition to filing a request for an investigation of Matthew Johnston's lobbying activities, we filed a request for investigation of René Fugère's lobbying activities.

René Fugère was investigated last year by the RCMP for failing to register as a lobbyist. The RCMP dropped the investigation, even though clear evidence exists that Fugère was paid by various clients to communicate with public office holders in an attempt to influence the awarding of federal grants. Those are clear conditions under which the lobbying law requires a person to register as a lobbyist. Given that Fugère is an unpaid aide to Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and that the Prime Minister's Office was involved in at least one of the same grant decisions, we also believe Fugère's lobbying activities likely put the Prime Minister in a conflict of interest.

One of the reasons the RCMP may have dropped the investigation without laying charges is the two-year limitation period. We're waiting to hear from them what their reasons were. They may also be raising what the ethics counsellor talked about last week and was also raised in the industry minister's letter to you—

The Chair: Mr. Conacher, I would ask you to wrap up your statement. You're over time now.

Mr. Duff Conacher: Yes, I will wrap up very soon.

And that is the issue of the meaning of the words “communicate in an attempt to influence”. We believe it defies common sense that the Department of Justice has concluded that the key word in that phrase is “influence” and that you only have to register if you are in fact influence-peddling.

This is not to say we don't support changing the standard for when you should have to register and broadening it, so that whether you're gathering information or just communicating with regard to an issue, or a grant, or a bill, or a law, you should have to register. But we do not believe the current phrase is unclear. And if the RCMP has dropped the investigation of Fugère on those grounds alone, we believe we will be seeking a way to challenge that decision, because we think it simply lets him off the hook entirely.

Finally, I would note a couple of other measures that we believe are very related to your review of the act—it's all interrelated, this area of government ethics. We call on you to recommend to the government that they put in place an open arm's-length and merit-based process for government appointments and awarding contracts. We also recommend very strongly that the government pass a code of conduct for all MPs and senators. That code of conduct should cover clearly, given what Matthew Johnston was able to do as a staffer for an MP, the activities of MPs' staff, because they can have inside access and therefore undue influence that is not available to average Canadians.

Again, we have set out six reasons for making significant changes and, we think, also much evidence. We can present much more evidence as to why this law needs to be tightened up, why ethics rules generally need to be broadened and strengthened, and why the overall enforcement system needs to be made much more independent and effective. Otherwise this system will continue to essentially allow the corrupting of government in secret, and that is not democratic in any way, shape, or form. Canadians deserve better. They deserve to have the promises made in 1993 kept.

Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Conacher.

Mr. Rajotte, do you have any questions?

Mr. James Rajotte (Edmonton Southwest, CA): Yes, I do. Thank you, Madam Chair.

The first question is for Mr. Grainger. In your report you state that today there is a widespread desire to ensure that the playing field is level in both private and public sector activity. That's a very general statement, so specifically what would you suggest?

• 1555

Mr. Brian Grainger: Thank you for picking up on that point. It's almost 10 or 12 years in the making. What I mean by that is in both the private and public sectors—and we can be specific, whether you're talking Lockheed Martin, Nortel, or you're talking the public sectors of Canada, the U.S., the Australians, or the British community—there have been specific efforts made to do three things. One is to put in place affirmative, positive codes. In this regard, I share Mr. Conacher's view that this House, the masters of this House being here, should in fact have a code. That will round out the package, as I think Mr. Wilson pointed out last week. That's one thing they've done.

Two, they have put in place extremely effective education and training pieces to a degree—to a larger degree or lesser degree—in all the communities I just mentioned and others that I can talk about. In fact, if you go to the OECD profile on OECD members, there is a whole section on this whole effort around the public sector—all sectors, politicians as well as public servants, if you will.

Then, thirdly, you have to try to create a community or a feeling that when you deal with the issue of integrity, we all have a responsibility to help build this issue of transparency and accountability. It's not something that happens overnight, but there have been some exceedingly important initiatives, including in the federal public service of Canada and the public service commissions of the provinces. It's not an easy task. It's a slow task, but it's under way. All I tried to say earlier and in previous appearances before the committee due to my work in all professional categories throughout the world is that we need to spend more time on the prevention side.

Why would you want Brian Grainger to fall down on his face for a conflict of interest problem last week or the week before, or anybody else you're talking about right now, when we could prevent it by doing some more work around just what is a conflict of interest? Do we want to go litigious? Do we want a compliance, rule-based system that is as expensive as the Americans'?

I can assure you, for example, that the very large, very well-endowed, expensive commission in the States at the federal level got nowhere near the White House. You can't legislate judgment. We have to work on the preventative side. That's where I'm coming from.

Mr. James Rajotte: Thank you very much.

My second question is for Mr. Conacher. You stated that we should require government departments to involve citizens in meaningful ways. How would you suggest doing that?

Mr. Duff Conacher: Well, the guidelines that have been set out are actually very progressive and complete in setting the standard for meaningful public consultation. There's also the Canadian Standards Association.

Mr. James Rajotte: How would we do that?

Mr. Duff Conacher: Specifically, first of all, engage people early. Secondly, make sure that all sides have adequate resources to participate fully.

Mr. James Rajotte: But when you say “engage people early”, what do you want? Do you want a budget hearing across the country? Do you want the minister to send out bureaucrats across the country? Specifically, how do you involve people?

Mr. Duff Conacher: Well, the Internet can be used very well and should be used to let everyone know who are the key civil servants who are working on what issues now—well in advance of a bill being introduced in the House—how to contact them, and what questions they are seeking to answer as they develop a policy. It should be fully searchable by subject matter and department. There is no reason why... That is how the government should be using the Internet—to engage people very early in the process.

Most Canadians do not understand the legislative process. They believe, when a bill has been introduced, that this is the first decision that's been made and that things are now open to be changed, and they can send in their letter and the minister will consider it. No, all the decisions have already been made.

So the Internet can be used much more, as well as simply a department reaching out. Rather than maintaining this very unhealthy attitude that government has to develop its agenda in secret and control its agenda in secret, departments can reach out, as happens really only in these five-year reviews where there is advance notice. There has been since last July a letter up on the industry minister's website saying that this issue has been referred to the committee.

In terms of new initiatives, it's very difficult for people to find out what's going on and how they can participate and let their views be known. So it becomes a very much inside-Ottawa process, because you have to be here to learn what is going on early enough to really influence the big decisions. Everyone else reads the headlines and learns about it much too late. That's not a process that in any way is representative.

• 1600

Mr. James Rajotte: But isn't that a process in itself? You're thinking that people are going to go to an Internet website, do the cross-checking on which government department and which bureaucrat are responsible for which policy, and then contact that government bureaucrat. Right now, a citizen can write the finance minister and say the limit on RSPs is too low, and I want it raised. There's a direct connection that they can make with a minister. I don't see how this system is more democratic than the one already in place.

Mr. Duff Conacher: Because timing is very key in government decision-making processes. So you can send in a letter, but maybe it's too late; maybe the consultation phase has ended. Or maybe it'll be two years before the government and the civil servants in a department are really looking at an issue. So your letter will get lost in that two-year shuffle. Timing is very important, and that's why the Internet can be used to let people know the opportune time.

As well, though, government departments should be reaching out. There's a process that is used in Sweden regularly, which is called study searches. It's kind of like focus group polling, only the individuals involved in the focus group are educated about the issue before they're asked their opinion. It's used regularly in Sweden; it's also used quite regularly by a foundation in the U.S. called the Kettering Foundation, and it's like informed focus group polling. You inform people about the issues, you set out the options the government is considering, and then you give Canadians the right and the direct avenue to let their values be expressed about which options the government should choose.

The government has only used it once at the federal level. It was in 1994 to develop immigration policy changes. After that, the civil servants have reclaimed their power to determine what the values are that should be reflected in legislation and to control the whole process in secret, shutting Canadians out in the process and shutting members of Parliament out in the process as well.

So lots can be done, believe me. All you have to do is look at the standards out there for public consultation, and you'll see that the government is falling far short.

The Chair: Thank you. Thank you very much.

Mr. James Rajotte: Just one more.

The Chair: Briefly, please.

Mr. James Rajotte: This is for Mr. Freeman. You mentioned that lobbyists have a tremendous influence over the process. Now, don't pick a specific case that we all hear about; pick a specific government policy. Can you point to a relationship between a particular government policy and lobbyists that have had influence that way? There are lobbyists on every side of every issue, so to prove a direct link there I think is...

Mr. Aaron Freeman: You can choose several examples. It's very difficult to say. At the end of the process, the government can always say we chose among the options that we thought were best. It's very difficult to divorce the question you're asking from the process. You can't just look at the outcome and say, well, in my opinion, that's a pro-industry outcome.

You know, when the Treasury Board decided to develop guidelines for the high-tech sector, and they opted to hire a high-tech lobbyist—a lobbyist that represents high-tech firms—to facilitate the development of those guidelines, was the end process a pro-industry result? Some would say yes, some would say no. I don't know enough about the high-tech sector to even offer you an opinion on that, but there are—

Mr. James Rajotte: Why do you make the statement, then? If you make the statement, clearly you have an example in mind to back up what you're saying.

Mr. Aaron Freeman: Well, there are many examples where lobbyists have tremendous influence over the process.

Mr. James Rajotte: Such as?

Mr. Aaron Freeman: I can offer you my opinion at the end of that process.

Mr. Duff Conacher: Well, the 1997 changes to the Bank Act. Between 1995 and 1997 Doug Peters, junior finance minister—or as now termed, Secretary of State responsible for financial institutions—met through that period with industry representatives 49 times, and he spoke at nine industry conferences. He did not meet once with a citizen group—not once in a two-year period. And if you look at the changes to the 1997 Bank Act, guess what? There was absolutely nothing addressing citizen concerns, even though there were several citizen groups making very clear recommendations for changes.

In fact, we still don't have a change that has been so well documented and it's crazy that the government hasn't acted, because it protects so many Canadians. Interestingly, it's protection for people with low incomes—I guess the government just doesn't really care about them—and that is a right to open a basic bank account.

The Chair: Mr. Conacher, that's enough. Thank you. We got your point.

Okay, we're just going to move on to the next questioner. Ms. Torsney, please.

Ms. Paddy Torsney (Burlington, Lib.): Thank you.

Just to clarify, Mr. Conacher, are you registered as a lobbyist?

Mr. Duff Conacher: Yes.

• 1605

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Yes, because I certainly know you lobbied me.

Just as a point of clarification, in my first mandate I held 17 public meetings to talk about issues, and we gave people lots of information on which to make decisions. The government is in fact consulting through the Internet on a whole series of issues, and things are taking place. Can we improve? All the time, absolutely, but to suggest we're not doing anything is really quite unfair.

Secondly, I did get a hijacked copy of a list of the 31 groups you're representing. Is your whole presentation what they're all presenting? How should we interpret your remarks in terms of the 31 groups?

Mr. Duff Conacher: They endorse the 19 recommendations.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Okay. That's a good clarification.

Mr. Grainger, I absolutely agree with you that there needs to be more education about ethics, and there could be lots of ways to do that.

I remember reading an article back when we used to have a magazine on Saturdays that came in the newspaper—so I was probably about 12 or 13—about an apple juice manufacturer. A whistle-blower was not able to draw attention to the fact that they were using corn syrup instead of apples. Just that whole process raised awareness in me, and as I was going through business school, I saw this as something we should have been talking about.

I'm not sure exactly what your role is. I've had a chance to talk to business schools, and I think it's something we absolutely need to do more of. We need to do it across all educational levels, but particularly in business schools. Is that being done more? I left a long time ago.

Mr. Brian Grainger: Very much. Building on the earlier question, indeed, some of the impact Mr. Conacher and others are trying to make in this field is very important in that the type of education we have going right now is very balkanized. We have the doctors, lawyers, and judges getting their input from various places; we have the business community and the teachers getting it; etc.

In the last decade or so a couple of things have come together. There's a general understanding that we have to have a core set of values—this is not to push a specific cultural set of values—around things such as integrity, transparency, and accountability, all the good things we were just talking about, and to put them on all curricula, not to add to the already tired high school teachers' sense of being beleaguered, which they are, but to see if we can parcel out some of this activity so that we're all doing it.

The business schools are doing it. York, Toronto, McGill, UBC, and Laval have some excellent programs in place.

What's happening, which is really exciting, frankly, is that we've gone from the level of a Brian Grainger lecturing you about do this and do that to the level of let's take a case and work it through, the X case, the Y case, the Nortel case, the case of insider knowledge on cigarettes, the apple juice case, and the Tylenol case. Let's get something out of this so that I, Brian Grainger, come up against the next case and say “I have a feeling I've seen this before. What am I going to do now?” “Don't tell me later, Mr. Grainger, that the CEO or whoever didn't tell you to go this way and not that way. We educated you to go this way.”

Ms. Paddy Torsney: One of the national newspapers is running a column on ethics. I think that's particularly helpful, because people need to understand how to approach an issue and how to get through it.

Mr. Brian Grainger: Absolutely.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: The one thing that came out a little this morning, or this afternoon—this morning was a whole other issue—that I'm a bit distressed by is the suggestion that somehow lobbying for something is a negative thing. That's just not the case. There has been some good lobbying that has changed and improved government policy, and a lot of consultation takes place.

As somebody who worked as a government relations consultant, I can tell you that many times our approach to business was in fact “No, this isn't going to fly”, or “Well, you want that from the government, but what are you really prepared to do to meet their agenda on a whole series of other issues?”

I think we do need people who understand what the government is doing and why the government is doing something to explain that to business people. It's a bit like having a tax lawyer do your taxes or a public relations consultant explain your issue to the public. We can't all be experts in everything.

• 1610

You need to be able to hire someone who understands government and what the government processes are and where the opportunities are, not so that you can influence or corrupt, but so that you can actually make a point and improve things for all Canadians, or even for your own business. That could be acceptable as well.

But it doesn't have to be viewed as negative. I think a lot of what you said, Mr. Conacher, left me with the impression that somehow it was all negative and dirty. I think that's quite unfortunate. Certainly, some of the issues you've raised with me in terms of banking and what have you are things I've thought about and talked to people about. I think you raised some really positive things, and that, of course, is lobbying.

Mr. Duff Conacher: The government hasn't acted on most of it because of the strength of the bank lobby and the ties of the bank lobby to the government—

Ms. Paddy Torsney: So your definition of lobbying is you have to have an answer immediately. It's not a dialogue or a process. It's you ask for something, and you get it delivered.

Mr. Duff Conacher: We're talking seven years now.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: I'm just trying to clarify. Is that the only aspect? Are you saying that everybody who lobbies the government on something has to get an immediate and positive response, otherwise they're not lobbying?

Mr. Duff Conacher: No, not at all. I'm just saying we have this impression a lot of things that are going on behind closed doors are against the public interest and the will of the majority of Canadians because we've seen it a lot.

One of the cases involves changes to the Bank Act, where the government has even ignored the report of the task force it appointed, the MacKay task force, even though recommendations in that report were endorsed by the Senate banking committee and the House of Commons finance committee. Those recommendations have still not been acted upon by the industry minister or the finance minister even though a poll shows that the majority of Canadians want them acted upon. Explain to me why that hasn't happened, if the system has such integrity.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: So we're only supposed to listen to certain people, and if we listen to certain people, then it's lobbying. If we don't listen, or if we listen but don't agree with the other people—

Mr. Duff Conacher: This involves the government's own task force and the government's own committees.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: No, I asked you...

Mr. Aaron Freeman: Maybe I can comment more generally on the point you're raising, which is the legitimate role lobbyists play. Lobbying has been an integral part of the democratic process throughout Canada's history. It is legitimate, and there is a legitimate role for lobbyists to play.

I think the problem for me is when the industry gets into areas where it has more and more influence over the democratic process. Since the last set of changes to this law, the lobbying industry in Ottawa has more than doubled in size, and we're seeing more and more instances when they take on the communications functions of government and the consultation role even though they or their clients have a vested interest in the outcome of that process. There is a problem with the lobbying industry, and all of the points you raised about it are legitimate and true for those who can afford it.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Sorry to interrupt, Mr. Freeman, but you are part of the lobbying industry. You are lobbying.

Mr. Aaron Freeman: Absolutely.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: So why are you characterizing them as something other than you?

Mr. Aaron Freeman: I'm not. I've already said lobbying has a legitimate role to play.

My concern is about an industry that has become part of the governing process. As part of the governing process, there should be disclosure and accountability provisions placed on their activities, my activities, our activities.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Can I just clarify something?

The Chair: Briefly, Ms. Torsney.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: How much have you been paid to come, then? You're telling me it's expensive, and you are lobbying.

Mr. Aaron Freeman: Nothing. I'm a volunteer. I don't get paid by Democracy Watch.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Then what's the expensive part? You said you can't lobby unless you have a lot of money. You are lobbying us.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais (Churchill, NDP): You don't get government results unless you have a lot of money.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Was that his point?

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: That's the point I got.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Torsney, and thank you, Mrs. Desjarlais, for that clarification.

Mr. Brien, please.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien (Témiscamingue, BQ): I believe it was Mr. Freeman who talked about the fact that lobbyists should not, for example, hold partisan political offices in an organization. I did not understand whether he was also referring to lobbyists who take part in fundraising activities, for example, or who organize such activities outside of electoral periods, so they are in effect holding positions that are linked to political organizations.

• 1615

I know that there is a contentious case that is being investigated at this time. What do you suggest in this regard?

[English]

Mr. Aaron Freeman: I'm sorry, I didn't catch the very last part of that, the very last example that you gave.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: I want to know what you are recommending concerning the control of lobbying activities as opposed to political parties fundraising activities.

[English]

Mr. Aaron Freeman: I would respond with two points. One is that the recommendation we've made has to do with those in senior positions on campaigns of political parties or candidates. Senior positions would involve fundraising positions, certainly. But the other thing is that we haven't called for a ban on these activities, we've called for disclosure of these activities. I'm not sure if that is a point of clarification... No, I'm sorry, I'm getting my recommendations mixed up. We have called for a ban.

I'm sorry. This is my third hearing of the day.

The Chair: It's happened to all of us.

Mr. Aaron Freeman: The reason we've called for that restriction is that if you're involved in government, you shouldn't be involved in partisan activities, because a part of your job requires you to remain non-partisan. In the same way, the involvement of lobbyists is part of the democratic process.

The issue is one of conflict of interest. The relationship that you develop in a senior position on an election campaign is one that is very close to the decision-maker. If you are then lobbying that decision-maker, you're inviting a situation that involves conflict of interest.

Mr. Duff Conacher: Just the very relationship has the appearance of a conflict. If that person is lobbying you, even if they don't do anything, people would term it undue influence.

The Chair: Mr. Grainger, do you have a comment to make?

Mr. Brian Grainger: I really have two comments.

I have watched very carefully, and because of my experience in the last decade—and for those who may not be familiar with me from the last time I appeared, I spent twenty years in the criminal justice system, so I'm quite interested in and knowledgeable about enforcement, whether it's prisons or policing or anything else—I know about rules-based world and how we're going to use a hammer on people.

The Americans have proven to us that you can litigate the world and still have a mess. We haven't gained anything from going in that direction. On the other hand, the kinds of things that have been raised today—transparency, accountability—are important.

I'm suggesting and many people are suggesting today that we're going to have to depend on and rely on the professionalism—the word is “integrity”—of individuals called to serve as politicians, because they have the last word to make the right judgments. When they don't make the right judgments, then yes, we have various kinds of hammers that we can put in play.

Sometimes we miss things, that's true. But I don't think what we want to do is have an environment in which we rely completely on rules-based approaches, not values-based approaches, because I think we're going to have a difficult time.

If we denigrate lobbying—and I'm not suggesting this is what's being done here, by the way—and other techniques and tools, and if we don't upgrade the lobbying, then we're going to get the cynicism and the litigation. The cynics are going to walk away, and those of us who stick around to fight are going to litigate. I don't think we need to go down the litigation road or the cynicism road. I think we have to look at issues like integrity.

The code issue is important. I do think that if the rules were set out, both for parliamentarians themselves, as masters in their own house, and for the lobbyists, as has been done, then we'd hold them to that. People have to be able to stand up and say “Yes, I did that, it's wrong, and I apologize”. We're seeing a little more of it, and I look forward to more of it.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Grainger.

Mr. Brien.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: Mr. Grainger, you talked a lot about "upgrading", to use your own phrase, lobbying activities generally. Would there not be greater confidence if, in our ethical practices, we did not allow corporations to give contributions to political parties, for example, or at least if we limited their ability to do so?

• 1620

Thus, these lobbyists would not be linked financially to the people they are lobbying while at the same time having the capacity to raise funds for these same people. Would that not allow us to at least alleviate the concerns that some people may have about lobbyists? Quite often, there are very real issues of money that are involved. It involves both the corporation that is raising money and the political party that is trying to raise some on its own.

Mr. Brian Grainger: I fully understand where you're coming from. However, in my experience,

[English]

we still have to rely on the good judgment of the professional people around us.

For example, yesterday I had the privilege of watching Pierre Péladeau and Luc Lavoie in front of the CRTC. I thought Péladeau did a brilliant job of explaining the values of his corporation, the values he had to meet inside of the CRTC. He explained very carefully, in detail, what he was going to do to meet the requirements of this activity. I think we're all capable of making that commitment and explaining ourselves that clearly.

It is that level of professionalism displayed by Péladeau yesterday before the CRTC that I think all the professional groups—indeed, many more than that—should be striving for in their lobbying. He was lobbying. He was the lobbyist in the sense of the highest level of his corporation. He didn't have his team of lobbyists around him. He did the lobbying yesterday, and he did it brilliantly, on the basis of the behaviour and conduct his corporation was committed to in order to make this project happen, and in terms of how to meet the code of CRTC with the Quebecor code. It was an excellent presentation of exactly what I propose today.

However, I must agree with you. If we allow tens of millions of dollars in soft money to be poured into specific campaigns unfettered, then, yes, we're going to have problems. I'm cynical enough to believe that sometimes, when we have the problems, it's not because the policy went wrong or right, it's because somebody used the money for some other purpose. That's how cynical I've become. It's not that they did anything with the money; they actually blew it.

The fact of the matter is, what I think we need to do is be very careful with those things, like you said. I totally agree with you. We cannot go overboard with expenses. But again, we have to find a balance.

My concern is that if we go in certain directions, it's out of balance—and I'll give you an example. I urge the committee to take a look at the anti-corruption commissions that have been struck in three states of Australia for twelve years. They have been semi-permanent royal commissions, to use a Canadian analogy. They have ferreted out whistle-blowing and disclosure for twelve years, and it's still not a situation you would say is perfect. They've spent millions of dollars in New South Wales, in Western Australia, and in Queensland, for good reasons. There were good reasons for why they started.

Tons of money have been spent on the good side in trying to get to the bottom of things, and we're still finding it's difficult to solve the problem by just throwing money at it, litigating against it, or giving it a legislative framework. We have to get back to some professional balance in terms of our expectations and commitment. But I'd meet you half way.

The Chair: Thank you.

[Translation]

Thank you very much, Mr. Brien.

[English]

Mr. Bryden, please.

Mr. John Bryden (Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Aldershot, Lib.): Thank you.

I have a very specific hypothetical question. In your opinion, is it in the public interest to know who in the bureaucracy has been lobbied by a former cabinet minister, a former parliamentary secretary, or a former chairman of a standing committee who has turned lobbyist?

I'd like that question answered by Mr. Grainger in the perception aspect, and by Mr. Conacher and his colleague in the principle aspect.

The idea is that it's a cabinet minister—I'm not saying anything is wrong with it—or a former chairman of a standing committee who has turned lobbyist and is now lobbying. We know he's lobbying politicians, but is it in the public interest to know, by name, the bureaucrats he's lobbying?

An hon. member: What if it's a “she”?

Mr. Brian Grainger: She or he.

• 1625

I would say to you that because we're all human beings, if I'm a public servant and the head of an opposition party or the leader of the Liberal government visits me, I'm sure it leaves a certain impression. I don't doubt it, because we're human. My question would be turned around the other way, and I think—

The Chair: Mr. Grainger, I think the question was about after.

Mr. Brian Grainger: I meant former. Excuse me.

Mr. John Bryden: You meant a former cabinet minister or chairman of a standing committee.

Mr. Brian Grainger: Thank you, Madam Chair. I totally agree. We're talking about where a formerly important person is a lobbyist.

Mr. John Bryden: He's a lobbyist now.

Mr. Brian Grainger: My argument would be that if Brian Grainger comes to visit you and you are an EX-1 in the federal government with an important file, Brian Grainger, former whatever, should have enough sense to be very careful about making that approach. Perhaps I should not make that approach but should ask a colleague to do it. We're talking about something that's inappropriate, and that's a perception issue.

Mr. John Bryden: All right, it's inappropriate. The question is, should we know the name of the bureaucrat? We know the name of the lobbyist. The lobbyist is a former cabinet minister or a former chairman of a standing committee. Should we know specifically who he's lobbying in what department? Right now the Lobbyists Registration Act simply says department. Is it in the public interest to know this?

Mr. Brian Grainger: I honestly don't know if it's in the public interest to know that sort of thing. I'd like to think that the chief executive officer, the deputy minister, would be held accountable if particular lobbying that targeted members of the public service was inappropriate. I think he or she needs to be held accountable.

Whether or not you need to know the name of some front-line supervisor in B.C. who got lobbied or—

Mr. John Bryden: By a cabinet minister? You don't think that's important?

Mr. Brian Grainger: I don't see the need, personally.

Mr. Duff Conacher: One question came to mind during Mr. Grainger's answers. How could the deputy minister ever be held accountable for inappropriate lobbying in that situation if we didn't know about it? I think our recommendations reflect the fact that yes, we believe that this should be disclosed, that beyond that the revolving door should be closed more tightly, and that former ministers should be prohibited for five years, not just two years, from making these kinds of representations. Two years is too short. There usually hasn't been an election within that two-year period, there hasn't been a change in government let alone in bureaucracy, and the former minister's relationships are still too strong with departmental officials.

But the disclosure, we believe, should be tied to the decision-making power of the civil servant. You have to draw a line somewhere. We believe that it's possible to draw a line, and you don't have to go right down to the front-line person because that front-line person will be reporting to someone who has decision-making powers.

Mr. John Bryden: Let me pick up on that.

Mr. Duff Conacher: If the meeting is between a former minister or similar person and a person who has decision-making powers, then that should definitely be disclosed.

Mr. John Bryden: I'm picking up on Mr. Grainger's comments. You say it's only the decision-makers who are important. What if the lobbyists are directing their attention to the young people who write policy papers? Often senior bureaucrats receive the policy papers from juniors. Wouldn't it be in the interest of the senior bureaucrats to know who has been lobbying the junior bureaucrats who are submitting policy papers to them?

Mr. Duff Conacher: Well, if that were reported up the chain, then we would—

Mr. John Bryden: Yes, but it's not reported up the chain, because I can't get that information. Let's answer a very specific question. Is it not in the interest of a senior bureaucrat to know who among his juniors has had approaches from that former cabinet minister—or from whomever, for that matter—for the purpose of lobbying? Is this not of interest to that person?

Mr. Duff Conacher: It's of interest to that person, and it's of interest to the public. We've generally had the response that the administrative burden would be too great for everyone at such a junior level to be disclosing entries in their appointment books to show who they have met with.

Mr. John Bryden: Oh, no. The lobbyists are registered, are they not?

Mr. Duff Conacher: Oh yes.

Mr. John Bryden: Surely a bureaucrat at any level would be able to record the name of the lobbyist who approached him for his superior.

Mr. Duff Conacher: Yes, we see no problem with this at all. They're all paid by the public. They're all required to uphold the public trust. There's a huge problem within the public service, we believe, and the Auditor General has shown this through two separate surveys. According to a survey conducted for the Auditor General a few years ago, one-third of public servants were willing to take a weekend at a cottage in return for a favour.

• 1630

Mr. John Bryden: Exactly. But who's giving the favours? The lobbyist is giving the favours, isn't he?

Mr. Duff Conacher: Yes. It's someone trying to win a contract or a grant.

Mr. Reg Alcock (Winnipeg South, Lib.): Are you saying a certain percentage of public servants are corrupt?

Mr. John Bryden: No, I don't think he's saying that.

Mr. Duff Conacher: No, I'm saying the Auditor General surveyed a representative sample of civil servants and published the results of the survey in 1995. He found—

The Chair: I wonder if you could table that report to provide the committee with a copy.

Mr. Duff Conacher: Call the Auditor General. He did another one last year.

The Chair: No, but you're... Okay. If you could, just direct the clerk to the specific part afterwards so we can find it.

Mr. Grainger, did you want to comment?

Mr. Brian Grainger: Madam Chair, I wouldn't mind following up again on Mr. Bryden's point.

Just on this point, let me say that, with the greatest respect to my colleague—as the British like to say—when you get that document, it will say that fewer than 5% and closer to 1% felt they had ever been in situations of the kind Mr. Conacher has just described. Nowhere has Denis Desautels said or have any of his staff said anything like 30%. I don't say this as an apologist. I'm not an apologist for the public service, nor for Denis Desautels, but that's simply not the case.

Mr. Reg Alcock: No, it was a hypothetical question that was that asked.

Mr. Brian Grainger: Would you, Duff, be very careful about that language?

Mr. Duff Conacher: I said that 30% would accept according to a survey in which they were asked the question “If you were offered a weekend away...”

The Chair: Mr. Conacher, we'll get the facts, and we'll discuss it at a later date in committee.

Now, Mr. Grainger, do you have another comment in response to Mr. Bryden's question?

Mr. Brian Grainger: I am sympathetic to Mr. Conacher's comments about knowing what's going on in terms of public trust, but I'm troubled by the possibility that right now... My experience is that most public servants, with the professionalism we talked about earlier, would say to a senior person in their office that they just had a visit from whomever or they just got taken to lunch by someone. “Brian Grainger just took me to lunch, and you well know that he's doing this for a particular reason”. The tendency in a bureaucracy—excuse the term—is to actually tell. It really is. The tendency is to actually pass along the information.

What may be at issue here, Mr. Bryden, however—and I hope I share this with Mr. Conacher—is whether we need the information to be on the table. Should it be a dump every year, every half year, or whatever so we know it? That I am troubled with, but I don't for a minute believe... If you get a visit from whomever—and we could name some parliamentarians who've been in that situation for the past couple of years—visiting me or you, the public servant would say “I just had lunch with...”.

Mr. John Bryden: Okay. Now, is that of any value to me as the elected official? Should I not have some idea of who in the bureaucracy is being lobbied at any level?

Mr. Brian Grainger: My answer would be that the lobbyist—company, corporate, in-house, or whatever—is already required to give you some information about what they're doing. I think there's enough public policy information there around this issue. I guess what I'm saying is I'm not sure that by knowing this you are, public-policy-wise, further ahead. That's my experience.

The Chair: Mr. Conacher, do you want to respond?

Mr. Duff Conacher: Again, we believe that yes, it should be disclosed. If it were true—and I wish I could believe that these meetings are all reported up the ladder to a senior officer—then the fact the line was drawn at a senior officer and the fact that the senior officer has received written comments or notes from the meeting would have to be disclosed. It would have to be disclosed that they had received a written submission, even via a junior officer, from someone who was lobbying. The onus should be reversed, and ministers and these senior public officials should definitely be required to disclose who they are meeting with.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mrs. Desjarlais.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: This might be tied to something you've already said in response to Mr. Bryden. In regard to the two-year statutory limit, which you indicated is not drafted very well and which you think needs changes, could you just expand on what you'd like to see. Again, that might be tied right into the former public officials having to respond. Again, could you just expand on that as to what you'd like to see in that area.

In the area of the disclosure of expenditures, does that mean any expenditures, or do you have some kind of limit in mind as to where there would have to be disclosure?

Also, in the questions we had there was talk about the lobbyists having to proclaim that they have 20% of their time... Do you have any comments on the 20% rule and any idea why they came up with 20%?

• 1635

Mr. Duff Conacher: Concerning the two years, it should be made clear that proceedings can be launched no later than two years after something becomes public, after it becomes known that it's occurred. What we're talking about in the case of René Fugère is that he didn't register. Then how do we know what he's doing? That can go on for three years, and then we find out that he wasn't, and if it's more than two years after it occurred, then already he's escaped all accountability. So it's clearly two years from when something becomes known.

I didn't quite understand your second point, so I'll come back to that. But as for how much expenditures should be disclosed, the Lobbyists Registration Act defines communication techniques and lobbying techniques that are being used, and you have to check off when you register which ones you're using. So the expenditures for those techniques and the overall campaign should be disclosed.

There was an issue in 1994 where the subcommittee examining the act tried to tell us that we were talking about the fees lobbyists are paid and that the federal government can't require fees to be disclosed, because that's a matter of contract and a matter of provincial law. That's not what we're talking about. We're talking about the round figure, broken down by those types of lobbying, of how much is being spent by the lobbyist and the client, or in the case of a corporation or organization, what is being spent overall. For example, we do not know how much the pro-merger banks spent to try to distort public opinion and distort the decision-making process of government.

I would note that Don Boudria, in his testimony before the Holtmann committee in 1993 and also before the Cooper committee in 1986, argued that the public has the right to know what resources private interests are devoting to their efforts to influence public policy. So much for that recommendation by the current House leader. I guess he doesn't have influence over his own government either, because we're still waiting for that one to be implemented.

As for the 20%, that's a pretty simple one the minister has raised. We're part of an organization, and so for anyone in our organization, all it has to do is amount to 20% of the overall time of the staff or of any one person, all of us collectively. And for corporations it should be the same. We have always felt that all lobbyists should be treated the same. We don't believe the three tiers are useful.

Just to highlight again one other loophole created in the 1994 round that really should be removed—Mr. Freeman mentioned it briefly—if you receive a written request to come and meet with an official, you do not have to register. That is an enormous loophole that was created by the Liberals in the changes to the act in 1994 for no good reason at all. Everyone receives a confirmation of any meeting they go to—that's all you need and you don't have to register. Remove that loophole; it's very misplaced. Many people could use it to escape registration very easily, just by saying, oh yes, I'm calling you and we're going to have a meeting, send me written confirmation. Written confirmation sent, you don't have to register any more that you're lobbying.

The Chair: Mr. Grainger, did you have any comments on those questions?

Mr. Brian Grainger: On the 20% figure, my recollection is that in Australia, the U.K., and the States people have used various figures to come to an understanding of the critical mass involved in the lobbying, and I think 20% is a norm that's accepted outside of Canada as well.

The Chair: Thank you.

I have no more questions on my list, so I want—

Mr. Pierre Brien: Madam Chair, I'd like to have another question, unless you're short of time.

The Chair: Briefly.

Mr. Pierre Brien: You were mentioning that lobbyists have to declare how much money they're spending on a campaign. What do they spend the money on when they're lobbying bureaucrats and politicians? What is the expense? Do we ever see details of how they're spending that money?

Mr. Duff Conacher: If it's an organization, you mean?

Mr. Pierre Brien: Yes.

Mr. Duff Conacher: It would include the staff time, preparing materials, research reports, things like that. If it's a so-called hired gun lobbyist, then the fees. But again, we don't want the contract disclosed, just the overall global amount, preparing research reports and maybe commissioning polls that they never release, but they just submit to the government to try to convince them.

• 1640

Mr. John Bryden: So we don't see expenditures on wining and dining or that kind of thing.

Mr. Duff Conacher: Only Revenue Canada would see those, but they wouldn't be defined as such. They're just under the whole business tax deduction that we think should be eliminated.

Mr. John Bryden: So we never see whether the bureaucrats and the politicians are actually being taken on trips down the St. Lawrence, or cruises in the Mediterranean, or whatever else.

Mr. Duff Conacher: No.

Mr. John Bryden: That can be an expense, but it's not disclosed.

Mr. Duff Conacher: There's no disclosure of expenditures at all now. We're not saying we want to see invoices and everything, just the round figures. And give the ethics counsellor a right to audit, to ensure that—

Mr. John Bryden: Can I reverse it then, with Madam Chairman's permission?

Perhaps we could put that kind of onus on those being lobbied, to report when they are being lobbied through gifts or whatever. Because I've never understood why a bureaucrat has to be taken out to lunch, when he can meet with a lobbyist in his office.

Mr. Duff Conacher: We do believe that all codes of conduct—it is one of our recommendations I didn't mention, but you'll see it—should contain stringent restrictions on gift-giving to public officials and employees, especially by lobbyists. Again, disclosure only applies to those covered by the public office holders code right now. Civil servants are not covered at all.

The Chair: No, the public office holders code does cover senior civil servants.

Mr. John Bryden: No, it doesn't. Possibly the middle ones are the problem though.

Mr. Duff Conacher: There's an internal code for civil servants.

The Chair: Oh, there's an internal code for civil servants. I apologize.

Mr. Duff Conacher: It doesn't cover these kinds of things and it's enforced by superiors who may be breaking it themselves. That's why we need an independent—

The Chair: Yes. Okay.

Mr. Grainger would like to comment on this too.

Mr. Brian Grainger: I do agree that we probably should look a little tighter on this issue of gifts policy. But I should mention, like everywhere else in the world, if you go to Treasury Board, there is a guideline on conflict of interest. Virtually every department and agency in government has guidelines about gift-giving.

For the record, it is not common practice for civil servants to get very expensive gifts, and it is common practice, when civil servants, wherever they serve in the world—because other cultures are different—do get gifts, to record those gifts. And they are a matter of consideration all the way to the level of deputy minister, depending on the nature of the gift, including of course on the public office holders' side that has been mentioned. If we get an expensive gift from some wonderful state government, it's recorded, whether it goes to a public servant or a public office holder.

You'd have to go a long way to find civil servants, with all due respect, going out for $700 lunches in Paris. That may be other people's habit, but it's not the habit of the public service. Again, I'm not an apologist.

Mr. John Bryden: I hope not.

Thank you, Madam Chair. That is appreciated.

The Chair: We are going to be having other witnesses with whom some of these comments and questions may come up, and we may be able to get further information. We will take a look at the report you recommended.

We appreciate your being here, Mr. Conacher, Mr. Freeman, and Mr. Grainger, and we look forward to meeting with you again sometime in the future.

The meeting is adjourned.