:
We will then notify the minister on the dual arrangements that we have.
The next piece of housekeeping is very brief. You've all been notified that we're going to be visited in Canada by the Minister of Defence from Croatia on October 9. They've been requesting that if our committee or whoever is available...I know that's break week, so the House is not sitting. Perhaps you can let us know within the next 24 hours if anybody's available on October 10 to be here in Ottawa to meet the minister. Kindly let us know as soon as possible. Look as your schedules--we surely know what we're doing a couple of weeks from now--so that in all fairness we can notify the minister.
That concludes the housekeeping. We'll introduce our witnesses.
I'm pleased to have with us here today as witnesses from the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, which is the order of the day, from the Conference of Defence Associations, Lieutenant-General Richard J. Evraire, retired, who is the chairman; and also Colonel Brian S. MacDonald, retired, senior defence analyst. We also have with us, from the Royal Military College of Canada, Dr. Sean Maloney, associate professor of history.
Gentlemen, welcome to the committee. We look forward to hearing your presentations. We normally have 10 minutes per individual, as I recall. If we can follow the previous pattern we used when I chaired, we'll go to each one of you individually, and at the end of your presentations we'll go to questions, if everybody still agrees with that format.
I don't know if you've drawn lots as to who's going to go first, but I have on my list Mr. Evraire. Should we start with you, sir?
:
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I will make a presentation, and Colonel MacDonald will assist me in responding to questions at the end of the presentations.
[Translation]
Mr. Chairman, the Conference of Defence Associations is grateful for this opportunity to comment on Canada's military commitment to Afghanistan.
[English]
This presentation of the CDA will deal with five topics: criteria for assisting the ISAF, the international force mission's effectiveness, a paper on which is included in the background information we have provided your committee; the ISAF concept of operations; a word or two on an assessment of the success of ISAF operations to date; comments on the relationship between the Canadian mission's combat operations and efforts in reconstruction; and to conclude, a comment on the state of personnel and equipment of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan.
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, the CDA believes that the ISAF mission, and Canada's considerable part in it, is an honourable undertaking being conducted with the utmost professionalism by the Canadian Forces, and that it will be considered to have been effective and successful if and when the campaign of terror being waged by the Taliban and their extremist allies fails; if security is restored to the point that ordinary Afghans enjoy personal liberty and freedom from fear; if the Afghan army and police become effective in ensuring security; if the country's market economy begins to flourish; if the central Afghan government control spreads throughout the country; if human rights are respected; if significant infrastructure development programs are under way; and if the elements of a made-in-Afghanistan democratic system of government spread to all parts of the country.
It is obvious that achieving the foregoing objectives is a phenomenally complex and difficult undertaking. Nevertheless, the CDA believes the absence of any one of the above criteria would put the successful completion of the ISAF mission in doubt.
[Translation]
The mission of the NATO-led ISAF is to conduct military operations in order to assist the Government of Afghanistan and the international community in establishing and maintaining, with the full engagement of the Afghan National Security Forces, a safe and secure environment that will allow the government to extend its authority and influence, hold free and fair elections and thereby facilitate Afghanistan's reconstruction.
From its inception, the ISAF's mission has consisted of five phases. Phase 1 is the assessment and preparation phase, including operations in Kabul, which are now completed. Phase 2 involves geographic expansion. It should be noted that in October 2003, the UN Security Council authorized the expansion of the NATO mission beyond Kabul. In October 2004, NATO deployed forces to the North and in September 2005, to the West. It also bears mentioning that expansion to the South was completed on July 31, 2006, that is a scant six weeks ago. Phase 3 of operations, the stage in which Canadian Forces are presently engaged, is a stabilization phase. Phases 4 and 5 will be ones of transition and redeployment.
Canadian Forces were recently deployed in Kandahar province with the launching of phase 3, the stabilization phase. However, the ISAF has been engaged in the North and West much longer than in Kandahar province, and in these districts, a relatively high level of stability has been achieved, which gives us reason for a certain amount of optimism.
[English]
The September 12, 2006, executive summary of the Afghanistan opium survey, published on an annual basis by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, is the most authoritative source in the world on the opium and heroin trade in Afghanistan and is an excellent independent and empirically verifiable source from which the progress and success of the ISAF operation can be measured. It is also a source of robust indicators of changes in opium production and of the level of security, both of which are themselves useful indicators of the degree of success, on a regional basis, of the ISAF stability operations. The report indicates that most of the provinces and districts of the north and west are identified as low risk in security terms, whereas the south, where ISAF has been in place for only six weeks, has a much higher proportion of provinces and districts assessed as high or extreme risk.
Another measure found in the UNODC report is the change from 2005 to 2006 in the total area under poppy cultivation. While the geographical boundaries of the various regions used in the report do not exactly parallel the ISAF regional boundaries, they are close enough to allow for meaningful inferences to be drawn. We find that the area under cultivation in the north declined by 20% on a year-over-year basis, whereas the area under cultivation in the south shot up an alarming 121%, though interestingly the area under cultivation in Kandahar province, the province which is the responsibility of the Canadians, declined by 3%.
[Translation]
From these two indicators identified in the recent UN report on opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, namely the area under cultivation and the level of security in each province, we conclude that ISAF operations in the North and West have been moderately successful. We believe it is reasonable to expect similar results in the South.
[English]
A critical problem for the Afghan government is the huge disparity between governmental sources of income and those available to the drug traffickers.
The UNODC Summary Findings of Opium Trends in Afghanistan, 2005 reports that the total export value of opium to neighbouring countries amounted to $2.7 billion. Of that sum, the farmers received $560 million, whereas the drug traffickers retained $2.14 billion, or about 80% of the total export value. Since Afghanistan's GDP for that year was reported to be $5.2 billion, opium exports stood at about 52% of GDP.
Set against that is the Afghan government's revenue base. The Asian Development Bank's key indicators of developing Asian and Pacific countries for 2004 shows the total revenue of the Afghan government in that year as $652 million, or about 5.2% of GDP.
In 2005, opium production in the southern region amounted to 43% of total Afghan production and will have provided drug traffickers in the south with an annual income of about $900 million. In 2006, the UNODC reports that the south will account for 61% of total production. If export prices remain similar, this would put approximately $1.9 billion in the hands of the drug traffickers.
It is, we believe, self-evident that the great disparity in financial resources between the drug traffickers and the Afghan national government would somehow ensure the complete overthrow of Afghan's national government forces in the south.
If the ISAF were to withdraw, the country would quickly pitch back into civil war, which at best would lead to a decline in regional warlord control, and at worst would see the coming to power of a neo-Taliban structure financed by the drug traffickers. Afghan would evolve from an narco-economy to a narco-state. To those who recommend that we cut and run, understand that they are favouring the return of a terrorist Taliban-al-Qaeda regime over the admittedly difficult birth of a fledgling democracy.
[Translation]
Reconstruction in Afghanistan is simply not possible unless a relatively secure and peaceful environment exists in which Canadian aid and development agencies, other NATO nations and numerous other countries around the world can set about to rebuild or build anew the infrastructure needed for a market economy to flourish. Given that from the beginning of Canada's involvement, the nature of military operations against the Taliban and their allies has constantly evolved, and Canadian Forces have of necessity modified their methods of operation and their inventory of military equipment, the CDA recognizes and acknowledges the professionalism of Canada's troops and their commanders. Canada's military has been able to accomplish its mission, a sine qua non of future reconstruction in Afghanistan.
[English]
It must be remembered, however, that the state of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan and their capacity to accomplish their assigned mission within ISAF needs to be viewed within the larger context of their ability to help meet and fulfill Canada's other international obligations, as well as its domestic and continental North American obligations.
This is why the CDA continues to encourage all decision-makers to accept that we are today living in an insecure world in which defence and security preparedness, aimed at providing citizens with a safe and secure environment, is the single most important responsibility of government.
It therefore is essential that the government continue to meet its obligation to the men and women of our Canadian Forces by providing them with the necessary levels of trained personnel and the appropriate equipment they require to pursue and successfully accomplish the missions assigned to them.
The CDA therefore views the recently announced addition to the CF ISAF mission of a tank squadron, an infantry company, combat engineers, and other elements as a prudent and commendable response to the needs of the mission as articulated by the commander responsible for the operations, who constantly assesses the evolving situation in his area.
Such decisions will provide a significant improvement to Canada's ability to meet its current mandate in Afghanistan.
[Translation]
In the same vein or for similar reasons, the CDA also applauds the stated intention of the Government of Canada to take significant steps to deal with the recapitalization of Canadian Forces' strategic and tactical lift capabilities.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your attention. Retired Colonel Brian MacDonald, an analyst with the CDA, and I will both be happy to answer your questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me ask my first question of perhaps Mr. MacDonald, or Mr. Evraire.
You said that in terms of the deployment of tanks and engineers and the like, the additional deployment is being done at the request of the commanders on the ground, as it should be, based on operational advice. Obviously it's required for the safety and security of our troops, and that's always job one. But I want to ask you a question with respect to what impact that would have on the hearts and minds question.
I read Mr. MacDonald's comments that hearts and minds can flow in different directions. That battle can take many contours. Obviously, while tanks provide security and safety for our troops, they are not known for reconstruction or development. They're usually known for blasting and demolition and destruction. From your perspective, as a military person, how does that impact on the issue of hearts and minds?
Then perhaps Mr. Maloney can follow up, based on his knowledge of Afghanistan, on how that might impact the feelings of the Afghanis we're trying to win over. Ultimately, if we want stability and security in Afghanistan, in addition to military presence we have to have a lot of development, and a lot of peaceful development, if we can ever get there.
:
Mr. Chairman, to respond to that question, the number of main battle tanks that have been added to the force has been said to be between four and fifteen. Regarding tactics, the army has taught for years, based on its own very lengthy experience, that you must have a combined arms battle team that consists of infantry, artillery, and heavy armour. The interaction between these three components is critical to the success in any tactical battle because each of them brings unique characteristics to the battlefield.
If you attempt to engage in conventional operations, for example in attacking a dug-in fixed position, you will find that using artillery and infantry alone makes for a very long process, particularly at the attack point. In such a case, the infantry, as it approaches the objective, is supported by the artillery, which fires on the objective, preventing the soldiers on the other side from directly firing at the infantry.
At some point, the infantry will get so close to the artillery that the artillery must stop firing because the fragments that come from our own artillery then threaten the lives of our infantry. At that point, in a space of about 300 metres, the other side is then able to emerge from its trenches and direct fire on our attacking infantry. At that point the infantry takes the majority of its casualties.
In order to reduce that further, main battle tanks move forward with the infantry, equipped particularly with machine guns and their main armaments, to provide the intimate fire support when our supporting artillery is forced to lift, and to continue the process of suppressing the defensive fire from the other side in order to place our infantry successively on the objective.
Most recently, neo-Taliban forces have changed tactics from using what might be described as hit and run operations to actually adopting fixed dug-in positions. It was the assessment of the commander, General Fraser, then, that if this is to be a possible line of tactics of the neo-Taliban in the future, he will require main battle tanks in order to be able to deal with such a situation.
I might observe as well that in addition to that squadron of tanks, the drafts of new additional troops being supplied to General Fraser include a number of combat engineers, particularly experienced officers who understand that as well as doing combat engineering things they can also supervise construction tasks. Those officers have been provided to act as project officers to deal with the small development and reconstruction tasks emerging, since these have been identified by the local people as something they require. The provision of these combat engineers plus additional funding through CIDA, through the provincial reconstruction team, allows them to deal with the smaller-scale reconstruction details that may include such things as driving wells, cleaning out the irrigation ditches that are involved, repairing roads, and doing that sort of thing. In addition, some of their own engineering armoured vehicles have been deployed with them. These are tract vehicles with the dozer blade on the front, and an arm that looks very much like what you'd find on a civilian backhoe, allowing them to do those sorts of tasks as well.
This additional deployment has a component directed towards improving the tactical balance of the Canadian Forces under General Fraser's command; an additional company provided to allow greater security for the joint civilian-military provincial reconstruction teams; and specialist engineer officers who are capable of undertaking and supervising these reconstruction projects, including hiring local labour to be part of that.
I would emphasize that this is an additional set of resources, ranging from those designed to deal with combat scenarios to those that are now dealing with practical, smaller-scale development scenarios.
:
One of the problems we have in the public domain debate over what we're doing in Afghanistan relates to the artificial distinction between combat operations and developmental aid and the continuum that exists between the two.
On the ground, the enemy--and the enemy is not just the Taliban, there are a number of enemies that work together--employs a variety of techniques to accomplish its objectives. I could go through the list, but fundamentally you're familiar with them: suicide attacks, political mobilization, and political intimidation--what we would call guerilla operations. They use a variety of techniques; they do not use a singular technique.
Each one of these techniques has to be met with a different tool. To emphasize one tool over the other at a particular time is not a useful exercise. You have to have a variety of techniques at your disposal, and we have those. In this case we've just decided to add a few more. The techniques we have in theatre are very good. The enemy has had a hard time trying to crack our system, if you will. But I personally don't view the addition of firepower resources as detracting from the Vietnam-era term “hearts and minds campaign”. I wouldn't call it that. I'm even hesitant to call it a reconstruction campaign.
Then we have to get into the heads of our constituency on the ground, and we have problems with metrics in that area.
So the mere presence of a certain piece of firepower or kit on the ground is not necessarily going to have a detrimental effect on our other efforts. We're dealing with a culture that's been at war arguably since 1979. They're used to levels of violence. They're used to equipment being present. They're even used to civilian deaths. Again, the presence of this particular force package is not necessarily going to have a detrimental effect on what we're trying to accomplish vis-à-vis the population. Indeed, the opposite could be the case. If we do not employ our forces effectively, we may in fact lose respect from certain parts of the population.
So I'd ask you to keep those things in mind when you're dealing with issues relating to Afghanistan and not focus on a particular piece of equipment, because that is only one part of the package.
:
Mr. Chairman, I often say that the Vietnam war wasn't lost in Vietnam, but in the United States, because of people's perception of what was taking place in that country.
At this point in time, Canadians and Quebeckers believe that 95% of the mission is devoted to hunting down the Taliban, rather than to achieving security objectives. It's not that they object to our military hunting down the Taliban, they just don't want that to be their exclusive mission.
We should also put ourselves in the Afghan people's position. As a military historian, you know that the Afghan people have always resisted invaders. I'm not implying by this that NATO countries are invaders. On the contrary, I think of them as liberators. However, there is a risk that the Afghans may no longer look upon NATO forces as an army of liberation, but rather start seeing them as an occupation force. The fact is that they have not seen their day-to-day lives improve since the arrival of the ISAF.
Personally, I have some concerns about this mission. When we held a debate in the House of Commons last June, I recall that virtually all political parties stressed the importance of the reconstruction efforts, namely building hospitals, restoring infrastructures, building schools, and so forth.
Today, Canadians and Quebeckers have the impression that our forces are not involved in reconstruction. Moreover, you clearly described the military instruments in your possession. A growing number of people, myself included, are beginning to doubt if ever democracy can be restored and the country rebuilt solely by resorting to weapons.
I'd like to hear your views on the subject. My comments reflect what many of our constituents in Quebec are thinking. Some maintain that we need to withdraw our troops, while others say we must stay the course. However, we're not going to win over the hearts and minds of people by killing as many Taliban as we can or by hunting them down in Pakistan, if need be. I think we need to take another approach, but I'm not sure if we're ready to yet.
:
I'm sure I can address that on a number of planes.
One of the problems we have is that many Canadians have a vision of what's going on in Afghanistan through the media and not actual ground experience. Part of the media's problem is that it tends to focus on the more exciting aspects and not the unexciting aspects of it, which involve the things you're talking about, such as school construction, etc. However, if you have enemy forces wandering around--and I've encountered this myself--they will assassinate doctors and cut the heads off schoolteachers unless there's some form of security. This is what I was talking about before. There's a yin and yang here between combat operations, non-combat operations, and how all this fits together.
So the media has not done its job in conveying these unexciting aspects. We have tunnel vision on a number of issues here.
Let's talk about democracy for a minute. The Afghans have their own form of government at the district and village level that is almost like ancient Greek democracy. We don't want to tamper with that and we're not trying to. So there are already governance mechanisms there that are not Taliban-like and that we don't even have to encourage.
Indiscriminate use of firepower will cause all sorts of problems with the population. That's what the Soviets ran into, and that's what the Americans ran into in Vietnam. We're not doing that here. It may look indiscriminate, but again we're dealing with a media perception of it through a camera lens or somebody describing it. We don't have people who go out and try to get into the heads of the people who are on the ground, in terms of the media, and then convey that to people in Canada. So I think we really need to be careful about the information we're deriving from these perceptions.
We're not out there just to generate a body count, but sometimes you have to kill these people. You have to kill them effectively and give them a bloody nose. How are you going to do that? You just cannot have reconstruction and development unless there's security. It all works together.
:
Thank you for that question.
Mr. Chairman, I think it's been reported fairly widely that one of the things the Canadian Forces would dearly like to continue to have from Canada is support for the mission they're doing there. Indications that there isn't overwhelming support would have some impact.
I have to add, though, and I'm sure Mr. Maloney would corroborate this comment, that the soldiers on the ground are really quite focused on what exactly is going on operationally over there. Although they do have information coming to them from Canada, their focus is entirely on preparing for the next mission. It might upset them to some degree, but I don't think it would really have a serious impact on the morale of the troops, who I think we recognize are imbued with a very high morale.
When you look at the most recent unfortunate incident, with the loss of four soldiers, a number of soldiers who were interviewed following that incident, soldiers who were very good friends and acquaintances of those who were killed, indicated that they were even more interested in making sure the mission succeeded. I don't think as a consequence that we would say the morale was in any way diminished.
I think it's very normal for any group operating outside our borders, particularly on this sort of mission, to hope that everybody back home is applauding their efforts. I think it would simply be reasonable to limit the reaction to being one of disappointment, as opposed to any impact on morale per se.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, welcome to our committee.
A lot of people in the last number of years have become more familiar with the history of Afghanistan. There's a lot of debate going on in the country with politicians and citizens who have become somewhat familiar with the history. They're wondering if we can ever get out of the country with our heads high, or if we can get out with an exit strategy that improves the situation for Afghanistan. For the price we're paying there, is it worth staying in? They are becoming very discouraged, I believe, with what they're reading and learning about the country and what the Russians and Brits...and the Greeks, depending on how far back you may want to go in this benighted country.
The Prime Minister says that he will leave when he's successful. As an exit strategy, there's no...and it's difficult to put a time limit on it. How do you put a time limit on a war? When we entered World War I we didn't put a time limit on it, I guess, or on World War II.
I see the article here by General Paul Manson, who outlines conditions for an exit strategy and how long it may take. Based on your experience, how long do you think it's going to take to actually leave this country, when its population is able to take over? How long will it take the Afghanis to become masters of their country, masters of their own fate? When will the NATO forces be able to leave there, with a successful operation behind them?
:
The closest model we have right now is Bosnia. We were there 14 years. Bosnia was simple compared to Afghanistan, so I would be very hesitant to put a date or timeframe on this. It's going to be at least a decade, and we've already been there five years.
We were in Cypress from about 1964 to 1993, so we can handle protracted conflict. The question is.... You've anticipated my next Maclean's article, actually, which deals with exit strategy. We've never had an exit strategy in Canada. We've never had to conceptualize one before. We've gone along with the flow, hopped on board with another international institution and let them do the thinking for us. In this case we can't do that, which means we have to mature and start thinking strategically. What do we want? What are the conditions going to be?
The main problem, as I see it, is the Afghan security forces, primarily the police. That's a real problem. The Afghan National Army is marginally better. Those two institutions definitely need work, because they're the ones who are going to handle the security.
Now, I've said that, but let's recognize that you have a Canadian general who's in charge of police transformation there. They've just initiated a program to try to work on this. This will take time. There is no easy fix. As I've pointed out, time is of a different construct in Afghani society.
Again, one of the initial reasons we're there is to form this shield so that these other efforts can take place behind it. At some point, that shield will have to go away and be replaced with an Afghan shield. In terms of being masters of their own destiny, they already are up to a great deal in a number of areas, but not in all areas. That's one of the reasons we're there.
:
I'll start off with the origin of the Taliban. I'll keep it short, but fundamentally the Taliban was a creation initially of the merchant class in Quetta, which was concerned about the routes leading through from Quetta to Spin Boldak to Kandahar for trade. At that time, Afghanistan was wracked in what we call the civil war or the war of the commanders, so there was essentially warlordism.
The Taliban then became augmented by the Pakistani intelligence services and the Pakistani armed forces and essentially became a tool of Pakistan to assert domination on Afghanistan, on what it saw as a chaotic situation. Then there's a radical Islamist thread that comes into that as well.
When they achieved control of part of Afghanistan--remember, they were resisted mostly by Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek populations, keeping in mind that the Taliban are predominately Pashtun, which is 38% of the population--they basically took control of large chunks of Afghanistan by the sword. Then they invited al-Qaeda in to create a series of base areas, and al-Qaeda developed a parasitical relationship with the Taliban.
Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 strips away the Taliban shield so we can get at the al-Qaeda meat. So the Taliban disperses as an institution and flees to the south, and al-Qaeda tends to flee east and then into Pakistan.
Who are the Taliban? Fundamentally, we have different types of Taliban. One type would be the hard-core people from that period who have melted back to their particular villages or towns in the south. They may have been fighters at the fighter level. Then there's sort of a leadership caste, who decamp from Pakistan. They're mostly in Quetta and Balujistan. On top of this, you have hard-core jihadists. They're entering into Afghanistan, facilitated by Taliban cells. They're usually trained by al-Qaeda or affiliates. They could be Chechen, they could be Punjabi, or they could be Canadian. You get all sorts of people coming in who are facilitated into the country to do particular things. Then the Taliban has sort of a militia. They're trying to gain a constituency with teenage boys by approaching them with weapons, motorcycles, and money, and saying “Join us”. So you have these different layers.
The debate centres right now on what they want. The only thing we can infer is by their actions. As far as we can tell, they are interested in the southern part of Afghanistan. They do not appear to be interested in the non-Pashtun parts of Afghanistan right now, maybe later, but it's very evident to me that they're trying to create some kind of enclave. They're trying to drive us out of the south and create what I would call flippantly Pashtunistan, under a radical Islamic sort of caliphate structure, create this enclave that can't be assailed by the international community.
That serves a number of purposes. It serves the Taliban's purpose of trying to gain some form of control or domination over the tribal groupings in the south on both sides of the border. It serves an al-Qaeda purpose, because that becomes a psychological defeat of the west.
The fact that we're in Afghanistan and we kicked the Taliban and al-Qaeda out of it in the first phases of the war is our first victory over the al-Qaeda movement globally. This is very big, and you can look at it in the al-Qaeda documentation. They lament the loss of Afghanistan. When we're talking about different enemies and different objectives, it tends to be going in the same direction.
So if we're going to target those populations, we want to target them with different resources. The kid with the AK-47 and the motorcycle we may be able to convince away from that particular lifestyle. The jihadists we're not going to be able to convince; we'll have to kill them. The leadership caste we'll probably have to kill too. That's the way I'm looking at it right now. I'm not saying this is the only way of looking at it, but given the information we have right now, that's the best way of looking at what the objectives in insurgency are. They appear to be limited to the south right now, but they may have larger designs later.
I hope that answers your question.
:
The debate over the contribution of resources to Afghanistan by NATO nations, of course, is ongoing. We recognize that there has been less than a rush to the gates to provide additional troops and equipment.
I should point out that if we look at the history of NATO since its inception in 1951, we should not be surprised that there appears to be a crisis right now in the response that is expected of some of the NATO nations. Crises, I think, have peppered the history of NATO from its very beginning, and interestingly, the alliance has managed through very difficult times--in the Cold War and since then in the changes to its mandate--to survive and survive rather well. It has undertaken in former Yugoslavia, for the first time in its history, offensive operations and it is continuing to do that in Afghanistan now.
Yes, indeed, we recognize that the response is slow. All we have really heard of, to my knowledge at this point, is an additional potential contribution from Poland, and we can only hope, following the upcoming series of ministerial meetings, that more will be offered.
I should point out as well that despite the increased number of member nations in NATO, some of the newer members are not necessarily in a great position to provide assistance in the sorts of operations that are going on in Afghanistan. Counter to that, of course, is the rather amazing and delightful contribution of Romania, a very small country, admittedly, and in terms of military capability one that we're delighted to see there. But I think we in Canada are probably a little disappointed at the response of alliance members. I can only repeat what I said a moment ago that the sorts of difficulties within the alliance are almost a standard feature of discussions and that these discussions will continue, no doubt, with the express purpose of eliciting from those who have not yet responded, in terms of increase in their contribution, to do so.
I would also point to the fact that the very large percentage--the majority of the NATO nations--are in some form or another contributing to the conflict. And counter to the argument that some--a very small number of NATO nations--are doing most of the heavy lifting, I guess it's almost our turn in the sense that over the years, during the Cold War certainly, where we initially presented quite a strong contribution and later decided to reduce it substantially, others were doing the heavy lifting. It's not only a question of it being our turn, but certainly I think it will be recognized fairly soon that if this NATO mission is to succeed--and I'm sure the alliance would expect that to happen--others will come forward.
:
The first time I heard the term “caveat” used was with ISAF in Kabul. I know that the concept existed before, particularly in Kosovo, and in prototypical form probably in SFOR. But the first time I really started to hear it and the restrictions on the various national contingents was in ISAF, when I was there in 2004, and this was a huge problem. This reflected national control over national forces, and it was completely legitimate, given the nature of the alliance. It was up to the commander of the force to apply his resources, given the limitations he had at the time. That caused a number of problems.
As I understand it, once we handed off Enduring Freedom to ISAF in the south, this hasn't quite been the case. The countries that don't want to be committed into that environment are committed elsewhere, particularly in RC West in Herat, and RC North. The people who want to be able to contribute in a robust way will go down to the south.
This becomes an issue of diplomacy on the one hand, and troop motivation on the other, in these various countries. Without having access to the information, it would be interesting to see, from the various members of NATO, how they assessed the motivations of the various forces in this environment or any other environment. In fact, if you do an historical analysis you'll find that the so-called heavy lifting has been borne by the ABCA countries, and usually The Netherlands. So it's been America, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, The Netherlands, and sometimes Germany.
You'll find that ABCA and New Zealand are always there. You can track those guys in almost every operation. I think I did it in an article somewhere. Then some people will show up and some people won't. I just have to take it as the state of affairs. That's going to form the core of any force going in, and all sorts of other things will attach to it.
:
I have two things that I'm going to throw at you on this. There are two things I've noticed.
Remember, in a counter-insurgency war we're dealing with how we're going to get people to side with us, essentially, and there are two things in parts of the rural south that interfere with our ability to gain allegiance from the population. One of them is poppy eradication, and the second is gender equality being pushed on them in the rural areas. They resent both--again, this is from people I've talked to--but the eradication issue in particular is very sensitive.
There's a schizophrenic split. The U.S. State Department, and to a lesser extent the British, have been pushing poppy eradication for a variety of reasons. When I talk to military commanders on the ground, they view this as counterproductive to trying to deal with the people, because we're taking away their livelihood. The alternative livelihood programs are mixed in terms of effect, and it's unclear as to what the best strategy is to deal with this problem, particularly in Helmand province, where the Brits ran into a lot of problems this summer. You wind up with a nexus between the insurgency and poppies. And then you have poppy people who are not part of the insurgency, but will go with whoever is in charge, etc. So you have different variations on the poppy side.
So when we're dealing with the population in the rural areas, if we show up and start doing things and tampering too much, they get annoyed, and then the Taliban show up say, “See, we told you they would do this.”
As we close the meeting, let me just say that it's a great disadvantage being a chair, because you can't participate, but one privilege that the chair does have, in closing, is to add his few comments.
Perhaps I may just ask a brief question. Mr. Maloney, you said, and I'll quote you, that Canadians want success and want it now. I beg to differ with you in these types of situations. I think Canadians are a realistic people, first of all, and quite intelligent. When they go into a theatre like this, or a mission like this, or a conflict like this, they want to deal with facts, and not innuendoes. Maybe the media sometimes doesn't put the proper picture out.
As far as I can recall, I don't think there was ever a mission or a conflict, or any type of military theatre, where a nation, or NATO, or whoever undertook the mission has said, we're going in on such a date and we're coming out on such a date. If somebody can tell me that there was one.... Even though 300 Spartans went in to fight, they didn't know when it was going to start and when it was going to finish. These are the conflicts that are unfolding, I believe, today.
What is puzzling here is this. You refer to three engagements that the Canadian military has engaged in. You used Cyprus, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. Cyprus was a very different mission completely--if you disagree, please let me know. Bosnia, again, was a very different mission in comparison to Afghanistan. Today we're looking at a mission where NATO has an obligation. When we were going into these missions in years past and now under the NATO banner, there was always a plan; it wasn't a plan that unfolded overnight or in a week.
So the question I have is this. We committed our men and women to the Afghanistan mission. We knew, because we were in Brussels with this committee some time ago and spoke to our representatives there.... When the Canadian government committed to this mission, surely NATO had a plan following two years. Please elaborate if you can, because I'd like to know. In our previous missions, we had an obligation under NATO to go in for, let's say, a year or two, or whatever, and then the other NATO members were to come in and fill that slot. Is that not the case here, or has the NATO mandate changed?
Part of the problem with ISAF, as an institution, is that it started off as a non-NATO organization that was neutered deliberately to get buy-in by the UN. Essentially, as far as I understand it, they couldn't get anybody to take control of ISAF, ultimately. So Canada came up with an idea where, okay, we'll take it over, but we want it “NATO-ized” so we can bring a lot more resources to bear.
There were plans at various stages, but the problem was that they had to assess what ISAF is going to do and when it is going to do it, and where does this fit vis-à-vis Operation Enduring Freedom. This split structure has been a problem, which hopefully will be eliminated when we get the RC East. This has been a problem going right back to the creation of the organization.
Under Canadian control there was a plan. The prototype of the ANDS came out of the Canadian period, but the follow-on people who took over six months later dumped it in the bin, saying, well, we don't want to be involved in this. So in the next six months somebody took over and said, well, wait a minute, maybe we should do this. There has been a continuity issue in this particular mission, I would suggest.