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FAAE Committee Report

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INSTITUTIONS AND IMPUNITY

The evidence heard by the Subcommittee clearly demonstrates that institutional fragmentation and fragility contribute to the existence of a climate of impunity in Honduras. Serious capacity gaps on the part of the police and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, combined with a lack of judicial independence, were identified as key issues by a number of witnesses. In the Subcommittee’s view, this institutional frailty undermines the rule of law and presents significant barriers to the protection of human rights in Honduras – particularly where attacks on human rights defenders, journalists, justice sector workers and other peaceful activists are concerned.

A.  Lack of investigative capacity

Corruption and a lack of investigative capacity amongst police and the Public Prosecutor’s Office present serious challenges to ensuring protection for human rights defenders and to combatting crime and insecurity in Honduras.[112]

Police reform is vital to any improvement in the protection of human rights defenders and, more generally, to improved citizen security in Honduras. Mr. Craig explained to the Subcommittee that the Honduran police lack the ability to conduct criminal intelligence analysis, such as making links between cases and identifying patterns. There is no capacity within the police force, for example, to determine and prove that different killings in a single area are the work of a single gang.[113] The Subcommittee believes that this type of work is a vital component in proving whether human rights defenders, journalists, justice sector workers and other peaceful activists were killed because of their work or for some other reason.

In this context, the Subcommittee was interested to learn that a new integrated investigative police force, the Agencia Técnica de Investigación Criminal (ATIC), was launched within the prosecution service in January 2015. ATIC is financed through a special government fund, the tasa de seguridad, created to specifically to support justice sector reform projects. While the unit will not be able to investigate all homicides and violent crimes in Honduras, Mr. Craig indicated that he hopes it will be able to deal with “the more high-impact” and “serious crime” cases.[114]

Canadians are helping to build investigative capacity in Honduras from the ground up. This work includes training Honduran police and prosecutors on crime scene investigation techniques, surveillance, major case management and oral trial advocacy techniques, as well as how to deal with the collection, protection, organization and presentation of criminal evidence.[115]

The Subcommittee was also told that the government of President Hernández is attempting to rid the police force of corrupt officers and those who have been involved in illegal activity, as recommended by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Questions exist, however, about the effectiveness of the process being employed, which relies primarily on polygraphs.[116] The Subcommittee heard that, in some cases, purged police officers had been replaced by individuals accused of being responsible for human rights violations.[117] Furthermore, Ms. Oliva and Mr. Main argued that, despite moves to improve the technical and investigative capacity of police and prosecutors, the Honduran government has not moved forward with the type of major police reforms that are needed to create a competent, professional force capable of tackling citizen insecurity in Honduras.[118]

B.  Military involvement in civilian functions

Several witnesses expressed concern that the government of President Hernández is relying inappropriately on the military as a means to improve citizen security – a function that should reside exclusively with civilian authorities.[119]

President Hernández has created a new military public order police force, which he has sought to enshrine in the Honduran Constitution.[120] Mr. Craig indicated that the military public order police were initially intended to be a rapid-reaction force, but he noted with concern the possibility that they may assume investigative functions and become a permanent feature of policing in Honduras.[121] The Subcommittee was concerned to learn that allegations of human rights violations by members of this unit have already come to light.[122]

Mr. Main also informed the Subcommittee that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has expressed concern regarding the increasing role of the Honduran Armed Forces in managing high-security detention centres, a number of which are located on military bases.[123] In addition, the Honduran military is involved in militarized civic and religious education programs for children and youth that are purportedly aimed at reducing the risk of involvement with organized crime.[124] Mr. Main criticized such military involvement in delivering programming for at-risk youth.[125]

The Subcommittee observes that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has expressed concern

over the armed forces’ involvement in professional activities that, given their nature, should be the exclusive purview of the police … because the armed forces do not have training appropriate for controlling citizen security, it is the job of an efficient civil police force, respectful of human rights, to combat insecurity, crime and violence on the domestic front.[126]

C.  Lack of judicial independence

The rule of law in Honduras is further undermined by a lack of judicial impartiality and independence. For example, Honduran judges hold office for five-year terms and are subject to political interference.[127] There is a need to build structures to ensure transparency and independence in the judiciary, to create a sense of institutional independence and to support civil society in holding the judicial system to account when it fails to meet international standards.[128]

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has investigated a complaint in relation to the dismissal of several judges during the June 2009 coup. The Commission found that the judges’ dismissal was not well-founded and considered that the dismissal process violated the judges’ due process rights.[129] It recommended that Honduras make regulatory changes to ensure that disciplinary proceedings against judges had sufficient guarantees of independence and impartiality. On 2 April 2014, the Inter-American Commission instituted proceedings before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights after Honduras failed to comply with its recommendation to reinstate the judges to similar positions or, if re-instatement was not possible for well-founded reasons, to pay compensation to the judges.[130]

In addition to the judges dismissed during the coup, four Supreme Court justices were summarily dismissed by the Honduran Congress in December 2012. Mr. Jeffrey Marder, Director of Strategic Relations, Latin America and Caribbean, at DFATD explained to the Subcommittee that the judges were dismissed after the constitutional wing of the Court refused to give its approval to proposed legislation introducing a vetting process for the police. This type of prior judicial approval is part of the standard legislative process in Honduras.[131] The Subcommittee recalls that the dismissal of the judges is not in keeping with the recommendation made by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that the Government of Honduras depoliticize the appointments process for high-level judicial officials.

The Subcommittee was also told that purges of the judiciary have recently been carried out by a newly created judicial disciplinary body, the Council of the Judiciary. The process is intended to remove corrupt judicial officials. However, the legal basis for the purging process, as well as the procedures used, have been criticized on the basis that they reportedly fail to meet the international due process standards necessary to preserve judicial independence and impartiality.[132]

The Subcommittee is very concerned about these developments. The independence of the judiciary from other branches of government is indispensable for the protection of human rights. Moreover, it is a cornerstone of democracy. Without an independent judiciary, victims of human rights violations cannot access justice, and the rule of law cannot be upheld. Judges must be able to administer justice and review the exercise of authority by the state without interference or bias, including the threat of arbitrary removal. The Subcommittee urges the Government of Honduras to take all necessary steps to reinforce judicial independence and impartiality as part of its efforts to strengthen its justice sector and overcome the violence and polarization that remain following the 2009 coup.

D.  Access to justice and impunity

The Subcommittee was told that the fragility of Honduran institutions – in particular in the justice sector – means that impunity is the rule rather than the exception for ordinary crime and violence, as well as attacks on human rights defenders, justice sector officials, journalists and other peaceful activists.[133]

Bertha Oliva told the Subcommittee that recently her organization had observed a worrying trend: victims of human rights violations or their family members – who had previously gained a measure of protection by making formal complaints in conjunction with human rights organizations – are now being killed shortly after making a complaint. She stated that after such killings the official investigation of the original complaint comes to a halt.[134]

The evidence before the Subcommittee clearly demonstrates that Honduras needs to rebuild trust in justice sector institutions amongst all segments of society. Ms. Spring explained,

The institutional structures in Honduras exist for Hondurans to go and formally denounce or complain about human rights violations, but there is very much a culture of impunity, and there’s really no rule of law to mediate these concerns.… Basically, even when people go forward to complain about human rights violations, there is no investigation and no legal follow-up of their concerns.[135]

Similarly, Mr. Kergin stressed that the “impunity of the few and the inequality of the many before the law” is a consistent problem in Honduras.[136]

Discussing the impact that the weakness of the rule of law has on the resolution of labour disputes in Honduras, Ms. Spring stated:

Within this environment of so much insecurity and violence, the workers completely mistrust all the institutions that are there to protect them, so there’s nowhere for them to go to complain about their issues.[137]

This lack of trust in state institutions means that the involvement of police and security forces can be a polarizing factor in disputes between communities and corporations.[138] In turn, this polarization has hindered democratic development in Honduras since the 2009 coup. Mr. Kergin insisted upon the need to reinforce the rule of law and to find ways to broaden citizens’ access to justice.

E.  Progress toward rebuilding rule of law

Strengthening the rule of law and re-building Honduras’ weak justice sector, security and governance institutions, which were further undermined during the coup, is a long-term process. The Subcommittee was warned that it is difficult to ascertain the impact of reforms in the short-term.[139]

Officials from DFATD indicated that the current government understands the need for action to improve the human rights situation and rebuild the rule of law in Honduras. Moreover, they stated that the Hernández administration welcomes Canadian and international cooperation on such issues.[140] Furthermore, Mr. Normandin and Mr. Craig pointed the Subcommittee to a number of positive steps undertaken by the government of President Hernández to improve citizen security, combat impunity and protect and promote human rights. For example, Mr. Normandin noted that the President has appointed a State Secretary for Human Rights, Justice, Governance and Decentralization “who comes from civil society and has strong credentials… and actively advocates for initiatives and interventions in support of human rights.”[141]

The Subcommittee was informed that an 18-member violent crime taskforce continues to conduct community outreach, which has encouraged better community and witness cooperation in criminal investigations. In addition, the National Human Rights Commissioner (CONADEH) has created a phone line through which Hondurans can make human rights complaints. DFATD officials indicate that there appears to have been some follow-up with respect to complaints received through this hotline. In addition, the President has pledged to receive human rights training along with members of his cabinet and to deliver similar training to the police, military and correctional staff. A number of initiatives designed to improve the capacity and effectiveness of the police and public prosecutors are also being undertaken.[142]

Although it remains deeply concerned about the climate of impunity that prevails in Honduras, the Subcommittee was pleased to learn that prosecutions have been undertaken in a small number of emblematic homicide cases concerning human rights defenders, including two involving journalists and four killings of LGBTI human rights defenders.[143]

Officials from DFATD also pointed to a new draft “National Law for the Protection of Journalists and Human Rights Defenders” as a sign of progress.[144] On the other hand, Mr. Main noted that many Honduran civil society representatives were concerned that the draft law was overly complex, that its operational framework and funding sources were unclear and that its risk assessment model was inadequate. Many civil society representatives reportedly also felt that they had not been consulted or kept informed as the bill moved through the legislative process.[145]

Finally, the Subcommittee was pleased to learn that Honduras has invited the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to open an office in the capital city of Tegucigalpa, a development that witnesses said was particularly important.[146]

On the other hand, Ms. Oliva and Mr. Main indicated that, in their opinion, protection for human rights has deteriorated following the November 2013 elections.[147] Mr. Main expressed concern that the current administration had restructured government ministries in a manner that “reduced institutional support for groups subjected to disproportionately high levels of human rights abuses.”[148] Both witnesses indicated that in their view the new Commissioner lacked sufficient background and expertise in human rights. They also raised questions about the transparency of his appointment process.[149] Overall, Mr. Main characterized the efforts of the Hernández administration to improve the human rights situation in Honduras as “grossly inadequate and, in some areas, completely counterproductive.”[150]

Given the complex security situation in Honduras and the fragmentation of state control, the Subcommittee is encouraged by the signs of progress brought to its attention by witnesses. It believes these initiatives represent useful starting points in the effort to re-build the rule of law. Nevertheless, the Subcommittee believes that Honduras needs to accelerate progress toward building justice sector and governance institutions that have the integrity and capacity to protect the human rights of all Hondurans effectively. It urges the Honduran government to leverage the expertise of international partners and to redouble its efforts in this regard.


[112]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 67, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 7 February 2013 (Jeffrey Marder, Director, Strategic Relations, Latin America and Caribbean, DFATD); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 76, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 18 April 2013 (Adam Blackwell, OAS); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 77, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 23 April 2013 (Karen Spring, Rights Action); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 79, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 30 April 2013 (Rick Craig, Justice Education Society); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 74, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 26 March 2013 (Michael Kergin); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 74, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 26 March 2013 (Rolando Sierra); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 82, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 9 May 2013 (Dana Frank, University of California, Santa Cruz).

[113]         SDIR, Evidence, ibid. (Craig).

[114]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 46, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 27 November 2014 (Rick Craig, Justice Education Society). See also: SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 43, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 6 November 2014 (Henri–Paul Normandin, DFATD).

[115]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 79, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 30 April 2013 (Rick Craig, Justice Education Society); SDIR, Evidence, ibid., 2014 (Craig).

[116]         SDIR, Evidence, ibid., 2014 (Craig); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 49, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 9 December 2014 (Alexander Main, Center for Economic and Policy Research).

[117]         SDIR, Evidence, ibid. (Main); Alexander Main, Written Submission to SDIR, 9 December 2014. See also: SDIR, Evidence, ibid. (Craig).

[118]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 21, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 8 April 2014 (Bertha Oliva, COFADEH); Alexander Main, Written Submission to SDIR, 9 December 2014.

[119]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 74, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 26 March 2013 (Michael Kergin); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 76, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 18 April 2013 (Adam Blackwell, OAS); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 75, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 16 April 2013 (Elsie Monge, La Comisión Ecuménica de Derechos Humanos); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 77, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 23 April 2013 (Karen Spring, Rights Action); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 21, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 8 April 2014 (Bertha Oliva, COFADEH); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 46, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 27 November 2014 (Rick Craig, Justice Education Society); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 49, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 9 December 2014 (Alexander Main, Center for Economic and Policy Research); IACHR, “Preliminary Observations concerning the Human Rights Situation in Honduras,” News Release, 5 December 2014.

[120]         SDIR, Evidence, ibid. (Main); IACHR, “Preliminary Observations concerning the Human Rights Situation in Honduras,” ibid.

[121]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 46, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 27 November 2014 (Rick Craig, Justice Education Society). For more details, see the IACHR’s discussion of the unit’s activities and its relationship to prosecutorial and judicial authorities, ibid.

[122]         SDIR, Evidence, ibid. (Craig); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 49, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 9 December 2014 (Alexander Main, Center for Economic and Policy Research).

[123]         SDIR, Evidence, ibid. (Main); Alexander Main, Written Submission to SDIR, 9 December 2014; IACHR, “Preliminary Observations concerning the Human Rights Situation in Honduras,” News Release, 5 December 2014.

[124]         SDIR, Evidence, ibid. (Main).

[125]         SDIR, Evidence, ibid. (Main); Alexander Main, Written Submission to SDIR, 9 December 2014; IACHR, “Preliminary Observations concerning the Human Rights Situation in Honduras,” News Release, 5 December 2014.

[126]         IACHR, “Honduras,” Annual Report 2013, para. 263.

[127]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 79, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 30 April 2013 (Rick Craig, Justice Education Society); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 76, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 18 April 2013 (Adam Blackwell, OAS).

[128]         SDIR, Evidence, Ibid. (Craig).

[129]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 67, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 7 February 2013 (Jeffrey Marder, DFATD); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 71, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 7 March 2013 (Esther Major, Amnesty International). The Inter–American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter–American Court of Human Rights are both created under the American Convention on Human Rights, which also sets out the structure, jurisdiction and powers of both organs. The Commission has the power to investigate complaints by individuals, report on its findings and make recommendations to member states of the OAS. If its recommendations are not implemented, the Commission may begin legal proceedings against any state that has ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, alleging violations of rights protected by the Convention. The Court has the power to determine that rights protected by the Convention have been violated, to order states to take remedial action and to award compensation or other reparations to victims. The Court does not hear cases brought by individuals. In contrast to the recommendations made by the Commission, the Court’s judgments are legally binding on Honduras under international law. American Convention on Human Rights; Statute of the Inter–American Commission on Human Rights; Statute of the Inter–American Court of Human Rights.

[130]            IACHR, “IACHR Takes Case involving Honduras to the Inter–American Court,” News Release, 2 April 2014.

[131]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 67, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 7 February 2013 (Jeffrey Marder, DFATD); IACHR, “Preliminary Observations concerning the Human Rights Situation in Honduras,” News Release, 5 December 2014; SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 43, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 6 November 2014 (Henri–Paul Normandin, DFATD).

[132]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 49, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 9 December 2014 (Alexander Main, Center for Economic and Policy Research); IACHR, “Preliminary Observations concerning the Human Rights Situation in Honduras,” News Release, 5 December 2014. See also the United Nations’ non–binding Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Milan, 26 August to 6 September 1985 and endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985; United Nations, “Dismissal of Honduran Supreme Court judges an attack on democracy – UN expert,” News Release, 29 January 2013.

[133]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 67, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 7 February 2013 (Neil Reeder, DFATD); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 74, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 26 March 2013 (Michael Kergin); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 75, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 16 April 2013 (Elsie Monge, La Comisión Ecuménica de Derechos Humanos); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 76, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 18 April 2013 (Adam Blackwell, OAS); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 77, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 23 April 2013 (Karen Spring, Rights Action); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 46, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 27 November 2014 (Rick Craig, Justice Education Society); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 49, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 9 December 2014 (Alexander Main, Center for Economic and Policy Research).

[134]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 21, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 8 April 2014 (Bertha Oliva, COFADEH).

[135]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 77, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 23 April 2013 (Karen Spring, Rights Action).

[136]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 74, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 26 March 2013 (Michael Kergin).

[137]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 77, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 23 April 2013 (Karen Spring, Rights Action).

[138]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 79, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 30 April 2013 (Rick Craig, Justice Education Society).

[139]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 43, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 6 November 2014 (Henri–Paul Normandin, DFATD); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 46, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 27 November 2014 (Rick Craig, Justice Education Society).

[140]         DFATD, “House of Commons Sub–Committee on Human Rights Hearings on Honduras: Opening Statement,” 6 November 2014.

[141]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 43, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 6 November 2014 (Henri–Paul Normandin, DFATD).

[142]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 46, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 27 November 2014 (Rick Craig, Justice Education Society).

[143]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 49, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 9 December 2014 (Alexander Main, Center for Economic and Policy Research).

[144]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 43, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 6 November 2014 (Henri–Paul Normandin, DFATD); DFATD, “House of Commons Sub–Committee on Human Rights Hearings on Honduras: Opening Statement,” 6 November 2014.

[145]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 49, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 9 December 2014 (Alexander Main, Center for Economic and Policy Research); Alexander Main, Written Submission to SDIR, 9 December 2014; IACHR, “Preliminary Observations concerning the Human Rights Situation in Honduras,” News Release, 5 December 2014. In its Preliminary Observations, the IACHR indicates that a number of Honduran civil society groups have voiced the following concerns about the law:

               [T]he legislation: (1) has a complex institutional design, duplicating roles and lacking clarity regarding its operating structure; (2) is ambiguous on the creation of a risk analysis model that would enable a proper determination of risk, based on each person’s needs; and (3) is unclear on the allocation of financial resources to implement the law, among other issues.

               In addition, the IACHR received information indicating that the law creating the protection mechanism needs to properly define who is a journalist, communications professional, and media worker, and that protection measures also need to address work–related needs and ensure that those in the communications field can exercise their right to freedom of expression. The IACHR also documented criticisms regarding limitations to journalists’ and media workers’ representation on the National Council for Protection established in the draft legislation.

[146]         IACHR, ibid.; SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 43, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 6 November 2014 (Henri–Paul Normandin, DFATD); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 49, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 9 December 2014 (Alexander Main, Center for Economic and Policy Research).

[147]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 21, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 8 April 2014 (Bertha Oliva, COFADEH); SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 49, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 9 December 2014 (Alexander Main, Center for Economic and Policy Research).

[148]         Alexander Main, Written Submission to SDIR, 9 December 2014.

[149]         SDIR, Evidence, Meeting No. 21, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 8 April 2014 (Bertha Oliva, COFADEH). See also: Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations on Honduras, 13 March 2014, UN Doc. CERD/C/HND/CO/1–5, paras. 11–12. The Commissioner is responsible for the promotion and protection of the human rights guaranteed by the Honduran Constitution and by the international human rights treaties the country has ratified. He has a mandate to investigate allegations, to make recommendations to public authorities and to report annually to the Honduran National Congress on the human rights situation in the country. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Margaret Sekaggya. Mission to Honduras, Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/47/Add.1, 13 December 2012, paras. 18–19, 48.

[150]         Alexander Main, Written Submission to SDIR, 9 December 2014.