Throughout the Subcommittee’s study, witnesses referred to Honduras’ weak governance framework and the deep polarization between left- and right-wing political groups. The Subcommittee heard that Honduran institutions are very fragile and that wealth, political influence and land ownership remain highly concentrated. Michael Kergin, a former Canadian diplomat who served as a commissioner on the Honduran Truth and Reconciliation Commission, informed the Subcommittee that a handful of families and groups control most of the country’s banks and media outlets and hold disproportionate political influence.[2] Neil Reeder, a senior official from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD), explained that, although “Honduras has come a long way, some of these dominant families, including large landholders…are resisting changes to their situation.”[3]

At the lower end of the income spectrum, many Hondurans struggle to overcome endemic poverty and high rates of unemployment.[4] In 2014, Honduras was ranked 129^th out of 187 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index.[5] According to DFATD, 35% of Hondurans live on less than US$2 a day. Food security is a “significant concern,”[6] with roughly 1.5 million Hondurans facing hunger. Likewise, malnutrition and stunted growth for children under 5 years of age, as well as maternal and child health, remain challenges. More than half of the population is under the age of 15, straining basic health and education services. One in six Hondurans is illiterate.[7]

In this context, Adam Blackwell, Ambassador of the Organization of American States (OAS) Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, explained to the Subcommittee that for decades “structural issues have affected the human rights of Hondurans, particularly in the areas of security, justice, marginalization, and discrimination.” In his view, key human rights concerns include:

deaths; arbitrary declaration of a state of emergency; suppression of public demonstrations through disproportionate use of force, criminalization of public protest; arbitrary detentions of thousands of persons; cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment; grossly inadequate conditions of detention; militarization of the Honduran territory; a surge in incidents of racial discrimination; violation of women's rights; serious and arbitrary restrictions on the right of freedom of expression; and grave violations of political rights.[8]

A.  Recent political turmoil

Witnesses stressed that, in order to adequately address attacks on human rights defenders and others voicing dissent, it is necessary to understand Honduras’ recent political history – in particular, the June 2009 coup d’état against President Manuel Zelaya.

a.  The 2009 coup d’état

A number of factors contributed to the crisis, including political polarization, large-scale social inequality and a rigid constitutional framework. The Honduran Constitution lacks processes for impeachment, limits the president to a single four-year term of office and prevents elected officials from advocating for changes to this term limit.[9] As a result of the coup, existing problems related to high levels of social inequality, poverty and crime were exacerbated, while already-weak Honduran civilian institutions were further undermined.[10]

The coup occurred when certain political factions, backed by the Supreme Court and the military, sought to prevent a referendum called by President Zelaya on whether to hold formal consultations on possible constitutional changes. The initiative was characterized by his opponents as an attempt to mobilize support for an amendment that would have allowed the President to serve a second term in office. The country’s Supreme Court and Congress both declared the plan illegal; they considered that it violated the country’s Constitution.[11]

On 28 June 2009, the military detained President Zelaya and expelled him from the country. With support from the military and the police, the Honduran Congress appointed a de facto government, led by the former President of the National Assembly, Roberto Micheletti – himself a member of President Zelaya’s political party. The international community, including Canada and the United States, condemned the coup. On 4 July 2009, the OAS decided unanimously to suspend Honduras from the organization, calling President Zelaya’s removal from office “an unconstitutional alteration of the democratic order.”[12] Despite international efforts to resolve the crisis, the de facto government remained in control until new elections were held at end of November 2009.[13]

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that, during the time the Micheletti government was in power, human rights violations were widespread. These violations included arbitrary detention on a large scale, a pattern of disproportionate use of force by the military and police and serious violations of the right to freedom of expression intended to limit political participation by opponents of the coup.[14]

b.  The 2009 elections

Presidential and legislative elections were held on 29 November 2009. The de facto regime continued to govern throughout the campaign and the election period. President Zelaya, who by that time had returned to Honduras, took refuge in the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa during the election period. Porfirio Lobo and his Partido Nacional (National Party or PN) won the presidential elections and also won a majority in the Honduran Congress. Despite this situation, DFATD officials told the Subcommittee that they considered the elections to have been free and fair.[15]

The day before President Lobo’s inauguration, the National Congress of Honduras approved an Amnesty Decree. The decree gave amnesty to all Honduran citizens who, by their participation in the coup d’état of 28 June 2009, attempted or committed the crimes of treason, attacks on the form of government, terrorism, sedition, usurpation of powers, attacks on constitutionally guaranteed rights, disobedience, misuse of authority or violations of the duties of officials.[16] The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights criticized the decree for being “confusing and ambiguous” and for failing to “establish precise criteria or concrete mechanisms for its application.”[17]

Following his inauguration in January 2010, President Lobo formed a multi-party cabinet. His government was widely recognized by the international community and in June 2011 Honduras was readmitted to the OAS.[18]

c.  The 2013 elections

General elections were held again in November 2013. Mr. Lobo could not run for a second term, but the candidate from his Partido Nacional, Juan Orlando Hernández, won the presidency with 36.9% of the vote.[19] These elections were characterized as “democratic” by officials from DFATD.[20] Alexander Main, from the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington D.C., noted, however, that the elections and the pre-election period were marred by political violence and reports of irregularities.[21]

The November 2013 general elections were contested by a number of different parties that won a significant portion of the vote. The centre-right PN formed a legislative alliance with the centre-left Partido Liberal (Liberal Party or PL), its traditional rival. The left-wing Libertad y Refundación (Freedom and Refounding Party or Libre) and the Partido Anti-Corrupción (Anti-Corruption Party or PAC) created an opposition bloc.[22]

B.  Efforts at truth and reconciliation

After taking power in 2010, the government of President Lobo took steps to begin a process of political reconciliation in the country.[23] A key element of this process was the creation, by presidential decree, of a truth and reconciliation commission to investigate the events leading up to and following the 2009 coup.

a.  The Honduran Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (the Commission) was created in April 2010 under the auspices of the OAS. Its mandate was to “examine the events leading up to the July 28, 2009 expulsion of President Zelaya, and then to present recommendations to ensure that such events, such a failure of governance, would not happen again.”[24] It was led by the former Vice-President of Guatemala, Eduardo Stein, and also included two Honduran representatives as well as two international representatives, one of whom was a Canadian, Michael Kergin.

On their own initiative, the commissioners expanded their mandate to investigate human rights issues that arose between the coup on 28 June 2009 and the inauguration of the new government on 27 January 2010.[25] The Commission received testimony on violations allegedly committed by Honduran security forces during the interim government’s rule, including extrajudicial killings, illegal imprisonment, torture, sexual violence, political persecution and violations of freedom of expression.[26] It presented its final report in July 2011.

The Commission substantiated allegations that during the time the interim government was in power Honduran military and police used excessive force, detained individuals arbitrarily and were responsible for extrajudicial killings in several specific cases. It also documented serious violations of the right to freedom of expression. Moreover, the Commission concluded that police and army officials systematically obstructed investigations into these and other human rights violations.[27]

The Commission attributed responsibility for these human rights violations to de facto President Micheletti, to the head of the Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the leadership of the National Police, and, with respect to violations of the right to freedom of expression, to the National Telecommunications Commission. The Commission also found that the National Human Rights Commissioner “acted at a minimum with negligence” in failing to protect the human rights of Hondurans while the de facto government was in power.[28] Efforts made to protect human rights by the Honduran judiciary and the Public Prosecutor’s Office were described by the Commission as being “notoriously insufficient.”[29]

Mr. Kergin, who served as a commissioner, told the Subcommittee that

there could never be any justification for the complicity of the senior levels of government, reaching to Micheletti himself, in condoning police violence, in failing to investigate obvious politically inspired assassinations, or in restricting freedom of movement through the imposition of extended curfews without corresponding constitutional authority.[30]

In its report, the Commission made a number of recommendations for constitutional and governance reforms. Mr. Kergin drew the Subcommittee’s attention to the following recommendations: that the Government of Honduras remove political and policing functions from the mandate of the military and that it enshrine civil control over the military; that a reform of political parties be undertaken to ensure higher levels of financial and electoral transparency; and that the appointment process for high-level judicial and legislative watchdog bodies be depoliticized.[31]

Regarding human rights, Mr. Kergin highlighted the Commission’s seven principal recommendations to the Honduran government:

• pursuing, prosecuting and punishing perpetrators of human rights abuses committed during the interim government;
• establishing a national plan of reparations for those having legitimate and verifiable human rights grievances;
• providing sufficient resources and independence to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, in order that it may respond promptly to human rights complaints;
• conducting an independent review of the actions of the human rights commissioner during the interim government;
• reviewing legislation to ensure that Honduran law is compatible with international norms and standards, particularly in relation to personal security related to freedom of expression – especially that of journalists – and freedom of association;
• guaranteeing that tribal and indigenous people have access to justice in their own language; and
• ensuring compliance with the International Labour Organization convention regarding the duty to consult about the use and exploitation of natural resources in aboriginal territories.[32]

Other recommendations that are particularly relevant to the Subcommittee’s study include establishing a criminal investigative unit under the control of the Public Prosecutor’s Office; reforming the police to improve training and accountability in line with international standards and to remove officers involved in criminal or “irregular” practices; guaranteeing citizen participation in the development of security policies and in reform of the Public Prosecutor’s Office; and offering public recognition of the important role played by human rights defenders and ensuring their ability to carry out their work without obstruction or harassment.[33]

As of October 2013, Honduras reported to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights that it had complied with 32 of the Commission’s recommendations, with another 37 in the process of being implemented and the remaining 17 still pending implementation.[34] Mr. Main noted in his testimony, however, that the Honduran government has failed to investigate and prosecute those responsible for human rights violations during the coup, with the exception of one case involving the closure of a television channel.[35]

b.  The alternative truth and reconciliation commission

The government’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission faced distrust from some civil society groups in Honduras, particularly because the Lobo government failed to include an explicit mandate for the Commission to investigate human rights violations and abuses.[36]

In response, an alternative (non-governmental) Truth Commission or Comisión de Verdad (CDV) was established in June 2010 by six Honduran civil society and human rights organizations.[37] The CDV’s stated objectives were to clarify the truth on the facts surrounding the coup of 28 June 2009; to promote justice for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms; and to promote comprehensive reparation to the victims.[38]

Former CDV commissioner Elsie Monge testified before the Subcommittee, and her fellow commissioner, Craig Scott, M.P., participated in the Subcommittee’s hearings in his capacity as a Canadian Member of Parliament.

The final report of the CDV was issued in October 2012. Consistent with the CDV’s objectives, its report emphasized human rights issues and the right of victims to truth, justice and reparation. The report was strongly critical of Honduran state security agents.[39] The CDV also highlighted the ongoing effects of the coup, focusing on the climate of impunity that persisted in the country and the ill-effects of the January 2010 Amnesty Decree. It concluded that there was a “grave and systematic policy of denial of justice to the rights of victims and to the entire society.”[40] Amongst its recommendations, the CDV called for

• the investigation and sanctioning of those who planned and carried out the coup d'état and the human rights violations that ensued;
• reparations for victims, reconfiguration of Honduras’ legal order through constitutional reform;
• greater space for the involvement of civil society organizations in the country’s affairs; and
• reconsideration of the methods, training and operational philosophy of the country’s security forces.[41]

Despite the elections in 2013 and the work of two truth and reconciliation commissions, high levels of distrust and political polarization persist in Honduras. Given this challenging context, the Subcommittee considers that the findings and recommendations of the Honduran Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as well as those made by the alternative, civil-society-led commission, provide useful benchmarks for analyzing the country’s progress on human rights issues.