:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, an arms trade treaty was first proposed formally in 2009, when the UN General Assembly passed a resolution mandating negotiations on a legally binding international treaty to set common international standards to regulate the import and export of conventional weapons.
Over the last two years, a series of meetings took place in New York to prepare for the negotiations on an ATT. These preparations will culminate in a negotiating conference to be held at the UN headquarters in New York next month, from July 2 to 27.
During these preparatory meetings, the Argentinian chairman of the ATT process prepared draft elements of a treaty text. I believe you have been provided with the chairman's draft text, which is dated July 14, 2011.
The chairman's text is helpful but needs improvement, particularly in sections dealing with the implementation and with transparency and reporting. Nevertheless, we believe it can serve as the working basis for negotiations on a treaty, as long as elements of the text undergo further revisions, particularly to the sections on implementation and on transparency.
[Translation]
An arms trade treaty—or ATT— should one be finalized this summer, will set common standards for national export and import regimes to regulate the international transfer of conventional arms.
Canada and others will advocate that the treaty not set out how each country should organize its own domestic import and export controls but only what the goals of such controls should be.
[English]
Canada believes an ATT should include criteria to determine if exports would, one, violate UN Security Council sanctions; two, contribute to serious violations of human rights; three, contribute to serious violations of international humanitarian law; four, provoke, prolong, or aggravate armed conflict; five, support or facilitate terrorism; or six, support or facilitate organized crime. If so, the arms export would be prohibited. Without these six key criteria, any future ATT would be meaningless.
While the ATT's criteria are meant to disrupt the irresponsible trade in conventional weapons, the treaty should also recognize the legality of the legal and responsible international trade in conventional weapons and respect the lawful ownership of firearms by responsible private citizens for personal and recreational uses such as sports shooting, hunting, and collecting.
[Translation]
In order to do this, the Canadian delegation to the ATT negotiations this summer will propose that two elements be included in the treaty. The first would recognize that the purpose of the treaty is to prevent the illicit and irresponsible transfer of conventional weapons, while the second would acknowledge and respect the responsible and lawful use of firearms for recreational purposes like hunting and sport shooting. Adding these elements to the treaty will focus and define its terms.
[English]
Many of Canada's friends and allies agree with this proposal and have worked closely with the Canadian delegation at the ATT talks to draft text that would be acceptable to a large majority of countries.
The Canadian government will have two goals at these talks.
First, it wants to be sure that the legitimacy of firearms ownership by responsible, law-abiding private firearms owners is recognized, which would be accomplished by our proposal to add the two elements I have just mentioned.
Second, the government wants to ensure that no new burdens are placed on Canadian firearms owners and manufacturers. This second goal has already been largely achieved in the lead-up to the ATT talks this summer.
All the countries participating in the talks now accept that the treaty should set out what countries signing it should do—for example, preventing conventional weapons from falling into the hands of criminals or terrorists—but it should not set out how countries should be doing this; that is, the treaty should not dictate to countries signing it how they should be organizing their own export control regimes, only that the goal of these controls should be to prevent weapons from falling into the hands of criminals, terrorists, and human rights violators.
Canada already has in place a robust system of controls for export of conventional arms. The international standards for export controls that will be established by an ATT will almost certainly be lower than those of Canada's own export control regime. The items being considered for inclusion in an ATT are already subject to export controls in Canada.
[Translation]
Similarly, many of the criteria being contemplated for an ATT are already factors that the government considers when deciding whether or not to authorize an arms export. Therefore, Canada's present export controls will remain largely unchanged by a future ATT. This means that Canadian firearms owners and manufacturers will not have any new rules or regulations imposed on them by an ATT.
[English]
Four weeks have been allocated for the talks this summer to negotiate an arms trade treaty. The four weeks will be difficult, and success is by no means assured. However, Canada will work closely with our friends and allies, including in particular the U.S.A., the U.K., Germany, Italy, Japan, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand, to negotiate an effective ATT that will make a significant contribution to global efforts to keep weapons out of the hands of criminals and terrorists, while at the same time recognizing and protecting the ability of law-abiding private firearms owners to enjoy the recreational use of their firearms in a responsible manner.
Thank you.
Thank you to our guest. It's good to have you back at the foreign affairs committee.
This is a treaty that many had hoped would be able to curtail the trade in arms. Clearly, as we watch scenarios like Syria happen, we see that there's an urgency to deal with the proliferation of arms. I have to say that when you look at the conflicts in a multipolar world and at the types of conflicts that we're seeing now, it is absolutely critical that we do this in a multilateral way. As you mention in your overview, we can have our own policies as nation states, but it's clear I think that if we can do it in a multilateral way, it will be more effective, and it will deal with the proliferation.
Just in terms of negotiations, you made a couple of points that have been topical with regard to the treaty. In particular, you emphasized a couple of times that you want to make sure that the treaty is going to, as you put it, “respect the lawful ownership of firearms by responsible private citizens for personal and recreational uses”, and you reference “sports shooting, hunting, and collecting”.
This, of course, became a bit of an issue during negotiations. I'm just wondering about this. Were there other countries that had the same opinion on it that we did? Also, were there other countries that actually didn't find this to be as important an issue as Canada did?
:
First, let me point out that I'm not a lawyer, so if in a legal discussion I get it wrong, I apologize. But as our lawyers have explained it to me, by putting this text in the preamble...the preamble starts to give a defining character to the whole text. Once you get past the preamble of a treaty and you go into the text, you're starting to go into the details.
The initial text sets out definitional criteria for what is being done here. We are going to be watching carefully the details of the text to ensure that the details are consistent with what we've said. But should there ever be any doubt, should there be any ambiguity, we would be able to go back to the preamble text and say, “Look, we have said...”. We have two text preambles. The first text says that the purpose of this treaty is to target terrorists, criminals, and human rights violators. The second text says that the purpose of this treaty is not to impact legitimate, responsible firearms owners.
When we go to the details of the text, should there be any confusion about that or some ambiguity and we need somewhere to be able to define what we can do, we can go back to the text in the preamble and say, look, just in case there was any doubt, here it is. I'll give you a specific example. In the discussions, a number of countries have said we should prevent weapons going to non-state actors. What they really mean by this is that they want to prevent weapons going to the likes of the narco-guerrillas in Colombia or to terrorist groups in the Middle East. That's fine, but if we were to somehow put the words “non-state actors” into the treaty, it could be misinterpreted to mean anyone who is not a government—a company, an individual....
Now, one of the things that we are going to try to do is to say, look, let's not use the words “non-state actors”; let's use the words “illegal armed groups”. That better defines it. But should there be any ambiguity about that, we could then turn around and say to look at the preamble, where we have said these people, not those people. That should clarify it, should there be any ambiguity.
:
A TV show tried that once, didn't they?
I don't want to interrupt you, but we're running out of time.
Would you be surprised if people who were part of the delegation in which you'll be involved as we head into July of this year were posting, on a website called “canadiangunnutz.com”, references to discussions taking place in the department, offering opinions as to how the government may deal with certain issues, and saying that understanding diplomatese is worse than Klingon?
You don't look like an alien, but you would be surprised, wouldn't you, that people participating as part of your group are on these websites posting stuff like that?
That wouldn't be typical, would it?
:
The United States has been very supportive of the ATT. It sees, as well as anyone, the need for common international standards.
Really, the goal here is to try to promote greater transparency and confidence among major exporters—that we all try to achieve the same goals. One of the key components, then, is going to be on reporting and transparency so that we can all be confident that we are all fulfilling these obligations we undertake. Therefore, reporting is going to be very important.
However, reporting must also be realistic and practical. For example, under the chairman's text, the chairman seems to believe that we can report in incredible detail about each and every transaction. What we have said in the PrepCom, and others have agreed with us, is that to be realistic and practical, we cannot report in such great detail. Our trade with the U.S. is the classic example of that, where, by all means, we would want to be transparent and open, but the number of transactions between Canada and the U.S. is such that we won't be able to report on each and every transaction.
In any case, there are certain limitations that we and everyone else are going to have in how much and what we can report, including, for example, national security. We don't necessarily want to be able to report in intimate detail how much the Canadian or the American armed forces are buying or selling.
There's corporate confidentiality. We shouldn't ask companies to provide such intimate details about their business transactions. We have to be realistic.
Finally, in the case of Canada, we have the Privacy Act. There's some information that, for private citizens, we just cannot give out, and we don't want to give out.
All that being said, there's still a way of being open and transparent in giving the kind of information that will promote confidence and transparency among the partners of an ATT, and this we would support.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you again to the two of you.
Mr. Massoud, when my colleague Mr. LeBlanc raised the issue of the delegation, I was particularly interested to hear you say that the minister was the one who decided who would be in the delegation for the last negotiations. It's interesting. The minister was here a few months ago and I asked him who had decided on the delegation; he said he didn't know. I don't know if he forgot that he had made the decision. Anyway, it was an interesting comment, and I think it furthered our understanding of the file, so I thank you for that.
At the same time, you mentioned that you did consult quite a few groups, but I understand that you consult the people in the delegation by e-mail and that kind of thing, so the consultations are relatively restricted.
I remember some years ago that we used to do large-scale consultations on that whole range of issues, most notably on human security issues. There were very formal, open consultations in which people would come to DFAIT or communicate—it was not Skype at the time, but by some other technology.
Have you seen a change towards fewer consultations in recent years?
I want to welcome our guests here as we look at the second hour of our hearings today.
From the Control Arms Coalition, we have Lina Holguin, member, policy director from Oxfam Canada; Kenneth Epps, member, senior program officer from Project Ploughshares; Mark Fried, member, policy coordinator from Oxfam Canada; and Hilary Homes, member, campaigner for international justice, security, and human rights at Amnesty International.
From the Canadian Shooting Sports Association, we have Steve Torino, president, along with Tony Bernardo, executive director.
As well, as an individual, we have Solomon Friedman, lawyer.
Welcome to you all.
I believe you have a well-coordinated strategy in terms of how you will deliver your message. I'd like to see this. This is going to be good.
Mark Fried, you're going to start off, sir, and you're going to pass it over to Hilary Homes. From there it's going to go to Lina Holguin, and then Kenneth Epps will finish.
Mr. Fried, we'll start with you, sir.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Bonjour, tout le monde.
On behalf of the Canadian members of the Control Arms Coalition, first let me thank you for taking up this issue and for inviting us to appear as witnesses today.
Oxfam works in 95 countries around the world. We've seen over the decades, particularly in the last 20 years, a marked increase in the number and the severity of armed conflicts and incidents of criminal violence. Disputes that might once have been resolved with fists or sticks are now fought with automatic rifles, bazookas, and grenades. This is feeding a death toll that now stands at about 2,000 people every day dying from armed violence.
We find it outrageous that countries continue selling weapons and ammunition to known human rights abusers, sometimes in violation of UN embargoes, or to countries where corruption and incompetence allow weapons to fall into the hands of terrorists and criminals.
We can do something to rein in this tragedy. With the arms trade treaty we have the opportunity to bring the world up to Canada's high standards for export controls of weapons. We can do so, as was said earlier, in a way that protects the rights of lawful gun owners.
I hope this is an issue that all parties can get behind. A robust arms trade treaty would cover all weapons, ammunition, and components. It would require governments to make a judgment call as to whether a shipment of weapons would likely lead to violations of human rights law or international humanitarian law, or would increase corruption or poverty. If the answer is yes, that shipment should not go forward.
I appreciate your interest in the details and look forward to answering your questions, but let's not lose sight of the big picture. It took over a decade of lobbying by Nobel peace laureates and by our organizations before the United Nations began these negotiations in 2009. We're now in the final stages.
Canada has been a quiet but steady supporter of the arms trade treaty. Some countries will try to water it down or tie it up in endless debate. We need Canada to be a vocal champion of the arms trade treaty.
My colleagues will answer the details. I look forward to your questions.
I'm going to speak briefly on why we need an arms trade treaty and provide a contemporary example of a situation that we hope will be addressed by an effective arms trade treaty.
What exists now in terms of regulating conventional arms is a patchwork of national, regional, and international rules and principles involving few common standards or obligations. There are significant gaps through which too many weapons simply end up in the wrong hands.
States are playing by different rules. Some states like Canada have comparatively tight export controls; others have practically none. Some states abide by arms embargoes, while others seek to get around them for political reasons or simply greed. Some states blatantly back one side in a conflict and sell arms accordingly, regardless of how they will be used.
An arms trade treaty should embrace one simple idea: if there is a substantial risk that arms exported to another country will contribute to serious human rights abuses, those arms transfers must be stopped. We need only look to Syria for evidence of how badly the current system can fail.
Despite an ongoing and serious human rights crisis in Syria over the past year, in which thousands have been killed, arrested, tortured, and many more have fled over the borders looking for safety, the UN Security Council has been unable to impose an arms embargo. Some governments, including Canada, took independent measures to impose sanctions and prohibit arms transfers. Canada's response was in fact very robust, including some seven rounds of sanctions.
For others, however, notably Russia—Russia is, of course, one of the permanent five Security Council members—it remained business as usual. The prevailing attitude can be found in the words of the general director of the Russian state-owned arms manufacturer, Rosoboronexport:
As long as no sanctions have been declared yet and as long as there have been no instructions and directives from the government, we are obliged to comply with our contractual obligations, which we are doing now.
However, you'll notice in that quote it says “as long as no sanctions have been declared”.
Russia has played a central role in preventing a wide range of sanctions. It has exercised two vetoes to block UN Security Council resolutions. Russia also voted against a recent UN Human Rights Council resolution condemning the killing of some 108 people, including 50 children, in Houla. Despite being Syria's main weapons supplier, Russian President Putin said on June 1, right after the Human Rights Council vote that “Russia does not provide weapons that could be used in a civil conflict.” No information, however, was offered to substantiate that claim.
There are many other cases, many other clear cases, where populations suffer from irresponsible arms transfers, including, notably, Sudan. I would welcome further discussion of these following our presentation.
I'll turn it over to Lina.
:
Thank you very much for having us here today.
[Translation]
Oxfam-Québec and the members of the Control Arms Coalition think that the UN Diplomatic Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, in July 2012, represents an unprecedented opportunity to greatly reduce the human cost associated with the irresponsible transfer of arms.
An effective ATT must cover the import, export and transit of all types of conventional weapons, their ammunition and related equipment. It must be legally binding and stop the transfer of arms that could be used to violate international human rights and humanitarian law. We are pleased that Canada supports these criteria.
However, the ATT must also prevent arms transfers by states when there is a substantial risk of undermining sustainable development. Unfortunately, Canada no longer supports the inclusion of a socio-economic development criterion in the treaty's parameters. Many civil society organizations, including Oxfam, and states, including the UK, believe that this criterion must absolutely appear in the treaty, since armed violence constitutes a direct obstacle to development. For instance, it has been shown that armed conflicts cost Africa $18 billion each year. I could also share with you other statistics that are in a new report that we are going to publish this week.
We believe that an arms trade treaty will help create the necessary conditions for true economic and social development, while also controlling the flow of arms that have precisely impeded this development in the past. I am speaking to you as a representative of Oxfam-Québec, but also as a Colombian. I grew up in Colombia, and I know what I am talking about when I say that the resources have been used for war and not for development.
Our position is clear: a weak treaty would be worse than no treaty at all. A weak treaty would simply legitimize the existing system, which is deficient.
Thank you.
:
We know that treaty negotiations next month will be challenging. All key elements of the treaty are contested, even its scope. For example, from their recent experience, many states in Latin America and Africa insist that small arms and light weapons must be in the treaty. Yet some states, including China in particular, want small arms omitted from the scope.
Similarly, the majority of states recognize that transfer authorization criteria should be based on international commitments. Some, particularly the U.S., argue that these criteria should be taken into account during transfer authorizations but that states should not be held to a “states shall not” wording in the text. The problem, of course, is that some states will interpret “take into account” as “choose to ignore”.
Two challenges stand out for treaty negotiations. First, the closest document to a draft text is a paper prepared by the chair of the ATT process at the UN, Ambassador Moritán of Argentina. It has wide support and includes all the fundamentals of a strong treaty, but the paper has formal approval only as a background document. The second and perhaps greatest challenge is that the final treaty text must be approved by consensus. This was a condition required for the U.S. to join the ATT process, and it may well become the greatest impediment to effective negotiations.
Nevertheless, we believe Canada can play a significant and supportive role to assist negotiations towards a robust and comprehensive ATT. Canada was an early advocate, co-sponsoring resolutions on the ATT at the UN General Assembly. Canada's national record on export authorization, including its case-by-case assessment of arms export requests and its use of human rights and conflict criteria suggest that Canada can bring substance and comparatively high standards to the negotiation table. A Canadian proposal for preamble language, as we heard earlier, to acknowledge the legitimate use and transfer of firearms for recreational purposes helps to clarify that the ATT is not intended to affect domestic firearms regulation.
In our view, however, Canada should also, first, demonstrate high-level support for an effective treaty via a public statement by the and participation by Foreign Minister in the opening ministerial segment of the diplomatic conference. Second, Canada should return to its earlier support for a strong treaty criterion on sustainable development. And third, Canada should consider including other stakeholders in the conference national delegation, such as parliamentarians and representatives of the broad range of civil society groups that have worked for a robust treaty.
In addition, we call on Canadian parliamentarians to sign the global parliamentarian declaration advocating a strong and effective ATT. To date, the document has been signed by over 80 Canadian MPs and senators from all official parties.
To conclude, civil society groups like ours across the globe are convinced the arms trade treaty is an unprecedented opportunity to reduce the human cost associated with inadequate controls on arms transfers. It can make important contributions to improved safety and security for the countless communities affected by conflict and armed violence. It is an opportunity that Canada and other UN member states should seize.
Thank you for your attention.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the standing committee, for inviting the Canadian Shooting Sports Association to participate and express the views of our members and other active Canadian firearm owners and users.
My name is Steve Torino. I'm the president of the Canadian Shooting Sports Association. I also co-chair the firearms advisory committee, reporting to . I have occupied this position for the last six years. Previously, I served as chair of the user advisory group on firearms for Justice Ministers Allan Rock, Anne McLellan, and Martin Cauchon from 1996 to 2003, and then I was part of Firearm Commissioner William Baker's program advisory committee for three years, wherein I chaired the firearms subcommittee.
The Canadian Shooting Sports Association represents active target shooters and collectors in Canada. From the volume of communication we've received concerning the upcoming July UN conference on the arms trade treaty, apparently the issue of sporting and hunting firearms being a part of the arms trade treaty has taken on some significance. CSSA has been asked to represent our members' position to the government.
While my colleague Mr. Bernardo will submit the views of CSSA members and of the firearms community in general, I will present some facts that may be pertinent in any discussions and deliberations this committee's members may hold in regard to the arms trade treaty.
Our members' main concern in the past has been and remains the fact that there does not seem to be an agreed upon definition of small arms and light weapons, and each country has either different interpretations or different applications regarding these items. The United Nations small arms survey and others seem to use various definitions, ranging from those found in a 1997 study to those in a 2005 UN version.
In regard to civilian small arms and ammunitions—
:
Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
In regard to civilian small arms and ammunition, Canada is primarily a nation of importers, not manufacturers. Current import costs of these specific items total some $250 million, as part of an industry generating some $6 billion annually in revenue, including costs related to and in support of these activities. Related imported equipment represents about 35% of this amount.
It must also be noted that these importers also import many related outdoor products, such as those for fishing, camping, and other outdoor activities. There are items such as telescopes for firearms and products by camera manufacturers, such as Nikon, Swarovski, etc. Specific clothing and shelter products for such activities are imported by many of Canada's firearms importers.
It must also be said at this point that Canada has probably the strongest import and export controls in the world, and is regarded as having such. Canada's major trading partner in this regard is the United States, accounting for some 65% to 75% of these products as a whole.
The number of small arms in civilian hands worldwide is really unknown at this point. The small arms survey's latest estimate is that there are some 650 million small arms in private hands. This amount increases or changes depending on the type of study done and the timing of such a study.
Canada's homicide rate with firearms is 0.5%, about 175 persons per year out of some 600 total homicides per year. The number of homicides with firearms registered to accused in Canada totals under 3% of that total. The small arms survey claims there are about 245,000 firearms deaths worldwide annually. Canada does not rank among the top 10 countries for possession of legal civilian firearms, according to the small arms survey's latest estimate. This study goes on to state that “...it is inherently impossible to be sure of the total number of all guns”.
At this point, the small arms survey also says that with regard to violent deaths listed among the 58 countries that were studied, the rate of violent death for Canada was some 10 times lower than that for the country lowest on the list in their survey.
In summary, the Canadian Shooting Sports' members and Canada's recreational firearms community are greatly encouraged by the government's attention to this issue and respectfully request that this government stay the course, as outlined to date, by any means deemed most effective. National discretion is an excellent criterion for all involved.
I would now respectfully pass the presentation to Mr. Bernardo.
Thank you.
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to you on a matter of such great concern for over two million Canadians.
My name is Tony Bernardo. I'm the acting executive director of the Canadian Shooting Sports Association. I've been an executive member of the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities since 1997 and have been attending and working at the United Nations since 1998 regarding civilian firearms issues. I've addressed the United Nations assembly four times.
As an association, the CSSA has no objection to the concept of a treaty on conventional weapons. Our concerns relate to the firearms that ordinary Canadians use every day. It's no secret that Canada has one of the most stringent sets of controls in the world on the ownership and use of firearms. Bluntly put, we don't need any more. Neither does the United Nations, not if they're actually trying to accomplish something.
The civilian firearms issue is a very important topic to many nations. Moreover, some nations have constitutional protection regarding civilian firearms ownership, protections that prohibit their involvement in any initiative that might undermine those constitutional protections. The issue of civilian firearms is, truthfully, a no-win situation that should be avoided at all costs if there's to be any hope of a functional treaty.
However, in my conversations with members of delegations from countries less developed than Canada, I'm told repeatedly that civilian firearms are almost never a problem. Most people understand that the real issue is the proliferation of exclusively military weapons being illegally sold by countries with less than scrupulous motives.
Have there been any deaths? Well, yes, of course—but not as you might think: 56 million people have died in genocides in the last 100 years, almost all of them murdered by their own governments.
The inclusion of civilian firearms, also called “small arms” at the United Nations, in the former firearms protocol virtually caused the collapse of the entire UN process and left that project in a state of utter failure. In fact, one of the few things that ever came from the firearms protocol was the Canadian firearms-marking regulation—an unmitigated disaster, at best.
For those who are unfamiliar with the marking regulation, permit me a brief explanation.
The UN marking regulations were passed into Canadian law in 2004. As is typical of those days, firearms importers were never consulted prior to the regulations being introduced. The Chrétien, Martin, and Harper governments have successively delayed the implementation since then. The obvious question is “Why?”
Members of the Canadian firearms industry conducted an exhaustive study and concluded the marking requirement was impossible to comply with. An international study reached the same conclusion. Participants in this represented Browning, Remington, Beretta, Sako, Savage, Tikka, Uberti, NORINCO, Ruger, Glock, Smith & Wesson, Heckler & Koch, and several others. These respectable and reputable companies flatly stated that if this were implemented in Canada, they would simply close their Canadian operations, devastating a legitimate billion-dollar industry and putting thousands of Canadians on the unemployment rolls.
These are the consequences of domestic legislation being developed by international forums with little or no understanding of the ramifications of their undertakings. An initiative, started to theoretically ease violence in the world's desperate regions, instead causes unemployment and financial hardship to peace-loving Canada.
We've been assured that the position of the Canadian government is that civilian firearms must not be included within the scope of an arms trade treaty. Indeed, the language of the preamble makes clear the Government of Canada's intention to have civilian firearms regulated domestically, not internationally.
Our support for the treaty process and the Government of Canada's participation in this process remains contingent upon the stated intention being upheld at all levels.
Civilian firearms must be regulated domestically, taking into consideration political, constitutional, and social factors inherent in each nation's makeup. In this instance, the one-size approach does not fit all.
In other words, members of the Canadian Shooting Sports Association are saying there is no good use for overriding one nation's rules based on the demands and needs of another UN state's requirements being applied to all other states without regard for each party's national jurisdiction and legislation. Again, national discretion and jurisdiction should and must prevail. The rules for civilian possession of small arms in one country do not necessarily make sense, nor are they useful, in another country.
It must also be said that we have seen no evidence that this position has changed in any way. We strongly encourage the government to stay the course and protect the rights of Canadian citizens first, before attempting to agree with having an international body regulate what is completely within the purview of Canadian national discretion and jurisdiction.
Article 2 of the UN charter specifically states that there is nothing in the charter authorizing:
...the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state....
Having one set of rules for the use of such items in all countries would be, at most, counterproductive and presumably unacceptable to the UN principle of national discretion and jurisdiction.
Lastly, to conclude, I'd like to say to Mr. LeBlanc that I wrote that, and I am not a member of the Canadian delegation, nor did I violate any confidentiality agreement.
I thank you very much for your time and attention to this, and I appreciate it. Thanks.
Good afternoon, honourable members. Thank you very much for inviting me to address you today.
My name is Solomon Friedman. I am a criminal defence lawyer in private practice in Ottawa. Although I maintain a comprehensive defence practice, a significant portion of my work is focused on firearms law, representing law-abiding hunters, target shooters, sportsmen and women, and firearms businesses in Criminal Code and related Firearms Act matters.
As the Government of Canada considers its position on the arms trade treaty, it is important that Parliament be aware of the potential domestic implications of the treaty in general, and in particular of certain more problematic provisions. I preface my remarks by simply noting that there is, as of yet, no official final draft of the treaty before this committee for consideration. Accordingly, issues highlighted today may become moot and new ones may arise. I base my comments, therefore, on the chair's text and on suggested model texts, which have been circulated by the United Nations and various NGOs, and by Canada's official policy statements concerning the proposed treaty.
In my view, there are three distinct areas of concern with regard to the proposed treaty. First, does the treaty signify a step backwards in firearms regulation and a change of direction for this government? Second, will the treaty adversely affect law-abiding gun owners and businesses by influencing domestic criminal and regulatory law and by unduly hampering law reform in Canada? Third, are certain key treaty provisions overly broad in their scope and reach?
With your kind permission, I will address each in turn.
First, the government should be careful that this treaty not signify a regression, a step backwards, in how firearms and gun owners are treated in Canada and abroad. Since 2006, the Canadian government has demonstrated a shift, exemplified in policy, regulation, and most recently legislation, in how Canadian gun owners are regulated under our law. Instead of punishing the law-abiding for the acts of the lawless, the government has consistently signalled that the regulation of firearms should target those who wilfully and unlawfully misuse firearms in a criminal manner.
It is imperative that Canada's involvement with the arms trade treaty not signify either a condemnation of responsible civilian firearms ownership or a step backwards to a time when it was thought—based on ideological speculation, not empirical evidence—that somehow the criminal misuse of guns could be addressed by more onerous and stringent regulation of law-abiding civilian gun owners, be they farmers, hunters, or target shooters.
Aside from the potential for symbolic repercussions, Parliament should be aware that international law, despite being conceived of and legislated thousands of miles away, can potentially have very real implications here at home. Of course, in Canada, unless a treaty is implemented by domestic legislation, it is not, strictly speaking, a part of Canadian law. However, courts are increasingly turning to international law, be it in the form of binding treaties or normative principles, when interpreting domestic law.
For example, a court may consider the arms trade treaty when wrestling with an unclear provision in the Firearms Act or the Criminal Code. Of course, despite Parliament's best intentions, legislators do not always say what they mean and mean what they say. For that reason, Parliament should be particularly concerned with broad, overreaching purposive clauses and preamble-like statements. If these are in conflict with our own domestic approach to regulating firearms, we do not want to put a court in the position of having to square domestic statutory interpretation with Canada's statements on the international stage.
Of course, such a discussion is, by its very nature, entirely speculative. We do not know which provisions of the Firearms Act or the Criminal Code will be litigated and require interpretation by our courts. Similarly, we do not know how a court may choose to use the arms trade treaty as the basis of statutory interpretation. Accordingly, when crafting any treaty provisions, Canada should proceed with caution.
Aside from the courtrooms of this country, the effects of the arms trade treaty may be felt in the chambers of Parliament as well. To illustrate this point, let me turn to the long-gun registry for a moment.
I had the opportunity to testify before the parliamentary committees that reviewed and ultimately passed Bill , both in the House and the Senate. At both these sessions, proponents of the long-gun registry repeatedly cited Canada's international commitments in the UN and other global forums as a purported reason for maintaining the wasteful and ineffective registry.
:
It is important that the government assess this treaty with an eye to not just the current state of firearms regulation in Canada but also to how the law may develop in the future. Make no mistake about it, the Firearms Act is desperately in need of rewrite, revision, and reform. Parliament should not bind itself through treaty commitments or other international instruments and thereby prevent the meaningful reform that is required to restore equity and fairness to the treatment of two million law-abiding Canadian gun owners.
Finally, I would like to point out two particularly problematic provisions that appear in numerous draft texts and proposals for the arms trade treaty.
First, it is essential that any final treaty protect Canada's sovereignty and national discretion in the regulation of civilian-owned firearms. I would therefore commend the government for the approach it has taken to propose the introduction of a paragraph acknowledging and respecting “responsible and accountable trans-national use of firearms for recreational purposes, such as sport shooting, hunting and other forms of similar lawful activities”. This is a good first step.
Also, many states have argued for a ban on firearms transfers to “non-state actors”. The use of this term is overbroad and inconsistent with Canadian domestic law. I would agree, therefore, with Canada's recent proposal that the phrase “illegal armed groups” be used instead. While no one would argue that armed guerrilla groups and insurrectionist insurgents should be denied firearms, the term “non-state actors” on its face connotes any non-government entity or individual, including, it would seem, responsible and law-abiding civilian gun owners.
In closing, I think the most important issue for this committee in considering the arms trade treaty is one of focus. It is clear that Canada should support measures that keep firearms out of the hands of those who seek to do ill, whether it is to terrorize their own people or to topple democratically elected governments.
At the same time, however, Canada must expressly recognize on the international stage, as it has done at home, that the lawful use and ownership of firearms is consistent with both international and domestic peace and security. For that reason, the arms trade treaty should not focus on compliant and law-abiding civilian gun owners. As I have seen time and time again in my firearms law practice, such an approach is ineffective, unworkable, and fundamentally unjust.
Thank you for your kind attention.
We think that the treaty needs to take these criteria into consideration. Before a country decides to transfer weapons, it must determine whether doing so will contribute to violating human rights or international humanitarian law and hinder development, in which case, those resources should perhaps instead be put toward fighting poverty.
In an Oxfam report that will be published this week, we indicate that, in 2009-2010, fragile states have increased their military spending by 15%. Of course, they could have used those resources to send children to school, improve their health care system or feed people. The treaty's introduction indicates that there is a connection between development and armed violence, and that in the case of a transfer, the country should consider what their responsibilities are.
The effectiveness of aid is also an issue for us. It is something that is extremely important for this government. If we give aid to fragile countries and others, but they use that money to buy weapons, it doesn't make sense. In our report, we give the example of Eritrea, which used 35% of its budget to buy weapons. But 35% of that country's total budget comes from development aid. In other words, the money comes in on one side and goes out the other.
As I mentioned, I'm from Colombia. I've been in Canada for 15 years now, but I grew up there. Colombia has been in a state of conflict for 50 years. None of the children have access to education. Inequality is growing. Why? Because the Colombian government has spent a lot of money in the course of the conflict. Colombia is of enormous economic interest to Canada. So there is not only the question of how effective the aid is; there is also an economic interest. If we want companies to engage in development in Colombia, but Colombia doesn't apply any control of weapons and everyone plays by different rules, it won't work.
I hope that answers your question.
:
I'm not sure I caught the end of that, but I think I understand generally what you're saying.
The other example I would give, as a contemporary example that hasn't been in the headlines in the same way Syria has, is Sudan. With the conflict in Darfur, there was a Security Council arms embargo, but it was only on the region. It wasn't on the whole of Sudan. Without going into a lot of detail, arms still were sold to Sudan and they got into Darfur, for all sorts of reasons, and to both sides in that situation. It shows the political will around the rigorousness of an arms embargo and the breadth you need to have to truly deal with an armed conflict. We just don't have enough of that to rely on it.
The other thing is that there is an increasing conflict now between Sudan and the newly independent South Sudan. Again, the international community has really struggled to deal with that through things like Security Council resolutions. There's a lot of attention on what's happening in South Sudan with the refugee flows, but not so much within Sudan. You have the government bombing two southern states, causing hundreds of thousands of people to flee, but they're bombing their own citizens.
I'm picking on the Security Council, but there is a reason for that. You would think that a state bombing its own citizens would result in some sort of Security Council condemnation, and it hasn't. And because that's where.... When I say there are few regulations, we're looking for something where there is a common standard, where people know where that bar is, and we don't have that for the arms trade. Everyone is sort of looking to a different set of rules. We're looking to establish that common set of rules so that even if not everyone has yet signed on to a treaty, the common standard exists, that norm exists, and you can use that as pressure to say, “You are falling short as a state”.
It's primarily Russia and China that have been selling to Sudan, but also Belarus. There are a number of states arming South Sudan, which is a new county being seen as a new market.
So it's to be able to bring that norm to these contexts and say, “Don't help fuel a conflict. Look at the abuses that are taking place. Look at how these weapons are being used.”
:
Certainly, Mr. Breitkreuz.
The U.S. position in regard to the arms trade treaty has not been fully declared. In looking back at previous references, Ambassador Bolton testified to the United Nations last time that the United States would entertain absolutely no measures whatsoever that would impinge upon their second amendment, which is the right of citizens of the United States to keep and bear arms. So it seems that constitutionally any U.S. involvement in something where the firearms of their citizens might be regulated by an international agreement is completely a non-starter. Now, while the U.S. has not declared itself yet with regard to this particular item in the current ATT talks, the U.S. Senate has. After the last conference last summer, the U.S. Senate sent a strongly worded letter to Barack Obama signed by a majority of the senators, which stated that if civilian firearms were going to be included in the arms trade treaty, then the U.S. Senate would refuse to ratify it.
If any member would like a copy of that letter, I have a copy of it.
As for other countries around the world, I think you see countries that perhaps would be quite agreeable to the exclusion of civilian firearms, particularly with regard to their domestic regulation. In previous negotiations that have happened within the UN framework, this has been a constant bugaboo. It's been an irritant going right back to 1995 when this stuff all started. It's always been a roadblock. If there's a legitimate need or legitimate interest in going forward with a real arms trade treaty that deals with the export of military weapons into the underdeveloped areas of the world, then you have to do what you can to make that happen. In doing so, if you include the domestically regulated firearms of civilians in that mix, you're already trying to do a dance with one foot in a concrete block, and it's not going to happen.
:
I'd be happy to clarify that.
In Canada, international law is formally received into domestic law through implementation by statute. That, however, is really not the end of the conversation, particularly when we look at statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is probably the most boring class in law school, and it has to do with how we divine the meaning of words and phrases in our legislation. Increasingly—and this is what I refer to—courts are turning to Canada's international commitments to decipher words or phrases that may appear in our own domestic legislation and that, for whatever reason, are unclear. As I said, this is a speculative process, but it's one that has happened again and again, and it has certainly gained favour in Canadian legal circles. The Supreme Court itself is engaged in this. There's nothing new or unusual about it.
I think what should be of concern to the Canadian government when considering the arms trade treaty is ensuring that, for example, when we have overarching statements of principle—let's say, for example, about how Canada ought to view the regulation of firearms, be they civilian or not—those phrases not be inadvertently transmitted and received into our domestic legislation. I pointed to the example of a judge who is trying to weigh a particular phrase in the Criminal Code—and in this case it would be something about firearms transfer, whether it be ownership, registration, or use—who would then look to the international law and say, “Well, if Canada has made this profound and overarching statement on”—let's say—“firearms control, including civilian use, then I should take a harsh or stricter interpretation.” That is precisely how it could affect law-abiding gun owners in Canada.
Ordinarily, for example, when we have an ambiguity in a Criminal Code statute, we say it's resolved in favour of the accused. If, however, there are other interpretive sources, such as international law, that give a different interpretation, that rule may not be followed.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
[English]
Thank you, again, to all of you for very interesting presentations.
One thing I picked up from the presentations is the effect of the current lack of rules on Canada from an aid effectiveness point of view, but also from an economic point of view. I think one of you underlined the fact that we have Canadian businesses all over the world, and what they are doing can often be preempted or disturbed by social upheaval. Of course, that's not even including humanitarian considerations and human rights considerations. So if we look at what it can do to Canada, on top of what it already does to the people in some developing countries, in particular, we see the importance of this treaty.
We've heard other witnesses talk a lot about the effect such a treaty could have on domestic gun ownership. Most of the experts I've heard, including disarmament ambassadors and people like that, have always stated, point blank, that it won't have any effect on domestic policy. But as we've heard other comments...maybe, Mr. Epps, you could react with your point of view on that.
To our witnesses, thank you very much for coming out today.
To the committee, I don't know when votes are going to happen in terms of all the massive ones. I'm hoping that we're still going to be on for Wednesday. In the event that we aren't, I'd like to look at the possibility of trying to meet on Thursday for an hour or so, if that's possible, and trying to reschedule the witnesses. I'm going to look at trying to deal with 3:30 as an option, but we're still hopeful that we'll be meeting on Wednesday at 3:30. Okay? We'll see what happens.
To our guests, thank you very much again for being here.
With that, the meeting is adjourned.