TRAN Committee Report

The report of the Advisory Panel entitled: Stronger Ties: A Shared Commitment to Railway Safety set forth a number of concerns and recommendations for improving railway safety in Canada.  The Advisory Panel stated in its report that while the safety record of Canada’s major railways is among the best in North America, there has not been sufficient improvement in their safety performance since the Railway Safety Act was last amended in 1999.  With the exception of accidents and incidents involving dangerous goods, main track accidents have shown an upward trend in recent years.  This needs to be addressed.  In addition, the report noted that accidents in railway yards and on spur lines are occurring far too frequently. 

Generally, the Advisory Panel found that the Railway Safety Act and its principles are fundamentally sound, but that a number of improvements are needed.  The Advisory Panel goes on to say that the regulatory framework is founded on performance-based regulations and railway operating rules, and requires attention to ensure that it is implemented properly and effectively.  Some areas that the Advisory Panel believes require improvement are set out as follows:

• The difference between rules and regulations needs to be better understood.  A more structured and inclusive process needs to be developed for rule making and for consultation to ensure the involvement of all interested parties.
• There is a need to determine the baseline safety requirements that must be met before a company commences operations, and for this to be recognized through the issuance of a Rail Operating Certificate.
• The regulatory framework needs to make provision for the regulator to be better equipped with a broader range of enforcement tools, including an administrative monetary penalty scheme.
• The Act needs to be updated to clarify the basis upon which railway safety inspectors exercise their current powers and to better reflect the changing nature of the railway inspector’s job to that of an auditor, a change brought about by the implementation of SMS a number of years ago. 

With regard to SMS, the Advisory Panel supports this approach to managing safety but stresses that there are implementation challenges.  Railway companies need to make a concerted effort to communicate what SMS is and how it can improve safety, and to do so at all levels of their organization.  Furthermore, the regulator must make safety management systems the key focus of its oversight activities.  The regulator also needs to collaborate with the industry in developing meaningful performance indicators and to improve its capacity and approach to auditing railway SMS. 

In terms of overall safety culture, the Advisory Panel stated that, from their point of view, passenger railways, and VIA Rail have a commendable safety culture.  CP has made great strides in improving its approach to safety management and in developing a healthy safety culture in its company.  On the other hand, in the Advisory Panel’s opinion, CN’s strict adherence to a rules-based approach, focussed largely on disciplinary actions when mistakes are made, has instilled a “culture of fear and discipline/ and is counter to an effective safety management systems.  CN needs to acknowledge this openly and take concrete steps to improve.

In relation to human resources to monitor rail safety, the Advisory Panel recognizes that Transport Canada is facing significant financial and personnel challenges.  With the rail traffic growing there are increasing demands on the regulator for ongoing monitoring and auditing of the SMS.  This means that the regulator must be adequately funded if it is to maintain effective delivery of its regulatory oversight program.  Transport Canada must enhance its financial and human resource capacity to perform its safety oversight role.

The Advisory Panel sums up its findings by concluding that Canadian railways are safe but could be safer.  It recognizes that there is a need for the railways and the regulator to take more action in certain areas to improve safety.  They believe that they are missing opportunities to do so – such as having better data for measuring and analyzing safety performance, encouraging participation at all levels in implementing effective SMS, and taking steps to enhance the regulator’s capacity to perform its safety oversight role.