:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Yes, it is indeed my pleasure to be here.
I will not burden you with a seven-minute speech but just respond directly to what I've heard are the issues before us.
I would like to thank the committee for giving me the opportunity to respond to allegations that I may have pressured inspectors, members of the Canadian Federal Pilots Association, to not appear before this committee. I'd like to begin by referring that at no time did I threaten inspectors or apply pressure to prevent them from testifying before this committee.
At meeting 35, a member of this committee indicated that he expected inspectors to appear here. It is my experience, which spans nearly 40 years of federal service, that inspectors rarely appear at parliamentary committees.
I anticipated that individuals and managers involved would have questions regarding these appearances since they have not been exposed to this process. I considered it my duty as a manager to ensure that if inspector witnesses were called, they and their managers were aware of their roles, rights, and responsibilities. That is why I decided to follow up with Mr. Holbrook.
I did call his office, but I was not able to speak with Mr. Holbrook and he did not return my call. I do not understand why Mr. Holbrook didn't follow up with me or my superiors if he had concerns about my request.
My sole purpose in making the call was to find out whether Mr. Holbrook intended to have civil aviation inspectors appearing with him, so that I might ensure that everyone involved knew of their roles, rights, and responsibilities.
At no time during this brief phone conversation with Mr. Holbrook's assistant did I make any threats regarding the appearance of inspectors before this committee. In fact, I've been working hard to create an environment both in the industry and in Transport Canada's civil aviation in which people know they can report issues and incidents without fear of retribution.
The safety management system regulations demand the creation of this reporting culture, and the disciplinary policy I have written into our civil aviation issues reporting system clearly demands the creation and maintenance of a non-threatening, blame-free reporting culture.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, gentlemen, madam.
[English]
Thank you for the invitation to appear before your committee to answer your questions.
This review began in May 2006 at the request of the Minister of Transport. There were concerns about whether the Toronto Port Authority had well managed its responsibilities. There were allegations in the press and elsewhere about actions that the authority had taken with respect to the fixed link, which eventually was approved and eventually was cancelled, and the settlement that occurred thereafter.
The purpose of my review was to do just that: review the decision regarding these matters. The minister wanted to be satisfied that the principles of good governance had been upheld.
My mandate, which you will find as attachment 2 of my report, sets out specifically the questions that I had to look into in the context of a very important agreement that was entered into in 1983 between the federal government and the then Toronto harbour commissioners and the City of Toronto.
I had the assistance, for the purpose of my review, of Jeffrey Smith, who was retained by the Department of Transport. Jeffrey Smith is a member of the BDO Dunworthy firm of forensic accountants. You have a summary of his findings attached to my report.
For the review, I had the assistance and cooperation of quite a number of people: the City of Toronto, the staff of the city, members of the Toronto Port Authority or TPA, the Department of Transport in Toronto and at an office here in Ottawa, and the Department of Justice lawyers who had been involved in the various events under review.
I received great collaboration from all the people I talked to. I have looked at hundreds and hundreds of documents, if not more. I met with anyone who wanted to talk to me about the TPA and their management, the decisions that had been made, the concerns they had. I received a lot of e-mails and had a lot of meetings, including meetings with representatives from the community associations on the Toronto waterfront. You have a list of the members.
Now for my findings.
In summary, I've come to the conclusion that the Toronto Port Authority had complied with due diligence requirements in all respects on the matters that concerned the proposed construction of the bridge, the purchase of the new ferry, and the commercial arrangements that were entered into as part of the settlement agreement. This is discussed on page 3 of my report.
The overall settlement after the cancellation occurred, as you will well know, cost $35 million, and there were a lot of questions relating to that amount. People were saying, why would it cost $35 million to settle claims? We don't have a bridge, and the bridge itself would have cost $14 million. So there were a lot of questions.
And people were concerned that one of the difficulties, perhaps, was that in effect there was not much information that could be made public and was made public at the time regarding the process of negotiations.
But I've come to the conclusion, and I will say more if required later, that the amount of $35 million was reasonable, that the principles of good governance here again had been respected not only in reaching the global settlement but also in the way the $35 million was allocated to each of the parties who were involved and who had been damaged by the cancellation of the bridge.
I looked at the Aecon contract. Aecon was the builder who had been retained, after a process of tenders, by the authority to construct the bridge. There had been allegations that in effect the construction contract had been purposely and inappropriately accelerated to ensure that the bridge could not be stopped by a new municipal administration. I deal with that in my report very carefully, at pages 64 and 68.
My conclusion, after having looked at all the circumstances, talking to people, and having looked at the documents that were available, is that such allegations were grossly exaggerated, and I have set out the reasons on page 66 for my coming to that conclusion.
There were also many questions about the environmental assessments that had to be performed before the contract could be let. There were assessments in 1999, in 2003 regarding the bridge itself, and in 2006 regarding the ferry, after the bridge had been cancelled. I reviewed in detail the various stages of the environmental processes, from the beginning to the end. You will find that on seven pages, on page 68 and following. Again, my conclusion was that principles of good governance have been complied with.
It was not easy. Every step had plenty of difficulties, but my conclusion is that the TPA itself managed the issues well, and the processes as well.
There was a question as well that had been specifically raised by many, and that was part of my mandate. There were questions about how it was that the Toronto port had come to be governed by the Canada Marine Act. I have read fascinating debates in the House of Commons and in the Senate. This is related at page 90.
In effect, there were two administrations involved. They were two Liberal administrations, but there was an election between. First, Bill was introduced; there was a lot of debate about it. And there was another, Bill , which followed the election of the Liberal government.
Again, if you're interested, I can tell you more about that. I've learned a lot about Toronto and about the Senate committee and the House of Commons committee debates on these matters. I found them fascinating.
But my conclusion was that Parliament had decided that the Toronto Port Authority qualified as a national port and that it should be on the list. Parliament itself—you people—had decided that it should be on the list. It was not a function or a responsibility that had been left to a minister afterwards.
There were provisions for the minister later to look at applications that other ports in Canada might make, and there were some criteria. These criteria were before the House when the list was devised and when steps were taken and amendments were made to get the Port of Toronto and the Port of Hamilton on the list. I didn't find anything wrong with that.
Although the department itself initially had proposed and the minister had agreed that Toronto should not be on the list, eventually—I guess there were caucus meetings and members' meetings—the decision was made, and there was an all-party agreement that the Toronto Port Authority should be on the list.
That's enough of that.
An hon. member: An all-party agreement?
Mr. Roger Tassé: An all-party agreement, yes. I discuss that in my report.
I have perhaps just one or two more comments, Mr. Chair.
There have been allegations that the port authority was too secretive and that it was not transparent, not making documents and reports available. Indeed, I found they had problems in complying with requirements of the CMA regarding the land use plans and their business plans.
There's no provision--unless there was an amendment in the last six months--in the CMA for the port authority to make an annual report. It doesn't mean that there were no annual meetings, but there was no requirement. They were preparing financial statements. They would call meetings, and they would try to respond to questions. So in this way they were trying to be transparent. But there are no requirements in the act or the letters patent for annual reports.
If there had been an annual report, it would have been an annual report of the Toronto Port Authority, not...the TPA itself. I note in my report that this is a bit of a problem. Having the activities, plans, or objectives of the port nested into the greater whole of the port's information is not the best way to disseminate information about it.
I think I will stop here. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I think you've heard the main points.
:
I'm pleased to meet you.
I don't know Toronto very well. I rarely visit this city. However, when the Standing Committee on Transport examined the various airports in Canada, we did have an opportunity to go through Toronto.
I was surprised to learn that the majority of complaints about operations and fees, particularly the landing fees charged to various airlines, involve this airport. It reached a point where companies were contemplating leaving the airport and landing in other cities such as Montreal. At least, these are some of the comments we heard.
You make the following recommendation in your report, and I quote:
A determined effort should be made by the TPA to take a more proactive approach to community consultations. It would be important for the TPA to reach out to organizations and groups who have raised concerns about its operations to build relationships and stimulate reasonable discussions [...]
This is similar to the comments that I had already heard to the effect that the administration failed to take into consideration the complaints of users, carriers and people living close to the airport.
This might be quite aside from the particular situation that you examined, but in my view, the results are more or less the same. I have the Minister's response to your recommendation. He indicates that he fully supports this recommendation and encourages the TPA to also support this important consideration.
In light of the comprehensive study conducted, are you genuinely confident in the will of the government, whatever government that may be, to improve the operation of port authorities, to ensure that sound decisions are reached?
:
Thank you for your question.
For openers, let me just say that communication with the port authorities and between the different stakeholders in the port of Toronto, particularly at the airport, are extremely difficult. One of the reasons for this is that several of the representatives who attend meetings have only one goal in mind, namely shutting down the airport.
Given that goal, it's not surprising that over time, tensions mount, inflexibility sets in and people have trouble communicating with one another maintaining good relations. Given that many of these people attend these meetings to let authority officials know that they have a responsibility, that they would like to have them relocate, that this airport should not operate like it does...
I have nothing against those who would prefer to see the land converted into parkland, but for the time being, an airport operates on this site pursuant to an agreement between the various parties, including the City of Toronto. The city is bound by this agreement. However, the people who live in close proximity to the airport want to see this facility shut down.
As I see it, the challenge here -- and as I said to the Minister, it's the port authority's challenge, not his -- lies in trying to resolve this issue with the help of mediators who try and find ways to brings the parties to the table to look at ways of resolving a problem situation, and also at how the port authority itself could provide more information, something that might reassure people. We've observed that the type of questions most often asked do not reflect the will to find solutions to real problems, but rather the will to identify problems and to show that things just aren't working.
The prevailing climate isn't very good.
:
It's difficult to reduce the animosity when there's a libel suit against the citizens of Toronto. When some of the residents spoke out in the past, the port authority decided to sue them.
But anyway, we do know that the port authority belonged to the City of Toronto for 87 years, since 1911, and until the Canada Marine Act came forward in 1998, at which time the federal government took control of it. So just for background information, historically, it always belonged to the City of Toronto until 1998 and the Canada Marine Act.
I have just a few questions.
Centred around the $35 million, it is true that it's hard to quite understand that a bridge of $20 million or $22 million would cost $35 million to settle. At that time, there was a contract with Aecon, which is the construction company, to build the bridge. There were three conditions: there needed to be a permit under the Fisheries Act; there would be approvals from the Navigable Waters Protection Act; and then, of course, the environmental assessment.
My understanding is that the Fisheries Act permit was not in hand until January 15, 2004, long after the former Prime Minister, Mr. Martin, had indicated that the federal government would respect Toronto's wish and desire to have the bridge cancelled. So if the permit wasn't there, then I would think the port authority would terminate the contract.
Also, in regard to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the coast guard, the permit was not in hand and there was no approval in place. So wouldn't it be prudent to wait until the permit is in hand before waiving these conditions, before the contract gets completely signed? Why would TPA be so quick to sign away all these conditions?
Also, of course, the environmental assessment is subject to Federal Court appeal, as you know.
So in those three areas alone, given that these conditions have not been met, by waiving these conditions before the approvals were issued, isn't the TPA really the author of its own problems? That is why, in my mind, the federal government should not have paid out the $35 million, because $35 million is a lot of money.
:
Mr. Tassé, thank you very much for being so forthright. Let me provide for comment some other observations.
I think in your study you found that the City of Toronto never passed a motion rescinding the previous three decisions to build a bridge. There was a resolution to ask the Government of Canada to not build the bridge if a certain series of conditions were met. It's important to know how you read that.
Secondly, I think you were asked about whether permits were available or not. Would you clarify for us whether in fact you saw that the permits were released in the month of January and whether they were available before the month of January? That is, the allegation has often been made that they were issued—I'm talking about the water permits, and so on—only after the election, to spite certain people, but they were available and they had not been released, and the Government of Canada had no legal authority to withhold the permits that had been provided by DFO.
Then, thirdly, I wonder if you could comment, in the very brief time that you have, because you have been so forthright with my colleague Mr. Zed, about the fact that Air Canada wasn't part of the legal action and that's why they didn't get any compensation, that in fact the Government of Canada had said it would take its cue from city council, and city council did not say, “Please cancel the bridge”, because it was a party to the signature that went on the contract to build the bridge, and therefore, they didn't want to be liable to a legal suit. That's the reason that doesn't come out very often.
So I compliment you on your quick response when those who were partisan responded so negatively to your report. They're not normally accustomed to truth and straightforward talk. Distortion and dissembling is a hallmark of some of those councillors who, when they were operating the Toronto Harbour Commission, found themselves in violation of everybody's definition of ethics and law and are the most surprised people in the world because they're not in jail.
So would you also give us an indication of how long those lands were held in a disgraceful manner by the people at city council? That's what led to that marine act, to reorganize the structuring of all those territories.