NDDN Committee Report

The mandate adopted on May 16, 2006, by the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence stated:

That the Committee examine the various aspects of the mission of Canadian troops in Afghanistan, such as its duration, the state of the personnel and materiel, the relationship between the mission’s combat operations and its efforts to help reconstruct the country, and the criteria for assessing its effectiveness, with a view to determining whether it is possible to complete the mission successfully while still meeting Canada’s other international obligations, and that the Committee submit recommendations in a report to the House based upon its examination.[1]

This report focuses on Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.

Canada is a signatory to the 2006 Afghan Compact,[2] an agreement between the international community and the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, in which the International Community agrees to help develop Afghan capacity to rebuild the country. There are three main areas — or ‘pillars’ — of activity:

a.      Security;

b.      Governance, the rule of law; and human rights;

c.      Economic and social development.

The Canadian military contingent — Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-Afg) — represents one ‘D’ — defence — that, along with diplomatic and development efforts, comprises the government’s ‘3D’ approach to complex conflict and post-conflict situations. The 3D approach is, in turn, part of the government’s overall ‘whole of government’ approach to modern crises.

The Committee finds that JTF-Afg is the most combat effective, best trained, best led, best equipped and best supported mission of its kind that Canada has ever deployed. It is among the best national contingents in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

The Canadian Forces are in Afghanistan:

a.      To protect the national security interests of Canada by helping to ensure that Afghanistan will not, once again, become a haven for international terrorists;

b.      At the invitation of the democratically elected government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, to help provide a secure environment in which the rule of law, human rights and economic prosperity can grow; and

c.      To support our allies and other international friends in the UN, NATO and the G-8 by providing leadership in one of the most difficult operational areas.

Perhaps the most important lesson the Committee learned is that our Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan is a highly complex and noble operation. It is extremely difficult and will not be ended by any simple remedies or quick fixes. International support will be needed for at least a decade, if not a generation.

One of our more significant findings was that Canadians generally did not know enough about the Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan and that many therefore had an incomplete understanding of what our military men and women are doing there. Our report therefore takes time to explain the complex environment and circumstances in which the Canadian Forces must operate. Our report goes on to discuss the mandate of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. Succeeding chapters examine specific issues identified in our study mandate and other important issues we discovered and studied along the way.

The Committee identified three important factors that had fundamental influence on the Canadian Forces mission. First, Canada is not acting unilaterally in Afghanistan. Consequently well-intentioned calls for Canada to do ‘this’ or change ‘that’ tend to oversimplify issues. Second, perhaps the most misunderstood aspect of the mission is that it is one of capacity building. From the beginning, the international effort has been offered in support of Afghans. Canadians do not do the work for Afghans, they help Afghans build the capacity to do the work themselves, giving development and reconstruction an ‘Afghan face.’ A corollary is that improvements come only as fast as the emerging capacity will allow — an ‘Afghan pace,’ so there is no advantage in simplistically throwing Canadian money, people or equipment at problems faster than they can be absorbed and used effectively. Third, and perhaps most important, Canada has taken sides in this issue. Along with its allies, Canada has decided to stand with the democratically elected government of Afghanistan. Therefore, the mission is not, and never has been, anything akin to a peacekeeping mission.

There are three general threats. First, the main direct threat to the national security of Afghanistan, and to Canadian troops, is the Taliban who have continued to mount an insurgency against the Afghanistan government and use guerrilla warfare tactics against JTF-Afg, including suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices and ambushes with machine guns and rocket propelled grenade launchers. The second threat is a poisonous mix of corruption, the illegal drug trade and continuing tribal warlord influence beyond the capital city of Kabul. The Committee feels the third threat is closer to home. It is found in our own national impatience with the pace of progress in Afghanistan. The reality is that the military alone cannot solve the Afghanistan problem.

As proud as we are of our military contribution, the Committee is not blind or deaf to the considerable challenges facing the overall international effort or Canadian mission in Afghanistan. We found that, although there are recent signs of some improvement, the Canadian government and media have been less than wholly effective in providing ordinary Canadians and Parliamentarians with adequate information about Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan. Government could have done more and the media could have been much more balanced in its approach and covered more of the non-combat activity constantly being conducted by Canadian troops. In this regard, we were encouraged by the government’s release of a report explaining the progress being made by the Canadian mission in Afghanistan.[3]

Critics of the mission have said it is unbalanced and that more diplomatic and development effort is required — and less combat operations. Nearly everyone we met, including military commanders, agreed that more development was needed, but they pointed out that security trumps development and until an adequate degree of security existed, development aid could not flow to the degree desired. Moreover, critiques of imbalance have usually been based on simplistic assumptions by which balance was equated to numbers of people or quantity of dollars. In fact, balance is most accurately measured on the basis of effect. The military mission has always had a degree of balance unknown to most Canadians, based on the work of the Canadian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar and the Strategic Advisory Team-Afghanistan, working within Afghan government ministries in Kabul.

A considerable number of Canadian Forces soldiers are involved in training the Afghan National Army and that they accompany Afghan soldiers into combat. Canada could do more in this area because a competent and effective Afghan National Army that is capable of protecting its own country is a prerequisite for foreign troops to leave Afghanistan.

Our troops have seen extensive combat and have been successful in every major tactical battle against the Taliban, but the cost has been heavy. Fifty-eight Canadians have died in Afghanistan so far. Many more have been injured — 205 by April 30, 2007. Those with physical injuries are cared for by a world-class medical system based on multinational and allied support from the battlefield to Canada. The Canadian Forces ability to diagnose and treat psychological injuries has matured over the past decade and considerable attention is devoted to the care of those who have suffered operational stress injuries as a result of service in Afghanistan. For the first time too, families of deployed personnel are receiving attention from mental health professionals, although more needs to be done here.

Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan have been provided with some of the best equipment in the world and, perhaps of more importance, the national defence procurement process has been dramatically successful in delivering new, important operational equipment quickly. Where it traditionally took up to 10 or more years for major equipment to reach the troops in the field, new artillery guns, new mine-resistant armoured personnel carriers, uninhabited aerial vehicles and additional armour plating for trucks all arrived in Afghanistan within one year of the request by commanders. This represents a startling and welcome display of government will and cooperation among military and bureaucratic officials.

Less timely has been the delivery of reconstruction and development aid. In 2006, after major combat operations, it took too long for reconstruction and development efforts to follow-up and mitigate the effects of ISAF operations on local Afghans, many of whom had fled and could not return until wells had been dug, houses repaired and food delivered. While Canadian military forces were able to provide temporary security, the absence of follow-on reconstruction activity made it difficult to convince Afghans to return. DND funds available to the Commander of JTF-Afg were immediately available and useful in getting some local projects underway, but the more substantial CIDA funds were longer in coming. There are promising signs that government bureaucracy has been tempered to the point that CIDA development funds are now flowing more efficiently In 2007.

Three issues have conspired to take a touch of the gloss off the military record. First, there are a number of Canadian investigations underway, based on un-proven allegations, examining the treatment of Afghan detainees while in Canadian hands and their transfer to Afghan authorities. Second, a degree of associated concern has been expressed over the quality of a technical arrangement between the Canadian Forces and the Afghanistan Ministry of National Defence, governing the details of detainee transfers from the Canadian Forces to Afghan security authorities. A subsequent arrangement, however, supplemented the first arrangement and removed much of the associated concern. Third, there have been a small number of incidents in which innocent Afghan civilians have been killed during fighting between ISAF and Taliban forces. Most of these unfortunate occurrences have come from the collateral damage of air strikes. Canada has no combat aircraft in Afghanistan, and although Canadian troops have not been directly involved in the air strikes, Afghan displeasure does not usually discriminate among foreign troops. Moreover, Canadian troops have shot Afghan civilians in the course of their operations. No matter the circumstances, these regrettable incidents provide a continuing concern in the campaign to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of ordinary Afghans.

Not one of the witnesses who appeared before the Committee expected the military problem in Afghanistan to be solved by February 2009. Everyone thinks it will take a long time. Some spoke of decades; some spoke of generations; but all spoke of a long-term commitment. This raises the question of whether the mission mandate ought to be extended or not.

In order to answer that question, the Committee offers some recommendations on how government might improve the information flow between itself, ordinary Canadians and Parliament. In the end, the Committee recommends a Parliamentary debate be held in 2008, on whether the mission should be extended past February 2009. In the meantime, the Committee thinks it is important to remember that Canada is not acting alone. Canada and its allies — United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Estonia and Romania — provide nearly 12,000 troops (2500 Canadian) in the south of Afghanistan. If we leave, someone else will have to carry the load.

We end on a note of humility, acknowledging that many of our close and traditional allies are indeed sharing the burden of combat and providing significant development and reconstruction resources in southern Afghanistan. Many of them have lost national blood and treasure as Canada has. While we might urge others to consider doing more, there is no more effective way to bring others along than to continue playing a meaningful leadership role ourselves. In this regard, the Canadian military mission in Afghanistan has been successful. The men and women of the Canadian Forces have contributed another wonderful chapter to Canadian history.