FAAE Committee Meeting

38th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, April 21, 2005

¿

0905

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.))

Mr. Paul Heinbecker (Director, International Relations and Communications Program, Centre for International Governance Innovation)

¿

0910

Hon. Dan McTeague (Pickering—Scarborough East, Lib.)

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

Mr. Ted Menzies (Macleod, CPC)

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

¿

0915

¿

0920

¿

0925

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, CPC)

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

¿

0930

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde (La Pointe-de-l'Île, BQ)

¿

0935

The Chair

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

¿

0940

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

The Chair

Hon. Dan McTeague

The Chair

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

¿

0945

Hon. Dan McTeague

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP)

¿

0950

The Chair

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

Ms. Alexa McDonough

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

¿

0955

Ms. Alexa McDonough

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

The Chair

Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.)

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

À

1000

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

The Chair

Mr. Ted Menzies

À

1005

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

Mr. Ted Menzies

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

Mr. Ted Menzies

À

1010

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

The Chair

Hon. Dan McTeague

The Chair

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

À

1015

À

1020

The Chair

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

The Chair

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Paquette (Joliette, BQ)

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

À

1025

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Paquette

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

À

1030

À

1035

The Chair

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

The Chair

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

Ms. Beth Phinney

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Chair

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

À

1040

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Chair

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

The Chair

Mr. Paul Heinbecker

The Chair

The Chair

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day

À

1050

Hon. Dan McTeague

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Chair

Hon. Dan McTeague

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

À

1055

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Paquette

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Paquette

The Chair

Hon. Dan McTeague

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Chair

Hon. Dan McTeague

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day

Á

1100

The Chair

Hon. Dan McTeague

Mr. Stockwell Day

Hon. Dan McTeague

Mr. Stockwell Day

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

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NUMBER 035

l

1st SESSION

l

38th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Thursday, April 21, 2005

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

*   *   *

¿  (0905)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): Good morning, everyone.

    Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we resume our study of the international policy review.

    We have as a witness this morning, from the Centre for International Governance Innovation, Mr. Paul Heinbecker, the director of the international relations and communications program. Mr. Heinbecker is a former Canadian ambassador to the United Nations and ambassador to Germany, and he is the director of Laurier Centre for Global Relations, Governance and Policy.

    Bienvenue, Monsieur Heinbecker. The floor is yours. You have all the time you wish. Please, go ahead.

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker (Director, International Relations and Communications Program, Centre for International Governance Innovation): Thank you very much.

    I have a lot of sympathy for foreign policy review writers, because I was one of them—not of this review, but I wrote the 1984 foreign policy review, an experience that jaundiced me a little bit about the process.

    Still, there are several things in this document that strike me as very welcome. First of all, I think it's conceptually strong. It recognizes that we're dealing with a very different world than we were when I wrote the 1984 foreign policy review, for example. Indeed, the 1995 review is out of date; the problem with reviews is that they get out of date very quickly.

    The statement recognizes that the central reality of our time is that insecurity undermines prosperity, and underdevelopment generates instability. There is a reciprocal relationship between development and security and, I would add, human rights, which is the argument in the Secretary-General's reform proposal for the United Nations. The paper also recognizes that perhaps the three greatest challenges Canada is facing are countering global terrorism, stabilizing and rebuilding failed and fragile states, and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—and the links between these challenges. Despite the fact that we've seen the horrific events we've seen, one is tempted to say that we are overreacting to the idea of terrorism, because more people are dying of diseases in Africa on any given day than are being killed by terrorists. However, at the same time, were the nexus of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism ever to happen, it could change very much our whole attitude towards globalization and everything else.

    I agree with the paper when it talks about the days of the middle-power idea being over. I've never been a believer in the idea of Canada as middle power; I think it's a limiting idea and I don't think Canada has ever been a middle power. I don't think the concept actually makes very much sense. We have one of the largest economies in the world, though I notice that in the time it takes one to go from reading one to two of the documents, Canada goes from being the eighth largest economy in the world to the twelfth largest. But that is a sign of things moving pretty fast.

¿  (0910)  

    Hon. Dan McTeague (Pickering—Scarborough East, Lib.): Give it a few more minutes.

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Give it a few more minutes and we'll be down further.

    An hon. member: Oh, oh!

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: The important point is that the document makes a strong case for policy coherence. In fact, the overview plus the four documents attached to it—at least I think it's four—are themselves a statement of the importance of coherence. We're not a big enough country to have the luxury of having one foreign policy made in the defence department, one made in the foreign affairs department, and another in the PMO or PCO, or the finance department, and so on. Foreign policy is what the Canadian government does; foreign policy belongs to the Canadian government, and not to any of the departments.

    Having said that, I think the document wisely recognizes that virtually every department has an international role, but asks the foreign affairs department to “provide leadership across government on international matters, both within and outside Canada” and to “lead in both the formulation of Canada’s overall international policy, and the interdepartmental development of 'whole-of-government' strategies”. I think that's a very important affirmation of the central role Foreign Affairs should play if we are to have a coherent international voice and presence.

    I also welcome the fact that the statement confirms the thrust of the recent budget, that an effective foreign policy costs money—for diplomacy, for official development assistance, and for defence, including the military, among other things. I'm not sure what's going to happen politically in the next while—not even in the next hours.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    Mr. Ted Menzies (Macleod, CPC): That's not funny, Beth, is it?

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: But there are important spending proposals in the budget that are actually crucial to the effectiveness of Canadian foreign policy. Declaratory foreign policy that is not backed up by effective instruments of influence and power risks being just empty rhetoric.

    It reminds me of a story that was told about a British diplomat who had returned to London from a stint at the State Department in Washington. He was asked what the difference was between being an American diplomat and a British diplomat. He said that in the State Department, when something bad happens in the world, they ask what they should do about it. In the U.K., when something bad happens in the world, they ask what the Americans should do about it.

    Too often in Ottawa we've asked what we should say about it. We really need to have effective instruments. We need a military that's capable and big enough to give the government options, not so small that it gives the government excuses.

    There are two things in particular that I draw your attention to. The idea of a stabilization and reconstruction task force is going to be very helpful in dealing in a more timely way with international crises, and the global peace and security fund that the budget promised will help our capacity to assist in dealing with failing and fragile states.

    I'll come back to ODA later.

    On Canada-U.S. relations, I think the statement gets the priority right on Canada-U.S. relations. Canada-U.S. relations are job one for this country, and that does not make it a zero-sum game for everything else.

    I'd say the statement is important for something that it doesn't say. While there's a lot of talk of regulatory harmonization, and one would want to look at that, there's no suggestion of any kind of grand bargain for a big bang of exchanging security for access, of going along to get along, or any talk explicitly about a customs union. The statement sensibly contemplates both a partnership with the U.S. and independence. We have every reason to make sure we don't become a back door, through the border, into American security for terrorists and others. We have every interest in that.

    At the same time, we should not forget that there's more to Canada-U.S. relations than border issues and terrorism issues, as important as they are, softwood lumber, cattle exports, and so on. We and the U.S. are sharing a shrinking globe, and we have every interest in having a made-in-Canada foreign policy.

    It's not anti-American to recognize that support for the United States around the world is at a low ebb. For Canada, differing with Washington for the sake of being different is unproductive, and gratuitous insults are unworthy of us. Recognizing that American foreign policy in important respects is not coincident with Canadian interests, let alone values, is only being realistic.

    By the way, I strongly agree with the Prime Minister when he argues that now is the time to strengthen international law and to consolidate international law while the U.S. is the sole superpower. That situation is not going to last long. The rise of China is already perfectly evident. Other countries are coming behind them. We're going into a very different world from what we have now, and now is not the time to be throwing out the rules of the road. We are going to want those emerging countries to respect those rules of the road.

    When Washington takes its notion of American exceptionalism to the extent of undermining the whole idea of collective security, and when it manifests contempt for international law, the same law that was created and promoted by Presidents Wilson, Roosevelt, Kennedy, Johnson, and George H.W. Bush, among others, it's time for Canadian governments to chart their own course internationally and to privately and respectfully speak the truth to power in Washington.

    The statement makes a point that multilateralism is essential to our collective security and our prosperity, not as a counterbalance to the U.S. but because, in an age of globalization, economic integration, asymmetric warfare, climate change, ozone holes, and globe-trotting viruses, no country can secure its citizens on its own.

¿  (0915)  

    A world without the UN--and here I'm talking about its security vocation--and without international law would take us back to the beginning of the 20th century. That period saw two of the bloodiest wars in world history--indeed, the two bloodiest wars in world history. In an age of weapons of mass destruction, what would world war three look like? It was to avoid world war three that the UN was created in the first place.

    The indispensability of the UN does not excuse its shortcomings and failures, which are all too obvious. Facilitating UN reform is a Canadian priority. In seeking to reform the UN, we should, as the statement asserts, remember that collective security depends on both power and principle. We should work with the United States where we can, and we should work around the United States where we must, against the day when they will come back to the organization in the way they have, for example, in the Law of the Sea treaty.

    I welcome the emphasis on gender and gender equality as a cross-cutting theme in this statement, particularly the importance of empowering women to participate fully in the political and economic activities of their communities.

    I like when the report uses the words “setting our own course”, “pulling our own weight”, and so on. I like the word “leadership” less. There are several cases in the report where we're talking about leadership when what we are doing in reality is rebuilding our standing after a decade of retreat--a retreat forced on us by our own financial situation, but nonetheless a retreat.

    I don't know what to make of the focus on foreign aid. I'm not an aid expert. It seems to be common sense, but I'd like to know more what it actually means in practice.

    On Darfur, the statement makes much significance of the crisis and speaks of a leadership role--again, “leadership”--but there appears to be no disposition to go beyond providing logistics to others or to put Canadian boots on the ground. Meanwhile, the statement emphasizes the importance of the responsibility to protect, a Canadian initiative that is vitally relevant to Darfur.

    The statement also skirts the issue of the Pearson target of 0.7% of GDP for official development assistance, to which we've subscribed for 30-odd years. In fact, beyond one single reference in the Foreign Affairs booklet to the report of the millennium project, which was the basis on which the Secretary-General wrote a good part of his reform document for the UN, the Sachs report is not mentioned at all.

    Establishing a timetable leading to 0.7% is part of the Secretary-General's first recommendation for UN reform. There are numerous poor countries, including those identified by the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation, whose governance and other attributes are such that they could put to effective use considerably more ODA. In fact, several of the countries on that list appear to also be on CIDA's new focus list.

    Either we accept 0.7% and establish a time-bound schedule, or we do not accept it and state why we think it's inappropriate. There are reasons why a lot of people in this town think it's inappropriate. Then we can debate the issue. But if we think a time-bound target is unwise and unachievable, we'll need to square that view with the fact that Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands have already achieved it, through good times and bad, and that the British, the French, and now the Germans have committed themselves to doing it by 2015, and that even the Japanese have begun to talk about it.

    Canada has never been richer and our finances have never been sounder. According to the statement itself, “Prudent fiscal policy has produced a series of surpluses and enabled us to reduce our debt. This foundation underpins our freedom to make the choices that define us as a country.”

    Nothing in the statement, by the way, including in the separate commerce booklet, demonstrates to me why we need a separate department of trade. That is especially true for trade policy, which is quintessentially the relationship between governments.

¿  (0920)  

    I'll say a few words on foreign affairs, and then I'll stop there.

    The statement effectively gives Foreign Affairs a leadership role in the development of Canadian foreign policy, as I said earlier, and I hope that implies an end to this sort of ready deprecation one hears of the foreign affairs department and the foreign service that has almost become routine in Ottawa.

    I'm going to declare not a conflict of interest, but maybe a confluence of interest. I was a foreign service officer for 38 years. I have two daughters in the department, one a foreign service officer and one on contract. The foreign service officer has four degrees--one from the University of Toronto, one from Queen's, and two from McGill. She had three years of prior international work experience before joining the service. She's fluently bilingual and can manage well in a third language. She has lived about a third of her life abroad. When I joined the foreign service, with the exception of one university degree, I had none of those qualifications.

    Between 5,000 and 8,000 people write the foreign service exam each year, and about 1% are offered jobs. I'm not sure whether this puts them among “the best and the brightest”, as some say. I don't know where such statistics are being kept. But there's no doubt in my mind that the young officers with whom I worked in New York, for example, before I retired in 2003 were more qualified, better educated, more broadly experienced, and more capable than I was at the same age.

    If the statement can assert that the Canadian Forces are recognized globally as one of the finest militaries in the world, which is true, it should not shrink from claiming that Canada's foreign service is also recognized as being among the best in the world, and that's also true.

    I have a younger daughter who's well qualified and comes with substantial relevant work experience. She's the contractor. She's not sure she wants to join the foreign affairs department. It's a major investment in developing the skills and expertise, and in acquiring the experience inherent in a profession.

    The statement states explicitly now that senior appointments will be open to other departments. I am not arguing there should be no lateral entry to the foreign affairs department. The place is not a monastery. It's not a trade union. It's a place where excellence is valued. But those who enter need to accept the same terms and conditions as everybody else does, and not come in and cream off an assignment and go away to some other job back in Ottawa when it's over.

    Recruitment from the outside should be needs based, and it should not be so extensive that it destroys the profession itself, because once gone, it will be very difficult to re-create. If jumping the queue becomes acceptable behaviour, why write a foreign service exam and subject yourself and your family to the hardships involved?

    As for the issue of heads of post, there need to be safeguards in place, including strict competencies to guard against bureaucratic patronage. I'm not sure there's any board of deputy ministers who have the international experience necessary--certainly many of them do not--to make sound judgments about such assignments.

    Thank you very much.

¿  (0925)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Heinbecker.

    We'll begin the question and answer period, and we'll start with Mr. Day, please. It's five minutes, Mr. Day.

    Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, CPC): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. It's too bad the necessary limitations of our committee don't really allow us to get into some in-depth discussion that could properly draw on your wealth of experience. We appreciate your service to our country and to the United Nations.

    I'll be as succinct as possible on some pretty big issues and ask you to comment.

    Yesterday we had a presentation here from Human Rights Watch. In their view, Canada could be taking a far more aggressive and proactive position related to the situation in Darfur by actually moving ahead, building some kind of multilateral coalition that could assist the African Union with more than just money, with an actual presence.

    First, could you comment on the practicalities? How would a country like Canada do that, related to the United Nations or some other grouping?

    Second, in the international policy statement, even though China clearly is recognized geopolitically in terms of its importance, there's not a word about human rights violations, and that seems to be a characteristic of the report in terms of strong statements related to China or Cuba or other areas.

    Third, the Atlantic alliance, vis-à-vis the U.S. especially, is under stress. There's no question about that. Canadian action tends to go between gesture, politics, and siding directly and consistently with the EU--taking the EU's position, or the position of some in the EU, of simply being a counterweight always to the United States, instead of seeing ourselves as what I think of as a bridge between Europe and the United States. We could play an effective role there.

    Please comment.

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: You would have to ask the Deputy Minister of Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff whether we actually have the forces currently at our disposal so that we could lead in Darfur. There is a real-life experiment we can draw on, and that is what we did in eastern Zaire in 1996, where everyone else was standing by hoping that something would happen, but no one was doing anything. Canada stepped forward and said we would lead the mission into eastern Zaire, and we found a lot of ready supporters for that.

    There were a number of lessons learned.

    The first lesson we learned is if you can't put enough troops on the ground yourself to be the backbone of the force, not just the command structure but the actual backbone of the force, people with boots and bayonets, you can't really succeed. The first question would have to be, do we have the actual capability now? It seems to me we must be getting close to that, because it's been some time since we've been in some of the other theatres.

    The second thing we learned in doing that is that when the Prime Minister called the President we were offered a battalion. When I called my counterpart, we were offered a couple of doctors. It's a lot tougher to lead that sort of thing than it looks.

    On the other hand, on the issue of Darfur, I've listened while people talked about sovereignty, I've listened while people talked about the complexity of the situation, I've listened while people talked about the various economic interests at play, and I've heard people saying that this is just one more plot from the west to push Muslim countries around. I've heard all of that stuff. Meanwhile, in all of that complexity we've gone from 50,000 dead, to 60,000 dead, to 70,000 dead, and now people are saying that the numbers are approaching 200,000. I don't know if anybody knows that. Now is really the time for someone at the UN who has the capability to step forward and say, we will participate and bring other people into it. I think that's the way it can be done. But in the absence of that being done, the African Union is just not capable of saving the situation. When we say, never again...well, it's happening right now.

    On China and human rights, I'm not sure how to answer that. It's certainly a major issue. On the other hand, China is moving so fast, developing so quickly, and changing so quickly that I think there's reason to be optimistic in all of that. Its integration into the world is moving at an enormous pace. There are plenty of things, of course, to object to.

    On the Atlantic alliance, to me it has become a kind of insurance policy. I don't know who the enemy is anymore. One of the things I find when I read through the defence report and the other report is talk about threats, but we're very vague about who the enemy is, who is actually threatening us. I suppose they're worrying about a residual threat whereby the Russians might start to behave like the Soviet Union somewhere down the road, and maybe they have in mind way down the road a kind of Chinese threat. There's a lot of talk of that, and I'm not convinced.

    I think the Atlantic alliance is not a regional organization in the normal sense of the word. A regional organization operates in its region. You don't see the OAS trying to do something in Afghanistan. I'm not quite sure what the future of this organization is.

    But I think the military has an absolutely vital role to play in Canada in coastal surveillance and air surveillance on the terrorism issue, and as an aid to the civil powers if need be. But it is a pretty big sledgehammer to use to go after creatures that are pretty small and manoeuvrable.

¿  (0930)  

    So on the terrorism issue, I think intelligence, information sharing, and police activity are likely to be more availing in most cases.

    Bringing it back to the Atlantic alliance, I think the alliance is there as a kind of insurance policy. Down the road we may need it. We shouldn't be getting rid of it, but it doesn't strike me as being an instrument we can use terribly well. It has had some success in Afghanistan, admittedly, but there's no sign of it in Darfur.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Heinbecker.

    Now we'll pass it to Madame Lalonde, s'il vous plaît.

[Translation]

    Ms. Francine Lalonde (La Pointe-de-l'Île, BQ): Thank you very much, Mr. Heinbecker. Listening to you is fascinating.

    Thank you for giving us a renewed trust in a foreign policy that is not only made of words, wishes or a desire for more visibility, but which shows the will to take concrete action and suggests the necessary means to do so. I am going to ask you three questions, or rather examine three issues.

    Firstly, you talk about this will to counter terrorism. I appreciate what you've said, but I'd like to know if you don't see a contradiction between this very clearly stated will and the fact that nowhere in this report—and you stressed that yourself—, can we find the idea that there should be a fixed timetable for the 0.7 per cent in international assistance.

    It seems to me that there are close links between terrorism and the ground that breeds it. I think that in this regard, Canada's foreign policy is really inconsistent because we want to fight terrorism by relying only on defence, i.e. border protection and the rest of it.

    Moreover, don't you think that it would be a good thing, rather than dwell only on the struggle between civilizations, to also talk about a possible dialogue between civilizations? In the Foreign Affairs Committee, we've made a study on the relationships between Canada and various Muslim countries, and that opened our eyes to many things. It seems to me that this report should refer to that important aspect of the issue.

    Further on, you said you read in the report that Prime Minister Martin felt that the time has come to reinforce international law. I'm going to read the report again because I hadn't seen that myself. But still I'm in full agreement with what you have said.

    Finally, you made the following statement, which is very important. You feel that Canada can either accept the 0.7 per cent target and establish some goals in this regard, or object to it. Thanks to its surpluses, Canada is in a position to reach that target within the allotted time. According to the UN reform, it should be 0.5 per cent by 2010.

    What do you propose?

¿  (0935)  

    The Chair: Mr. Heinbecker.

[English]

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I think one of the things we're seeing at the UN in New York, in the statement by the Secretary-General on reforming the UN, in the advocacy of reform by the high-level panel, and indeed in the Sachs report is that you have to take a comprehensive approach to terrorism. The Secretary-General said that without security you won't have development, without development you won't have security, and without a respect for human rights you won't have either.

    Let me also say that this report has been out since Tuesday and I'm not sure I've absorbed every detail in it, because it's 120 pages or something like that and it's dense.

    What I would say is that certainly you're correct that the emphasis on fighting terrorism has to be comprehensive. It isn't just a question whereby, when you have people actually crossing your borders, that's police and intelligence, and when you have a ship off your shore that may have unmanned aerial vehicles on board carrying something terrible, that's a military issue.

    There's a whole world out there, and if we can get governments established that respect the views of their people and are subject to peaceful change, that kind of world is much safer. By the way, that's been growing. We're now at over a hundred countries in the UN--I think some people say there are 130--that are either democratic, partly democratic, or largely democratic.

    So putting the emphasis, as the CIDA statement does, on governance and improving the functions of governance, the capacity of states to function--something we used to call peace, order, and good government in Canada--is, I think, certainly part of preventing terrorism.

    There are always going to be some people who are terrorists. Making terrorism illegal doesn't mean it stops terrorism any more than making murder illegal stops murder. There are always going to be some people, but the more you create societies that can look after their own problems, the less you're going to have to worry about terrorism.

    There has been discussion in the UN on the dialogue of civilizations. I think we certainly need greater understanding. I don't think I would want to see--and this is going to be controversial--religious leaders leading it. I'm not sure that actually makes it better or turns the temperature down.

    On law and the Prime Minister, I do know where I read it. It was in a statement he made on Monday over in the Museum of Civilization. I presumed it was in here somewhere, but I haven't had time to cross-reference it.

    The third point was on 0.7%.

¿  (0940)  

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: Yes. Either we accept it and give the aid or we contradict it. What is your position?

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I think we should do 0.7%. Fundamentally, it's something Canada can afford; I don't think it's something we can't afford. Taking together what we've just been saying about the importance of development abroad to our security and our prosperity, you could even portray it as an interest, but I do think it's a value. It's a question of helping other people who are less fortunate than we are, and I think that's something Canadians support.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Now we'll go to Mr. McTeague, please.

    Hon. Dan McTeague: Ambassador, thank you for being here today.

    You've raised a number of very interesting points, drawing on the knowledge and broad experience you've acquired since you wrote the 1984-85 paper.

    I was looking at the different approaches taken at the time. The Prime Minister, then Mr. Mulroney, favoured engaging with the United States as the reality-based policy of the time. Mr. Clark's policy was to look at engaging with nearly every country in the world except the United States. Many of these trends are still present today, although there is an increased security factor.

    The question of debt relief is important. Do you have any comments on the mix of initiatives that the Government of Canada has taken? It of course means commitment of resources, debt relief, and support for other organizations. Taken as a whole, it would mean that Canada's contribution per capita might be greater than that of the countries you've cited.

    Second, in recognizing what Mr. Day has just said, this committee is well aware of the decline of Atlanticism, certainly since the European Union and the redundancy of going down that road as Canada tries to define itself as a bridge between Europe and the United States.

    With respect to how you see this document, there was discussion about the tragedy of Darfur and Canada's possible lack of humanitarian commitment. We've just come through the Axworthy period, in which human security was paramount.

    There are a lot of issues occurring at the same time, and human security has now somehow morphed into a question of general security. Do you see this document as being reality based, or do you see it as something more notional? To paraphrase what Lester B. Pearson said, if you want to know where I stand on foreign policy, come back in a year and I'll tell you.

    The Chair: Mr. Heinbecker.

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: There's an interesting study I can commend to you--if you haven't already read it, and maybe you have--done by Foreign Policy magazine in the U.S. I think it's being done by the Center for Global Development. It tries to measure the things you're talking about on assisting other countries, things like lowering your tariffs, development assistance, forgiveness of debt, and so on. My recollection is that even on that we're not leading the pack, by any means.

    So I think there is a certain assumption that we're doing more than we actually are doing. Certainly that would be the view, when people look at us. That's the impression they have. I was talking to a foreign ambassador Monday, and he said, “I don't understand that a country as rich as yours has such difficulty with these kinds of things”. He left it at that.

    Debt forgiveness is important. Letting poorer countries have access to our markets is important. Getting rid of, for example, textile limits is important. For a lot of countries, development assistance is important. The market is not going to take care of the problem, no matter how well they govern themselves. They are not going to be places where the private sector is pouring in with money.

    Regarding your second point on the Atlantic alliance, I'm not sure I understood what the question was, or was it that the Europeans don't need a bridge? They haven't needed us as a bridge, I don't think, since about the fifties. While that comes up every once in a while--and it's an attractive idea because it is clearly the case that there is a gulf of understanding between Washington and many European capitals--I'm not sure that there's really a role for us in there.

    That role was played, to some degree, by Mr. Mulroney in the nineties. I was his foreign policy adviser in the late eighties and the nineties. For example, it's not much known, but he had a significant impact on the willingness of other countries to support German unification. At the time when both Margaret Thatcher and François Mitterrand were having serious doubts about the wisdom of German unification, Mr. Mulroney was able to persuade Mr. Bush--I don't know if he needed a lot of persuading--that this is something that had to be done.

    So at times we've been able to play that role. As a kind of general principle, I don't know. I think it has to be kind of issue-specific on that.

    You mentioned that in those days we had a foreign policy in which the Prime Minister looked at the U.S. and the foreign minister looked at the rest. To some extent, that was the case, although the Prime Minister was very interested in Indonesia, and human rights in South Africa and Indonesia and East Timor.

¿  (0945)  

    Hon. Dan McTeague: And Central America.

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: And so on. I think regarding the set-up now, where you have a cabinet committee for the U.S. and a cabinet committee for the rest of the world, I don't really care how they're organized, so long as they work well.

    When I was secretary of the cabinet committee for foreign and defence policy in the late eighties and early nineties, it didn't work very well. No one was interested. No one showed up. It had no money to spend. It met as a kind of pro forma thing once in a while.

    So the issue really is effectiveness rather than the structure. That depends on the amount of investment the Prime Minister is able to put into those committees. Mr. Mulroney didn't go to those committees at all, for example.

    As for human security and security, I think that's right. We've been saying for some time that human security and national security are two sides of the same coin. They have different implications, and we're seeing the implications in this report. If you're going to take human security seriously, you've got to have a military that can do something.

    It's a little bit like the reverse of Madeleine Albright's question to Colin Powell when he was head of the Joint Chief in the U.S.: why do we need this military if we can't use it? The reality is, why do we have a human security policy if we can't do anything about it? You're not going to save people in Darfur with diplomatic notes or with aid programs. That's important. That has its place, but the immediate need is to stop people killing people, and for that you need a combat-capable military.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    We will go to Ms. McDonough, please.

    Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Heinbecker, for being with us today.

    It's a bit of a daunting task for you to reflect on every aspect of this document, which took 16 months in the making. It's going to take a little more in the digesting than you've been given the opportunity to do.

    I really not only welcome your sharing your expertise this morning, but I admire the fact that you were prepared to share some personal reflections about two daughters who are contemplating where the foreign service is going. I have to say that one of the things I find extremely distressing is that when it suits, the government likes to talk about how much we are respected in the world for our professional foreign service, but in fact we do nothing today to ensure that it remains robust and continues to be supported as it should be, both at the level of their remuneration and at the level of their advice being taken seriously.

    I'd like to raise questions in three particular areas.

    It won't surprise you about the 0.7%. I'm sure you're aware that we have had, over a period now of certainly the three years that I've had any association with this committee, a series of outstanding experts, both domestic and international, who have come before us and pleaded eloquently and convincingly the case for Canada moving to the 0.7% Pearsonian target, with targets and timetables, and in a timely way, meeting our international obligations. To say that it's disappointing that this document has not done that is probably the world's greatest understatement. I think “humiliating” would probably describe it more accurately.

    One of the questions I want to raise is in relation to your earlier comment that we are trying to recover, really, from a decade of dwindling status. The words were used again and again that Canada's reputation really has been shrinking somewhat because of our failure to deliver on some of these things. What do you see as the implications for our being a respected multilateralist participating in the international arena?

    Secondly, on the comments you made about having--I don't want to misrepresent your words--some skepticism about the concept of middle powers, if we are not prepared to associate with...perhaps middle powers isn't the concept so much as progressive powers, from other parts of the world, in trying to push forward the human security agenda, the non-proliferation treaty obligations, for example, moving from those who fail to deliver on 0.7%, to be among those who have met their obligations. We're now at the back of the pack. We're in the lower half of donor nations, for example. What do you see as the base from which Canada is to be a progressive, proactive international citizen and global leader if we don't move on either of those fronts?

    The third question I want to raise really is to ask for some clarification. I'm not sure I totally grasped your comments about this debate or controversy around the merging or separating of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. I have to say that the paper, in its complete failure, for example, to address human rights and human security, reinforced my concern about the separation, so that International Trade can be completely unfettered in ignoring human rights issues and just turning its back without even having a Minister of Foreign Affairs able, in any way, to account for that. Could I ask you to clarify your comments on that?

¿  (0950)  

    The Chair: Mr. Heinbecker.

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: If I understood the first question, it was the impact of not doing 0.7% on our reputation.

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: And our ability to really be a respected actor.

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: The statement begins with--what is the overall line?--“a role of pride and influence in the world”. Influence comes from doing things, and if you are not present.... It's one of the reasons I also expressed a certain hesitation about the issue of focus. I'm reminded of a paper I read that said “focus-pocus”.

    If we're talking about the eradication of poverty strictly on its own terms, or if we're talking about it as part of our foreign policy, you might end up with a different attitude as to how you spend the money. It's certainly not the current conventional wisdom, and it's not the view taken by this paper—which I'd have to say is a mainstream view—that we really ought to be focusing our money and not dispersing it. But on the other hand, if you want to have influence in a lot of countries, it doesn't take very much spending in those countries to have some influence. So from a sheer foreign policy perspective, there's a question in my mind about it all.

    But you do need money. Foreign policy takes money. It takes, as I said, a very capable military, and it takes a very competent CIDA, with money to spend. If we don't give them that money, and if we're not perceived positively...because 0.7% has become a kind of symbolic test. That shows whether you're serious or not about it, and whether you really accept that this is an important issue. If we're not going to accept that, then I think we're going to pay a cost in influence. I don't think there's any question about it.

    As for skepticism on middle powers and progressive countries, I'm very skeptical about the idea of being a middle power. I always thought that was an excuse. As I read Jennifer Welsh's book, I think she's right, it was about process, not results. I think we're big enough that we need to get past that.

    I do agree with you that there's a role for progressive countries. It reminds me of a joke I was told by a crusty American diplomat who said, “Now that Sweden has joined the EU, the job of world's mother-in-law is open. Are you planning to run for it?”

¿  (0955)  

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: A mother-in-law without a pay cheque, apparently.

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I've always been a little skeptical about that.

    I do believe in the notion of being a good global citizen. It is manifestly in our interest to try to see progress on arms control—manifestly in our interest. If terrorism is the big issue, and the weapons of mass destruction and terrorism nexus is what we are now told we are to be most worried about, doesn't it make sense to get rid of the nuclear weapons, and shouldn't that be an emphasis? I think to some degree that is an emphasis here—to a good degree.

    On the issue of the role between foreign affairs and trade, I really do believe that trade policy is part of foreign policy; it's integral to foreign policy. It's relations between governments, and I don't think you strengthen your position by separating those things.

    At the same time, these issues have to be integrated somewhere. They can be integrated halfway or three-quarters of the way up in the foreign affairs department or they can be integrated at cabinet. But I don't think it would be possible for modern government to say Foreign Affairs will look after the human rights stuff, and International Trade, you just look after selling guns. I think that stuff does have to be integrated, and if it doesn't get integrated within the department, it's going to have to be integrated at cabinet. I don't see any way around it, and I don't think people would stand for a kind of tous azimuts military sales policy.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Ms. Phinney.

    Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.): Thank you very much for being with us today.

    You mentioned that you're pleased this review confirms the thrust of the last budget, and you also mentioned that we need a military that's big enough. Do you think what we had in the last budget and what was suggested in the last budget will be big enough?

    Further on, near the end of your address to us, you said that the report doesn't mention putting boots on the ground. If your answer is yes to the first part, what did you mean by this? It was a very short statement, and it wasn't explained. Could you explain why you mentioned that specifically?

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: How much is enough? I don't know how much is enough on defence. This is a good start. I don't think there's any question about that. It might be better if some of it were more front-end loaded than back-end loaded, but there isn't much prospect, I don't think, that the money will not be forthcoming one way or the other. It seems to give the Chief of the Defence Staff and the defence department the confidences and assurances they need.

    You may actually need more money and more boots. I think 5,000 regular troops and 3,000 reserves is good. It wasn't very long ago that we had considerably more than that. When you add that to what we have now, we had an even larger capability. So that may well turn out to be.... We'll see. If the world becomes more and more demanding, it needs more and more intervention.

    If you look around the world and ask yourself where you're going to need troops, you look at the Congo, you look at northern Uganda, you look at southern Sudan--there are 10,000 who have just gone in there--and western Sudan. West Africa is always a candidate for more forces. One day there may be an agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. That may take a substantial number of forces. We have Afghanistan. Something is happening in Nepal. Who knows what will go on between the Indians and the Pakistanis.

    There is an almost endless need of capable forces. It's not up to Canada to provide them all, obviously, but if you want to be a responsible global citizen, you have to do your share. And we'll see whether the 8,000 new troops and the money to be spent on gear.... And by the way, the defence department is talking about a much more modern force, more mobile, in some ways more lethal, and more usable than what we've had, with a lot of emphasis on the ground forces, who are the people you need if you're going to be going to Darfur or places like that.

    That's what I was getting at. We are just providing logistics. We're providing helicopters. We're providing communications and so on for the African force. But I think the evidence is that the situation is not being turned around in Darfur, and it may be that it won't be turned around until there is a militarily competent force there--I don't mean any disrespect to the Africans, but they don't have the equipment and they often don't have the training--that will make other people stand up and take notice and stop doing some of the things they're doing.

À  (1000)  

    Ms. Beth Phinney: Thank you.

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Someone said something about human rights that I didn't answer, that there's no reflection on human rights in this. I think there is, actually. There's talk of the International Criminal Court, for one thing. There's talk of support for the new human rights council on the multilateral side.

    There may not be a section that says “human rights”. There's talk about women's rights. It's one of those things where there are 120 pages and it's in there, and if you package it you get quite a bit. But they haven't said economics, military, human rights--which, by the way, was what we did in the 1984 review, which was close to dead on arrival.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Heinbecker.

    Now we'll go to Mr. Menzies, please.

    Mr. Ted Menzies: Thank you very much, Mr. Heinbecker. I find your remarks to be a breath of fresh air. It's quite interesting and informative for us.

    I would like to start off with a comment. Since 1993, we've watched our ODA slashed by $9 billion. I'm assuming that hasn't sat well with you.

    As a comment, there are some glaring errors in the development part of this policy statement, as far as I can see. We've split the aid envelopes into one-third and two-thirds. I would like some comments and your opinions on this.

    To me, it looks like we've chosen the easy wins and left out those that are in the news and that are serious concerns to us. You've mentioned a few of them, such as Haiti, Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East. We seem to have forgotten that we have a peace process that is imminently necessary in the Middle East, and we haven't addressed that. Those very important ones aren't even on the target list. They're left to the one-third envelope that is probably going to be the most difficult to resolve. That would be question number one.

    I just came from a briefing on African issues and the NEPAD process. It was highlighted that the African Union does not want UN troops or Canadian troops on the ground. I sense that you have some concerns with that. They've said that they would accept help from Canada and the United Nations in training African Union troops. Could you comment on that too?

À  (1005)  

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Who said that?

    Mr. Ted Menzies: It was a briefing that I was at this morning. Some CIDA people were reiterating the African Union's position, where they stated that they were not comfortable. In fact, they were pretty strong on the fact that they don't want Canadian troops or UN troops in Darfur, Sudan, but they would certainly like some help in training African Union people to intervene in that process. I'd like some comments on that, if you would.

    I look at Canada's position overall as being weakened not only in international affairs but also in international trade. I've talked to a number of different countries that are asking where Canada is at the WTO and in international affairs. Could you comment on that, if you would, please.

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I was trying to find a comment I had written in a margin that was pretty much the same as your first point. I'm not prepared to second-guess exactly what they're going to do with the money because I don't think it's very clear, but I did write down “Iraq” and “Afghanistan”. Those are our two major destinations for ODA now, yet I don't think they qualify as to good governance, human rights, or a lot of other considerations.

    I'm not sure how we're going to square those numbers they're talking about. I'm not saying they can't do it, but it's not evident to me this will work out.

    This goes back to the issue of focus I was talking about. You need to have flexibility to be spending money in places like Haiti, Sudan, and Iraq and maybe giving to the Palestinian Authority, and they may not be meeting the tests of good governance and all that sort of thing. They may not meet your tests of focus. These are things that are going to have to be worked out on a case-by-case basis, I presume.

    I think they want to establish a focus, because without a focus there's a tendency to be blown all over the map. They say they're going to try to focus on these, but the very fact that they're talking about one-third that's not going to be focused, I think, is recognition that it really is impossible just to pick 20 countries and say, that's it, that's all we're doing, and we don't care about the rest. There are also the millennium development goals, and there are things we could be doing there as well that would not necessarily fit within the focus.

    As for the African Union not wanting foreign troops, I also heard the Sudanese ambassador saying they didn't want foreign troops. I'm not going to put myself up as an expert on Sudan; I just note that we're now approaching 200,000 dead, and at what point do we stop listening to people talking about their druthers and start doing something about it?

    Mr. Ted Menzies: With respect to our position at the WTO and our position in international affairs overall, I feel and sense other countries are, shall I say, losing respect for us when we should be in a dominant position. We used to be a peacekeeper. Where are we at now?

À  (1010)  

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: It depends on how you measure it. When I left the UN, we ranked 35th or 36th in terms of UN peacekeeping. I often had the experience of passing back requests for Canadian participation that had been turned down in Ottawa at one level or another. Very often they were not for many people, and mostly that was the case with respect to Africa.

    At the same time, I want to make a counterpoint, and that is, as ambassador at the UN, I never had the impression we weren't being listened to. I never had the impression someone was saying, oh well, there go the Canadians; they would say that, wouldn't they; too bad they don't actually live up to what they say. We always got a respectful hearing.

    Take the issue of Iraq, which was where we tried and failed to find a compromise between the Americans and basically the rest of the UN. We were probably the only country that could have done that. If we talk about the idea of bridging, that was a bridging effort there between the United States and everybody else. People listened to us, people welcomed the fact that we made the proposal, and a lot of people hoped the major powers would accept it, including some of the people who were in the coalition who were very keen on the major powers accepting the compromise. We were encouraged, for example, by the British to keep pushing our proposals.

    So I don't think it's the case that we have fallen off the table in any perceptual sense, but I do think it's the case that we've been living off past successes to some degree and that we need to start reinvesting in our foreign policy. In the budget and in this statement there's quite a bit of reinvestment. Whether it's enough, time will tell.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Now we'll go to Mr. McTeague.

    Hon. Dan McTeague: Thank you again, Mr. Heinbecker.

    Again, you've raised a number of very interesting points. I'd like to get your opinion on a couple of them.

    One of them, of course, is the proposal in the study of the L-20. Based on the success that we had in G-20 as far as the human security agenda is concerned, in stabilizing nations, particularly as it relates to food or to energy security, and of course being able to address more effectively, given the weight of the nations that would be proposed as part of that group.... Could you give some opinions and your comments on that? This is certainly a bold step in the right direction, as this side of the committee believes.

    I'd like your comments on the Canada Corps in relation to the situation as it relates to your own family, opportunities to become involved, not necessarily through Foreign Affairs but through other related organizations, and the importance that will play in terms of channelling Canada's many energies towards long-term relief. Also, I would like some of your comments with respect to the redeployment of personnel from the FAC to, as it were, a variant of putting more boots on the ground, but putting more officials from the department over into our missions, given what this document has recognized as being highly concentrated and Ottawa-centric. If you could, comment on those.

    Finally, and I'm sorry to throw this in, but when you touched on the term “customs union”, immediately alarm bells went off in my head. I'm thinking of zollverein in 1866, and of course the creation of Germany. I understand some politicians and previous politicians, certainly Mr. Manley, have talked about this idea. I'm wondering if you could expand on that a little bit in the time you're given.

    The Chair: Mr. Heinbecker.

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Yes. I'll go as quickly as I can.

    I think the L-20 is a great idea. I should declare an interest. Our research centre, together with our colleagues in Victoria, is doing a lot of work in providing ideas on that. We've had a series of about eight or nine meetings around the world with think-tank people and, to some degree, government officials from other countries.

    Why is it a good idea? I think it's a good idea because the G-8 has become just too narrow. If you want to talk about exchange rates, the Chinese are not there. If you want to talk about failing economies, the Argentinians, and the Turks, and so on--by the way, the Turks are not failing anymore, but the economy's in difficulty--are not there. If you want to talk about the security issues, which we do talk about, the security-consuming countries are not there.

    While the G-8 can do a lot of things itself--it can make decisions that it will do things--its decisions are not going to carry conviction for people who are not at the table. So the individual members of the G-8 can decide what they're going to do, but that doesn't mean that the Argentinians are going to listen to what the G-8 says on the economic meltdown they had. I think that's very obvious. So that's one thing.

    The second thing is that leaders can do things ministers can't do. Leaders have broad responsibilities. That's one of the lessons of the G-8. If you have an agenda, you can work agreements across several different areas at the same time. Trade ministers can't do that. Foreign ministers can't do that. Finance ministers can't do that. It's only the prime ministers who can do that.

    A third thing that happens is that there's a relationship that develops between the leaders. Networks get established. Back channels get built. Issues become easier to manage when you understand the political situations facing each other. It's all very well for the President of South Africa to, in the abstract, want more of this or that from the President of the United States, but when he's had an opportunity to sit there on a regular basis for a day and a half or two days, he begins to understand what's possible and what it makes sense to ask for and what it doesn't make sense to ask for, what he needs to give, and what he needs to get. So you get a much better-informed discussion.

    Another reason is that there is nobody really looking at governance in a global sense. There are a lot of problems at the IMF. There are lots of problems at the World Bank. There are problems at the UN. The UNDP does some things. The World Bank does some things. The regional banks do some things. The IMF is doing something else. At the moment, that stuff is not really being brought together. It can't be brought together because in some forums you have finance department people, in other forums you have development agency people, and in other forums you have foreign affairs people. These things just remain at loggerheads. There needs to be somebody who looks down at these institutions from above.

    The fourth thing is that there are inter-institutional problems. Right now we're looking at, for example, what an L-20 meeting would do if you had one. Well, what it would do, for example, is look at international public health. When you're talking about viruses that can transit the world faster than their incubation periods, for instance, we know that from the local level, the city level, to the provincial level, to the national level, to the international level, we're not well-organized to deal with these things.

    We're also worrying about bioterrorism. The response to bioterrorism is pretty much the same response as it is to viruses. So we can combine these things. There's no institution in which these kinds of ideas are perfectly housed. It could be the WHO to some degree, and maybe that would be an operational one. That kind of issue and the linkages between issues reside between institutions, and there's no one now looking after them.

    Finally, I'd say, it's not a competition with the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council does peace and security. It meets at the level of ambassadors. It's a standing committee that meets virtually daily.

À  (1015)  

    Heads of government would meet once a year, probably. I don't see them as being in competition. In fact, I think one of the good things an L-20 could do if it were already in effect would be to push UN reform and try to get some consensus among rather divided countries on what has to happen, for example, on responsibility to protect, dealing with terrorism, and so on. That's a very strong idea.

    On Canada Corps, I think the paper makes a lot of good points. The fundamental issue is that foreign policy increasingly goes beyond what governments do. There's a role abroad for Canadians, and lots of Canadians. In fact, there are a lot of Canadians abroad. It's one of the striking things when you go to places.

    I visited Angola, and there's a man there who is running a very small NGO and has made an enormous difference. He got the Order of Canada, by the way. He made an enormous difference to the local community. While the government was putting flagstones down on the corniche so they could have a nice walkway, he brought a pipeline of water to a neighbourhood of 250,000 people who didn't have any.

    There are a lot of things that can be done by individual Canadians or by groups of Canadians, and the Canada Corps is a good way of organizing and supporting that kind of thing.

    Having more FSs abroad is probably a good idea. We made a number of mistakes. I think we made mistakes when we were making cutbacks in the nineties. We tended to cut back on the most junior positions, and then we found ourselves with a lot of junior officers and no place to put them. I think that has actually become a morale issue. We should have been cutting more of the senior positions, which cost more anyway, so you could have kept more junior positions.

    In any case, they are really the eyes and ears of Canada. It's all very well to read the The New York Times and The Globe and Mail, but you don't really get a sense of what's at stake for Canada and Canadians unless you have people who can report on what's going on.

    I'm not one of those people who thinks it has to be only foreign service officers. We can make good use...I would point to Marcus Pistor, who is sitting here and used to be at the Canadian embassy in Bonn as a political officer. It makes a lot of sense to have people like that--people who understand the local scene, understand the language intimately, and can provide the kind of understanding that maybe you don't readily get, or don't get right away, if you're a foreigner.

    Nevertheless, we need to get more people abroad. I think it's the right decision, although it does cost money.

À  (1020)  

[Translation]

    The Chair: Thank you. We'll now go to…

[English]

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Customs union--

    The Chair: I'm sorry; go ahead.

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: If the red states and the blue states became two countries, I'd be interested in a customs union.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Mr. Paquette, the floor is yours, please.

    Mr. Pierre Paquette (Joliette, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Thank you for your presentation and your comments.

    You mentioned in your presentation that foreign policy should be linked with trade policy. From what I understood, you agree that a single department should manage what you could call the two missions. As you know, the government tried to split the department into Foreign Affairs, on one side, and International Trade on the other. But Parliament refused. The government, however, does not appear to acknowledge that decision. We have not seen any changes in the estimates in the way the government manages trade and foreign affairs.

    I would like to have more details on the links between these two areas, and I wonder if you could tell us whether you feel the Committee should, in its consultations and in drafting a report eventually on the Foreign Policy Statement, recommend that the government review its approach on the departmental scission.

[English]

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: It's not up to me to make recommendations to the committee on what it should do, but if the committee wanted to make that recommendation, I don't see why that would be a bad thing.

    I was there when the place was put together in 1984. It was very difficult—it took years to get it. The lesson of all of these major reorganizations is that reorganization, to my mind, should be an ongoing thing. The world changes, life changes, and you have to keep adapting to it. Major reorganizations are perhaps necessary sometimes, but no one should think that it's going to be easy and that's it's going to be over quickly. They've been working at this over at Foreign Affairs, and the street rumour is that a lot of bad blood is created by it, that there is a lot of argumentation over this position or that position. It isn't obvious to me how people can be going through that kind of a process and at the same time be concentrating to the extent they ought to be concentrating on the international negotiations, which matter so much.

    So if the committee wanted to make that recommendation.... I'm not a parliamentarian and I don't know the rights and obligations and rules, and so on, but if it's within your power to make such a recommendation and if that's what you think, I don't see why you wouldn't make it.

À  (1025)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Pierre Paquette: One of the opposition's arguments was that the administrative decision had been made before completing the consultations on the Canadian International Policy Statement. At the end of the day, I think it would be normal for the Committee, based on the consultations that will take place, to make a recommendation in this regard. We have to determine how the work should be organized with respect to those two basic missions.

    Still talking about the link between Foreign Affairs and International Trade, you know that Crown corporations, such as Export Development Canada and Canadian Commercial Corporation are under no obligation to comply with the international commitments of the Canadian government. Nothing in the Act compels them to fulfill Canada's international obligations.

    Do you feel that we should include, in the Acts that create these public organizations, some language to say their mandates should be compatible with Canada's international commitments?

[English]

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I guess I'm not exactly sure of the specific cases you're talking about, and I'm not sure I understand fully the mandates of those particular organizations. If we got into a situation where the policy of the Canadian government, pursuant to a treaty, was to safeguard nuclear materials, and a Canadian crown corporation was not paying attention to that, it would obviously be a major problem. I'm not aware of issues of that kind, but maybe if you could tell me more specifically about it, I might be able to react more intelligently than I am now.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Mr. Paquette.

    Mr. Pierre Paquette: Canada has signed a number of treaties.

    We proposed an amendment when Export Development Canada, previously Export Development Corporation, was created. That corporation is there to help in implementing projects, to help business people export or invest abroad. With that amendment, its mission would have been in compliance with Canada's obligations. The amendment was rejected by the Liberals. My argument was that we could state that in the Act, if it didn't create any problems. Apparently, it does create problems.

    Let us imagine that, in one of its ventures, Export Development Canada funds a project in a country which is considered as a threat, under some treaty. Legally speaking, Export Development Canada is not bound to pull the plug on that project. I would like to know what you think. It may not be your field of expertise.

    Lastly, I would like to know briefly what you think of the UN reform project put forward by the present Secretary General, Kofi Annan. Do you think it is the right track for the UN? Should Canada support that report? I would like to hear your comments on this.

[English]

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: The UN reform is certainly necessary. His report is timely. The reform is necessary.

    There are some questions about whether it's possible, and they're quite significant. I'm not talking about the UN Security Council and how many people get a permanent seat. Of all of the issues we have to deal with, it is in some sense the least important one. Maybe it's the most important to the people who want the seats, but far more important is to get some kind of consensus on the grounds for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

    When does the international community have the right to intervene in another country? We would argue, under the responsibility to protect, that when that country is abusing its citizens, when there are massive human rights abuses with widespread death and destruction, the international community must temporarily assume the sovereign responsibility of that country to protect its people. That's not agreed upon internationally. The Iraq war created a lot of confusion over that and a lot of suspicion. First of all, the war was justified on the grounds that there were weapons of mass destruction, which weren't found, and that there was a connection with terrorism, which wasn't there. Then it became a human security issue--saving the Iraqis from Saddam Hussein.

    This ease with which the rationale has been changed has made a lot of countries very suspicious. It makes them suspicious in Darfur, and it makes it possible for the Government of Sudan to argue that this is one more case of the United States, or the west, or Christianity, or the old colonizers, to get involved in its affairs. One of the bulwarks against intervention and interference among the poorer countries, which feel themselves quite powerless vis à vis the big countries, has been the notion of sovereignty and the principles of the UN that you don't interfere in the internal affairs of other states. In their own lifetimes, these people have been colonized. They've lived in colonies. They've had other people coming and telling them what to do, and in a lot of cases it's been catastrophic. So they will not give up that bulwark of sovereignty easily.

    That's where the consensus is lacking. That's why we can't get anywhere on Darfur. There's no consensus there. We think it's self-evident. People from Africa and other places think it's a lot less so.

    Similarly, there is no consensus on the great issues of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and so on.

    Until you can re-establish that kind of consensus, the UN is not able to help you very much. The UN is not an independent entity. There are some people who think that a real reform of the UN would be to make it a really independent entity, to give it the money, to give it taxation authority, to give it the capacity to raise forces so that it could act independently. I don't think that's ever going to happen, or at least it's not going to happen for a long time, but in the absence of consensus on these major questions, the UN ends up being paralyzed.

    It's no good blaming Kofi Annan for it, because Kofi Annan is not responsible; the Security Council is responsible. He has proposed a number of very important things. On the use of force, he's proposed a series of criteria that were derived from the Canadian-sponsored Responsibility to Protect report. Were that to be accepted by the Security Council, you would begin to get coherent behaviour on that issue, on when countries can intervene. That's extremely important.

    He's said that the Commission on Human Rights is an embarrassment and has to be gotten rid of. I don't think there's anybody in Canada, probably, who wouldn't agree with that statement.

    He's proposed a definition of terrorism that is not perfect, but that is extremely good and would take care of all those cases.... Kenneth Roth was speaking to you and he probably would have said the same thing. It means that the ends don't justify the means. You can never kill innocent people because you have a political agenda you think is worthy of that. You can't go into a pizza parlour with a bomb.

    It doesn't deal with state terrorism, and that's a weakness of it. It doesn't deal with terrorism that doesn't kill people. If somebody wrecked the Canadian communications network, that could be an act of terrorism, but if nobody were killed by it, the definition wouldn't cover it. There are weaknesses in the definition, but fundamentally, it covers most of what you have to have and it would be an enormous step forward.

À  (1030)  

    If you can get some of those things, plus the 0.7% that the Secretary-General is talking about, so you'd have more money flowing into the countries that can use it, I think we could make a very broad-based impact. But these things are really not easily done.

    The last thing is changing the Security Council. The Germans and especially the Japanese argue that they put up so much money and there should be no taxation without representation. The argument of most of the rest of the membership is that permanent is a long time. Maybe some way should be found to reflect the contribution of some of these countries and a better way to represent them. The UN's not a democracy; it's a representative body. And it needs to be more representative in its major decision-making. But it isn't easy, and there are a lot of people who argue that adding 10 members to the UN Security Council is not going to make it a more effective body; it's going to make it a more argumentative body.

À  (1035)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: What it will do is make it much more difficult for the permanent members to cast their veto, because looking at a 23-to-1 outcome is even worse than looking at a 14-to-1 outcome. It would probably have the effect of diminishing the use of the veto.

    The Chair: Merci.

    Now we'll go to questions.

    Ms. Phinney, please.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: Yes, on that, just a short question, short answer.

    This review included four departments. Some people have suggested it should also have included Immigration. Could you give a brief comment on that?

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Yes, I think Immigration has operations abroad. It's a very significant part of our presence abroad. It's a very significant actor in our national makeup, the immigration function.

    This was another reorganization, by the way. It took place in about 1993, when Immigration and Foreign Affairs separated, and the immigration function was done separately. I don't think that was a very good separation either, because it's integral to what our missions abroad do. It's integral to our interests abroad.

    Now, the shortest paper here is 20 pages, I think, on commerce. Maybe on immigration, it would be difficult to make a case for 20 pages; maybe you'd have to settle for 10. But it is an integral part of our foreign relations, without any doubt.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Heinbecker.

    Do you have any questions, Ms. McDonough? Go ahead.

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you.

    Mr. Heinbecker, I'd like to go back to the millennium development goals. The reason I want to do so is because of the extremely powerful testimony that we received from Jeffrey Sachs, from James Wolfensohn, from Robert Greenhill. Everybody who's addressed this issue has made it clear that if you are truly committed to the elimination of poverty in the world and if you are truly serious about the importance of governance as it relates to genuine development and human progress, then at a minimum, the donor nations meeting 0.7% is critical. Secondly, the millennium development goal magic--if I can put it that way--the power that lies in this major commitment, is that it does deal with governance, that in fact, to the extent possible, there is true accountability attached to those governments that are receiving donor dollars, that are part of rolling out their programs to achieve the millennium development goals.

    In view of that, I want to come right back to your very candid comments at the beginning about Canada trying to recover from 10 years of--you didn't use all these words, but these are the words that have been used again and again before the committee--the “withering” reputation, the “dwindling” reputation, the “deteriorating” reputation of Canada as a serious contributor to making poverty history, to achieving the elimination of poverty and so on.

    My question is, how do we even see ourselves anymore as serious multilateralists, and how are we seen by other serious players in the world as serious multilateralists, if we talk about millennium development goals as something that's really important but we don't do the single most important thing on which the success of millennium development goals depends, namely donor nations contributing the 0.7%?

    I don't know whether you agree with the assertion of Jeffrey Sachs--I believe it was Sachs--who said that if every donor nation actually delivered on 0.7%, we could literally make poverty history, maybe not in today's world but in tomorrow's world.

    The Chair: Mr. Heinbecker.

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: In the back of my mind there's a caution that it's about more than money. To some extent, I think there's some reaction internationally to the idea that all that's missing is the money; you put the money there, and all the other things will therefore follow.

À  (1040)  

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: With due respect, if I could just say, that wasn't at all the position put to us again and again by those who said money is an essential element. Money is a precondition, but the reason the millennium development goal is worthy and that we should make a serious commitment is that it does deal with much more than money.

    The Chair: Ms. McDonough, I want to hear the answers.

    Please, go ahead.

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: The argument of Sachs, if I understand correctly--and I do think I understand correctly, because I just organized a conference on UN reform, including this--is that the bulk of the money is not sufficient, that there are countries that are sufficiently well governed. Part of the argument is then made, “Well, it's a lot of money, and we don't want to waste it. These countries can't absorb it, and we can end up throwing it away. Then a reaction is going to set in and we're going to have a backlash”.

    The response is that there are a whole list of countries that are well enough governed that they could use the money well, and they're not getting it now. That's one thing.

    The second thing is that he argues that the millennium development goals really will work, that it's not enough to halve poverty, it's not enough to do what's in the millennium development goals, but the millennium development goals are achievable if you spend the money now. If you wait even to the end of the year, according to people who work with Sachs, it's too late. You have to make the commitment now. You have to get this going by September, because we're five years into the process, and if we don't start doing it now, mathematically it starts to become impossible. It adds up to too much money. Then it can't be absorbed.

    I'm not sure what your specific question was, but the issue fundamentally is that it appears most of the developed countries, with the exception of the United States, are going in the direction of accepting 0.7% because they think it's important symbolically, it's practical financially, and it's practicable in development terms, and if we don't do that, then people will draw some negative conclusions.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Heinbecker, I have one last question you just pinpointed. It concerns Mr. Paquette's question and the fact you just mentioned, that your centre has recently had a major conference on reforming the United Nations.

    My question is very simple: are there any conclusions coming out of that conference that could be useful for our committee in order to advance the reforms that are most needed? Is there anything coming out of your conference?

    Mr. Paul Heinbecker: It was almost as much of a retreat as it was a conference.

    We brought together the President of the General Assembly and about 20 ambassadors, about an equal number of academics, and another equal number of NGOs. Altogether, it came to far more than we were expecting, but it was intended to be able to bring these people out of New York and have them sit down and talk across the table about what's possible and what they should do to implement it.

    What it revealed was that, on the one hand, they all thought the UN needed reform. On the other hand, there are still a lot of differences on the fundamentals of it, and even on the wisdom of it. What I could say is that the outcome is that we help these people who will be on the floor, trying to carry this process forward, to understand better what's possible and what's not possible, and a little bit about how to do it.

    I'd be glad to give the committee a copy of our report. I'm not sure it would be helpful in that sense, but it doesn't have clear-cut things saying you must not change the Security Council. It's pretty much “on the one hand” and “on the other”.

    The Chair: If you don't mind, could you provide a copy to our clerk, who will provide it to all the members.

[Translation]

    Thank you very much, Mr. Heinbecker. Your insights in international matters have made our meeting this morning very interesting.

[English]

    Once again, thank you very much. We are going to proceed to committee business. We're finished with you.

    We'll be back in one minute.

À  (1045)  

---

À  (1048)  

[Translation]

    The Chair: You have been given a list of suggested witnesses for the study of Canada's International Policy Statement. While we're waiting for Ms. McDonough, I would like you to please tell the clerk which of these witnesses you would like to hear in priority. In this way, we'll be ready for action in May.

    Ms. McDonough is coming to present her motion.

[English]

    The Chair: Mr. Day has a motion concerning observer election monitoring in Ethiopia.

    Mr. Stockwell Day: The elections in Ethiopia are critical, and we have had recommendations from human rights groups and others that the elections be properly monitored and fairly conducted. The government has indicated that by proxy we would have some observers there, using possibly people who are going to be there already through the European Parliament.

    The various Ethiopian groups and expatriates here in Canada are concerned. They would like to see actual Canadians present. This would add credibility to the election process and would work to deter irregularities.

    The motion is asking that the government supply observers, as we did in the Ukrainian elections.

À  (1050)  

    Hon. Dan McTeague: I wish to remind the mover of the motion that Canada has always advocated a harmonized approach to election support, which would have the effect of maximizing the efficiency and minimizing the risks of contradictory observer statements.

    Mr. Day may not be aware that the European Union and the Carter Center will field over 200 short- and long-term observers as well as local observers. With a good contingent of international observers, Canada feels additional observers at this stage would not be required. For observers to be effective, they should be in place well before the election, which is scheduled for May 15.

    I understand what Mr. Day is trying to establish and what he is trying to do. Mr. Axworthy, who was here not a month ago, did not suggest that Canada should take this approach. We would not want to be redundant in our efforts, and we believe that what the various observatory organizations are doing is more than sufficient, especially given the time constraints. We would recommend not supporting this.

    The Chair: Ms. McDonough.

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: On a point of information, I wonder if the parliamentary secretary could indicate whether we now know or if he could find out and advise the committee whether there is a Canadian contingent in the delegation under the umbrella of the Carter Center. If there is not, to express support for what is intended in the motion before us, I wonder whether it's possible for us to ensure there is a Canadian contingent among those 200 representatives who could report back to us in the direct way that I think would be much appreciated and desired.

    The Chair: Mr. McTeague.

    Hon. Dan McTeague: From what I understand here, at this stage there is no Canadian contingent with the Carter Center in relation to this election. There may be Canadians who are there, but what I have here is that there is no separate Canadian technical support in the election. This of course respects the harmonization principles that were put forward under the UNDP.

    As far as I know, there was agreement originally with the European Union that the greatest value of leading the observation process on behalf of the entire donor community emphasized the European element as opposed to bringing in or inviting Canadians to do the same. I think we want to be faithful to that request by the Carter Center...and by the principles under which the observer mobilization was requested.

    Canada has not been requested to do that. It might be nice to offer that, but it would be at the risk of being both late to the game and redundant. It may have the unintended effect of creating confusion where we really want to focus on the outcome of the election, making sure it is fair and is conducted in a way that is transparent.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Ms. Lalonde, you have the floor.

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: Mr. Chairman, I would like to seize this opportunity to ask the Parliamentary Secretary, or our assistants, to give us some information about Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada's present policy on election monitoring in countries where we feel this might be useful. Canada sent more than 500 people in Ukraine. However, it might be the case that other countries require less people. We should discuss this issue, as well as parliamentarians' participation. I had expressed my interest in going to Israel and Palestine. I was told to call an NGO called Aga Khan Foundation Canada, but I never heard from them.

À  (1055)  

    The Chair: Very good.

    Mr. Paquette, please.

    Mr. Pierre Paquette: I would like to add this to what Ms. Lalonde has said. As for the Bloc Québecois, no one will be available by May 15, given the very special present circumstances.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Pierre Paquette: It is difficult to support something in which we will not take part.

[English]

    The Chair: Let's be very brief. If we want to vote on this, remember, we have four minutes left.

    Mr. McTeague.

    Hon. Dan McTeague: I understand.

    Canada has contributed $1 million to the emphasis on this election. It is the fourth largest donor after Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Of course, we have put in another $900,000 as part of a second component, which has been recently provided under the UNDP, the United Nations Development Program, as part of a harmonized funding arrangement managed jointly by all donors.

    I should point out that Canada reserves the right to express its own opinion in the elections without having its own observers and may field a small embassy contingent of observers on election day. For its overall assessment, Canada intends to rely on the European Union and U.S. observers, as well as our numerous civil society sources.

    I want to tell you,

[Translation]

Ms. Lalonde, that there are Canadians in the Carter Centre. But they're not deployed. In short, we have made many efforts to make sure that Canada duly participates and contributes financially.

[English]

    The Chair: Merci.

    Ms. McDonough, rapidly.

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: I'd like to support the request for the policy of the department to be shared, because there were many serious concerns raised about the process whereby 500 delegates were sent to Ukraine, and not pretty stories about people who had been given indication that they would be given an opportunity to participate, who had appropriate training, who had been on track for some time to do so, and who were bumped for what appeared to be completely unacceptable, narrow partisan reasons. I think there is a bigger issue here about the policy.

    Secondly, my question would be this. If we are in fact sending, if I understood the parliamentary secretary, close to $2 million in aid of this monitoring effort by the Carter Center, I wonder if the parliamentary secretary could clarify if that means there are no Canadians being sent as part of that. Or is it that formally, officially, the word is there aren't, and in fact we're going to find out, in the same way as happened with respect to the Ukraine delegation, that there is some other process going on that is not open to public scrutiny, that doesn't exist within an established set of transparent policy guidelines?

    The Chair: Mr. McTeague, go ahead, please.

    Hon. Dan McTeague: Ms. McDonough, I think the Ukraine experiment, by all objective analysis, went very well. If there was any complaint that may have come of this, it's regarding the overall enthusiasm of so many Canadians who wanted to participate. Specifically in this issue there is nothing hidden, as far as I know. We're transparent, and I've given you pretty much all that I can give you as it relates to Canada's significant contribution to this election.

    Canadians may have a question about whether there is in fact an observer status, but I think it is incumbent on us to reinforce the leader organizations. The Carter Center, of course, has an excellent reputation, and it has made decisions. If we want to attach individuals to ensure the money is properly spent, which I don't think is the intent of your question, I think we should do that through our mission there. More importantly, I think Canada's contribution cannot be gainsaid. It's a strong contribution, and it's one that we on this side are very comfortable with.

    The Chair: Mr. Day, are you ready for the question or do you want other comments?

    We've one minute left.

    Mr. Stockwell Day: I have a comment and then I guess we'll call for the question.

    Mr. Chairman, everything I've heard here from the government raises more questions than it settles. Despite the fact that we've put over $1 million into the election process, the groups with whom I've met, Ethiopian expatriates and others who are still there, indicate to me that there is little or no recognition of that money or where it went. I'm not suggesting anything untoward here, but the impact of it is minimal, if not in fact nonexistent. The situation in Ukraine warranted and was followed by a gigantic worldwide response. The number of monitors there was huge, and appropriately so. It was proven to have a deterring effect.

    Quite frankly, Mr. Chairman, I fail to see why Canada would not see the Ethiopian situation in just as extreme a light. Frankly, the discussions we're having here are not going to have any effect on the ground in Ethiopia. They're not calling for parliamentarians themselves. I recognize, and my Bloc friends have recognized, the difficulties with any of us actually going at this time, but they've asked for up to 100 Canadian monitors. There is no question in my mind that if that call went out, even from those who already have experience in the Ukraine situation, we would have 100. The pool of money that's already been set aside to go to Ethiopia could easily be tapped into for the funding.

    Here's the big question, Mr. Chairman, that I'd like my colleagues to consider. In the situation, for instance, related to Darfur, constantly this question arises internationally: if it's happening in a European context or a North American context, our cultural context, there seems to be a response, but when it happens in an African context, when there's possible suffering going on.... It's just a question they ask, and I'm not suggesting there's anything untoward here. There's no cultural bias, but I'm telling you that's the question that comes up, and to answer the question, to put it to rest, and to help the Ethiopian people, Canadians on the scene would be a tremendous asset.

    I call for the questions on that.

Á  (1100)  

    The Chair: Okay. You've made your point.

    Mr. McTeague, for 10 seconds only.

    Hon. Dan McTeague: Mr. Chair, I completely and utterly reject the insinuation of Mr. Day on the question of where money is put.

    Mr. Stockwell Day: It's not coming from here. It comes from over there.

    Hon. Dan McTeague: Mr. Day, I listened to you. Please listen to me, because I think it's important. You put some very dangerous things on the record here, sir.

    I don't think we have any point here in trying to do anything more than ensure that we are helping the people over there. This government has been faithful in its commitment.

    You made substantial, wild allegations about where money is potentially going. I can only tell you that as it relates to elections and as it relates to our commitment through international organizations, Mr. Day, which you seem to have a problem with, we are prepared to commit and to continue to help the people of Ethiopia, and we've done so in a very substantial way.

    As for your accusations, innuendo, and other forms of intrigue, Mr. Day, that is not the kind of thing that I think comes out of the effort that we're trying to make collectively as a Parliament. Sir, regardless of how you have tried to distance yourself from these things, I think that your comments are unfair and unacceptable.

    Mr. Stockwell Day: Mr. Chair, my remarks have been clear. There has been no insinuation whatsoever.

    The Chair: No, please. I'll call the vote or I'll call the meeting to an end. Do you want to vote or call the meeting to an end?

    Mr. Stockwell Day: Yes, call the question, please.

    The Chair: I call the vote on the motion of Mr. Day. You all have the motion.

    (Motion agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings])

    The meeting is over. Thank you.