FAIT Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, October 29, 2002

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1535

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.))

Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.)

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll

The Chair

Senator Douglas Roche (Chair, Middle Powers Initiative)

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1540

The Rt Hon. Kim Campbell (Head of the Delegation, Chair of the Council of Women World Leaders, Middle Powers Initiative)

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1545

The Chair

Mr. Bruce Blair (President of the Center for Defense Information (CDI) in Washington, Middle Powers Initiative)

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1600

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1605

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1610

The Chair

Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance)

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1615

Mr. Bruce Blair

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ)

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1620

The Chair

Ms. Alice Slater (President, Global Resource Action Center for the Environment; Middle Powers Initiative)

Ms. Kim Campbell

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1625

The Chair

Mr. Mark Eyking (Sydney—Victoria, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Bruce Blair

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1630

Mr. Mark Eyking

Mr. Bruce Blair

The Chair

Mr. Jonathan Granoff (President of the Global Security Institute, San Francisco, Middle Powers Initiative)

The Chair

Mr. Svend Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP)

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1635

The Chair

Ms. Alice Slater

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1640

The Chair

Mr. Jonathan Granoff

The Chair

Mr. Bruce Blair

The Chair

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1645

Mr. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Bruce Blair

The Chair

Ms. Alice Slater

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Mr. Jonathan Granoff

The Chair

Senator Consiglio Di Nino (Ontario, P.C.)

Mr. Bruce Blair

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1655

The Chair

Ms. Kim Campbell

The Chair

Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ)

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day

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1700

The Chair

Senator Douglas Roche

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

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NUMBER 003

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Tuesday, October 29, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

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[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): With your permission, we're going to start now.

    This is the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the meeting of October 29, 2002.

[Translation]

    Before we begin, I have some information for members concerning Bill C-14.

[English]

    Tomorrow we're going to start hearings with the officials and witnesses regarding Bill C-14. We had previously intended to finish the bill by tomorrow afternoon, but according to the clerk we're going to receive many amendments from the government side, and also from the opposition side. It means that tomorrow we're just going to hear witnesses, and on Tuesday morning from nine to eleven we will finalize the bill.

    One thing is quite important. Draft amendments should be in to the clerk by this coming Friday, for next Tuesday.

    Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.): For Bill C-14.

    The Chair: For Bill C-14, yes.

    Ms. Aileen Carroll: So we're not going to have it tomorrow.

    The Chair: It's not going to be done tomorrow; we just cannot, because we have some other witnesses on Tuesday morning. One witness is going to be the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada. After that we're going to do clause-by-clause, on Tuesday morning, from nine to eleven.

    Ms. Carroll, just to be sure, we're still meeting tomorrow afternoon for the officials and witnesses, from 3:30 to 5:30.

[Translation]

    Ms. Aileen Carroll: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I merely had a question about the bill.

    The Chair: Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade is meeting today with members of the Middle Powers Initiative.

    This is the third time we've had the pleasure of welcoming to our committee this organization's spokespersons, chief among whom is our colleague Senator Douglas Roche. We are equally delighted to welcome a former colleague back to the fold, the Right Honourable Kim Campbell who, we are pleased to see, is still passionate about the major issues of the day.

[English]

    There is life after politics.

    As you will remember, the first meeting with representatives of the Middle Powers Initiative was in the spring of 1999. Soon afterwards we tabled our report, Canada and the Nuclear Challenge. In May last year a very distinguished panel appeared before us.

    I should tell members of the Middle Powers Initiative delegation that over the past six months the committee has worked on a number of issues that touch on your concerns. In April we held our annual meeting with Canada's ambassador for disarmament, Chris Westdal. Last spring and summer we discussed terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in the context of our hearings and report on the Kananaskis G-8 summit. Finally, for the past year we have heard a number of witnesses on missile defence and other related issues as we carry out our work on North American relations. We will be addressing these issues in a forthcoming report on this subject. So your appearance before us today is timely.

[Translation]

    I now invite Senator Roche to introduce the other delegates. Go ahead, Senator Roche, you have the floor.

[English]

    Senator Douglas Roche (Chair, Middle Powers Initiative): Thank you, Chairman Patry. I wish to thank both you and Senator Di Nino, on behalf of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs.

    The Middle Powers Initiative begins by expressing its appreciation to the two committees. This is actually the third time we have had the honour of appearing before such a joint meeting.

    Our opening presentation will be quite brief, because I know that members want to get on with questions. So permit me, sir, to present to you my colleagues on this delegation. The Right Honourable Kim Campbell of course is former Prime Minister of our country and former Minister of National Defence. Dr. Bruce Blair is president of the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C. Jonathan Granoff is president of the Global Security Institute of San Francisco, California. The Middle Powers Initiative is a program of the Global Security Institute. And on my left is Alice Slater, president of the Global Resource Action Center for the Environment in New York City.

    Senators and members, we have presented to you an executive summary, which is available in both official languages. I will just highlight the executive summary, because you have the material in front of you and we will respond to your questions concerning it.

    The focus of our delegation, in which we are meeting with the foreign minister, Mr. Graham, and the defence minister, Mr. McCallum, is our briefing paper, which is entitled “Priorities for Preserving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the New Strategic Context”. It makes six recommendations, and I will just name them: strategic arms reductions; control of missile defences and non-proliferation of missiles; tactical arms reductions; non-use of nuclear weapons; ban on nuclear testing; and control of fissile materials.

    We want, Mr. Chairman, to commend Canada for its positive vote on the New Agenda Coalition's resolution at the first committee of the United Nations General Assembly last Friday. This was a principled vote by Canada, and we commend it.

    We also want to express our appreciation for the leadership that Canada has taken in having NATO begin a process of reviewing its nuclear weapons policies. However, we would be remiss if we did not say that this review is far from complete. We hope that Canada will use its good offices, as a member of NATO, particularly at this time of a yet enlarging NATO, to have that alliance continue a serious review of its nuclear weapons policies.

    We endorse the statement that was issued a week ago by the Nobel Peace laureates summit meeting that was held in Rome. This was a very special meeting, which drew the attention of the world to the continuing problem and threat of nuclear weapons and about new military doctrines that contemplate the use, even a pre-emptive use, of nuclear weapons. That statement said very clearly that nuclear weapons are immoral and their use is illegal and that it is imperative to achieve the total abolition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

    Therefore, sir, we call upon Canada, as a highly respected middle power, to press the United States, as well as the other nuclear weapons states, to bring nuclear weapons policies into line with the 13 practical steps that all states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty agreed to at the 2000 review. We think this is extremely important, and our brief spells that out.

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    Finally, I think members will be interested to know that at the UN on October 9 the UN study on disarmament and non-proliferation education was tabled. This was the result of a year's study by a group of experts. We commend that study. It is available in both official languages in your kit.

    We think there should be a renewed liaison between the Government of Canada and civil society leaders in Canada for a conference or an apparatus that can bring the issues we're discussing today to the greater attention of the Canadian public.

    I thank you again, sir, for having this delegation present to you.

    I now turn to my colleague, the Right Honourable Kim Campbell.

[Translation]

    The Rt Hon. Kim Campbell (Head of the Delegation, Chair of the Council of Women World Leaders, Middle Powers Initiative): Mr. Chairman, honourable members and senators, it is indeed a great pleasure for me to be here today, especially as I am not running for any office. I am greatly honoured to be a member of this delegation. This issue is critically important to our future as a country and as a society.

[English]

    I am not the expert among our delegation, but I think of my own involvement with the issue of nuclear arms going back to the late 1970s, when I taught strategic studies at the University of British Columbia, and then when I was sworn in as Minister of National Defence, and I recognize my colleague, the Honourable Art Eggleton. Incidentally, I was just in the department and saw our photographs, and I was trying to figure out why mine was different from all the others. Then I realized it was because I wasn't wearing a tie.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    Ms. Kim Campbell: So much has changed in the strategic context of arms policy, and yet in other ways things have remained disconcertingly the same in certain kinds of mentalities.

    We are here today to share information with you--and there is an enormous amount of expertise around this table--on how to keep the issue of nuclear non-proliferation on the public agenda given that there are so many other issues that are distracting attention from that important one. Nuclear weapons have been lumped together in this broad category called weapons of mass destruction, but I think there is no question that they are qualitatively very different from the very frightening biological and chemical weapons, which preoccupy us so much in our defence policy. So today what we are hoping to do--and we've had some excellent discussions during the day with other members of the government--is to share ways in which we can be advocates for that concern, to find a vocabulary and define the concepts that will enable us to keep our citizens preoccupied with and focused on what is really one of the most important issues of foreign policy for any country.

    I look forward to the exchange, and I thank you so much for taking the time to meet with us. We know that you have a very charged agenda.

    It is really a great pleasure to see you all.

    I'll conclude there.

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    The Chair: Mr. Blair.

    Mr. Bruce Blair (President of the Center for Defense Information (CDI) in Washington, Middle Powers Initiative): Thank you very much for this opportunity to appear before this committee, which I appeared before several years ago in Washington. It's a great pleasure to have the opportunity again to address this same issue with you.

    It's something of an irony that during the first decade after the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States are adopting doctrines, taking actions, or not taking actions that have the effect of lowering rather than raising the nuclear threshold both for the deliberate and the accidental use of nuclear weapons. These trends betray a fairly callous disregard for the letter and the spirit of the non-proliferation treaty, and at the same time, they underscore the need for this treaty and for putting abolition back on a track to implementation.

    Let me also add to the kudos here in congratulating and commending Canada for its leadership in this arena and for the Middle Powers Initiative in shining a light on this path of abolition.

    I'd like to review some of the trends that warrant that somewhat grim assessment before discussing some of the remedies that we would like to table for discussion here today, beginning with Russia, which in the 1990s increased its reliance on the early first use of nuclear weapons to deal with a crisis, in order to compensate for its weakened conventional forces, the effect of which was to lower the threshold for the deliberate use of their weapons. Russia also suffered from decay in its command and early warning system, the effect of which was to lower the threshold for the mistaken or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

    I continue to travel many times a year to Russia and each time come away equally dismayed by the state of the Russian armed forces, including the strategic forces, half of whom live below the poverty line, including the nuclear units, many of whom suffer from alcoholism and most of whom receive very poor training. A strategic nuclear bomber pilot in Russia today receives in the order of 10 to 20 hours of flight time per year, compared to 250 hours of flight time for a U.S. bomber pilot. I hardly ever meet a strategic rocket force officer in Moscow who isn't moonlighting to cover expenses, driving a taxi, appearing for his second job sitting in front of a radar screen all blinky-eyed, with responsibility to assess the validity of sensor information that may report a nuclear attack against Russia.

    The U.S. also has done its part to lower the nuclear threshold during this period. In the late 1990s, following a decision by President Clinton, the United States put China back in the strategic war plan for the first time in 20 years and focused on China as the next designated enemy of the United States, to replace Russia in our nuclear planning apparatus, at least until 9/11 and the distraction that ensued from that tragedy.

    The United States also expanded the roles and missions of nuclear weapons to deal with non-nuclear threats, particularly chemical and biological threats from so-called rogue states. Our nuclear thinking about these steps regressed really to the mindset of the 1950s and the way we thought about the original rogue state, the Soviet Union. It's reminiscent of the frustration experienced in the 1950s and the way in which the United States pursued every conceivable instrument of power to deal with that state, including preventive war, consideration of preventive war, of pre-emptive attack, of bomber defence, missile defence, civil defence--now called “homeland defence”--and so on and so forth. Our thinking about the current so-called rogue states and their leaders--North Korea, Iran and Iraq, and elsewhere--is very, very reminiscent of it, and out of frustration today with the inadequacy of deterrents alone in protecting us from these dictators, we are once again considering the war-fighting use of U.S. nuclear weapons to deal with them.

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     Picking up on a trend started, again, during the Clinton years, the Bush nuclear policy review, completed earlier this year, advances several ideas that are quite inimical to the non-proliferation treaty and to elimination, such as a new bunker-buster nuclear weapon, which, by the way, Congress is authorizing funds for as we speak; and for example, the Bush nuclear policy, among other things, calls for increasing our readiness to resume nuclear testing and calls for building a new plutonium pit factory capable of building 500 nuclear cores for 500 nuclear weapons per year. So in short, the Bush policy continues a trend towards not downgrading the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy, but increasing the role of nuclear weapons, setting, in my view, a very bad example for the rest of the world.

    Other countries have done their part to lower the nuclear threshold. That's true in Asia. China, Pakistan, and India are among them. I won't dwell on that story but will rather skip to the last major party of concern in this discussion, and they, of course, are the terrorists, who we must worry about in the future, not only because of their potential ability to exploit weaknesses in the storage of Russian nuclear materials and weapons, weaknesses that might enable them to steal a weapon, but also because of the spectre of their inducing false alarms in early warning systems and even compromising the system of launch control over strategic nuclear forces on launch-ready alert.

    Here I might just point out that the Russians consider terrorism, including nuclear terrorism, to be very high on the list of their security concerns. They would, for example, be sympathetic to the question I pose here: could an armed guerrilla band, such as the 60-odd Chechens who took over the theatre in Moscow, with or without insider help, seize physical control of a Russian missile and figure out how to circumvent the safeguards and fire that missile? I realize that sounds far-fetched. There are many scenarios that are far-fetched until they actually materialize, as we discovered on 9/11. To give you an example, the Pentagon not long ago discovered that there was an electronic back door that could enable cyber-hackers or terrorists to gain access to our Trident missile broadcast network and to transmit a launch order to U.S. Trident submarines.

    There are obviously many positive trends I could report in the historical picture during the last 10 years, but in my view the overall picture is not positive. Nuclear developments in recent years cast a very long shadow on nuclear abolition, on non-proliferation, and on the sincerity of the weapon states to honour their commitments to seek nuclear non-proliferation. I think the U.S. in particular has clearly failed to grasp the point so well articulated 10 years ago by defence minister Les Aspen, that the U.S. and our allies would be far better off in a nuclear-free world. I think that point should have been driven home very clearly on 9/11, when U.S. nuclear weapons obviously played no role in deterring a terrorist attack, nor would they have played any role had the terrorists possessed nuclear weapons. And U.S. nuclear weapons clearly played no role whatsoever in the military campaign in Afghanistan. In short, their deterrent and military utility were null. All the nuclear weapons materials around the globe represented to almost everyone on September 12 was an acute danger to civilization.

    So the lesson of 9/11 for nuclear policy is not that the U.S. or other countries should be looking for new ways to use nuclear weapons in conflict with rogue states or terrorists, but rather that they should all be eliminated. The only answer really is a nuclear-free world. It's in our supreme national interests collectively to seek and achieve that world. And by the way, as I need to remind American officials occasionally, it's also a treaty obligation. This needs to be constantly said, particularly to Americans, who need to be reminded of the bargain they struck in signing this treaty. It's disarmament in exchange for non-proliferation.

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    The Middle Powers Initiative, and others who have been working with it, have put on the table a number of very compelling recommendations that I endorse. If the U.S. understood that abolition were in its interest, or a movement in that direction, it would move much closer to Canada's enlightened position on these issues and lead the world toward adoption of many of those recommendations Senator Roche has put on the table.

    I would place special emphasis on the importance of standing down U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, taking them off hair-trigger alert, and extending the time needed to launch them from the current period of how long--I'll ask the question--to fire strategic nuclear forces.

    At the moment, if a launch order were transmitted from the Pentagon to the U.S. Strategic Forces, it would take two minutes for missiles to leave their silos, launch tubes, and submarines. All the re-targeting and reversal of the so-called de-targeting agreement between Russia and the United States would be overridden, and missiles would be leaving their silos en masse within two minutes. Within ten minutes, from a standing start today, without any prior preparation, the United States and Russia together could fire the equivalent of 80,000 Hiroshima bombs at each other, which would cover the planet and land in each other's territory in thirty minutes.

    The United States, in its nuclear posture review, claims that their nuclear forces are not on a hair-trigger alert. But to me, this is the biggest misrepresentation of our nuclear posture since Yeltsin and Clinton declared the de-targeting agreement of 1994.

    Let me just wrap up by mentioning two or three other important recommendations of the Middle Powers Initiative that reflect, as far as I understand, Canada's position on these issues.

    One, the roles and missions of nuclear weapons should be strictly limited to deterring a nuclear attack. The U.S. and Russia should adopt a no-first-use policy, and reject these calls for developing new weapons, testing them to destroy underground bunkers.

    The U.S. and the nuclear states should make their nuclear arsenals much more transparent than they are today. Full transparency and accountability are preconditions for eventual abolition. I think Canada could and should propose that the nuclear states undertake this task very soon.

    Second to last, NATO should review its nuclear policy, with a view to withdrawing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stored overseas for delivery by dual-capable aircraft deployed there.

    Last but not least, safeguards and security over nuclear weapons and fissile materials in the former Soviet Union should be defined as the top current nuclear priority by the United States and the rest of the G-8. In my opinion, the success of the Nunn-Lugar program in safeguarding Russian materials is more important to our collective security than anything else on the table--absolutely anything--with the possible exception of reaching that final implementation of the nuclear proliferation treaty.

    Finally, on that note, I commend Canada again for taking a lead role in convincing the G-8 to take on more responsibility in this area of safeguards over Russian fissile materials.

    Thank you very much for giving me this opportunity to speak to you.

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    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Blair.

    Does Mr. Granoff have something, or are we going to go to questions? Okay, we'll go to questions.

    I just want to remind my colleagues that our guests need to leave by 5 p.m. because they're meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs at 5:10 p.m.

    Mr. Obhrai is next for a five-minute round.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much for your presentation.

    I don't think there is anybody who would disagree with the initiative you have taken for a nuclear-free world. Everybody understands that is the need, that is required, to get there. But there are roadblocks there that I think need to be addressed before we move towards this.

    Since the Cold War, we know this need to have a nuclear-free world is paramount. However, in the current issue in Iraq that is coming up, the weapons inspection, one of the key elements would be that any treaty you sign must have pith behind it, must have the reasoning behind it. I mean to say it must be able to verify. Weapons inspection has become one of those key elements right now in order to make the world safe, because people are using nuclear power as a deterrent. They want it as a deterrent.

    Now, unfortunately or fortunately, whatever we want to say, the United Nations, which we tend to go through, is mired in its own little political issues and tends not to be an effective organization in doing weapons inspection. Iraq is proving that quite clearly. So would one of the things your association or your group can think about be, would it be far more beneficial to the world if we have weapons inspection beyond and outside the realm of the United Nations, still by countries but not subject to political tugs and pulls, that this will give countries in the world the security they need so that they do not develop nuclear weapons? Would that be one of the solutions, a strong point that your group should go and do that?

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    Mr. Bruce Blair: Yes, I agree with that. There are many mechanisms for monitoring the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear states, some of which are embodied in bilateral agreements between Russia and the United States, some of which are embodied in multilateral treaties--for example, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. There are programs of monitoring and accounting that lie outside the specific jurisdiction of the United Nations that are very valuable.

    By the way, I think there are even mechanisms of monitoring that lie outside governments altogether, whether collectives or individual governments, and by that I mean civil society. By that I mean free press, investigative journalism, democracy. There are institutions that provide mechanisms for countries to police themselves. In fact, if we are ever going to get to zero nuclear weapons, I think our countries will have to have a great deal of confidence in the civil society of the countries that we have been fearful of, for them to police themselves and expose any systematic cheating that may occur. If the United States were to undertake systematic cheating on a major arms control agreement, it wouldn't be Russian satellites that detected, the violation; it would be civil servants inside the U.S. government or a free press that would uncover the cheating.

    So there are many mechanisms that are important, but the UN is one of them. The IAEA, of course, is under the umbrella of the United Nations. One of its problems is that it has a budget of $100 million per year--$100 million per year; that is the cost of one U.S. ballistic missile flight test. It takes $100 million to test the national missile defence system in half an hour. It's the most expensive half an hour in military testing history. We spend in 30 minutes the total amount of the budget of the IAEA. I'm sorry, but that is just a gross misallocation of resources. The UN and other instruments of monitoring could do much better.

    I'll just close by emphasizing that one of the recommendations in this initiative is for all nuclear states to be subject to very, very strong monitoring. As I said, transparency and accountability of all nuclear states are key to the future of nuclear disarmament.

    The Chair: Now we'll go to Madame Lalonde.

[Translation]

    Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    First of all, thank you for coming and for your presentations. Quite frankly, it's refreshing because officials at Foreign Affairs who have been following developments on the international stage closely for some time now believe - and that's true for me as well -- that we have turned a page, what with the new US administration, the events of September 11 and the response to September 11. As I see it, people are once again arguing that war is a possible solution, that a preemptive war might yet be the best solution. I read the paper published by the National Security Council on the new US Strategic Doctrine and to be honest, it sent shivers down my spine.

    Furthermore, when we met with National Security Council representatives in Washington, we were told in no uncertain terms that the antimissile shield project would be given the green light, that more nuclear weapons would be targeted for other purposes and that Canada would have to decide whether to come on board or not. They hoped to convince Canada to participate in the antimissile shield initiative because otherwise, this might mean having to double resource levels in order to preserve NORAD.

    All of which begs the following question: Politically speaking, how...? Politically, we are in a situation where the world's greatest power and others even are comfortable with the idea of having nuclear weapons in their strategic arsenal. Therefore, even before we can argue the need to control the proliferation of such weapons, we are confronted with a policy that implies the use of nuclear weapons.

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[English]

    The Chair: Who is willing to answer? Ms. Slater.

    Ms. Alice Slater (President, Global Resource Action Center for the Environment; Middle Powers Initiative): Go ahead.

    Ms. Kim Campbell: I agree with what you're saying. I think one of the things we need to do is to try to recapture the agenda, because in the public debate now, it's a kind of “with us or against us” view. You're either against despotism or you're not, or you're weak. When President Bush made his speech, he used the expression “the United Nations, not the League of Nations”, as though he were trying to discredit that multilateral process.

    I think it's very important, when we engage in this debate, to make it clear that those of us who are concerned about nuclear proliferation, about the re-legitimization of nuclear weapons, are not naive about security. I remember that when I was sworn in as defence minister—and Art Eggleton will understand this reality—one of the first things I said was that it was highly premature to beat our swords into ploughshares. We know there are bad people out there doing bad things, and the challenges they present to our security are extremely complex and difficult. When we engage in the public debate, I think it is extremely important to acknowledge that and not to let it be allowed that we're pushed into a position where it seems we don't recognize those realities. We do recognize them.

    The point we are making is that nuclear weapons are not the answer to that. If anything, they increase our vulnerability, particularly in this age of cyberspace. You heard Bruce Blair talk about some of the potential there. Bruce could also talk to you about the Pakistani and Indian officers who come to see him because he is a missileer. He is an expert on missiles, and they come to talk to him about building appropriate command and control structures for their existing nuclear arsenals.

    The point is that it's very important to recapture the agenda and make it clear that what we are talking about is security. We're talking about security in a complex, extremely difficult, high-technology world. The value of nuclear weapons in providing the umbrella under which we could live during the period of the Cold War was based on the doctrine of mutual assured destruction and on hostility between two superpowers, a situation in which, in an oddly perverse way, there was an understanding of the rules of the game. There were huge dangers there.

    Again, we were talking earlier today about the film Thirteen Days. If you talk to any of the people who were involved in the Cuban missile crisis about the potential there for disaster, about the misinformation and the disinformation.... In that particular circumstance, I understand the limitations of people to deal with even making these decisions. We have missiles on a hair trigger.

    So I think what's really important is to insist that this agenda, far from being naive about security, is extremely hard-nosed and realistic about security. It demands a rethinking of how we can use the technologies that we have created to actually make people safer and how we can acknowledge the need to make changes.

    Those who argue that some of the international instruments are no longer useful very often have a good point. We mustn't be afraid to say, yes, it requires us to rethink some of the commitments that we may have made before, but again, always with the same clear-eyed view on all parts of the agenda.

    The point you're making is that there are people who are trying to re-legitimize nuclear weapons, and they are talking about weapons that are significantly, by several orders of magnitude, more powerful than the weapons that were used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But the other part of it is that we need to remind ourselves of what we're dealing with and that nuclear weapons are themselves a wholly different category from other weapons of mass destruction. That very profound realism is our only hope to try to create the kind of public support and constituency needed for the changes that you so clearly recognize need to be made. Your experiences in Washington are very interesting to hear about.

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    The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Campbell.

    We'll now go to Mr. Eyking.

    Mr. Mark Eyking (Sydney—Victoria, Lib.): Thank you.

    Mr. Blair, I have a couple of questions.

    You mentioned that if everybody started shooting, there would be almost 80,000 bombs comparable to the one used in Hiroshima. I was under the understanding, since way back in Iceland and the SALT talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, that there were going to be all these reductions happening over the last 10 to 15 years. I'm just wondering how many we had before, 15 years ago.

    Another question I have has to do with NATO expansion. Quite a few of the Russian satellites are coming into the NATO sphere and are becoming NATO partners. Is that making it more difficult for Russia? Is it putting them on edge? How's that whole thing working? They must have had nuclear weapons in these satellites before and must have brought them back onto their own soil. Is that something that's creating a bad situation?

    The Chair: Mr. Blair.

    Mr. Bruce Blair: The United States, over the course of its history, built 70,000 nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union built 55,000. That's 125,000 weapons. Most of those have been decommissioned. Twenty years ago, on the order of 30,000 to 40,000 of these weapons were still in weapons form. Today, on the order of 10,000 U.S. weapons and 15,000 Russian weapons are usable weapons. They're mostly in storage but usable if they were to be taken out of storage. In addition, the United States has in storage the nuclear components for at least another 10,000 weapons. And who knows what the Russians have?

    One of the problems in the history of nuclear arms control is that we never addressed nuclear weapons, per se; we only addressed the launchers, or the missiles, or the number of warheads on missiles. We never, ever forced a reckoning of the total arsenals. Unfortunately, we never will be able to know for sure how many were built and how many are still around. Many hundreds of equivalent nuclear weapons materials have disappeared forever into the shafts and vents and plumbing of nuclear weapons production facilities. We'll never be able to get an exact accounting of weapons, give or take a few hundred.

    Today, when I said that we could launch 80,000 equivalent weapons in a few minutes, that was a little misleading. We could actually launch, between us, about 2,000 on each side--2,000 U.S. weapons and 2,000 Russian weapons--in just a few minutes. That's 4,000 weapons, enough to blow up the world several times over. But they're weapons of such high yield that if you divided those weapons into the equivalent of Hiroshima weapons, which had a yield of around 15 kilotons, much lower than the existing arsenals, you'd come up with 80,000 Hiroshima-equivalent bombs in those 4,000 launchable weapons on the two sides.

    Now, Russia has withdrawn all of its nuclear bombs from the satellite countries of eastern Europe, and has consolidated them in 100-odd sites inside of Russia. That's the focus of an intense effort on the part of the United States and Canada and other countries to ensure that those weapons are secure inside of Russia and are not susceptible to theft and diversion into the hands of terrorists.

    I don't think I answered your last question exactly, but I wasn't sure what you....

º  (1630)  

    Mr. Mark Eyking: I'm just wondering about the relationship between Russia and NATO with all these satellites becoming NATO partners. Is it causing a problem for Russia?

    Mr. Bruce Blair: Oh, I see what you're saying.

    The short answer is that it's definitely a source of complaint and annoyance, but so far the Russians seem to understand that admittance to NATO carries with it certain obligations and rights for the deployment of both conventional and nuclear weapons in the territory of those countries.

    I think the Russians feel fairly reassured that there are no plans for NATO to deploy nuclear weapons to those countries. If anything, over time we'll see a continuing reduction of NATO nuclear weapons even in the existing countries of Greece, Turkey, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Holland. The reduction there has been fantastic over the last ten years, from thousands down to 150. If anything, they'll be gone someday.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Thirty seconds for a supplementary, Mr. Granoff.

    Mr. Jonathan Granoff (President of the Global Security Institute, San Francisco, Middle Powers Initiative): First, Russia has probably between 6,000 and 10,000 tactical weapons, which are not even being discussed. Second, they had a “no first use” policy; in other words, they pledged that they would not use a nuclear weapon first. Post-Cold War they've changed that policy, largely because of these issues that you raised. So I think it is quite hazardous. There's a lot of window dressing about a dramatic change.

    When you look carefully at this new treaty between the United States and Russia, at the end of the day, there are no nuclear weapons being destroyed, there's no verification, there's no, as Ronald Reagan said, “trust, but verify”, and there's no transparency. So in a lot of ways, we've backtracked. I think it is irresponsible to allow Russia and the United States to get a free ride from the international community. Russia is claiming that they're moving towards reducing the risk, as is the United States, but when you unpack this agreement, you see that all they've agreed to is that one day in the year 2012 they'll have between 1,700 and 2,000 each pointed at each other, and you have to realize that some of these weapons are 20 megaton weapons. That's more fire power than all the weapons used in all the wars in the entire history of humanity, and this is thousands of them. That's what they claim is the best they can do for the rest of us, for Canada, for my children?

    I think to say it is business as usual is very hazardous, because we're not even enemies any more, and yet technology and the failure of diplomacy allow these weapons and the inertia of these bureaucracies to continue.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Robinson.

    Mr. Svend Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): Thank you, Chair.

    I'm really pleased to be able to welcome back the MPI delegation. I've had the privilege of participating in a number of previous delegations, and I want to pay tribute in particular, if I may, to Doug Roche for the tireless efforts he's put into this. As a Canadian, I'm very proud, Doug, of your leadership on these issues. I'm also glad to see back my former colleague, my friend, Kim Campbell. I remember questioning her in this very room when she was wearing another hat as Minister of Justice a few years ago. It's good to have you back here.

    I have just a couple of comments, because time is limited, and just a couple of questions. I want to join in saying how pleased I was that Canada did vote in favour of the New Agenda Coalition resolution on Friday. I think it was a very hopeful signal. Bill Graham, frankly, had a lot to do with that decision, and I welcome that opening and hope it's an indication of further progress in that area.

    There have been a couple of other encouraging developments. I don't know if anybody's mentioned it, but Cuba just signed the non-proliferation treaty, which again is very important, I think. We're still trying to get Israel to sign it, and India and Pakistan, but that may take a little longer.

    I was delighted with the outcome of the meeting of Nobel Peace laureates as well, and I want to say, on behalf of my party, we fully share their conclusion that nuclear weapons are immoral, their use is illegal, and we must work towards a total abolition of nuclear weapons. Certainly, that's my hope.

    We heard talk earlier about rogue states. When I look at the contempt the United States has shown for a whole range of international treaties.... Step 7 in the NPT 2000 review final document was reaffirmation of the profound importance of the ABM treaty. The United States signed that; it was ripped up. Biological weapons verification is gone; the United States won't sign on to that. The CTPT--I could go down the list. If there's a rogue state in this area, it seems to me it's the United States. I think Canada owes honesty to our neighbour and our friend to be really clear and strong on that and speak out. Then there's the threat of missile defence and weaponization of outer space. So I'd like to hear from one of you about the importance of Canada's speaking truth to power--because this is power, massive power--on these important issues.

    Then there is one other question, on the Middle East. The eyes of the world are now focused on the Middle East and what's happening with Iraq. My colleague Madame Lalonde has spoken of the September 20 doctrine, a terrifying doctrine, of Bush. Pre-emptive strikes could be pre-emptive nuclear strikes; they're not ruled out. If you read the document, it's pretty clear. Do you see any scenario at all at this point in which there is a possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and in the context of Iraq?

º  (1635)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

    Mrs. Slater.

    Ms. Alice Slater: I'd like to thank Canada for the leadership it has shown. As an American citizen, I feel we're in a very precarious time and we really need Canada's help.

    You might not know that last Saturday 400,000 people marched in Washington against the war in Iraq. That is part of the problem, that you don't know about it, it's not even reported. So we have a long way to go. I think the congressional vote where 133 Democrats, more than half of them, voted against the war was quite a surprise, along with 23 senators. Nobody saw it coming. The perceived wisdom was that it was going to be a route for war and for Bush. I just feel that we're going to be surprised, and we need you to help us. There is this spirit bubbling up. We have this e-mail network. After Paul Wellstone, who unfortunately died, voted against the war in Iraq, we got an e-mail message from this “move on” movement that he was in trouble because of his vote. In three days they raised $1.25 million for Paul Wellstone over the Internet. None of this is reported.

    There's hope out there. I think, with Canada holding our feet to the fire, with Mexico not going along with us in the Security Council, if Americans can learn that our neighbours, with whom we've lived in peace and harmony for all these years, do not approve of our posture, it would help us to organize to throw them out next time.

    Also, it's very important that the United Nations be supported. I sat through two days of the Security Council hearings. Thanks to South Africa, they opened it up to the public. I felt almost as if I was watching the League of Nations go under when I heard the U.S. ambassador talk about “my way or the highway”, you know, either give us what we want or we're out of here, we're going to put together our own coalition. I hope Canada will never be part of that coalition if it happens.

    I'll leave the Middle East to wiser heads than mine.

º  (1640)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Granoff.

    Mr. Jonathan Granoff: I don't like to be characterized as a wiser head, but I'll just offer a few simple suggestions.

    The New Agenda Coalition, as you know, led with this resolution. The New Agenda Coalition is middle powers, countries that are nuclear capable but have refrained from developing nuclear weapons because of the promise. One of their statements included:

Any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by a nuclear weapon state is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Indefinite possession is contemplated by the nuclear posture review and the new strategic doctrine.

At the root of the issue with Iraq and the disarmament process is the enforcement of the disarmament regime. The problem we have is that the country that is most vociferous about enforcing and preventing horizontal proliferation is openly contemplating vertical proliferation. Thus, the consistency between morality, law, and the exercise of power has been severed. So the first thing I think the United States must become aware of is that for stability to be instituted, both with respect to Iraq and with respect to preventing the next tyrant to threaten us, we must bring coherence between morality, law, and the exercise of force.

    This argument has not been squarely presented in the public arena. Canada actually has the history and consistency to make that argument, because Canada has made the sacrifices by putting peacekeeping forces into areas in which stability has broken down. You've made the sacrifice without a view to any particular economic advantage, and so Canada has the moral high ground. That's what's needed to hold the feet to the fire, that moral consistency. So that's the first step, I would say.

    The second is with this new doctrine of the pre-emptive use of force. I was recently with some ambassadors from South Asia. If India and Pakistan were to adopt this doctrine, either or both of them, it would be absolutely catastrophic. Somebody must explain that the rule of leadership is “as you do, so will others do”. These are simple principles that need to be put out into the public forum. Canada has the history of leadership in the area of human security that gives it the right to do that.

    The Chair: I'll give you 20 seconds, Mr. Blair. We have a problem with the time, but go ahead.

    Mr. Bruce Blair: Just to extend the point, if countries in the Middle East were also to adopt similar doctrines—not only pre-emption, but the doctrine that nuclear weapons may be used to deal with chemical or biological threats—then if Iraq or Iran had possessed nuclear weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, they could have been used legitimately, as measured against U.S. nuclear doctrine. Or Israel, fearing an imminent launch of an Iraqi missile loaded with germs or gas, could merely cite, rhyme and verse, U.S. doctrine to justify its first use of nuclear weapons. I don't think any such scenario is likely to unfold, but we are creating the conditions that would encourage it.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Blair.

    We have 15 minutes left. I'll go with Mr. Eggleton and Senator Di Nino, and we'll get questions from three other people to close.

º  (1645)  

    Mr. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is the first time I've been a member of a committee and have gotten to ask a question. Having spent the last eight and a half years as a member of the cabinet, with five years as Minister of Defence, I've usually sat at the other end of the table.

    Anyway, I'm happy to have this deputation here today, and I thank the Middle Powers Initiative for their attention to these issues. Whether or not everybody around this table agrees with every aspect of everything you say, I think it's terrific that you're out there doing what you're doing and that you're keeping attention focused on these vital issues. Nowadays, it can't be easy to get them the attention that all of them deserve, given the focus on terrorism and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, but what you do is definitely quite valuable.

    I'd like to ask about missile defence, which is a topic I had some involvement with when I was defence minister. I haven't heard too much about it lately. I know the arguments pro and con in great detail, but I wonder about the politics of it now in the United States. For a while there, it looked like both the Democrats and the Republicans were lining up for it, and I wonder if anything is changing there.

    Also, what would you think Canada should do if they do proceed? Notwithstanding the difficulties they're having in testing, whatever system or combination of systems is put into effect at some point in time, what do you think Canada should do, since they're going to put this in place whether we like it or not, so to speak? If Canada doesn't sign on, of course, the United States will then be making all the decisions relevant to missile defence that affect our country, whether we like it or not. If we do sign on, we become a part of it. What would you suggest Canada should be doing in that case?

    The Chair: Dr. Blair.

    Mr. Bruce Blair: Well, it's hard for me to know how missile defence would fit into your strategic security architecture and plan, and I would rather mull that question over and respond at a later point.

    I think the missile defence program in the United States has lost its “cosmic significance” and has become more or less a normal defence program that will be subject to the normal kinds of evaluations, according to performance criteria, including the performance of the technology and the costs. I think the program is going to limp along for quite a long time before anyone reaches the point of deciding whether this system can possibly work or not.

    I'd say it's an interesting, worthwhile research and development program that bears watching, but until it becomes a technically viable system, it seems to me to be extremely hypothetical to factor it into any country's strategic calculations, whether it's the U.S., Canada, China, or Russia. It's a long way off. It's going to require at least a decade of operational testing before any kind of significant operational system could be deployed. So I would be patient and weigh the role of such a system into your own long-term strategic plan.

    The Chair: Mr. Granoff and Ms. Slater, for 30 seconds each—and I'll be strict now.

    Ms. Alice Slater: Briefly, I'll just say that at the grassroots we have networks of abolitionists and anti-Star Wars people who are calling for a missile test freeze. That could be a very useful thing that Canada could do. It is moving along, and it's totally driven by huge amounts of corporate lobbying and funding. There has been something like $30 million in lobbying over the last two years, and $8 million in campaign contributions. It's a scandal.

    Maybe Bruce is right and it will never work. In the meantime, there should be a public outcry, and I'd love to see Canada join us in calling for a ban on missile testing right now. Please.

º  (1650)  

    Mr. Jonathan Granoff: Canada, in its support of the New Agenda Coalition resolution, recently emphasized that there should be no steps taken that would lead to the weaponization of outer space. Insofar as missile defence is a Trojan horse for the weaponization of space, I would hope Canada would maintain the leadership in preventing space from being weaponized. This is absolutely of indispensable value for the rest of the world.

    If you look at Vision 2020 of the U.S. Space Command—which I recommend to everybody for study—it calls for utilizing the missile defence system as part of a space force application combining “global surveillance with the potential for a space-based global precision strike capability”. They are the agency that would administer national missile defence, so the danger of an offensive system behind this alleged defensive system merges with the weaponization of outer space.

    So this is the area in which we must draw the line: no weaponization of outer space.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    We'll now go to Senator Di Nino, please.

    Senator Consiglio Di Nino (Ontario, P.C.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    First of all, in extending my welcome, I must confess that every time I listen to statements of this nature, it scares the heck out of me. I hope it does the same to everybody else.

    I'd like to commend all of you for your admirable objective, and I extend my best wishes. Hopefully you can achieve it not only by yourselves, but with our help.

    My question deals with what, to me, your presentation deals with, both in written form and verbally. You seem to be focusing on the U.S. principally, and also on Russia. In his comments, Mr. Blair talked about the role civil society and the media would play in making sure we're aware of how this particular issue is developing. Very little has been said, if anything at all, about other nations that have been building their own nuclear arsenals. I'm talking about nations like China and nations like India and Pakistan. We've obviously heard about Korea as well recently. I would remind Mr. Blair that civil society and the media don't play quite as strong a role in those places as they do in the western world. I would therefore appreciate some comments on how that plays in this whole discussion that we're having.

    Mr. Bruce Blair: Thank you.

    India and Pakistan, as you know, are not signatories to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and have therefore operated according to their own lights on this issue. This represents, obviously, a nuclear flashpoint in the world, and I think the most likely location for the use of nuclear weapons in the next five years.

    Frankly, I am at a loss to know what to do about it. These countries are effectively shunned by the rest of the world, and there's very little cooperative security under way to deal with the nuclear threat, the nuclear dangers in South Asia. The United States and other countries have simply kept at a distance, because they refuse to recognize these states as nuclear powers.

    I'm puzzled and troubled, because Indian and Pakistani military officers come through my office every month wanting to sit down and talk about how to design a safe nuclear command and control system, an effective system of personnel reliability for people who handle nuclear weapons. They're clearly going through this evolution that places them at the very early stage of a process that the United States and Russia went through. When we went through it, we made a lot of mistakes, and India and Pakistan are going to repeat those mistakes without benefiting from the wisdom of the rest of the world.

    So it's difficult. We have all these countries--from North Korea through Asia, to China to the Middle East--that are intractable to us. India and Pakistan paid no attention to what any of us had to say about nuclear weapons, and the same is seemingly true about North Korea and other countries.

    It's a very tough problem, and I don't have solutions here, but I know the United States and Russia play a key role in a lot of this. My particular concern really is with loose nukes in Russia. I think we should be focused on ensuring the security of Russian nuclear materials and weapons so that they don't fall into the hands of terrorists. I think that is our number one priority at the moment.

    Perhaps Prime Minister Campbell can be given the final word.

º  (1655)  

    The Chair: Yes. After Ms. Campbell's comments we have another four or five minutes. I'll ask three colleagues for one 10-second question each, with no preamble, to get some answers, if possible.

    Do you want to make your comments now?

    Ms. Kim Campbell: Yes, just briefly.

    With respect to India and Pakistan, one of the things that works against India initiating a nuclear strike is in fact its enormous high-tech economy and the extent to which American companies, among others, have put pressure on the Indian government to stand down from the very high level of tension they had with Pakistan recently, because a great deal of the work of those companies is done by people in India.

    The ideal thing would be to create a similar kind of incentive within Pakistan. So I think when we're looking at these issues of how to deal with countries like India and Pakistan, recognizing that there's very little we can perhaps do in the areas that Bruce Blair was talking about, we need to be creative in trying to find some other incentives, perhaps economic incentives or vested interests, to try to dissuade the leaders from playing that kind of high-stakes poker. I'm less optimistic about our being able to do that in Pakistan, but certainly the recent dynamic with India was extremely interesting in that regard.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Now, three questions, beginning with Mr. O'Brien.

    Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I regret that I couldn't be here for the presentation, but I have looked at the written material.

    Just following along from Mr. Eggleton's comments, I chaired defence part of the time he was defence minister, and we held the only hearings on MDI. With all due respect, it didn't seem that hypothetical. The preponderance of evidence was that its technology inevitably will work. They've had it everything but pencilled in as a NORAD project at Cheyenne Mountain, which we visited.

    My question--and it may be posed to the wrong people, and if so, fine--is on whether or not MDI is progressing in the United States. Are they in the defence department still moving forward with this initiative? It certainly has a lot of relevance to Canada strategically, as a NORAD partner.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Monsieur Bergeron.

[Translation]

    Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I'd like to focus for a moment on the question raised by Senator Di Nino concerning states that stand out, perhaps not because of the size of their arsenal, but by virtue of their nuclear weapons or the presumption that they have nuclear weapons. Some have been called delinquent countries that make up the so-called “axis of evil”.

    My question is this: How is it possible to determine if these countries do in fact possess nuclear weapons, and if so, how do we determine the size of their arsenal?

    The Chair: Do you still have the same question?

    Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: Yes, I do.

    In the case of countries like Iraq, Iran and North Korea that have been identified as belonging to the “axis of evil”, can we talk about a positive evaluation? Do we in fact have solid proof that these countries have developed and do possess an arsenal of nuclear weapons? If nothing has been proven, is the President of the United States merely resorting to war-mongering rhetoric?

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.

[English]

    The last question, without any preamble, will go to Mr. Day.

    Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance): On a small point of order, I appreciate the appropriate respect you showed our senator in granting him almost two minutes. I would hope that elected members would have half the time or even a quarter of the time of the non-elected presenters. But I appreciate the respect you showed him.

    The Chair: Even without your comments, you will always have respect from the chair and you will have the time. Go ahead.

    Mr. Stockwell Day: Thank you , sir. I appreciate that.

    First of all, the peaceful approach to the discussion has been somewhat jarred by the characterization of the United States as a rogue state. I'd like one of the witnesses to address whether they would agree with Mr. Robinson's intellectually and historically deficient characterization. Whether we're talking about Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, Pax Romana, Pax Britannica, the Third Reich, or Saddam Hussein, any time in history that a country has had unlimited military superiority they have invaded other countries, other than the United States. This is the first era in history we've seen that. So would they agree with Mr. Robinson's characterization of the United States as a rogue state?

»  (1700)  

[Translation]

    I also have a brief question concerning the second recommendation:

...prevent missile proliferation, through ad hoc arrangements, as with North Korea...

    Do you view North Korea as a success story when it comes to stemming proliferation? I'm referring to your second recommendation.

[English]

    The Chair: Merci. There are three questions. Who will answer the first one? Mr. Roche.

    Senator Douglas Roche: Mr. Chairman, with your consent I'll answer all three.

    The Chair: Good. Thank you.

    Senator Douglas Roche: I want to point out to Mr. Day, with great respect, that we are under severe time constraints right now because we have to be in the minister's office in five minutes.

    Let me take the first one. Mr. O'Brien, the national missile defense system is progressing. As my colleague Mr. Blair said, it is so long range as to still be hypothetical as to whether it will actually work or not. The fact that the United States is spending $8 billion a year on the research shows the commitment to trying to develop it. But in political terms it has certainly been overtaken as an issue by Iraq.

    Second, to Mr. Bergeron, evaluating the states' capabilities in nuclear weapons is, of course, the primary job of the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, which, as we pointed out earlier, is so underfunded that they have to rely on voluntary contributions from states to have even their eight-point program, which was brought in after September 11, properly administered.

    The point here is that the only way we could be sure about states having access to or the ability to develop weapons of mass destruction is to have rigorous verification procedures that are backed up by a legal base. The Security Council is the only body in the world that is empowered to oversee such inspections. We're having this problem in Iraq now. We believe that it is Iraq's responsibility to allow unfettered inspections by the United Nations teams and that these inspections should be complemented by an enhanced IAEA with a greater budget. Canada can play a great role and provide a great service in persuading our friends and allies to put more money into verification.

    Third, with regard to the United States as a rogue state, that is not our characterization. We believe that the United States--I speak as a Canadian but I'm surrounded by Americans at this table--is a great country. It has done a tremendous amount for the world over the years. In our view its leadership has deficiencies in its policies at this time, in which it has allowed itself to undermine the development and application of international law as has been developed by the United Nations over the course of the last 57 years or so.

    We think that it is our role as the Middle Powers Initiative to help the United States and the other nuclear weapon states to see their responsibilities under the terms of the non-proliferation treaty and their obligations to international law. It is the role of the Middle Powers Initiative to deal with middle power countries--and we go around the world doing this--to help them use their access to the nuclear weapon states, particularly, to be frank about it, the United States. The United States is the hyper-power today. They have a great responsibility to the world, and we want to help them exercise and fulfill that responsibility.

    Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much indeed, along with all your colleagues, for your courtesy in hearing us at this meeting. We're sorry we have to run, but there it is. Thank you very much.

    The Chair: Thank you very much to our witnesses. Merci beaucoup, monsieur Roche.