FAIT Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, February 25, 2003

¿

0905

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.))

Mr. Terence Taylor (President and Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies, United States)

¿

0910

¿

0915

¿

0920

¿

0925

The Chair

Mr. Jocelyn Coulon (Director, Montreal Campus, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre)

¿

0930

¿

0935

The Chair

Mr. James Keeley (Professor of Political Science, Fellow, Centre for Strategic and Military Studies, University of Calgary)

¿

0940

¿

0945

The Chair

Mr. Marco Sassoli (Professor of Law, "Université du Québec à Montréal")

¿

0950

¿

0955

À

1000

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance)

À

1005

The Chair

Mr. Jocelyn Coulon

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ)

Mr. Stockwell Day

Ms. Francine Lalonde

À

1010

Mr. Jocelyn Coulon

Mr. Marco Sassoli

The Chair

À

1015

Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Terence Taylor

À

1020

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP)

Mr. Terence Taylor

À

1025

Ms. Alexa McDonough

Mr. Terence Taylor

The Chair

Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Terence Taylor

À

1030

The Chair

Mr. Jocelyn Coulon

Mr. Murray Calder

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance)

À

1035

The Chair

Mr. Jocelyn Coulon

Mr. Terence Taylor

À

1040

The Chair

Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.)

Mr. Terence Taylor

Mrs. Karen Redman

Mr. Terence Taylor

À

1045

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ)

The Chair

Mr. Marco Sassoli

À

1050

The Chair

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan (York North, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. André Harvey (Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, Lib.)

The Chair

Hon. Jim Peterson (Willowdale, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Marco Sassoli

À

1055

The Chair

Mr. Jocelyn Coulon

The Chair

Mr. Terence Taylor

The Chair

Mr. Terence Taylor

The Chair

Mr. Terence Taylor

Á

1100

The Chair

Mr. Jocelyn Coulon

The Chair

Mr. Marco Sassoli

The Chair

Mr. James Keeley

The Chair

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

Á

1110

The Chair

Mr. André Harvey

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin

Á

1115

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Chair

Hon. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.)

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan

Á

1120

The Chair

Mrs. Karen Redman

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Chair

Mr. André Harvey

Á

1125

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Á

1130

Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC)

The Chair

Hon. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

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NUMBER 021

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, February 25, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿  (0905)  

[Translation]

    The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): We are ready to begin. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are considering the situation of Iraq.

[English]

    As the witnesses this morning we have, from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, United States, Mr. Terence Taylor, president; from the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Monsieur Jocelyn Coulon, directeur sur le campus à Montréal; from the University of Calgary, James Keeley, professor of Political Science and fellow at the Centre for Strategic and Military Studies; and later, from l'Université du Québec à Montréal, Monsieur Marco Sassoli, professeur de sciences juridiques.

    We are going to start with Mr. Taylor. Then we'll go to Monsieur Coulon and Mr. Keeley, and we'll have a question and answer period after that.

    Mr. Taylor, the floor is yours.

    Mr. Terence Taylor (President and Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies, United States): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    I'm really delighted and honoured to have the opportunity to address the standing committee today. The subject of our discussions is an issue that goes to the heart of the debate on international security, in essence, the issue of peace and war. What I'll do in the 10 minutes I have available is talk about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, then the UN inspections themselves.

    In light of the recent reports of the heads of the UN and International Atomic Energy Agency inspection teams to the Security Council and the debate over whether more time should given for inspections, it's very important, I think, to revisit briefly the earlier inspection process on Iraq and to understand what the Iraqis had in their weapons of mass destruction arsenal and what they may now have. Much misinformation has been put out that either exaggerates or, as frequently, underestimates Iraqi capabilities. Also, the former inspection process, the UN Special Commission, and the IAEA record in Iraq has too often been distorted and misrepresented, which I think is unfortunate. As someone who has been directly involved with the Iraq issue in several ways in the past decade, in my capital, in the Ministry of Defence, as a commissioner on the special commission, as a chief inspector in the field, and now, of course, with an independent think tank--so I'm in a different mode yet again on this issue--I'm going to try to offer you some thoughts to stimulate your deliberations.

    Perhaps most of you know the institute I come from is an independent and international organization that owes no allegiance to any government or any political entity. We're not an advocacy organization. I think it's important to remember that. Our mission is to study the various political, economic, and social problems that can lead to instability, as well as international cooperation. We have members in 100 countries around the world, individuals and organizations from all walks of life. We're a non-profit organization supported financially by our members. We're governed by an international council, with our head office in London and offices in Singapore and Washington, D.C., which is where I come from.

    Canadians have always been deeply involved in our institute. Lester Pearson was the second president of our council. The Honourable Roy MacLaren is currently the Canadian representative on our council. We had the Canadian defence minister in London just last month for a briefing, and he'll be attending the Asia security conference we're holding in Singapore later this year, along with other defence ministers from the Asia-Pacific region. We value highly the Canadian input in our organization, which has been substantial from the day we were founded in 1958.

    Some of the remarks I'm going to make today are based on a report I know you have in your library, because your library ordered it from my office in Washington. This is IISS's net assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. An international team, an independent team, not paid by any government, made an assessment. The members of the team came from the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, I think also Australia, so it's very much an independent assessment. It's not a political assessment, of course, it's a technical assessment.

¿  (0910)  

    We've tried to assess as accurately and as dispassionately as possible Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability. We couldn't fail to note that Iraq has made every effort to obscure its past, the history of the weapons programs, to obstruct the dismantlement of its present assets, and to retain the capabilities for the future. That is indisputable. These are just facts. And since Iraq forced the inspections to end in 1998, and they were withdrawn, inspections by late 1998 became useless. There was no cooperation, and so there was no point in having inspectors in Iraq at that time. The Iraqi leadership had decided that the attention of the world's leading military powers was elsewhere, on the Balkans at that time. So Iraq was immune from any serious military operation that would destabilize the regime.

    When you think about this issue, there are a number of questions you have to keep in the back of your minds. One is the extent to which Iraq has taken advantage of the absence of inspectors since 1998 to begin reconstituting its programs. Of course, they did continue with their programs while inspectors were there. That's an important point to bear in mind. I witnessed that with my own eyes, certainly on their biological weapons program. I've watched them rebuild facilities, build new facilities, knowing full well that they were hoping we wouldn't discover what they were up to.

    Another factor to take into account is the extent to which Iraq has been able to obtain foreign assistance through cracks in the sanctions regime. It's well known, of course, and they've admitted to importing equipment for missiles. Hans Blix has reported that.

    There is also the extent to which Iraq has been able to conduct activities that would have evaded sophisticated surveillance techniques, overhead high-altitude surveillance aircraft and satellite observations.

    A fourth point is the degree to which information gathered from defectors on Iraq's programs can still be relied upon. That is a very difficult area. There are some major defectors who have given very valuable information to the UN and governments, but there are quite a number of unreliable ones.

    The key questions are, what will the new inspection regime that started on November 29 last year discover, and how quickly can its work progress? I think we've actually had some idea of pace over the past 12 weeks or so of the inspection process.

    As I've said, in making our assessment, we've used an international team. I'll just highlight one or two points, without going into full detail, because I imagine we can deal with that during the question period. As a reminder, when UN Security Council resolution 687 was passed on April 3, 1991, that set the key provisions for the ceasefire terms, among which, of course, was the prohibition on Iraq retaining weapons of mass destruction and associated programs, facilities, and so on. At that time they had 15 days in which to deliver their full, final, and complete declaration, to use the actual title of the document they had to deliver. They had 30 days this time, and they still, in the opinion of the chief inspectors, not just mine, are nowhere near to getting it right. So it's over 12 years, and we're still a long way off.

    Iraq practised a series of elaborate deception measures. They had an elaborate concealment plan designed to prevent the UN inspectors. I experienced it first hand. On one of my inspections I found a document hidden in a store, thrown away by accident, that gave the orders to the heads of the establishments to hide things from the inspectors. So these are not allegations, these are again facts.

    I think the UNSCOM experience--that's the first inspection period of the 1990s, not the current one--demonstrates that no on-site inspections of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs can be successful without a genuine change of policy on the part of the government of that country. It can't succeed in weeks, it can't succeed in months, in my personal view. As one example, it took us four and a half years, with a large group of people, dedicated people--it wasn't a defector, by the way, as some governments have said--to force the Iraqis to admit that they had an offensive biological weapons program. They didn't tell us much about it, but we found the evidence. That was a dedicated team working inside Iraq, outside Iraq, following equipment into Iraq, against denial the whole time, with people telling us, you've done enough, perhaps they have a program, perhaps they don't, maybe we shouldn't carry on with this process. By year three and a half for me, as one of the chief inspectors on the biological weapons program, it was very disheartening to hear people telling us to give up, because they wanted the smoking gun, when we knew jolly well they were continuing the work while we were there on these programs. That's the disheartening part about it. I think that factor should be in the back of your minds as you think about the issues right now, as indeed some governments have made clear.

¿  (0915)  

    Now I'll just very briefly touch on each of the weapons programs, and we can explore those as we go along.

    The Gulf War heavily damaged Iraq's nuclear facilities, and by the end of the inspections in 1998 the IAEA felt that Iraq's indigenous nuclear weapons programs had not produced more than a few grams of weapons-usable material. But you have to remember that the expertise was not eliminated. They kept their teams together on civilian projects, and since 1998, of course, Iraq has had opportunity to reconstitute elements of its nuclear program and to keep the activities secret. What it would be difficult for them to do is hide a large gas centrifuge facility, for example, though not impossible.

    If you look into Dr. Mohamed el Baradi's most recent statements, there are two points I'd like to draw your attention to. He says the Iraqis have not given them any weapons design information. We didn't find any weapons components. They worked on this program for 25 years, and we never found any electrical firing circuits, explosive lenses, all these components that go together to make a weapon, hence the assessment in our work here. They have all the components, they've tested them, they'll have done the high explosive testing. By the way, Mohamed el Baradi reported last time that 35 tonnes of the HMX specialized explosive for nuclear weapons was missing and not accounted for, and the Iraqis say it's used in quarries. This is very expensive, high-quality explosive, only useful for nuclear weapons. I went and saw their store while I was there.

    So I don't feel comfortable at all about the nuclear weapons side now. I would believe, and my colleagues believe, they have all the components to make a weapon. All they need is the weapons grade material. Well, that could be stolen, that could be bought somewhere. Two or three months ago that quality of material was intercepted on the border between Bulgaria and Turkey. So this is a very dangerous situation with nuclear weapons. I would urge the committee not to feel relaxed on nuclear weapons, as there might be an impression from reports you have seen that it's too difficult for them. Okay, it's very difficult to build a whole gas centrifuge uranium enrichment process, but it's not impossible.

    On the biological weapons, after the invasion of Kuwait and before Desert Storm a brand new or relatively new site, which was hidden as a civil facility, as a single-cell protein facility for additives to animal food, and a bio-pesticide production plant, was proved to be their main biological weapons production site. In 1990 it produced thousands of litres of anthrax and botulinum toxin. That was dismantled--I led the mission which dismantled it--but those activities could be conducted in any number of places I could think of in Iraq that would not look like weapons facilities, and they certainly conducted what I would call a mobilization production capability. So the plant, it might be a pharmaceutical production plant, could be producing legitimate things one day and two days later be making biological agents.

    So our net assessment is that Iraq has probably retained substantial growth media, in other words, the capability to produce biological weapons agents, perhaps thousands of litres of anthrax. I think Dr. Hans Blix reported they had the capability to produce 8,500 litres. I can expand on that through questions if you like.

¿  (0920)  

    On the chemical weapons capabilities, as you know, at the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq had probably the largest chemical weapons capability in the region. Largely, during the Gulf War, the major facilities were destroyed, because we knew where they were. Despite all that and despite the many thousands of munitions and thousands of litres of chemicals destroyed by the excellent work of the UN Special Commission--that's not me, my colleagues did the chemical side--they still, in our view, could have retained stable precursors for several hundred tons of sarin and cyclosarin, nerve agents, and a similar amount of VX, the most lethal nerve agent known in weapons arsenals up until now. If you recall, Dr. Hans Blix did report that they have found evidence that Iraq, despite its statements that it did not do so, has weaponized VX. They said they produced some agents, but weren't able to make them stable enough. Even Dr. Blix--you don't just have to listen to me--says that's not so, from his recent inspections and looking at the evidence. So Iraq is capable of resuming chemical weapons production on short notice, months, from existing facilities, and it has agents it can use now and has munitions to put them in.

    On the missile side, you've heard the story of the Al Samud II missile. We put in our report published last September that Iraq was extending the range of its shorter range missiles beyond the permitted range of 150 kilometres. Dr. Blix's team found evidence of a test to 190 kilometres. So I think that's a proven case of a breach of the obligations on the part of Iraq. On the larger missiles, the Al Hussein missiles, some 650 kilometre range missiles, we estimate they may have components and parts to make 12 of those. Some national intelligence agencies give higher assessments.

    I'm not here to try to make a case either way for war, because that's a political judgment, but it is clear to anyone involved in this process that Iraq remains in substantial breach of its obligations. There's talk of a second resolution the United Kingdom and the United States are putting before the UN Security Council--people call it the second, but it's the 17th. If Iraq is not dealt with effectively in the next few months, I would say, it will result in increased dangers for the region and the wider world. I think weapons of mass destruction capability in the hands of the kind of regime that rules in Baghdad provide a very dangerous situation. The longer it continues, the more dangerous it gets. So in doing your risk analysis, you have to balance the risks of a military operation in the near future against, maybe in a year or two, if Iraq gets off the hook this time, a far more dangerous and, in my view, almost certainly a nuclear weapons capability, a central objective of the regime. It's clear, I think, even from today's reports from Baghdad, where Saddam Hussein is arguing now about the obvious case of a breach with the Al Samud II missiles, that he's not going to dismantle them. So the news from Baghdad is not good, and it seems that some means of prompt action has to be carried out.

    Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry I galloped through my remarks, but I have more information.

¿  (0925)  

    The Chair: You are our guest today, Mr. Taylor, thank you very much.

    Now we'll pass to Monsieur Jocelyn Coulon.

    Mr. Jocelyn Coulon (Director, Montreal Campus, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre): I would like to thank the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade for inviting me to testify. I will speak not on behalf of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, but on my own behalf. For the purpose of clarity, I will give my presentation in French, because in this matter it is better to speak one's own language than to try to please everyone and not be fully consistent in English.

[Translation]

    Mr. Chairman, committee members, the question under consideration is that of war or peace with Iraq. I will not comment on Mr. Terence Taylor's report or comments on the specific issue of weapons of mass destruction that Iraq allegedly possesses. Mr. Taylor has provided a description that is circulating in public opinion, in some research institutes and in certain governments.

    It is true that these are serious matters. I would however like to remind you of what France, Germany and Russia stated yesterday in the memorandum that they presented to the Security Council on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. I will read the paragraph in question:

While suspicions remain, no evidence has been given that Iraq still possesses weapons of mass destruction or capabilities in this field.

    Here are three countries, France, Germany and Russia that have intelligence services, that have inspectors in the field, that have experience in issues involving weapons of mass destruction, and that are calling into question the information provided by the U.S. and the U.K.

    I would also like to point out that I am not opposed to war in principle. On the contrary, I believe that war must be used as a weapon of last resort in international crises that jeopardize international law, society and morals. Thus, The Gulf War in 1991, the war in Kosovo in 1999, and the war in Afghanistan in 2001 were, in my opinion, legally, politically, and morally justified wars. And I am sure that on the matter of law, my colleague Marco Sassoli will undoubtedly have more intelligent remarks to make than I do, as I am not a lawyer.

    However, I would like to go back to the case of Iraq and its political and moral specificity. Of course, we are faced with violations of United Nations resolutions demanding that a State disarm, in accordance with very specific provisions of the United Nations Charter, and more specifically, chapters 6 and 7 of the Charter. Iraq is clearly violating these resolutions.

    According to the U.S., Great Britain and some institutions, Iraq allegedly still possesses weapons of mass destruction or the means to build these weapons of mass destruction. The reports by Mr. Blix and Mr. El-Baradei show where the alleged violations or suspicions exist. I believe, however, that we must ask questions about the real capability of Iraq to have these weapons or to build them in the short or medium term. In light of these violations and the fact that Iraq could have weapons, the issue is whether or not the situation is sufficiently serious to necessitate the invasion of a country and the destruction of its government, as well as the consequence of that, the occupation of Iraq. Since I am not a lawyer, I will not get into legal technicalities on that, but I do think that this is a question we must ask ourselves.

¿  (0930)  

    Another issue that members of Parliament, public opinion, and the government should look at is the difference between action taken with the UN's blessing and unilateral action taken by the US. The US and its allies maintain that the 1991 ceasefire has not been respected, because there were conditions attached to the 1991 ceasefire, and so the war is not over, it has just been suspended. The US maintains that it can continue this war, since the ceasefire has allegedly been violated. This debate has also divided the legal community.

    Does the US have the right to act unilaterally? The US will say that it is not acting unilaterally, since there is a ceasefire and because the ceasefire has not been respected, they are simply continuing the operations legally authorized through resolution 678 which was adopted on November 29, 1990.

    But if this war is unilateral, will it be illegal? Will this war be considered as an aggression? And if it is considered as such, will it be a crime against peace? Will it be a crime against humanity? I remind you that the head of diplomacy at the Vatican stated yesterday in Rome that if a war were declared unilaterally tomorrow morning that was not sanctioned by the United Nations, the war would be considered as an aggression and would be a crime against peace. So we must ask ourselves the following question: does Canada want to be associated with a unilateral war and perhaps a crime against peace?

    The other issue revolves around the Security Council decision to go to war. Everyone is of the opinion that the Security Council is the executive branch of the United Nations. If action has the blessing of the Security Council, it is fair and right, according to the law. It is legal, legitimate and politically justified. I would like to draw the attention of this committee to the fact that not all Security Council decisions are necessarily good and that the Security Council as an instrument may prove to be diabolical.

    I am reminded of General Romeo Dallaire's experience in Rwanda in 1994. General Dallaire was in Rwanda, and it was April or May. He asked the Security Council to help by increasing the number of his ground troops. Not only did the Security Council deny his request for additional ground troops, but it reduced the number of peacekeepers on the ground, and attempts to prevent the genocide were unsuccessful. That was a Security Council decision. Was it a legal decision? Yes. But was it a morally justifiable decision? We can say no, it was not. So the Security Council does not always make the right decisions.

    People in Washington and elsewhere say that the Security Council is at a turning point and that over the next few days, it will prove its relevancy and its importance in enforcing its resolutions.

¿  (0935)  

    I want to point out to honourable members that this will not be the first time that the Security Council has been unable to enforce its resolutions. Look at the crisis in Cyprus, where Turkish troops are occupying half of the country, or at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or other conflicts, resolutions are often violated.

    But we are faced with a fact, an American position: we are being told that if we do not agree with the American proposal, we will see if the Security Council is important or relevant. I can tell you that the majority of Security Council members feel that peaceful disarmament work is important and relevant and that the Security Council is currently showing its relevance and its importance. But we are hearing the voice of the minority, which is attempting to lead us to believe that the majority is in an illegitimate situation. I would like someone to explain how we are supposed to wrap our minds around that kind of explanation.

    Finally, I personally believe that Canada must take a stand on a unilateral declaration of war and say no to a unilateral declaration of war by the United States. We have the means to calmly explain that to our US allies and to show our support for the broad UN principles that we have been respecting and promoting for 50 years.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Coulon.

[English]

    Now we're going to Mr. James Keeley, a professor of political science and a fellow at the Centre for Strategic and Military Studies of the University of Calgary.

    Mr. James Keeley (Professor of Political Science, Fellow, Centre for Strategic and Military Studies, University of Calgary): Thank you very much.

    I want to thank the committee for the opportunity and, indeed, the honour of being here. This is my first appearance, so pardon my nervousness.

    The theme I want to focus on is that of war versus containment, one would hope war versus progress during containment. The question is, what would containment actually require, what would it mean? I want to concentrate on inspection as the primary mechanism of that containment, and also because inspections will be the grounds on which a justification for stronger action will be advanced. So we want to know what's involved in this.

    Iraq's history in regard to weapons of mass destruction is well known, as Mr. Taylor has pointed out, so I will skip very briefly over a couple of points. One is that the smoking gun language is misleading, a marvellous media thing, but the formal burden of proof is on Iraq. The smoking gun could be discovery of weapons or production capabilities, it could be uncovering the knowledge base, the soft capabilities that remain, it could be Iraqi efforts to evade or deceive inspections, but it could also be simply failure to comply fully and proactively with resolution 1441. Resolution 1441 is not about containment, it is about one final opportunity. If we take the view that it's sufficient to have the inspectors in Iraq, and now they should be kept there as long as necessary, we shift towards a containment position, not one last chance, but one more chance.

    If containment is meant as an alternative to war, what does it mean? It means possibly three things. First, it could mean the hope of realizing the original intentions of UNSCOM and of the IAEA action team. Second, it could be a hope that inspections may at least impede presumed Iraqi efforts to rebuild or to preserve their programs, a hope to buy time. It's not clear to me exactly for what we would be buying time or what we do in that time. Third, containment could mean “anything but”, that is, anything but any stronger action. In that case, it is containment of the United States, not containment of Iraq.

    The situation with respect to Iraq is dynamic in a number of senses, the levels of political support for action against Iraq, action of various sorts, the learning curves of Iraq with respect to inspections, relevant technologies, ability to acquire materials and other items, continued pressure on the trade controls on Iraq, the inspectors' learning curves and capabilities, and the apparent need for periodic or even continual threats to maintain the capability and the integrity of the inspections.

    In other words, containment is not a naturally stable or a naturally acceptable policy. Without the threat of war, after all, the issue on the table around the world would probably be the sanctions and the oil for food program. Containment, in the opinion of some observers, is an eroding strategy. It would need active, continual support to work, and its working cannot be guaranteed. Some already believe it is eroded past revival.

¿  (0940)  

    There are a number of contextual factors containment would face as well. One is, of course, that Iraqi good faith cannot be presumed. Iraq has irredeemably, I think, harmed its credibility in its well-known actions of the past years. Without this confidence in Iraq, of course, inspections must be presumed to take place in a hostile environment. Further, there are technical ambiguities imposed by dual use capabilities, technological maturation, smuggling, and the legal possession of missiles under 150 kilometres in range. And of course, there is the logical problem of proving a negative. The question this leaves us with is, what level of assurances would be sufficient to satisfy us?

    On this basis, then, what efforts would be needed to preserve or strengthen the inspection process, and how long would the international community be willing to bear the cost of these efforts and be able to stick together to accomplish that task? I'm afraid the record of 1991 to 2002 is not very reassuring in this regard.

    What would be required in a containment effort? First, you would need continued controls of some sort over Iraqi export revenues and trade, strengthened efforts to block Iraqi revenues gained outside the oil for food mechanism, strengthened efforts to deal with smuggling, efforts to deal with Iraqi's ability to use its power to award contracts both within and outside oil for food to political advantage. Second, the integrity of the inspectors' rights would have to be protected, even at some risk of confrontation. Third, a close watch would have to be kept over attempts to evade, define down, erode, find exceptions to the inspectors' rights or to block their access to information. Fourth, additional information from various sources would be required; they would need to actively pursue that. Fifth, solid, consistent, reliable, political backing, up to and including serious threats of consequences, must be available as and when needed. Unfortunately, the key components of a credible threat are the known willingness and ability to inflict unacceptable costs on your target. Sixth, if we offer Iraq rewards for compliance, we must also be willing to impose penalties for non-compliance--the ratchet has to work both ways. And seventh, we must be prepared, in light of experience, to strengthen the inspections as needed.

    The irony is that the continued threat of military force is vital to securing all this, concentrating the mind not only of the Iraqi government, but also, it seems, of other states in the world. But there are implications, there are costs for all this. Continued containment vigorously supported imposes costs on the Iraqi people. It has implications for relations with Iraq's neighbours, for solidarity within the Security Council, for the ability to ramp up and ramp down the threat of force as needed, and of course, it has very considerable other global and regional implications, some of which Mr. Coulon has referred to.

    So real containment means real burdens. If those requirements are not adequately met, we slip from containment in the first sense, trying to achieve the original intent of resolution 687, to containment to buy time, or we move, indeed, to containment as anything but effective action. If containment isn't unstable or an eroding strategy, failure to discuss these requirements seriously, much less to try to meet them, means we really have to focus our discussion elsewhere, and that means either we find some reason to believe the threat from Iraq does not justify the risks of stronger action or we seriously debate the merits and the costs of military action.

    Thank you.

¿  (0945)  

    The Chair: Thank you very much Professor Keeley.

[Translation]

    We will now turn the floor to Mr. Marco Sassoli, who is a professor of political science at the University of Quebec at Montreal.

    Welcome, Mr. Sassoli. You have the floor.

    Mr. Marco Sassoli (Professor of Law, "Université du Québec à Montréal"): Good morning Mr. Chairman and honourable committee members. I want to start by apologizing for my late arrival, which was due to scheduling problems at VIA Rail Canada; if I understand correctly, that kind of problem does not come under you committee's mandate. You kindly referred to me as a professor of political science. However, I am simply a law professor and I will limit my remarks to the law and other legal aspects, simply because some of my eminent colleagues are specialized in politics and geopolitics, and because as policy makers, you are the true political experts.

    Clearly, opting for war or for peace is a highly political decision, and not a legal one, but the law does provide a framework for making that decision. But if international law is not successful in providing a framework for that kind of decision, in my opinion, it is useless, because the main role of any law in any society is to channel violence and organize, and sometimes authorize the use of violence.

    As a starting point, let's take the fact that since 1928, the use of force has been banned in international relations. With the Briand-Kellogg Pact—with some exceptions—the idea behind the United Nations since 1945 has been to institutionalize and centralize the use of force. Obviously, we cannot expect a State that is under attack to wait for a centralized and coordinated institutional response by the international community. Nevertheless, originally, in 1945, it was the United States that wanted to centralize and institutionalize as much as possible all decisions regarding the use of force, with a view to insuring to collective security and to fulfill the dream of a better world.

    As regards the use of force against Iraq, possible justifications would be, in this case, legitimate defence, through Security Council authorization. Legitimate defence is allowed as a pre-existing right by the United Nations Charter “if an armed attack occurs” against a member of the U.N.

¿  (0950)  

[English]

“if an armed attack occurs”.

[Translation]

    According to the letter of this Charter provision, one would say that an attack must occur for the right to legitimate defence to exist. But for a long time now, there have been theories that justify preventive legitimate defence. It is a delicate issue, given the letter of the Charter and given that it is an exception.

    Legitimate defence is an exception to a fundamental rule of current international law, in other words that the use of force is prohibited; exceptions must be interpreted in a limited way. Moreover, we must bear in mind that under international law, contrary to what occurs in domestic law, there is no judge. Society applies the law to itself and to others.

    Therefore, where possible, reference must be made to facts that are easy to establish. An armed attack is easy to establish. The risk of an armed attack, however, is much more difficult to establish, and contrary to what would prevail in domestic law, there is no judge who will subsequently determine if there really was a risk.

    If, at the outset, it is felt that there is a right to prevent legitimate self-defence, it should be pointed out that certain conditions exist and that these were established during the 1837 Caroline Affair, which Canada was involved in. The superpower at the time, was discussing this type of right with what was then a small country, the United States, that had lost a war with the superpower in question. The United States set out a condition whereby the British government could invoke preventive legitimate self-defence. It had to show, and I quote, “... a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”

    I do not share the secret of the powers that be, nor of the intelligence services, but I would assume that one could determine whether the risk is hypothetical or real, and rather or not other means could be used first. There is no such thing has a situation that leaves no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. Even supporters of preventive legitimate self-defence do not see how, in such a case, the conditions for preventive legitimate self-defence could be met.

    Another way of justifying the use of force is a Security Council resolution. Some would say that resolution 1441—and I will come back to previous resolutions—already explicitly allows for the use of force. In fact, this resolution was a negotiated compromise and was worded in such a way as to neither include nor exclude that possibility.

    From a purely legal point of view, if the treaty is to be interpreted as a trade treaty, according to its goal and context, it would be surprising if the decision to authorize the use of force—which is allowable, even without an armed attack, wherever international peace and security is under threat, a much broader concept than an armed attack—was made implicitly, by interpreting a text rather than explicitly, by using a clear resolution. After all, this is maybe one of the most important decision ever to be made by the international community.

    Furthermore, this would beg two essential questions which I feel are distinct. First, has a breach occurred and second, what was the reaction to that breach. Each country has to find their own answer to those questions. The fact that from a legal point of view the United States is equal to Burundi, to Canada, to Switzerland, to France and to Nigeria, means that Nigeria can say that there was a breach and that force can be used. Burundi however may feel that there was no such breach and that therefore force cannot be used. That is almost the opposite of the approach of the Charter that I will now quote from in chapter 1, article 1, with your permission:

The purpose of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace,...

¿  (0955)  

    I would say that the same argument counter the notion that some people have put forward, to the effect that the cease-fire resolution adopted 12 years ago, which was subject to a number of conditions, authorized renewed use of force—something clearly legitimate at the time—if at any time the conditions were not complied with. First of all, 12 years is a very long time in international law. Let me give you an example: could the Allies of World War II take up harms against Germany again, because one of them felt that Germany had not complied with the conditions of its surrender? And there is another problem as well: legitimizing such actions would give the individual member countries of the United Nations the authority to decide for themselves whether non-compliance existed.

    My last point is an a different vein entirely. I am concerned about the law that would apply in the case of an armed conflict, international humanitarian law. If there was an armed conflict, I believe it would be essential to insist that international humanitarian law—the Geneva Conventions—be fully complied with, regardless of whether the conflict in Iraq was legitimate or not. Thus, Iraq would become an occupied territory within the meaning of the Fourth Geneva Convention. And I fervently hope that no brilliant lawyers will attempt to explain that Iraq is not an occupied territory.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

À  (1000)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Sassoli.

    We will now move on to questions.

[English]

    Mr. Day, a five-minute round.

    Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance): Thank you to each one of you for your deliberations.

    I appreciate, Mr. Sassoli, your speculations on international law, because with law, there are always lawyers, and therefore there are always at least two points of view on any law. Domestic law, civil law, even national law always provoke different points of view, but somehow, international law takes on this magical quality: people say, international law says, where they should be saying, my point of view on international law says. So I thank you for making it clear that even international law has different points of view. Voltaire said God was on the side of the bigger battalions. I think, when it comes to modern law, that'll be on the side of those who are able to exact the biggest sympathy in the media. That's significantly where international law, in the minds of people, seems to go.

    Mr. Taylor, you've been there, you've seen these things. I'm fascinated that in general terms, whether in the time of Mr. Taylor or Mr. Blix, the people who've been there are convinced that there's a high degree of danger. Many times people who haven't been there take the view that there's no danger at all and that these guys are somehow fabricating things. So I appreciate your raising the point about the danger.

[Translation]

    I have a question for Mr. Coulon. He said that the war in Kosovo was justified. I agree that it was justified, because there was no doubt Mr. Milosevic represented a serious threat, and that thousands of Muslims had been killed. I agree that the war was justified without U.N. support. So if that war was justified, why not this one? Milosevic was an amateur in comparison with Saddam Hussein. Hussein has invaded other countries twice, and used chemical weapons against his own citizens, against women, children and whoever else happened to be there. He has attacked Israel with missiles. So as some people, including Mr. Taylor, have said, he is now a threat.

    I hope that we will be able to avoid a war. History has shown that war can be avoided. If Hussein is convinced that there is a common front to stop him, we may be able to avoid war. But if he sees that allies are divided or split, he will no longer fear them. I think history has shown that very clearly.

    In my view, that is the problem France's position poses.

À  (1005)  

[English]

Here we have a situation where France has indicated that no matter what the Security Council does, they're going to veto. So we have a deranged dictator wringing his hands in glee that at least one, and maybe more, of the people on the Security Council is going to say the war would be immoral. I think France has conflict and is implicated in this. Certainly, their history shows that when it is in their interest, they get very bellicose. They're one of the few nations I know to have blown up a Greenpeace ship, blown up and killed Greenpeacers, because it affected their interests. And there's the terrible thing that happened on the Ivory Coast--all of a sudden, French soldiers invading that country. France was significantly involved in the fracture of the League of Nations. They were a significant force against what the allies wanted to do related to Abyssinia and Mussolini. Certainly, they were implicated in their misjudgment on the Second World War, and the blood of Canadian soldiers on French beaches helped to rectify a situation they misjudged, despite the Vichy regime. And now they lead other countries. The U.S. was wrong in arming Iraq in the Iraq-Iran conflict, but France leads all nations in arm sales to Iraq, and they have broken UN resolutions related to oil and gas. The French position, quite frankly, in my view, is strategically unwise and morally untenable, both in their present actions and their past history.

    I'd like to know if Mr. Coulon could comment on how war could be justified in Kosovo and not now. I'm not hoping for war, we're hoping for peace, but how do you justify one and not the other?

[Translation]

    The Chair: Please keep your answers brief. Since each member has only a certain number of minutes, the time you take to answer is deducted from Mr. Day's time. You have 30 seconds, Mr. Coulon.

    Mr. Jocelyn Coulon: Oh, my goodness. Listen, I will not comment on the commentary on France, because I think the position is more subtle than that.

    With respect to justifying intervention in Kosovo, it is quite true that there was no Security Council authorization, but there had been a number of Security Council resolutions warning the Milosevic regime that failure to comply with the Kosovo resolutions would result in severe repercussions. That is my first point.

    Secondly, there was a very broad consensus internationally to engage NATO to take up arms against Yugoslavia. I did not see a single Muslim nation publicly insists on compliance with the letter of international law. Today, those same people are acting in a way that contradicts their former positions, since it now appears the United States is to attack a Muslim nation, or Islam in general. Now, all Muslim nations are invoking international law. There is an essential contradiction there.

    My colleague Marco Sassoli could probably provide you with more details on the legal—or illegal—basis for the war in Kosovo.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Coulon.

    Ms. Lalonde.

    Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): Thank you.

    I should point out that this anti-French sentiment seems based on feelings that I would rather not describe here, but elsewhere—perhaps face to face. After all you said, Mr....

[English]

    Mr. Stockwell Day: It's the leaders in France.

[Translation]

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: Oh, please! If we had said the same thing about the United States, you would have found it pretty offensive.

    First of all, I have a question for those who say that war is necessary because Iraq poses a danger. Why is it that between the time the inspectors left in 1998 and their return a few months ago, during the period when al-Qaida—as we now know—was preparing to do what it did to the United States—during the period when Saddam, as we claim, had all those weapons of mass destruction, nothing was done? I think we need to really substantiate the theory that there is danger after the fact. Here, we have heard testimonies from inspectors who were a good deal less worried than other people. That is my first point.

    Secondly, I would like to hear the views of Mr. Coulon and Mr. Sassoli on the issues of international legality and morals. You have been very clear in what you said, but I would like you to go somewhat further.

    As for Kosovo, I was myself in favour of an armed conflict, because I wanted to put an end to what, according to every indication we had, appeared to be ethnic cleansing. At the time, we had no other means to put an end to it. Perhaps we should have invented some.

    This time around, however, there seems to be a vast disconnect between the dangers, which have not been established, and the promised war, which will have significant humanitarian effects. The war may not only be illegal, but even if it is legal, it may appear highly illegitimate.

À  (1010)  

    Mr. Jocelyn Coulon: On the morality issue, we have heard many people, many groups and many States say that Iraq was a rogue country which violated human rights; essentially, that it was a concentration camp. If this is so, why not say so in the UN resolutions?

    The resolutions state that the international community must disarm Iraq by force. I have not seen—though others may correct me on this—any goals other than disarming Iraq. I have not seen any resolutions stating that we will not only attack Iraq, but also invade the country and topple its government on the basis of international law and moral considerations, because Iraq is violating human rights, massacring its people and doing other unspeakable things.

    Why is this not clearly spelled out in a resolution? If it were, we would all know what we were voting on, and what the ultimate goal was. That is basically all I have to say.

    My colleague, Mr. Sassoli, may have something to add.

    Mr. Marco Sassoli: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I have worked for the International Red Cross committee in the region, and for a brief time even worked on Iraqi soil; I can say I have very little sympathy for the Iraqi regime. However, I will restrict my remarks to international law. We should bear in mind the fact that, in international law, there is no objective judge, and therein lies the difference with domestic law. In domestic law, there are lawyers, and ultimately an objective judge who decides a given issue. In international law however, every State is both lawyer and judge. As a result, international law could not exist if we applied the premise that there are two possible legal answers to every issue. It would be useless.

    With respect to Kosovo, I do admit that the precedent is a dangerous one. I concede that, at the time, I believed that in international law we could have a different moral slant, yet every country has its own morals while law is common to all. In international law, conditions governing the use of force were not present. Perhaps we should review the corpus of international law that provides for humanitarian intervention, but then we should also establish a body that can rule in cases where human rights or international humanitarian rights are violated sufficiently to justify the use of force. If we had that system in place today, Iraq would unfortunately not be the only country targeted.

    Thank you.

[English]

    The Chair: Merci, Monsieur Sassoli.

    Ms. Carroll, please.

À  (1015)  

    Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I wish we were up in the TV room in Centre Block because the excellence of the four presentations should be shared by a far wider audience than we are forming today.

    Also, you might note, Mr. Chair, that there was a very good letter, I thought, to the National Post by the French ambassador to Canada explaining exactly what his view was of the allegations the National Post has been putting forward. I think it would be good for everyone to note it.

    I want to let you use my time to respond, and I want to begin with Mr. Taylor. I think it's important that all of us note your background and the credibility it and the International Institute for Strategic Studies bring to this question. While there is so much for us to digest, I certainly would not want us to lose sight of your excellent comments, and I thank you for them. So I'm just going to put a couple of questions, and then ask you to reply.

    Given all you've said, it would appear that we are very close to accepting that Iraq is, if not right now, on the verge of a nuclear potential, and I think that has to be brought into the mix in discussions. I would ask you, Mr. Taylor, if you would comment on how you see all this affecting the future of the United Nations, whatever way the next couple of weeks play out.

    Professor Coulon, your remarks were excellent as well. You comment on Dallaire in Rwanda, and of course, everyone was terribly cognizant of the horrors and the personal impact of all that on him, and how he asked the Security Council for more ground troops, and they not only declined, but reduced the peacekeeping force in the field. You ask whether or not that decision was moral, and there's a great deal of talk around the table about what is moral and what is not moral. It was logistically a poor decision, there's no question. You also, in the course of your comments, made reference to what the Vatican has said. I think it's very important what the Vatican says, but I also think it's interesting when we reach for what the Vatican is saying to bolster positions and when we elect to not pay too much attention to what the Vatican is saying.

    So to bring that together in my mind a bit, I'm sure the Security Council has made poor decisions in the past, but only the Vatican claims to speak ex cathedra, and the UN is left with just being a human organization and the best we have. While their decisions are at times flawed and, as I mentioned, poorly deduced, I would not want to conclude an irrelevance, I would not want to conclude, or hope you would not conclude, that this, in and of itself, speaks for a decaying organization. So I would ask you, as well as Dr. Taylor, if you would comment--and there's much in the papers now--on what all this means for the Security Council.

    The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Carroll.

    Mr. Taylor.

    Mr. Terence Taylor: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your very good question.

    These are my personal views, not those of my institute, nor do I speak for any government, of course, but there's no doubt in my mind from the evidence, hard evidence, substantive evidence, not just allegations, some of which have been confirmed by the new inspection process that's in hand, that Iraq has usable chemical weapons, has usable biological weapons, and in a very short period of time could have a usable nuclear weapon if nothing effective is done in dealing with the current situation in Iraq. So if the UN Security Council does not deal effectively with this issue in the next few weeks, I think it will be a serious loss for the United Nations.

    I have in my mind the remarks of Mr. Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, to the meeting of the Security Council on February 14, when he said the UN had faced 12 years of humiliation by Iraq repeatedly flouting resolutions. We're approaching what might be the seventeenth resolution. By the way, resolution 1441 reaffirms resolution 687, which has all the human rights issues included in it. I think this is very important to have in mind. Certain governments who've raised the human rights issues as part of the reason for taking rigorous action now or hoping to avoid war have been criticized for drawing attention to those issues.

    I was quite pleased that Kosovo and the Balkan issues have come up, because I think it's very important for the committee to think about these issues. Slobodan Milosevic's dreadful crimes--and they are dreadful, I'm not minimizing them--pale by comparison with those of Saddam Hussein. I think the committee needs to reflect on that as they think about this issue. There have been repeated reports, well documented by people such as a UN human rights rapporteur. I'd urge you to read those regular reports on human rights abuses in Iraq over the past 10 years or so, and of course, even before then.

À  (1020)  

    The Chair: Thank you. We need to cut you off here, in fairness to my colleagues.

    Now we're going to pass to Ms. McDonough.

    Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I want to thank the panel very much. I think you've given us a great deal to think about.

    I won't speak for anyone else, but for some people to think Saddam Hussein is not a demonic dictator is totally ridiculous. The question is whether there is such a threat to international peace and security that only the use of force can deal with it. I think that's what we, as legislators, and nations of the world are trying to calculate. It seems to me that the UN Secretary General has helped in pushing us even harder to meet the test, before any decision is made, of whether the use of threat is the only way to deal with obvious violations by the Iraqi regime of the requirement to totally and fully disarm.

    I would like to raise a question that may seem far afield. I'd like to ask it directly to Mr. Taylor, because I think you've echoed the sentiment of the Bush administration, although you've made it clear you're speaking for yourself, that Iraq is a very severe threat, and if it's not dealt with within weeks, this is a tremendously dangerous situation and may warrant the use of force. The calculation of United Nations disarmament affairs under the general secretary is that at the current rate of the nuclear states of the world meeting their disarmament compliance requirements, it would take 350 years to rid the world of nuclear arms. Since the Bush administration came to office, it has been in direct violation of its commitments under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, it has cancelled its commitment to the ABM treaty, and without doubt, one can find many other violations. I'm wondering, Mr. Taylor, if you consider those a threat and whether the institute has an official position on the degree of threat posed by the many violations by the U.S. of its requirements under various UN non-proliferation and other kinds of treaty obligations.

    Mr. Terence Taylor: We don't have an institute official position, so I can only speak for myself. I'm not aware of any breaches of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty by the United States. I'd be very interested to know precisely what they are. Certainly, I see no evidence of that. Thousands of nuclear weapons have been dismantled over the past decade in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and many other countries. So the reduction of nuclear weapons--I can't remember the figure--goes into tens of thousands on the part of all the nuclear powers. We have before us, as I think is relevant to the present situation, the ending of a nuclear program in South Africa with the cathartic political changes there. There, as some governments have pointed out, is a classic example of genuine, willing cooperation with disarmament and the International Atomic Energy Agency. I think that's the example we should be reflecting on in the case of Iraq.

    I would like to say more about the NPT, but time's up.

À  (1025)  

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: I'll quote directly from the Simons Centre for Peace and Disarmament to respond to your question on who would suggest that the U.S. is in violation:

The United States, in flagrant violation of its treaty obligations, has reversed its direction, announced that nuclear weapons will remain the cornerstone of its strategic defence, and is moving ahead with the development of new nuclear weapons which will be integrated into its battlefield fighting strategy.

I don't know whether Mr. Taylor would like to respond.

    Mr. Terence Taylor: I'd just say I don't agree with that interpretation. You also quoted the Department of Disarmament Affairs at the UN, where I used to be a political affairs officer myself. The United States has hugely reduced its arsenal. The world, in its judgment--and I'm not speaking in its defence--is not in a situation where it could disarm completely, although it hasn't disavowed the very long-term strategic goal, whatever actions it may take over its much reduced nuclear arsenal at the moment. The United Kingdom has reduced its arsenal, France has hugely reduced its arsenal too, and obviously Russia. I think nuclear disarmament is very important, and I'm an avowed nuclear disarmer myself, but one has to be realistic and pragmatic about the present world political situation and the threats we're faced with. I think they are consistent.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Taylor.

    Now we'll go to Mr. Calder.

    Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    Mr. Taylor and Mr. Coulon, both of you just touched on this issue. The last 12 years we've seen Saddam Hussein basically play cat and mouse, and he's going to keep on playing this. Seeing that he is the problem, probably, if he is removed, he'll be the solution to the problem. Have you done any studies on post-Hussein Iraq? For instance, if he is gone, who fills the void, given that there doesn't seem to be any resistance movement within Iraq, not one I've read about anyway--and that I find curious, given that in Afghanistan you had the Northern Alliance?

    Another question would be whether the Kurds or the Shiites would want their own country out of Iraq, given the Yugoslavia situation.

    Finally, given that Iraq imports about 70% of its food, have you done any studies on what type of occupation force would have to be put into Iraq to make sure civilian deaths are kept as low as possible?

    The Chair: Mr. Taylor.

    Mr. Terence Taylor: We've just published at the institute a collection of essays, and I can leave this copy for the committee if you so wish. It's called Iraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change. It's a set of essays by different authors, so you'll find different positions in it and a detailed analysis focusing on a post-Saddam Iraq. I haven't got time to go into the details, but at the heart of it, there doesn't seem to be a strategic decision at the apex of the regime in Baghdad, in other words, Saddam Hussein, to fully comply with the obligations, so the only way we're going to see some change, it could be argued, is with a change of management in Baghdad. That's a very unpredictable thing, but I don't think the international community should be afraid of the risks involved. They are probably less than leaving weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein.

À  (1030)  

[Translation]

    The Chair: Mr. Coulon.

    Mr. Jocelyn Coulon: I'd like to add something on the issue of regime change. If we want a regime change in Iraq because we believe that the current regime has or could build weapons of mass destruction—I think it's the "could build" that worries us most—I would like someone to tell me what we are doing about North Korea.

    Well, what are we doing about North Korea? What are we doing about Pakistan? Is Pakistan an alley, an opponent, or a regime that is about to collapse? And if it does collapse, what will happen to its weapons of mass destruction?

    Everyone's focus is on Iraq. At least three countries have expressed doubts that Iraq indeed has weapons of mass destruction, and they are not just any countries. Well, tell us what is being done about North Korea and similar countries.

[English]

    Mr. Murray Calder: Mr. Coulon, that really brings out an interesting point. I think we're all concerned that as long as Hussein stays there, he'll keep trying to push towards having nuclear, and at that point you're into the situation of the last resort: would he in fact push the button? I guess then the question would be expanded, if you go into North Korea or the like. That also would be my concern.

    The Chair: Mr. Martin, please.

    Mr. Stockwell Day: Mr. Chairman, I'm exercising my right to raise a point of order. Madame Lalonde made some remarks about my being anti-French, and this is very important. When I criticize the British for their involvement in Suez, I am not anti-English. When I criticize Germany for its actions in the Second World War, I am not anti-German. When I criticize Canada for its actions in Somalia, I am not anti-Canadian. I take it, Mr. Chairman, as a slight on my rights as a member. I've spent most of my political life defending the provincial rights of Québécois. I spend hours every month improving a language I love, which happens to be French. I was the person who took on our party, in its previous incarnation, for ads that were a slight to French-speaking people in Quebec. Madame Lalonde represents a party that wants to split Canada and move Quebec, but I have never accused her of being anti-English, because I don't believe she is. When I criticize another government for its actions and I am characterized as being anti-French, that is beneath the standards Madame Lalonde usually sets for herself. I would ask her to withdraw that remark.

    The Chair: Mr. Day, it's not a point of order, it's a point of debate.

    Now we will go to Mr. Martin.

    Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance): Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. I echo Madam Carroll's comments. That was truly fascinating, and I wish all Canadians were privy to your fine discourse here today.

    Dr. Taylor and Monsieur Coulon, given that security is our number one concern, given our economic dependence on the United States, I'd like to you to answer three questions. The first concerns containment versus invasion. If we engage in an early invasion of Iraq, my concern is what this will do to our largest security concern, al-Qaeda. Would not an early invasion of Iraq actually swell the numbers of al-Qaeda and give al-Qaeda the political boost to increase its actions against the west?

    Second, historical records show us very clearly that we have not been very good at post-conflict reconstruction. War is the easy part. My concern is what's going to happen after the conflict, and perhaps you could address that.

    Finally, why Iraq, why right now, if you do a risk analysis comparing North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia? Russia has uncontrolled fissionable material and a number of individuals who are well capable of selling their knowledge and teaching others how to build a nuclear device.

    Thank you.

À  (1035)  

    The Chair: Monsieur Coulon.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jocelyn Coulon: Thank you for your questions, Mr. Martin. I will focus on the more political questions, and let Mr. Taylor deal with those on North Korea and Russia. Those are very technical questions that I could not answer well, because they touch on something that is not my area of expertise.

    You asked whether an early invasion of Iraq would give the nebulous terrorist group al-Qaida the boost it needs to resume its activities. But we didn't need to talk about invading Iraq to get hit by al-Qaida on September 11, 2001. Terrorists choose their own time, place and target to hit, regardless of whether the U.S., France and other countries do. Let's not forget that al-Qaida has been active since 1990, that terrorist attacks were made on the World Trade Centre in 1993, and against U.S. troops in Somalia, among other things. This is some kind of a vortexl that the invasion of Iraq may speed up, but I think that we have to clearly distinguish between war and terrorism.

    You say that war is the easy part, and that the real problems come after. But war is not necessarily the easy part. It took 100 days of bombing and 3 days of ground-based offensive to expel Iraqi soldiers from Kuwait, even when dealing with an army that wasn't that powerful. But invading a country the size of California, fighting against a small, not very threatening army... The problem isn't really the army, it's the urban guerilla warfare—fighting in the cities, in the mountains, and other difficult places. If the U.S. plan is to invade and occupy Iraq, then Iraq must be occupied. To my mind, that is the difficult part.

    After the war comes reconstruction. The Security Council, Europeans and international organizations will have to do their part when it comes to rebuilding Iraq. And that is all I have to say on this.

[English]

    Mr. Terence Taylor: Perhaps, with the limited time, I will indeed concentrate on your third question.

    Why now? Because I think the lesson of September 11, 2001, is that it's too dangerous to let unattended situations fester too long, as was the case in Afghanistan. All the signals were there and there was too much waiting for all the dots to be joined up, and then this dreadful event happened in the United States. I think it's not so much the direct connection. I'm not talking here about Iraq helping al-Qaeda. What I'm saying is that 12 years have passed, and we have not disarmed Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. It has usable chemical and biological weapons, and the latter of those two is very dangerous in respect of possible terrorist use and could cause very large numbers of casualties. And as I've said, I think, if the matter is unattended, we'll end up with a nuclear-armed Iraq within a fairly short period, within a year or two maybe, and that would be a completely different strategic situation in the region as far as the world is concerned. So this is why now. It's too late, of course. We should have done it some time ago, but other political events took the attention of the major powers away from this country.

    As to the link with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea in shorthand, if Iraq is not attended to decisively, that sends completely the wrong message to Pyongyang. It will encourage them to brazen it out. It will say the UN Security Council is not serious, the inspection system is not serious. So that's another reason why we have to deal with Iraq now, because of the situation in North Korea.

    With regard to Russia, while there are indeed very serious concerns about Russia, it is in a process of very serious engagement on these issues, and I'm very much encouraged by the cooperative threat reduction program and work through the G-8 on some of these issues. Russia is integrating efforts with the key countries on these issues of proliferation. So I think the picture in Russia, while it's not one we can be complacent or comfortable about, shows a process of engagement that is very encouraging. There's an example there of the International Science and Technology Centres involved in projects to re-employ weapons scientists, and the European Union's involved in this, Japan is involved in this, and the United States as well. So there's a multilateral effort engaged in Russia, in which President Putin's government has been more positive, more proactive, and more active than previous ones. It's not solved, it's serious, and we have to keep on eye on it, but in the case of Russia, I don't share, Mr. Martin, your concerns in the same kind of way.

À  (1040)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

    We'll go to Mrs. Redman.

    Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.): Thank you.

    I too would voice my thanks for all your excellent interventions.

    Mr. Taylor, you may have already touched on one of my questions, but can inspections, in your view, be successful, and under what circumstances?

    My other question would be, given the complex ruminations of the UN, are there other opportunities for multilateralism to work, outside the UN?

    Mr. Terence Taylor: Can inspections be successful? In the shorter term, only if the Iraqi regime genuinely cooperates, in other words, delivers new information and so on. Otherwise, it will take years, as indeed it did in the 1990s, to uncover weapons programs against denial. I mentioned the biological weapons program, when the Iraqis made their first and several subsequent full and final complete declarations, as they're called, and said, no, we have no offensive biological weapons program. It was four and a half years before we uncovered the evidence. That's what we're faced with if we go on now in the same way. There are some governments with the view that this is the “safer” route, because it has a containment aspect to it, it makes it more difficult for Iraq to continue a weapons of mass destruction program. But the fact of the matter is that in the 1990s, in these circumstances, they did continue their weapons of mass destruction programs. They hope political will will perhaps erode over time, as Dr. Keeley said earlier on; I agree with his remarks. I think there are far too many dangers in going into a lengthy inspection process. Maybe over 10 years, with political will, with everything applied, but is that a process of successful inspections? My answer to that is no.

    I was so carried away with the answer to your first question, you'll have to remind me of the second one.

    Mrs. Karen Redman: I would throw both questions out to all the witnesses.

    Are there other multilateral efforts that can be effective if the machinations at the UN end up being an obstacle?

    Mr. Terence Taylor: I think the UN should be used as a primary focus, but there are other examples of regional work. The conventional forces in Europe treaty is one example, and there's the OSCE Vienna document process, where countries come together and have a very vigorous and intrusive inspection process as part of the regime. So in certain specific circumstances regional processes can be made to work, but the climate is not right for it now. At the Middle East peace process in 1993 I attended for my government, the United Kingdom, discussions with Palestinians, with Israelis, with Egyptians on how inspections were to take place as part of an integrated Middle East peace process. So it is possible, but certain political conditions have to apply. I would say, in relation to the present situation, the UN has to remain the primary focus of action--I stress the word action, not inaction.

À  (1045)  

[Translation]

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Taylor.

    Mr. Bergeron.

    Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    First of all, I would like to join my colleagues in thanking you for those excellent presentations. I must say that, like many others here, I am embarrassed by the turn the debate has taken with this disgraceful attack against France's foreign policy. I do find it remarkable that those States most virulently opposed to the war, including France, Germany, Belgium and Russia, are those which, unlike the United States and Great Britain, can still well remember the ravages of war within their own borders. This is something we must take into account when considering the issue, or attempting some facile analysis of certain countries' response to the current situation.

    That said, Mr. Chairman, I increasingly believe that the international community is mired in controversy, and answers first and foremost to U.S. domestic policy imperatives in singling out Iraq, apparently because it has violated some 17 UN resolutions. Yet other countries, like Israel, have violated about 20. We single out Iraq, which it seems has, or will build, or may build weapons of mass destruction. Yet we know full well that North Korea does have weapons of mass destruction, and is becoming increasingly recalcitrant to the international community, threatening to withdraw from the armistice treaty and yesterday conducted missile tests.

    Singling out Iraq in this fashion is at the very least worrisome, because as I said it seems to be in line with U.S. domestic policy imperatives. I find it very unfortunate that the international community has let itself be dragged into this.

    My question is to Mr. Sassoli. It's about the fact that the international community seems to have been dragged into a controversy that is based on or flows from U.S. domestic policy imperatives. We know that post World War II international law was based on the bipolar nature of the international balance that emerged after the Second World War. Don't you think that what we are seeing now, the emergence of a hyper-power that is becoming aware of its own status, should now lead to a review, a redefinition or a restructuring of international law to ensure that it properly takes into account this new factor on the world stage?

    The Chair: Mr. Sassoli.

    Mr. Marco Sassoli: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Detlev Vagts, a major U.S. international expert who teaches at Harvard, wrote an article entitled Hegemonic International Law which appeared in the American Journal of International Law.

It would be a completely different system, a system reminiscent of the Roman Empire, to which we nevertheless owe many of our legal institutions. But, at the time, there was no international law. There was a jus gentium, which was the law established by the Roman Empire for foreigners. For the moment, we are still in what is called the westphalian system, which is made up of sovereign and equal nations. Let me just add a small nuance and say that the United Nations Charter was not created for a bipolar system. The bipolar system happened quickly thereafter and, at some point, froze the system into place. Rather, it was designed for a multipolar system.

    In my view, France's position is also strongly based on its defence of the multipolar system, because it enables France to play a role within it, whereas France would be an average country like any other within a hegemonic system. Therefore, I would simply say that the other countries still have not agreed to another system, but international law can adapt and must certainly adapt to the international reality. After a war against Iraq not sanctioned by the United Nations, which would represent a huge failure for the UN, we may witness the birth of a new, different system.

    But I don't think we should give up on the United Nations too quickly just because we disagree with a certain decision. Even if we decide that we must wage war against Iraq, I think it is important that it be a common decision. We are members of an association and, as with any association, you can't always be right. Most countries wanted to pass certain resolutions against Israel. Imagine what would have happened if every country had decided that the United Nations were useless because nothing ever happened after the United States used their veto to kill every resolution which, as it turned out, was not valid anyway.

    Thank you.

À  (1050)  

[English]

    The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Sassoli.

    Now I have three other colleagues who would like to ask questions. If you all agree, I'm going to ask Madam Kraft Sloan, Mr. Harvey, and Mr. Peterson to ask one question each without any preamble.

    Madam Kraft Sloan.

    Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan (York North, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    Professor Sassoli, you mentioned briefly the Geneva Convention and humanitarian law and in a post-Saddam world the possibility of that happening. It's been suggested that the Americans would want to hold positions of authority, senior positions, within a new government. That's one idea that's been floating. My question is twofold. As the Geneva Convention would apply, as humanitarian law would apply, could you comment on that idea and other concerns you might have if there is an armed conflict in Iraq?

[Translation]

    The Chair: We will now move on to Mr. Harvey.

[English]

We'll answer all the questions afterwards.

[Translation]

    Mr. Harvey, please.

    Mr. André Harvey (Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    I would like to ask Mr. Taylor whether he thinks that within the framework of an armed intervention—incidentally, France is not necessarily against an armed intervention, rather, it is in favour of enforcing the United Nations Charter—it is possible that the Iraqi military quickly rallies to the side of the allied forces.

    Finally, of course, I would like to ask Mr. Coulon whether he feels the deployment of British and American forces in the Persian Gulf area does a lot to help the inspectors carry out their work. I myself wonder how well the inspectors could have carried out their work if the 250,000 young American and British soldiers, and those from other countries in that area, had not been deployed.

    I do not want to come across as being extremely naive, because Saddam Hussein is not a saint. In any case, I think we must take the situation very seriously. Having seen many of the placards waved during the demonstrations which were held throughout the world, very few of them were addressed to Saddam Hussein, who, after all, lies at the heart of this conflict. Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Harvey.

    Mr. Peterson.

[English]

    Hon. Jim Peterson (Willowdale, Lib.): Mr. Taylor, has anything been said by Dr. Blix or any of the inspectors to date with which you disagree?

    The Chair: A very good question, a short one.

    On the first question, regarding the Geneva Convention, Monsieur Sassoli.

[Translation]

    Mr. Marco Sassoli: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Occupation further to an armed conflict is covered by many rules under the Fourth Geneva Convention. So the law exists. I simply have some concerns that, given what we have seen with respect to the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions pertaining to individuals that the United States had arrested in Afghanistan and who are currently being held in Guantanamo. According to the theories of these new legal experts, these individuals do not fall under any of these conventions, under any law.

    There is a fear that some legal experts, once the United States has occupied Iraq, will come out with the theory whereby the Fourth Geneva Convention will not be applicable to this situation. In my opinion, this would mean the end of the Geneva Conventions because if everyone can use legal technicalities in order to circumvent these conventions every time they apply, during the next conflict, when victims perhaps have even greater need of these conventions, international humanitarian law will no longer be recognized.

    Thank you.

À  (1055)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Sassoli.

    Mr. Coulon.

    Mr. Jocelyn Coulon: As regards the deployment of troops, it is indeed because of the threat of the American and British troops, the stick, that the inspectors are in Iraq today. The weakness of the French and German positions, and of all the other positions that favour disarmament through peace, is that they do not shake the military stick hard enough. If you adopt a resolution without any means or threat behind it, it will not be respected. That is why the Turks are not withdrawing from Cyprus or why other countries do not abide by the resolutions pertaining to their wrongdoings.

    I think that the Americans and British should be congratulated for deploying these military means. But why do we find ourselves in a situation where only the British and the Americans have deployed their means, whereas the other countries have not done so? I think that the Americans proceeded too quickly in this matter. They began deploying these means before the United Nations had even begun discussing the matter, while the opposite approach should have been taken.

    Thank you.

[English]

    The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Coulon.

    Mr. Taylor, regarding the work of Mr. Blix.

    Mr. Terence Taylor: Can I have one sentence on Mr. Harvey's question, since part of it was addressed to me?

    The Chair: Go ahead.

    Mr. Terence Taylor: There will be other states, it won't be just the United States and the United Kingdom. We already know about nine European countries have signed a letter in support. There's also Australia. So it's not the kind of unilateral action referred to earlier on. I doubt if there would be a rallying of Iraqi forces. I think one can only expect the Special Republican Guard, possibly, and some elements of the other parts of the Republican Guard to stand and fight for any length of time. But as you're probably aware, it would only take a relatively small number of determined troops to make life very difficult. One has to have that in mind. On other hand, I don't think there's a real prospect of Iraqi forces holding out for very long in the face of coalition forces, even if they're only British and American.

    On Doctor Blix and Mohamed el Baradi, putting them both together, which I think is very important, I find very little to disagree with in what Doctor Blix has delivered in his presentations. He has complained that Iraq has still not delivered on substance; he's regularly done that, he's done it very clearly, very lucidly. He's protested a little at Colin Powell's allegations about vehicles around sites and so on, but I think on substance he's been very clear. I can't find anything major I disagree with him on, but it's what you do about it that matters.

    In the case of Doctor Mohamed el Baradi, whose views I respect enormously, and I make these remarks respectfully in his case, he said on January 27 his organization could certify that Iraq was free of nuclear weapons within a few months. I contend that is just not possible. If you look into his presentation, there are two elements I mentioned earlier. First, Iraq has handed over no weapons design information, they have found no weapons components. Second, what's happened to the high-quality specialist high explosive for nuclear weapons, HMX--35 tonnes missing? So I think it's a much more depressing scene on the nuclear side than is presented by Mohamed el Baradi, but if you look at the details of his presentation, the facts are there, it's just the gloss and the spin that goes on it, amplified by those who feel more inclined to give Iraq the benefit of the doubt.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Taylor.

    I have one question. How best can Canada help to ensure that the effectiveness and credibility of the United Nations Security Council is preserved in response to this crisis?

    Mr. Terence Taylor: That's a key question. I think it goes to the heart of everything we've been saying. If the UN Security Council simply stumbles on for months, and perhaps years, with Iraq in the same situation as it is now, I believe the UN will lose credibility as an international security organization. Whatever we do, it has to be prompt.

Á  (1100)  

[Translation]

    The Chair: Mr. Coulon.

    Mr. Jocelyn Coulon: I fully agree with Mr. Taylor's position on the matter, but I would remind you once again that this is not what is happening at the UN Security Council right now. One faction of the Security Council is trying to impose its agenda on the majority and is trying to make the majority believe that it is wrong. However, if the Security Council is to operate correctly, it must do so with all of its members, and they must not be intimidated. When one country manages to intimidate its own allies, that means that something in its foreign policy is not working any more.

    The Chair: Thank you. Mr. Sassoli.

[English]

and then Mr. Keeley.

[Translation]

    Mr. Marco Sassoli: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

    One way to undermine the credibility of the Security Council

[Translation]

and of the United Nations is to announce at the outset that, regardless of what is decided, we are going to do what we want. That is unacceptable in any legal system. Just imagine if, in Canada, someone were to make such a statement before the pertinent authority had decided. Thank you.

[English]

    The Chair: Mr. Keeley, do you have any comments?

    Mr. James Keeley: I assume everybody who was on the council and voted for resolution 1441 knew what was on the table. I think the real problem we face here is that it's almost, damned if you do, damned if you don't. The 20th century began with World War I and ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. I think we're in for an equally interesting time. I don't see Iraq deciding to comply out of the goodness of its heart. I don't think the United States, Britain, or some others will accept something that looks like a repetition of 1991 to 2002. It's third on my list of desirable outcomes, but I think the train has left the station.

    The Chair: Merci beaucoup.

    I want to thank our panellists this morning for their comments and the quality of their statements.

[Translation]

    Thank you very much. We were privileged to appear before you here today.

[English]

    Colleagues, we're going to suspend for a couple of minutes, then we'll have a motion from Ms. McDonough.

Á  (1103)  

---

Á  (1108)  

    The Chair: We received a notice of motion from Ms. McDonough on Canada's role in addressing the Iraqi humanitarian crisis. The motion is this:

That in view of the recent compelling evidence presented to the Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the committee call upon the Government of Canada to begin leading proactive efforts aimed at engaging members of the United Nations in addressing the existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq and the certain humanitarian catastrophe that will be caused by a war on that country.

The floor is yours, Ms. McDonough.

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    Very briefly, because I think the resolution is straightforward, I submitted this notice of motion after we heard the very worrisome, very distressing testimony last week from representatives of five different NGOs involved in humanitarian assistance now in Iraq. I understand there was some idea earlier of asking both Foreign Affairs and International Development to address this question, but it was suggested this was premature. I don't know how we could possibly view it as premature, given the events that are unfolding and given the very detailed and compelling evidence presented last week. I know members, in addition to that, have been receiving a lot of information from other sources. I think the case for ramping up humanitarian preparedness is made even more urgent if you look at the “shock and awe” bombing campaign the Pentagon clearly leaked to the world to serve notice of what they had in mind to unleash on Iraq and what the humanitarian consequences of that would be. There's no guessing involved.

    So I would just urge the support of members for this quite straightforward motion.

    Perhaps it's a separate issue, but I hope, when the two ministers come before the committee, as soon as we reconvene after the break, they come prepared to address the question of what the respective departments are doing to try to ramp up the humanitarian assistance.

Á  (1110)  

    The Chair: Now I have Mr. Harvey, Mr. Bergeron, and Mr. Martin.

[Translation]

    Mr. Harvey, please.

    Mr. André Harvey: Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Ms. McDonough for her motion. We are engaged in a consultation process within the committee pertaining to everything surrounding the intervention in Iraq. We are listening to all of the witnesses who come here. I believe that the witnesses who come here and we ourselves are all engaged in constructive work.

    As regards the question of being prepared to help, as Ms. McDonough said earlier, following the two-week break, we will be hearing from the minister in charge of aid as well as the minister responsible for international matters. Accordingly, I would like us to refrain from adopting a motion right in the middle of our study. Things are happening right now. Everyone knows that we have been participating in the discussions for many years and that nearly $35 million have been spent on the most vulnerable people in Iraq, and even on the Iraqi refugees. The United Nations had also requested money in December, and the Canadian government, through the Canadian International Development Agency, provided $1.7 million. I think that we are strongly committed to the United Nations' process in the hope that a peaceful solution will be found.

    In the meantime, Mr. Chairman, we are operating through international organizations to help the people of Iraq, who desperately need this help. I would like to repeat that the ministers will be appearing following our two-week break. We have one meeting left, and we will be in a better position to adopt a resolution once we have heard those individuals directly concerned by the measures taken by the government. In all humility, these are my comments. Thank you.

    Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: Mr. Chairman, one can't be against motherhood. In light of the testimony that we heard the last time, it goes without saying that we must use every means possible to avoid the human catastrophe we fear will occur.

    In principle, I have absolutely no opposition whatsoever to the adoption of this motion. I would simply like to make two comments, one pertaining to the form and one to the substance, with respect to this motion.

    In the translation of the motion, which was clearly drafted in English, we read “à la lumière des preuves péremptoires”. With all due respect to the interpreters and translators, Mr. Chairman, I do not think that the word “compelling” can be translated by “péremptoires” in this particular context. We could talk about “évidentes”, “flagrantes” or “éloquentes”, but, the suggestion of my colleague from Mercier, I think that the word “preuves” is adequate in itself and it is not necessary to add an adjective.

    Now, as for my comment on the substance, at the end we read: “in addressing the existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq and the certain humanitarian catastrophe that would be caused by a war on that country.” I think that this is over-estimating Canada's ability to avoid, all by itself, the humanitarian catastrophe. Perhaps we should amend the motion to read as follows: “to contribute in addressing the existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq and the certain humanitarian catastrophe that would be caused by a war on that country.” This would certainly be a concerted effort on the part of the international community to avoid a catastrophe from occurring in this country should a conflict begin.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.

    Mr. Martin.

[English]

    Mr. Keith Martin: I have a great deal of sympathy for Madam McDonough's motion, but I would like to present a friendly amendment that would reflect what's actually going on, as Monsieur Harvey mentioned. The amendment I would propose would be, after “Canada to”, to take out “begin leading proactive efforts aimed at engaging” and substitute “increase our involvement in ongoing efforts with” members. That would reflect the fact that Canada is involved, but it would perhaps move us forward in a more proactive way. which I think is the intent of Madam McDonough's motion in this worthy cause.

Á  (1115)  

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: Mr. Chairman, to facilitate the discussion, I would be happy to accept that as a friendly amendment to the motion.

    The Chair: Okay, fine.

    Mr. Eggleton.

    Hon. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.): Indeed, we had some very compelling evidence given before this committee. In view of that, I think this motion is really quite reasonable, with the amendment of Dr. Martin. We had people come in here and tell us there are some 16 million civilians, half of whom are children, who are dependent upon the Government of Iraq for food distribution because of the sanction situation. Those food lines are going to get cut off if there is a war. We're very quickly going to see starvation set in. There are already a lot of undernourished people. There are people dying, including children, of starvation now in Iraq. This situation is going to become that much more severe in a case of a war. We also heard from one of the other presenters, as you may recall, that the concept of dropping food supplies from the air was not very effective. It didn't work very well in Afghanistan, it's not likely to work very well here. We also heard that there's a problem with getting clean water, and without that, you get diseases. So there is a very compelling case that there is going to be a humanitarian catastrophe.

    What I think this addresses is not the question of CIDA. I appreciate Mr. Harvey's saying the Minister of CIDA wants to come in. Well, yes, CIDA is doing its thing, but this is a broader context. This is Canada taking a position in the United Nations and in world forums to try to impress upon the countries that are going to carry out the attack, the United States, the United Kingdom, and whoever else might be a part of it, that they should pay attention to this question of humanitarian assistance. If they're going to attack, let them not forget that there are millions and millions of children and innocent civilians at risk, not just from the bombs, but from starvation and from disease. That, to me, is what this motion is all about. I don't think it impinges upon CIDA.

    If the CIDA Minister were coming in here within a few days or within a week, I would say, okay, let's just defer it; maybe there is something she can add, even though I don't think this is really in the CIDA context. But we're talking about two and a half to three weeks, and given what's happening right now, that's an awful lot of time. I really think there needs to be attention paid to this question of a humanitarian catastrophe. There are millions of civilians, millions of children at risk here. The U.S. and the U.K. have got to start looking at ways to deal with this in the context of an attack, if an attack should occur.

    So I support the motion, with the amendment of Dr. Martin.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Ms. Lalonde, please.

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: I would like to thank Ms. McDonough for presenting this motion this morning. I heard on the news that the United States says that it is stockpiling food in warehouses located around Iraq, but I too remember being told that this way of providing food was extremely ineffective, as we saw in Afghanistan. Perhaps we forget about the fact that these food banks were the same colour as the scatter bombs, which was a particularly hideous mistake. In my opinion, this is even more important given that we will not be seeing each other until the two-week break is over. As the minister has said, and as the people are saying in France, now is the time.

    The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Lalonde.

    Ms. Kraft Sloan.

[English]

    Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    I support this motion, and I think my colleague down the table here has made very good points. Also, Madam Lalonde has raised the issue that indeed, the war may commence before the House comes back.

    As a new, associate member of the committee, I would like some clarification on the mechanism you would use to call upon the government. Is it just in the form of a resolution that goes to the government? Is it a letter? Is it by calling certain witnesses here?

Á  (1120)  

    The Chair: To answer Madam Kraft Sloan, if it's adopted, I will table the resolution in the House.

    Mrs. Redman.

    Mrs. Karen Redman: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I think we're hearing a lot of consensus on the thrust of the motion, but I'm going to move that we defer it until after we hear from the minister. Obviously, there is goodwill, and I know Ms. McDonough did accept a friendly amendment from Dr. Martin, but I always have a problem when we do things on the fly, and I think it would be very worthwhile to hear from the minister. This is a good motion, but it needs some reflection. So I would move that we defer it until after we hear from the minister.

    The Chair: The amendment of Mr. Martin was before the committee. It was accepted by Ms. McDonough. Does the committee accept the friendly amendment of Mr. Martin?

    (Amendment agreed to)

    The Chair: Now we have a motion by Mrs. Redman that this motion from Ms. McDonough be deferred.

    I have Ms. McDonough, because she is the mover, Monsieur Harvey, and Monsieur Bergeron.

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: I'd like to speak strenuously against any motion to defer under the circumstances. The point has already been made by members on all sides that we need to have an appropriate sense of urgency about this. The fact is that the House does not sit and this committee does not hear from the minister until at least three weeks from today. We would be putting our heads in the sand if we didn't recognize that it is a very urgent situation, and we're simply taking responsibility, as members of this committee, to not sit idly by after having heard compelling evidence as to why this is an important position for the committee to put forward, as I say, with an appropriate sense of urgency. So I would urge defeat of the motion to derail the very intent of the motion of which I gave notice. I don't think we're doing this on the fly at all. We are doing it in consideration of not just the evidence already brought before the committee, but evidence that is amassing all around us. If the foreign affairs committee can't act with a sense of urgency on this, I'm not sure whether we're just here to be a debating society. I don't think that is what Canadians expect of us.

    The Chair: Fine.

    Monsieur Harvey.

[Translation]

    Mr. André Harvey: This motion is in good faith, and we must acknowledge that; it calls upon the government to do everything that it can. However, before adopting easy motions, to earn everyone's respect, we have to wait for the stakeholders to come and explain what is already being done, both with regard to our work as part of the United Nations and with regard to our active international aid program.

    We can adopt a motion to ask the federal government to do its outmost and prepare afterwards, Mr. Chairman, but if we want to take a more in-depth look at these two aspects, we have to wait until the ministers have appeared. I am not saying that this is not a good motion; I am saying that we must be a little bit more serious in our approach. It is not that difficult.

Á  (1125)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Harvey.

    Mr. Bergeron.

    Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: Mr. Chairman, I am strongly opposed to Ms. Redman's motion, although I clearly understand the reasons behind it. Having said that, we are currently witnessing a humanitarian crisis. Even before the conflict has begun, there is already a very serious humanitarian crisis in Iraq. We have a UN report on the humanitarian problems in Iraq, which stipulate that the United Nations needs money now, as we speak, not only to meet Iraq's current needs, but also to prepare for the possibility of a conflict. As it appears very likely that the conflict will begin within the next few days, right when the House is scheduled to adjourn for two weeks, we cannot wait until the minister has appeared before this committee, before taking action. As Mr. Eggleton pointed out a few moments ago, this issue just not just affect the Minister for International Cooperation, this is an issue that affects the entire Canadian government, which must take action at the United Nations and with UN member countries so that steps are taken to speed up the pace and prevent the disaster. So this issue does not just affect the Minister for International Cooperation. Moreover, Mr. Chairman, we are facing an emergency and we cannot wait for the minister to appear. This is not a matter of money; it is about the influence Canada can have on the international community.

    So we must adopt this motion now; we cannot wait three weeks to do it. In three weeks, it may well be too late, Mr. Chairman.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.

[English]

    Mr. Day, Mr. Martin, Madame Lalonde, and Mr. Casey.

    Mr. Day.

    Mr. Stockwell Day: Mr. Chairman, just as the record shows the number of times I was in agreement with the former representative on this committee from the NDP, I'm in agreement with the present representative. This is a situation of urgency and immediacy. Other nations are already involved in the planning process, England, the United States, working with exiled Iraqis, already planning for humanitarian and long-term needs in Iraq. Though the polls show that Canadians en masse are not supportive at this point of military intervention, they would certainly be in support of this type of intervention. I don't believe we can delay this matter.

    The Chair: Mr. Martin.

    Mr. Keith Martin: In emergency we have a saying, the golden hour. If you treat somebody within that hour in emergency, you have a much better chance of saving their life. Outside that period of time the mortality rate increases dramatically. I would submit, colleagues, that for Iraq, we're in the golden hour right now. We heard, as Mr. Eggleton mentioned, the incredible humanitarian catastrophe that is taking place already. The mortality rate under the age of 5 shows the greatest increase over the last 10 years in any country of the world, 60% of the population under the age of 15 is relying on food aid, and this conflict will wipe out all food and water capabilities and access to those basic essentials during the conflict and after it. If we don't act right now, we will have lost the golden hour for the civilian population in Iraq. If we wait two and a half weeks, we're out of that period of time, and the mortality rates will increase dramatically. Now is the chance for our committee to make a very strong statement that could have a profound positive impact in saving lives in that country. I would strongly support Madam McDonough's intervention and speak against the efforts to delay this.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Ms. Lalonde.

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: I will be brief, Mr. Chairman. I will not repeat the arguments already made. It says here that the committee must call upon the Government of Canada to begin leading proactive efforts aimed at encouraging others to do something. Those are the two main aspects. So we do not need to hear from the minister. I do not see how the minister could be opposed to that. We are talking about the Government of Canada.

[English]

    The Chair: Mr. Casey.

Á  (1130)  

    Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC): Thank you very much.

    So often when we move a motion on this side of the table we hear that it should be deferred, we should wait, or it's premature. We hear it all the time. In this case it's not premature. The time is now. This is not criticizing the government, it's just sending a message that this group of people think this is a role for Canada to play and we should play it. I think Canada has struggled to find a role in this issue, and here is a role we can play. We're good at this. We have the respect around the world to lead this. I support hearing the motion now, and I will support the motion when it comes to the table.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Ms. Marleau, please.

    Hon. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.): I think that we are already doing a lot of this work, but I do not know to what extent. I do not see why we could not vote in favour of such a motion, since this is something that we usually do and are probably already doing. I think that we can meet with the minister to obtain additional information, but I think that it would be good to show how much attention we are paying to this matter.

[English]

I really believe we should be voting for the motion. It does no harm. It is the kind of thing that, as a country, we always do and should be doing now, if we're not doing it, though I think we probably are already doing it. So I say, vote for this motion and let's get on with it.

    The Chair: Fine.

    Last comments, Mr. Eggleton, please.

    Mr. Art Eggleton: I hope we're doing it, but when Paul Heinbecker, our very distinguished ambassador to the UN, talked the other day, I didn't hear him say anything about the humanitarian crisis. This is a Foreign Affairs issue more than a CIDA issue, because we're not dealing with just the Canadian involvement, that's a CIDA issue, we're talking about Canada overall pressing the issue, and Heinbecker should be pressing that issue front and centre at the UN.

    The Chair: I just want to say to Mr. Eggleton that our ambassador last week mentioned that the humanitarian situation in that country is already severe.

    We have a motion from Mrs. Redman asking that this motion be deferred. We're going to vote on that motion.

[Translation]

That means the motion will be deferred, for those who vote in favour of it.

[English]

    (Motion negatived)

    The Chair: Do we agree that the motion of Mrs. McDonough, as modified by a friendly amendment from Monsieur Martin, be carried?

    Monsieur Bergeron.

[Translation]

    Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: I did not move a formal amendment, but I mentioned the translation problem and the use of the word “péremptoires”. That must be corrected. I also proposed adding a few words that could have been considered a friendly amendment: “and contribute to averting the certain humanitarian catastrophe that would be caused by a war on that country.”

    The Chair: But where will we put the words “and contribute to...”?

    Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: It is: “and contribute to averting...”. The words “and contribute to” would be inserted between “Iraq” and “averting”.

    The Chair: Instead of “addressing”?

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: No, it is: “and contribute to averting the certain humanitarian catastrophe...”.

    Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: Instead of the previous wording, it would be “and contribute to averting...”.

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: The English version uses the word “addressing”, which does not mean to avert, but to do something.

    The Chair: Okay. It is “and contribute to averting...” to the second-last line from the end of the paragraph. Perfect.

[English]

    Okay, now the question is there. Is the motion of Mrs. McDonough, with the two friendly amendments from Mr. Martin and Monsieur Bergeron, carried?

    (Motion as amended agreed to)

    The Chair: Now I need agreement that the chair report this motion to the House.

    (Motion agreed to)

    The Chair: The meeting is adjourned.