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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Legislative Committee on Bill C-17

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, December 10, 2002

1600

The Chair (Mr. Bob Kilger (Stormont—Dundas—Charlottenburgh, Lib.))

Hon. John McCallum (Minister of National Defence)

1605

1610

The Chair

Mr. John McCallum

The Chair

Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Mr. Rob Anders

The Chair

Mr. John McCallum

Mr. Rob Anders

Mr. John McCallum

Mr. Rob Anders

1615

The Chair

Mr. John McCallum

The Chair

Mr. Steve Mahoney (Mississauga West, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. John McCallum

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. John McCallum

1620

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. John McCallum

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

Mr. John McCallum

Mr. Claude Bachand

1625

Mr. John McCallum

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. John McCallum

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.)

1630

Mr. John McCallum

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

Mr. John McCallum

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Chair

Mr. Rex Barnes (Gander—Grand Falls, PC)

Mr. John McCallum

1635

Mr. Rex Barnes

Mr. John McCallum

The Chair

Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP)

Mr. John McCallum

1640

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. John McCallum

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. John McCallum

1645

The Chair

Mr. John McCallum

The Chair

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.)

Mr. John McCallum

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Mr. John McCallum

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Mr. John McCallum

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Mr. John McCallum

Mr. Robert Bertrand

The Chair

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. John McCallum

1650

Colonel Dominic McAlea (Deputy Legal Advisor (Military), Department of National Defence)

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Col Dominic McAlea

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Col Dominic McAlea

The Chair

Mr. John McCallum

Mr. Steve Mahoney

The Chair

Mr. John McCallum

Colonel Robert Leitch (Commander, Canadian Forces Information Operations Group, Department of National Defence)

The Chair

Col Robert Leitch

The Chair

Mr. Rob Anders

Mr. John McCallum

1655

Mr. Rob Anders

Mr. John McCallum

Mr. Rob Anders

Mr. John McCallum

Mr. Rob Anders

Mr. John McCallum

The Chair

Mr. Rob Anders

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. John McCallum

The Chair

1700

The Chair

Hon. Elinor Caplan (Minister of National Revenue)

Ms. Mary McMahon (Senior Counsel, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency)

Ms. Andrea Spry (Director, Risk Assessment Systems Division, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency)

Ms. Elinor Caplan

1705

1710

The Chair

Mr. Rahim Jaffer (Edmonton—Strathcona, Canadian Alliance)

Ms. Elinor Caplan

Ms. Mary Anne McMahon

1715

Mr. Rahim Jaffer

Ms. Elinor Caplan

Mr. Rahim Jaffer

Ms. Mary Anne McMahon

Mr. Rahim Jaffer

Ms. Elinor Caplan

Mr. Rahim Jaffer

The Acting Chair (Mr. Robert Bertrand)

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Ms. Elinor Caplan

1720

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Ms. Elinor Caplan

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Ms. Elinor Caplan

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Ms. Elinor Caplan

1725

The Acting Chair (Mr. Robert Bertrand)

Mr. Steve Mahoney

The Acting Chair (Mr. Robert Bertrand)

Mr. Rex Barnes

Ms. Elinor Caplan

Mr. Rex Barnes

Ms. Elinor Caplan

Ms. Andrea Spry

1730

Mr. Rex Barnes

Ms. Elinor Caplan

The Acting Chair (Mr. Robert Bertrand)

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.)

1735

Ms. Elinor Caplan

The Acting Chair (Mr. Robert Bertrand)

Mr. Rahim Jaffer

1740

Ms. Elinor Caplan

Ms. Andrea Spry

Mr. Rahim Jaffer

Ms. Andrea Spry

Ms. Elinor Caplan

Mr. Rahim Jaffer

1745

The Acting Chair (Mr. Robert Bertrand)

Ms. Elinor Caplan

The Acting Chair (Mr. Robert Bertrand)

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Ms. Elinor Caplan

1750

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Ms. Elinor Caplan

Mr. Steve Mahoney

The Acting Chair (Mr. Robert Bertrand)

Mr. John O'Reilly

1755

Ms. Elinor Caplan

Mr. John O'Reilly

The Acting Chair (Mr. Robert Bertrand)

CANADA

Legislative Committee on Bill C-17

NUMBER 004

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, December 10, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

º (1600)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Bob Kilger (Stormont—Dundas—Charlottenburgh, Lib.)): I call the meeting to order of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-17.

Appearing before the committee this afternoon is the Honourable John McCallum, Minister of National Defence. Minister, welcome.

I would ask you possibly if you would introduce other officials with you, and we look forward to your ten-minute presentation and we will respond with five-minute rounds of questions or comments.

Mr. Minister, the floor is yours.

Hon. John McCallum (Minister of National Defence): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to introduce Colonel McAlea beside me, and we have a number of other gentlemen and ladies behind if the questions get very difficult.

I'm pleased to have this opportunity to speak to the committee on the impact that Bill C-17 will have on the defence portfolio, but I'd like first to begin with what is not in this new bill, and I'm referring to the military zones, the controlled access zones.

After Bill C-55 was tabled last spring the government took the time to re-examine those portions of the legislation concerning controlled access military zones. After listening to Canadians, provincial officials, and members of Parliament we decided to remove this provision from the bill.

In measuring the security needs of the Canadian Forces against the concerns expressed over the zones, the government concluded that a more measured, a more surgical, approach was both necessary and possible, one that made sure that the Canadian Forces and visiting forces could adequately protect their personnel and property.

The fact remains that even before September 11 we saw how vulnerable our military forces could be, and unfortunately it's a reality that's been playing itself out since then--for example, the bombing of the French tanker Limberg off the coast of Yemen and attacks on U.S. forces abroad.

So what it comes down to is we must give the Canadian Forces the legal tools they need to effectively guard against such acts of terror in Canada. The attack that killed almost a hundred Australians in Bali is another grim reminder that no country is immune.

The government therefore decided to allow the creation of a buffer zone to ensure the safety and security of military personnel and property. These zones will clarify the manner in which access to Canadian Forces and visiting forces may be controlled.

Specifically, the government will provide for the establishment through an order in council of controlled access zones in three places: Halifax, Esquimalt, and Nanoose Bay harbours. These zones will be much narrower in scope than the area zones prescribed in Bill C-55 and they will apply only to the three naval ports in question.

The approach the government is taking is also about openness and transparency. Officials from the Department of National Defence discussed these zones with officials from the affected provinces and municipalities and will continue working closely with them on this issue.

With that, I would now like to say a few words about what is in the bill, and I begin with the definition of “emergency”.

[Translation]

As was the case in the government's Anti-Terrorism Act passed last December, there is a need to update certain definitions in light of the changing security environment.

And in this case, “emergency”, as outlined in the National Defence Act, is one such definition. This term will now be defined as “insurrection, riot, invasion, armed conflict or war, real or apprehended.”

In other words, “emergency” will include hostilities involving states or non-state entities that fall short of declared war. In practical terms, declaring an emergency under these circumstances would allow a compulsory call out of the Reserves.

So while this definition will in no way lower the threshold for declaring an emergency, it will better reflect some of the realities of the modern security environment we're facing.

[English]

The third point I'd like to address is aid of the civil power. Something else that is part of this new security environment is the increased potential for the government to have to manage multiple requests from the provinces for aid of the civil power. In fact, we've already learned that this could be a real possibility when we were planning for the Canadian Forces response to the anticipated year 2000 problem.

While such a situation did not occur in that case, it is not difficult to imagine the scenario where we would have less time to plan and more demands to respond to. This amendment would therefore allow the Minister of National Defence to provide appropriate direction to the Chief of the Defence Staff, particularly in circumstances when there were multiple and simultaneous requests for assistance from the provinces. And in doing so this would ensure that the Government of Canada had the ability to respond effectively to multiple demands from the provinces.

I would note, however, that requests for aid of the civil power would continue to be made directly to the Chief of the Defence Staff.

The next area to note is the reserve judges panel.

º (1605)

[Translation]

This bill also provides for the establishment of a panel of reserve military judges. This panel would increase flexibility within the military judiciary and allow the system to respond more efficiently when demands or conflicts otherwise limit the availability of military judges. It would be comprised of reserve force officers who have previously performed judicial duties in the military justice system. The Chief Military Judge would be able to select officers from the panel to augment the military judiciary as required. This panel would be a permanent part of the military justice system.

[English]

I come now to job protection for the reserves. As with some of the other amendments contained in this bill, this provision is about military responsiveness. I don't think I need to tell you the critical role the reserves play in augmenting our regular forces, whether on missions abroad or at natural disasters here at home. This amendment would help us recognize that.

Bill C-17 will make sure that following a compulsory call-up of the reserves, which hasn't happened in the 50 years since Korea, employers would be required to reinstate reserve members in their jobs or equivalent jobs. I would note that this amendment does not reverse the government's position on voluntary employer support for reserves. Indeed, Canadian employers know well the value they get by hiring a trained member of the reserves, and they've consistently been supportive of their employees' commitment to the Canadian Forces. This amendment would simply provide a safety net in the unlikely case that a compulsory call-up were required.

Finally, I come to the question of information technology protection. Members are no doubt aware that threats to our critical infrastructure have become part of the security landscape. Well, computer systems and networks are an integral part of defence's command and control structure and ones that have to be protected. In fact, over the past decade the Canadian Forces have been making increasing use of technology, especially in military operations. While this has improved their operational effectiveness, it has also widened the scope for interference and attack, which is why under this new legislation the Minister of National Defence would have the authority to authorize the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces to intercept communications passing into, from, or through defence computer systems. This authority would only be given to persons who perform duties in the day-to-day protection of these systems and networks. These individuals could be authorized to intercept private communications in order to isolate or prevent harmful, unauthorized use of, interference with, or damage to defence systems.

This amendment is not about eavesdropping; we're not interested in listening in on private conversations. What we are interested in is making sure that we can protect critical defence IT systems and networks both at home and abroad, and in doing so we also make sure that we are a reliable international partner and that we can operate effectively in coalition with our allies.

[Translation]

In protecting our computer systems, we will focus only on those who are seeking to attack the integrity of our IT systems and networks and let the Acceptable Use Policy and Criminal Code cover all other types of unauthorized use.

At the same time, we have made sure that nothing in this provision affects the powers or role of the Privacy Commissioner. In fact, a number of safeguards regarding the use and retention of intercepted communications have been incorporated. And to ensure that the proper checks and balances are in place, the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment is given the mandate to review the activities carried out under this authority.

º (1610)

[English]

In conclusion, the government has listened to the concerns of Canadians and is presenting a bill that does a number of things. It responds to the security threats facing Canada, it protects individual rights and privacy, it makes us a strong partner internationally, and finally, it further improves the ability of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces to protect Canadians from terrorism and its effects.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister.

Of course we had a delay in beginning the proceedings, but I wonder if you could indicate to the committee if your itinerary would allow you to stay with the committee for the duration of one hour, which would mean concluding at approximately at 5 p.m. Is that agreeable?

Mr. John McCallum: That's agreeable to me.

The Chair: Thank you very much for your cooperation.

We'll start the first round with Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, Canadian Alliance): Thank you.

I must admit, through this whole exercise we've been going through since 9/11, it has been curious to me that we've been going after people like Olympic shooters, for example, who are going to be affected by the explosives provisions in this act when they don't seem to pose any terrorist threat in the country. The flip side, though, is that the people who are posing a serious threat in the country... We know there are about a dozen countries who, over the last ten or twenty years, have been actively engaged in promoting and aiding terrorism in some way and who have actually seen their diplomatic privileges increased in the time period since 9/11.

So one of the obvious questions that comes to my mind is why is it that we see a cut in the budgets of the coast guard, why is that we see the abandonment of the harbour police, and why is it that we see an extension of diplomatic privileges to countries that have used their pouches, travel documents, safe houses, and financial arrangements in this country to aid and abet terrorists? Why have we seen things we should be promoting, like the coast guard and the harbour police—and even National Defence, in many respects—in the broad scope of things be decreased, and yet the diplomatic privileges of a number of embassies whose nations have engaged in terrorism have actually increased? We've given them more leeway inside Canada to do their business. Then we're also going after Olympic shooters with the explosives provisions in this act, so they can't do what they do, while they're not really terrorists.

I just pose this as a general question, because it seems to be nonsensical to me. I know you are probably going to tell us it impacts other areas, and you don't want to answer for them. But I just pose this as a general question. We know who some of the threats are, yet we've made it easier for them and much more difficult for the people to do their job who are supposed to be doing their job, and difficult on citizens in this country who aren't terrorists.

The Chair: Before I ask the minister to respond, I just want to remind colleagues that we've had other ministers appear. There will be others. It's incumbent upon all of us to focus on the ministry and the minister before us, and the impact he or she, or her or his ministry, has on Bill C-17.

So I don't know if the minister found anything there pertinent to National Defence.

Mr. Rob Anders: Mr. Chairman, I can make it more specific if you want me to.

The Chair: Let me first ask the minister if he has any response to your first intervention. You will have some more time in your five minutes.

Mr. Minister.

Mr. John McCallum: I must admit, Mr. Chair, I was searching somewhat for relevance. So perhaps the honourable member would like to proceed. I don't think any of the points were relevant to this bill and the defence-related amendments. In any event, when we're not told who they are, it's difficult for me to comment on embassies that are allegedly receiving better treatment.

Mr. Rob Anders: Mr. Chair, I could list off probably about a dozen countries who have been actively involved in terrorism for the last ten or twenty years. But you know what—

Mr. John McCallum: Actually, Mr. Chairman, this is the wrong move.

Mr. Rob Anders: That's a red herring.

I'm going to focus on the National Defence aspects. I've talked with many members of the Canadian Forces. As a matter of fact, just recently, when I was down at a mess-hall meeting on last Friday night, they said it's incredible that the coast guard hasn't been brought in as part of the navy. This aspect is so crucial to our national defence. Whether it's for drug interdiction, weapons smuggling, or any number of these things, they're dealing with terrorism. They think it's incredible the government has not considered the idea of bringing the coast guard into the navy and better equipping the navy and coast guard to deal with terrorist threats. Why is this not included in this bill?

º (1615)

The Chair: Mr. Minister.

Mr. John McCallum: Again, Mr. Chair, that had nothing to do with the contents of this bill. But I think the coast guard has been transferred from the Department of Transport to Fisheries and Oceans. It think the functions and cultures of the navy and coast guard are very distinct. We do work together. We certainly share information. But I don't think it would be optimal to integrate the two.

The Chair: Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney (Mississauga West, Lib.): Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Minister, thanks for coming.

On the controlled access zones you're referring to, we've now limited them, I think, to three areas. I wonder if you could expand on this, particularly in light of the new agreement that you are in the process of signing--I'm not sure if it's signed yet or not signed--with the United States. You refer to “visiting officer”, “visiting military”, and some people, Canadians, might have concerns about Americans allowed to come in. They're concerned that maybe there's a safety zone created with this bill, and they can run their brand of military intervention or whatever. I wonder if you could maybe address that and give us some sense of how you see that working.

The Chair: Mr. McCallum.

Mr. John McCallum: Thank you. I'm happy to deal with that.

Let me deal first with the new planning group. I think it's a little misleading to refer to U.S. military intervention, because the way it would work is if there were some natural disaster, like an earthquake in Vancouver or a terrorist attack on one of our cities, the first group to respond would be the first responders, like the firefighters and the police. If it was too much for them to handle, then, through the provincial government, the Chief of the Defence Staff--and that is in this bill--would be approached for military assistance. And this happened with Y2K, the Manitoba floods, and so on.

What's new in this new agreement is that if it's more efficient to request U.S. assistance--for example, if assistance for Vancouver is close at hand in Seattle and far away in Ontario within Canada--then this new agreement provides a mechanism for Americans to come in from Seattle to Vancouver, but only at the express invitation of the Government of Canada, in response to one particular incident, and also with the provision that those Americans, when in Canada, would be under the control of the Canadian Forces.

So that's the context in which it would operate. I suppose it could be something naval. I suppose one of the protected zones in one of our naval bases could be in effect, but I think it would only happen in a very limited context. In that sense, I don't think Canadians need to be too concerned about it.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: If I might pursue that a little bit, could you explain the purpose of having in the area of the controlled access zones... If we're talking about protecting certain facilities, for example, from terrorist attack, it would seem to me that we might look at places like Darlington or Bruce in Ontario--I'm sure there are other locations across the country that could be threatened--and yet what we seem to be doing with this is creating three enclaves, if you will, where the military would be protected, either Canadian military or visiting military, but in no way addressing any of the potential strategic sites that might be targets.

I'm assuming we have a list, since the Americans had a list, of potential terroirst targets. I don't know how accurate theirs was, but I'm assuming that our people and our intelligence would certainly have a list of what potential terrorist targets might be, and should there be in any way a relationship between a controlled access zone to them.

Mr. John McCallum: I would say it's not necessary to have a controlled access zone in such cases. This does not come directly under defence, but we have had discussions in the public security committee of cabinet, and we are certainly intent on improving, and we have indeed improved, the security around those facilities.

Should military assistance be required, then primarily it's a matter for the RCMP, not for the military. But as in the earlier example I mentioned, should military assistance be required, it can always be obtained through the mechanism I described earlier.

º (1620)

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Maybe I wasn't clear. If we're creating controlled access zones in three parts of the country specifically for military, maybe you can explain why we need that kind of protection for military, as opposed to having it in other areas, whether it's under your jurisdiction or not.

And when we're talking about visiting, are we just talking about someone who ties up to a wharf on a ship might all of a sudden be in some kind of controlled access zone? I think it's a little bit James Bondish to some folks.

Mr. John McCallum: I think we're focusing on the naval because this is the area in which the world has experienced actual attacks: the U.S.S. Cole, and then recently the French tanker off the coast of Yemen. So the first priority is to have this zone in place to protect both Canadian ships and visiting ships, given the recent experiences.

All of this is done by order in council, so should some other emergency arise of the kind you describe, or anything else--and it's very difficult to predict exactly how these things will arise--the order-in-council mechanism exists. One could have another order in council for another unknown future situation, but because the naval case has been the most vulnerable in the past and seems to be the highest priority, we're not proceeding with any other cases at this time. We're only proceeding with the naval case, but should some unspecified emergency arise in the future, the government would be able to rapidly bring forward another order in council to take the necessary action.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to focus for a few moments on clause 76 which replaces subsection 31(1)(b) of the Act.

This provision describes action undertaken by Canada under the North Atlantic Treaty, the NATO accord, and the North American Air Defence Command or NORAD Agreement.

I'm wondering if perhaps an amendment that would include a reference to the bi-national Planning Group, the establishment of which was announced yesterday, might not be a good idea. Could we include a reference to the bi-national Planning Group established yesterday in the new legislation to be voted on?

Mr. John McCallum: The provision refers to:

...any action undertaken by Canada under the North Atlantic Treaty, the North American Aerospace Defence Command Agreement or any other similar instrument to which Canada is a party.

I've been informed that adding a reference to the new Planning Group is unnecessary because

[English]

it doesn't have standing forces underneath it.

[Translation]

The Planning Group will make recommendations and any action will be undertaken by the Canadian Forces. Therefore, there is no need to include a reference to it in this Act.

Mr. Claude Bachand: I find that rather odd. At yesterday's press conference, you mentioned, among other things, that if Vancouver were ever attacked, it would likely be preferable to turn to the Seattle response team for assistance, given this city's proximity, rather than to Toronto, which is further away.

We're talking here about anti-terrorist legislation, certain provisions of which involved National Defence. Yesterday, you mentioned coordinated activities with the US. In my opinion, it would be entirely appropriate to include a reference to this Joint Planning Group in this legislative provision.

Regardless of your response, I also question the legality of this initiative. Correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems to me that the proper way to proceed is through an exchange of diplomatic letters, whereas in most of the agreements listed here, the word “treaty” or “accord” appears. Therefore, in my opinion, in terms of coordination action, the proper way to proceed would be to exchange of diplomatic letters.

From a legal standpoint, does this agreement respecting the Planning Group have the same force as an accord, or treaty?

º (1625)

Mr. John McCallum: I'm not a lawyer, Mr. Chairman, but I've been assured that the agreement with the US announced yesterday is quite legitimate and that the proper legal instruments exist. I've been told that the presence of US soldiers in Canada is already governed by the NATO treaty. Therefore, the legal authority for this kind of operation already exists.

Mr. Claude Bachand: I see.

I'd now like to shift the focus to controlled military access zones. The major difference here is that now, instead of prescribing this in legislation, the government is reserving the right to proceed through an order-in-council. The government has already announced the establishment of such access zones at Halifax, Nanoose Bay and Esquimalt. As I recall, the former Bill C-55 contained a vaguely worded provision to the effect that the dimensions of the zone may not be greater than is reasonable necessary and that such designation may not be for a period longer than is reasonably necessary.

Could you explain to us briefly how you go about establishing these zones by order-in-council in designated areas? Will the order-in-council set out the dimensions of the zone or the designation renewal period? Would it be possible for parliamentarians to be kept informed of zones that have been designated, zones such as Halifax or Esquimalt?

Mr. John McCallum: It's considerably more limited than in the past in several respects. For starters, only three zones have been established, that is the three you mentioned and within these zones, even more restrictions apply. The only feedback I've received from the provinces thus far is a suggestion from the Nova Scotia government that the dimensions of the proposed zone be expanded.

Perhaps the colonel can enlighten me, as I do not have the full details as to the dimensions and the period of time during which these zones remain in effect. That shouldn't come as a surprise because the details haven't yet been finalized. However, the order-in-council will be published in the Canada Gazette. We are still working on the details, but these will be published locally when they have been finalized. We're drawing up and fine-tuning the plans.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much.

My first question stems from my colleague's question when he asked, if there were an emergency in Vancouver, because Seattle is closer to Vancouver than Ontario, if you could ask the army to come from Seattle to help us with the emergency.

My first question is simply, who would pay if we invited the Americans here? Who would pay for their expenses, daily maintenance, and military hardware? How would you do that?

Second, if they came over, would they have to comply with our legal and constitutional rights toward our citizens, or would they bring their own rights with them? How would you sort that out?

My third question is on military cooperation between us and the Americans. Would it cover only Canada, or would it cover Canadians outside our territory, like that Bali case, who were victims of some sort of terrorism, or what have you?

º (1630)

Mr. John McCallum: Thank you. Those are good questions, and I must confess I didn't know the answer to the first one. The answer is that each army or military force would be responsible for covering their own costs. So if we had an emergency and the Americans entered Canada, they would pay for the cost of their own soldiers, seamen, or airmen, and we would do the same if they called upon us.

On your second question, the agreement states that if one country called upon the other country for assistance, then the control would rest with the host country. So if we were in some trouble and we called upon the Americans, when the Americans were in Canada they would be under Canadian control, and would have to comply with Canadian law. The converse, of course, would also be true.

Finally, I think this agreement would only relate to mutual assistance for events that occurred in our two national territories. I don't think this agreement would have anything to do with events occurring in Bali or any other place outside the physical territory of Canada and the United States.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: I have one quick question. Do the Americans have the right to refuse a request from Canada asking them to come here? Can they say no, sorry, thank you very much? Do we have the same right to refuse to go to the States at their request?

Mr. John McCallum: Yes, they have the right to refuse, as would we. This doesn't compel either country to respond favourably to a request from the other, but the spirit of the agreement is that they would. That is the idea. I suppose one can imagine circumstances when there's a very major event that involves places on both sides of the border, and they may say we can't now because we have to look after our side of the border first. That's always a risk. But the spirit of the engagement is that we would willingly come to the aid of the other. That has certainly been the pattern throughout our history. Halifax had a big explosion in 1917, and many Americans from Boston came to help for several months. They still have this tradition of the residents of Halifax providing the Christmas tree that they put up in the middle of Boston. So there's a long tradition of mutual help when bad things happen, and this agreement is in that same historical spirit.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Thank you very much.

The Chair: Mr. Barnes.

Mr. Rex Barnes (Gander—Grand Falls, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Of course the bill covers a large variety of issues, but I'd like to go back to your latest announcement about the United States and Canada coming to an agreement with regard to their troops. The impression out there, regardless of whether it's right or wrong, is that now we're depending upon the United States to protect our country. Of course, people are saying that we should protect our own country. There's nothing wrong with looking for assistance from other countries. Because of all the publicity with regard to the condition of our troops and the financial problems, it appears that we're leaning more on the United States, rather than building up our own troops for our own public safety to protect our own Canada.

Mr. Minister, why wouldn't we have a major program to entice people to join our military so that we can build up our own military to protect our own Canada and have our own forces do the job that's required, rather than giving money to other countries for their assistance? I know that in times of extreme emergency we will. But I'm just wondering why we aren't building up our own military and reopening bases, such as the one in Gander, Newfoundland.

Mr. John McCallum: I would argue that the government is capable of moving on more than one track at one time. I've said a number of times that I am making a request for more defence funding so that we can be more sustainable doing what we are currently doing. So that is one track I am trying to go down.

In terms of encouraging people to join, it happens that over the last year we had a record number of new recruits, something like 10,000 in a single year, partly because of September 11, perhaps, but also partly because of a very successful advertising campaign.

Although that's one track, it doesn't have much to do with the other track, which is this agreement that the Minister of Foreign Affairs and I announced yesterday, because it doesn't reflect an inability on our part to defend Canada. What it reflects is a long-term historical tendency for Canada and the United States to work together to jointly defend the continent.

More than 60 years ago the major threat to both countries was Nazi Germany. That's when we signed the Ogdensberg Agreement in 1940 to jointly defend the continent. Then over 40 years ago the major threat was communist Soviet Union, and that's when we signed a second partnership, NORAD, to jointly defend the continent. Now the third major threat is terrorism. So in accordance with our historical tradition, yesterday we signed this third agreement for continental defence. So we've had a long tradition with the United States to work together to defend the continent. We've done that irrespective of whether we need to spend more or less on our military at any moment in time.

I'm saying that we're working on both tracks. Consistent with our long historical tradition, we are partnering with the United States against a mutual external threat. At the same time, domestically, we're looking at the state of our defence spending.

º (1635)

Mr. Rex Barnes: Okay. I would think there's no doubt that what you're saying you may be doing looks good. Out in the public, people are fearful that we probably are relying on the United States more than we should.

I'll ask another question with regard to the control access zones. What would be the difference in the zones, in Bill C-55, of course, and Bill C-17? What would be the difference with regard to the control of access zones? Is there any difference? Remember, you said in your speech that it was not in this new bill. What is the difference? Why wouldn't they put it in the bill?

Mr. John McCallum: The reason they weren't put in the bill is because I came into this job, talked to people, and listened. I knew that there was a big fuss about the zones. I asked people in the department whether we really needed them, or whether we could achieve our security needs in a more surgical, less intrusive manner. The answer came back, after some back and forth, that maybe we could do so.

The result is this bill doesn't have the zones in it at all. I came to the conclusion, and my colleagues agreed, that it wasn't really needed. We could achieve the primary security requirements, particularly involving our naval assets, through the order in council route.

We listened to people's problems with the earlier bill. We acted on it. That's why we took them out of the bill.

The Chair: Ms. Carroll.

Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.): Mr. Chair, that's fine. I don't have a question at this time.

The Chair: Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Minister.

You have mentioned, in terms of the reservists, the fact that if they were called out, employers would be required to reinstate them. How do you plan on actually doing it without proper legislation? How does that work?

Mr. John McCallum: That's a good point and a good question. The answer to the question is that we put this in the legislation--that is, the framework--and then we have to develop a regulatory scheme, a system of regulations. We have to work with the provinces to ensure that it's fully operational.

º (1640)

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Have you given any consideration to working with various chambers of commerce or the Canadian Federation of Independent Business, for example, which represent the hundreds of thousands of businesses, regarding their concerns?

The reason I ask that is, as you know, we talk to the reservists all the time. The reservists are split on whether they should or should not have guaranteed job protection as reservists. The fear is, if you mark down on your application or résumé that you're a reservist, the employer may not hire you. The other aspect is you may have an employer who agrees with the sentiment of Mr. McCallum's argument that when you hire a reservist, you're hiring a very good employee. You have the two discussions on it at the same time.

Have the various business representatives been consulted? If they have been consulted, what are their opinions toward this type of future legislation?

Mr. John McCallum: I think there are two very distinct issues. One is guaranteeing reservists their jobs in a time of national emergency. It is all that this bill deals with. We haven't had a national emergency since the early 1950s, in the Korean War. This bill creates the legislative framework to protect the jobs of reservists in such an event. We have to complete it through regulation. I would say perhaps I'm a natural optimist, that this is a very unlikely event.

The more general and in a sense more important issue is whether there should be some job guarantees for reservists in more normal times. For example, there's a reserve company that I saw recently in Bosnia. I was there a few weeks ago. All of them left jobs and don't have legally binding guarantees. I have spoken to reservists.

There's the council under John Eaton that works with employers, provincial governments, and others to get voluntary agreement from the private sector and the public sector to guarantee the jobs. I think they've done a good job.

There is a question that always arises, as you said. Would it be better for reservists, not only in emergencies, as this bill covers, to have some guarantee in general that they would have their jobs on return from service overseas, as is the case in Bosnia? There's always a plus and a minus. The plus is, yes, it would be nice if they had a guarantee. The minus is where a lot of employers might be reluctant to hire reservists, if the employers knew that they would have to provide the guarantee.

Opinions do vary. I think the voluntary method has worked well. On balance, I have heard from the reservist community that there is not a great clamouring for legislation. This is a very specific and unlikely case of an emergency. From what I've been able to determine so far, the general opinion in the reservist community is that they're not calling for legislation in the more general run-of-the-mill cases.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you.

As to my next and probably last question, when you talked about the controlled access zones in Halifax, Esquimalt, and Nanoose Bay harbours, you talked about having discussions with the province and municipal officials. But as you know, in the port of Halifax, we have just-in-time deliveries on a lot of freight forwarders. Have there been discussions with, for example, the port authority and with various companies that use the port on a regular basis for economic reasons?

Along with that question, if indeed the city of St. John's, Newfoundland, is under an attack and you're going to go in there with a bunch of troops and everything else, how quickly would you be able to ascertain consultations with the province or local authorities in the city in order to set up a controlled zone, in order to do the job that you may be asking the military to do?

Mr. John McCallum: Let me try to answer your second question first, in terms of who precisely we've consulted in Halifax. I'd ask the colonel to answer that, because I don't know.

Well, look, the military has been able to respond effectively to emergencies, whether they be the Manitoba flood, the Quebec ice storm, or the G-8 summit, without these military zones. So I don't know exactly what you're envisaging in St. John's, but through the channels that we've always used, I think we could deal with just about any eventuality in St. John's as we've done in the past, without invoking an order in council to create a zone. But should it be necessary to create such a zone, I think it can be done very quickly, because an order in council requires, I believe, three cabinet ministers to sign, and they have this walk-around. They can just walk it around to people's offices, and in the case of an emergency, this can be done very quickly.

As to the first question, Colonel, do you know, or does anyone in the group know?

º (1645)

The Chair: Mr. Minister, if there's a brief response to the other one...

I think maybe I've been had, because it's an old trick to ask more than one question when you know your time is limited. So unless there's a short response...

Mr. John McCallum: We'll have to get back to the member as to exactly who has been consulted in Halifax.

The Chair: A very timely reply.

Monsieur Bertrand.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

Mr. Minister, I have just a quick question.

In your speech here, when you say “aid of the civil power”, we know that in order for the army, or the Canadian Armed Forces, to go into a province, the Minister of Justice or the Solicitor General from that province has to make a request to the Minister of National Defence. If we were to need American help to go into a province, who asks the Americans to come over? Is it the province, or do you do it?

Mr. John McCallum: The request comes from the provincial government, actually not to me, the minister, but to the Chief of Defence Staff, who then consults.... Well, under the new legislation I, the minister, would have to approve what the response would be, but on the recommendation of the chief.

In the unlikely event that the situation is so grave that we want to call upon the Americans, then the request would come from the Government of Canada, through I'm not sure exactly which individual, but it would not go from the province to the United States. It would come from the Government of Canada to the Government of the United States, requesting that U.S. military assistance. It would have to be approved by the Government of Canada.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: And they would be allowed to go into whichever province has made the request.

Mr. John McCallum: Yes, but we're already assuming that the province has made the request, and should it be grave enough--

Mr. Robert Bertrand: The Canadian Armed Forces.

Mr. John McCallum: Yes.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: But not for the Americans.

Mr. John McCallum: The request would have to go from the Government of Canada to the American side, if we wanted to go as far as that.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Okay.

The Chair: Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: I'd like to go to your statement on page 5 of your notes, where you talk about privacy, the privacy commissioner and the issue of intercepting private communications. The statement is made here that it's not about eavesdropping, because you're not interested in listening in on private conversations. Maybe you could expand on that and tell me what it is about. And have members of your staff talked with the privacy commissioner, who will be appearing here, and is he satisfied with this particular aspect of it?

Mr. John McCallum: My understanding is that the privacy commissioner originally had some objections and we responded directly to his concerns. Has he stated that he is now happy? We haven't heard directly from him as to whether he is happy, but we have responded directly to his stated concerns so that we hope he will be happy.

What we are trying to do in this operation is to intercept what you might call “hackers”, or people who are otherwise trying to invade the Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces computer systems to put viruses in them, or to gain access to information that they ought not to, or to do other things that would compromise our security.

So we're not interested in the contents of the messages. And I was just told earlier today that in the vast majority of the cases we don't have to open up the message, but they can identify in ways that are beyond me technologically whether something coming in is of the attacking variety and can deal with that without opening up the message.

Perhaps, Colonel, if there's a more lucid way to explain that you could comment briefly.

º (1650)

Colonel Dominic McAlea (Deputy Legal Advisor (Military), Department of National Defence): Thank you, Mr. Minister.

What we're looking to do is protect the integrity of the system from attacks. As the minister has said, we're looking to identify malicious codes and viruses. It's not our intention to actually look at the substance of the millions of e-mails or electronic communications that come into and out of our system every day. We're just looking to identify those that are aimed at attacking the system or the data the system contains.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Are we talking about viruses? Is that what you're looking at?

Col Dominic McAlea: That's one of the concerns we have, yes.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Because how would you know without looking at the content of the message as to whether or not it was in some way compromising other information? I presume this would be a communication from base to base, for example, and then someone would come in and alter that communication in some way.

Col Dominic McAlea: It might involve that. It might involve a member of the public sending something in. And if you want a detailed technical response, we have Colonel Leech here, who can speak to you either now or off-line to respond to you.

The Chair: Mr. Mahoney, I thank you. Now let's move on.

Mr. Minister, quickly.

Mr. John McCallum: Colonel Leech gave quite a good explanation earlier today. If you can give him one minute I think he will address my colleague's question.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Mr. Chairman, in addition to the technological aspects, I want some clarification now because there's a statement here that says “we have made sure that nothing in this provision affects the powers or role of the privacy commissioner.” Yet we don't have concurrence from the privacy commissioner on that, and we're going to hear from him. And he's not shy about putting forward his concerns.

The Chair: Mr. Minister.

Mr. John McCallum: On that last point, I'm sure, as you say, the privacy commissioner is not shy. It is our view that we've responded to all his concerns and he should be happy. If he's not happy, I'm sure he will let that be known.

Now, Colonel, on the technological side, maybe you could help clarify the situation.

Colonel Robert Leitch (Commander, Canadian Forces Information Operations Group, Department of National Defence): Mr. Minister, ladies and gentlemen, the issue we're dealing with is that the format of information as it's sent through the various networks is in little packets of data. And what we are looking at to try to make those determinations is the first few bits in each of the packets, and that is basically protocol information on how the computers talk to each other. We are looking for commands and other things that are being sent back and forth to do harm to our networks, to command computers to do things they are not supposed to or not being legal commands from other people in the area.

We have to look at the front part of the information, which is not the private communications, or the actual packet of information that is being sent by the individual. So it's that first part we're looking at to see what they're trying to do to our systems.

The Chair: Colonel, before you leave the table, could you give us your name in full for the record?

Col Robert Leitch: Yes, sir. It's Colonel Bob Leech and I am the commander of Canadian Forces Information Operations Group.

The Chair: Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to follow up on Mr. Mahoney's question. Under 273.8(1), the minister is not asking for just tiny little bits of information; he is requesting the ministerial authorization to go ahead and intercept private communications. Furthermore, when you go to the next page, in subsections (5) and (9), it's the ability to intercept private communications for a year, with the ability to renew for another year. And not only the ability to intercept, but that the crown is not liable for interference with, or any damage to, the system or networks or any damage to the data that they contain. So it's not just the ability to intercept, it's the ability to damage it and do so without any form of compensation.

The question I have for the minister is, with this type of what I think is a fairly obvious invasion of privacy, why is it that when we go to war, as it were.... It's very difficult to go to war on a noun. So what we're actually choosing here, in terms of terrorism, is private Canadian citizens and their broadcasts to each other, their private communications. That's who we're going to war against.

In my humble opinion, there are countries like Libya, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria, Algeria, and the Palestinian Authority that over the last 10 to 20 years have actively engaged in promoting terrorist activities. And I don't know why it is that the minister will sit here and justify going to war against private individuals and their communications between each other, citizens of this country, rather than advocating the clampdown on diplomatic immunities and their abuse by those other countries that have actively engaged in terrorism.

Mr. John McCallum: Mr. Chair, I wasn't aware I was proposing to go to war with anybody. So what is the question? I'm a bit lost.

º (1655)

Mr. Rob Anders: I'll pose it again, Mr. Chairman.

If the idea is to go to war against terrorism, when one goes to war one has to choose an identified enemy. The enemy, as stipulated in proposed subsections 273.8(1), (5), and (9), is very clearly private citizens in Canada communicating between each other. Why not make your focus, instead, those countries that have actively engaged in promoting terrorism over the last two decades?

Mr. John McCallum: Mr. Chair, the aim of this legislation is somewhat narrower than the member has in mind. We're not talking about wars against any country. It's not really the subject of today to talk about Libya and these other matters.

But on the narrower issue he raised, I think the basic problem is we're not intercepting communications from one Canadian to another Canadian out there—

Mr. Rob Anders: You will have the authority to do it.

Mr. John McCallum: —we're only talking about communications coming from the outside into our computer systems, or from our computer systems. This is the much narrower issue with which we are dealing.

Mr. Rob Anders: It's worded very broadly. It is not worded narrowly at all. It's giving you a broad swath to go where you will. If you want to go after something specific, you should specifically mention it in the bill. Instead, you leave a very broad swath that you can go after.

All I'm saying is that it would be a lot easier for you to focus your firepower, resources, computer technicians, or what have you, to go after and restrict the diplomatic immunities of those countries that have been actively engaged in these things, rather than asking for a broad swath to go after Canadian citizens in their own private communications.

Mr. John McCallum: Well, Mr. Chair, again, the subject of these larger issues is not the topic of today.

I'm told this is not a broad swath at all. But in order to discover that it is indeed narrow, the member would have to read further in that section. If he reads further, he will find it is much more circumscribed than he would be led to believe if he were to read just the first part of it. As I say, it is directed at communications coming into our system. It is not directed at communications between any two Canadians outside of our system. So it has the very narrow target of protecting the computer systems of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence.

The Chair: Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders: Mr. Minister, why are you not going after those countries that have actively promoted terrorism over the last two decades, rather than going after communications inside Canada?

The Chair: I'm not going to... That question has been on floor. It has been dealt with.

Mr. Rob Anders: It hasn't been answered.

The Chair: Respectfully, it's not part of the bill.

Mr. Rob Anders: It should be part of the bill.

The Chair: It's a greater question for another day.

[Translation]

We've only a few minutes left, Mr. Bachand. Do you have a question?

Mr. Claude Bachand: Yes, I have an important one, Mr. Minister.

In a press release dated October 31, the government indicated that it would not be seeking, through Bill C-17, the authority to establish a controlled access military zone and that it would be acting by order-in-council.

By what legal authority are orders-in-council issued if you decide to act? By what authority would you not be required to seek permission to establish a military zone?

Mr. John McCallum: The government has always had this authority. It has nothing to do with this bill. As far as military zones are concerned, the government can act by order-in-council, with or without this bill. Indeed, it could have moved to establish such zones 10, 20 or even 100 years ago, by invoking the royal prerogative.

The Chair: I'm sorry, Mr. Bachand, but our next witnesses have already arrived.

Mr. Minister, thank you to you and your associates for coming and especially for your cooperation.

» (1700)

[English]

We'll suspend for five minutes.

» (1700)

» (1703)

The Chair: We will reconvene proceedings on Bill C-17.

I want to welcome the Minister of National Revenue, the Honourable Elinor Caplan.

Madam Caplan, thank you very much. We apologize for the delay. It was beyond our control, of course. Could you indicate to the committee if in fact you'll be able to stay with us for one hour? Then would you please begin with your presentation, and would you kindly introduce your officials please?

We'll begin immediately and go to questioning.

Hon. Elinor Caplan (Minister of National Revenue): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I would like to introduce Mary Ann McMahon and Andrea Spry. I will ask each of them to let you know what their exact titles are.

Ms. Mary McMahon (Senior Counsel, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency): I'm senior counsel with CCRA legal services.

Ms. Andrea Spry (Director, Risk Assessment Systems Division, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency): I am the director of risk assessment systems in the customs branch of CCRA.

Ms. Elinor Caplan: Thank you, Mr. Chair, for inviting me to appear before this legislative committee. I welcome the chance to explain Canada Customs and Revenue Agency's contribution to Bill C-17, and to respond to your questions about our agency's involvement.

I'd like to begin by commending committee members for their valuable service in carefully analyzing the Public Safety Act. This will help to ensure that this bill strikes the right balance between protecting Canadians from terrorist and other threats to our society, and upholding our citizens' constitutional rights. I can assure you these are precisely the Government of Canada's objectives with this essential piece of legislation.

We are committed to safeguarding Canada's borders for both people and business, to protect us all from terrorists and criminal activities that could put our lives or livelihoods at risk. The public's safety is paramount, yet we are equally cognizant of the necessity of respecting Canadians' rights and freedoms, and steadfast in our determination to ensure they are upheld.

We are confident that with Bill C-17, we now have a legislative mandate that balances the privacy rights of Canadians with everyone's right to security and health and safety.

There are two CCRA-related amendments to this bill. As you know, the CCRA received the legislative authority to collect advance passenger information with Bill S-23 last fall. Two provisions in Bill C-17, both proposed amendments to the Aeronautics Act, will complement our own advanced passenger information program. That's known as API.

One important amendment will ensure reciprocity in our exchange of API information with other customs organizations. Under section 107 of the Customs Act, we were authorized to share our API information with other customs authorities. The amendment will allow us to receive information in return, for customs purposes.

The second amendment of interest to the CCRA will allow customs officials to receive API information from Transport Canada, but only where Transport Canada requires our assistance in dealing with a transport security issue.

The CCRA and Canadian law enforcement agencies have relied on intelligence information to protect Canadians for decades. Changing times call for changing tactics, to keep pace with technological innovations and the ingenuity of terrorists and criminals who would jeopardize our way of life.

The latest tool in our arsenal to combat threats to public safety is our advanced passenger information passenger name record program that's known as API/PNR. It is just a small part of CCRA's overall strategy to secure our borders, but it's an essential element of our comprehensive plan nonetheless.

The essential purpose of this new program is to provide us with vital current information to enable us to better carry out our customs responsibilities. However, it also strengthens our ability to track and arrest terrorists, international criminals, and pedophiles, before they enter the country.

The advantage of having this information in advance is that it speeds up the process for legitimate travellers. Even more critical, it allows customs officers to identify known smugglers and other criminals, track terrorists, and prevent other threats to Canada. Having this heads-up lets customs analyze the passenger lists prior to the time of entry, and over the longer term establish travel patterns that can lead to the detection of conspiracies and criminal acts. In light of recent history and continuing threats of terrorist acts against western nations, including Canada, it would be irresponsible not to collect and retain such information.

» (1705)

API-PNR has already proven its worth. Since its introduction in October, within the first month of its existence, advance passenger information led to an $8 million drug seizure in Vancouver, preventing 16 kilos of heroin from hitting our streets. Using advance information, customs officers identified three passengers for further examination. A search of their luggage yielded the drugs, clearly demonstrating how this early warning system is assisting law enforcement agencies in protecting the health and safety of Canadians.

We anticipate similar direct benefits to medical officers of health in dealing with health emergencies. For example, we could use advance passenger information to notify travellers on a specific airplane when one of their fellow passengers falls ill with an airborne disease, such as tuberculosis.

Of course--and this is extremely important, Mr. Chair--CCRA has developed strict guidelines governing the conditions under which information can be disclosed. Section 107 of the Customs Act provides explicit direction with regard to the circumstances under which collected information can be released. Without exception, all requests for information will be made in writing, and only the minimum information reasonably required for the defined purpose will be released. We will as well conduct regular audits of this process, which is always subject to oversight by the Privacy Commissioner of Canada.

I remind committee members that the customs advance passenger information and passenger name record program was one of the initiatives in the customs action plan, which was announced in 2000 and had been under consideration for some time. This initiative is supported by legislation that was fully debated and adopted in Parliament.

Don't forget that keeping the information of Canadians safe, be it tax or travel information, is our business at CCRA. We have a demonstrated record of integrity in protecting the confidential and private information of our clients, including 23 million taxpayers and 111 million travellers who enter Canada every year.

If I had more time, I'd be pleased to outline a range of progressive initiatives we've undertaken at Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, from our new free and secure trade program, called FAST, to CANPASS at most of our ports of entry, which reflect our resolve to provide our citizens with the personal security, economic growth, and quality of life we all cherish. However, in the interest of brevity, Mr. Chair, I will conclude my formal remarks and happily answer questions you may have about our programs and services.

Thank you very much.

» (1710)

The Chair: Minister, thank you very much.

I hate to begin with an apology, but I must, to you, the officials, and members on both sides of the table here. I will have to leave because of a conflict in my schedule, and I will ask Mr. Bertrand to preside over the rest of the proceedings today.

We'll begin the first round with Mr. Jaffer.

Mr. Rahim Jaffer (Edmonton—Strathcona, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to the minister and her officials for being here today.

I have only a couple of questions. They mainly have to do with greater clarity. You may have answered one of them.

On October 7, 2002, your agency implemented the advance passenger information and passenger name record program, which authorized airlines and passenger reservation systems to share information with various government agencies. In various statements CCRA has justified this program, saying that it is fully authorized by recent amendments to the Customs Act, Bill S-23, and that the use of this data is now covered under section 107 of the Customs Act, as you've said. Where in Bill S-23 or the Customs Act would I find the specific provisions for CCRA to collect this information from the airlines?

Ms. Elinor Caplan: I'm going to ask Mary Anne McMahon to provide the specifics.

But it's interesting to note--and I think it should be on the record--that before Bill S-23, CCRA, and before that both Revenue Canada and Canada Customs, had the authority on the basis simply of ministerial discretion. It was in Bill S-23 for the very first time that the authority was codified. But that authority had always been available on the basis of ministerial discretion prior to Bill S-23.

Mary Anne, do you want to refer to the specifics?

Ms. Mary Anne McMahon: Yes. Bill S-23 contained two provisions. One was section 107 of the Customs Act, which codified the disclosure provisions under which customs information can be shared in a variety of specific circumstances.

The specific authority to collect API-PNR information is in section 107.1 of the Customs Act, the very next section. It provides that the minister may require specified information to be provided. The information to be provided is specified in regulations that are now going through the regulatory process.

» (1715)

Mr. Rahim Jaffer: That's what I thought, and I guess where the question came up.

If the government already has the ability to collect the information under the particular data system under the Customs Act, then why does the government need to modify the Aeronautics Act to give it the powers it already has? Aren't we are wasting our time here, in essence, if customs already has that power?

Ms. Elinor Caplan: No. What's really important about the amendment in this legislation is that we have the authority to collect information and to share data. This allows us to receive information from other customs organizations and agencies. It allows us to fulfil our responsibilities as well as our mandate, I guess, particularly as it relates to the smart border accord.

Mr. Rahim Jaffer: I think the one thing that, again, I need a bit of clarification on is that under the Customs Act, I thought the information was available to the department if the minister requests it. Why did this change need to happen with the Aeronautics Act? This is why I think we're wasting our time on this.

Ms. Mary Anne McMahon: The authority under section 107.1 of the Customs Act will provide CCRA with information with respect to flights inbound to Canada. The information that we will be able to receive from other customs organizations would be other flights that were inbound to other countries from Canada, for example. There's no other source for the CCRA to receive the information.

Mr. Rahim Jaffer: Under the current system, are we sharing the information with our U.S. counterparts? Is that happening through customs or through other security agencies?

If I understand correctly, this change was also made in order for us to share information more effectively with our U.S. counterparts. Is that correct?

Ms. Elinor Caplan: The API-PNR, the advanced passenger informationand passenger name record program, was negotiated so that it would operate and function in this way. Canada would collect information on inbound international flights into Canada. We would develop what I call a centre of analytical expertise. The United States would collect information on passengers coming into the United States. They would have a comparable centre of analytical excellence.

We would then establish protocols so that they could tell us specifically what they were looking for in the way of terrorist and security risks. We would then go through our information and provide it to them under the agreement, the smart border accord, with all the appropriate memoranda of understanding.

That was negotiated. I have to tell you that when we first sat down at the table, the request from the Americans was that we give them all the data and let them do their own analysis. We felt it was in Canada's interest to be able to have our own data centre do our own analysis, and then ensure that their requests were appropriate and we were not releasing any sensitive trade information as an unintended consequence.

Mr. Rahim Jaffer: I have a final question. Do I have time?

The Acting Chair (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Thank you. Your time is up.

Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Minister, thank you for coming.

On the API system, there had been some concern expressed in the past, I think, by George Radwanski that there was too much data. It was too comprehensive, right down to wanting to know the seat number of a particular individual, and the length of time it was retained was too long. Has your ministry had a chance to respond to his concerns? Have you addressed them here?

Ms. Elinor Caplan: We provided him with a letter, and I'd be pleased to see that a copy of that letter is tabled with the members of the committee, if you'd like to have it.

Succinctly, the standard for retention of all customs enforcement databases is six years. When we sat down to discuss the API in our program under the smart border accord, we said we didn't think it needed to be kept any longer than six years because that was the experience we'd had, and the Americans agreed to that under the proposal. So this is not being held any longer or any differently from any other customs enforcement database.

Mr. Radwanski is an advocate for privacy. He has said he has no objection to this information and data being maintained for terrorist activity. We believe it's in Canada's interest if we can, through the use of this information as with all other customs information, identify drug traffickers, smugglers, pedophiles, and health risks.

You know, if three or four months or a year after you've been on an airplane, Health Canada discovers that someone who sat near you had a serious communicable disease, and came to us with a request in writing for the names of the passengers on that plane, we think Canadians would want us to be able to share that information, so people could be contacted, told about the situation, and offered appropriate medical treatment.

» (1720)

Mr. Steve Mahoney: That clarifies a question I had. When you said we could use API to notify travellers on a specific plane when one of their fellow passengers falls ill, it almost sounded like you'd be making the announcement in flight. But you're suggesting this could be discovered three or four months later, or whenever.

Ms. Elinor Caplan: We actually had a similar situation in the past. You may recall when someone arrived in Canada with a very unusual and rare illness. In fact, I think it was in Hamilton. It took a long time before they ruled out all the things that were wrong with her. People were phoning in because they had identified the flight she was on, but at that time there was no program such as this to be able to systematically and properly identify and notify those people who were on the plane, to let them know what the facts were. I think that's something Canadians expect us to be able to do.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: There was a lot of hysteria about that particular case.

Ms. Elinor Caplan: That's correct.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: That might have helped us get the true information out.

You said if you had more time--and I want to give you some time--you'd talk to us about the initiatives at the border, particularly given the comments by our Deputy Prime Minister this week, expressing concern that if the Americans were to adopt a system of checking every single occupant of every single vehicle, the Detroit crossing would become a parking lot. So I think that's a very real concern.

Can you tell us a little more about the CANPASS, and whatever other initiatives you've put in place?

Ms. Elinor Caplan: Our whole approach in working with the Americans has been to develop what we call a smart border, and I describe it this way: Looking for a terrorist is like looking for a needle in a haystack, so what we want to do is to make the haystack smaller by removing from the haystack all the people who we know are low risk--whether they are people, or in fact goods.

So we have a couple of different programs that were actually tested in Canada, and we've negotiated a two-way program with the Americans. One is called “Free and Secure Trade”, or FAST. The foundation of that program was the customs self-assessment program. And I can tell you that if the customs self-assessment program had been developed in the post-9/11 world, it probably would have been called the customs more secure program, because in fact it is more secure, because it has all the elements of gathering information in advance, pre-clearance on goods. We know who the driver is: the driver is pre-cleared. We know who the company is: they're pre-cleared. We know what the goods are: we have all the information in advance. That's why this program is called “Free and Secure Trade”.

CCRA had a lot of very good experience in the development of the CSA program, which was one of the foundations. We added to that the Partners in Protection or the American C-TPAT program. What that has done is help us to remove the low-risk and expedite them so that we could spend our time and attention on those we didn't know, who might be higher risk.

With other programs, such as NEXUS, which is people, whereas FAST is goods, it's the same concept, with slightly different technology. It's people who go across the borders all the time. That one started rolling out of B.C., and it's moving across the country. We have at the airports pilot projects at Pearson and at Vancouver, called CANPASS-Air. It's using iris technology. It's a voluntary program. You sign up, and there is a fee. It's supposed to identify security-cleared, criminality-cleared individuals who are frequent flyers and travellers, going back across the border all the time. So that they don't have to talk to a customs officer when they enter Canada, they look into a kiosk that looks very much like the Air Canada get-your-boarding-pass kind of kiosk.

We're expecting in the new year that what is being tested now at Pearson and Vancouver will become a two-way program, called NEXUS-Air, with the United States at Montreal, Dorval, and Ottawa.

So we're working with the Americans to identify those people who we know pose no risk to either of our countries, because we recognize that with 200 million people going back across our border each year, the kinds of concerns expressed by Deputy Prime Minister Manley are very serious.

The only countries I know that have effective entry-exit controls are Australia and Japan, and they're islands. So it's going to be a tremendous challenge for us to work with the Americans to keep the border functioning--which is in the interests of both of our countries--as well as ensuring that we do it not only as safely as we possibly can, but that we use technologies to expedite and speed goods and services that contain no risk at all so that we can spend our time, energy, and resources where we might have some question or concern.

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The Acting Chair (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Thank you very much, Minister.

Mr. Mahoney, if you have any other questions, we can come back later.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Okay. Thanks.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Mr. Barnes, if you have any questions....

Mr. Rex Barnes: I have just one. With regard to the privacy commissioner, you said you've been in communication with the privacy commissioner and you had a letter you wanted to submit to the committee afterwards.

Ms. Elinor Caplan: Yes.

Mr. Rex Barnes: Is he satisfied with regard to the manner in which you will be dealing with the privacy of our travelling public, with regard to some of the issues that he raised?

Ms. Elinor Caplan: He and I disagree on the fact that API-PNR should be able to be used for health, safety, and criminality purposes. He believes it should only be able to be used to identify a terrorist.

We believe that just as other customs information can be used to identify a dangerous or wanted criminal coming into Canada, just as I told you how we could help people who were on an airplane sitting beside or near someone who was sick, or in fact seeing our missing children program, which helps to find abducted children, stopping them at the border, the use of advance information and the ability to look at tracking and travel patterns over a longer period of time could help us identify pedophiles and stop them before coming into the country.

We believe that is in the public interest, that it's a legitimate public purpose. We do those jobs now, and the additional tool of the API-PNR information will help us to do those jobs even better.

Mr. Rex Barnes: On the health issue, you might want to elaborate, how would the health issue work? You mentioned health and you mentioned other issues. I'm curious as to how you would see the health issue as a major thing.

Ms. Elinor Caplan: That's a very good example, because one of the concerns the privacy commissioner has raised is you can have fishing expeditions. But you can't. There are no fishing expeditions, and that's because the guidelines are very clear.

We would have to have a written request from Health Canada, or another public health agency, saying “We've identified an individual recently arrived in Canada who has a communicable disease. Could you please give us the names of the people on that airplane? We would like to be able to contact them to let them know they may be at risk.” We could then, at our centre of analytic excellence, provide that information. We would have a paper trail and it would be audited to ensure that we were using it only for appropriate purposes. That's how it would work.

Andrea, did you want to add anything to that?

Ms. Andrea Spry: No, I think you have really covered it off quite well, Minister.

I think the important thing is that by keeping this information for a period of time we would be able to go back. If something came up say three weeks afterwards and it was discovered this person was ill, then we would have the information in our database. It's an enforcement database; we already have an enforcement database. But there's a very small number of people who would have access to this database, and the usage of it would be monitored.

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Mr. Rex Barnes: I have a final comment. I don't think any person in their right mind would have any problem with having access to the criminal element with regard to making our country safe. But I think I would ask that you caution yourselves accordingly with regard to the other aspects of communicable diseases and other areas. There's no doubt that we must respect the privacy, but at the same time we have to tread very carefully. That would be my concern for the bigger picture, rather than the terrorists. Because if anyone is part of the criminal element, as far as I'm concerned we should do what we can to get rid of them. And that would be the feeling of probably 90% of Canadians.

Ms. Elinor Caplan: In fact I think most people would agree that in terms of the purposes this information can be used for, first, the guidelines are very clear. It can only be used for preventing or identifying potential terrorists, or identifying criminals who would pose a serious risk--and I use pedophiles, but also people who would import kiddie porn in the same category--and being able to track them over a period of time.

I don't want to give you details of that. I was at a conference and an expert on this issue explained how they do this. It was after listening to the individual make their presentation that I asked, are you saying it would be helpful to be able to identify? Do you know what they do right now? They go through the passport and they look at the stamps in the passport to determine where people have been. By having this kind of information and identifying the kind of travel pattern they can know who they should be considering as someone who might be importing kiddie porn or obscene materials, or someone who poses a risk.

Similarly, we've heard about GST fraud and people who have offshore accounts and that kind of thing. Going to a place once where they might have a tax haven certainly is not what we're talking about. But a pattern over a period of time--that's why six years is what we've chosen--can show potentially where we should be investigating.

We wouldn't be able to go on a fishing expedition to do that; we'd only be able to respond to requests. And that's where the safeguard is, to only be able to respond to requests. But if there's an investigation and they say this is what they're doing, and ask us to provide them with information, we would be able to look at that request, see if it's within the legislative mandate of section 107 and ensure that it met the guidelines, and that it would be properly audited and done in a way to act in the public interest.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Thank you very much, Mr. Barnes.

Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Madam Minister, for appearing before us.

Bill C-17 takes in some 24 departments, and in reading through it, I find things that are very confusing to me as to how they could be administered. For instance, when I went through the Marine Transportation Security Act, the Navigable Waters Protection Act, the Fisheries Act, and the Canada Shipping Act, I found out that one department looks after a boat that is under five tonnes and another completely separate department looks after a boat that's over five tonnes. So you need two ministers in order to pass any particular regulation. That concerns me.

When we come to the presentation that was made by the Solicitor General, they talk about the RCMP and CSIS and the retention of records and client information. They say that they would collect only a certain amount of it and that it would be destroyed very quickly, in fact within seven days. Now we have another agency collecting information, and it is keeping it for six years. I'm having trouble knowing just who is gathering what. Is it joint? Is it separate? Is it shared? How many agencies will be sharing it? The privacy commissioner thinks that some of it is fine but also that some of it is terrible.

So we have the RCMP, CSIS, CCRA, and other people collecting all of this information, plus the airlines collecting their information. In my own mind I'm in information overload trying to study this legislation, not being of a legal mind, although I don't mind challenging legal minds. I'm trying to find out how this all dovetails and who actually is responsible for each part of this. I don't think we have coordinated this. If anything, we've taken 24 agencies and some of them are doing the same thing.

Who coordinates this? Maybe you could shed some light on that.

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Ms. Elinor Caplan: Actually, the Prime Minister was very aware of the concern you've just raised. That's why he established the PSAT committee. As a result of the work of that PSAT committee, where things were coordinated to ask how do we act in the public interest to ensure that departments are working together... That's why omnibus bills were brought in, because there's no question the world changed after September 11. There were needs identified, or as I would say, there were gaps.

But there are also differences as far as needs--for example, API-PNR needs for CCRA. We have a customs database. We've always had a customs enforcement database. It has been there for six years. That's our standard. The RCMP, CSIS, and others, if they are doing an investigation, can make a request to us in writing, and as long as it meets the guidelines, we could then share that information with them. They don't need to maintain it for longer than seven days initially because we will have it. If they have an investigation, they can come to us and make the request. It is a way of making sure it is coordinated, rather than having...

The other is I think an important point. The API-PNR database is a joint initiative of CCRA and CIC. The fact that we have negotiated the smart border agreement with the Americans, that we're working together... As you know, immigration is on the front line in the U.S., and in Canada customs is on the primary line. So the four agencies—U.S. Customs, U.S. Immigration, CCRA, and Canada Immigration—work together. There are differences as far as the needs and requirements for the Solicitor General, RCMP, CSIS. But the important aspect of the API-PNR database is that it will be maintained in accordance with CCRA's long record of integrity in ensuring that information is properly maintained and confidential. I think both on the tax side and on the customs side there is a very long history of that.

Secondly, it can only be accessed by any other agency or department—whether it is RCMP, CSIS, Health Canada—if they make a request in writing and it meets the guidelines. Therefore the protections are there as well as the opportunity for ongoing audit, not only within our own agency, and as Andrea has said, tightly controlled with experts. The privacy commissioner is welcome at any time to come in and audit to ensure that we're doing it the way we said we're going to do it.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Thank you very much, Madam Minister.

Mr. Jaffer.

Mr. Rahim Jaffer: I want to follow up on Mr. O'Reilly's question, because this is what I wished to ask in my last question before my time was up.

As to the information that's being collected under these database systems--all the passenger lists--are they automatically forwarded to the database system, to customs, to be kept track of?

Under subsection 4.8(1) of the Aeronautics Act that governs the transport minister's jurisdiction, which is what I think Mr. O'Reilly was driving at, when you look at what is outlined in that particular section of Bill C-17, it says that

information provided to the Minister or an officer of the Department of Transport under subsections (1) and (2) or disclosed to the Minister under subsection 4.82(8) must be destroyed within seven days after it is provided or disclosed under that subsection.

I'm just curious. If Transport obtains information that you may in fact want, and within seven days it's not requested and is destroyed, does the system automatically have access to every passenger list? Is that how it currently stands?

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Ms. Elinor Caplan: I'm going to ask Andrea, who's the expert on how the database itself will actually work, to explain that for you. Then when she finishes I may make one more point.

Ms. Andrea Spry: There are only a few points I'd like to make.

Canada Customs and CIC are collecting the information on people for flights coming into Canada. The RCMP and CSIS are looking at domestic flights as well as international flights, but their mandate is a bit different. They're looking for this information on people to decide who to let on the flight. They want to collect the information 15 minutes before the flight takes off. It's to help them decide where they want to put their security protective officers. With CCRA and CIC, the information comes to us at least 15 minutes after the wheels are up. We don't get the information before the flight.

The information automatically goes into our database. For API, for example, we run it against our two enforcement databases. It runs against ICES, the Customs enforcement database, and FOSS, the CIC enforcement database. It immediately comes up. We will know immediately if there's someone on the flight who we may be interested in from an immigration or a customs point of view.

The other thing to remember is, for both the RCMP and CSIS, we put their lookouts in our system. If there is someone who is on a flight that the RCMP or CSIS could be interested in, it also comes up. We would know it and would be able to advise the RCMP or CSIS that there is someone they're interested in. Then we would refer them to secondary.

Mr. Rahim Jaffer: Will that be at all airports? Is it in place now?

Ms. Andrea Spry: It's a national system that's in place now for international flights.

Ms. Elinor Caplan: There's one thing that I will add. This very similar system has been available at our land borders for quite a long time. When you cross at a land border, we have licence plate readers at all of our large major crossings. The licence plate and information about the driver is checked against the immigration database and CPIC, the RCMP database.

In the post-September 11 world, we worked cooperatively with the FBI. We actually identified a number of people who were on the FBI wanted list trying to cross into Canada.

The idea of having information available as a tool of intelligence to identify people who pose a risk to our countries is something we've been doing at our land borders for a long time.

We identified, prior to September 11, a gap at the airports. For quite some time, some airlines have been sharing information with us on a voluntary basis for referral to secondary. Even at the airports, this is not new.

What is new is that it's more than referral to secondary, which is how it has been used traditionally at the border and airports. We unfortunately recognized, as a result of the tragedies of September 11, that good data, intelligence information, good analysis, and appropriate sharing were lacking. We found that we really needed to do a better job in the collection, in the analysis, and in the ability to share appropriately to identify potential risks.

Mr. Rahim Jaffer: I have a question on the issue of sharing. There still seems to be a concern. Obviously, it's encouraging to hear what's happening at our airports.

At our land border crossings, I know we have quite a significant number of border crossings, I believe 144 or so, where the basic information is still not available to the customs agent. In some of the particular land crossings, it's still not available. They don't have access, in some cases, to a computer database. In some cases, when I've spoken to some of them, they've said that they're not able to share information with some of the other security agencies in a timely fashion. Even if they have identified someone as a high risk, often they allow them to enter the country until they can notify the RCMP to deal with it.

What progress has been made, especially in light of the harmonization you speak about with the U.S.? That is obviously a concern.

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The Acting Chair (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Very quickly, Ms. Caplan.

Ms. Elinor Caplan: By March 31, 87% of passengers entering Canada at our land borders will be met by customs officials who have officer powers at that port of entry. We expect to see phases one and two substantially completed by the end of March. There are some remote ports of entry where there is not the capability to network, so they have access by phone. Any customs officer who has a concern about any individual can ask that individual to go to secondary and wait while the phone call is made to a place where that information is available. So all of our officers at all of our points have access to the information, even if they aren't online because the infrastructure isn't available to them.

By the way, we're way ahead of the Americans as far as the number of our posts that do have access to the kinds of technology and databases you're talking about. I'm quite proud of the fact that by the end of March almost 90% of people coming into Canada will be met by officers in posts that have access to the information and that have been designated as officer power locations.

[Translation]

The Acting Chair (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Thank you, Madam Minister.

Mr. Mahoney.

[English]

Mr. Steve Mahoney: As vice-chair of the immigration committee, I had a chance to tour some of our land borders. A bigger problem than sharing information is the fact that we have such a massive border in terms of its length and the inability to police it. To even get to the point where you can collect data is just mind-boggling. You see that beer commercial where the guy walks across the river. Well, that can happen pretty easily just about anywhere in this country. Frankly, I don't know how we control that kind of thing.

Ms. Elinor Caplan: I have visited posts from coast to coast to coast. I was up in Iqaluit to see how they do it at the airport there.

CCRA has responsibility at the land borders, the airports, and the marine ports. But between those posts it's actually the RCMP that has responsibility. The integrated border enforcement teams have been extremely effective. They include not only Customs, Immigration, and RCMP, but also their American counterparts, and they work together.

One of the really interesting things I saw, Steve, when I was at one of our more remote posts is that while it looks as if it's unguarded after-hours when it's closed, the truth is that on the Canadian side we have sensors in the roadway, and if a car crosses at night when the border is closed, the sensors trigger cameras, which turn and take a photograph of the licence plate. In some of those remote posts we actually have remote CANPASS operations, where people in the local area who have been pre-approved, screened for both criminality and security, and issued a computer CANPASS card swipe their card, and that's registered on the inside. When our officers come in in the morning, they can contact the police if a car has entered illegally and follow up on it. There are bulletins that go out. In most of those locations they know 90% of the people who cross.

When I asked our officers about this system of sensors, they said that most people are not aware they're there unless they live in the area. There is a sign that says you're not allowed to cross unless you report to a customs office. They said they've had a great deal of success because of the warning signs and also once people are aware that there are sensors and cameras.

I asked them if our system is compatible with the American system. They said that the Americans don't have this system. One of the things we're working on is how we can have compatible systems at the borders so that people can cross both ways. It's nice to be able to come back to Canada. But if an American is in Canada and wants to head for home after the border is closed.... We provide that information to the Americans, because we're able to take that picture.

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Mr. Steve Mahoney: I believe the system in Europe is called Schengen?

Ms. Elinor Caplan: Yes.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: And there are a number of countries in Europe that have managed to enter into an agreement to allow for the free flow of people, at least. I'm not sure if it includes goods, but I know it includes people. I've gone through this system, going from Austria to Italy, and I forget where else, and I was amazed at the ease of getting through the checkpoints--and I'm obviously not travelling on a European passport.

I know you're familiar with that system. Does that system work? We're in a post-September 11 scenario, where it's probably just as dangerous to be in Europe, if not more so, as it is to be in North America. If it does work, how is it that all these European countries, where there are literally millions and millions of people travelling back and forth almost on a daily basis for business or whatever, can have such a system working, yet we seem to be struggling and worried about the Americans taking too long?

I have a case on my desk right now where a woman who is a Canadian citizen, and has been for seven years but was born in Tehran, was held up for hours, trying to get to Houston. She missed her flight, and on and on.

We just don't seem to be able to deal with this in a smooth and effective way, which on the surface it appears these European countries are doing.

Ms. Elinor Caplan: I'm glad you said “on the surface”. In fact, the U.K. has not joined Schengen. I would say Schengen works well if you are a citizen of Europe, of one of the European countries, the European Union, but they are having some real problems with Schengen, particularly sorting out some of the refugee problems that they have. They do have the Dublin agreement, and so forth, and they're having some difficulties.

So for us, I'd say there are lessons to be learned, and I don't think there's any system that I've seen anywhere in the world that is a panacea. However, I think Canada can be proud of the fact that I don't think there's any country that is using technology better than we are to identify the low risk and to speed that kind of individual and good where we know it poses no threat to our country or to the U.S., working together, using technology in an appropriate way to enhance security and efficiency at the same time.

What Schengen means is that you pass through, really with no inspection, among all the European countries. It's a model we certainly look at, but recognize that there are some very significant challenges that come along with it. So I wouldn't recommend that we rush down that road without really understanding and having a good look at how that's working and what their problems are.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Thank you.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Thank you very much, Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think a lot of my questions have been asked and answered, that the minister's department will be the lead department on it. That kind of pacified me a bit, because the questions I've been asking previously have just created more questions.

I asked the Solicitor General and the RCMP to identify to me the number of incidents that have taken place since September 11, and they had to go out and consult to find out what happened, because in their original submission, they talked about the last two years, but they provided statistics beyond that.

They had 73 incidents in 2000, and none in 1999, which really bothered me, because when I asked them why they didn't use the current statistics, they have since sent me a letter saying there were 200 incidents since September 11, 2001.

Naturally, I want to know what happened in 1999, now. That's going to be my next question to them. But I worry about the collection of data by people who, first of all, obviously don't retain it, and secondly, give you inaccurate answers to it.

I know Canada Customs and Revenue has an accurate database and an accurate system for follow-up and it's retained for six years, but the rest of the things that are happening in the system worry me. Really, agencies that don't know how to collect data are collecting them, and I would hope that your department is the lead department on it, because I think, naturally, this is your job; this is how you work on it.

So I'm not so worried about your department. That was why I was asking the questions, to clear up some of the things that happened in this legislative committee before. So I rest assured in that.

That's not necessarily a question, but an observation.

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Ms. Elinor Caplan: In fact it's an important observation, because the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency--both Revenue Canada and Canada Customs before the establishment of the agency three years ago--have had responsibility for the collection and use of tax information and customs information for many years. They've had a long and a proud history of integrity.

Whenever I have a briefing from officials, part of that briefing always includes “this is protected information”. I think our approach to the API-PNR program builds on that strong foundation of understanding the importance of finding the right balance between civil liberties and public protection. Part of that civil liberty, of course, is appropriate protection of information, and ensuring that the use of collected information is for a public purpose that is legitimate and worthwhile.

That's why I made the point at the beginning of these hearings that prior to Bill S-23, Canada Customs and Revenue Canada, now CCRA, always had the authority, simply on the basis of ministerial discretion, to collect the information they needed for customs, tax administration, and revenue purposes. They did a very good job.

Bill S-23 was brought in to codify and put in legislation, for the very first time, what the agency had done in practice for many years, because they knew the important responsibility they had. That's why, as minister today, I'm confident this new program is going to be done with the same professionalism and integrity we have seen in the past. I'm confident we will act in the public interest at all times to protect Canadians.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Madam Minister, I think this brings our meeting to a close. I would just like to thank you and your officials for appearing before this committee. I'm sure it will help us quite a bit. Thank you very much.

The meeting is now adjourned.