C-17 Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Legislative Committee on Bill C-17

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, December 3, 2002

¹

1535

The Chair (Mr. Bob Kilger (Stormont—Dundas—Charlottenburgh, Lib.))

Hon. David Collenette (Minister of Transport)

The Chair

Mr. David Collenette

¹

1540

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

¹

1545

The Chair

Mr. David Collenette

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Mr. James Moore (Port Moody—Coquitlam—Port Coquitlam, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. James Moore

Mr. David Collenette

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1550

Mr. James Moore

Mr. David Collenette

The Chair

Mr. Steve Mahoney (Mississauga West, Lib.)

Mr. David Collenette

¹

1555

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. David Collenette

The Chair

º

1600

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. David Collenette

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1605

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.)

Mr. David Collenette

º

1610

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

Mr. James Moore

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. James Moore

Mr. David Collenette

º

1615

Mr. James Moore

Mr. David Collenette

The Chair

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.)

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. Robert Bertrand

º

1620

Mr. John Read (Director General, Safety and Security Group, Department of Transport)

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Mr. John Read

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Mr. David Collenette

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

º

1625

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. David Collenette

º

1630

The Chair

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.)

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. John O'Reilly

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. John O'Reilly

The Chair

Mr. James Moore

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. James Moore

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. James Moore

Mr. David Collenette

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1635

Mr. James Moore

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. James Moore

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. James Moore

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. James Moore

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. James Moore

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. John Read

º

1640

The Chair

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. John Read

º

1645

Mr. Steve Mahoney

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. David Collenette

Ms. Sherill Besser (Senior Counsel, Legal Services, Department of Transport)

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. John Read

The Chair

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1650

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

Ms. Sherill Besser

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

Ms. Sherill Besser

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. John Read

The Chair

Mr. John O'Reilly

Mr. David Collenette

Mr. John O'Reilly

º

1655

Mr. John Read

The Chair

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais (Churchill, NDP)

Mr. David Collenette

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. David Collenette

The Chair

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CANADA

Legislative Committee on Bill C-17

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NUMBER 002

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Tuesday, December 3, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

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[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Bob Kilger (Stormont—Dundas—Charlottenburgh, Lib.)): I call this meeting to order.

    I want to begin by thanking Mr. Collenette for availing himself today on short notice, this being the first such hearing on a legislative committee on Bill C-17.

    Mr. Minister, if you would like to introduce your officials, we're prepared to start.

    Hon. David Collenette (Minister of Transport): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    With me is John Read, director general, safety and security group; and Sherill Besser, the senior counsel, legal services, at Transport Canada.

    The Chair: If you wish to begin, we've allotted ten minutes for your presentation and then we'll go on to rounds of five-minute questions following your intervention.

    Mr. David Collenette: I am pleased to be here, Mr. Chair. As you know, this is the third incarnation of this particular piece of legislation. The other two didn't make it to committee, or at least I didn't make it to committee with them.

    Of course the bill is a very important one. It was developed following the terrible events of September 11, 2001, and contains proposals relating to the prevention of and response to terrorist acts. As such, it has to strike a very careful balance between safety and security on one hand, and freedom and privacy on the other hand. That was certainly the focus of much of the debate on the former bill, Bill C-55, in the last session. Several members of the committee spoke very strongly about the need to find the balance and suggested ways in which the Public Safety Act ought to be more finely tuned, I should say.

    I hope the committee will recognize that we've responded to many of their concerns in the legislation we have now brought forward in this new session. We listened, quite frankly, and while governments are often accused of pushing things through without regard to the views of Parliament, I believe this legislation has been improved by taking into account the views from all parties in the House and the concerns expressed by the provinces and territories.

    The key principles of the bill remain the same. Our goal is to increase the government's capacity to protect citizens, to prevent terrorist attacks, and respond swiftly should a significant threat arise. Both Bill C-55 in the last session and the bill now before us put the safety and security of citizens in the forefront. To that end, members of the committee will recognize the basic elements of the bill as the same as we introduced in the bill of last April, which died on the Order Paper in September.

    This bill enhances our ability to provide a secure environment for air travel. It facilitates restricted data sharing between air carriers and the federal departments and agencies responsible for transportation and national security. It provides for interim orders to be issued if immediately required in emergency situations, while ensuring proper control over interim orders. It has provisions that would deter hoaxes that would endanger the public or heighten public anxiety.

    It establishes controls over export and transfer of technology and over explosive substances. It helps identify and prevent harmful or unauthorized use of or interference with computer systems operated by DND. And it establishes the Biological and Toxin Weapons Implementation Act.

[Translation]

    Mr. Chairman, these are very broad issues. We examined them in depth both in the House, at second reading of the bill, and during the debate on its predecessor, Bill C-55.

    In the coming days and weeks, you will hear my colleagues comment on the issues relating to their specific fields of expertise.

    Today, I would like to take a few minutes to describe certain amendments to the Aeronautics Act before answering your questions.

[English]

    Part 1 of the bill deals with the Aeronautics Act. It clarifies and updates the regulation-making authority, particularly with respect to screenings. These include providing for the establishment of restricted areas; requirements for people or goods to enter a restricted area; the training and qualifications of screeners; requirements for security clearances and how to obtain these; the implementation of safety management systems, including at the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, otherwise known as CATSA; requirements for equipment and the testing of security systems and equipment. It provides for all of these things.

    The bill makes air rage an offence subject to a maximum fine of $100,000 or five years in prison.

    Anecdotally, Mr. Chair, we talked a lot and heard a lot about air rage before the 11th of September. We don't hear about air rage any more because what happened on September 11 has taken air security to a new level beyond just irate passengers to one of absolute and ultimate security.

    In any event, the bill does make an offence for air rage and a maximum fine of $100,000 or five years in prison.

    The bill also provides that the Minister of Transport may request personal information from air carriers or the operators of aviation reservation systems, and I want to take a moment to clarify the associated restrictions with this. Such a request may only be made with respect to a specific individual or with respect to all persons on, or intended to be on, a flight for which there is an immediate threat to that flight. The request may be for all or portions of the information listed in the schedule to the bill.

    Air carriers or operators of aviation reservation systems are only required to provide information that is in their control. To be clear on this, let me point out that there are no provisions in the bill to require air carriers or operators of aviation reservation systems to collect any information from passengers. The information can only be requested for the purposes of transportation security and cannot be held by Transport Canada beyond seven days. The maximum penalty for failure to provide information is $50,000.

[Translation]

    The bill also amends the Aeronautics Act by clarifying the provisions regarding the inquiries addressed to air carriers of other countries.

    Under these amendments, an air carrier can only provide another country with information on passengers on board an aircraft if this aircraft is to land in that country.

[English]

    As you will recall, Bill C-55 carried a provision that would give RCMP designated officers access to passenger information. I know that you will have questions on this particular issue, and I would ask that you direct them directly to the Solicitor General when he comes to the committee--I think he might be here tomorrow.

    I would like to point out that under the amendments to the bill the designated officers will only be able to request passenger information for the purpose of transportation security. CSIS will have the power to request information for both national and transportation security.

    Also, the ability to collect information for the primary purpose of matching this information against warrants has been removed. That was a sore point in Bill C-55. However, a warrant that is uncovered during the review of information will not be set aside should it relate to one of the very serious crimes set out in the regulations.

    Bill C-17 proposes changes to the CATSA Act, and these ensure that CATSA must comply with the requirements of the Aeronautics Act, as amended by the bill. It clarifies that aerodrome operators may conduct screening on behalf of CATSA and provides that CATSA may enter into contribution agreements with an airport operator with respect to the provision of policing services, and not just some operators, as the CATSA Act now reads.

    Finally, Mr. Chairman, before opening the floor to questions, let me speak to one of the general provisions of Bill C-17 that affects the ability of each of my colleagues to respond in a timely manner to emergency events.

    Now, there has been a lot of debate about the provisions for interim orders. The most important lesson we draw from September 11, 2001, is not what specific authorities we used or didn't use, but that a situation can arise requiring instant response. We cannot foresee all such instances, nor what the associated response should be. Mr. Chairman, what I went through on that day is living proof as to why we have to ensure that ministers have the ability to act in times of crisis.

    When the U.S. decided to absolutely close the skies to arriving transatlantic aircraft on September 11, we were faced with 500 aircraft flying towards North America requiring a place to land. One new aircraft, on average, was crossing the halfway point every 45 seconds, adding to the number requiring landing in Canada. There was no time to conduct an analysis to determine the likelihood of any particular aircraft being controlled by terrorists. There was no time to consider what was in bilateral agreements on landing rights. There was no time to consider how Canada's Department of Citizenship and Immigration would cope with tens of thousands of unknown persons landing in the country. There was no time to consider the impact on the communities that would end up hosting large numbers of passengers. There was no time to discuss the optimum placement of aircraft at airports. There was no time to develop a plan for how we would reintroduce these aircraft into the skies. There was no time to consider the effect on our customs officers or on our police forces, and more important, there was no time to comb through international agreements, federal laws, provincial laws, municipal laws to see if there were procedures we had to follow or formal notices we had to provide.

    Mr. Chairman, with time and need as pressing as it was, decisions had to be made within minutes, and when I say minutes, I refer to that, literally minutes.

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[Translation]

    Although Canada was not under attack, we were faced with an unexpected situation that required immediate decisions. Terrorist attacks, which cause unpredictable emergencies, led to the interim orders.

    Mr. Chairman, we are often able to predict the causes of accidents based on predictable events, such as the technical characteristics of an aircraft wing, and we have the power to require that this wing be built, used and maintained appropriately.

[English]

But we can't predict with the same kind of scientific analysis when we may be attacked by terrorists, nor by what method.

The balance is to establish provisions using normal processes as general threats unfold, but to hold in reserve the ability to act rapidly in the event, as Bill C-17 states, an immediate action is required to deal with significant risk--direct or indirect--to health, safety, security, or the environment. The interim order provision, given its flexibility, which is tempered by the manner in which it's constrained, is the necessary tool.

    I should say, Mr. Chairman, that ministers are accountable to the House and to the court of public opinion. Quite frankly, if those of us who were involved on September11 had messed up the situation, that would have precipitated our resignations and would have had dire consequences for the government. There was accountability.

    Mr. Chairman, you cannot be hamstrung by procedures when your country is under assault. I think those events demonstrate the need for these particular provisions, but of course with the appropriate safeguards, and I know the committee will give some great thought to those safeguards.

    The backgrounders and the press releases that members have received go into the many constraints that have been put in for interim orders, so I won't restate them here.

    I think you'll see that we're proposing a system that will provide exactly the authority needed to act immediately while respecting the paramountcy of Parliament and the statutory framework.

    Mr. Chairman, these are just a few of the provisions contained within this omnibus bill. I would hope that committee members will hold their questions concerning other portfolios until my colleagues have an opportunity to come before you. But I would be pleased to respond to the transportation security issues contained in Bill C-17 and to respond to the general provisions of the bill.

    Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister, for your opening remarks.

    I'll turn to Mr. Moore for the first question.

[Translation]

    You have a point of order, Mr. Bachand?

    Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): As I understand it, the minister who is before us today is the one sponsoring Bill C-17, but we cannot question him on anything other than issues relating to transport.

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    The Chair: We can ask the minister if he is willing to answer your question.

    Mr. David Collenette: I would rather answer the questions directly related to transport and the Aeronautics Act. I can answer general questions relating to security, but I must emphasize that requests for accurate information which concern the Minister of Revenue or the Solicitor General should be addressed directly to them.

    The Chair: Does that answer your question, Mr. Bachand?

    Mr. Claude Bachand: I would like to ask a supplementary question, Mr. Chairman. Did the steering committee ask if it is possible to hear other ministers? I think we would like to ask questions relating to issues other than transport.

    The Chair: We had a meeting, and we had an interesting discussion and drew up a fairly impressive list of witnesses, including other ministers. We can discuss this briefly at the conclusion of our meeting with the Minister of Transport, later today.

[English]

    I'll now go back to Mr. Moore.

    Mr. James Moore (Port Moody—Coquitlam—Port Coquitlam, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much, and thank you to the minister for coming here.

    Mr. Myers was asking why I asked the clerk to come by. I just wanted to say to the minister that I appreciate the minister coming.

    We of the official opposition and other opposition parties asked for an independent committee to be struck. It has been. The fact that so many Liberal members are here, including three parliamentary secretaries of the relevant ministries, I think is a very helpful thing, and I wanted to congratulate the government for doing that. It's very helpful.

    I have a number of questions and I only have five minutes. One question I have is with regard to the concerns raised by Mr. George Radwanski about this bill.

    When Bill C-42 was tabled in November, it gave police in Canada access to passenger lists for both domestic and international flights and it allowed the police to look through those passenger lists and cross-reference those lists with any outstanding arrest warrants or search warrants that may be outstanding in CPIC, the police database, and so on. I notice that has been changed from Bill C-42 to Bill C-17. I would like to ask what prompted the change.

    Can you comment on Mr. Radwanski's concerns, and can you give an affirmation that this won't take place--passenger lists won't be cross-referenced with police databases? There is a large concern that this is an invasion of privacy and going beyond the scope of what's intended with Bill C-17.

    Mr. David Collenette: Well, I recognize that there is some considerable debate. The specific use of this information on the part of the police and security forces will be dealt with by Mr. Easter, specifically, when he comes, and other aspects will be dealt with by Madam Caplan.

    The answer to the initial question of why was the provision on warrants dropped is it was dropped because we felt upon reflection that this was an inappropriate direct use of the legislation.

    Mr. James Moore: George Radwanski's comments have been widely publicized. He's still very critical of Bill C-17 with this provision. He says it doesn't protect privacy to the extent that it should. His concerns are legitimate. I think every member of the House from all parties understands these concerns. We want to make sure the federal government isn't going beyond the scope that's intended with Bill C-17.

    So I would ask the minister to comment more broadly on Mr. Radwanski's concerns and whether or not he thinks they're legitimate, and whether or not the government will be offering or will be considering amendments from opposition parties to deal with these concerns.

    Mr. David Collenette: I want to make a general statement, because I think Mr. Easter will deal with the specifics on the use of this information.

    The general comment I have for Mr. Radwanski, which I've made to him both personally and in letter form, is there has to be a balance in terms of protecting the rights of individuals and the wider right of society to be protected.

    It's obviously his job to raise concerns of privacy. I don't think some of the rhetoric we have heard about compromising basic values and undermining the state of civility in Canada are accurate at all. This may sound a little naive, but I do think Canadians trust Parliament, trust government, and trust the law enforcement authorities to get it right. I think there's a basic support in the country for our system of law, law enforcement, and the judicial system. In a perfect world, people obviously want the most ultimate of protections from the point of view of privacy. But you're dealing with people who have no respect whatsoever for not only your privacy but also your democratic right to express yourself.

    This will not cover warrants and it will only take notice of warrants actually included in the regulations. But Mr. Easter will expound on this.

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    Mr. James Moore: One aspect concerns the firearms community and sportsmen in Canada who are reloaders of their ammunition. They have raised concerns with my office, which I'm raising here to offer you an opportunity to respond. They're concerned about the definition of the inexplosive components of firearms. What they're specifically worried about is that the government may now, in a backwards way, regulate against shell casings, the inexplosive components of how competitive shooters reload shells and so on. They're very concerned about this.

    In the legislation specifically, the definition of what constitutes “inexplosive” has not changed. This has raised a lot of concern. I think what a lot of people are looking for is a more precise definition of what constitutes an inexplosive component of firearms in the Explosives Act. It's not in this legislation. So people in that community are looking for some clarification about what you're looking to regulate in terms of inexplosive components of firearms, and whether or not you will provide this kind of specificity in law.

    Mr. David Collenette: Yes. Your concerns about the definitions in the regulations is something that really can be explored. But the reason these ammunition components, such as cartridges and cases and bullets, are included for control under the Explosives Act is that in November 1997 Canada signed the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials, which is a convention of the Organization of American States, or the OAS. This particular convention captures these components in its definition of ammunition. The convention targets the illicit manufacture of and the trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials through a system of import, export, and transit licences, aimed at protecting shipments within the Americas from loss or diversion to criminal or terrorist interests.

    We can give you chapter and verse on this. Its controls will be in the form of regulations, creating a requirement to obtain an importation permit to bring cartridges and bullets into the country. As you know, Canadian importers are already able to permit import of ammunition primers and propellant powder under the Explosives Act. All they will need then is to amend their existing permits to include cartridge cases and projectiles.

    Again, we'll listen carefully to the committee on this.

    The Chair: Mr. Mahoney.

    Mr. Steve Mahoney (Mississauga West, Lib.): Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

    Particularly to the critic from the official opposition, while I'm officially the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport, it's not for Transport, it's for crown corporations. So on some of the questions, you might think I would know the answers, when I don't. You might understand. I'll just give you that heads-up.

    Minister, in the area of transport specifically, I'm interested in some of the issues around security on the aircraft itself, like the cockpit door. It strikes me that it's not very substantial. Is this an area your ministry can regulate through either regulation, coercion, negotiation, or something?

    On the other example, as you know, when we fly Air Canada and they serve us lunch or dinner, they give us plastic knives and metal forks, which defies my understanding. You can do just as much damage with a metal fork as you can with a metal knife. So there doesn't seem to be a lot of consistency.

    I just wonder if you have any thoughts on in-flight security that you could share with us.

    Mr. David Collenette: On the last point, immediately after the events of September 11 we kicked this around, and I think people should understand that we basically re-did all the screening regulations for passengers within two weeks. This process, after consultation with stakeholders, usually takes two years, and in some cases we may have been overzealous.

    On the issue of knives, it is my understanding that we have issued or are about to issue an addendum. I think you'll see steel knives start to reappear on Canadian flights--with a dull edge, for obvious reasons.

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    Mr. Steve Mahoney: I was afraid you were going to tell me we were going to start using plastic forks.

    Mr. David Collenette: The issue of the cockpits bothered me when I became minister. Having flown a lot, like most of you, I always found it odd that when you got on a train or subway car you never saw the driver or had access to the driver, because they were in a locked compartment. But somehow these aircraft, flying over the oceans with hundreds of people in them, had the doors open and people went up there all the time. It was a great PR device and was really good for kids and others to get a thrill, but it was highly dangerous as a practice.

    I didn't like it, and discussed it with my officials when I came in. I was told I would meet incredible resistance from the pilot community. When a British Airways 747 going to Nairobi was taken over by a deranged man and almost crashed, I drew the line. With great resistance from the pilot community--we worked with them, but they were not very happy about it--we came up with regulations on the cockpit doors being locked. There's been no debate since September 11, and to the contrary, the pilot community and others want even stronger doors. In fact, I think even the Airline Pilots Association now wants double doors.

    The cockpit doors on all major Canadian aircraft, and even on the smaller planes with over 19 passengers, have all been strengthened now, so it's much more difficult to enter the cockpit today and it is restricted. We have restricted third persons from going into the cockpit, and that's caused some annoyance on the part of airline personnel who like to ride in the jump seat. But we've been pretty tough.

    So I think our record for on-board security, the kinds of things you can't take on--sharp objects and the like--the strengthening of the cockpit doors, and other modifications that are underway, which we are helping to pay for with taxpayers' money, will give Canadians an added degree of security.

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: I've heard some criticism in the House--I won't name names, but the initials are James Moore--that we have failed, as a government, to react to the security issues, that we're bringing out this bill now, but why is it taking so long?

    That clearly seems not to be the case. There's been a lot of work done, and this bill will just give additional authority and more clear-cut guidelines and understanding for everyone. Is that a fair comment?

    Mr. David Collenette: We had the regulatory authority on September 11 to take the steps I described: to order the landing of planes; to order Nav Canada to turn half the planes over the Atlantic back to Europe; to order all of the new screening changes; and to order the cockpit doors to be closed and then reinforced.

    We have all of those powers, but upon examination we need additional authorities under the Aeronautics Act, especially on the issue of secure zones at airports--restricted areas--that will be facilitated by this.

    On whether or not we have done our job in reacting to September 11, I think the Canadian public understands we really have our act together, and we are probably one of the top jurisdictions in the world. In many cases the U.S. actually implemented our regulations, and in some cases we implemented theirs. In some cases the intent of ours was the same as theirs, but done differently. We called it equivalent level of security. I don't think anyone can really stand up and accuse us of not having done our job on airline and airport security.

    The Chair: M. Bachand.

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[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I will first ask the minister a question on the air security regulations of the Aeronautics Act.

    According to proposed section 4.71, the governor in council may introduce a whole series of regulations on air security, and we are given examples. About fifteen are listed. I have two questions on proposed section 4.71.

    The governor in council will make decisions. Will the members of the House of Commons be consulted on the regulations, or do you consider that only the cabinet can make these regulations?

    In the list before us, there are 15 regulation objects. Is this list exhaustive, or can the governor in council add other types of regulations?

    Mr. David Collenette: First, I must emphasize that the cabinet is responsible for making regulations. The role of the members is to discuss the bill and principles. They may make suggestions regarding the regulations, but the traditional process is that, after we receive consent to an act, the cabinet is responsible for making regulations. As you know, there is a process for publishing these regulations, and we can make a comment. We also have a joint Senate/House of Commons Committee which has the right and power to review all regulations derived from acts; this committee can not only make recommendations but it can also order changes. This is an ultimate guarantee for Parliament.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: So, it is cabinet that makes regulations. However, members may suggest other types of regulations to cabinet.

    I would like you to answer my question on the 15 or so objects of regulation provided for in the bill. Could cabinet add regulations regarding other aspects than those described in proposed section 4.71 of the Aeronautics Act?

    Mr. David Collenette: Yes. There is no limit to making regulations. Regulations must be made following the principles established by Parliament. In this case, we believe there will not be a large number of regulations, but we cannot say it will never be the case. What is important is that the principle be established by the committee and Parliament, and then cabinet will make the regulations. However, as I said earlier, there is a review process for this procedure.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: I would now like to ask a question on the emergency directives.

    In the bill, it is said that you can issue emergency directives. Proposed section 4.77 even says that you can delegate a certain number of emergency directives to your officials. Could you give us an example of this? How would you consider resorting to emergency measures, and how far does your power to delegate powers to officials extend? You can tell officials that you are issuing an emergency measure and that you allow them to enforce it. How far can the emergency directives go? Give us examples of possible emergency directives.

    Mr. David Collenette: The purpose of the exercise is to give this power to the deputy minister. At the Department of Transport, we have thousands of regulations, and the minister cannot see to the enforcement of each one and oversee operations. As you know, Transport Canada is responsible for transport security, but not only in the air. The work of the employees is essential for issuing the directives under the regulations, but generally, I retain authority on critical regulations.

    On certain occasions, the department recommended that I delegate the power to an official, and I refused to do so, which resulted in debates within the department. I can give you examples of such situations tomorrow, or later in a letter I will send you.

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    The Chair: Mr. Minister, we can pursue this in a second round with Mr. Bachand.

    Mr. Assadourian.

[English]

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much.

    Mr. Minister, in replying to my colleague earlier, you referred to a knife being so dull that you can allow them to go on the airline for service. I'm sure your wife is like my wife: the last thing they pack is a makeup kit. In a makeup kit, you have tweezers.

    I was travelling a month ago with my wife. The very first thing they took from the bag was the tweezers. I'm sure tweezers are not a dangerous weapon. If you have a list of these dangerous weapons, I would please ask you to review that list. Maybe you have to add some other things to it. But tweezers, knives, and forks, which we use on a daily basis, should certainly not be considered dangerous weapons.

    The other thing that concerns me as a weapon is liquor. When I was flying overseas, the stewardess came around with the duty-free list. You could buy liquor off the plane. If it comes down to it, a bottle of liquor is certainly more dangerous than tweezers. This is my first question: what are you going to do with the list?

    Second, as you know, terrorists tried to shoot down a plane with ground-to-air missiles in Kenya last week. Is there any plan we're acting on to make sure that all the airports and airlines in Canada are protected, just in case a similar undesirable act by terrorists takes place in Canada?

    My final question--if you have any authority on fingerprinting--is do we fingerprint American criminals when they cross the border here?

    Mr. David Collenette: Well, on the last point about what happens with people coming into the country, you'd better talk to Mr. Easter when he comes tomorrow.

    With respect to the unfortunate events last week in Kenya, quite frankly, this takes terrorist acts to another level. First it was flying planes as missiles into tall buildings, as in New York, and now we have a case of an attack on a civilian airliner by a hand-held surface-to-air missile. There are a lot of these particular missiles floating around, coming from theatres such as Afghanistan and other places in the Middle East. We don't know who has them.

    The key here is that we live in a free, democratic society. I don't think Canadians would expect the government to ring all the airports in the country with anti-missile defences. The cost would be extraordinary. What is very important is to ascertain the risk. Obviously, if a risk is determined, then you take the appropriate precautions.

    Now, as Minister of Transport, I have full authority over everything to do with airports, planes, and everything happening in the skies. I don't have authority outside the airport perimeter. Under the Aeronautics Act, I do have authority in terms of the skies outside the airports, but not on the ground. This is something for civilian law enforcement agencies. This is a combination of local police forces, the RCMP, CSIS—and, in some cases, the military. There is an intelligence community in this country that works very well together. Both the RCMP and CSIS cooperate with provincial and municipal police systems. If the intelligence warrants it, then certain actions can be taken. But I should tell you we have no intelligence to the effect that a Canadian aircraft in Canada may be the subject of a hand-held missile attack.

º  (1610)  

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: How about the list of...

    Mr. David Collenette: We should get you the list of prohibited items. There were some amendments made. You may remember that I issued an order at the end of September, saying you don't have to turn your cellphones or laptop computers off any more. The reason it wasn't done earlier was that if there was an explosive device present, and you turned it on, you'd blow yourself up. This was the ultimate precaution. But now with the EDS equipment in play at all the major airports in the country, you probably notice that cellphones and computer devices are now brushed with a scanner. So the equipment has come on much quicker than we thought. We've made some changes.

    I don't know where we are with tweezers. I don't use tweezers. But as a good member of Parliament who travels, I certainly had an occasion early on to carry a little sewing kit that you usually get from hotels.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    Mr. David Collenette: I've had it confiscated. So we've looked at that. But after September 11, a lot of people were overly zealous. People with pins and poppies were stopped. But by and large, I think people know what is restricted now. I can't answer you on tweezers. I apologize.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Okay. Thank you.

    Mr. James Moore: Thank you.

    Given that we've slid away from Bill C-17 and are now on to air security, I'm pleased to ask some questions on air security and the attacks themselves. If air security has improved since September 11 and we are going in the right direction and the United States is following us, could the minister please comment on why Air Canada pilots voted to give themselves Tasers?

    Mr. David Collenette: Well, I can't speak for the Air Canada pilots. It is my view that if we do our job in terms of restricting dangerous objects and weapons on planes, if people are properly secured, if the aircraft are properly secured, if the restricted areas at airports are properly secured, plus, of course, if cockpit doors are secured, these are the best ways to deter any attacks. But, as you know, we were required by the U.S. to have armed personnel on planes going into Washington's Reagan Airport. Air Canada is the only foreign carrier allowed to land there, so it's treated as a domestic carrier. We agreed to this.

    We also agreed to random RCMP presence on other flights, particularly because of the competitive position of airlines with regard to the United States. Personally, I was not comfortable with it. Even today, I'm not comfortable with it. But it's a fact of life. My personal feelings can't overcome my responsibility as minister. When I recommended it to the cabinet committee, it was unanimous.

    Now we have the spectre of U.S. pilots being armed. This is something I certainly do not like. I think pilots should do their job, which is to pilot an aircraft. This is more of a philosophical discussion. I think that if we do our job properly as a society and government in securing planes and airports, then we don't need a whole array of weapons. But the introduction of weapons, even by a well-trained RCMP officer, on a plane constitutes a danger if a weapon goes off and does some damage to the fuselage.

    Mr. James Moore: I agree.

    If I could, Mr. Minister, because I only have five minutes.... I agreed with everything you said. But if we're securing cockpit doors, if we're doing a good job on the ground, if we're doing this and if we're doing that, you wouldn't therefore have to have Tasers in cockpits, and pilots wouldn't see the need to use these arms. However, the majority of Air Canada pilots polled said they wanted to be able to carry Tasers to defend themselves. Therefore, ipso facto, if you run back down the argument in the other direction, something along that chain of security isn't working, because these people don't feel comfortable. What is failing, and why do these pilots want to carry Tasers if things are so great?

    Mr. David Collenette: First of all, maybe if you're interested, you can get the Air Canada pilots in here as witnesses and ask them. But the fact is, I've met with the Air Canada pilots and my officials have met with them. We met with the Airline Pilots Association, with both the domestic branch and the main group from the United States—with Mr. Woerth. We just don't agree that we need to go down this particular route.

    We believe that the proper application of screening rules, and the proper application in dealing with people who are intoxicated or are behaving in a strange manner, will prevent these kinds of things from happening.

º  (1615)  

    Mr. James Moore: The last question I have deals with the two largest or big-ticket items, which are seen to justify the $24 air tax: the air marshals and the installation of the equipment, and management. In order to defend the airport tax, the public wants some accountability on what is happening here. So I would ask the minister, what percentage of flights have air marshals on them, and what percentage of checked bags are screened? I mean percentage—not specific flights. This is not divulging national security issues.

    Mr. David Collenette: First of all, we don't call them air marshals. We refer to them as RCMP police on board planes. These are the police who do a great job. They are not a sort of special brand. They are the good old RCMP.

    Second, with respect to the number of flights, the percentage of flights these people are on is something we're not going to divulge. In terms of the percentage of checked baggage, we are not going to divulge that, either. We are moving to 100%.

    The ICAO timeframe is 2006. The U.S. timeframe is December 31, 2002. In the homeland security legislation just passed by the U.S. Congress, they've given it an extra year. I will be surprised if they will be able to comply with that particular measure by December 31, 2003.

    When it comes to the issue of percentages or just giving percentages or instances, I would cite Senator Kenny, who said the obvious a couple of weeks ago on a Global TV program, that you don't want to give any information that lets the bad guys do their job, to say it in a colloquial way.

    With respect to the other issue, Mr. Chairman, I might suggest that Mr. Moore hold his questions for when I go to the transport committee on the estimates, where the expenditures for CATSA will be demonstrated. But I just wish to correct him. He left out a big big-ticket item in what he described as the “big-ticket items”. These are the wages of all personnel involved in screening and the entire security apparatus of CATSA.

    The Chair: Monsieur Bertrand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. Minister, I would like to ask you a few questions on the information you will collect on carriers. In your presentation, you say:

The bill also provides that the Minister of Transport may request personal information from air carriers or the operators of aviation reservation systems.

    Could you tell me what kind of information on passengers Transport Canada could request?

    Mr. David Collenette: The list is on page 104; it is in both languages and includes 34 elements. It is clear. But the air carrier must have the information that is being requested. One cannot provide information one does not have.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: Under what circumstances would the department decide to request information on a passenger? Would it be when he is buying his ticket, or when he is in the plane?

º  (1620)  

[English]

    Mr. John Read (Director General, Safety and Security Group, Department of Transport): Yes, the provisions for Transport Canada provide two cases in which they can request information on passengers. The first one is a fairly obvious one, when the plane is under an immediate threat—if, for example, it is being hijacked—and you want to know everyone who is on board and as much as you can.

    The second case occurs... For example, shortly following September 11 we received a call from the U.K. Department of Transportation, who advised us there were certain people they thought to be flying who were known terrorists. There was concern that these people might be on flights to Canada. These are the kinds of people Transport Canada would have an interest in.

    In Canada our interest is only in aircraft taking off from Canada. If we have been given names of people of concern from the RCMP, CSIS, or the department of transportation of another country, we could then go with the specific name to the airline company or the reservation system and ask for the information they have in their control—which is on that list. If they don't have it in their control, we don't get it, and we can't ask them to ask for it.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: So, what you are saying only applies to planes that take off from Canada. If a plane arrives from London, England, we cannot ask the British air carrier to provide the names.

[English]

    Mr. John Read: The objective is to prevent an attack on an aircraft. Transport Canada's role is with respect to aircraft taking off. However, for an Air Canada flight arriving, the wording of the bill would permit us to ask whether or not a person was on board. But that's not the objective of the way it has been set out.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: Proposed subsection 4.81(3) includes a list of people to whom this information could be disclosed. It includes the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, the Minister of National Revenue, the chief executive of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, or any other designated person. I read this and I was surprised to see that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police--they are mentioned later--and the security agency were not there, and that the information will not be disclosed to them right away.

    Mr. David Collenette: Yes, but they are included in proposed paragraph 4.81(3)(d): “any person designated under subsections 4.82(2) or (3).” This includes the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. They are covered under proposed paragraph 4.81(3)(d).

    The Chair: Your five minutes are up.

    Mr. Bachand.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: There is a provision in the bill which says, much to my surprise, that you can close the airspace. I understand that in certain situations, such as visits by heads of states or air shows, a certain airspace can be closed. But I would like to know how much of it can be closed. Imagine that you get information on a highly probable attack by a plane on a tower or nuclear plant in Canada, and that you decide to close the airspace. I wonder whether we are not in contradiction with the NORAD Agreement, which in fact controls all air traffic. Can we close the entire Canadian airspace without, for example, the support of the Americans, ignoring the Americans, saying that it is our airspace and that their planes flying over our country must go elsewhere because our airspace is closed? How far can we go in closing an airspace, and must we ask permission of the Americans, to meet the NORAD Agreement requirements?

º  (1625)  

    Mr. David Collenette: In this case, it is for clarifying what already exists and the section I used on September 11. But we added the words “security or the protection of the public.” It is simply a clarification.

[English]

So it's just to make things absolutely clear that we're not just talking about safety—which was the reason or legal authority I had on the eleventh—but also to say “security or the protection of the public”. It just broadens the net. It broadens the power. 4.87

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: But that is not my question. If you feel that air security is threatened, that public protection is threatened, do you have the power to close all the Canadian airspace?

    Mr. David Collenette: Yes. I did it on September 11, 2001.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Yes, but after the Americans had closed their own airspace. If the Americans do not close their airspace, can you close your airspace without consulting with them, under the NORAD Agreement?

    Mr. David Collenette: We do not need to consult with the Americans, because we are a sovereign country. But in the September 11 case, there was an emergency in the United States, they closed the airspace, and we decided to do the same. But it can be done without the approval of the United States. In this case, we must inform the Americans, as they informed us on September 11. This is a far-reaching power. We can close the airspace of a region, a city or the entire country.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: I have doubts about this. I remember a situation where an American destroyer went through the North Channel, in the Canadian North; they requested authorization after crossing the channel. If the Americans say they are going to fly over our territory, I am not sure the F-18s will be able to perfectly control the Canadian airspace. What is your leeway? Do you have any?

[English]

    Mr. David Collenette: I disagree. First of all, you're talking about the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, if I remember correctly. I was here in another life in the seventies when we passed that in the Trudeau years. That was because of the American submarine that went through the Arctic waters. There was a bit of a standoff where we said “Look, these are our waters, this is our sovereignty. You can't go through.”

    The Americans privately agreed to notify us when they were coming through, but they said that as far as they were concerned, it was international waters. That is totally different from what we're talking about with air space.

    Let me tell you what would happen--and I'll tell you what happened on September 11. In one particular case, I made an exception to bring an executive from Aon Insurance from Newfoundland, where he was on business, back to Chicago, because the entire company had been wiped out in the World Trade Centre. It was absolutely necessary that he get back. But that individual could only be landed in Sarnia, because the Americans said if his plane went across the border they'd shoot him down. That was control of their air space.

    By the same token, we could have done the same thing, and would have done the same thing. That is why the Canadian Armed Forces deployed its F-18s in the aftermath of September 11.

    So there's no question we have authority, but it's interesting that the moment we went on highest alert--I forget the phrase in defence terms--the airspace in North America came under NORAD's control. NORAD is a joint venture between Canada and the United States. The deputy chief of NORAD is a Canadian, and the control centre is in Colorado Springs.

    But because our military does not have an air traffic control capability like the Americans, that authority immediately is devolved to the Minister of Transport, who has the authority over Nav Canada, which is the civilian agency. But in terms of control of the skies, we have it. If a plane had intruded into our skies, it would have been forced down, one way or the other, in the same way it would have happened in the United States.

º  (1630)  

    The Chair: Mr. O'Reilly.

    Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. Minister, I particularly want to have you talk a little bit about security clearances. At Pearson, for instance, with all of the construction going on and all of the agencies involved in this major airport construction project, the present security clearances seem to be all over the place, and no one seems to be restricted to anything. If you are working on that project, you seem to be able to go anywhere, even into the flight areas.

    I just wonder what is contained in the new act that would clear that up.

    Mr. David Collenette: In the case of construction at Pearson Airport, those workers are only cleared to work in the construction zones, which are separate from the air-side operations.

    If you're talking about other people with access to air-side or secure areas, I announced last month an expansion of CATSA's role to ensure random checks on those workers. But I should underscore the fact that all workers in secure areas at Canadian airports must have security checks before they are cleared to work at the airports. These are background checks done by CSIS and the RCMP. They use credit information and other personal information to make the normal security checks.

    These kinds of checks were not done on any air-side workers, such as refuelers, maintenance people, or caterers, in the U.S. before September 11, 2001. They adopted our system on clearances.

    You can argue, as I did yesterday in the Senate, why can't we do it all the time, but it would be a hell of an expense. For example, to have full-scale screening of groomers of planes, who go in and out of secure areas God knows how many times a day, or caterers would cost a lot of time, resources, and money. But given the fact that these people are security-cleared before they are employed, and we are now authorizing random checks, we think that deals with the level of risk.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: Do you think this will operate for the casual labourer who works at Pearson International, or any airport where major or even minor construction is going on? I am concerned about this because two of the roofers I talked to I think I did parole hearings for, so I wasn't overly excited about their security clearance.

    Mr. David Collenette: I'll get this precise information for you, but if you're working on the construction site at Pearson, you are cleared to work on the construction site at Pearson. You are not cleared to be in a secure area at the airport, either air side where there are planes, or in the terminal in a secure area. There are two differences.... In fact, if you go to the construction site, you'll see big chain-link fences. You cannot go from one to the other without having the appropriate documentation.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The Chair: That's it from Mr. O'Reilly for now.

    Mr. Moore.

    Mr. James Moore: I appreciate the minister's offer to come to the transport committee to talk about the air tax, but I want to go back and talk about--

    Mr. David Collenette: It's an air security charge.

    Mr. James Moore: Okay, it's not a tax. Convince taxpayers it's not a tax.

    I want to ask the minister about the day of September 11, 2001. The order to ground all airplanes and to close the airspace, where did that order come from? Was that done through an interim order? Can the minister explain the legal process and how that worked?

    Mr. David Collenette: Perhaps Mr. Read can explain the exact terminology, but it was an existing authority that we had, and we did it. It was done. Once we did it, we then communicated to the centre that we had done it, the centre being the Privy Council Office. I assume they informed the Prime Minister and everybody else who was relevant. There was no time to ruminate about this; we had to act.

    Mr. James Moore: I'd appreciate your comments, Mr. Read, but that order came specifically from the Prime Minister or from yourself, or from Defence--

    Mr. David Collenette: The Minister of Transport. The Minister of Transport ordered Nav Canada, through which we regulate the safety, to ascertain which planes had enough fuel to go back to Europe, send them back, and the rest were told to immediately land in Canada. We worked with Nav Canada to land them at certain airports. As you know, they were largely on the east coast.

    That was done under existing authority of a minister. We may have other cases where a minister may not have the authority that I had on that day, then you're scratching around for an order in council. You have to get four ministers together. I can tell you, if we'd had to get four ministers together on September 11, when I was in a van coming from Montreal to Ottawa on an emergency basis, we wouldn't have dealt with the emergency. We did it within the existing framework of the regulation.

º  (1635)  

    Mr. James Moore: On the day of September 11, and given that experience--and clearly that's an example of the need to give this kind of lateral power to a minister to act like that, an example of where an interim order is clearly defensible and in the public interest--was it from the events of September 11? Was that the genesis of the idea of expanded interim orders? Did it come from there?

    Mr. David Collenette: Yes. We hadn't been through this before. In the days that followed, the senior public servants, like Mr. Read, Ms. Besser, and the DMs in all the rest of the various departments, started to say “Gee, what have we got hold of here?”

    We had to do the front-end stuff that dealt with the crisis in the skies and getting the people down, then doing the evaluation of all the air regulations and getting the planes back up in the skies. But there were other ramifications, as we know, in terms of security, intelligence, military and all the rest. As a result of these deliberations, it was felt that existing authorities were inadequate.

    Mr. James Moore: I really want to understand this in plain language. At 8:34 a.m., or whenever it was, on September 11 you saw the television or you got a phone call from--

    Mr. David Collenette: I was in the middle of a speech in Montreal to 2,000 airport executives from North America and around the world, including the airport executives from Los Angeles, Boston, and La Guardia. They were all stuck and they all had to drive back.

    Mr. James Moore: You got on your cellphone and called the head of Nav Canada and said “Shut it”.

    Mr. David Collenette: No. The moment it happened, I was supposed to fly to Toronto. I decided we had to get back to Ottawa. My DM, who had been in another meeting of Industry Canada, by then was alerted by officials at the department that the FAA had closed the skies. She and I talked about it very quickly and we made the decision that we had to close our own skies. All those decisions were made on the telephone. I gave the authority to her. She gave the authority to the relevant officials, who transmitted that to Nav Canada.

    We had an operation centre that in effect was the government operation centre in the early stages of the crisis.

    Mr. James Moore: Was your ability to do that easier or more difficult than what they experienced in the United States, in being able to ground planes?

    Mr. David Collenette: No, but both Mr. Mineta, who has responsibility for the FAA, my counterpart, and I had the same statutory authority to do what we did.

    Our problem was that we weren't asked what we thought of the situation. The FAA called at the operations level and said they were doing this and they just wanted us to know, and they were landing all the planes. I don't know whether they realized there were 500 flights across the Atlantic, most of them destined for the United States, for which we had responsibility, and we were stuck with all those people in the sky. I think they were too preoccupied with getting their own planes down to worry about that, but we had to worry about that.

    Mr. James Moore: I appreciate your recounting that history, because it hasn't been explained. As an example of where an interim order type of power would be relevant, I think that story frankly needs to be told more.

    Mr. David Collenette: Except in that case it's not an interim order, it's a permanent regulation under the Aeronautics Act, I think.

    Mr. John Read: Well, it strongly illustrated the principle. It was from that we recognized that, as President Bush even said when he signed the Homeland Security Act into law, we cannot foresee nor protect ourselves from all events that may come through the terrorist route. And that's what we recognized on September 11, that there are decisions that have to be made immediately.

    Fortunately, we actually had three different routes the minister could have followed to do what was done. Those were all present and those were used. Again, the point that really has to be made that I keep whispering to everybody who will listen is this: the interim order provision comes from September 11 because we recognize there will be decisions arising in the future that we can't foresee today. If we could see all these cases today, we'd draft the regulations for you, but we can't foresee them. We recognize that we have to have that in the back pocket for rare cases, and hopefully that will never be used.

º  (1640)  

    The Chair: On the next round, I can go to Mr. Mahoney.

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: Thanks, Mr. Chair.

    Minister, you mentioned NORAD. It's interesting that I was there a couple of weeks ago and I met with General Pennie, who is the deputy commander of NORAD and he is a Canadian general. In fact, on September 11 it was the first time in history that the three doors at Cheyenne Mountain were closed, which then seal off and secure all the people and the equipment responsible for the defence of North America. And the person in charge on September 11 was General Pennie, a Canadian, so it was quite an eye-opener, quite an interesting tour to see that operation in Cheyenne Mountain.

    A lot of the amendments to the Aeronautics Act that are here seem to me to deal with issues and regulations and abilities that you have now. In fact, your actions on September 11 clearly show that you took the authority, you obviously had a team in place to quickly give you advice, and you in turn worked with them to come to the final decision, which it would appear was made in a matter of minutes on that day.

    Your decision and your reaction have probably been overlooked a little, as well as the courage it must have taken to make it and the professional advice that gave you that courage and that ability to make that decision. So I think that should be acknowledged.

    If all of that was in place on September 11, why do we need to put a bill in place to amend an act that was already there, that already gave you the authority and clearly the clear-cut ability to make that decision?

    Mr. David Collenette: First, until the recent CBC program I don't think the department's work on the day was sufficiently well recognized. I'm talking about the officials as an outstanding group of people.

    In fact, there was a labour dispute when it happened, and all those people abandoned the picket line and went to work. Some of them worked around the clock three or four days without sleep and they did a phenomenal job, and I'm glad that it's being finally recognized.

    As Mr. Read said, while we had the authority to do those certain things on September 11, there were other authorities required. Some of them are under the Aeronautics Act, but generally they deal with other ministries that require an interim order provision. This is so you legally can make decisions, where you can't consult with cabinet, you can't consult with the Prime Minister, you just have to use your statutory authority or obligation to act.

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: Not to belabour the point, but the areas that are addressed include the safety of passengers, crew members, and aircraft; the restricted area on aircraft, which we've talked about; screening of persons; prevention of unlawful interference with civil aviation; and applications for security clearances. There's a long list of items that are affected by the amendments in this bill to the Aeronautics Act. I just want to give you and perhaps Mr. Read the opportunity to explain to the committee why we need to be as specific as this. In being so specific, do we run any risk that in fact we could exclude something that needs to be addressed and limit the flexibility that was demonstrated on the morning of September 11?

    Mr. John Read: One thing we did after the eleventh was examine very carefully not only whether we could respond to September 11, because clearly we could, but also there were other kinds of scenarios we could develop. We wanted to be absolutely certain we could follow a very good security program for all the eventualities we could currently foresee.

    Our current Aeronautics Act contains only subsection 4.7(2), which says “The Governor in Council may make regulations respecting aviation security.” It sort of sits there, and that's it. We went through a lot of thought and said we want to get examples for this and make perfectly clear in our minds the way we should lay things out so that we'll be able to cover all the cases that we feel are necessary. That is why you see proposed subsection (2) begin by saying “Without limiting the generality of subsection (1),” and (1) is wide open, “regulations may be made under that subsection”, and then it lists the various things. If you look at these, you can predict how we will run a security program. We think we have it all, but no one is ever perfect. But we still can fall back on the general power, should that be necessary. Naturally, regulations have to go through the whole Governor-in-Council, Canada Gazette process. But we do believe that by laying this out ourselves, it has helped us as to how to organize our security branch and how to decide what we tackle first. It's an example of good planning, rather than the general power itself.

º  (1645)  

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: Was there any--

    The Chair: Mr. Mahoney, if I might--

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: Am I done?

    The Chair: The five minutes has elapsed. We want to conclude this meeting at approximately 5 p.m.

    Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the minister would agree to answer a question on interim orders. I think there is a provision which applies to interim orders, which states that interim orders can be issued.

    Under the Statutory Instruments Act, orders may not apply as such. Some say that the fact that the order does not apply to parliamentary texts could mean that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is violated. I would like the minister to tell me if he considers that this concern is groundless or if he thinks this could be justified.

[English]

    Mr. David Collenette: Madam Besser will answer. She's the lawyer.

    Ms. Sherill Besser (Senior Counsel, Legal Services, Department of Transport): The charter applies to all government action. It applies to legislative administrative actions by the government. So the charter would apply. What the Statutory Instruments Act provides for is a review for compliance before a regulation is made. Although there will not be a review in this case before the interim order is made, the review will take place when that interim order is turned into a direction. But in that interim period the charter does apply.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Orders in council and regulations, under the Emergencies Act, must normally be tabled in the Senate and the House of Commons within two days. In the bill that is currently before us, it is said that 15 days would be needed before tabling in Parliament. I do not understand why there is a double standard.

    In the bill that is currently before us, why are there 15 days for tabling in both houses, while under the Emergencies Act, any order in council issued by the government must be tabled in both houses within two days?

[English]

    Mr. John Read: There is one significant difference here that you have to recognize, which is that on the interim orders the tabling in Parliament is 15 calendar days, it's not 15 sitting days. It used to be 90 days and it was changed and changed. And it's now 15 days, and it has to be tabled within 15 days whether Parliament is sitting or not. There is no requirement for Parliament to be recalled to deal with this; they can be deposed with the clerk.

    If you're comparing this with the War Measures Act, that's a different system; that's for a major event for which you would recall Parliament. There are four parts to the War Measures Act, and again, the important distinction comes down to this basic question of the immediacy of making a decision.

    Under the War Measures Act, the Governor in Council must make the declaration, and to make that declaration he must first consult with the Governor in Council of the province involved. And even if we say that's done rapidly and finished in four hours, we still accept that we can have, in this new world and new environment we're in, situations where we will have to make a decision immediately--that's the interim order power. Hopefully it will never be used, but it's for the immediacy of it. Then there are all of the conditions afterwards that are necessary: in Canada Gazette within 23 days; in Parliament within 15 days, whether in session or not, etc.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Mr. Bachand, is this a conclusive answer?

[English]

    Mr. Assadourian.

º  (1650)  

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Thank you very much.

    A minute ago we were discussing the War Measures Act, and I have a question on that. Maybe I would put my question to Ms. Besser.

    We all agree, as we discussed earlier, that Bill C-17 takes away some liberties, or there is a compromise we make through the act, to make sure we are safe in our country. Obviously the whole thing there... Do you understand what I'm saying?

    Ms. Sherill Besser: I'm not sure we agree that it takes away liberties; I think it tries to strike a balance between privacy concerns and security.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Balance. When you balance, you take some, you give some.

    If you take a scale of one to ten, the War Measures Act, which took away some liberties... I came in 1970, November, just a few weeks after the October Crisis, so I'm quite concerned, like most Canadians are. If you balance from one to ten the freedom we lost with the War Measures Act, with this Bill C-17, are you telling me there is no comparison, or there is some comparison? From one to ten, how would you scale it down?

    Ms. Sherill Besser: First of all, the War Measures Act was replaced by the Emergencies Act, so if we look at the Emergencies Act, there are four different powers that can be used in the Emergencies Act: there's a public welfare emergency; there's a public order emergency; there's an international emergency; and there's a war emergency.

    When you're looking at the kinds of security concerns the Department of Transport has, if we could equate any of them, this would fall within a public order emergency. For an emergency to be a public order emergency, there has to be a threat to security, as defined in section 2 of the CSIS Act. That means it's threats directed towards violence, either real or threat of violence, to a number of persons in Canada. Once you have that, then if that kind of emergency is declared, the Governor in Council could act within the scope of that part of the act, which may not cover the kinds of things we would need to do, from a security perspective, under interim orders, and which we would be otherwise authorized to do under the Aeronautics Act.

    Is that helpful?

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: No.

    The Chair: Mr. Assadourian, I'll give you one more chance. Final chance.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: My point is, in 1970, we all agree, we lost some freedoms. Am I right or wrong? Do we agree there?

    Mr. David Collenette: Let's not revisit history. There was an emergency, the law was invoked at the time, as the government had a legal right to do, and there were restrictions on liberties, in a temporary nature, which some people say were excessive, but that's really another matter in another time.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: That's fair, that's what I'm saying. But compare that to Bill C-17. Some people, Minister, state that it was excessive power. You watch a documentary and everybody gives their own point of view, that's fair game. But the bottom line is, there is some truth somewhere. Compare that to Bill C-17. How do you rate that? That's my question.

    Mr. David Collenette: There is no comparison.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: No comparison? That's good enough.

    Mr. David Collenette: Mr. Read would like to say something for the record, Mr. Chairman, if you don't mind.

    Mr. John Read: I think he wishes to compare an interim order power, and you may only make interim orders if you can make a regulation under the act. They're not unlimited, they're restricted by what you can make a regulation for.

    If you're comparing that with part 4 of the Emergencies Act, the comparison is something like ten plus one on one side and zero on the other. There is no comparison between what you would do under part 4 versus what we can do in interim orders. That, I think, was the comparison you were making.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Read.

    Mr. O'Reilly.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    I also want to talk about interim orders, but in a different vein. Some of the interim orders, for instance under the Canada Shipping Act, allow the Minister of Transport, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, or both to make an interim order. How do you decide, if they're both available, which one decides? Which one is the lead minister? Who decides on that interim order?

    Mr. David Collenette: There are prescribed powers. There are certain responsibilities the Minister of Transport has and certain responsibilities the Minister of Fisheries has, and I think they're prescribed in the bill, aren't they? Therefore, it's quickly known who has the authority.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: But it says clearly in part 22 that either minister may make the order or both may make the order. I just wondered why. Normally, it would be if one wasn't available or if for some reason it covered both areas. Is there a crossover of authority in that particular area, or have I created a terrible question here?

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    Mr. John Read: No, it's actually a very good question.

    One of the other sides of predicting the future is to ask the question, if we could predict the future and future potential terrorist acts, would we want to put in place today the preventive measures? For two examples, would we want to put walk-through screening and metal detectors at our shopping centres, as is done in Israel? If we decided this is a threat, would we want to vaccinate everyone in Canada today against all possible infectious diseases just in case?

    Now, the case that is under discussion here, which relates to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and under those two acts the Minister of Transport, relates to the potential closure of not only air space but water space surrounding sensitive sites such as nuclear power facilities. We don't intend to close off the St. Lawrence Seaway as it passes near Pickering or Darlington, but what we do need is to be able, if there is a serious threat that arises and there's a serious concern where you do want to close the water space similarly to closing the air space, to have an interim order power. This doesn't currently exist under the Canada Shipping Act.

    Moreover, the division of labour is such that the Minister of Transport is responsible for some sizes of ships and the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans is responsible for the smaller size. In order to effectively close the water around Pickering or Darlington in an emergency--should we have, God forbid, such an event--both ministers for that would have to respond. They both would have to close the waters for their particular jurisdictions.

    The Chair: The final round goes to Ms. Desjarlais.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais (Churchill, NDP): Since you gave me the opening, Minister, I can't help but comment and get some thoughts on it.

    You indicated the restrictions on liberties under the War Measures Act were temporary and that some people thought they were excessive. Is it a fair statement that the restrictions on liberties under this bill are permanent?

    Mr. David Collenette: No, not at all. The information that's being requested is requested for cause. It's not a blanket request and this doesn't mean to say that civil liberties are permanently undermined. These are authorities that are required if there is suspicion that warrants it.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: You're indicating now that it's requested for cause. That's an issue that has come up, that it can be requested without cause for each and every passenger, a restriction on someone's liberties that's going to be permanently in place.

    Mr. David Collenette: I think Mr. Easter will be here tomorrow, so you'll be able to pose that question to him.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister and the officials, Ms. Besser and Mr. Read, for being so very generous with your time today for the first meeting of our legislative committee.

    This concludes our meeting, and I remind colleagues that the next one will be on Thursday morning at nine. The notice has gone out, and we'll have the Honourable Wayne Easter and the Commissioner of the RCMP and other officials.

    The meeting is adjourned.