C-17 Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Legislative Committee on Bill C-17

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, March 20, 2003

¿

0920

The Chair (Mr. Bob Kilger (Stormont—Dundas—Charlottenburgh, Lib.))

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais (Churchill, NDP)

The Chair

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

The Chair

Mr. Richard Le Hir (President, Shipping Federation of Canada)

¿

0925

The Chair

Mr. James Turk (Executive Director, Canadian Association of University Teachers)

¿

0930

Mr. Paul Jones (Research and Education Officer, Canadian Association of University Teachers)

¿

0935

The Chair

Mr. Mario Laframboise (Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, BQ)

¿

0940

Mr. Richard Le Hir

À

1010

The Chair

Mr. Mario Laframboise

Mr. Richard Le Hir

Mr. Mario Laframboise

Mr. Richard Le Hir

Mr. Mario Laframboise

Mr. Richard Le Hir

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.)

Mr. Richard Le Hir

À

1015

Ms. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Richard Le Hir

Ms. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Richard Le Hir

Ms. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Richard Le Hir

Ms. Marlene Jennings

À

1020

Mr. James Turk

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Paul Jones

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. James Turk

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Richard Le Hir

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Richard Le Hir

Ms. Anne Legars (Director, Policy and Government Affairs, Shipping Federation of Canada)

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Richard Le Hir

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Richard Le Hir

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Richard Le Hir

À

1025

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Richard Le Hir

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Richard Le Hir

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Richard Le Hir

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. James Turk

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. James Turk

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

À

1030

The Chair

Mr. Richard Le Hir

Mr. James Turk

À

1035

The Chair

Mr. Rex Barnes (Gander—Grand Falls, PC)

Mr. Richard Le Hir

Mr. Rex Barnes

Mr. Richard Le Hir

À

1040

Mr. Rex Barnes

Mr. Richard Le Hir

Mr. Rex Barnes

Mr. Richard Le Hir

The Chair

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz (Yorkton—Melville, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. James Turk

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz

Mr. Paul Jones

À

1045

Mr. James Turk

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz

The Chair

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz

The Chair

Mr. Steve Mahoney (Mississauga West, Lib.)

À

1050

Mr. James Turk

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. James Turk

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. James Turk

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. James Turk

Mr. Steve Mahoney

The Chair

Mr. Steve Mahoney

À

1055

Mr. Paul Jones

Mr. Steve Mahoney

The Chair

Mr. James Turk

The Chair

Mr. Mario Laframboise

Mr. Paul Jones

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Paul Jones

Mr. James Turk

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Á

1100

The Chair

Mr. Paul Jones

The Chair

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CANADA

Legislative Committee on Bill C-17

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NUMBER 015

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Thursday, March 20, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿  (0920)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Bob Kilger (Stormont—Dundas—Charlottenburgh, Lib.)): I'd like to call the meeting to order on the study of Bill C-17.

    I'd like to deal with a housekeeping matter first, because we're approaching the time when witnesses will conclude. The last round of witness testimony will be next Tuesday, March 25. We'll hear from representatives from Air Canada. But I also want to put on the record a very important date for all of us--Friday, March 28, 2003. Pursuant to a motion adopted by the committee, all amendments must be submitted to the clerk of the committee in their final format by 2 p.m. We will begin the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill on Tuesday, April 1, 2003.

[Translation]

    So the key date that I want to emphasize is March 28. By Friday, March 28, pursuant to the motion adopted by the committee, all amendments must be submitted to the clerk of the committee in their final format by 2 p.m. Then we will begin clause-by-clause consideration of the bill on Tuesday, April 1.

    On behalf of the committee, I would like to apologize for that delay in our proceedings.

[English]

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais (Churchill, NDP): Would we have the opportunity to discuss it after the witnesses are done, rather than have questions related to the amendments when they're coming in?

    The last amendments are coming in on Friday, March 28, and we're starting on Monday, April 1?

    The Chair: That's on Tuesday, April 1, yes.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Okay I just want to make sure there's time for everybody to receive all the amendments in both languages.

    The Chair: All right.

[Translation]

    I would like to apologize to our witnesses for the delay. I will first introduce Richard Le Hir, President, and Anne Legars, from the Shipping Federation of Canada.

[English]

    We have Mr. James Turk, executive director, and Paul Jones, research and education officer from the Canadian Association of University Teachers.

    Welcome to all of you. Bienvenue.

[Translation]

    I believe that Mr. Le Hir will be making the first presentation. The floor is yours.

    Mr. Richard Le Hir (President, Shipping Federation of Canada): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    I would like to begin by thanking the committee for inviting the federation to appear before it this morning. The Shipping Federation of Canada is celebrating its 100^th anniversary this year, and our theme is “100 years of contribution to the Canadian economy.” The federation represents 95% of ocean vessels and shipping agents involved in international trade to and from ports in Eastern Canada, from Newfoundland and Labrador to the Great Lakes, including Churchill in Hudson Bay.

    Our presentation today will be very short and specific. We are here in support of Part 12 of the bill, which would amend the Marine Transportation Security Act to allow Canadians access to federal funding or contributions in order to enhance security at Canadian ports. We would also like to congratulate the Minister of Transport for putting an end to the legislative impasse with respect to port security that has existed since the events of September 11^th.

    It is essential, in our view, that part 12 of the bill be passed as soon as possible. If we are here before you today, it is because we want to be sure that you give part 12 the attention it deserves, since it is somewhat more technical than other parts of the bill, whose social implications may be more obvious. So the purpose of our presentation is to convince you that part 12 of Bill C-17 is urgently needed, even if other parts of the bill should need to be reworked before being approved by Parliament.

    Since you have received a copy of our brief, I will briefly summarize the issue addressed by part 12 of the bill.

¿  (0925)  

[English]

    The Canada Marine Act essentially makes Canadian port authorities into real estate managers that must be financially self-sufficient and commercially oriented, and they are prevented at this time from receiving federal grants. Given these constraints, although the ports have had to play a significant new role in the security of the continent ever since the events of September 11, 2001, they had no choice but to pass on the costs related thereto. As a result, security at Canada's marine gateways, a public-good function, has thus far been wholly dependent on the ability of port users to finance that function.

    Port authorities have, under their own initiative, put in place a variety of such security measures in response to the events of 9/11. Such measures have included improved fencing and gate-keeping, enhancing video surveillance, and the development and implementation of ID cards for people working within the ports perimeter.

    In addition, the ports have incurred new costs related to consulting, re-engineering, auditing, and training. Thus far, the costs associated with the implementation of these new measures have totalled $1.5 million for the Halifax Port Authority, $5 million for the Montreal Port Authority, and $3 million for the Vancouver Port Authority, all of which has been financed by port users. This is only the start.

    The next phase of measures will take the form of new requirements under the international ship and port facility security code, which was adopted by the International Maritime Organization last December. This new code was sponsored by the United States and basically extends the security standards that the United States has set for its own seaports to the international level.

    In contrast to the situation in Canada, the United States has used the need to increase port security levels as an integral part of its national security strategy, thus enabling U.S. ports to benefit from federal appropriations. Here in Canada, although Transport Minister Collenette recently unveiled a funding package for marine security, the funds contained therein are earmarked for various federal departments and government agencies involved in marine security.

    The package does not address the financing of national security by port authorities because existing legislation would not allow the government to grant such appropriations. However, this statutory obstacle will be removed when part 12 of Bill C-17 is adopted. Because part 12 of Bill C-17 provides Canadian ports with access to grants for the funding of security measures, the security of Canada's marine gateways will no longer be solely dependent upon the ability of port users to pay. In short, part 12 of Bill C-17 will allow the federal government to do what is actually its responsibility, which is to take the necessary means, including financial means, to ensure the security of the country. It will allow government to follow the recommendations expressed both by the House finance committee in November 2001 and by the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence in February 2002 to the effect that security is a public good and that ensuring the security of the population is one of the basic responsibilities of the federal government.

[Translation]

    Part 12 of the legislation provides piece of mind for the Canadian public, who are the true beneficiaries of national security, as well as for port users. Half of the cargo handled by Canadian ports is bound for US markets, and that cargo would transit American ports directly if Canadian ports fail to remain competitive. I do not think that anyone here would like to see security at Canadian ports totally dependent on the ability of remaining users to absorb increased port fees. That would not be a good policy for our country, from either a security or an economic standpoint. That is why part 12 of Bill C-17 must be passed quickly, regardless of the fate of the other parts.

    Ladies and gentlemen, members of the committee, I told you that my presentation would be short. It has been. Thank you for your attention. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Le Hir.

[English]

    Now, Mr. James Turk.

    Mr. James Turk (Executive Director, Canadian Association of University Teachers): Thank you.

    Mr. Chair, members of the committee, we're pleased to be here today. We represent the Canadian Association of University Teachers, which is an organization of about 32,000 people who are faculty members, librarians, and other academic staff at more than 80 universities and colleges across Canada.

    Our purpose is to assure high-quality post-secondary education that's accessible and that fulfills its public responsibilities. A key part of that is defending academic freedom, which is an absolutely essential characteristic for universities to be able to fulfill their mandate, so that university can be a place where ideas, theories, practices, and processes can be examined and questioned and popular and unpopular ideas discussed.

    Academic freedom, we recognize, really depends on broader freedoms in a democratic society, which is why the academic community has historically been a strong defender of civil liberties and human rights. We realize what a historic moment this happens to be, to be appearing before you today, and we want to begin by congratulating the government and the Prime Minister for the position they've taken in this current crisis in defending Canada's traditional position in defence of multilateralism.

    Dealing with terrorism always requires a balance. I know this government has been wrestling with how, in developing anti-terrorism legislation, to strike that balance to protect civil liberties and human rights, the very things that characterize our democracy.

    We feel that Bill C-17 is a marked improvement over earlier versions, Bill C-42 and Bill C-55, but we still feel there are aspects of it that are unbalanced and that put freedom and civil liberties unduly in jeopardy. My colleague, Paul Jones, would like to go into some detail on a key point we wanted to raise with you.

¿  (0930)  

    Mr. Paul Jones (Research and Education Officer, Canadian Association of University Teachers): Thank you.

    Some of the other groups who have appeared before the committee have brought their particular legal expertise and have been able to go through the bill in a line-by-line way. What we thought we would do is bring a different perspective, and that is to place the bill in a historical and political context and then relate the context back to a particular part of the legislation. We hope this assists the committee in its deliberations.

    We'd like to begin with an historical perspective.

    In Pakistan, there is a group called Anjuman-i-Muzaireen Punjab. Its leaders are currently in jail; they've been jailed under Pakistan's anti-terrorism laws. Anjuman-i-Muzaireen Punjab—in English, the Punjab Tenants Organization—is a non-violent alliance of Muslim and Christian farmers who have united to prevent the confiscation of their land by larger farmers.

    Their plight illustrates a danger we believe the committee should keep front and centre in its consideration of the bill; that is the tendency of anti-terrorism or national security legislation to be used for purposes incidental to fighting terrorism. Some other examples include, from the U.K. in the 1930s, the Public Order Act. It was enacted initially to clamp down on Oswald Mosley's blackshirts or fascists; subsequently it was used to clamp down on public displays of homosexuality.

    Another example comes from Ireland's sectarian warfare. Limitations were brought in on the right to silence for people suspected of paramilitary activity. These limitations on the right to silence were subsequently extended to cover people charged with ordinary crimes.

    In Israel, the 1948 Law and Administration Ordinance was initially used to promulgate emergency regulations in a national security context. Now it is used in an almost routine manner to bypass the collective bargaining process in labour disputes.

    These are examples of what Member of Parliament John McKay from Scarborough East has described as function creep: specific measures to address national security threats can be extended to confront organized crime and ordinary criminality and finally begin to impinge on the rights of law-abiding citizens.

    This problem—from our perspective, this over-breadth in drafting or usage of anti-terrorism or national security legislation—finds some echos in Bill C-17. An example we want to point to—and it's an example some other groups have brought forward as well—is proposed section 4.82. This is the section that allows screening of air passenger manifests for people who are a threat to transportation security.

    The general principle is troubling. There are issues of racial profiling, of false matches, of false ID, of how the list of people who are threats is established in the first place. But at the end of the day it is a principle that I think can be defended. There's a problem with airplane security—we've seen that—and some measures have to be taken to address it.

    The specific problem we want to discuss, and other groups as well, concerns proposed subsection 4.82(11), which allows the RCMP to compare the passenger manifest list with more general lists of people who are wanted on outstanding warrants for Criminal Code offences unrelated to transportation security. Our belief, and it's one shared by a number a groups who have appeared before the committee, is that this is a new and serious invasion of privacy rights of Canadians.

    The ability of Canadians to conduct their lives, to go about their business without informing the government of their whereabouts, is a fundamental aspect of privacy. Any infringement on this right can be justified by pressing, serious circumstances. Air safety is arguably one of those circumstances, but administrative convenience is not. Just because police can review air passenger manifests for general criminal law enforcement purposes doesn't mean they should. Such mandatory self-identification to the police for general law enforcement purposes is offensive to Canadian values.

    The recommendation we're bringing forward is that this proposed subsection, 4.82(11) and paragraph (a) of the definition of “warrant” in proposed subsection 4.82(1), should be deleted from the bill.

    The subsection is disturbing in and of itself. It's also disturbing because it clearly demonstrates the problem of function creep, something the government has been warned about and should be cautious to avoid. While we have seen the bill improve through the various stages, we're troubled that this remains in there.

    As an aside, we're not attributing any malevolent motivation to the RCMP or CSIS to have it in there. I think the general problem is, if asked or given the opportunity, police or security services will always ask for more power, will always want more power. It's the goal of the government to say no to these requests when the requests are unreasonable, as we believe proposed subsection 4.82(11) is.

    That's a brief historical perspective on the bill. What about the political perspective? What we would like to point out here is that the groups that perpetrated the September 11 attacks don't enjoy very much popular support. They have relatively few resources, particularly compared with any kind of state power. Their success is going to be dependent on pushing democratic regimes to overreact, to respond to violence with authoritarian measures.

¿  (0935)  

    Oren Gross, an Israeli-American law professor, states that such overreaction predictably weakens the fabric of democracy, discredits the government domestically as well as internationally, alienates segments of the population and pushes people to support the terrorist organizations, and undermines the government's claim to holding the moral high ground.

    The classic example of this are the events of January 30, 1972, in Derry, Northern Ireland. At a demonstration to protest legislation allowing internment without trial, 13 unarmed protestors were shot by British paratroopers. This was the day known as Bloody Sunday. It was a watershed event in the modern history of their troubles. It was an overreaction to a problem that alienated the British army from the populace and boosted support for the IRA.

    A strong case can be made that the perpetrators of September 11 are provoking a similar reaction or response. The United States, which enjoyed initially overwhelming international sympathy and solidarity in the face of the horrendous events of September 11, is now increasingly isolated. That support has weakened because they have reacted in such a heavy-handed way to those events. In the United States itself, draconian security laws have undermined traditional rights and liberties.

    In Canada, the response has not been anywhere near as extreme, but there are still some troubling indications. The Canadian Bar Association, which is not a radical organization by any stretch of the imagination, has characterized Bill C-17 and its companion legislation as taking this country down the road toward a police state.

    In the case of universities, the national security agenda has created pressure for self-censorship on scholarly publications, has contributed to limitation on campus discussion of controversial issues, and has led to barriers to international travel by academics, particularly to and from the United States. These aren't healthy signs.

    How can Canada avoid going down the road toward a police state that the Canadian Bar Association has warned about? In light of the historical record with function creep and the self-defeating nature of overreaction to extremist groups, we urge the committee to ensure the provisions in this legislation are drafted as narrowly as possible and are subject to close parliamentary and judicial oversight.

    Drawing upon the submissions of the Canadian Bar Association and others, such measures would include deleting all references to warrants in proposed section 4.82; permitting retention of flight information for 24 hours rather than seven days; providing for an independent oversight mechanism to prevent unauthorized use of disclosure of passenger information and ensuring the timely destruction of such information; deleting proposed section 7.41 on air rage; and clarifying parliamentary jurisdiction over the creation of military security zones and controlled access zones.

    Those are some of the specific suggestions that groups better placed than us to do a line-by-line analysis of the bill have brought forward to you. We hope you are able to follow up on them. We also hope the larger historical and political context that we've provided will be helpful.

    Thank you for your time. We wish the committee success in the difficult task of balancing security and liberty.

    The Chair: Thanks to both of you for your testimony.

    We'll now begin rounds of five-minute questions.

[Translation]

    We will begin with Mr. Laframboise.

    Mr. Mario Laframboise (Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I would first like to thank you very much for coming this morning. I apologize for being late. The Minister of Transport is tabling new legislation this morning on airport administration, which is a different type of administration from yours. Since I represent Mirabel, among other areas, and because of what ADM did with Montreal, I follow issues very closely that have to do with changes to airport administration.

    Mr. Le Hir, I want to say at the outset that I completely agree with you. The Marine Transportation Security Act must definitely be amended to allow for direct grants. Industry does not have the means to pay for security, and neither do users. You are even asking us to split the bill, so the situation is urgent.

    First of all, who pays for the security measures? Does the government provide any funding at present?

¿  (0940)  

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: Yes, the government has spent money on security for its own purposes, but not to help the ports. It has asked the port administrations to be responsible for recovering costs incurred in upgrading security, so that immediately upsets the competitive balance between Canadian and American ports.

    Over the past few years, our industry has had to absorb a significant increase in the cost burden, which is eroding its ability to compete. As a result, if you look at increasing demand for services in our industry, you will see that the upward trend is stronger in the United States. There are many reasons for that, but one of the most important is that higher costs are incurred in handling cargo in Canada. As I already explained, 50% of the cargo coming into Canada is bound for the United States, in any case. When such a volume is put at risk, then these activities can easily be lost. History has shown us that activities that are... [Editor's Note: Technical Difficulties]

À  (1010)  

[English]

    The Chair: I call the meeting back to order. I'd just like to remind witnesses and members that we have the meeting room here until 11 o'clock, so keep that in mind.

[Translation]

    Mr. Laframboise, would you like to repeat your question?

    Mr. Mario Laframboise: My question was simple, Mr. Le Hir; I wanted to know whether you were responsible for assuming the costs in the meantime.

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: Yes, and as I was explaining when the interruption occurred, that is what concerns us.

    We always need to keep in mind that 50% of cargo coming into Canada is bound for the American market, and this generates a great deal of economic activity.

    The cargo is shipped out from Halifax on Canadian trains and is handled by Canadian workers in the ports, the rail yards and throughout the road and rail systems. Moreover, this cargo generates taxes that come back to the Canadian government, since fuel is used for these activities.

    In short, Canada gains a whole series of benefits from this economic activity. It would be unfortunate to lose it, since both the economy and Canadian workers would be affected.

    Mr. Mario Laframboise: The government announced an envelope specifically for port security. Have you had a chance to analyze that? Do you feel that it is adequate?

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: In fact, that envelope is earmarked for marine safety and amounts to $170 million, of which a good part is already committed, in any case. There is actually only $124 million left in that envelope. And it is spread over five years.

    Finally, when you realize how many agencies have to get a share of that money, it is obvious that there will be a sprinkling of money every year. Furthermore, the money is not being spent in areas that will guarantee better port security. One way or another, we are still the ones paying the bill for port security, and that is what concerns us.

    Mr. Mario Laframboise: So we need a new envelope.

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: Absolutely.

    The Chair: Ms. Jennings.

    Ms. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): Thank you for the presentation.

    Mr. Le Hir, I would like to go back to the issue raised by my colleague. Have the members from your federation estimated the cost of the new security measures that the ship and port personnel have to...

    In your presentation, you talked about the port of Montreal and the sum of $5 million, of which $800,000 was for additional operating costs directly associated with these new measures. I would imagine that if the port of Montreal was able...

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: You must realize that the first thing that we need to do, under such circumstances, is to proceed with what is referred to as a security audit. These audits have never been carried out anywhere in Canada at present.

    Discussions are currently underway to determine how to proceed with these audits, and what we must or must not include. Right now we cannot even agree on the definition of what is necessary. You will therefore understand that, given such a situation, it is difficult to calculate how much money will be required in terms of investment.

    For these reasons, the government needs to establish some standards, and on the basis of these standards, we must verify the situation in each port to be able to then determine the amount of investment that is required in order to comply with the new standards.

À  (1015)  

    Ms. Marlene Jennings: Given what you have just said, we can presume that if part 12 of Bill C-17 were adopted and implemented quickly, your sector would receive contributions and grants. You are hoping that these will be retroactive.

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: No...

    Ms. Marlene Jennings: Let me finish. You more or less said that by stating that, in the United States, they already have access to such contributions and grants and that this is putting our Canadian shipping industry at a disadvantage.

    In order to rectify the situation, you are hoping that the government will amend the Canada Marine Act. Nevertheless, until that happens, the amendment to part 12 of Bill C-17 will enable this to happen.

    The fact remains that if you wish to benefit from some measure of retroactivity, you are going to have to be able to clearly justify the additional expenditures that are directly associated with the new security measures.

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: The ports have already been charging fees since the events of September 11, fees that are directly attributable to the implementation of new security measures. It is the ports that have told us what these amounts are, and given that it is the ports that have told us what these fees are and have done the necessary work, you will understand that we are not in any position to justify anything whatsoever. Indeed, it is the ports that have imposed these costs on us.

    Ms. Marlene Jennings: Yes, but if there is retroactivity, I would imagine that you will be requesting a refund of these additional costs, since you alluded to some disadvantages that already exist and which will continue to exist so long as your industry has no access to parliamentary appropriations.

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: That is right. But you know, right now we are being saddled with a whole range of costs and obviously some consideration is going to have to be given to retroactivity with respect to all of these costs that we have to bear, and that becomes a matter of compensation.

    Ms. Marlene Jennings: Thank you. Do I still have some time left? I would like to ask Mr. Turk a question.

[English]

    It's about the presentation you made and the recommendation that proposed subsection 4.82(11) be amended to eliminate all references to existing warrants, allowing the RCMP and the police to disclose information when they learn incidentally of...etc.

    You also talked about the necessity of establishing an independent oversight body, regardless of what form Bill C-17 is adopted in and comes into force. I assume you are aware that the Privacy Commissioner and the access to information commissioners have authority to audit right now. Do you feel, therefore, that they do not have sufficient authority, that their authority is limited or is not as effective as the association would like to see?

    If that's the case, when you call for an independent oversight body, are you then...? There already are at least two. CSIS has SIRC, which definitely has all the authority necessary, and the RCMP has the Public Complaints Commission, which there's doubt as to whether or not it has sufficient authority. So are you talking about superimposing another independent oversight body or examining those that already exist to see whether or not the authority they already have is sufficient to be effective with these new powers that Bill C-17 would provide to CSIS, the RCMP, etc.?

À  (1020)  

    Mr. James Turk: My colleague is quite anxious to answer your question.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Okay, Mr. Jones, then.

    Mr. Paul Jones: That recommendation was picking up on our interpretation of testimony from the Privacy Commissioner and others, who felt they had insufficient power to examine what was going to happen with the records, whether they were going to be destroyed or not, and how long they were going to be kept.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: The Privacy Commissioner has full authority to audit both CSIS and the RCMP anytime. Those bodies actually came and said that if the Privacy Commissioner wanted to have somebody sitting right at the computer terminal each and every day, 24/7, they could do that. The issue was more a question of resources, whether or not they have the resources to exercise the powers they have effectively. I would suggest that you may wish to relook at this, to determine whether or not it is authority or resources to exercise that authority effectively. It's an important distinction.

    Mr. James Turk: The distinction you're raising is an important one. The very nature of Bill C-17 and anti-terrorism legislation generally is such that we would be more comfortable with an independent oversight body that's properly resourced to do that. I think the reality is that the Privacy Commissioner model, while theoretically possible, is unlikely to ever have the resources to do that. So I think as a counterpart to taking this extraordinary action in these extraordinary times, it would be preferable to use the model used with CSIS and have the equivalent of CIRC to oversee it.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Thank you.

    The Chair: Ms. Desjarlais, please.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Thank you, and thanks for putting up with all the little splits in the meeting this morning.

    Mr. Le Hir, I may have misunderstood you, but you mentioned that the security funds the government had put into the ports were going to government departments. Was the $170 million that was talked about going to government departments? It wasn't going to the industry itself.

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: Exactly.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: If you know, can you give me a specific idea of the government departments and what they would have been using that money for?

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: Anne, I think you did the research on that.

    Ms. Anne Legars (Director, Policy and Government Affairs, Shipping Federation of Canada): Well, there is some money for DFO, Fisheries and Oceans, so they can have short-wave receivers for automatic identification systems for ships. There is money for CCRA, the customs agency, to have more offices and to buy a few X-ray or gamma-ray machines to screen a certain percentage of containers. There is money for immigration officers. There is money for the RCMP. There is money for intelligence services.

    Altogether, it's spread among a dozen agencies.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: So it's not as if that money that was announced went to the port authorities or to the shipping federation for any kind of improvement--

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: As a matter of fact, the law as it stands prevents the federal government from granting appropriations to port authorities.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: From the perspective of the airlines having some additional security costs and a separate agency that is charging for security for the airlines, how do you put that in the context of the shipping federation?

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: It's a very different context. First of all, airlines transport passengers essentially. Cargo is a minor aspect of their operation. When you're dealing with passengers, there is a clear understanding there has to be a user pay system in place. It makes sense.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Why does it make sense?

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: Well, because you're already paying for your ticket, so the costs are going to be allocated. I personally want to believe that security is a national issue and it should be financed through the public purse. However, there is a case that can be made for a different interpretation. I don't agree with it, but I understand it.

    In the case of cargo, cargo is for the benefit of the Canadian economy. It's either cargo coming in or cargo going out. If it's coming in, it's because it's going to contribute to the Canadian standard of living. It's going to be reflected in the price structure of the goods we consume. If it's cargo going out, it helps Canadian businesses to be competitive abroad on foreign markets. And as I mentioned, 50% of the cargo that comes into Canada is going to the United States, so it just transits, and we benefit heavily from that transit.

    So in fact we're killing the goose that lays the golden eggs.

À  (1025)  

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Has there been any estimate on what the cost increase has been for, say, the shipping lines or the ports? Have there been any rough estimates?

    You mentioned--and I'm just going to highlight this--that they're in the process of security audits, but they're not completed. We're well over a year since September 11, and that hasn't been done. I'm actually a little surprised there isn't a process in place yet.

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: There is not even an agreement as to what should be in the process.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Yet we've just put in $170 million of taxpayers' money.

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: Or so we have said.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Okay, that's a good point. We don't know for sure that the $175 million--

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: Oh, I'm not going to argue that it's gone somewhere. It's just that we haven't seen the colour of it.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: I have a question for Mr. Jones and Mr. Turk.

    You highlighted comments from the Bar Association as well as some others in your comments, and that obviously is a common thread that has come through from a lot of witnesses who have appeared before us, that there's a real concern over the civil liberties issue. I just want to comment that it was good to have that re-emphasized from another perspective.

    Certainly, one of my concerns has been...we've heard a number of witnesses and different news articles out of the U.S. that there are public library lists being checked out to see who is taking out what kind of information, so you might have to check up on people who might be reading up a bit on Islam or different processes. I'm wondering if you've experienced anything like that, not necessarily the lists, but is there a concern that this might happen within the universities?

    Mr. James Turk: There have been a variety of concerns expressed. Fortunately many of the things that we hear about happening in the United States have not happened here. Not only our organization, but the Canadian Association of Research Libraries and the Canadian Library Association have been quite outspoken about how turning over lists of borrowers and borrowing practices is a fundamental contravention of civil liberties and human rights. We're unaware of that happening here.

    There has been a lot of concern expressed about police authorities wanting to gather information on students and on faculty. It has been more anecdotal to this point. We're doing a survey right now of what campus police have been asked to do by the RCMP or by CSIS. We're having discussions with CSIS as well.

    We've had a long-standing relationship going back to 1963 with, then, the RCMP and now with CSIS about the unique nature of universities and what security services can and cannot do. The Government of Canada has actually specified a series of rules that have been followed for 40 years now. We want to make sure that those basic civil liberties on university campuses are respected and continue.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: When that survey is done, would that information be available to, say, this committee, or does it come out through the CAUT?

    Mr. James Turk: Certainly, we'll be issuing it.

    Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: It would be interesting to know where it falls.

    That's it. Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Ms. Jennings.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: My first question is for the federation. There has been some talk here on the Hill about the 24-hour notice that the United States has imposed. I'd like to know how is that of concern to your members and how that may increase costs.

    Mr. Turk, Mr. Jones, you talk about the fact that the increased security powers that have been given to CSIS and the police forces having created a certain amount of self-censorship on the part of your members.

    I'd like to know, are you in a position to say what percentage of self-censorship we're now seeing, and have been seeing for some time, on the part of academics is directly attributable to the heightened terrorist threats that have existed over the last two years, or year and a half, and what percentage is directly attributable to the increased authority that's been given to CSIS and to police forces here in Canada?

À  (1030)  

[Translation]

    The Chair: Mr. Le Hir, please.

[English]

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: Yes, thank you.

    On the 24-hour advance notice of shipping that the U.S. has introduced, we feel that given the nature of our business, it is very important for Canada to adopt a similar standard very soon.

    What is happening is that ships loading for North America, in the Mediterranean, for instance, or in Asia, are also delivering cargo in the United States at the same time. You realize that it is extremely difficult for a shipowner, or a line operator, to manage two different standards and to load his ship to do two different standards.

    It's creating a lot of problems. It's also creating situations where line operators are thinking twice before they load a ship. They're thinking, maybe we'll wait for this because this is going to Canada and we have more volume to the U.S. So what you have is a slowdown in the frequency of service to Canada, because obviously our business is volume driven. Where is the brunt of the volume going? It's going to the U.S.

    For instance, you have to understand also that a lot of the cargo that goes to Halifax eventually winds up in the United States anyway. The only reason for which they are stopping in Canada, in Halifax, is because the draft in the Halifax harbour happens to be important and better than ports on the eastern seaboard in the U.S.

    They load the ship to the maximum because that's how you make money in that business. That's how you can remain profitable and you can operate a service. They'll take the cargo off in Halifax and then go on to the U.S. ports. But if you have to apply two different standards, it becomes very difficult to manage your cargo according to the needs of different regulations.

    There is nothing to gain, from a Canadian perspective, from maintaining a different standard from the U.S.--nothing, absolutely. As a matter of fact, there's a lot to lose by enforcing a different standard from what they're requiring.

    Mr. James Turk: We start from the premise that I began in my opening remarks, that a fundamental responsibility of the university community is to be a place where people can speak their minds openly.

    We think generally it's useful for everywhere in society to have that right, but certainly university has to preserve that because so often views that are not popular turn out to be right, whether they be scientific views, or political views, or views on culture, or whatever.

    The very nature of self-censorship makes it hard to quantify, hard to even know it exists. For instance, take the biologist who is doing work on various pathogens to better understand the development of cures. That same information could be used by terrorists for other purposes. So does the biologist publish his findings so that the medical community can develop those, or does he censor them and say, because there's a potential dual use, I'm not going to publish them?

    There are those kinds of issues that are becoming more prominent. Certainly in the United States, under their anti-terrorism legislation, there were restrictions being placed on academics that caused a massive outcry against it that hasn't happened here. Or take the political scientist who looks at the history of Islamic movements and wants to say objectively there's a great antipathy between the Government of Iraq and Islamic fundamentalism, but at this moment that's not a popular thing to be saying. Do they repress that?

    As you may have seen yesterday, a group of law professors across Canada did have the courage to speak out that the current war in Iraq is an absolute violation of international law. It's not a popular thing to be saying, but they've spoken out. And why many people didn't speak out, why it was 13 or 14 law professors who issued the statement out of 25, I don't know.

    To give you one other example, the specialty of one of Canada's most famous geologists during the Cold War years was certain kinds of rocks that were found only in parts of the Soviet Union, on remote islands, and because he undertook that research he came under scrutiny by the RCMP security service. He was investigated and there were agents planted to monitor his behaviour. That created a real crisis when that came out subsequently.

    So academics are worried about those kinds of things in these times. We somehow have to provide a shield that allows legitimate security work of security services to be undertaken, but not in the way that it infringes on the ability of academics to do their work.

À  (1035)  

    The Chair: Mr. Barnes.

    Mr. Rex Barnes (Gander—Grand Falls, PC): Thank you very much.

    I notice you mentioned that approximately 55% of products basically are shipped through to the U.S., and we don't hear a lot that ships weren't given entry into the U.S. with regard to the difference in port security in Canada versus the U.S.

    We notice that of course there was supposed to be $172 million spent on port security, but this was more likely spent on different directions of port security rather than dealing with the ports themselves, probably with regard to the shipping industry.

    All ships that presently move back and forth across borders have ship manifests and other documentation, I suppose, to tell what is being brought back and forth. So what other measures really should be done? We don't hear of the U.S. barring Canadian boats from entering the U.S.

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: Ship documentation is just one aspect of the overall security picture that we have to be managing, addressing. The port infrastructure itself is extremely important and an extremely costly item. Take fencing, for instance, or installing ID systems, security control systems for the port personnel and those who actually transit through the port.

    You have train operators, you have trucking companies that come in and out of ports constantly. There's a lot of people who come in and out of ports constantly with legitimate business in the port, and there is therefore a very important apparatus to put in place to be able to control that activity and make sure the operations are as secure as possible, from the personnel point of view.

    Then you have the fencing, the lighting, the special docking facilities that are required to accommodate special types of cargo where there is suspicion of.... It's endless.

    Mr. Rex Barnes: I won't say it's cosmetic, but it's like doing up a doll sort of thing. You have to put all kinds of cosmetics on it to make sure it's going to look good. The thing about it is if the cosmetic work with regard to the cameras, and probably education and fencing, and all those items had to be done, then of course we would hope that any money the government has announced, like the $172 million, probably should have gone into that direction, because that has a direct impact on the costs the shipping companies will have to absorb.

    If they absorb it, then it passes on to consumers. But from ships going back and forth, there seems to be a high level of security within the shipping organizations to make sure things are on par.

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: Ships move from port to port, and because of that it's a huge chain. The problem is no chain is ever more secure than the weakest of its links. We have to make sure Canada is not the weak link in the chain.

    The standards to which other ports are now raising themselves, in terms of security in Europe, are considerable. I mentioned the IMO rules that have been put in place. Those are international rules. They apply to everybody. In the process of putting in place those measures, we have to make sure we are on par to ensure the strength of that chain of supply.

À  (1040)  

    Mr. Rex Barnes: Have you done an analysis about how much money is going to be required to bring the Canadian ports up to a secure level?

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: It's a question I answered earlier in French.

    The problem right now is we're still waiting for a standard to be defined. You're only going to be able to assess the costs when you know what the standard is; then you'll be able to see how everybody performs against the standard. Then you'll see what shortcomings have been identified in each port, and then you'll be able to say, we need to spend so much for this and so much for that. Until we have that, it's a wild guess.

    The Chair: Final question, Mr. Barnes.

    Mr. Rex Barnes: But haven't the ports started that in motion now, to the point of saying, what can we do? I do agree with you that this is a national issue, this is national security, and the federal government should place emphasis on that to make sure the money's there to do the improvements. In saying that, hasn't there been movement made to say, look, this port here and this port here need this done to ensure...and they must come up with a dollar figure?

    The thing about it is that $172 million may not cut it when of course in the U.S. they spent about $335 million U.S. The thing about it is if there's going to be a period of time wherein it's going to have to be done, I'm sure there's a dollar value that you're looking at to be attached to it so that the government understands the necessity.

    Mr. Richard Le Hir: I think, clearly, some ports have been doing it; we mentioned the three cases of Halifax, Vancouver, and Montreal. Clearly, the ports have begun to move in the direction of reinforcing their security. But, again, until we know what the standard is, it's very hard to be able to say it's going to be so much.

    Some ports, for instance, may have done more in surveillance, some ports may have done more in fencing. It's a question of how people locally will interpret the threat they are subject to, but it's not the way to do it. The way to do it is to define a standard.

    The Chair: Mr. Breitkreuz, please.

    Mr. Garry Breitkreuz (Yorkton—Melville, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you. I apologize for being late, but I've scanned your brief.

    I must tell you, I've followed other pieces of legislation that have come forward in recent years. I've noticed a disturbing trend. I also preface what I have to say by making the comment that sometimes the cure is worse than the disease.

    In the brief submitted here by the university teachers association, the statement is made, “taking this country 'down the road toward a police state'”. I want to zero in on that.

    I would like you to explain to this committee in more detail why this should be a concern to Canadians. Why is this injurious to our society? I agree with your statement, but why is this legislation that would take us down this path a problem? Maybe at the end of your comments you might want to suggest what other alternatives to this approach there might be.

    Mr. James Turk: Both of us are quite anxious to respond to you. My colleague would like to go first.

    Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: Please take the rest of my time to do so. That's my only question, yes.

    Mr. Paul Jones: The first thing I'll say is, we're picking this comment up from the Canadian Bar Association, and we are quite struck that it was the Canadian Bar Association, a fairly conservative body, that made this comment and not some more radical or fringe group.

    In our examination of this bill and the other ones, what we thought about was, how is this country going to respond to a real threat to national security? At the first level, steps seen to be taken are enhancing physical security measures, and I think this is what the shipping federation's talked about. This might mean the physical infrastructure of fencing, X-rays, explosive detection equipment, and increased inspections, and these are the kinds of rationally connected responses that have minimal civil liberties implications but do reassure Canadians that something's happened.

    At the next level there are more problematic things, and this would include the scanning of passenger lists for potential terrorists. We know that people have hijacked airplanes, we know this is a concern, so there is a rational or logical connection there. But it becomes problematic when the civil liberties implications are taken in because this is an intrusive step by government to monitor people's whereabouts and where they're going. So that has to be balanced.

    But then there's the third level, the third kind of response, and this is using this opportunity to round up people who are just out there on warrants, which is a legitimate policing concern but has nothing to do with national security and has huge privacy concerns.

    So that's the kind of extra step that I think has tweaked or signalled the concerns from the Canadian Bar Association and others that we're going beyond the legitimate security needs to simply giving police increased powers for general policing duties. I think people have talked about this as being a roadblock in the sky, or if we do this why don't we just start examining hotel records or busing records? That's where it becomes an infringement on privacy that is not the Canadian way. It's maybe how things were done in Eastern Europe, or in other places during the Soviet times, but that's not Canada, and I think that is our concern with the police state comment.

À  (1045)  

    Mr. James Turk: When I began my remarks I was saying it's a matter of balance, and it's always been a matter of balance, and when we go through difficult periods, whether it be the Cold War years in the late 1940s and early 1950s or now, police are always in the position that they want to do their job as efficiently as they can, and so want greater opportunity to be able to request from Canadians identification, for example.

    We have a long tradition that you have a right to privacy and only under very specific circumstances can a police officer ask you to give identification. Their response is, if you're doing nothing wrong, what's your fear? We're talking about certain basic rights in a democratic society, and if we give them away, we'd start changing the very character of our society. So when we look at this bill, we're saying, what is the minimum we can give away to provide a reasonable level of protection? One of the things we know is that when you give away everything, you can still have terrorist activities and not have protection.

    So where do you strike that balance? As Paul has said, the logic of saying that the police should have a right to the airline lists for general purposes is a logic whereby you could then say, the list Ticketmaster gets of everyone who goes to a Senators game should be given to police so they can scan it. In fact, in the United States, you may have read that they have new technology that allows them to decipher face types, and they scanned everyone going into the Super Bowl and the police were checking those against terrorist lists.

    You start moving pretty far down the road, so how do you put limits on it? We think that when there's a doubt, the balance should be in terms of democratic rights. Where you do take an extraordinary step of saying we are going to have these lists, we are going to allow them to be searched for national security purposes, then we think you do need to take the additional step of having an oversight mechanism, as with SIRC for CSIS, to provide that kind of protection. It's not that people in the security services have bad intentions; they're trying to do their job, and one has to assure a balance. In the absence of that assurance, then we can go down roads that I think are harmful to our democratic society.

    Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: I think that last point--

    The Chair: Mr. Breitkreuz, I regret, but you'll have to be very brief, please, because I have two final rounds and ten minutes left.

    Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: I'll be very brief.

    I think the problem is that many people in our society do not realize the importance of privacy rights in a free and open democratic society. I think this is an underlying problem we wrestle with.

    The Chair: Mr. Mahoney, et ensuite, monsieur Laframboise.

    Mr. Steve Mahoney (Mississauga West, Lib.): I'm interested, Mr. Turk, in your question about what we give away. If I were going into the Super Bowl game, I'd be kind of happy if they were scanning everybody, particularly given the potential for a terrorist attack and the impact that could have. This is not about hotels, buses, Ticketmaster, or roadblocks on the street. What do we get if...?

    Let me explain it this way. If the system is such...and there will be amendments, by the way, because when we had the police, the RCMP and CSIS, here, I think we had a major disagreement on how they interpreted the bill and certainly how we interpreted the bill. There will be an amendment, which I need to speak to the committee about before we leave today, but if you have a situation where there is an electronic drum, shall we say, rotating names through, comparing to databases of known and suspected terrorists, we're not talking about some individuals sitting in a room, looking up James Turk and saying, “Who is this guy? I want to know where he's going, and I want to follow him.” If it identifies someone who is a known or suspected terrorist, there will be a hit, and then that individual will be looked at.

    So when you talk about giving up rights, it's my sense that most Canadians are not only prepared to give up certain privacy rights, but in fact insist upon it in terms of making sure they and their families can travel safely.

    Next week, my wife and I are travelling to Europe separately because of our conflicting schedules, and I hope somebody's watching who's on both of those planes.

À  (1050)  

    Mr. James Turk: Mr. Mahoney, I don't think there has been any disagreement expressed about having passenger lists and having them searched for national security purposes. The question, however, is how much more they can be used for.

    What you were expressing was, I would take it, narrowly focused on national security purposes. But if that's the case, then the general list shouldn't be retained by anyone for more than 24 hours.

    If there's a hit, then the police can follow up on that. If there's not a hit, then there shouldn't be, as currently allowed, a longer provision for those lists to be retained and followed. They shouldn't be able to be used for general police purposes--which is why the reference to warrants should be taken out.

    In other words, I don't think anyone disagrees that there's a legitimate protection that's needed. I fly a lot and I want to be protected too, but I also don't want the kinds of records to be collected that could be used for other purposes that change our democratic society to the very kind of society we're fighting against in Iraq right now.

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: I think it's actually a good and healthy thing that those concerns get expressed at this committee, but I just want to say, I find the statement of taking us down the road toward a police state, frankly, sensationalism.

    I suppose the fact that it's said sends a message, at least to the police, who I will admit are somewhat militaristic in their approach sometimes, but at least it sends that message.

    But we're not talking about monitoring who goes to Senators' games.

    Mr. James Turk: First of all, I think the committee should listen when an organization like the Canadian Bar Association uses that dramatic language.

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: But I want to tell you, sir, I asked the Canadian Bar Association, are you actually advocating that if, in the operation of checking for national security, we actually determine that there is someone on that aircraft who has an outstanding warrant for murder, we should just let that person go, that we should not do anything? Their answer to me, incredulously, was, yes, that's what we're saying.

    Well, I can tell you, my constituents would wonder what the heck I was thinking if I were to support a situation that would allow someone who has an outstanding warrant to just walk away because we inadvertently found the information.

    Mr. James Turk: What if it's a warrant for theft? What if it's a warrant for--

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: I think that's very clear.

    Mr. James Turk: No, but where do you draw the line?

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: We're talking about crimes.

    The Chair: You have only about a minute left, Mr. Mahoney.

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: We're talking about crimes that would result in imprisonment in excess of five years in this country. Theft would not fall into that category. If we want to be more specific in outlining the crimes that would be involved, I don't have a problem with that. That probably makes some sense. I think my colleague has suggested that we do something along those lines. We can't just allow people to walk away because we happen to discover...in fact, a police officer would not be doing their sworn duty if they allowed that to happen.

À  (1055)  

    Mr. Paul Jones: My very quick response is why would the person who's on a warrant come up in any event if you're looking for people who are national security threats? I mean, the purpose of this is anti-terrorism, national security, not general policing. Why is their name popping up in the first place?

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: Think about the answer to that. If someone determines there is a security threat on the aircraft, then there's going to be a hit. And that passenger list is going to be looked at, because it's very likely or very possible that individual, who is a known security risk, is not travelling alone. If someone is attempting to plan to overtake an aircraft, they're not going to do it by themselves with a pen knife; there's probably going to be others on that aircraft.

    So the authorities would, as a result of that hit, scrutinize the passenger list. Then they might find out there's a guy on there who is wanted for murder. Do we let him go? The worst-case scenario in the world is how do you then tell the family that you let him go and he went into downtown Toronto and killed again? I just can't imagine.

    The Chair: A quick response, please, Mr. Turk.

    Mr. James Turk: One could always use those kinds of sensational things to justify violations of fundamental civil liberties. We've made a choice as a democratic society that we are prepared to put up with certain risks in order to protect the key characteristics of civil liberties in our society. We don't allow police to go on fishing expeditions, they can't wander through your house, they can't wander through your office looking for things, they can't demand lists. That's something we've valued historically, and I think it's very dangerous to be willing to give that up too readily in the name of anti-terrorism.

    The Chair: Mr. Mahoney, I regret, I'm going to move on.

    Monsieur Laframboise, s'il vous plaît.

[Translation]

    Mr. Mario Laframboise: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In my opinion, Mr. Turk, we are now touching the heart of the matter. I am glad that your association, namely the Canadian Association of University Teachers, is appearing before us. You represent our society's elite, and your statements must not be misinterpreted, especially with regard to section 4.82, among others.

    On page 2 of your brief, in the second paragraph under the headind “Section 4.82”, you say:

This represents a new and serious invasion of the privacy rights of Canadians.

    On page 4, in the last paragraph which begins with the words, “The response in Canada...”, you also say that the Canadian Bar Association has characterized Bill C-17 and its companion legislation as “taking this country down the road to a police state”.

    With regard to section 107, whereby personal information on pilots is no longer subject to the Access to Information Act, let me quote the Information Commissioner. And I quote:

If section 107 is passed...

    This refers to part 24 of the bill.

...this information will have to be kept secret forever. There are certainly no reasonable grounds for adopting such a measure in a healthy democracy.

    I will not say anything about the Privacy Commissioner, because it would make the Liberals bristle. But I want to tell you that you, as representatives of civil society, university professors and members of the Canadian Bar, have my full support. You have just told us to be careful with this bill because it is going too far. And that is the truth.

    The problem is that when CSIS, the RCMP and the Department of Transport appeared before us, they all came forward together to tell us that this bill struck a fair balance. When we put questions to the Department of Transport, they were answered by the RCMP and by CSIS.

    We have a problem. This bill was prepared by the police forces, for their own intentions. Now they are trying to convince us that it strikes a fair balance.

    As far as I am concerned, I agree with you: this is not a fair balance and serious amendments have to be made. In my opinion, you have clearly identified the problem as well as the apprehensions that Canadians have. I hope that you will be heard and understood.

    My question—because I must put a question to you—is the following: Do you think that substantial parts of this bill should be rescinded, and if so, which ones?

[English]

    Mr. Paul Jones: I can think of part 12 and the Shipping Federation's concerns.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: How much did they pay you?

    Mr. Paul Jones: I'm getting a free cruise.

    Mr. James Turk: On a cargo ship.

    Mr. Steve Mahoney: And it's going to the gulf.

Á  (1100)  

    The Chair: Order.

    Mr. Paul Jones: One of the things I've discussed is a rational connection between the security concern and a measure that's going to enhance the safety of Canadians. We're not here to condemn the entire bill. We've focused on one particular part, where we've raised concerns and where we don't see that connection. We hope you pick up on that. We also hope you pick up more generally on the historical and political context we've raised and work that into the submissions of the Bar Association and the Coalition of Muslim Organizations, which have raised concerns, and find the balance between liberty and security.

[Translation]

    The Chair: On behalf of the committee, once again I thank our witnesses for their patience and understanding with regard to the delays in today's procedures. Thank you for your testimony.

    The meeting is adjourned for today.