C-17 Committee Meeting

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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Legislative Committee on Bill C-17

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, February 20, 2003

0835

The Chair (Mr. Bob Kilger (Stormont—Dundas—Charlottenburgh, Lib.))

Mr. John Read (Special Project Officer, Department of Transport)

0840

The Chair

Ms. Patricia Hassard (Assistant Deputy Solicitor General, Policing and Law Enforcement Branch, Department of the Solicitor General)

0845

The Chair

Mr. Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police)

0850

The Chair

Mr. Gary Lunn (Saanich—Gulf Islands, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Ms. Patricia Hassard

The Chair

Mr. Gary Lunn

0855

Mr. Garry Loeppky

The Chair

Mr. Steve Mahoney (Mississauga West, Lib.)

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mr. Steve Mahoney

0900

The Chair

Mr. John Read

The Chair

Mr. John Read

The Chair

Ms. Patricia Hassard

The Chair

Ms. Patricia Hassard

Mr. Steve Mahoney

0905

Mr. John Read

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. John Read

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. John Read

The Chair

Ms. Patricia Hassard

The Chair

Mr. Garry Loeppky

The Chair

Mr. Mario Laframboise (Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, BQ)

0910

The Chair

Mr. John Read

The Chair

Ms. Patricia Hassard

Mr. Mario Laframboise

0915

The Chair

Mr. Garry Loeppky

0920

The Chair

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais (Churchill, NDP)

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

0925

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.)

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

0930

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Ms. Patricia Hassard

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. John Read

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. John Read

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Ms. Patricia Hassard

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Mr. John Read

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. John Read

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mr. Gary Lunn

The Chair

Ms. Patricia Hassard

0935

The Chair

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz (Yorkton—Melville, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Steve Mahoney

The Chair

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. Garry Loeppky

The Chair

Mr. Mario Laframboise

0940

The Chair

Mr. Garry Loeppky

The Chair

Mr. Garry Loeppky

Ms. Patricia Hassard

The Chair

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz

The Chair

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz

Mr. Garry Loeppky

The Chair

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz

The Chair

Mr. Garry Loeppky

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.))

0950

Mr. Christopher Watson (Chief Inspector of Explosives, Director, Explosives Regulatory Division, Department of Natural Resources)

0955

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly)

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz

1000

Mr. Christopher Watson

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly)

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly)

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly)

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Christopher Watson

1005

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly)

Ms. Anne-Marie Fortin (Counsel, Department of Natural Resources)

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly)

Mr. Mario Laframboise

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mr. Mario Laframboise

Ms. Anne-Marie Fortin

Mr. Mario Laframboise

1010

Ms. Anne-Marie Fortin

Mr. Mario Laframboise

Ms. Anne-Marie Fortin

Mr. Mario Laframboise

Ms. Anne-Marie Fortin

Mr. Mario Laframboise

Ms. Anne-Marie Fortin

Mr. Mario Laframboise

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly)

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly)

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz

Mr. Christopher Watson

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly)

Mr. Christopher Watson

1015

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz

Ms. Anne-Marie Fortin

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly)

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz

Ms. Anne-Marie Fortin

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly)

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. David McCulloch (Inspector of Explosives, Department of Natural Resources)

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. David McCulloch

Mr. Steve Mahoney

1020

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. Christopher Watson

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. Christopher Watson

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly)

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. Christopher Watson

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly)

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz

1025

Mr. Christopher Watson

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly)

The Chair

Mr. James Hinter (National President, National Firearms Association)

1035

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. James Hinter

The Chair

Mr. John O'Reilly

The Chair

Mr. James Hinter

Mr. John O'Reilly

Mr. James Hinter

The Chair

Mr. Tony Bernardo (Executive Director, Canadian Shooting Sports Association)

1040

The Chair

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz

1045

Mr. James Hinter

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. James Hinter

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. James Hinter

Mr. David Tomlinson (Legal Chairman, National Firearms Association)

1050

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Tony Bernardo

Mr. David Tomlinson

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Tony Bernardo

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. James Hinter

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Tony Bernardo

Mr. David Tomlinson

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

1055

Mr. David Tomlinson

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. David Tomlinson

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mr. Mario Laframboise

Mr. James Hinter

1100

Mr. David Tomlinson

The Chair

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. Tony Bernardo

Mr. Steve Mahoney

1105

Mr. Tony Bernardo

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. Tony Bernardo

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. James Hinter

Mr. David Tomlinson

The Chair

Mr. Steve Mahoney

Mr. David Tomlinson

The Chair

Mr. Darrel Stinson (Okanagan—Shuswap, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

1110

Mr. Darrel Stinson

The Chair

Mr. James Hinter

The Chair

Mr. David Tomlinson

The Chair

Mr. Tony Bernardo

The Chair

Mr. Darrel Stinson

Mr. James Hinter

Mr. Darrel Stinson

Mr. Tony Bernardo

Mr. Darrel Stinson

Mr. James Hinter

Mr. David Tomlinson

The Chair

Mr. Myron Thompson (Wild Rose, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. David Tomlinson

Mr. Myron Thompson

Mr. David Tomlinson

Mr. Myron Thompson

The Chair

CANADA

Legislative Committee on Bill C-17

NUMBER 011

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Thursday, February 20, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¾ (0835)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Bob Kilger (Stormont—Dundas—Charlottenburgh, Lib.)): I'd like to call the meeting to order on the study of Bill C-17.

Let me begin by introducing our witnesses this morning: from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Deputy Commissioner Garry Loeppky; from the Department of the Solicitor General, Patricia Hassard, Assistant Deputy Solicitor General; and from the Department of Transport, Mr. John Read, Director General.

Ms. Hassard and gentlemen, welcome to our committee. We look forward to your testimony. I'm sure you've been seized with the committee's challenge in terms of clarification of a particular area of interest over the last number of meetings in some of the testimony exchanges we've had. Hopefully, you can assist us in bringing some clarification to this matter.

I'll leave it up to you as to who might speak first.

Mr. Read.

Mr. John Read (Special Project Officer, Department of Transport): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We each have some short introductory comments, after which we'll take questions.

As the representative of Transport Canada at today's hearing, I'll provide introductory comments on proposed section 4.81 of the Aeronautics Act, which is contained in clause 5 of the bill.

Prior to September 11, 2001, Transport Canada shared the common view that a hijacking could be thwarted by intercepting the objects necessary to carry out a hijacking, such as a gun, rifle, or explosive. It was not necessary to be concerned over the passengers themselves. The attacks of September 11 show that a number of determined assailants could take over an aircraft without using any of the traditional weapons. The challenge now before us is not just one of searching for weapons. There must also be consideration of people who have access to aircraft.

Following September 11, Transport Canada determined that the basic response to those events should be, first, to upgrade activities and equipment involved in searching for weapons and explosives, recognizing that this traditional threat will remain, and, second, to have access to airline reservation systems to search for specific persons. For example, this would allow us to put in place a watch list related to transportation security.

The third item is to have access to all data on all people on board or expected to be on board a flight if there is an immediate threat to that flight. I could clarify here that this of course would be operative if the plane had already taken off. If the plane has not taken off, it would not be allowed to take off if there were a serious immediate threat. This was the kind of event we had with the flight from Korea. We would have wanted to know everyone on board that flight, which was supposedly hijacked.

The fourth point is to advance in-flight security through the deterrence and response capabilities of an aircraft protective officer program.

The ability to access airline reservation systems for specified persons for the purpose of transportation security and the ability to access information in the event of an immediate threat to a flight are contained in proposed section 4.81 of the Aeronautics Act.

Transport Canada is not an investigative body. However, some information may need to be retained beyond seven days, such as the information that a person identified from a watch list holds a reservation for a flight in 60 days' time. So we would certainly not want to drop that information after seven days. In this case, as the bill is now laid out and with the system we have envisaged,Transport Canada would provide this information to the RCMP for retention, as is permitted under proposed section 4.82 of the Aeronautics Act, and for any investigative work they may need to conduct.

With regard to the provision enabling Transport Canada to share information with other federal entities, these are federal entities with a presence at airports: Customs, Immigration, RCMP, CSIS, and the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority. This is in recognition that assistance at an airport may be required; for example, a silent search, wherein we would tap all of these people but they would not be doing anything in an overt aggressive fashion. However, I would like to highlight that there is no intent to provide data routinely to any of these entities.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will now defer to my colleague Patricia Hassard from the Department of the Solicitor General.

¾ (0840)

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Hassard.

Ms. Patricia Hassard (Assistant Deputy Solicitor General, Policing and Law Enforcement Branch, Department of the Solicitor General): Thank you, and good morning. Bonjour.

I'd like to thank the committee for the opportunity to address some of the questions that were raised about the data-sharing regime in proposed section 4.82.

Why is proposed section 4.82 needed? Essentially, it was designed to allow designated RCMP and CSIS officers to access air passenger information for inbound and outbound international flights as well as domestic flights. There are three main reasons why such access is necessary: first of all, we now have an air carrier protective program in Canada in which RCMP officers are present on certain high-risk flights. The RCMP requires access to passenger information to assist in determining which flights need to be covered and, when selected, to screen passengers' backgrounds for potential risks.

Secondly, CSIS requires the information to assist in its investigations of threats to the security of Canada.

Thirdly, passenger information will assist the RCMP and CSIS in preventing terrorism and dangerous persons from boarding airplanes.

[Translation]

How will it work? A small number of agents, designated by the RCMP Commissioner or Director of CSIS, would be able to access passenger information for specific purposes related to their agencies' respective mandates. The RCMP or CSIS could have access for transportation security purposes. CSIS could have access to investigate terrorist threats.

The RCMP would compare passenger information against police data bases, such as CPIC, to look for matches against persons who have ties to a known terrorist group or persons who may pose a risk to transportation safety and security, for example, those with a history of violence.

[English]

In the course of analyzing passenger information for potential threats to transportation security, an RCMP designated officer may find that an individual has a warrant for his or her arrest for a serious crime. In such a case, if the offence were listed in the proposed regulations, proposed section 4.82 would allow the designated officer to share that information with a peace officer so that action could be taken.

In order to pursue its counter-terrorism work and contribute to transportation security, CSIS needs to compare passenger information with a watch list of known or suspected terrorists or those who may pose a threat to the security of Canada. When the government developed this provision, serious thought was given to intrusiveness and striking the right balance between individual privacy rights and overall public safety. As the RCMP commissioner and the director of CSIS indicated last week, the more information that is accessible to the agencies, the more effective the data-sharing system will be. To respect privacy, information on travellers who pose no risk to transportation or national security will be destroyed within seven days.

As currently drafted, proposed section 4.82 provides the agencies with the flexibility needed to react to various situations that could threaten public safety. The vision expressed by the director of CSIS and the RCMP commissioner--that is, to be able to make a standing request for passenger information for all flights--is a long-term goal that could ensure maximum protection from national and transportation security threats. Should Parliament adopt this legislation, it would take time to develop such a system.

[Translation]

The data-sharing regime is intended to provide the agencies with the flexibility they need to access any passenger information that is required to protect the safety of Canadians in an evolving security environment. Thank you very much.

¾ (0845)

[English]

The Chair: Deputy Commissioner.

Mr. Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police): Good morning.

[Translation]

Good morning. I am pleased to be here today and to answer any questions pertaining to Bill C-17, the Public Safety Act, and, in particular, clause 4.82.

[English]

This bill will address a potential threat to Canadians and the air-travelling public by identifying people who may be terrorists or who pose a threat to flight safety.

The 9/11 terrorists exploited the weaknesses in transportation security, and in the process they have shaken Canadians' confidence in the safety of air travel.

Programs like the aircraft protective officers and the data comparison of passenger lists, authorized by proposed section 4.82, are necessary not only to ensure the safety of aircraft passengers but also to restore their confidence in the safety of air travel. It must be emphasized that the bill deals with transportation security, not just counter-terrorism.

For this section of the Public Safety Act to provide a meaningful benefit to the security of Canadians, it must not become so restrictive or burdensome that the benefits are lost in the process.

We have interpreted proposed section 4.82 as authorizing the RCMP to receive the passenger lists of domestic airlines and international carriers taking off from or landing at Canadian airports for the purpose of checking names in a data comparison against the subject records in RCMP databanks, including the Canadian Police Information Centre, for terrorist suspects and threats to aircraft security.

The access this would give the RCMP is consistent in part with what other countries are doing with respect to air passenger information. For example, American law enforcement agencies must be provided with passenger information relating to aircraft leaving Canada and entering the U.S. Parliament passed Bill C-44 to amend the Aeronautics Act to comply with the U.S. legislation, thus enabling airlines to share passenger information with American officials. However, Canadian law enforcement agencies do not have that same privilege under our current law.

The RCMP already possesses information in its databanks that could be used to identify threats to transportation security. The only way this information can be used effectively to ensure the safety of aircraft passengers is for the RCMP to compare the names, dates of birth, document identification numbers, and other key biodata of the passengers about to board the aircraft with the names and document identification numbers in its databanks. This is information people divulge about themselves almost daily. If there is no cause for concern after checking air passengers information against our databanks, the data will be destroyed.

Less than full access to airline passenger lists is not an effective way of proactively identifying threats to aircraft, nor will it assist the RCMP in determining which flights should be assigned aircraft protective officers. We have to be mindful that terrorists are sophisticated and could easily circumvent a system providing limited or random coverage. Information on terrorist suspects and transportation security threats is already in the RCMP databanks, and the airlines are already collecting the biodata information on passengers. What needs to be done is to link the two.

It is our intent that the data comparison process will be automated as soon as possible to reduce operating time and costs while being the least disruptive possible to the Canadian flying public and air carriers. But there will always be manual verification of data matching to prevent any errors.

With this bill there are public expectations that the RCMP will be able to enhance commercial passenger aviation safety. At present, air travellers can be subjected to a search of their personal belongings. Our experience is that while some people are not happy with this, they nevertheless accept it as a necessity to be safe and secure when travelling. The primary benefit of the RCMP's access to airline passenger information data will be its contribution to making air travel in Canada significantly more secure. Moreover, a subsidiary benefit is that it will contribute to maintaining the public's confidence in air travel.

At this time I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

[Translation]

I would now be pleased to entertain your questions.

¾ (0850)

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much for each of your presentations. We'll begin immediately with rounds of five minutes.

Mr. Lunn.

Mr. Gary Lunn (Saanich—Gulf Islands, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'm going to really target in. I'm sure you all know why we called you here at such short notice. At our last committee there was some concern over the interpretation of proposed subsections 4.82(4) and (5). So forgetting what I think they should be, I would like to know specifically and more importantly from our officials.

The issue, specifically, is that the head of CSIS and the RCMP explained...and I think Mr. Loeppky also explained it to us. He was quite clear even this morning, but the other two witnesses have left me with some room for concern where you exactly stand.

Basically, they explained that they believe the PNR lists--the passenger name records--of every single flight will automatically be downloaded into their systems and they will automatically cross-reference those with their lists from CPIC and their terrorists lists and look for hits to see if there's a concern. However, if you actually look at the legislation, the legislation appears to be clear that only specific lists would go. They would actually have to make a request every time they want a list.

For example, let's say they had a concern that terrorists were actually targeting a specific aircraft type. Then they might be going after those lists, or if they were worried that terrorists were on a specific route, let's say Halifax to Toronto--they had concerns or intelligence that they would be on this--they would be targeting those lists, but not every single one.

Even on the flowchart--I'm not sure which witness provided this--it shows again that under these clauses the designated officer would request this information, whereas we took it last week that the witnesses very clearly said, no, there would be a rolling--I think those were their words. The data would just keep coming on every single flight. It would electronically be automated so that it would cross-reference.

I appreciate I have to end here really quickly, Mr. Chair.

I think it was Ms. Hassard who said that the vision expressed by the director of CSIS and the RCMP to make a standing request for passenger information for all flights “is the long-term goal”. Forgetting about the long-term goal, what is the interpretation of this legislation now and what are our intentions? I would really like you to hone your answers in on that and give us some really clear interpretations--what you see the act as now and how you see it going to work.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Ms. Hassard.

Ms. Patricia Hassard: I'll start on that, but I have to start with one caveat, which of course is that I won't be an arbiter of what the intent actually is.

I can start by saying that I agree with the director of CSIS and the commissioner in their view that it's unlikely we would ever get to the stage where 100% of flights' passenger information is passed on to the two agencies. I think some airlines will not have the electronic systems to do that, and there may be other reasons why we would never get to that stage.

But I believe the intent of proposed subsections 4.82(4) and (5) is to provide the commissioner and the director with the authority to request, to require passenger information for specified flights. The provision does not limit the number of flights that may be specified, to which they may have access in order to carry out their mandates. So this concept of a standing request, I think, is borne out by the legislation.

We're of the view that it's necessary to have the flexibility to look at a wide range of flights. Intelligence is one way to target particular flights, but if there is a sifting of all the information, then there is a higher level of public safety that is achievable. I hope that helps.

The Chair: Mr. Lunn, you still have a little bit of time.

Mr. Gary Lunn: I personally agree you would get a higher level of safety. But that's not what the legislation says and that's where we need to be clear. If there's an airline out there that cannot do it, they're going to have to comply. If that's the law, that's the law. In the age of computers, if we have to create systems, or whatever has to be done, that's what's going to have to be done.

Do you see this as specific flights? Do you see this as all data coming in and all data being cross-referenced with--and I say “all data”, but I'm just talking about the names. Obviously, nobody seems to care about meals and how you paid. But would every single flight be cross-referenced with CPIC, with the terrorist lists, etc., or only specific flights?

¾ (0855)

Mr. Garry Loeppky: One of the things we're obviously aware of is that the terrorists and people who would be a threat to airline safety are very sophisticated. If we have less than full access to all of the data, then it allows them to plan around that and exploit weaknesses in the system that might exist if there was not full access--in other words, if there was limited access to certain flights--and they were aware of that.

I think what Ms. Hassard was suggesting was that current technology does not allow perhaps to do a full data matching at this time. But I think that would be the intention, to ensure there is a broad level of comfort that every flight is subject to the same requirements. But I agree that currently the technology is not such to allow that to happen. That is the objective, to ensure a consistent level of application, to ensure that people who would be a threat to airline safety would understand that there are no gaps in the system, or no potential gaps, simply because we're only doing certain areas as high risk.

The Chair: Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney (Mississauga West, Lib.): To pursue the line of questioning, Mr. Chair, it's puzzling to me how we can't recognize the fact that these subsections in 4.82 are contrary to the testimony here. It's very frustrating, frankly, and I'm going to try not to get angry about it.

It seems to me we need to find an amendment to these clauses around the words “person designated” or “flight specified”. We're being put in the position here of saying that we want to restrict your access to information, and yet I don't think anybody on the committee wants to do anything that would make things less safe and less secure. Obviously you have to have access to the information of who's flying in airplanes around the country and in and out of the country. But as Mr. Lunn has absolutely correctly pointed out--and when you get Liberals and Alliance members agreeing, there has to be a problem here--what you're saying runs counter to what the bill says. And it's not a matter of interpretation, I would say, because it's very specific in these sections when it refers to “any flight specified” or “any particular person specified”. Help us out here. It's really all flights. And maybe that's what we have to do. We have to amend the bill to say what it is. It's all flights, all information on all passengers at all times that you want to have access to, so you can run it through the RCMP and the CSIS database to see if there are any hits with bad guys.

Mr. Garry Loeppky: You are absolutely correct, sir. I agree that the interpretation is difficult in that it can be interpreted in different ways. But all I can speak to is what I see as the needs from a security transportation perspective, and then give the assurance that the information is then managed in a way that does not compromise the privacy rights of individuals. I've outlined what our needs are, and that would be access to all of those to ensure that there is a consistent message across the community.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Access is not in question. Your presentations this morning talked about the need to have access to passenger information for inbound and outbound international flights, as well as domestic flights.

Ms. Hassard, you give the reasons and the justifications in your presentation for why you need that information. That's not at issue at all, at least not for me. The issue is your methodology, and the issue is, does your methodology as enforcement agencies match the methodology that's described in this bill? It doesn't. I don't even think, with due respect, that it's a matter of interpretation.

Maybe Mr. Read can help us, but somebody has to give us a suggested amendment to the bill to make the music match the words, and I'm at a loss to suggest it at this stage.

You know where this concern comes from. We had Mr. Radwanski here saying that you folks all want to go on fishing expeditions all the time. Unless we clear this up, I have to tell you that I think George is right. I really hate to say it. It drives me crazy to have to say that, but I think he's right. You have to help us out with an amendment to either the bill or to your methodology.

If it is flight-specific, then I think the reverse process is the case where you would take your information and if you suspect there is somebody on a flight, or a problem on a flight, you would run it through that passenger list information and see if there's a hit. But if it's going to be a rotating 24-hour, seven-days-a-week, computer-based database running through your information, that is not what this bill says.

¿ (0900)

The Chair: Mr. Read.

Mr. John Read: I want to again emphasize that after September 11 we are forced to consider people. I recognize that you've accepted this. You can do that in increments, and each increment provides you a significant increase in the level of transportation security that you're considering. A partial watch list is basic, at the very bottom, and it's submitting certain names of people who have already identified themselves as terrorists. Of course, those who carried out the events of September 11 would not have been on such a list, so that's a very low level.

Moving up a level, we look at the aircraft protective officer program. Certainly if there are officers on board an aircraft, it is advantageous for them to know who is on the aircraft with them and where people are sitting, generally speaking, and what the aircraft looks like.

At the next level up, you could look at data matching for various flights. I'll clarify my last--

The Chair: Maybe I'm experiencing the same frustration as my colleagues are on both sides of the table, Mr. Read and guests.

Notwithstanding needs, they've been made very clear in the previous meeting with CSIS and the RCMP. I think members on either side of the table here understand clearly what the needs are. The difficulty is that a challenge to these articles, specifically for specific flights and so on, doesn't match up with the needs, and you're not getting what you want according to the legislation as it is written. When you read those articles, when we talk about “any flight specified”, don't you see a problem with that? Does “any flight specified” meet the needs as have been expressed by the RCMP and CSIS?

Mr. John Read: The words in proposed section 4.81 have a condition attached when we talk of a specific flight for which there is an immediate threat. That narrows you to one plane.

In proposed section 4.82 there are no conditions attached and the words as written would permit all three levels of data gathering that I've just identified, and they would permit, if we were technologically capable of doing it, the continuous data-streamed matching all the time. The words as written would permit this.

The Chair: I'll allow a supplementary.

Mr. Mahoney, I have--

Ms. Patricia Hassard: Could I add--

The Chair: Ms. Hassard, go ahead, please.

Ms. Patricia Hassard: I think here we're really talking about what the policy decision is and what the committee thinks the legislation should be. If there is a major disagreement on how the legislation is written, and we have described the needs of the agencies in such a way that you feel it's inconsistent with the legislation as drafted, then the decision has to be, are you going to be amenable to an amendment that would remove that as a restriction?

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Are we going to be amenable to an amendment? I'm insisting that there be an amendment somehow.

To Mr. Read, you say that 4.81 is different. Proposed section 4.81 refers to the minister, or any officer authorized by the minister, and it has the exact same wording. It says that it may ask for information that is in the air carrier's or operator's control concerning the persons on board or expected to be on board an aircraft, (a) “for any flight specified”, and then (b) “concerning any particular person specified”.

This is identical wording to that of the commissioner of the RCMP and the director of CSIS. Where's the difference, John?

¿ (0905)

Mr. John Read: If I may point out, there is no difference with respect to going for a particular individual. There is a difference when we look at a flight because under 4.81, I draw these words in proposed paragraph 4.81(1)(a) to your attention:

that it is in the air carrier's or operator's control concerning the persons on board or expected to be on board an aircraft for any flight specified by the Minister or officer if the Minister or officer is of the opinion that there is an immediate threat to that flight;

So that is a condition that must be satisfied in order to exercise paragraph (a). That will be rarely exercised.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: So the minister must specify a flight. The minister does not have access to some rolling database. He or she must specify a flight or a person.

Mr. John Read: In 4.81 it can only be a flight for which there is an immediate threat to that flight. There is a condition.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: So if that same condition were put onto proposed subsections (4) and (5) in proposed section 4.82, then the bottom line would be that the RCMP and CSIS would be under the same restraints as the minister. What I'm hearing from them is that they don't want this, that it would not be the level of security they require to do their job.

So what you're saying is that because that suspicion sentence that is there in 4.81 is not there in 4.82, by omitting that, it gives them carte blanche basically.

I don't want to tie the hands of CSIS or the RCMP. I don't think the Canadian public wants us to put our enforcement agencies in a position where they cannot ensure that safety exists in the air. So I think we need to clarify those, and then we're going to have to deal with the reality that Mr. Radwansky is probably going to be back here saying, “Told you so”.

Mr. John Read: Your analysis is correct, but I would offer that to put the same condition that's under 4.81 in 4.82 would not match the expectation of what we would like to do with the data. Proposed section 4.81 is when a plane is actually already threatened, when there are hijackers on board. In proposed section 4.82 we really do want to try to find some way to identify the people who will be a threat before they get on board the aircraft.

So if you were to put restrictions in 4.82...in my opinion, 4.81 restrictions would be far too severe; it would have to be something in between.

The Chair: Ms. Hassard.

Ms. Patricia Hassard: I have a point to add to what Mr. Read was saying. Essentially there is a difference between 4.81 and 4.82 in their essential purposes. Proposed section 4.81 is meant more to deal with the immediate threat to a particular flight. On the other hand, proposed section 4.82, I believe, is meant to deal with the general long-term threat, and the purpose is to allow the agencies the authority in order to collect information to prevent threats.

Thank you.

The Chair: Deputy Commissioner.

Mr. Garry Loeppky: With regard to 4.82, what we were looking for is something that would allow us to be proactive in terms of ensuring transportation safety, to ensure that we were able to assess the risk to a flight based on passengers who were travelling who might link up to one of our data banks that have information in them on threats to airline safety or national security. That's the process we require to be effective in terms of a consistent approach for transportation safety.

The Chair: I hope the committee will bear with my discretion. Of course, I was very generous with the time to Mr. Mahoney.

Now we'll recognize Monsieur Laframboise, and subsequently Ms. Desjarlais, in the next two rounds.

Monsieur Laframboise.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise (Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What has annoyed me from the very start is the fact that the RCMP, CSIS and representatives from the police sector have come here to tell us that nothing has changed and that this is a good piece of legislation that upholds the rights and freedoms of citizens. However, the Privacy Commissioner, the Information Commissioner and the Canadian Bar Association have stated that this bill contains several privacy violations. I have a lot of problems with that.

Mr. Read, tell me who drafted the text. Was is the Department of Transport, CSIS or the RCMP? The lady corrected you earlier on a point of interpretation; they appear to really be familiar with the bill. Were they the ones who wrote it?

¿ (0910)

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Read.

Mr. John Read: In point of fact, the policy is offered by the departments. The cabinet determines if this policy is acceptable. The legal drafters then take the policy and draft the text. We do not, in the departments, draft the text of the bills. The text of the bills does come from.... We have some input into policy. The policy is then adopted by the government and the legal drafters actually draft the text.

The Chair: Ms. Hassard.

Ms. Patricia Hassard: Monsieur Laframboise, I would like to add simply that, as with all bills, it is based on government policy, government decision-making. It was conceived and drafted in full consultation with the RCMP, CSIS, the Department of Justice, the Department of Transport, and other interested parties.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: The fact of the matter is that I feel your influence. Perhaps that is why there is no amendment. As I said, this has bothered me right from the very beginning. I will go back to the way I interpret that.

In my opinion, everybody recognizes that we have to be able to make sure that no terrorists board a plane. The problem, however, is that we want to establish a data bank on individuals taking a specific flight. Obviously, this would be a flight where there is some threat to safety, and potential danger.

There are different interpretations as to what constitutes a threat to security. The Canadian Bar Association told us that the word “warrant” “always applies to offences that are not extremely serious and are not associated with terrorism.”

That means that we could have, on this flight, somebody who is deemed to be a threat to security but, in the eyes of the Canadian Bar Association and others, not someone who is deemed to be a serious threat. It is clear that some individuals do represent a serious threat, but the offences stipulated in 4.82(1), and which pertain to transportation safety, mean that those who will be identified are not just terrorists.

Accordingly, this database enables you to identify those people for whom a warrant has been issued but who are not necessarily associated with terrorism and are viewed, by the Canadian Bar Association, and other agencies, as people who are not necessarily dangerous.

However, as far as the other individuals on the flight are concerned, you said, Mr. Read, and I quote:

to have access to all data on all people on board or expected to be on board a flight if there is an immediate threat to the flight;

That implies that if a person has the misfortune to find himself on board a flight where an individual for whom a warrant has been issued is targeted, because he is on this flight, the innocent individual will from then on be part of a data bank. Section 4.82(14) stipulates that you can keep the information for seven days or possibly even longer, up to a year and perhaps more than a year in certain cases.

In discussing this matter, the Privacy Commissioner told us that it was absolutely essential that we provide some recourse that will enable the private citizen to avoid situations where he becomes a victim of the RCMP or CSIS activities or a victim of the computer system that has been created. RCMP witnesses, as well as others, have testified that their computer system is very effective. Today, you are telling us that you intend to create a database. In my opinion, you are a lot more realistic; you will be investing money and obtaining a much more effective system.

Nevertheless, the Privacy Commissioner is asking us to stipulate that he too should be entitled to consult, among other things, the files that will be kept for more than a year. This suggestion was supported by the Canadian Bar Association. I asked the RCMP representatives a question on the matter and I am also asking you this question. Would you have any objection to the addition of a provision to clause 4.82(14) stating that the Privacy Commissioner may consult the files that are kept for more than a year in order to ensure that private citizens who inadvertently find themselves on a targeted flight do not suffer any harm? On this matter, you have said, in your text, that you would like to run a check because people can reserve 60 days ahead of time.

That is not realistic. I would be surprised to learn that a dangerous criminal, who is in any way whatsoever aware of your legislation, made a reservation 60 days ahead of time. Some people may try to do it, but there are much faster ways of obtaining plane tickets.

But what is the point of this seven-day period—we would have preferred a 24-four-hour time period—once these individuals are aboard the plane? Why keep the information? My colleagues asked this question. You are trying to convince us that this information has to be retained so that you can run checks because of the 60-day period. But what are you going to do about the individual who obtains his plane ticket three days ahead of time?

I would like to first of all ascertain whether or not you would agree to amend 4.82(14) so as to give the Privacy Commissioner the authority to verify whether or not ordinary citizens are being penalized by your procedures.

My second question pertains to section 107. The Information Commissioner told us that you do not need to amend the Access to Information Act because certain provisions already allow some specific information to be kept secret. However, the fact that personal information is exempted from the Access to Information Act means that we will never have access to certain documents.

We are trying to prevent abuse. Accordingly, would you agree to withdraw clause 107 in its entirety so that the current Access to Information Act would apply, given that this legislation does provide for non-disclosure of information for matters of national security? Indeed, the commissioner is not always obliged to disclose requested information.

¿ (0915)

There are some exemptions whereby he is not required to provide documents in certain specific situations.

Those are my two questions.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Deputy Commissioner.

Mr. Garry Loeppky: You asked about a number of points there, and I'll try to address them. First of all, with respect to the information that's required and the purposes we would put it to, as I said, it's for transportation security. It's to assess where we best place our aircraft protective officers and to provide a consistent approach in ensuring flight safety.

You referred to a database that would be created. There will be no database created. The data provided will be checked or electronically matched against databanks that we have, and if there is not a direct hit it will be retained for seven days and then be deleted and be gone.

The reason for seven days, sir, is that if a day or two after a flight there was information that in fact there had been a terrorist on board, we would have a little bit of time to go back—knowing that somebody who's a threat to national security very rarely travels alone on flights—to see if in fact there are others who are associated with him. And 24 hours would be an extremely short period of time to try to do that type of review; seven days is a minimal amount simply to allow any follow-up in case there was an identified individual who came to our attention either before the flight, during the flight, or immediately after the flight.

With respect to the issue of warrants, those are, as I think the commissioner suggested last week, purely incidental. If a subject who is a subject of a Canada-wide warrant for one of the listed serious offences comes to our attention as the subject of an outstanding warrant—and I want to emphasize that these are serious offences; they are Canada-wide warrants—then I think there is a moral obligation and an expectation by the public that we would act on that in the interest of public safety. Those are only situations where that comes to our attention as a result of checking data for transportation safety and for flight safety—no other reason.

Concerning the Privacy Commissioner, the Privacy Commissioner has certainly full access in terms of overseeing how we manage the processes to ensure that privacy rights of individuals are respected. In my view, the authority is already there for him to do that.

¿ (0920)

The Chair: I'm going to have to move to Ms. Desjarlais.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais (Churchill, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I still have a little bit of laryngitis, so I apologize if it's a bit scratchy here.

Commissioner, exactly what type of information will you be looking at that you're matching with the airline database?

Mr. Garry Loeppky: Essentially we will be looking at a few critical elements—

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Exactly what are you looking for? You have date of birth, you have maybe a credit card and how someone paid, you have where they're going to and from. What other information would you be matching?

Mr. Garry Loeppky: I know that the data elements are laid out. If you're asking me the basic—

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: I'm asking you what information you would be matching.

Mr. Garry Loeppky: What we would require to match is the name, the date of birth, and the gender, because in some cultures the names can be very similar between the female and the male. Those are essentially the data elements.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: So that's purely how you're matching up whether or not someone may have some—

Mr. Garry Loeppky: And perhaps a travel document, if they're travelling on a passport or something and it's identified. But that would be it.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Okay, so that's purely what you're going to be matching with a database.

What databases would you be using that you're matching this passenger list with?

Mr. Garry Loeppky: There's the Canadian Police Information Centre, which has—

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: You don't have to tell me what each one has. I have a very good idea.

Mr. Garry Loeppky: There's the Canadian Police Information Centre, the national crime databank, the secure criminal information system, which houses the majority of the national security information, and our police information retrieval system.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: In the presentation that Ms. Hassard made... for example, we're going to match up anyone with a history of violence. How would you identify people with a history of violence in regard to how you're matching that database?

Mr. Garry Loeppky: If a name matched someone in our databank who had a history of violence, who for example had previously been caught with explosives, those types of things, that would be a flag for us to say—

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: You're specifying something like explosives, but I would consider extreme violence to be an assault on someone. How would you match that with what you're talking about?

Mr. Garry Loeppky: Well, unless that individual came back with a very specific match, it would not come to our attention at all, because it's an electronic process.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: If it's a very specific match and you have a date, birth date, and gender.

Mr. Garry Loeppky: If the individual comes back as a subject of an ongoing investigation or a national security file, then we would do some background work to determine whether... if they were the subject of an ongoing national security investigation, obviously we would look at that data and—

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: I don't think anybody has any objection to it if you find someone who has a match. I think the objection comes in where there will be retention in case someone is a potential risk, and that's been stated time and time again in witness presentations.

Just out of curiosity, how many outstanding Canada-wide warrants are there right now for serious offences? You don't have to give me the exact number, but roughly.

Mr. Garry Loeppky: I'm sorry, I couldn't even venture a guess. I know there are many, but I would have to—

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: A hundred, a thousand, two thousand, five thousand?

Mr. Garry Loeppky: I know there are perhaps 200,000.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: So you're going to take 200,000 names with a Canada-wide warrant and match those names, ages, and genders to passenger lists and possibly pick people out because they might be a risk.

Mr. Garry Loeppky: No. I want to clarify that by saying before I make a commitment like that. I want to ensure that those in fact are warrants that meet the criteria of the—

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: That's what I'm expecting. So there could in essence be other warrants, even greater than that, out there.

Mr. Garry Loeppky: I can't image it being greater; I think it's probably a lot less. But I'd need to verify that.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Okay, fair enough.

Now, are you aware, Commissioner, of the list that was made available though access to information that listed Democracy Watch, Amnesty International, unions, the Council of Canadians, and Greenpeace as possible terrorist risks?

Mr. Garry Loeppky: No, I'm not.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: That came out in previous representations made before us, that those groups were listed as possible terrorist risks.

I'm wondering, would you then have the membership of those organizations and cross match them to the passenger lists as well?

¿ (0925)

Mr. Garry Loeppky: First of all, I don't accept that those are terrorist organizations, and therefore I don't support that those people would be--

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: But the RCMP and CSIS did list those groups--

Mr. Garry Loeppky: I speak for the RCMP.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Through access to information, they were listed as possible terrorist risks on RCMP, CSIS lists. So if they did do that, and you don't consider them terrorists, how do we address that kind of situation, if the RCMP and CSIS can now do this and nobody's going to be able to access that information under this legislation?

Mr. Garry Loeppky: Well, I don't consider them a threat to airline safety, and therefore I don't suggest that they would—

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: With this legislation making it no longer possible for people to access that information under access to information, how do we ensure we protect the civil liberties of Canadians?

Mr. Garry Loeppky: As I mentioned, first of all the Privacy Commissioner has full access to how we manage that information.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: He won't after this legislation.

Mr. Garry Loeppky: I misunderstood. I thought he did. And there are oversight bodies that look at both our performance and CSIS's performance to ensure we're behaving appropriately. Ultimately, there's accountability to the courts, because our objective is criminal investigation.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Okay.

The Chair: I'm going to suggest, hopefully with the cooperation of our witnesses, that they extend their testimony to no later than 9:45 p.m. I appreciate everyone's cooperation here.

Having said that, I'm only willing to do that... we all know the specific reasons...and without prejudice, these witnesses were called back before the committee to address a very specific part of Bill C-17.

Now, if there are any specific questions on the purpose for which these witnesses were called back, I wish we could just focus on them in the time we have remaining.

Ms. Jennings.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): Thank you very much for what I believe is clarification. As I understand it, in order to be able to effectively carry out the mandate that's been given to the RCMP, Transport, CSIS, etc., you require being able to take the information you already have concerning individuals and hopefully match it at one point against all flights--inbound, outbound, international, and domestic flights--but at this time you don't think you have the technological capability. But to the extent that technology will allow you to look at so many flights, you want to be able to look at all those flights you can look at through the technological advances. Am I correct?

Mr. Garry Loeppky: You are correct.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: As you understand, the concern of the committee... Some don't want you to have that authority, but those of us who understand or who believe that it could be justified are concerned that proposed subsections 4.82(4) and 4.82(5) are worded in such a way that they may in fact be confusing. There are those who may interpret those subsections as they are now worded as requiring you to actually give a list of flights to the airlines in order to then be able to match that against your data, yet you would like to be able to simply have access to all the flights.

Mr. Garry Loeppky: You are exactly right.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I'm not going to get into whether the legislation as it's now worded actually allows you to have that authority for all flights or not. Let's just take it hypothetically that it doesn't, that a court would say no, you would actually have to specify flights, okay? So let's look at the wording and take proposed paragraph 4.82(5)(a). The way it's now worded it says:

that is in the air carrier's or operator's control concerning the persons on board or expected to be on board an aircraft for any flight specified by the person imposing the requirement.

If that were modified to say “that is in the air carrier's or operator's control concerning all flights”, period, would that meet--

¿ (0930)

Mr. Garry Loeppky: That would send that consistent interpretation we have to ensure that there's a consistent approach toward flight safety for all aircraft operating in Canada.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Ms. Hassard.

Ms. Patricia Hassard: I think that would certainly clarify the matter.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Mr. Read.

Mr. John Read: With respect, you would have to say “concerning the persons on board or expected to be on board on all flights”.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: But in proposed subsection 4.82(4) it says “the information set out in the schedule”. The schedule says the passenger's name and their date of birth; it gives that personal information.

Mr. John Read: I wasn't objecting. I thought it would clarify it if we left in the words “concerning the persons on board or expected to be on board”, and then you would say “all flights”.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: It would be “all flights”, fine.

The second question is just for clarification. Does the legislation as it now stands in any way modify, amend, limit, or expand the authority the Privacy Commissioner now has to audit your activities in terms of personal information?

Ms. Patricia Hassard: The answer to that is, in my view, no.

Mr. Garry Loeppky: No.

Mr. John Read: I understand it makes no changes.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: The legislation as it now stands, specifically clause 107, limits the access to information commissioner's authority. Is that correct?

Mr. John Read: Clause 107 of the bill is a renumbering; it is not an addition of any new powers or a taking away of any powers. It is a renumbering because the Aeronautics Act is renumbered and the references to the Aeronautics Act, where they referenced a certain section, would now reference the new, correct number. So clause 107 does not add, subtract, or change anything; it is simply a renumbering provision.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Lunn.

Mr. Gary Lunn: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Chair, I will be asking my question to Ms. Hassard and Mr. Read, and if possible, I would like a written response. It does not need to be answered now, so if you could, give it to the chair at a later date.

It's very clear we have to amend these two proposed sections, and we'll be doing that when we go to the clause-by-clause. Again, I agree with Ms. Jennings that we need to give this data on an ongoing basis, and we have to make sure the act is painfully clear so that is clearly understood. I'd like you to submit to the chair new wording for these proposed sections, wording that makes it very clear that it's for all flights on an ongoing basis, 24/7, so this data can be matched irrespective of whether we have the technologies or not, because that can change by the hour, as you know.

We need to avoid words like “may”. We have to be very clear so that this data, when requested, shall be made available, and we're going to have to deal with this in the clause-by-clause. You have the officials in your departments. You have the input, as you said, with the ministers, so this needs to be cleared up.

The last point I would like you to also consider, which is not in here, is that it would be very helpful if we even became clearer than just using PNR. Some in the opposition are saying, well, then you get into who they're sleeping with, who they're travelling with, whether they have their girlfriend with them, what they are eating, and all this. Clearly, all these authorities have said we don't need that. Now, why don't we get even more specific and say that they will be required to submit the following data: name, gender, travel documents if available--i.e. passports, visas, or whatever travel documents they have--and date of birth if available. Obviously not every airline would have that, so we specify the data that is going to be required to be transferred and technology will take care of itself.

If you could, please deal with those issues. We don't need to wordsmith this today--we'll be doing that in the clause-by-clause--and be very specific. You also need to do it with proposed section 4.81. Please do that, and if you could get it to the chair as soon as possible, it would be most helpful in our clause-by-clause analysis.

Thank you.

The Chair: Do you have any comments at this time, Ms. Hassard?

Ms. Patricia Hassard: I have just one comment, which is that we'd be happy to take that into consideration. We would work through the parliamentary secretary and have that given to the chair.

¿ (0935)

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: This is just to point out that, by the way, Gary, if you look at page 104 of the bill, the schedule, it specifically refers to proposed subsections 4.82(4) and (5), and it gives us all that data. That may need to be either contracted or expanded if it is not satisfactory to the committee, but all that stuff is outlined there.

I just want to point out that I think the flow chart you've given us doesn't really reflect the reality here of what it is you need. The top boxes, where it says that the RCMP request passenger information or that CSIS requests passenger information, should probably just be taken out. The reality is that the airlines will provide passenger information directly to either the RCMP or CSIS so they can run it against their database to see if there's a hit.

All I've been trying to say is--and I think Marlene hit on it too--let's just make sure we're being transparent and honest here. This clause as it stands almost looks as if it was drafted by CSIS, maybe trying to not put it all up front. We just want it to be clear.

I appreciate you coming, and hopefully when we get to the clause-by-clause, we can have this entire section reworded. Maybe the problem occurs where, if you go back to proposed section 4.81, there's clearly a requirement for suspicion before the minister can act. I guess we just assumed there was a similarity, but there's a huge difference.

We're going to have to be open and transparent and say to people, yes, we are running the passenger data through our RCMP and CSIS databases to see if there are any hits. If there are no hits, if you don't have a problem, if you're not a threat to transportation security, etc., we're not interested, Mr. Lunn, in whether you have a girlfriend in Montreal or wherever and you fly back and forth between here and there. Good luck to you if you do.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz (Yorkton—Melville, Canadian Alliance): I have a point of privilege here.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: All right, in Calgary, then, Garry.

We're interested in being open and transparent in this, so I hope we can get this reworded the way the committee--

The Chair: Can we please get a response from our witnesses?

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Just say you agree and we'll all move on.

Mr. Garry Loeppky: We certainly look forward to the clarification as well. Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Laframboise.

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Earlier, Deputy Commissioner, you mentioned that there was no new databank. I am going to read you what the Director of CSIS said last week:

The Service will draw up a separate computerized surveillance list.

So, if that is not a new databank...

I am going to come back to the Privacy Commissioner. The commissioner has asked us to strengthen his powers. That is what he asked us to do. Stop telling us that the commissioner has enough power when he himself has told us that he wants the clauses of this bill amended and added to, because he feels his powers are inadequate. And why does he need these powers? To ensure that no files are kept on any Quebecker or Canadian without a good reason for doing so.

When I asked the Auditor General the same question, she was not sure she had the power to guarantee that you would not keep files in an unreasonable manner. We want independent authority in place to avoid having you, the police system, taking advantage of defenceless individuals. That is the kind of service we want.

The following is what the Information Commissioner of Canada said in his statement regarding clause 107 and access to information for privacy considerations:

Clause 107, if adopted, would make it mandatory for such information to be kept secret forever. And surely that's not reasonable in a healthy democracy.

This statement by the Information Commissioner is serious. It means that if clause 107 is passed, the rights of our free and democratic society will be trampled. I would like you to look at that and reply to my question.

¿ (0940)

[English]

The Chair: Ms. Hassard or Mr. Loeppky.

Mr. Garry Loeppky: Perhaps I can just respond to the first issue with respect to the list—

The Chair: Please be brief. That's all I'm asking.

Mr. Garry Loeppky: I will keep my comments short.

I believe the director of CSIS was referring to the fact that they already have a databank. He was talking about extracting names from that databank for a list of specific issues relating to national security, and that they would provide it. I do not believe at all that he intended to send a message about the creation of a new databank.

Ms. Hassard, I don't know if you have any comments on clause 107 of the bill.

Ms. Patricia Hassard: Yes, I do on the Privacy Commissioner and his access and the powers available to him. My understanding is that he has full powers under this statute. He would have the ability to investigate and would have full access to all of the records.

In fact, this legislation was designed to keep particular records. Whenever there is a retention and whenever there is a disclosure, records will be kept. Plus, the director and the commissioner will have to do an annual review of the information retained to determine whether or not it has been retained improperly.

I think there are plenty of opportunities and the ability for him to exercise his mandate in relationship to this initiative.

The Chair: A brief question only, Mr. Breitkreuz.

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

This is not my area of expertise, but I'm observing the proceedings here with great interest. I have been working on another file that has a bit of a bearing on this.

I have become aware that there are about four million Canadians on a database the RCMP accesses from time to time, called the fifth database. I am wondering whether this is one of the databases that will be cross-referenced or checked when airline passenger lists are scrutinized. Is this fifth database going to be one of the databases you will access?

I ask this because I am concerned that there are four million Canadians on the list, and many of them shouldn't be on it. Most of them don't even know they are on it. They could be inconvenienced; they could be detained; they could even be hassled by this.

The Chair: We will have to leave it at that, because we're already impinging on the other witnesses.

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: In raising this concern, I'm just wondering if you know whether that's the case.

Mr. Garry Loeppky: I don't believe the fifth database is one of the four that I said earlier we would be using.

The Chair: Let me move then to—

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: It's tied in with CPIC. That's why I'm—

The Chair: I understand. Thank you very much.

On behalf of the committee, let me thank our witnesses this morning for being with us and assisting the committee and its work, because of course I think we were focusing on a very specific area.

Are there any other questions? Thank you very much for your testimony again this morning. Hopefully we won't have to call you back.

We're adjourned for about five minutes.

Mr. Garry Loeppky: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

¿ (0943)

¿ (0949)

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.)): As you can see, I'm not the Honourable Speaker of the House or the Deputy Speaker. He's gone to do his functions at the House of Commons, which apparently has to open very shortly.

I want to take this opportunity to welcome you to the next section. I'm sorry we're a little late. We had some clarification required with the last witnesses, who were called back. I think we've cleared up a few items to some people's satisfaction and not for others. We'll deal with that later.

Today, at this point, we will go with the Department of Natural Resources: Christopher Watson, chief inspector of explosives; David McCulloch, inspector of explosives; and Anne-Marie Fortin, counsel. I believe, Mr. Watson, you're going to lead off. The floor is yours.

¿ (0950)

Mr. Christopher Watson (Chief Inspector of Explosives, Director, Explosives Regulatory Division, Department of Natural Resources): Thank you.

Good morning. Bonjour.

We're here today to make a brief presentation on part of the Explosives Act component of Bill C-17, specifically on the inexplosive components of ammunition. If you look at the presentation, which I believe you have copies of, on page 2 you will see the topics in the order in which we will be discussing them.

Taking page 3 first, what are the components of ammunition? For the purpose of this discussion, ammunition is made up of two components, explosive components and inexplosive or non-explosive components.

The explosive components are the propellant powder and the primer that sets it off. The inexplosive components are the cartridge case that contains that powder and the projectile itself, the bullet.

The current situation, as far as controls under the Explosives Act are concerned, is that for importation no permit is currently required for inexplosive components. For explosive components, up to 5,000 rounds of ammunition, 5,000 primers, and eight kilograms of propellant powder for personal use may be imported without an explosives importation permit. With regard to explosive components, a permit is required for greater quantities, and a permit is required for any quantity for commercial use for sale--that is to say, components of ammunition or ammunition itself.

With regard to storage, no licence is required to keep inexplosive components. Reasonable quantities of primers and powder for personal use may be kept without a licence. Up to 12 kilograms of powder and up to 10,000 primers may be kept for sale without a licence. Quantities greater than the above for commercial use require a licence.

[Translation]

We now come to the current controls for the manufacture of ammunition. No licence is required to manufacture ammunition for personal use, but ammunition manufactured for sale, or commercial manufacture, requires licensing.

[English]

In a document referred to as the OAS convention, “the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials” are considered to be problems in the Americas. A system of control of importation and exportation and of in-transit shipments, coupled with verification, is envisaged to protect shipments from loss or diversion to terrorists or criminal interests within the Americas.

A convention known as the Organization of American States Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials was signed by Canada and other states in November 1997. This convention requires control over import/export and in-transit shipments of explosives, ammunition, and firearms, and requires the tracking of production and exchange of information with other states, if so required.

[Translation]

Explosive ammunition components, that is cartridge cases and bullets, are included in the definition of ammunition in the convention. Failure to include these components would mean that Canada may not be able to implement the convention.

[English]

So we have a set of controls that are proposed. From a commercial point of view, we propose to have licensing requirements for importation, exportation, and in-transit shipments. There will be exemptions for personal use. The licensing requirements and these exemptions will be developed through the regulatory process, in consultation with stakeholders, such as the hunting community, target shooters, and the law enforcement community.

The expected impact on legitimate commerce is given on page 11. People who currently import ammunition and explosive components who already possess an explosives importation permit would have to have that permit amended to include the inexplosive ammunition components.

As far as, internally, within Canada, legitimate domestic wholesale and retail sale of these inexplosive components will not be affected by these proposals. The situation will remain as it is today.

The impact on the users for personal use. No import permit will be required for limited quantities of inexplosive components for personal use. We do not foresee the requirement for any licence for the possession, storage, or use of these inexplosive components, and in general the implementation of the OAS convention should be invisible, should have no effect upon the Canadian user communities.

That concludes the presentation.

¿ (0955)

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly): Okay. We'll go to our round of questions. Five minutes each, and that includes the answer.

Mr. Breitkreuz.

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: Thank you for your presentation.

I have two main questions. On December 3, in a report to Parliament, the Auditor General had this to say about the regulatory regime imposed on law-abiding firearms owners through the Firearms Act, and I would like to just quote from that briefly:

In February 2001, the Department told the Government it had wanted to focus on the minority of firearms owners that posed a high risk while minimizing the impact on the overwhelming majority of law-abiding owners. However, the Department concluded that this did not happen. Rather, it stated that the Program's focus had changed from high risk firearms owners to excessive regulation and enforcement of controls over all owners and their firearms. The Department concluded that, as a result, the Program had become overly complex and very costly to deliver, and that it had become difficult for owners to comply with the Program. The Department said the excessive regulation had occurred because some of its Program partners believed that the use of firearms is in itself a “questionable activity” that required strong controls, and there should be a zero-tolerance attitude toward non-compliance with the Firearms Act.

Now, I also want you to note that in the previous presentation, just before you came here, the RCMP deputy commissioner stated:

For this section of the Public Safety Act to provide a meaningful benefit to the security of Canadians, it must not become so restrictive or burdensome that the benefits are lost by the process.

So my first question to you is this. From the reading of these amendments, with respect to the inexplosive ammunition components, it seems like this is another program that is designed and destined to become excessively bureaucratic and expensive and useless, very much like the firearms registry. So what's so high risk about people using inexplosive ammunition components? In essence, if they can't explode, why are we controlling them? How many people will be affected by this? Can you provide us with some cost estimates for implementing the inexplosive ammunition components regulations? That's my first question.

Mr. Christopher Watson: The inexplosive components are not regarded as being a threat. The inexplosive component provisions were included because they are included in the OAS convention, which was signed by the Government of Canada in 1997. We include them here for completeness, in order that Canada may be able to ratify and implement that convention in the future.

The cost of dealing with inexplosive components I don't think would substantially add to the rest of the program, which deals with importation, exportation, and in-transit permits for explosives, everything considered as “explosives” under the act. The inexplosive component, I think, would be a fairly minor component of that program.

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: So you do not feel that the cost estimates would be significant.

Mr. Christopher Watson: I don't think that putting in or taking out inexplosive components would materially affect anything.

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: One observation I have to make is that it says in your brief “Failure to include these components would mean that Canada may not...” It doesn't say “shall”. So I think there's something there.

I don't have much time, so I want to go to my second question. As you have just explained, these amendments to the Explosives Act are a consequence of Canada's signing the Organization of American States Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials. When Deputy Prime Minister Herb Gray signed this agreement on behalf of Canada--and this is very important--he said:

This could be the start of a global movement that would spur the development of an instrument to ban firearms worldwide that would be similar to our land-mines initiative.

Given the Deputy Prime Minister's predicted end result for this agreement, you can see why firearms owners across Canada are very concerned about the government's ultimate objective in moving these amendments to control inexplosives. So my question is, what consultations took place with the real stakeholders in this debate before Canada signed this agreement with the OAS?

À (1000)

Mr. Christopher Watson: I'm sorry, I can't--

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly): I'm not sure that question relates to anything you've presented or what we have here.

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: Is there anything urgent about implementing this? It says “may” in the agreement. Why are we possibly creating a huge bureaucratic mess here by trying to do this?

Mr. Christopher Watson: As I said previously, the inexplosive components item is only a small part of the whole picture when it comes to the OAS convention. The importation/exportation of explosives in general is an area that certainly does bear control. The inexplosive components item, as I say, is included simply for completeness because it is captured in the convention.

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: Could it be omitted?

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly): Mr. Breitkreuz, your time is up. In fact, I let you go over by a whole minute.

Mrs. Jennings.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Has the United States implemented the convention?

Mr. Christopher Watson: The U.S. has implemented parts of the convention. For instance, the exportation of ammunition to Canada now requires export permits from the U.S. and import permits from Canada.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: What, if anything, has been the reaction of firearms owners and hunters in the United States given the implementation of this convention within their country? For instance, has the NRA, which is very vocal and politically active and has big bucks, mounted a sustained public campaign against the United States now having implemented provisions of the convention?

Mr. Christopher Watson: Not to my knowledge. The provisions that have been implemented are concerned with the cross-border movement of product, importation and exportation, which would not affect the user in either country.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: In terms of Canada, do you have any data on our firearms owners and hunters who import ammunition or its components from the United States by whatever means, whether it's by direct mail, the Internet, phone, or whatever? What is the percentage of those amongst the overall number of owners?

Mr. Christopher Watson: We have information on the commercial operations because we license them, people who import and people who manufacture ammunition for commercial purposes. There are personal exemptions for hunters and target shooters to bring material in from the States. So we don't have any data on that.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: You state that the changes will not affect them.

Mr. Christopher Watson: No.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: With regard to the film industry, there has been some concern that these amendments will in fact affect their effectiveness in terms of being able to use explosives, non-explosive components, etc. Can you address that issue.

Mr. Christopher Watson: In terms of the special effects that are used in the production of films, this will certainly be an item for consultation with the industry before we decide on limitations, quantities, and exemptions. It certainly would not be our intention to interfere with the film industry. In general the film industry uses very small quantities of these materials for their purposes, so I would not foresee any problems for them.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: And their needs can be addressed through the regulations, you're saying?

Mr. Christopher Watson: Absolutely.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Okay, thank you.

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly): Madam Desjarlais.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: You indicated Canada signed the OAS convention in 1997. Since 1997, what's been happening in regard to inexplosive devices?

Mr. Christopher Watson: With regard to the convention as a whole, it has been one of the things on the list of things to do.

À (1005)

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: With regard to inexplosive devices, what's been happening since 1997?

Mr. Christopher Watson: Inexplosive devices are not controlled and have not been controlled. Inexplosive components of ammunition are not controlled currently.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: They're not controlled. So we signed the convention in 1997, and up until now there's been no control. Has there been a problem?

Mr. Christopher Watson: No.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: So why do we have to change anything?

Mr. Christopher Watson: Because the inexplosive components are contained within the definitions in the OAS convention. And given that we've signed that convention, we are trying to comply with what the convention says.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: So you went from 1997 to 2003 with no big issue?

Mr. Christopher Watson: I think as a result of the events of September 11 in the States, the terrorist-type activities became much higher profile and came much more to the fore.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Because they were using inexplosive devices?

Mr. Christopher Watson: Traditionally, explosives have been one of the favourite weapons used by terrorists.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: In your response to Ms. Jennings, in regard to the U.S. implementing the convention, you didn't say that the U.S. implemented the convention, you said--

Mr. Christopher Watson: Partially.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Could you tell me, has the U.S. implemented the inexplosive aspect of the convention?

Mr. Christopher Watson: That I don't know.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Would you suggest you were trying to give the impression that they had when that question came up earlier?

Mr. Christopher Watson: No.

I know that for the export of ammunition, the U.S. now requires export permits and import permits issued by Canada, which was not the case previously. So they are implementing the convention, at least in part.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: What about the part we're dealing with here, the contentious part, the inexplosive aspect?

Mr. Christopher Watson: That I don't know.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Okay. That's fine, thanks.

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly): Ms. Fortin, did you want to come in on that? You were playing with your microphone there.

Ms. Anne-Marie Fortin (Counsel, Department of Natural Resources): The only comment I would make is that Canada did sign the convention, but to my knowledge it has not been ratified yet, so Canada does not have the legal obligation to implement it. But in order to ratify the convention, we would have to be in a position to implement it legally.

This is not the case at this point.

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly): Okay.

Mr. Laframboise.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My questions are along the same line as those of Ms. Desjarlais. If I understood correctly, there are exemptions for personal use, and they will be determined during the regulatory process. In other words, we will need a regulation to specify the exemptions for personal use. Did I understand you correctly?

[English]

Mr. Christopher Watson: Yes, that's correct.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: That is where I have a problem. First of all, there was no urgency. Why not consult the community before tabling a bill for which the regulations will not apply in any case? What will be of concern to us as members of Parliament is the issue of personal use; there is a problem regarding personal use. That is what this bill will do. That means that until the regulations are implemented, people could be searched because they have all sorts of non-explosive materials.

So why not do the consultation first and learn from it before tabling the regulations, unless you are saying that the regulations will be tabled next week or following the passage of the bill, or at the same time? But why did we not have this discussion first and why not have some draft regulations afterwards to find out what would happen in the case of exemptions for personal use?

Ms. Anne-Marie Fortin: I think that in the case of restrictions on imports, given that the bill will require regulations to prevent imports without a licence even before there is a requirement to have such a licence, things will happen at the same time. There is no need for a regulation for an exemption before we have even passed the regulation that will prohibit the actual import. Thus, it is not quite accurate to say that the bill itself will impose the restriction.

Mr. Mario Laframboise: So you are telling us that ordinary people do not have to worry. They can continue to own what they have at the moment, and this bill does not present any problem, except for imports. Is that what you are saying?

À (1010)

Ms. Anne-Marie Fortin: Even for imports, the regulation will have to be in effect before the prohibition is in place, and, at that point, we will deal with the situation generally. I do not know how the regulation will be drafted, but things will be done in a...

Mr. Mario Laframboise: It is rather complicated, but there are some offences mentioned. So, these offences will not be applicable until the regulations are in effect?

Ms. Anne-Marie Fortin: That is correct.

Mr. Mario Laframboise: In the meantime, ordinary people do not have to worry about all the offences mentioned in this bill. There will be a discussion with the community about the regulations. In the meantime, there will be no enforcement.

Ms. Anne-Marie Fortin: This is true for these components, of course, and not for the act as it exists at the moment.

Mr. Mario Laframboise: The act that exists at the moment is still applicable; that is what you are telling us. These are not new components you want to add, including the non-explosive components. That is what I understood you said.

Ms. Anne-Marie Fortin: That is correct.

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Thank you.

[English]

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly): Merci.

Madam Jennings, and then Mr. Breitkreuz.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

To come back to the issue of the United States, you said it's implementing parts of the convention with respect to requiring import and export permits or licences. If you cannot at this moment, can you get the information, verified, and get it to the committee, through the chair, as to whether or not the United States, in any of its implementation of the OAS convention, is using the OAS convention definition of ammunition, which includes cartridge cases and bullets that are used in any firearm, and which we are defining as “inexplosive ammunition component” in Bill C-17?

Mr. Christopher Watson: Yes, we can get that information and provide it to the committee.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Thank you.

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly): Thank you.

Mr. Breitkreuz.

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: Thank you very much.

I gather from your response that this has nothing to do with a response to terrorism, but everything to do with our agreement under the OAS. That convention, you said, is not ratified. I really fail to understand why this is an urgent matter at this point and why we cannot consult with all the stakeholders involved here to see how this will unfold. One of the big mistakes that was made with the Firearms Act was that the stakeholders were not consulted. The provinces were not consulted, so you have eight provinces and three territories saying they don't want to have anything to do with this. Now you're going to implement something about which I think we don't even have the foggiest idea as to how it will unfold, because we don't have the regulations before us. I don't think we can even decide on a lot of this. I just don't understand why suddenly this is coming forward.

In fact, part of Bill C-17, part 23, which implements the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, was ratified in 1975, and now we're thinking about putting something in place for that, almost 30 years later. That, to me, would seem far more dangerous than inexplosive ammunition components. Terrorists do not use these in any way, shape, or form. I'm really at a loss to understand how what I've heard here this morning is going to improve in any way the safety of Canadians.

You said we'll see if exemptions or adjustments need to be made after the legislation is passed. My experience with the Firearms Act is that those adjustments to problems don't ever seem to be made--$1 billion is spent, and nothing really seems to be changing to improve things. So I would like you to respond to that.

I also have a question. What are the powers of an inspector under these amendments? When is an inspector able to exercise these powers, and when does an inspection turn into a search and seizure? There are two aspects to what I'm raising here.

Mr. Christopher Watson: I think you actually asked three questions—

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly): And made a statement.

Mr. Christopher Watson: Under our current regulations, which relate to the importation of explosive components, there are and always have been exemptions for personal use, and we don't see any change in that. There would certainly be exemptions for personal use for inexplosive as well as explosive components.

As far as consultation goes, during the regulation-writing process there will certainly be full consultation with everyone who will be affected by the process, so there will be consultation to determine what are reasonable quantities to be exempted for personal use.

I think the second part of your question was what the urgency is to deal with the OAS convention, because inexplosive components are not particularly weapons of terror, that's true, but the OAS convention overall is a counter-criminal/counter-terrorism convention that deals with firearms, ammunition, and explosives, and the inexplosive components are only one small part of it.

The Explosive Act amendments proposed in Bill C-17 are to enable the ratification of the entire OAS convention, and the inexplosive components are just a small part of it. The other parts are probably more relevant and more immediate than the inexplosive components, but it comes together as a package. Adding it or taking it out doesn't really make any difference overall.

À (1015)

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: And the powers of the inspector—my third question?

Ms. Anne-Marie Fortin: I'll answer that.

The powers of the inspectors are being expanded to cover the subject matter. These powers are typical of a regulated industry. There are no increased powers given to the inspectors in comparison with those in existence right now, other than covering the subject matters.

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: “In existence” can—

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly): Mr. Breitkreuz, you're out of time, but if you have a brief question I'll allow it.

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: Under the Firearms Act, those inspection powers are quite onerous at this time. Is that what you're comparing it with?

Ms. Anne-Marie Fortin: I'm not familiar with the inspection powers under the Firearms Act. The inspection powers an inspector of explosives would use are those that are provided for under the Explosives Act.

These are not investigation powers, but they are inspection powers. The inspector can enter premises—not dwelling houses, though; there are conditions for dwelling houses—but cannot enter premises unless they have reason to believe there are explosives present.

So the subject matter is being expanded. If we are going to include a regulation-making power to cover components of explosives, you need to expand on the subject matter for which the inspectors can inspect. Other than that, we're not increasing their powers.

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly): With that I'll go to Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Mr. Chairman, it's my understanding that the United Nations has adopted a convention on...I think it's called transnational organized crime. That may not be the exact title, but it's something like that. I've been given information that this convention supercedes the OAS provisions. Do you have any information on that?

Mr. David McCulloch (Inspector of Explosives, Department of Natural Resources): Yes, we're aware of that convention. Essentially the OAS convention came first, but a lot of this is in alignment with the UN convention. A lot of that convention was based on the work that was done in negotiating the OAS convention in 1997.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: So there's no conflict there, or there's no overriding of—

Mr. David McCulloch: I don't believe so.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: The critics of this section of the bill have raised the issue of what are referred to as reloaders—the people who make their own ammunition. We're talking about Olympic athletes, target shooters, people like that. Their concerns, as I understand it, are that this will increase their cost, their regulation, that this will cause problems when they import some of the material. Presumably they're doing so in fairly small quantities, although I may be wrong about that. It's not for resale. They're not stocking a shelf in a gun store with it; they're doing it for their own purposes. I assume they do it because it would have an impact on the accuracy and the weight, and all of that kind of stuff, of the ammunition.

Are these folks exempt from this situation? You said there were personal exemptions. How can you address their concerns for us?

À (1020)

Mr. Christopher Watson: As far as sale and internal use in Canada is concerned, nothing in these proposals will affect the personal user. As far as importation goes, all people will have an exemption for the personal use of limited quantities.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: What are limited quantities?

Mr. Christopher Watson: We will have to determine this by talking to the people who use it.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Okay. Will this be done before the regulations are drafted?

Mr. Christopher Watson: Yes.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: So you have some empathy or sympathy for the concerns being expressed. We don't want to be putting onerous restrictions on people who actually use this on a personal basis.

Mr. Christopher Watson: It is absolutely not the intention of these proposals to place any restrictions or financial burden on users. It is for the gathering of information and the control of importation and exportation of large quantities of shipments, to ensure they aren't diverted for criminal or terrorist use.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: You were probably here for the previous deputation and saw the specific references made to air traffic security, fighting terrorism, and identifying dangerous situations.

I must tell you that I have not heard a case made this morning around what this does to provide greater security for Canadians. Everyone says that since 9/11, life is different, but that seems to be a catch-all.

I really need to be convinced there is a compelling reason relating to Bill C-17 to somehow provide a safer and more secure environment for Canadians to travel in and out of the country, or for dealing with goods coming in, out, or going across the country. With due respect, Mr. Watson, I have not heard a compelling case made.

I am very open to being convinced, because the intent of Bill C-17 is to arrive ultimately at such security. I just don't want to be targeting a group because it seems like it is an area we should be targeting. I need you to sell me on this.

Mr. Christopher Watson: Okay, I'll try.

We're not targeting a group. As I've said, the provisions of this proposal should be invisible for the personal user. As a user or target shooter or hunter in Canada, you should not see any effect from these provisions.

As for the urgency of this, the change in legislation has been on the books since 1997 to help enable Canada to ratify...because this is only part of the legislation required for ratification. This doesn't refer to firearms, but only to ammunition and explosives. This has been on the books since the convention was signed by the government in 1997. However, the events of 9/11 made it more urgent and moved it up the list of things to do.

It is a counter-terrorism convention, and this bill is concerned with counter-terrorism activities. That's why it's in there. The inexplosive components provisions should be absolutely invisible to the user.

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly): A very short question only, and then we'll go to Mr. Breitkreuz.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Would it make more sense for you to make these amendments within your own legislation and to go to your own committee, so that you can deal with this as a natural resource issue rather than an anti-terrorism issue? I still have not been convinced that the proper place for this is in this bill.

Mr. Christopher Watson: I'm not sure I can answer that. This is included in Bill C-17 as part of a suite or parcel of counter-terrorism provisions for increased security of the explosive supply in Canada.

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly): Please make your last question short, Mr. Breitkreuz.

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: I just want to follow up on my colleague's excellent question, which I think summarized how most of us feel around this table.

You said that the average person, the hunter and sport shooter, would not be affected or targeted by this. Who is targeted?

Secondly, can the provisions for controlling the inexplosive ammunition components be pulled out of the bill without affecting the rest of this piece of legislation? I see problems developing here, which I wouldn't want imposed on the rest of the bill because they may prevent some of the good things in the bill from going forward. Can it be removed?

Who is targeted by this? It is not clear to me who is being targeted.

À (1025)

Mr. Christopher Watson: I think to say who is being targeted is perhaps a little misleading. What we are proposing to do is to be able to gather information on shipments of ammunition and components of ammunition into, out of, and through Canada in order to help ensure they are not diverted for illegitimate uses. This is what the OAS convention is trying to do.

So we're not targeting anybody; we are proposing to put better controls on importation, exportation, and shipment. We're talking about large quantities, commercial quantities, not small quantities for personal use. In general, it's the industry that produces, ships, imports, and exports large quantities of these components.

As for whether it can be pulled out, I'm not sure I'm competent to answer that question.

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly): Thank you very much.

I want to wrap this up, if I may. If the committee needs more information on this, we'll certainly invite you back--which we've been known to do. But at this point, because we have other witnesses coming in and the room is here for only a certain amount of time and we're already over, let me take this opportunity to thank you very much for your presentation and your time. It was very informative.

We'll break for five minutes as we change for our next set of witnesses.

À (1026)

À (1032)

The Chair: I'll call the committee on Bill C-17 back to order. We'll move to the final portion of our work today. We have with us Mr. Hinter, the national president of the National Firearms Association, accompanied by Mr. Tomlinson, their legal chairman; and representing the Canadian Shooting Sports Association, Tony Bernardo,their executive director. Welcome to the committee.

Gentlemen, who might lead in the first presentation?

Mr. Hinter, would you please begin?

Mr. James Hinter (National President, National Firearms Association): Thank you. It's always nice to come to Ottawa, and now that I know the Alliance and the Liberals can agree, I have to go home and explain that to everybody in Alberta, and they aren't going to believe me.

I believe everyone who gets involved in the public policy process does so out of a desire to make our great country even greater, so thank you for your time and your participation today.

The National Firearms Association represents over 132,000 Canadians--I could amend this after yesterday and add 401, because so many new people from Quebec joined us yesterday--and that's growing every day as Canadians react to the firearm control system.

I hope our discussions today can lead to improvements in what I see as a very flawed proposal on the inexplosive components of ammunition. I realize that as parliamentarians you're hearing from the bureaucrats that this legislation is vital for the future of Canada and our safety, and that they are world-class experts in the field. Remember, those were the bureaucrats who came before you and told you that the Firearms Act was going to cost $2 million. Mr. Hession now says $1.5 billion. We appeared before the committee at that time and told you the problems.

One of my political heroes is C.D. Howe. Mr. Howe was slammed in the 1950s by Mr. Diefenbaker for asking “What's a million dollars?” He never said it, but it led to the defeat of a Liberal government when people thought you were being careless with tax dollars. Inflation is terrible, and the $1 million of the 1950s is the $1 billion of today.

When we look at legislation, what we do at the NFA is turn it on its ear to see what it's really going to be, what it could possibly say. It is written by the bureaucrats. It goes to the minister, to Parliament, to the committee. Now we have to change and work on it. Things that often seem like a good idea at the time aren't. When passed and handed back to the bureaucrats to administer, the cost can be grossly understated.

On the proposals today of the inexplosive components of ammunition, what the bureaucrats are really doing is asking you to criminalize brass and lead. Think about that--brass and lead.

The old brass ashtray made by a soldier in World War I out of a brass shell casing now requires bureaucratic involvement to be sold at a garage sale.

When a hunter misses a shot, the bureaucrat apparently.... If Madam Jennings and I went hunting and she missed, she'd have to go and get the bullet.

À (1035)

Mr. Steve Mahoney: She wouldn't miss.

Mr. James Hinter: What we have to ask ourselves is, would that reduce terrorism? Will this make Canada a safer place in which to live? No, it will not. It will give the people at Royal Canadian Air Farce and This Hour Has 22 Minutes some good fodder as time goes along. It will increase the growing unhappiness that many Canadians are having with government. That's not good for Canada.

This will, however, increase the budgets, the power, the staffs of bureaucracies, and create little kingdoms for bureaucrats. It will make law-abiding Canadians jump through hoops. Those proposals can make you, as parliamentarians, look silly, and not one of those goals is going to show up on your campaign literature, I think.

Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly: On a point of order, is this handout in both official languages?

The Chair: No, regrettably the--

Mr. James Hinter: When it is translated it will be available. My apologies.

Mr. John O'Reilly: This puts my friend from Quebec in the difficult position of not being able to participate.

Mr. James Hinter: I agree, and I apologize for that. This is something we are working on in our organization.

The Chair: By usual practice, your chairman would not have circulated those documents had they been given to the chair to circulate, but in fact they were circulated by the witnesses themselves.

We have taken the precaution in every instance, with every witness, individual, or group, to ask for the submissions to be made in both official languages. When they are not, whatever language they are in, they are sent to translation to be translated into the other official language that they might not have originally been sent in, and then circulated to the committee.

This is certainly not the practice of the workings of the House.

The point has been made. Let me turn to Mr. Bernardo now to make the next presentation.

Mr. Tony Bernardo (Executive Director, Canadian Shooting Sports Association): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My purpose in coming here today is primarily in an educational role. It has become apparent to me, after reading it, that the people who drafted this section did so with the belief that you would read it and pass it without knowing what you were talking about.

I would like to describe to you first off what an “inexplosive ammunition component” really is. When Inspector Watson was giving you this, he told you about brass and bullets. Well, certainly brass, which is the casing the cartridge is made of, is an inexplosive ammunition component. The bullet, which is not what Hollywood portrays as being a cartridge, is actually a projectile. It's made of lead; that's all--just lead.

There are some bullets that are made of lead that have a nickel or a cupro-nickel casing around them to make them a little harder, but there are also other inexplosive ammunition components; for example, a shotgun wad, which is a little piece of flimsy plastic, which looks as if it was cut out of a margarine container. It's a little plastic cup; it looks like a miniature shot glass.

Then there is shot, which is what a shotgun expels, hence “shotgun”. Shot are little tiny beads made out of lead that look like miniature fishing sinkers and right up to full-size fishing sinkers. The difference between shot and a fishing sinker is a name. Somebody could be importing 100 million fishing sinkers and it's exactly the same as importing 100 million pieces of shot. There's no difference. They're both made of lead, they're both round balls, and they're both very small. Shot goes down to the size of a pinhead. Clearly this is not much of a danger.

The other thing is patches. On muzzle-loading firearms, patches are used, and a patch would be an inexplosive ammunition component. A patch is an approximately one-inch square piece of cotton fabric, white.

These are the things you are talking about regulating. We're not talking about hand grenades and napalm bombs here. We're talking about little bits of margarine containers, little pieces of cotton fabric, and fishing sinkers.

Some questions were asked earlier that could not be answered. First of all, I'd like to clarify. You were saying that from 1997 to 2003 these things haven't been regulated. No, that's not true. From Confederation to now, these things have not been regulated, and they've never been an issue to anybody. About the only way you could hurt yourself with any of this stuff is if you put a lot of it in a box and dropped it on your foot.

The OAS treaty, as you pointed out, has not been ratified. The United States has adopted pieces of it; they have not adopted the inexplosive ammunition components portion of it. As a matter of fact, you can send inexplosive ammunition components through the mail, not just from U.S. address to U.S. address, but from U.S. address to Canada. I know; I do it all the time. These things are not regulated by the post office or anybody else, because they can't hurt you. They can't even cut you.

The OAS treaty has formed the basis for the Firearms Protocol of the Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, which is the document that was alluded to earlier from the United Nations. That document was resoundingly defeated in the 2001 UN small arms summit. Yet the Government of Canada still pursues it with a vengeance, spending unbelievable amounts of money.

As a matter of fact, today in Romania the Canadian government opened up a very large conference that they're paying the whole shot for to pursue this dead document. This OAS treaty is the basis for the Firearms Protocol and the Convention on Transnational Organized Crime.

If I'm getting a little convoluted and long-winded now, does it pertain to this? This is just a bureaucratic jungle.

This whole section on inexplosive ammunition components is the creation of a regulatory world. That's all it is.

À (1040)

However, as usual there are unintended consequences. For example, shot, that wonderful inexplosive ammunition component, is also used for ballast in aircraft. Every time Air Canada drops a jet down on Pearson, are they illegally importing inexplosive ammunition components into Canada?

Our police departments burn up vast quantities of ammunition in training--at least we sure hope they do--and when it's all done, they're left with these empty brass casings. Now, nobody is buying surplus brass any more, and because it's heavy metal, you can't throw it into a garbage dump. So what does the police department do? They sell it to firearms owners, who recycle it and reuse that brass. Are police departments now guilty of trafficking in inexplosive ammunition components?

If somebody makes their own fishing sinkers, are they manufacturing an inexplosive ammunition component? No, they're making a fishing sinker. But how about if they make their own lead shot, which is exactly the same? Are they then manufacturing an inexplosive ammunition component without a licence?

Suppose somebody is out hunting. They fire a shot and eject the empty cartridge onto the ground, where it gets lost in the leaves. Somebody else comes along a year later and picks it up. Did the one person commit a crime by dropping it or did the other person commit a crime by picking it up? You can see the bureaucratic jungle this is going to create. It just doesn't end.

We would like to see this entire portion of the legislation removed. It serves absolutely no purpose. To my knowledge there has never been one single recorded case ever in history of a terrorist organization reloading their own ammunition. Why would you do that when you can buy it by the shipload from North Korea? If the terrorists aren't going to reload their ammunition and they're not going to pile this stuff in big heavy boxes and throw it out windows at people, what is the point in regulating this stuff? Certainly, nobody is being hurt by it, and there is no potential for anybody to be hurt by it. The potential does not exist.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much to our witnesses.

We'll begin with rounds of five minutes, and I'll begin with Mr. Breitkreuz.

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: Thank you very much.

I think you've made abundantly clear the absurdity of trying to regulate this. I was hoping that maybe you would supply us with samples rather than just simply give us a description of what we're trying to regulate in this.

I have a couple of questions. Bill C-10A is before the House right now, and it's probably going to catch some unsuspecting air gun owners in its net. Would air gun owners be somehow affected by the regulations we are dealing with here today? I'm not talking about the air in the air guns but about the pellets and so on.

My main question is about something else that came out of the last group of witnesses we had before this committee, the concern I raised at the very end, and I'd like to pursue it at this point. With regard to the powers of an inspector under this legislation, do you have any concerns about what they may be able to check? You have some experience, I think, with the Firearms Act inspectors. Would that translate into any concerns you would have about the powers of an inspector under this bill?

À (1045)

Mr. James Hinter: Thank you for the question.

I can start with your first request because I do have some samples here to show you. Mr. Bernardo talked about the plastic wad or the projectile, and I'm going to pass some around. I would like you to see if you can be hurt by that. Don't eat it.

I shoot black powder firearms, especially a flintlock rifle, which is a lot of fun. It uses little marbles or ball bearings made out of lead, and I would like to pass some of those around. These are samples of the shotgun hulls that are used. Flying with these was no issue because they're very simple plastic items.

Here's a question for you: how many people around the table own firearms?

I remember when I was a kid, if your dad owned guns, you probably got a whistle out of an old cartridge. I'm not really good at whistling these things--I guess I'm full of hot air, not cold air, I don't know--but this is a brass cartridge. This is from a .45 calibre Long Colt, which is the peacemaker of the old west. This is another one here; this is out of a .45 ACP, and this is what we're talking about here, ladies and gentlemen. When we're talking about the projectiles themselves, Mr. Bernardo is absolutely right, if I have a thousand of these--oh, careful!--which I buy in boxes, and I drop it on my toe, that's the only way I can be hurt by these, and I tend to be a little more careful with that.

When it comes to the inspection powers, under this act the inspection powers will be identical to those in the Firearms Act. My mom teases me about the Firearms Act and its inspection processes. I'm a single guy, but every morning I make my bed because if I were to be inspected and my house were messy, it would reflect against me.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Do you change your underwear?

Mr. James Hinter: Of course.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: My mom always said do it every day; you never know if you're going to be in an accident.

Mr. James Hinter: Every day.

That's the inspection process we're working with here, and it is a little frightening that we're expanding these inspection processes for inexplosive components. Under this act, conceivably, if I gave a child a whistle, I could be committing a criminal act and so could the child by having it. That's where we're headed here, and this is silly.

I hope seeing some of the stuff we are talking about helps.

Mr. David Tomlinson (Legal Chairman, National Firearms Association): I'd like to make a comment on where this is going. You're all experienced here in Ottawa and know that orders in council change the law. It has been our experience in the firearms area, and I suspect it will be the same in the explosives area, that when a bureaucrat proposes an order in council to a minister, it is always and without exception an order in council that will increase the budget, increase the bureaucrat's power, or increase the staff levels of the bureaucracy that works under that senior bureaucrat.

In the firearms field, in the period from 1998, when the last change in the law came through, until the end of 2001, there were 43 orders in council that changed the law. Now, that can be extremely dangerous, because unless you have a subscription to the Canada Gazette, you cannot and do not know what new laws and changes in the laws have been incorporated through those orders in council.

In the case of Regina v. Rusk, Mr. Rusk was charged in 1999 with an offence under regulation 4 in an order in council. Unfortunately, that order in council disappeared in 1998. The trial was not held until 2000, and even then the crown prosecutor, the defence lawyer, and the judge were unaware of the change in the regulation, and the entire case was fought on regulation 4 when regulation 5 had replaced it on December 1, 1998. That's ridiculous.

À (1050)

The Chair: Ms. Jennings, please.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: As I understand it, you recommend strongly that all references to inexplosive ammunition components be deleted from Bill C-17. That's the first thing.

The second is that any powers inspectors would have to implement the other amendments contained in Bill C-17 that would amend the Explosives Act be clearly spelled out in the legislation itself and not by regulation, and that the minister's authority also be clearly spelled out in the legislation, rather than leaving it up to the minister to define his or her authority through regulation or order in council.

Mr. Tony Bernardo: Yes.

Mr. David Tomlinson: Thank you for your absolute clarity. You have grasped our position exactly.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Are there any other recommendations that you make? For instance, if this committee decided in its wisdom to scrap any mention of inexplosive ammunition components in Bill C-17 and made or accepted amendments that required that the powers of the minister be clearly spelled out in the legislation rather than through regulations delegating the authority to do it through regulations, are there any other irritants you think are of sufficient substance that they would require further amendments to Bill C-17 in those sections that touch the Explosives Act?

Mr. Bernardo?

Mr. Tony Bernardo: Not on behalf of our association, no.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Mr. Hinter?

Mr. James Hinter: No.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: And you've made it clear that the United States may have or has implemented some elements of the OAS convention, but it has not done so under the OAS definition of explosives where it also includes inexplosive ammunition components. They have not included that in their definition of explosive components.

Mr. Tony Bernardo: That's correct.

Mr. David Tomlinson: There are several interesting sections in this act where appeals to the courts are blocked by the language of the act. That is done by saying this can be done where in the opinion of the minister this needs to be done.

When you put that wording in and someone appeals the action of the minister to the court, the court is unable to act because it cannot substitute its own opinion for the opinion specified in the act.

We've run into this problem several times in firearms control law. You have the same problem in this act, both in existing sections and in the proposed alterations.

The Chair: Make this a short one, Ms. Jennings, please.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: You say you've run into that with regard to the Firearms Act, and there are actual court cases that say the court cannot.... Can you provide the chairman with specific references for those cases?

À (1055)

Mr. David Tomlinson: They're in our statements here, to show you where it occurs in the act.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: No, I see it in your statement. On page 6 you give one reference in the third to last paragraph, R. v. Heywood 1994. In that particular paragraph you're talking about giving inspectors god-like powers and setting the limits to what the inspector can do. But in one of the previous paragraphs—where you say the existing EA section 12 is abusive “in that it allows the Minister to”...blah, blah, blah, and “in the opinion of”—you don't give a reference. You just say that “such an order cannot be successfully appealed to a court of law, because the court cannot substitute its own opinion for the opinion specified in the law.” That's where. Is that R. v. Heywood, or is it another case?

Mr. David Tomlinson: It's another case. That's the case where the AR-15 rifle was converted to restricted firearm status because in the opinion of the governor in council it was not suitable for hunting or sporting use in Canada.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: So you'll give us the exact reference. Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Laframboise.

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Personally, I agree. In any case, when we asked this question of the previous witnesses, they said to wait for the regulations. Thus, in light of the previous testimony, we were clearly told that individual needs would not be affected as long as there are no regulations. Therefore, personally, I see no urgency for legislation at this point. They told us that in any case, when they discuss the exemptions in the regulations, there would be consultations with community representatives. I hope you will be involved in these consultations when they take place. I too fail to see the urgency here.

However, my only problem is that since Canada has ratified the OAS Convention, which deals with non-explosive components, among other things, if the government is determined to include regulations... In any case, if we allow that we agree on a bill, that there are not regulations in place and that all of this will be included in a bill to be tabled later--and I would agree with you that much of the current bill should be withdrawn--if you're asked as a community representative, would you agree to take part in a discussion on non-explosive components, or do you not simply prefer to have Canada accede to the OAS convention on non-explosive components?

[English]

Mr. James Hinter: What we would like to do, and what I think would make more sense, is be invited into the consultation process before a bill is presented to committee. That allows the best and brightest minds from all sides to get involved, and not have plastic wads considered dangerous.

Yes, we think that is important. It has not happened. It has not happened, in a meaningful manner, with any of the changes that have been brought forward with the Firearms Act, which is where we live.

We had consultation with the previous chief administrator of the Firearms Act, who brought us into a meeting and proceeded to tell us that she was changing the licensing form and here it was. She had been at a meeting in another part of the country, given copies of the forms to people at that meeting, and then said she wanted to work with them to create a new form. That type of consultation is not consultation at all, and members of almost every firearm group in the country walked away from those meetings. Consultation, when you are telling me what you're going to do, without listening, is not consultation.

If there is anything we can do to help, we're there.

Á (1100)

Mr. David Tomlinson: The big problem is that the bureaucrats insist on being a filter between the people who live and work in the affected area and the minister. If the people who live and work in that area try to convince the bureaucrat that what he is doing is foolish, hyperexpensive, or any one of a myriad of objections, that information never makes it to the minister, because it is not in the best interests of the bureaucracy that the minister should know that.

That is an absolute boil on the butt of the firearms community. The bureaucrats do not want input. As a result, they put things in the law that are absolutely appalling

In this legislation, for example, it would be quite legitimate for an inspector who sees my granddaughter out in the street playing with an old empty rifle cartridge case that I have given her as a toy to then inspect the inside of my home. He would be authorized to seize all of the gun powder that I use for reloading, if in his personal opinion that is desirable action.

That is abusive, and it is something that may not happen. According to the bureaucrats you listened to earlier, they have no intention of doing anything like that. Well, they had no intention of doing anything with the order in council powers that were given to them by the Firearms Act and the firearms section of the Criminal Code. From 1998 to the end of 2001 they issued 43 orders in council. That's a lot. And we don't know what's in a number of those orders in council because we just can't get access to them.

The Chair: Merci, monsieur Laframboise.

Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: I'd like to deal specifically with this bill and this issue, as opposed to Bill C-68 or the regulations under the registry, or any of that stuff, which are all alluded to in your presentation. There will be regulations drafted to limit specified quantities of these items for personal use.

I asked questions of the hated bureaucrats who were here a moment ago. I asked a question in relationship to the amount that would be limited. We're not interested in penalizing target shooters, penalizing our Olympic athletes in training, that kind of thing, and we would like to ensure that in fact those exemptions do come through.

Can you tell this committee what limited specific quantities would satisfy your concerns on behalf of those groups of people?

Mr. Tony Bernardo: A competitive target shooter would go through several thousand rounds per week. So they would need to have in store no less than two months' supply of components, because sometimes there are backlogs in getting the stuff through. Given that they would go through several thousand anywhere up to 10,000 or 12,000 rounds of ammunition per week, multiply that out over two months and that should give you your answer.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: That doesn't seem like a limited quantity.

Á (1105)

Mr. Tony Bernardo: You asked.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: But it doesn't seem very limited in that regard.

Frankly, the only answer I heard that made some sense before was that the concern here has to do with the shipping of ammunition into and out of Canada, and I suppose internally in Canada, and if there are in fact large quantities of material that could become ammunition. We're talking of the non-explosives, that if they fall into the wrong hands, or they're being shipped to someone for use other than personal use, there is some concern.

That was the only convincing answer given, and I think it was Mr. Breitkreuz who asked who is being targeted here. The reply was, “We're not targeting any individual; rather what we're targeting is the shipment of these materials in and out of Canada and across the country”.

That seems legitimate, that there be some controls on that, even the non-explosive, because it obviously can become explosive when it's put together with the proper components. But at the same time, there should be some reasonable limits established so that we don't penalize the people I've referred to.

As far as input is concerned, this is a legitimate input process. We're listening to your issues. I think Madame Jennings outlined very clearly your position, and the committee is listening. So we'll try to find some reasonable position that deals, as I said, specifically with this bill. But what I've heard you say is that you're talking about 100,000 rounds of ammunition for personal use, plus or minus. That does seem a lot.

Mr. Tony Bernardo: It isn't.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: That's fair. You've given us a number, they didn't, so that's helpful, and we'll take that to them.

Thanks, Mr. Chair.

Mr. James Hinter: I'd like to address that.

I'm a fairly casual shooter, and on an average week I shoot on Monday nights, Wednesday nights, and Friday nights. I go to the West Edmonton Mall. I get a walk through the mall for some exercise in Edmonton's winter, and I shoot about 300 to 400 rounds of ammunition a night. I find it very relaxing. I reload my own ammunition.

Occasionally, I get a deal on the non-explosive components, and like any consumer, if all of a sudden I can get a deal on lead bullets--these little guys here--I buy a lot. When I get a deal on brass, I will buy a lot; I will stock up. It's the same thing with primers.

What you have to realize here is that the explosive components are already regulated. When we're talking about ammunition, I cannot buy ammunition without having a valid firearm licence for completed ammunition. For the components, the explosive, the powder, they're already regulated. So asking for a regulation on lead and brass becomes excessive regulation.

Mr. David Tomlinson: It is not possible to make a cartridge without using gunpowder, and the gunpowder is regulated. Therefore, regulating the brass and the lead is of advantage to absolutely no one except the bureaucrat who gets a job to regulate brass and to regulate lead.

The Chair: Let me just take a short supplementary from Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: We're talking about importing and exporting here, not domestic purchases. Do you object to a requirement that importers amend their existing permits to include inexplosive components?

Mr. David Tomlinson: Yes, we do, because as far as this act is concerned, it is opening the door to regulation of something that doesn't need to be regulated. If you want to regulate transshipment through Canada, exportation from Canada, or importation from some other country into Canada, the question is, who is the target of that legislation? And don't tell me it's terrorists, because I've never heard of a case of a terrorist group that reloaded ammunition. If you're trying to control the lead and the brass, you are specifically targeting those Canadians who reload for the purposes of hunting and target shooting, because nobody else is using it.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Stinson, please.

Mr. Darrel Stinson (Okanagan—Shuswap, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'd also like to thank you for being here today, gentlemen.

I also have to start wondering exactly whereabouts we're going in this country when we start encompassing every component you can think of and trying to regulate it. We've heard a number of times before in other committees, and particularly in this committee, about this consulting that is done by the bureaucracy or the government in regard to these issues.

Now, you are representatives of probably the largest firearms organization in Canada, one with 132,000 members. I would like to know, how many times have you been consulted not only in regard to Bill C-17 but also in regard to the Firearms Act? How much consultation was done with your organization or with organizations you know of?

The Chair: Just a moment now. Bill C-17 is in itself a very complex bill, and a legislative committee is somewhat different from the usual House committee in that we're given different parameters. Notwithstanding that, I think the question is a little too general. I wouldn't want the witnesses to take up whatever little time we have left to go into other matters besides Bill C-17, if I could put it that way.

Á (1110)

Mr. Darrel Stinson: Mr. Chairman, I respect that. It's just that these gentlemen haven't been consulted in regard to Bill C-17, yet in regard to every other time we're told they're consulted. That's what I want to know.

The Chair: Is this the first time, Mr. Hinter?

Mr. James Hinter: This is the first time, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate the opportunity to do so.

The Chair: Mr. Tomlinson.

Mr. David Tomlinson: Generally, we are never consulted on anything until a bill is entered into the House for first reading. Up until that time, what they're planning to do is a deep, dark secret. After it has been entered into the House, we may be allowed to speak at the committee hearings. There is no guarantee that anything that comes out of the committee will actually wind up in the bill.

The Chair: Mr. Bernardo.

Mr. Tony Bernardo: I would echo those comments.

The Chair: Mr. Stinson, you may have a supplementary.

Mr. Darrel Stinson: Were you consulted on the 43 orders in council?

Mr. James Hinter: No.

Mr. Darrel Stinson: So there was no consultation at all. To me it would seem that we're doing things a little bit backwards here in this country. We're trying to put forward pieces of legislation without consulting the stakeholders themselves to see what the impact is going to be or if there is a better way of doing this.

Mr. Tony Bernardo: That's why Bill C-68 doesn't work, sir.

Mr. Darrel Stinson: Thank you very much.

Mr. James Hinter: There is a consultative body the minister set up originally, the Minister's Advisory User Group on Firearms, which the current minister hasn't met with, period, since he became Minister of Justice.

Mr. David Tomlinson: And that's routine. The user group on firearms appears to meet only with the bureaucrats; therefore, the bureaucrats have absolute control on what information from that group actually reaches the minister. If the bureaucrats don't want it to reach the minister, it appears that it doesn't reach the minister.

The Chair: Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Myron Thompson (Wild Rose, Canadian Alliance): I don't have a lot to add to that, but I think this is something we have tried to correct with our officials for quite some time. We consider that when a bill such as Bill C-17 comes forward, there should be an ample amount of input from various interested groups into what's going to take place in this regard.

Just to make it perfectly clear, could you confirm that you were not consulted prior to the introduction of this legislation?

Mr. David Tomlinson: Honestly, I was the president of the National Firearms Association from 1984 until 2000. During all of that time the standard position of the bureaucrats who were preparing legislation was that they could never show us anything because it was a secret until it was tabled in Parliament. That's just the way it is.

Mr. Myron Thompson: And to your knowledge there have been no consultations with any other organizations?

Mr. David Tomlinson: They have only talked to people from the User Group on Firearms, and they are forbidden to talk to any firearms organization. They are forbidden to talk to the news media. They are forbidden to give any publicity on anything they have to say in any meeting they ever have. In our view, that is not a meaningful group.

Mr. Myron Thompson: Thank you.

The Chair: Are there any other questions, Mr. Stinson, Mr. Laframboise, Madam Jennings, or Mr. O'Reilly? No.

I hope I'm not taking too great a liberty as a chairperson to say that I hope this part of the consultative process on Bill C-17 has been certainly beneficial to the members of Parliament. We thank you for taking the time and the effort to be with us today to assist the committee in its study of Bill C-17.

The meeting is adjourned.