AANR Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, Northern Development and Natural Resources

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, November 21, 2002

Á

1105

The Chair (Mr. Raymond Bonin (Nickel Belt, Lib.))

Mr. Serge Cardin (Sherbrooke, BQ)

The Chair

Mr. Serge Cardin

Á

1110

The Chair

Mr. Serge Cardin

The Chair

M. Serge Cardin

The Chair

Mr. Serge Cardin

The Chair

Mr. Serge Cardin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin (Windsor—St. Clair, NDP)

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

Á

1115

The Chair

Mr. Benoît Serré (Timiskaming—Cochrane, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Serge Cardin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

Á

1120

Mr. John Godfrey (Don Valley West, Lib.)

Mr. Joe Comartin

Mr. John Godfrey

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Á

1125

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

Mr. Benoît Serré

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Mr. Gerald Keddy (South Shore, PC)

The Chair

Mr. Gerald Keddy

Á

1130

The Chair

Mr. Gerald Keddy

The Chair

Mr. Benoît Serré

Mr. Gerald Keddy

Mr. Benoît Serré

The Chair

Mr. Gerald Keddy

The Chair

Á

1135

Mr. John Godfrey

The Chair

Mr. Shawn-Patrick Stensil (National Coordinator, Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout)

Ms. Elizabeth May (Executive Director, Sierra Club of Canada)

Mr. Shawn-Patrick Stensil

Á

1140

Á

1145

Ms. Elizabeth May

Á

1150

Á

1155

Mr. Norman Rubin (Director, Nuclear Research, Energy Probe)

Â

1200

Â

1205

The Chair

Mr. David Chatters (Athabasca, Canadian Alliance)

Â

1210

The Chair

Ms. Elizabeth May

The Chair

Mr. Norman Rubin

Â

1215

Mr. David Chatters

Mr. Norman Rubin

The Chair

Mr. Serge Cardin

The Chair

Ms. Elizabeth May

Â

1220

Mr. Norman Rubin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

Mr. Norman Rubin

Â

1225

Mr. Joe Comartin

Mr. Norman Rubin

Mr. Joe Comartin

Ms. Elizabeth May

Mr. Norman Rubin

The Chair

Mr. Gerald Keddy

Â

1230

Ms. Elizabeth May

Mr. Gerald Keddy

The Chair

Mr. John Godfrey

Â

1235

Ms. Elizabeth May

The Chair

Ms. Elizabeth May

Mr. John Godfrey

Mr. Norman Rubin

Mr. John Godfrey

Mr. Norman Rubin

Ms. Elizabeth May

The Chair

Ms. Elizabeth May

The Chair

Ms. Elizabeth May

The Chair

Ms. Elizabeth May

Â

1240

The Chair

Ms. Elizabeth May

The Chair

Mr. Serge Cardin

Mr. Norman Rubin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

Â

1245

Mr. Norman Rubin

Mr. Joe Comartin

Mr. Norman Rubin

Mr. Joe Comartin

Mr. Norman Rubin

The Chair

Mr. John Finlay (Oxford, Lib.)

Â

1250

Mr. Norman Rubin

The Chair

Mr. Gerald Keddy

Mr. Norman Rubin

Mr. Gerald Keddy

Mr. Norman Rubin

Mr. Gerald Keddy

Mr. Norman Rubin

Mr. Gerald Keddy

Â

1255

The Chair

Mr. John Godfrey

Mr. Norman Rubin

The Chair

Mr. Serge Cardin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

·

1300

Mr. Norman Rubin

The Chair

Mr. Shawn-Patrick Stensil

Mr. Norman Rubin

·

1305

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

·

1310

·

1315

·

1320

·

1325

The Chair

Mr. Joe Comartin

·

1330

The Chair

---

CANADA

Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, Northern Development and Natural Resources

---

NUMBER 004

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Thursday, November 21, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Á  (1105)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Raymond Bonin (Nickel Belt, Lib.)): We have a quorum. We'll call the meeting to order.

    The first part of the meeting has been scheduled as in camera. I can see the first motion being in camera, because it's future business. The second motion I have difficulty seeing as in camera, because it's a notice of motion. It should be publicly debated and voted on. Can I have consensus that we remain a public meeting, rather than going in camera?

    So we are not in camera. We are a public meeting.

[Translation]

    The first motion is moved by Mr. Cardin.

    Mr. Serge Cardin (Sherbrooke, BQ): Mr. Chairman, you asked committee members if there was unanimous consent to continue in public. Obviously, you need our unanimous consent.

    The Chair: Members gave their unanimous consent.

    Mr. Serge Cardin: To continue the proceedings in public?

Á  (1110)  

    The Chair: Yes.

    Mr. Serge Cardin: Then I misunderstood. I thought we were continuing in camera, not in public.

    The Chair: Do you have a problem with our continuing in public?

    Mr. Serge Cardin: No, I'm fine with that.

    The Chair: The first motion, which I have a small problem with, is from Mr. Cardin.

[English]

He is suggesting that we revisit a decision we have made already. The committee decided how it would proceed, how many meetings, who would be invited, and this is suggesting that we change that and extend the consultation the committee would be making.

    Before we debate the motion, I can only accept it if Mr. Cardin seeks approval of the committee to reopen that decision. So we are not debating the motion of Mr. Cardin, we are debating, for a very short time, if we will reopen the discussion the committee had establishing the procedures for dealing with this bill.

    Monsieur Cardin.

[Translation]

    M. Serge Cardin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    First of all, let me just say that I'm not trying to be difficult. I want to focus on ground that we have already covered because there have been some new developments since the committee decided to limit its work on Bill C-4. First of all, we heard testimony in committee on Tuesday from a number of witnesses. We heard from representatives of the Department of Natural Resources, from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and from the Canadian Nuclear Association.

    However, two important witnesses with a direct interest in Bill C-4 and the proposed changes were absent from the proceedings. In my opinion, the witnesses confirmed that to all intents and purposes, the proposed amendments were aimed at giving the private sector greater opportunities to invest in the development, management and ownership of nuclear power plants. Although Natural Resources Canada did not state it in so many words, in terms of reasons for promoting the development of Canada's energy industry, one option was to promote the financing of nuclear power plants by financial institutions.

    Based on the various comments made, I have decided to table the following motion. Even the Canadian Nuclear Association, which has not received any requests of this nature in over five years...The bill does not necessarily draw a distinction between the many different activities in the nuclear industry. Indeed, activities not connected with nuclear power plants have never posed any kind of problem. Now we have a private firm which will be involved in the operation of nuclear power plants, and this majority shareholder firm has some financial problems. It is seeking financing from financial institutions. The existing provision stipulated that...

    The Chair: Mr. Cardin, you are debating your motion. The issue we need to consider is whether the committee should revisit its decision.

    Mr. Serge Cardin: That's precisely the point.

    The Chair: Then, that is what we need to focus on at this point in time.

    Mr. Serge Cardin: I agree. The issue needs to be revisited because of these new developments. After hearing from the witnesses at their last meeting, committee members now know that the proposed changes allow for all kinds of nuclear related activities, including those of nuclear power plants. Therefore, there may still be some additional information to be gleaned from Bruce Power, for instance, or from the Canadian Bankers Association. We still need to find out if the various provincial governments intend to go forward with nuclear energy development.

    This morning, Atomic Energy of Canada tabled its plan for the future development of nuclear power plants. That plan was still under wraps two days ago. It would seem that plans call for a proliferation of nuclear stations. In light of this development, shouldn't the committee gather more information in order to gauge if the privatization of the nuclear industry and the proliferation of power stations is the right way to go or not? I feel we lack sufficient information to make this determination and to proceed any further with this bill.

    The Chair: Thank you. Are there any further comments? Mr. Comartin.

[English]

    Mr. Joe Comartin (Windsor—St. Clair, NDP): I want to support Monsieur Cardin in his motion for these witnesses to be brought forward. It's quite obvious to me that the information we received from the witnesses on Tuesday did not help us address some of the most pertinent issues that are before the committee with regard to this particular amendment, in particular when we looked at what was reported in the Globe and Mail this week-end--copies of that article, I believe, have been circulated now to the committee. The best evidence we could get, which was still quite vague from the Nuclear Association, was that nobody required this amendment that he could point to except Bruce Power, and yet we're going ahead at this point without hearing Bruce Power. There's no explanation, just a phone call simply saying they're not showing up. I think, Mr. Chair, I made quite clear the importance of having Bruce Power here when we made the list up.

    The Chair: I am still at the point of asking the committee to make a decision as to whether we will reconsider an issue that has been dealt with in this committee.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: That's the point that I'm trying to make, Mr. Chair, that--

    The Chair: We're not making it. We're talking about the motions.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: You're asking me to explain why we should revisit this issue. When we visited it the first time, I thought it was quite clear that Bruce Power was going to be here. I don't think I'm misrepresenting the factual situation the committee faced at the point when they made their decision and voted on it. In fact, that hasn't happened, so I think it's very appropriate that we revisit the matter. Then there are Monsieur Cardin's other points about the government. Does this signify a shift in government policy? We have no evidence on that, although we're getting some indication of it from some of the witnesses. Key witnesses to address this amendment in keeping with what we were trying to do two weeks ago when we set the schedule have not come. I think that is a very strong justification to revisit it, and in fact, to have those witnesses before us.

Á  (1115)  

[Translation]

    The Chair: Mr. Serré.

    Mr. Benoît Serré (Timiskaming—Cochrane, Lib.): That's precisely the point I wanted to raise. I think we're revisiting a subject that the committee has already discussed. We agreed on the witnesses and gave them an opportunity to make presentations. The decision to testify or not is theirs to make. I think we should proceed with the vote, and then move on to the next item on the agenda.

[English]

    The Chair: Are we ready for the question? Do we reconsider the planning decisions made by the committee or not?

[Translation]

    Mr. Serge Cardin: Could we have a recorded vote, Mr. Chairman?

    The Chair: By all means.

[English]

     (Motion negatived: yeas 3; nays 9)

    The Chair: Now we move on to the notice of motion of Mr. Comartin, which was provided to the chair in good time, so is accepted by the chair and on the floor.

    Mr. Comartin.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: Mr. Chair, I would like to put this down until we hear today's witnesses, because some of the testimony we hear from them may be relevant to the arguments.

    The Chair: We're following the agenda as is. I could very well have put it after we do the clause-by-clause, and it would have been a dirty trick. I wanted to deal with it before, because to put it after we do the clause-by-clause would have served no purpose. We're in meeting now, and unless you get unanimous consent to change the agenda, we'll proceed with it.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: The fairer way, Mr. Chair, would be to put it in-between, as I'm requesting, so I will ask that we have unanimous consent.

    The Chair: Do we have unanimous consent to delay dealing with the notice of motion of Mr. Comartin until after we hear the witnesses and before we do the clause-by-clause?

    We don't have unanimous consent.

    Mr. Comartin, your motion.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: Mr. Chair, what we have before us is, as we all know, a very short amendment. That amendment clearly, from the evidence we got on Tuesday, is only applicable to one player in this country at this time, and that's Bruce Power, which is managing the site up on Bruce Peninsula. We know from prior information that Bruce Power, by the end of this month, has to meet a requirement of posting a bond, which was requested both by the Ontario government in the agreement they have--so it's a contractual responsibility--and by the safety agency. That requirement runs out as of the end of November. We know from other information that the British company that is behind Bruce Power is in serious financial difficulty and had to be bailed out by the British government, but on a temporary basis. They're facing bankruptcy in the U.K. They are the ones who guaranteed that bond, and it is highly doubtful that they will be able to continue to guarantee that bond after the end of this month, just a little more than a week away.

    So we're faced, Mr. Chair, with the situation where, to go by the obvious position taken by the government and the official opposition and the Progressive Conservatives, we're about to pass an amendment that is going to allow for the privatization of nuclear energy, at least on that site, to go ahead to a much more significant degree than it would otherwise, with a company that may be bankrupt before this legislation can get through the House and the Senate. That's what we're faced with. Those are all facts, and yet we're insisting on going ahead without hearing from the company or getting any explanation from them as to whether they're capable of continuing the process that they've undertaken. We haven't heard--and this is back, I suppose, to Mr. Cardin's point--from the Ontario Government what they're going to do at that point.

    With regard to Bruce Power, the other reality is that we may be dealing then with a different owner of that management company. Is the owner going to be able to perform it? Who is the owner going to be? Again, there was speculation in the Globe and Mail article that they were Canadian companies, none of whom would comment on the issue. So we're faced with writing a blank cheque, if we pass this amendment, that's going to allow either an about-to-be-bankrupt company to move ahead or somebody we don't know. Is it the companies that have been mentioned in the newspaper article? Will it be somebody else? Will it be some other foreign company? Will it be an American company? Will it be a Russian company? We don't know any of that, and we won't know any of that unless we hear from groups.

    It is highly irresponsible, I would suggest, to allow this procedure to go ahead. I think we're not doing our jobs, not really understanding what we're confronting here.

Á  (1120)  

    Mr. John Godfrey (Don Valley West, Lib.): On a point of order, Mr. Chair, I need clarification. Bill C-4 is the Nuclear Liability Act. Surely, that's not what we're talking about. We're talking about the Nuclear Safety and Control Act. I just want to make sure on that.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: I'm talking about the Nuclear Safety and Control Act.

    Mr. John Godfrey: Unfortunately, the amendment actually states it's the Nuclear Liability act.

    The Chair: The reason I accepted the motion is that the issue we're in essence debating is whether we will summons them or not. I guess I don't have to explain it, but I have to deal with the issue of asking that we summons them. That's the issue.

    Your point is correct.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: Needless to say, I will ask to amend it.

    The issue I believe is crucial here is that we have a potential operator that is about to reactivate reactors that is not in a financial position to do that, not now, and not likely to be by the end of the month. And then it raises the question of safety. If you have a company that is in such bad financial shape, what expectations do we have, in the short-term even, of their ability to continue to meet the safety requirements? We heard from Mr. Taylor on Tuesday that they have their inspectors there, their supervisors there, but the reality is that any number of things can go wrong in the short term when you don't have adequate resources in the management company, the operator. That's what we're confronted with here, potentially.

    I don't think I had a time limit on this one, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: Well, I'm going to give you one.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: You can't.

    The Chair: I can. We have half an hour for a meeting, and I'm going to chair this committee.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: You may do that, Mr. Chair--

    The Chair: I will ask you to conclude.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: I have a right to continue speaking.

    The Chair: No, I will decide on the amount of time you have. We have half an hour for a meeting, and you want to consume it all yourself. I have three other members who wish to speak, and you will be the last one to speak again. So you get two turns, and I want you to be reasonable.

Á  (1125)  

    Mr. Joe Comartin: With this type of motion, I have a right to continue speaking as long as I wish.

    The Chair: I can suspend the meeting, we can move on to witnesses, and do clause-by-clause right after.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: As long as I have the floor, Mr. Chair, you can't do that.

    The Chair: I can do that.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: No, you're not able to do that. You don't have the authority.

    The Chair: I will chair the meeting, not you.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: You may very well chair it, but you have to do it within the confines of the existing policies and practices of both the House and committee procedures.

    The Chair: I can suspend proceedings any time I want.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: You do not have authority to cut me off.

    The Chair: If you continue, I will suspend proceedings.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: I have the floor and I'm entitled to keep it as long as I want.

    The Chair: If you continue to disrupt the meeting and extend it past 11:30, I will suspend the meeting. You may as well get your point on the table.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: You may suspend the meeting, but when the meeting reconvenes, I still have the floor and I can still continue.

    The Chair: The meeting will reconvene when I call it. At 11:30 we're hearing witnesses, and at 1o'clock we're doing clause-by-clause. I think I'm doing you a favour by telling you this will happen.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: You're not doing me a favour at all if you're going to make that type of ruling.

    The Chair: I've made it.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: Well, I'm going to continue speaking.

    To go back to the safety issue, it's very clear that we have a company here in serious financial difficulty, and we're about to allow that to continue without understanding the consequences, without understanding clearly, in fact, what their situation is at this point. What is their ability to reopen those reactors, their ability to pay the shot, to continue their present operations in a safe way? We have no information on that from them. We've got a fair amount of speculation. We know they are in financial difficulty; that information's been in the public domain for over two months. As long as that's the situation, it would be grossly irresponsible on the part of this committee to proceed without having a clear picture.

    If this was a situation where other people, other corporations, other endeavours were an issue, we might be able to justify rushing this matter through, but there isn't any here. This is the only one that requires this assistance. As long as we are sitting here doing our job, we have to find out what the current situation is. We don't know that.

    Mr. Benoît Serré: Mr. Chairman, I think we're debating the finances of one particular company. I think the motion asks specifically if we should subpoena such a company. I would move that we take a vote to see if the committee is willing to proceed to a vote right now on the motion.

    The Chair: I will put that to a vote.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: I want to be clear on the record that this is improper as long as I have the floor. A point of order is in order on specific points, but when it takes the floor away from me, it is not proper. You do not have the authority, Mr. Chair, to do that.

    The Chair: That's why I will put it to a vote of the floor. I am asking you to vote on whether you want me to call the question at this time or not.

    (Motion agreed to: yeas 7; nays 1)

    The Chair: I'm calling the question on Mr. Comartin's motion.

    (Motion negatived)

    The Chair: We will now deal with Mr. Keddy's request. Mr. Keddy, we don't have very much time, but we'd like to know--

    Mr. Joe Comartin: On a point of order, Mr. Chair. I want to be again on the record that I will be challenging this decision of the committee to the Speaker.

    The Chair: That's fine. It's on record.

    Mr. Keddy, you have a request that we invite the Minister of Natural Resources. When do you wish us to do that?

    Mr. Gerald Keddy (South Shore, PC): As soon as it is possible for him to appear before the committee. I hope it is possible before we break for the holiday.

    The Chair: Could we ask you to briefly explain to the members the reasoning for calling the minister at this time?

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: Absolutely. There is the whole debate surrounding the Kyoto accord. We should be hearing from the minister at this committee the government's position and his position on that subject. It is not something we've dealt with up to this point. It gives us an opportunity, as individual committee members, to hear what the minister is saying and to ask questions, and I think it's of the utmost importance that each of us have that opportunity before the break, because this is going to be dealt with, supposedly, in the House and also in our own communities and the provinces and the areas we represent. So I think it's important that at least we have the opportunity to hear the minister in his own words and to ask questions.

Á  (1130)  

    The Chair: But in your letter, you ask that the minister appear to defend his estimates.

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: Estimates as well, but there's a whole group of issues we need to discuss.

    The Chair: Okay.

    Monsieur Serré.

    Mr. Benoît Serré: I just wanted a clarification from Mr. Keddy. He's appeared before the committee after the estimates. Are you talking about supplementary estimates?

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: Yes, and other issues that are out there. We need the minister to appear before the committee as often as possible, not to the point that we disrupt his schedule or things like that, but it's certainly important for him to be here.

    Mr. Benoît Serré: Mr. Chairman, I would agree with the request.

    The Chair: If it's your wish, we'll call a special meeting for that, because we have yet another bill coming, I'm told.

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: If it were to be a special meeting, that's fine, and if he can't appear before the break, I would like some explanation of that, but I think it would be incumbent upon him to appear before the break.

    The Chair: Okay. Are we ready for the question?

    (Motion agreed to)

    The Chair: The minister will be invited to appear before committee before the winter break.

    Before we go to the public hearing we have future business. We have a potential witness list on Bill C-2, and we're asking you to authorize us to proceed with that. We're distributing the potential list of witnesses. If you find we don't have sufficient time to deal with this now, we can do it later. If I could have your directive to proceed with this list, it does not prevent you from asking that additions be made at a later time.

Á  (1135)  

    Mr. John Godfrey: I so move.

    The Chair: Is there any discussion on that? Do you allow me to proceed with this list, of course with the intent that if you need to add witnesses, a majority vote will do it?

    (Motion agreed to)

    Therefore, we will proceed with this, and if you have other names to be added, please advise us.

    I would like to invite to the table, from the Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout, Mr. Shawn-Patrick Stensil, national coordinator; from Energy Probe, Mr. Norman Rubin, director, nuclear research; and from the Sierra Club of Canada, Ms. Elizabeth May,executive director. We have until 1o'clock. I will ask you to make presentations of 10 minutes or less, if you can. If there are things you are not able to get into your presentation, you can always sneak them into the answers to the questions. With questions, we give a specific time, which is for question and answer.

    Mr. Stensil.

    Mr. Shawn-Patrick Stensil (National Coordinator, Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout): Hello, everyone, and thank you. This is my first testimony in front of the natural resources committee, so be nice, please.

    Ms. Elizabeth May (Executive Director, Sierra Club of Canada): I think it may be your first time testifying in front of any committee, Shawn.

    Mr. Shawn-Patrick Stensil: Yes, any committee.

    I'm flanked by two people who I think have been working on nuclear energy issues for as long as I've been alive. That just means I'm in very good company here. I hope at least my inexperience is charming and that you find the presentation useful.

    Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout was founded in 1989. We are a pan-Canadian coalition of organizations working to phase out nuclear energy in Canada. Throughout our 13 years we have initiated a number of things, such as nuclear budget work, where we have exposed the ongoing subsidies to the nuclear industry. We've also worked on MOX shipments into Canada, as well as developing the first atomic map of Canada, which was never mapped before, including all the nuclear sites in Canada.

    The Campaign is aimed at phasing out nuclear energy in Canada, and across the world people are moving out of nuclear energy. Atomic Energy of Canada, which this committee should know very well, is celebrating its 50th anniversary this year. This is a very good opportunity to discuss and debate the future of nuclear energy. We would contend that after 50 years the promise of nuclear energy is no longer a promise, but is a chain of broken promises. For the future, with Kyoto and to develop a sustainable energy plan for Canada, we should be looking to phase out nuclear energy.

Á  (1140)  

[Translation]

    Along with our Quebec partners, we are currently actively working to promote the closure of Gentilly-2 scheduled for 2008. The Point Lepreau plant is slated for closure in 2006. All signs point to Canada's withdrawal from the nuclear sector. However, some choices need to be made.

    It's possible that in ten years' time, Ontario may be the only province in Canada still using nuclear energy. In our estimation, the proposed changes call into question Canada's nuclear energy support program.

[English]

    Our name in French is Sortir du nucléaire. Across the world there are a number of other organizations working for nuclear phase-out. In France there's an organization called Sortir du nucléaire, and in Switzerland even the Sortir du nucléaire is holding a referendum on the future of nuclear energy in the coming year.

    It is for these reasons that today we would like to state our position against Bill C-4. Our argument is that the nuclear industry is already, through a web of subsidies and legislative crutches, held up and not ongoingly sustainable. Despite industry proclamations to the contrary, nuclear energy is not a solution to climate change. It was not put into the Kyoto protocol. Because of its high costs and serious environmental problems, countries around the world have accepted that it is not such a measure. So those arguments should be overlooked, we believe. Indeed, Canada's federal draft plan for Kyoto has no mention of nuclear energy.

    It is also important to highlight that in 2002 subsidies for Atomic Energy of Canada Limited reached $210.5 million. This is the highest amount since 1987. If the government believes we are pushing back and this industry is competitive, it's obvious that it's continuing to be propped up, and this committee should look at that. Indeed, funding for renewable energy in 2000 was seventeen times less than that for nuclear. So I think we have a problem of priorities, and we believe Bill C-4 demonstrates these misplaced priorities.

    With Bill C-4, our question basically is, who wins? Being a coalition, Sortir du nucléaire is made up of organizations from a number of different ideological backgrounds. Mr. Norman Rubin of Energy Probe would be for privatization and from the ideological right side of the perspective. Elizabeth May, who is the executive director of the Sierra Club, could well be seen as a left-winger. What is interesting is that from both perspectives, these individuals who have worked on nuclear energy for 25 or 27 years--whatever my lifespan may have been--are against Bill C-4. Why is the government moving forward with this as a priority, when there should be a greater discussion? This bill absolves people further from responsibility for nuclear contamination. For this reason, we believe it should be abandoned.

    Why? Clean-up of nuclear toxic sites in Canada has been an ongoing problem and is shown to be extremely difficult, so we should be very conscious of this. Indeed, the report for the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development pointed out that Canada is failing to deal with its toxic legacy of abandoned uranium mines in Saskatchewan and toxic waste sites on federal sites, as well as Sydney tar ponds, as I'm sure you're all aware.

    The nuclear industry is claiming that this clause is an anomaly, but we believe that when you look at the web of subsidies and legislation, such as the Nuclear Liability Act, we should be looking at the larger picture before pushing ahead with this. Indeed, Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout has stood in front of this committee before and testified on revisions or amendments to the Nuclear Liability Act. This has dragged on for a long time. The only ones winning out of this clause would be the nuclear industry or the banks. The nuclear industry is protected, the banks are protected, the operators are protected, but where is the insistence on protecting the public?

Á  (1145)  

    This is an initiative of Bruce Power. We're assuming it is because of Bruce Power that this bill has been put forward. On September 12 Bruce Power was called in front of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. Its parent company, British Energy, one of the few privately traded nuclear companies in the world--showing you how competitive this industry is--has gone into insolvency and was bailed out until November 29. The CNSC is questioning Bruce Power's ability to deal with its licence obligations, and indeed, Bruce Power is filing weekly reports. When questioned on what they are looking to do to prop themselves up, Mr. Hawthorne stated that the possibilities for ensuring against insolvency include “insurance for a shutdown event, achieving our own credit rating, which is very, very likely given our operational track record to date, subject to some legislative change we are hoping will be passed”.

    So we would urge the committee to put the interests of the public before pushing forward with the initiative of Bruce Power and discuss this with greater debate. It has been our recommendation that this be abandoned. My cohorts to the left and to the right will further detail the reasons in legalese as to why this bill should be abandoned.

    Ms. Elizabeth May: If I may, I will go next, Mr. Chairman.

    It is with some chagrin that I note that I have indeed been working on nuclear issues longer than Shawn-Patrick has been alive. He hadn't pointed that out to me earlier.

    It's true that on the privatization issue Sierra Club of Canada hasn't taken a position. It's a very tricky issue. In some sectors we think privatization represents enormous risks to the public, but in others we don't see the same level of concern. So our organization, to be clear on the record, doesn't have a position on the privatization issue, but doesn't believe in the unerring wisdom of market forces, as does Mr. Rubin's organization.

    My fundamental points deal with the fact that you've been given a lot of nonsense about this act from previous witnesses. I hope you'll forgive me for being blunt, but the interpretation of this as a matter of law has been considerably obfuscated by previous witnesses.

    Let me turn to the submission from the Canadian Nuclear Association. There are some concepts in law here that have been completely muddled. The notion of liability is the crucial one. This bill does not create automatic liability for banks and other investors in the nuclear industry. The current Nuclear Safety and Control Act does not create automatic liability for investors, as you have been told it does, nor does subsection 46(3) as rewritten to remove what are apparently offensive words, “or any other person with a right to or interest in”; the removal of these words makes no sense from a public policy point of view.

    Let me try to go over this. Clearly, as you can see, we all think this attempt at making the nuclear industry even more immune from the impacts of its actions should be completely rejected, and I find it appalling that it's come before you at all. This act was passed fairly recently. One would think that as recently as five years ago the Parliament of Canada was aware of all the ramifications of what it was passing. A Nuclear Safety and Control Act is not something where it's been dredged up because the language no longer makes sense. I think Mr. Godfrey pointed out in questions to your witness from the Department of Justice that nothing in law has changed since this bill was passed. It's therefore baffling to find the enormous machinery of the House of Commons and Senate being brought to bear on a paragraph. I don't know how you'll do clause-by-clause--you're stuck after you do clause. It's really appalling that this is before you at all.

    That said, let me point to why I think some of the witnesses have been misleading, on the differences between this and brownfield sites for instance. Yes, there's been a problem in the clean-up of brownfield sites, because lenders are unwilling to invest in a potential buyer of the site cleaning it up and getting it back into good, efficient, public use. A lot of good work has been done on this point, and I would encourage you to hear from more witnesses. Particularly, I recommend to you Angus Ross, who's a former executive of SOREMA insurance and chaired a national round table process on brownfield sites. I think he might be able to shed some light on the confusion that surrounds the differences between brownfield sites and this bill.

    Yes, on brownfield sites banks are loathe to take on ownership of a property for fear that they will be stuck with toxic clean-up. That issue is being addressed and there are some changes coming. But this clause on subsection 46(3) does not invoke for lenders the obligations of liability, far from it. It creates a discretionary--I want to stress discretionary--ability of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, after public hearings, to decide to name parties to be responsible for clean-up of specific contamination on a specific area. The language in section 46(3) does not convey automatic liability on any investor for the impacts or damages caused by their action. Even if it did, the Nuclear Liability Act, a separate piece of legislation, has ensured that the Canadian nuclear industry would never pay the full cost of a serious nuclear accident.

Á  (1150)  

    I'm going to set aside the issue of liability and just continue to define why it's different. This subsection 46(3) creates the discretionary ability, not automatic, of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, following a hearing, to file a notice. Then they may order that the owner or--yet another level of discretion, as the investor is again one step away--occupant or any other person with a right to or interest in the affected land take prescribed measures to reduce the level of contamination. A plain reading of this does not mean that everybody attached to the project is liable for gazillions of dollars because they've killed everybody on the adjacent land. This means you've got to clean it up. This is sensible, this is completely consistent with Canadian law and policy, and it is completely outrageous that these words are now offensive. The only thing that's changed since this bill was passed is, as my colleague Shawn-Patrick Stensil has pointed out, that we have a private sector operator in Bruce looking for investors and afraid of potential problems. I wouldn't mind if it created liability, quite frankly, but it doesn't. It simply says the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission may, following a public hearing, decide that the clean-up of the contaminated site and reducing the level of contamination requires actions by a number of prescribed people, and within that list of prescribed people are those who have a right to or interest in the land or place that requires cleaning up.

    I've been thrashing about in previous transcripts of appearances before this committee seeking examples of other areas of law, other approaches of the federal government to problems. This may seem like a far-fetched one, but what came to mind for me is that the federal government, when faced with liability and claims for the residential schools, had no hesitation with regard to third parties, anyone else they could find with deep pockets, in that case the Anglican Church, the Catholic Church, other people they could find. In this instance, why should the Parliament of Canada decide that if the federal government needs to get a clean-up, it should remove some of the deepest pockets around, the private investors, from being responsible? We don't do this as a matter of policy.

    Bill C-4 should be scrapped. You need to hear from more witnesses. This thing should not be railroaded through. It's a significant public policy issue, and frankly, it's incomprehensible that it's before you at all.

    I'll conclude with one last point. The public of Canada and the Parliament of Canada have never had any form of debate or discussion or royal commission on the benefits or desirability of having a nuclear industry in this country. There was one Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources in the history of Canada who called for such a public debate and review. It was Ray Hnatyshyn when he was Minister of Energy in the government of Joe Clark. Unfortunately, because of the short duration of that government, that set of public debates never took place. It really is time for a public debate about an industry that is an enormous fiscal drain, a radioactive white elephant. We don't need it, and we certainly don't need to be cutting up existing legislation to make it even easier for an industry no one wants to continue.

    Thank you.

    I'll turn now to Norm Rubin.

Á  (1155)  

    Mr. Norman Rubin (Director, Nuclear Research, Energy Probe): Thank you.

    I think there are a number of excellent public policy reasons not to pass this bill into law. In Canada the net effect of having a nuclear industry so far, according to Energy Probe's admittedly rough calculations, is that investment has destroyed somewhere between $30 billion and $40 billion worth of wealth in this country. Upwards of $30 billion has been destroyed in Ontario alone by the former Ontario Hydro's escapades in this untested and unreliable and uncompetitive technology. That number, unfortunately, has increased since the Government of Ontario tried to keep it from increasing by imposing a more commercial structure that would supposedly make the new parts of Ontario Hydro accountable and not increase their taxpayer-supported debt. In fact, taxpayer-supported debt has increased, benefit has not increased.

    In addition to the wealth destruction, the net impact, which was supposed to be to give us energy, specifically electricity, security, has been to destroy energy and electricity security. If one had to point to a single cause in Ontario for the possibility of black-outs and brown-outs this past summer, next summer, and this winter, it would be impossible to come up with a formulation that does not include “Candu nuclear”, and it is impossible to come up with a formulation that does not include the shut-down reactors at Bruce A and Pickering A, six of which are scheduled, and have been scheduled for a while, to someday come on line and generate a spark. Since New Year's Day 1998 the eight reactors of Bruce A and Pickering A have managed to underperform against virtually every windmill and solar collector in the world. It is hard to find a windmill that has not turned since January 1, 1998. It is hard to find a solar collector that has not found at least one sunny day on which it can generate something useful that might power a computer, a watch, a calculator, or something. Pickering A and Bruce A, billions of dollars of public expense, contaminated site, radioactive mess, environmental liabilities, probably until the end of time, have generated nothing but additions to taxpayer-guaranteed debt.

    Now we hear that the owners of contaminated sites, especially their lenders and investors--sites such as Pickering A and Bruce A, but also mom-and-pop nuclear--led by the Bruce Power consortium, seem to be objecting to the discretionary power of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, a regulator, I hasten to add, that I criticize at every opportunity for being too close to the regulated industry and not close enough to potential victims of this technology. That same regulator is now creating fear that it might use these discretionary powers to go after interested parties in random order, rather than in a sensible order. That is the problem this amendment seeks to solve.

  (1200)  

    If there is a problem, it can only be that the people who are looking to sell a share of Bruce Power, the people who are looking to get a credit rating, or their banks are afraid that faced with a choice between forcing the licensee to clean up a contaminated licensed site and forcing the responsible party, the owner or landlord of a non-licensed contaminated site, if one is found, to clean up, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, after having a public hearing, at which we can all express our views, including those who feel threatened, would nonetheless, for reasons that presumably are not in the public interest--I don't know what they would be thinking to have this bad a day--bypass the people who contaminated the site. They would bypass the owners, they would bypass the people who are in control, and go straight for the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce or the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System and nail them. As a result of that, there is presumably fear in some quarters of an irrationally aggressive Canadian nuclear regulator. Let me tell you, based on my decades of experience with Canada's nuclear regulator, any fears that this regulator will be irrationally aggressive are, alas, misguided.

    The other issue that arises when one looks at this limited amendment is the context in which it falls. Shawn-Patrick has already referred to multiple subsidies the industry gets, and I have been known to comment on those issues for a few decades myself. But I would like to focus not just on subsidies in general, but on limits to responsibility. Of those the most amazing is the one I have spent way too much time trying to get rid of, the Nuclear Liability Act.

    The Nuclear Liability Act gives this particular hazardous industry, this particular toxic industry, this particular polluting industry comfort that in the event that they create a catastrophe, not on their own land, but off-site, their liability for making the rest of us whole, restoring our losses, whether those losses be property or health or life or food or water, is limited to $75 million, and only one party, the licensee, is responsible for the $75 million. For example, what if--God forbid--a catastrophic accident at a reactor at Darlington or Bruce or Pickering should make us move out of southern Ontario for a few hundred years, and should we find the memo, the smoking gun, in which Westinghouse, General Electric, or one of the other suppliers of parts to that facility confided among themselves that they were delivering a part that might cause a catastrophic accident that might make us move out of southern Ontario for hundreds of years? I would maintain that the odds of the accident are small and the odds of finding the memo are vanishingly small, but even if all that happened, no financial liability could flow to the company that issued the memo. That is the law in Canada. That is a frontrunner, in my opinion, for the craziest law in this wonderful country. I would defy anybody to come up with suitable competition for the Nuclear Liability Act.

  (1205)  

    It is obvious to me, having challenged that law in court and having seen how spirited and skilful and expensive the defence was from the federal government, Ontario Hydro, New Brunswick Power, and indirectly from their suppliers. They told us they could not find suppliers if this law was not in place. Nobody would supply. That impressed the judge who was hearing the case; it impressed us rather the other way. By the normal rules of responsibility we must follow in this country, if I drop a barrel of corn cobs on my neighbour's property, I have to take it away, not him, not the federal government, not the taxpayers, not our grandchildren. It is my responsibility. However, if it is more than $75 million of radioactive corn cobs, I am no longer responsible. That is the law, and the people who are protected by that law feel very strongly that this law must continue to protect them. They are comparable to a voice coming out of a bullet-proof bunker telling the rest of us that the bullets won't hurt us. When we ask them to step outside the bullet-proof bunker and repeat that, they respectfully decline, and when we try to pull the door open, they pull very hard to keep it locked. Action speaks louder than words. My conclusion from this is that without special protection from responsibility, there would be no nuclear industry to contaminate land.

    Then one has to turn to a well-established principle in political science and economics known as the problem or the doctrine of the second best. Even if the amendment here, taken out of context, makes more sense than the existing legislation--and I agree with Elizabeth May that it does not--and if you believe it does, by fixing this little “problem”, have we increased public welfare? Have we made the world a more sensible place? Or have we put the lunatics more in charge of the asylum?

    What we have done is made made some business associates of an unusually irresponsible--and I say that in the legal sense of not responsible--party a little bit less responsible. Why would you take the most irresponsible industry in Canada and make it less responsible? How is this moving towards a sensible regime of responsibility? And that is assuming this amendment makes sense, assuming the nuclear regulator is in fact likely to go after people in random order.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    We will now proceed to questions from members. If we can, we'll do another round.

    Mr. Chatters.

    Mr. David Chatters (Athabasca, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    It's really difficult to know where to start and where to ask questions, because the witnesses have covered such a wide-ranging subject area, far wider than the bill we're addressing today. I'm just amazed. Much of the rhetoric I've heard, much of it centring around the Nuclear Liability Act, I would agree with. I think that act is antiquated and inadequate and needs to be changed, but we're not dealing with that.

    Ms. May's comments about this clause as it exists not conferring liability, then in the next sentence saying no deep pockets should be absolved of liability, doesn't make a lot of sense, one against the other.

    Of course, the Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout seems to be opposing this amendment simply because of the possibility of its allowing the viability of a certain reactor and a certain part of the nuclear industry. By their very name, you would oppose the amendment, because of the way it could contribute to the lessening of the viability of the industry. It doesn't make a lot of sense to me.

    I look at this simply as an issue of an industrial sector's ability to raise funds to finance their project and nothing more than that. I suggest that the banking industry or the private financial industry wouldn't be any more inclined to accept liability for a wind farm or a solar collector project or the steel industry. Somebody brought up the Sydney tar ponds, for example. Why would the private financial sector be willing to accept any liability in those sectors any more than they would in this sector? The issue we're looking at with this bill is whether or not it's proper, right, and reasonable that we impose a liability on the private financial sector for the operation of the Bruce reactors. I suggest that it doesn't make any more sense to impose that liability there than it does in many other projects. Someone will say the liability is so much greater in the nuclear industry, but of course, it isn't, because of the Nuclear Liability Act. It's only $75 million, and until that act is taken care of, the size of the liability is irrelevant.

    So I'm disappointed that we didn't focus more on what's in front of us and less on residential schools and the Sydney tar ponds and the Nuclear Liability Act. I'll just ask the witnesses if they could respond to that, because I really don't have a direct question.

  (1210)  

    The Chair: Ms. May.

    Ms. Elizabeth May: Mr. Chatters, I may not have spoken clearly. What I was trying to clarify--and I certainly don't want to leave it confused--is that there is a very large difference in law with a discretionary ability, in this case of a regulator, to get a listed group of parties responsible. I think Norman put it very well: why would they go after these people in an irrational order instead of in a logical sequence? The plain words here, “take the prescribed measures to reduce the level of contamination”, do not create liability for the off-site damage, for impacts to others who might be exposed. They do not create automatic liability, nor even automatic responsibility, for a clean-up. It allows a regulator, after a public hearing, to make a decision, which they may or may not make, to require owners, licensees, and other persons to take the prescribed measures to reduce the level of contamination.

    So my single point--and I've obviously not conveyed it very well--is that the industry's claims that the language needs “clarification”, because it has created this unending liability, is simply false on a plain reading of the act.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Rubin.

    Mr. Norman Rubin: I believe there may be an important misunderstanding couched in this first question. It is not easy to imagine a situation where the $75 million liability limit in the Nuclear Liability Act would limit the cost of clean-up of a contaminated site that is envisaged in section 43(6), I believe it is, of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act. Those were brought together in a way I believe is incorrect and not rational. The Nuclear Liability Act applies to off-site releases of radio activity and contamination and damage done off-site by releases. Here in Bill C-4 what are amended are orders that the CNSC may or may not make to clean up a contaminated site, where there is no mention of them telling a distant polluter to clean up--

  (1215)  

    Mr. David Chatters: My point exactly, sir. You brought the Nuclear Liability Act into this debate.

    Mr. Norman Rubin: That's correct. And I want to explain how they could come together, because that--

    The Chair: Your time's up. I will do everything I can to allow you each two minutes for closing remarks to get these points in. It will depend on my colleagues.

    Monsieur Cardin.

[Translation]

    Mr. Serge Cardin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to our witnesses.

    I know we could continue discussing responsibility in so far as decontamination is concerned, but clearly, despite the apparent simplicity of this amendment, important questions have yet to be answered.

    Ms. May, I regret to inform you that we won't be hearing from additional witnesses. We won't have an opportunity to fully review this matter or address the public's concerns and the long-term implications of these proposed changes.

    Representatives of the Canadian Nuclear Association who testified before the committee last Tuesday confirmed that to all intents and purposes, no one sector of the nuclear industry has encountered problems with this provision, aside from the fact that it may have prevented financial institutions from investing in the industry. However, the principals involved, namely Bruce Power and most likely the Government of Ontario, through its various agencies, never came before the committee to discuss the bill. Moreover, the main player in this whole affair is currently experiencing financial problems. It's a well known fact that when a company has financial problems, safety can be neglected, which only compounds the risk factors.

    Regardless of what you may think about the level of decontamination or the attendant responsibility, I'm still convinced that the primary aim of this provision is the promotion of nuclear power stations. In the past, in view of the responsibilities that were clearly spelled out and existing restrictions, no one would have dared to loan money to companies.

    The proliferation of nuclear power stations and the possibility of withdrawing from the nuclear sector were never discussed.

    In your opinion, can anything else be done in terms of the development of nuclear plants? This is one question that my colleague Mr. Comartin and I have asked ourselves on occasion, but we always seem to hit a wall, and a formidable wall at that. I feel we need to hear more in the way of testimony to increase the awareness of our colleagues opposite. That's not possible, given that our actions are restricted.

    I am firmly convinced that we should end our association with nuclear energy, in light of everything it represents. However, there are many applications for nuclear energy, including medicine and so forth. To date, these other sectors have not encountered any problems securing financing.

    I'd like an opportunity to hear more from you on this subject.

[English]

    The Chair: Ms. May, you have two minutes.

[Translation]

    Ms. Elizabeth May: Thank you.

    It's truly a shame that the committee cannot hear from additional witnesses.

[English]

    The proliferation of nuclear energy has not been a problem in North America since 1978. There has not been a single new nuclear reactor built since 1978. The largest reason for this is that they're simply uneconomical. As Ontario residents are well aware, there's a large stranded debt from the mistakes that were made in building huge nuclear megaprojects, which, as my colleague Mr. Rubin has noted, have been singularly unreliable and represent an ongoing cost to taxpayers, as well as an ongoing risk to future generations. Such things point out the problems with any reliance on nuclear energy. It's not so much, as Mr. Chatters characterized it, the industrial sector, it's failed government policy. It bears very little relationship to anything to do with the private sector.

    You're quite right to note that the people now taking on Bruce have enormous financial problems, and they may go bankrupt, for all we know. Their problems in Britain seem very severe. This effort is to try to make it easier for one company to obtain loans to stay afloat, when the costs down the road to residents of Ontario, to taxpayers of Canada, are only larger as a result.

    I think Mr. Rubin may want to comment as well.

  (1220)  

    Mr. Norman Rubin: The situation with Bruce Power I think is very relevant. If they should have an accident that might or might not have off-site consequences and might or might not trigger the Nuclear Liability Act, but contaminates their land, my understanding of the amended Nuclear Safety and Control Act, if Bill C-4 is passed, is that the nuclear regulator would have to limit itself to telling Bruce Power, who at that point might not have enough money to buy car fare, to clean up. Ontario Power Generation, as I understand it, would be among those protected from an order. They might be slowly in the process of taking over the site as the lease is in default, there might be messy proceedings, it might take a long time for those to be settled, and in the interim radioactive clean-up could not be directed to somebody with pockets.

    The Chair: Mr. Comartin.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: Just quickly, Mr. Rubin, do you want to continue what you're saying?

    Mr. Norman Rubin: To the extent that this gives comfort to the people who might contaminate the site at Bruce, or I should say might contaminate it further, as it's already significantly contaminated, I think we have to wonder whether the public is served, because there may be an artificial shield from responsibility by reason of poverty.

    Interestingly, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission has just taken a very important step, breaking new ground in nuclear regulation in Canada in this new world of private lessees of nuclear generating stations. They did that by requiring that Bruce Power, which is dominated by British Energy of the United Kingdom, which is essentially insolvent, show that they have a fund of at least $222 million, if memory serves, that could sustain the management of the site for six months, even if it generates no electricity, if it does what Pickering A and Bruce A have done, which is generate no income, in those cases, for more than six months. That brings the CNSC into a realm of financial regulation it hasn't been in before. I think everybody in this room would agree that what they did was essential and sensible, that we must not have a situation where somebody with no money is responsible for maintaining security, ongoing safety operations, the operation of the cooling pumps, and everything else that's important at a shut-down nuclear generating station. That amount of money, I also hasten to add, is almost exactly three times as much as victims of a nuclear accident, a catastrophe, would be assured.

    But at any rate, we have a situation there where the CNSC is slowly wrapping its head around what it means to require responsibility in the case of a nuclear problem, when it's not just another government that can always raise taxes. Now we have to imagine what happens if there is a catastrophic accident, which would almost surely bankrupt Bruce Power and its partners, and of course, it would contaminate the site as well. So how long is it going to take to have a responsible party step in to meet the demands of Bill C-4, so that somebody will clean up that mess?

  (1225)  

    Mr. Joe Comartin: In fact, the potential for contamination increases if they open the other four reactors, correct? So it's not only the four that are contaminating the sites now, we're going to have four more if they get their loans.

    Mr. Norman Rubin: Two more is the current plan at Bruce. Of course, the shut-down reactors are now inherently safe. There is no way to have a standard nuclear accident, catastrophic or not, at any of those plants, because they've been shut down long enough that it's impossible, and indeed, the fuel has been removed from the Bruce A reactors. They're remarkably safe. The plan is to make them inherently hazardous again.

    If I can continue--

    Mr. Joe Comartin: Could you allow Ms. May to get in, because she wants to make a point?

    Ms. Elizabeth May: It's a very small point. While I agree with Norm that a shut-down nuclear reactor is virtually unproblematic for conventional accidents, post-September 11 we need to recognize that these sites also represent a risk of terrorist activity, even when shut down.

    Mr. Norman Rubin: If I can just complete a sentence I started a few minutes ago, the reason we are more in danger of freezing in the dark with Bruce A and Pickering A under reconstruction is that they are not only not generating a spark, they are preventing others from generating a spark. Even the crown corporation that might be adding capacity is not adding other capacity, because they dream that these reactors will operate and will operate reliably and well. Private generators have announced, and one reads in the business press almost every week that another one has said, forget it, this isn't a place to generate electricity. One of the main reasons they cite is that the elephant is about to roll over. One of these days Pickering A and Bruce A, or half of Bruce A, may start again.

    The Chair: Mr. Keddy.

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I'd like to thank the witnesses for appearing.

    It seems to me that I'm hearing two different things here. I'm clearly hearing your concern about nuclear power generators and possible environmental damage they can cause and a debate about the nuclear industry. Whether or not that is correct is something the committee can look at at another time, and I'd certainly be interested in looking at it at another time. I think we have to take it to your interpretation of the amendment. On the one hand, Ms. May is saying there is not a liability for the financial institution, on the other hand, Mr. Ruben is saying, in the event of a nuclear disaster, it would be important to have somebody with deep pockets. You can't interpret this clause in both directions.

    Again, I'm not discussing whether or not we should have a debate over nuclear energy. I'm happy to have that debate, I think we should engage upon it. The issue before us is the language in the clause. I'd like to read the change. The original subsection 46(3) read, “order that the owner or occupant of, or any other person with a right to or an interest in”, which includes your financial institution. The change would read, “or any other person who has the management and control of”. No other sector in this country holds the financial institution liable. If you want to--excuse my language-- dumb it down, you can go out and buy a car, you can borrow the money to do that, and the bank is not going to be held responsible if you are involved in a motor vehicle accident and kill somebody, nor should they be.

    Again, I want to separate this out. This has got nothing to do with whether we should have a debate on nuclear energy. It does have a lot to do with what I'm hearing as two different views as to whether or not there is liability here from your presentations.

  (1230)  

    Ms. Elizabeth May: I don't want to have our evidence appear to be contradictory. We are, in fact, saying exactly the same thing. I use the term liability in the legal sense. If someone is liable, they are liable, it's an automatic thing, it's not discretionary. You're liable for something because you stand in a chain of liability. In this act what is talked about is responsibility and, in that sense, liability for a clean-up of a contaminated area following a public hearing, following discretionary actions by a regulator. When I talk about liability, I'm talking about that responsibility you say wouldn't extend to the person who lent the money to the driver of the car. The driver of the car could be liable etc. Liability in that sense is not conferred by this section, because this section speaks to a financial responsibility that may or may not be invoked by a regulator.

    There was one other quick point I was going to try to make. There's no question that you do want to have someone available for the clean-up of a radioactive site. In the brownfields situation the banks and financial institutions are in fact the ones who take the responsibility if the person who owns the land that has toxic waste on it defaults and they become the owners.

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: That provision we understand. If they default and they become the owner, they have responsibility for it, and they should. There is no one else who should have responsibility for it, because they then become the one who has “management and control of”, and that is the absolute difference. So yes, they're on the hook in that instance.

    There are several other points I want to make, but I'll try to reduce down to one. You made several statements, I believe, Mr. Stensil, and Mr. Rubin as well, on the amount of money that goes into nuclear research through subsidies, through a whole range of other factors. For the interest of myself, and I think our committee members, I'd like to see that information. So if you could make sure you got that to the committee members, I'd be interested in looking at it.

    The Chair: If you send information, we would appreciate that you send it to the clerk.

    Mr. Godfrey.

    Mr. John Godfrey: Thanks very much, and I must say, it's been a most informative morning.

    The first point where I agree with the witnesses, Mr. Comartin, and others is that it really is important that at some point we get our heads around a total review of the nuclear industry. I think it's appalling that we have never done this as a Parliament and haven't had a minister who's wanted to do it since Mr. Hnatyshyn. My initial instinct was to be a little fearful of trying to undertake such a review by the back door of this amendment.

    I'm going to cut right to the chase. The thing that concerns me the most and I find most compelling in your testimony is that the more this seems to be an initiative strictly and specifically and provably linked to the situation with Bruce Power, the less I like it. I happen to think that single cases make bad law. I think in Mr. Stensil's brief there was a reference, in September, to the fact that we were hoping to get this thing changed so we could get on with it, but if that's how we're making public policy, because we're being driven to it by a specific situation, the more you can prove that to me, the more I'm likely to vote against this amendment. If I vote against it, I am not voting against government policy, because government policy is the status quo, we actually passed the predecessor piece of legislation. This is a slightly more recent piece of government policy, but I view it as very much what we would do until we waited for the review.

    I would invite the witnesses to comment on the connection between Bruce Power and this particular initiative.

  (1235)  

    Ms. Elizabeth May: I just want to let you know that I'm happy to leave with you the transcript of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission hearings on Bruce on September 12, in which they speak specifically to this, as Mr. Stensil has said. This is a quote from Mr. Hawthorne, Bruce Power CEO.

What I have talked to the staff about is the range of possible ways that Bruce Power can protect itself from an insolvency position with the parent, including insurance for a shutdown event, achieving our own credit rating, which is very, very likely given our operation track record to date, subject to some legislative change we are hoping will be passed, being able to have our own working capital facility.

This is very clearly a connection. There was no credible answer, if you'll forgive me for so characterizing the evidence of the Department of Justice, as to what had changed in law to require this so-called clarification of language now before you in Bill C-4. This is the most transparent example I've ever seen of an attempt to rewrite legislation to suit one case.

    The Chair: If you have information on that document, you should share it with us. The document will not be distributed, because it's not in both official languages. I say this so that you can tell us as much as you can from the document.

    Ms. Elizabeth May: Yes, I see.

    Mr. John Godfrey: I want to come back to the brownfields point as well. There are great things happening there. I want to know if this is the best analogy with this piece of legislation. In the case of the brownfields legislation it's if the bank takes back the property. So I guess the first dumb question is, do they have to take back the property, or can they say, you can keep the property, we don't need it, and so we're not liable for the clean-up? Is that analogous? If I lend money to an institution that contaminates a site, do I, as the lender to Bruce Power or anybody else, take back the site? Or are there differences?

    Mr. Norman Rubin: I can answer this in part, because I asked Elizabeth May exactly that question about half an hour ago.

    Mr. John Godfrey: Oh good.

    Mr. Norman Rubin: Her answer was--and she can correct me if I'm wrong--that if it is a secured loan, the lender has no choice and becomes the owner in the case of default by the borrower.

    Ms. Elizabeth May: The situation with brownfield sites and contaminated sites has been such that exactly as in this instance, there is a reluctance in private sector financing of properties that have a significant risk of becoming contaminated. I don't think that's any different for the nuclear industry. Anyone who's about to invest in Bruce is going to know they're investing in something that is a potential nightmare financially, because of the financial risk of a company that's having insolvency problems and because of the inherently dangerous nature of the operation. With the fact that there is a public policy instrument that would allow, on a discretionary basis, the regulator to find some additional help in cleaning up the contamination after the fact, I find it extremely unlikely that the existence of the language in the current bill would be a significant disincentive to lending institutions that are already well aware of the problems they face when investing in properties that have contaminated soils or other forms of contamination.

    The Chair: That brings us to the next round.

    Ms. Elizabeth May: I have to leave. I have to apologize.

    The Chair: I'm very sorry, we don't make exceptions.

    Ms. Elizabeth May: Sorry, I wanted to apologize.

    The Chair: Committee members are always reasonable. Do you agree that we allow two minutes to Ms. May for closing remarks?

    Ms. Elizabeth May: Oh no, I hate to take any of your time, Mr. Chair. I just wanted to apologize that I had to leave early. Mr. Rubin and Mr. Stensil can continue.

  (1240)  

    The Chair: I understand, but I asked a question of my colleagues and I need an answer. Is it okay? Are we agreed?

    You have two minutes, there we go.

    Ms. Elizabeth May: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I don't need to take two whole minutes. I think this is one of those instances where democracy in this country needs to work. All of you on all sides of the House need to join together in a single, sensible solution to this bill, which is to scrap it.

    Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    Now the next round will be a three-minute round. Maybe we'll have yet another one.

    The committee does not have the power to scrap bills. It's been assigned to us by the House of Commons, and it's up to the House to deal with it when we get through with it.

[Translation]

    You have three minutes, Mr. Cardin.

    I'm sorry, Mr. Cardin.

[English]

     For the members, witnesses, and support staff, there is food in the back. After everyone has had a chance, if there is still food there, everybody is welcome to it.

[Translation]

    Mr. Cardin.

    Mr. Serge Cardin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I'm hearing many things. Of course, if I consider the bill strictly from a financial standpoint and put on my accountant's hat--I trained as an accountant and worked with SMEs--my personal view is that as a rule, financial institutions are not responsible for the actions of managers. Simply put, that is the danger inherent in this amendment. However, the point is that this provision served a purpose in that financial institutions had some concerns about the significant risks and dangers associated with nuclear power plants. Since it was impossible to know precisely the level of risk involved, they preferred not to get involved in this sector. Now, however, since their responsibility will be limited, to all intents and purposes, the burden of responsibility will shift directly to the government and to the public as well.

    Earlier, mention was made of the fact that this sector is not profitable and that one of the aims of this privatization initiative is to ensure the profitability of nuclear plants through private sector involvement. Apparently, Mr. Rubin was quoted recently in the press as saying that it might be in our best interest to back Bill C-4 because promoting the privatization of nuclear facilities would likely lead the industry down the road to eventual bankruptcy.

    Should we then conclude that it is impossible for the private sector to play any kind of role in the nuclear industry, from the standpoint of financing and safety?

[English]

    Mr. Norman Rubin: Thank you for the question.

    Obviously, I said many more words than were quoted in that newspaper article. If the article gave the impression that I was supporting Bill C-4, that's a false impression. I do support having willing investors at risk from nuclear enterprises, instead of having unwilling investors like me at risk from nuclear enterprises. I have been trying to sell my shares in Pickering, Bruce, and Darlington virtually since they were built. I'm not allowed to sell my shares, because I'm a taxpayer in Ontario. But I have finally got rid of some of the risk from Bruce A and B because of a lease with British Energy etc., the consortium known as Bruce Power. They now have the risk of losing money if that plant doesn't operate. I have less risk--still some, but less.

    My support for privatization is in part because this is a risky, untested, unreliable, inherently hazardous toxic technology, and I don't believe we should be risking the financial health of a government on that kind of investment. Having governments pick winners and losers is one thing, but having them pick only losers is definitely a bad idea.

    The Chair: Mr. Comartin.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: Mr. Rubin, we heard some testimony from the witnesses on Tuesday from the industry and the safety association that none of them had any notes or could give any explanation as to why subsection 46(3) was put in place back in 1997. Were you there at the hearings? Do you have any knowledge of what the reasons were?

  (1245)  

    Mr. Norman Rubin: Are you suggesting, Mr. Comartin, that this section was inserted after the original proposed bill?

    Mr. Joe Comartin: No. When they passed the Nuclear Safety and Control Act in 1997 and subsection 46(3) came into being, we cannot find what the rationale was behind it, what the committee was thinking about, what the House was thinking about when they passed it, and I'm asking if you have anything on that.

    Mr. Norman Rubin: I understand that the bill was essentially drafted by the then retiring secretary of the Atomic Energy Control Board, who basically wrote a new set of rules for his organization under a new name. I testified to the committee on that bill. I suggested that this would take them from the 1950s to about the 1960s. I stand by that. It's not a very good bill, but I believe this section was in the first draft from that gentleman, John--I forget his last name right now. It worked its way through the system and Parliament passed it, as far as I know, without amendments.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: Mr. Shpyth from the Nuclear Association said this amendment we have before us now was to correct the present wording, the old wording was an anomaly, it was an unintended effect. Do you agree with any of that?

    Mr. Norman Rubin: I've seen no evidence that it's true. I'm sure, from the point of view of lenders to Bruce Power, who obviously are staying up nights sleepless worrying about some scenario.... I wish I knew exactly what scenario it was, because what worries them worries me, and if we can legislatively put them to sleep, the scenario still worries me. If we can legally protect them from having an order to clean up a contaminated site, that just makes the situation worse, not better, if the site goes without being cleaned up. That seems to me the problem this is supposed to solve, and that sounds like a terrible solution.

    The Chair: Mr. Finlay.

    Mr. John Finlay (Oxford, Lib.): I have to agree with Mr. Keddy, and I have to say a few things generally. As people have rightly said, if there is need for a debate about nuclear energy, maybe we should do that. I would remind everybody that nuclear energy has been around for some time. It's credited with shortening the length of World War II and saving millions of lives. It's also had some pretty significant effects on human health, medicine, and so on. Nuclear fission is a part of nature. I guess it's what keeps us alive. If you look wide enough, the sun is the best example of nuclear fission, and without the sun, we wouldn't be here. So I think we ought to be a little cautious about making it the devil in this situation.

    We have before us a question of liability on investment in an industry. As I understand it, what the government is requesting us to do is make it fair. I'm not at all sure this wording will protect anybody from having to pay up if there is an accident. I'm not sure it will not allow people to sue other people for damages. We're being asked to make it equivalent for private industry to be involved if they wish to be involved. If they don't, that's fine. I think we're going way beyond the mandate, Mr. Chairman. If we're going to get into those other things, then I want to talk about the future of this planet and I want to talk about a lot of other things that stem from nuclear investigation.

    Thank you.

  (1250)  

    Mr. Norman Rubin: If I may respond, I'd like to indicate that in the non-nuclear area of brownfield sites, for example, lender due diligence has been the driving force of companies doing assessments of what their environmental risks are. They've been doing it because secured lenders, who are afraid they're going to end up with the contaminated property, have a need to protect themselves. Here, presumably, we're wondering about unsecured lenders.

    Again, we're speculating wildly, without much evidence and without being able to subpoena witnesses, about what the nightmare is, the problem with Bruce Power and its lenders that we must rush in to solve. As I said before, if they have a problem that's keeping them up, I'm not sure why any of us is sleeping at night.

    The Chair: Mr. Keddy.

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: We're dealing with a lot of other issues, and I'd be more than happy to deal with those at another time. We still have a piece of legislation here that deals specifically with one thing. You just answered Mr. Comartin's question by stating that you didn't think it was intentional that the phrase was inserted the way it was.

    Mr. Norman Rubin: No, excuse me, I said I have no evidence that it was a mistake.

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: That's a nice way of saying you don't think it's intentional.

    Mr. Norman Rubin: No. As far as I know, it was intentional. I have no evidence that it was unintentional, that it was a mistake.

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: But you don't believe there's any liability involved for the banking institution. I asked that question in the first round, and you and Ms. May both said there is no liability involved necessarily for the banking institution. So if it was not intended, it would only make sense that you come back and correct the mistake that was unintended the first time and change it. I don't think it is the intention of this committee or any other committee to make the financial institution liable here. I'm not convinced at all that we should be simply looking for someone with deep pockets.

    There is the question of nuclear liability and the $75 million. It's a different piece of legislation, and we should revisit that. I have no difficulty at all doing that. But the piece of legislation in front of us deals with liability to a financial institution, and I don't agree with your reasoning. I'm here to be convinced otherwise, but I just don't agree with your reasoning.

    Mr. Norman Rubin: My main reason for bringing these two pieces of legislation together was to make an argument about whether the world will be a better place or a worse place if this is passed. I hope that is among your considerations. My suggestion was that in a broader context, in which this particular industry needs and receives tremendous protection from responsibility for its own actions, adding more irresponsibility at their request is arguably the work of the devil, not of God. If that connection is too remote, then I'm sorry, I can't make it any tighter.

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: In closing, because I don't think we will get another round, I still see it as two separate issues. Again, your comparison with brownfields I think is quite a stretch. This is not a question of anything beyond who is liable. The bank obviously is liable if and when they assume control of any nuclear establishment, as they should be, the day they are the owner-operator, whether that nuclear establishment is operating or not operating.

  (1255)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Godfrey.

    Mr. John Godfrey: I have two points. Returning to the brownfields analogy for a moment, would I be correct in assuming that any financial institution lending to a nuclear facility would normally prefer to be in a secured lender position, because that puts them higher in the hierarchy of claims, they get their money first, but it carries with it the downside that they get to own it? I need that confirmed.

    Second, if, in fact, this piece of legislation is being driven by the Bruce Power situation, we have to remember that the piece of legislation was introduced last spring. Can either of you, from memory or documents, remind us of where the Bruce Power story was at the time this seemed to emerge from the ether, which is looking back to March, April, May, and does that further strengthen the connection I'm looking for?

    Mr. Norman Rubin: On your second question, I don't think I have anything to contribute. I may be able to dig something up, but I can't think of anything from last spring that would illuminate the situation. It's an excellent question.

    One of the interesting things about the Bruce lease when it first came out was that Bruce Power, the organization that leased the Bruce nuclear generating complex, spent more for that long-term lease than anybody up to that point had ever paid to purchase a nuclear generating station of that size--that is, on a per megawatt basis--including themselves, because British Energy is one of the major purchasers. British Energy had always paid less to buy than they were now paying to lease. The more I thought about that, the more it made perfect sense. Wouldn't you pay more to lease a nuclear generating station and then return it to the landlord than you would pay to own it until the end of time or until you found a willing buyer for it when it was through fulfilling its useful purpose and had no purpose left other than nefarious ones?

    That gets into second guessing what the TD Bank, CIBC, and the Ontario Municipal Employees Pension Fund would structure to try to protect themselves from a Nuclear Safety Control Act that has been amended by Bill C-4. I suspect it is not beyond human ingenuity for them to protect themselves so that a contaminated piece of land would stay contaminated for a very long time.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    This completes this round. There are a few members who wish to ask further questions, so I will allow one minute each for questions, and the answers could come in your closing remarks.

[Translation]

    You have one minute to put your question, Mr. Cardin.

    Mr. Serge Cardin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If it's my last question, then I would like to say that in light of the comments made by committee members, the general consensus seems to be that a debate on the nuclear industry is warranted. Even Ms. May pointed to the fact that no such debate had ever taken place in this country. Therefore, a debate is urgently needed. However, proponents of this bill maintain that we need to move forward quickly.

    We haven't had a debate. Yet, there are those advocating the industry's privatization and likely expansion. It's a classic case of putting the cart before the horse. The groundwork hasn't been done and an attempt is being made to push through a bill which certainly would not be consistent with our findings, should a genuine debate on the nuclear industry ever take place.

    My position, therefore, hasn't changed. I still maintain that it would be preferable for the committee to reject the amendment outright and to tell the government to go back and do its homework.

[English]

    The Chair: Mr. Comartin.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: I have a question for Mr. Rubin, and perhaps Mr. Stensil as well. It seems to me there is still confusion between the two pieces of legislation, so can you be very clear? The Nuclear Liability Act does have a limit of $75 million, but it is only applicable on injuries and damages that occur off-site. The Nuclear Safety and Control Act is specifically designed for on-site contamination and problems, if I can put it that way, and there are no limits to that. Could you confirm that?

·  (1300)  

    Mr. Norman Rubin: Yes, that is exactly my understanding.

    The Chair: Now I will allow you three minutes of closing remarks, because our colleagues were brief.

    Mr. Stensil.

    Mr. Shawn-Patrick Stensil: I don't know if it will be three minutes, but for review, as you may have heard, there is a difference of opinion in the coalition here, whether the right or left are against this bill. Indeed, as Mr. Godfrey said, one case is not a good example for a whole bill, and I would encourage the committee to investigate that further.

    Bruce Power continues to have financial troubles. Right now there is a question at the CNSC as to whether they are indeed fulfilling their licence obligations, because of the problems with British energy. So this is an issue of the day that you may wish to address.

    People have noted that we are not debating nuclear energy here, but nuclear energy has been supported for 50 years through a web of subsidies and crutches that are keeping it alive. This, in that grand scheme, continues as nothing else but that. We continue blindly going off in the same direction without asking ourselves some principal questions. The promises of nuclear energy are gone. No one is talking of building any new nuclear reactors in Canada. Such a debate is happening in the provinces, it's happening with Point Lepreau, and it's also happening in Quebec. It's a very pertinent question for the day.

    As for the piece of legislation, we suggest that you abandon it, for reasons stated. As Ms. May pointed out, there is a discretionary function in here, and we're assuming that the CNSC is without logic in interpreting that.

    I think I'll pass it over to Norm.

    Mr. Norman Rubin: Thank you, Shawn-Patrick.

    To build on the last point Shawn-Patrick raised, I think one has to figure out what problem this bill would solve and whose problem it is. It's apparently a problem for Bruce Power, which leads us to speculate what would happen if this amendment were not passed or what would not happen. It's possible that they would have trouble restructuring or getting a line of credit they need for some reason. It's possible that this would lead to the dissolution of the Bruce Power consortium, the lease would be in default, and the reactors would be operated again by Ontario Power Generation, the crown corporation. I don't know. This is all speculation. It would be nice to hear what nightmare scenario motivates them to lobby for the passage of this amendment. I'm with Mr. Godfrey. The more I speculate on their nightmares, the more I think I don't want to give them a sleeping pill. I want to give them an incentive and to give their lenders an incentive to avoid the scenario that would lead to the nightmare.

    Obviously, this is quite speculative. We're talking about if the land is further contaminated, if it is the fault of Bruce Power, if they are presumably unable to pay. Otherwise, there's no problem. Then this amendment might give some credit to the people who otherwise might pay, and so the taxpayers will pay or the site won't be cleaned up. None of those solutions is a solution, none of them is in the public interest, none of them is desirable. Therefore, solving this problem creates a problem.

    So if you can amend this to make it look like a blank sheet of paper--I'm not sure exactly what the technical way is by which you people say no to something in committee--if somehow or other you could vote this down, it would probably be a step towards increasing public welfare in Canada. It would be in the public interest and safeguard the environment better than passing it.

    Thank you for your time.

·  (1305)  

    The Chair: Thank you very much. Thank you to all our witnesses.

    Colleagues, we'll proceed to our agenda of 1 o'clock, which is dealing with the clause, not clause-by-clause. As I ask you if clause 1 will carry, I inform you that we have an amendment to the clause from Mr. Comartin.

    Mr. Comartin, do you wish to speak to your amendment?

    Mr. Joe Comartin: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Perhaps I can explain where I'm coming from on both this amendment and on the proposed amendment by the government. If the commission makes the determinations under subsections 46(1) and (2), after conducting a full-blown hearing and determining that in fact there has been contamination and the operator or the person with a right to or interest in the property is responsible for that, they must make an order. That's my amendment. Again I want to be clear that I am opposed to the government amendment removing “with a right to or interest in”. I want this to be combined. I propose that we amend the existing law to take out “may” and substitute “shall”, but then defeat the government's amendment, which would remove the wording “with a right to or interest in”.

    The Chair: So that we're clear, this amendment addresses only the issue of “may” and “shall”.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: That's correct.

    The Chair: You're explaining your intent?

    Mr. Joe Comartin: Yes.

    The Chair: Right, thank you.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: I don't want it to be seen in any way that by doing this, I'm agreeing that the government amendment would be going through. I want to be clear on that right at the outset.

    The reason for the amendment is to impose on the commission a direction from the government, parliamentarians of this country, that if they conduct a process and make that determination, there should be no doubt at all that they require the operator or any person with a right to or interest in the affected land to conduct a clean-up. We've heard a lot, Mr. Speaker, from the witnesses today in particular, about the nature of the nuclear industry, the types of liability left with society because of the contamination, that there are perhaps no time limits on the liability and damages to society when there has been this type of contamination.

    Mr. Chair, as we look at this bill and the law it's proposing to amend, it's quite clear that the House of Commons, when they were passing this in 1997, had very clear intent. I would suggest that they should have included the mandatory direction to the commission. I say that because of the inherent risk in the nuclear industry. We've seen across the globe what happens. Chernobyl is probably the clearest example, but there are others.

    We know about Three Mile Island, but I don't think it is as commonly known that when we were working this through the House, when it was first introduced in the spring, at about the same time there was a bill working its way through the U.S. Congress and Senate. What you had here was a site where the government had been left holding the bag, something I think we're going to be faced with if we pass the government's amendment. There was no provision at that time in the legislation in the U.S., not enough regulation. This site--I think it was in Delaware--was one of the earliest. There had been a fair amount of experimentation there as they were developing the nuclear weapons during the Second World War. It continued for a very short time after that, then was operated and controlled by the private sector for a number of years. Then it was abandoned. Of course, we know what happened after that--the government got stuck with it.

    That bill worked its way through the House and resulted in a law being passed by both levels of government, and I think approved by the president, so I think it's in effect, that the federal government would spend $7 billion U.S. to clean up the site. That was the price tag on that one. That's the kind of price tag we're looking at if Bruce Power goes down and doesn't operate. That's the price tag we're looking at imposing on the taxpayers of this country. That particular incident was only going to result in this. They were going to clean the site of all the contaminated soil--that's all that was left there--and then they were going to ship it in some fashion down to North Carolina and store it on a nuclear site. That alone, just cleaning that site up, decommissioning it by removing the soil and whatever other bits of equipment were still left there that were contaminated, and shipping it cost $7 billion U.S. That's $10 billion or $12 billion Candian. That's the kind of price tag we're talking about. It's the kind of price tag that, if we don't both pass my amendment and reject the government one, we're exposing the taxpayers of this country to.

·  (1310)  

    You again heard extensive evidence today, and we heard a fair amount of it in front of this committee when we were dealing with nuclear waste, on what the ramifications are of this industry for the Canadian taxpayer. If we impose this responsibility on the sector, give the commission some additional control, we also send out to the operator, owner, occupant, any other person with a right to or interest in the property a message that we expect them to operate this from two vantage points, a safety vantage point and a vantage point of having sufficient funds from their sources if they're operating to deal with the contamination they're creating on-site.

    If we don't pass my amendment and pass the government's amendment, we're sending a different message, which is saying to financiers, well don't worry about it; even if you were to be held responsible, the commission can just let you go, they don't have to impose liability and make you pay damages or make you clean up the site. It says to the owner and operator and the financiers, you can be a bit less careful, you can cut corners, because we don't ultimately think you should absolutely be responsible. That's the message that we're sending.

    We've had some evidence, I think from Ms. May, that the Conservative government in 1979 took a quick look at it. We were going to do a review of the nuclear industry. Because of Bob Rae, who moved the motion to strike the finance bill down, that government collapsed and was replaced by a predecessor of this government, which didn't do anything about it. Of course, this government hasn't either.

    A number of people from the other side of the table have indicated that it's not important, it's a minor amendment. That's not the way you draft legislation, it's not the way you conduct your business as parliamentarians. This does have some significant ramifications. It should be part of an overall review of the industry. This ad hoc attitude we're seeing in this amendment is, quite frankly, repulsive to anybody who sees the process as one where you do exercise responsibility as parliamentarians, you do, in a case like this, look at the whole industry, you don't take one little seven-word amendment and try to shove it through. That's what we're faced with here. We're not conducting ourselves in this process the way we should be. It's as simple as that.

·  (1315)  

    This government was obviously approached by a private operator, and I wonder if they knew at the time they approached this government? They said, look, we've got a big screw-up here; we entered into this contract with the provincial government, we want to open these other four reactors, two right away and two a bit down further along in the long-term plans; it's going to cost some money, and our financiers are saying they won't do it unless you amend this. My guess, from my discussions with the minister, is that this probably occurred around April of this year, and within a month we had the bill before the House. It would be interesting to see how often that's happened in the past, Mr. Chair. It would be interesting to find out from both the minister and Bruce Power whether they disclosed how bad was the financial shape they were in, which became very apparent by the summer of this year, a couple of months after they had that conversation and this bill got rapidly drafted. We don't know that, because we haven't heard from Bruce and we haven't heard from the minister in that regard.

    What we do know is that they are in deep trouble financially, and yet we're about to give them a blank cheque. It was interesting to hear Mr. Rubin today speculate on what would happen. We've got a $222 million guarantee that expires in nine days. That's there to help conduct operations for six months. It's there also for some clean-up if that becomes necessary. But that's going to expire in eight or nine days, and what we're about to do by passing this is perhaps allow them a little bit of leeway. But what is going to happen to the operations there? We don't know, but we're facilitating matters for a private sector operator that is on very weak ground.

    The parent company that guaranteed that $222 million is, in effect, technically bankrupt in the U.K. at this point. The British Government has bailed them out, but it's not at all clear whether they're going to continue to do that. And yet here we are, this committee and this government, with very little knowledge, at least as a committee, about to maybe let them off the hook. Or maybe all we're doing is extending the time they're contaminating that site. Who knows what they're doing safety-wise? Are they cutting corners now because they are in such a tight financial situation?

    So, Mr. Chair, the position my party is taking is that it is extremely dangerous for this amendment to be allowed to go through. Obviously, I'm strongly in support of my amendment, which will add some additional responsibility for the operator and to financiers if they fit into the description we have in the law as it is now.

    By the way, it was really interesting to listen to the Nuclear Association when they were here, Mr. Chair. I think it was Mr. Cardin who asked, weren't you around in 1997? Of course, they've been around a lot longer than that. Were you involved in getting the bill through the house and into law? We got a positive on that. We got a negative on their having any notes about subsection 46(3). They didn't object to it then. Nothing has changed since then except for Bruce Power's having come on line in respect of their management of that one site. That's the only thing that has changed. We know we don't have all the facts from them as to their financial circumstances.

    Mr. Stensil made a point today about the long and--let me use the term--sordid history of our propping up this industry. Mr. Rubin said it has cost us, as a society, $30 billion to $40 billion. And now what are we doing? We're just going to perpetuate it a bit more, maybe a lot more. That $30 billion to $40 billion may look small, because if this goes through and they keep operating, but eventually collapse, we're going to be stuck, as a government and a people, with cleaning up and managing that site. And what if it goes beyond that? What if Point Lepreau goes private? Obviously, the New Brunswick government doesn't have the money or the interest in continuing that. Then are we going to have a second site because of passing this and allowing the private sector in without taking full responsibility for their actions?

·  (1320)  

    I chaired a credit union board of some substance for a good number of years, and I know the kind of control financiers exercise from time to time. So you may have this appearance of the owner-operators making all the decisions, but if they're in financial difficulty, as Bruce Power is, they don't call the shots any more, the shots then are called by the financiers. They tell them very clearly, very directly what they have to do. Even though on the surface it would appear that the controlling mind is the owner-operator's, the reality is that if they want the financing to continue, they don't want the plug pulled on them, they're going to take instructions from the financier, whether it's a bank or some other form of lender. That's the reality of the marketplace. So this whole thing about, we've got to protect big financial institutions in this country, whether they be insurance companies or banks, ignores that very practical reality of the type of control they will exercise. Again it brings us back to Bruce Power and its dire financial straits.

    Mr. Chair, Bruce Power have to be here, they have to come and testify, we have to hear from them. It's just grossly irresponsible on our part not to proceed with that.

    A number of you were at the committee hearings when we dealt with the nuclear waste. We can't pretend we don't understand the implications of this. To suggest that this is a minor amendment, don't worry about it, it's just cleaning up a little, as Mr. Shpyth said the other day.... I've got to go back to his words. He said it was an anomaly, it was a mistake.

·  (1325)  

    The Chair: Mr. Comartin, if I may, I'm not about to cut you off, I just want to tell you what my plans are, so you may strategize accordingly. Our meeting is 1 till 1:30. At 1:30 I will ask the members if they wish to sit until we finish clause-by-clause or do as the agenda says, adjourn and come back in the future, at which time you will get the floor back. That will be what I will try to do at 1:30.

    Carry on.

    Mr. Joe Comartin: I think you can guess, Mr. Chair, that I would prefer the latter to the former, but I will continue talking and not yield.

    I look across the table, I look at some of the other members on this side. We know--and if you don't, you should--what the implications are. You should know the bill you're about to dump onto the Canadian taxpayer and the time limits we're faced with. That is the reality we're confronted with.

    To minimize this amendment, to say it's seven words, it's not really important, it corrects an anomaly and some mistake that was made I don't think is factually correct. Certainly, there has been no evidence before this committee that it was a mistake. The committee that passed this bill originally, which then went to the House and became law, didn't think this was a mistake. In law, the court looks at this--that's who would ultimately interpret this--and says, well, we look at the face value. You can't produce any evidence there was a mistake, that's very clear from all sides. Nobody can produce any suggestion of notes or records that would say this was a mistake, that the parliamentary committee and the full House of Commons, when they passed this, didn't know what they were doing, didn't intend the consequences of this. They had reasons to do it at the time, and those are obvious.

    Some I've already mentioned, and part of it was to say they weren't in favour of privatization, and that's what this fosters. There was no indication from this government--you may hear from them in that regard--that they supported the privatization of the nuclear industry, in spite of the fact that this goes some distance in facilitating it, certainly at Bruce and potentially at Lepreau, if a private sector operator-owner comes on site and wants to take that one over and spend the billions it's going to take to clean it up and get it operational.

    We didn't get that signal from the government. We certainly didn't get any direct expression of it. What they've done is demean the process. They've downplayed the significance of this amendment. If the government, in fact, is going to support the privatization, as the Conservative government in Ontario did, then let's be honest about it, let's get it out on the table. Let the Canadian public know that's the position of this government, let them react to it. Let us conduct committee hearings into it that are meaningful, so that again, the Canadian public gets a full view of what this means.

    Don't shove it in through the back door, which is what we're doing here. It's a simple matter of being comprehensive in our approach as parliamentarians, being honest with the rest of the House, and being honest in particular with the Canadian taxpayer. Let's say to the Canadian taxpayer, we're about to pass a bill into law that's going to expand your liability. You've got a big chunk of it already because of the sites we've got, and we're about to expand it. We're going to open up two more at Bruce, maybe two more after that in the next years, if this goes through. Lepreau may not shut down, may continue to operate. You'll be exposed there. Tell that to the Canadian people. Don't try to shove this through the back door. We're being dishonest if we do that.

·  (1330)  

    The Chair: Mr. Comartin, it being 1:30, I will ask the committee members, without debate, whether thay wish to sit until we've completed our work or to adjourn. Together we would find another time to continue with Mr. Comartin having the floor.

    By vote, this meeting is adjourned.