FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, December 2, 1997

• 0909

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills (Red Deer, Ref.)): I call the committee to order.

I do notice that most of the Liberals all went to that end, because I'm chairing. I assume that's the reason. I just noticed and I thought I should bring it to your attention.

Anyway, I'd like to welcome our guests. I understand we have three speakers who are going to present to us the issues. Our process will largely be that if you can make your comments as brief and to the point as possible, the most important part for the members here will be the ability to ask you questions about the issue of Algeria. So if I could ask you to keep it as brief as possible, then we can get the most questions in.

• 0910

I believe we're starting with Mr. Frenette.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Frenette (Director, Amnistie internationale): Good morning everyone, my name is Michel Frenette and I am the Director of the Canadian francophone section of Amnesty International.

As you know, on October 24 last, a number of organizations sent a joint letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs requesting that Canada try to arrange a special session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights for the purpose of sending an international mission of inquiry to Algeria.

The Civil Liberties Union worked with Amnesty International to promote this endeavour, thus reflecting in Canada the joint appeal on this subject launched one week earlier in Paris by Amnesty International, the International Federation of Human Rights, Human Rights Watch and Reporters without borders.

Why did so many organizations mobilize and why was such a request made? The answer is very simple. It is because the violence inflicted on the civil population in Algeria has reached intolerable proportions, and yet at the same time these people are being increasingly abandoned both by their own government and the rest of the world.

It should be noted that no United Nations machinery specializing in human rights has intervened in Algeria over the past six years. During that period, 80,000 people have been killed. We are telling you today that that number is high enough, that it cannot continue and that if in fact human rights know no borders, than the international community, beginning with Canada, must take action immediately.

Two weeks ago today, Amnesty International issued in New York its most recent report on Algeria, the sixth one devoted to that country since 1993. It explains how the civilian population, caught between the terror of armed Islamic groups and violations committed by the security forces, is less and less protected, particularly as in the country the rule of law is becoming weaker and weaker and the authorities are trying to erect a wall of silence to hide the real crisis in the area of human rights.

Armed Islamic groups are deliberately and arbitrarily killing civilians, with ever increasing savagery. During the early years of the conflict, they attacked members of the security forces and their families. Then specific groups such as teachers, journalists and professional women. From individual murders, they have now moved on to bomb attacks, thus killing people indiscriminately.

More recently there were the massacres of Sidi Raïs, where 300 people were killed; Sidi Youssef and Bentalha where 60 and 200 victims respectively; many women, children old people and even babies were massacred. Sometimes, these massacres go on for hours in highly militarized areas, because the local population are traditionally sympathetic to the Islamic Salvation Front.

In many cases, it has been shown that the army and security forces were stationed close to the villages and had ample time to intervene, stop the atrocities and apprehend the attackers. They never did so. Should we believe some evidence suggesting that armed groups responsible for these massacres sometimes work in cooperation with certain army units or security forces, or at least act with their consent? The question has not been resolved to the satisfaction of Amnesty International.

What is certain is that the reluctance or inability of the army and security forces to protect the civil population and the complete lack of inquiries into these massacres are particularly troubling. The Algerian government continues to state that it has control over the situation from a security view point and that violence occurs only infrequently. More than ever we can question the truth of these statements.

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The evidence is in fact that since 1995, the authorities have encouraged the civil population to take up arms and organize themselves into militia units. Such units, which often take part in large-scale military operations, do themselves use intimidation in order to control the populations concerned. Thus, you see groups of individuals recruited for arbitrary reasons acting outside the law, without necessary training or supervision. As regards the rule of law, such privatization of the conflict is certainly a step backwards.

In recent years, a climate of anarchy and impunity has developed. The judicial system has very little control over the various branches of the security forces. Given that no investigation has been carried out on violations of fundamental rights and that perpetrators are not being brought to justice, the members of the security forces know that they will not be held accountable for their actions. As a result, there are more and more violations. Violations can be divided into three types.

First, there are disappearances. Since 1994 Amnesty International has compiled reliable information on hundreds of cases.

Algerian law allows someone to be held in custody for 12 days, but in fact people are arrested and held in secrete detention for weeks or months, without any recourse to the legal system. They are deprived of any contact with the outside world and held in secret detention centres. During this period of secret detention, torture is commonly used. Over the past five years, Amnesty International has submitted to the Algerian authorities hundreds of cases of prisoners complaining of having being tortured, and we have asked them to ensure that investigations are carried out. To the best of our knowledge, no legal investigation has been undertaken.

Lastly, there are also cases of non-judicial executions for all those people that they cannot be bothered to arrest or try. The fact that Amnesty International has submitted hundreds of cases to the Algerian authorities shows that these are well-established practices and not just isolated incidents of abuse of power, as claimed by the authorities themselves.

The request of Amnesty International to the authorities have always been met by silence, a silence which moreover is intensified by all the restrictions they impose on the gathering and distribution of information. An edict published in June 1994 by the Ministry of the Interior gave instructions to the editors of newspapers concerning what they could publish and how information was to be presented. And if that is not enough, financial pressure is used to restrict press freedom.

The murder of over 60 journalists and people working in the media between 1993 and 1996, which is a higher number than in any other country, have dissuaded many foreign journalists from coming to Algeria. Some of those who still wanted to come have not been able to obtain a visa or, in order to ensure their so-called protection, have been subject to surveillance.

Algerian human rights advocacy groups are no longer able to collect information, carry out research or conduct appropriate inquiries. Death threats, harassment, arrests and the banning of meetings have paralyzed the activities of these organizations. It is also difficult for international human rights advocacy organizations to enter Algeria. Since the beginning of 1997, Amnesty International has been refused entry into the country. The last time the ICRC sent delegates to Algeria was in 1992.

As a result, the human rights crisis Algeria is going through is surrounded by a wall of silence. That is why we believe that the opening of an independent and impartial inquiry, to shed light on crimes committed and establish responsibility, would be the first step in breaking this vicious circle of human rights violations in Algeria.

• 0920

The Algerian authorities, who still ask the international community for support in its fight against terrorism, are hiding behind the pretext of sovereignty and non-interference when asked to account for the situation. Fundamental rights cannot be considered just as a domestic matter. No state, Algeria or any other, can invoke the principle of non-interference to justify allowing a helpless population to be butchered. By ratifying international treaties on human rights, the Algerian government has already recognized that such rights know no borders.

So I ask you to support the request forwarded to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that Canada intervene actively in favour of setting up an international mission of inquiry under the aegis of the United Nations.

Thank you.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Thank you very much.

I think we'll just go on and have the three presenters present and then we'll go to our questions. The next person is André Paradis, please.

[Translation]

Mr. André Paradis (Project Coordinator, Algeria, Ligue des droits et libertés): Good morning. My name is André Paradis and I am the project coordinator for Algeria at the Ligue des droits et libertés.

It is as a member of the International Federation of Human Rights that the Ligue des droits et libertés has gotten involved in the situation regarding Algeria. The International Federation of Human Rights is made up of about 100 national human rights advocacy organizations throughout the world and its membership includes two Algerian organizations.

The International Federation has been following the evolution of human rights in Algeria for a long time, and has been paying particular attention to it since the start of the crisis in 1992. It has intervened on several occasions with respect to the crisis, by appealing to international public opinion, bodies such as the United Nations and OAU, and the Algerian government.

The position of the International Federation has always been to not hesitate to condemn terrorism by fundamentalist groups, but also to say that the appropriate response would not be that of State to terrorism, because only a constitutional State, that is respectful of human rights, can stop the hate-based action taken by the armed fundamentalist groups and other Algerian extremists.

The position of the International Federation has always been to try to prevent the isolation of Algerian society that has been taken hostage by minority extremist groups.

Because of these basic positions, the International Federation has joined Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders and the World Organization Against Torture over the past few months in requesting that the UN Commission on human rights hold a special session on Algeria and set up an international commission of inquiry on basic human rights violations in this country.

The International Federation, like Amnesty International and the other large international human rights organizations, is convinced that only concrete steps taken by the international community can put an end to the spiral of violence and ensure that civilians in Algeria are protected.

The spiral of violence has accelerated and worsened over the past year. And again over the past few months, with the many horrific and barbaric massacres that have affected thousands and even tens of thousands of people.

Not only have Algerian authorities shown that they are unable to prevent an escalation in these civilian massacres, but there's persistent doubt that has developed among the Algerians affected by these massacres and among the numerous people observing the situation in Algeria regarding the deliberate laissez-faire attitude on the part of the forces of law and order with respect to these massacres.

Last spring, following a mission of inquiry into the administration of justice in Algeria, by the President of the International Federation of Human Rights, the Federation concluded that human rights were seriously and systematically violated by the Algerian government's military security forces.

More specifically, the FIHR concluded that the sphere of application of the law is highly restricted in favour of these extrajudicial measures, and moreover, that the legal framework is not synonymous with guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of the people subject to these laws.

Extrajudicial action comprises the most serious human rights violations that occur outside any legal framework. These actions were contrary to Algerian laws, including its most repressive provisions linked to maintaining the state of emergency that has been in force since February 9, 1992.

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The International Federation of Human Rights has solidly documented arbitrary arrests and secret detentions; systematic torture and abuse of known or alleged members of terrorist groups; involuntary disappearance including several cases that can be attributed to the security forces; summary executions and physical elimination by security forces of suspects or alleged suspects; numerous exactions by the militia, that is communal guards and legitimate self-defense groups set up at the request of the State.

The International Federation has also been able to measure how the guarantees of the justice system had become formal and practically inoperative in most cases.

The conclusions in the International Federation's report, like those reached by other international human rights NGOs, clearly showed that instead of getting stronger, the constitutional state has considerably weakened over the past year. Because the Algerian government is unable to ensure that its citizens' basic human rights are respected and because its security military forces are themselves responsible for the most serious abuse that the Algerian government cannot or will not sanction, the international community must step in immediately.

After the UN secretary general, the UN high commissioner for human rights, the director of UNICEF and the high commissioner for refugees, the French prime minister, Lionel Jospin, stated two weeks ago in Paris: "The international community needs to know what is going on in Algeria."

We believe Canada must move in the same direction and even go a bit farther. We feel that it must support, at the United Nations, the request made by international NGOs to set up an international inquiry commission on fundamental rights violation in Algeria, an inquiry that will focus, as my colleague said, on establishing the facts, examining who is allegedly responsible and formulating recommendations concerning the massacres and other abuse committed by all parties in the conflict. It is only through actions like these that it will perhaps be possible to come up with a solution to the Algerian crisis.

Thank you.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Thank you very much.

Paul, could you carry on, please?

Mr. Paul Dingledine (Director General, Middle East and North Africa Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): My name is Paul Dingledine. I'm director general for the Middle East and North Africa for Foreign Affairs. I have with me Mark Bailey, who is the director for North Africa, as well as Michel Archambault, who is the director general from CIDA for the Middle East.

Mr. Chairman, this terrible conflict that has been under way in Algeria since 1992 has now claimed well over 60,000 victims. Women, children, and the elderly have been the preferred targets of merciless terrorists in their daily attacks on the weakest members of Algerian society. Women have paid a particularly heavy price. In recent months the violence has reached a peak of cruelty. Canadians are shocked and deeply troubled by the numerous atrocities inflicted on defenceless people.

Our picture of precisely what is happening in Algeria is obscured by the inability of the press, both Algerian and international, to report fully on the events there. Similarly, the ability of our embassy personnel to observe and report is severely constrained by concern for their own security. Nevertheless, a few elements of the picture are indisputable.

Armed terrorists known as the Groupe islamique armé are carrying out attacks on the civilian population of great ferocity. Several other armed opposition groups, notably the Islamic Salvation Army, have recently declared truces in order to isolate and clearly identify the GIA as the perpetrators of the massacres.

The security forces, consisting of the army, the Gendarmerie, and the Sûreté nationale, are seeking to neutralize the GIA through large-scale military campaigns in areas where they are known to be active, but they are still some distance away from achieving their goal. The authorities have also armed elements of the civilian population to enable them to defend themselves, notably in rural areas. These are the so-called “patriotes”.

Allegations have been made—and we've just heard some this morning—that the security forces have stood idly by during some of the massacres and that some units as well as some of the patriotes may have actually participated in them. The Algerian authorities vehemently deny these allegations of complicity or participation.

• 0930

Allegations have also been made that the security forces, in the course of their anti-terrorist campaigns, committed human rights abuses. The Algerian authorities maintain that when such abuses are reported to them, investigations and corrective action, including the punishment of those who are guilty, are carried out.

[Translation]

The Algerian crisis affects us even more since Canada has excellent relations with Algeria. The Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to his Algerian counterpart to reiterate Canada's full and unequivocal condemnation of terrorism and to express Canada's profound sympathy for the victims of this terrible violence.

In recent months, Minister Axworthy has also had two opportunities to speak with the Algerian minister of foreign affairs about safety and humanitarian issues in that country.

[English]

To show our solidarity with the Algerian people and our determination to help them, Canada has maintained an embassy in Algiers, unlike some other countries. Indeed, we expect to inaugurate a new chancery this winter, proof of our long-term confidence in the future of Algeria and Algerians.

By maintaining our presence in Algeria, Canada is able to act directly in providing humanitarian assistance to the Algerian people, notably to those sectors of the population who are targeted by the terrorists.

For example, Canada helped with the reconstruction of the Maison de la Presse in Algiers after it was bombed by terrorists. Canada helped renovate day care centres so Algerian mothers could return to work. We purchased tools and machines to enable handicapped Algerians to work. In total, our embassy has implemented around 50 such humanitarian projects in the last two years.

Our work is sufficiently effective that a European country that does not have an embassy in Algiers recently contacted us to discuss having the Canadian embassy undertake to implement similar projects in Algeria on behalf of that European country.

Our diplomatic presence in Algeria allows us to conduct a continuous and open dialogue with the Algerian authorities. They know that the issues of security and human rights in their country are on the minds of Canadians and the Canadian government.

Minister Axworthy mentioned these concerns in his recent speech on human rights at the University of Ottawa. They were also mentioned in Canada's intervention on human rights at the UN General Assembly.

For my own part, last week, I called in the Algerian ambassador here in Ottawa to the department to go over some of our concerns. Our ambassador in Algiers is also raising these issues during his daily meetings with the Algerian authorities. We believe that the ultimate solution to these security and human rights problems lies in the consolidation of the rule of law and the full implementation of political and economic reforms in Algeria.

Accordingly, Canada supports these reforms that aim to increase citizen participation in governance and to lay the foundation of sustained economic growth. Only in this way can Algeria resolve the socio-economic problems that are the source of the current difficulties.

In particular, Canada supported the legislative elections last June by providing an elections expert to the UN team that organized the international observers, and then by contributing two observers to that team.

My colleague, Michel Archambault, can speak to you directly about CIDA's principal programs in Algeria, but for our part at Foreign Affairs, we're working actively to help Canadian companies find customers and joint-venture partners in Algeria, because we believe that strengthened commercial ties between Canada and Algeria will benefit both our peoples. This will help develop the Algerian private sector, which is a priority objective of the Algerian reform program.

To summarize, Mr. Chairman, Canada's policy approach to Algeria consists of the following elements: an unreserved condemnation of the terrorists; humanitarian support through our embassy to those sectors of the Algerian population targeted by the terrorists; and support for the political and economic reforms currently under way in Algeria.

Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Thank you very much.

Michel, I believe you have comments.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Archambault (Director general, North Africa and Middle East, Canadian International Development Agency): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Michel Archambault and I represent CIDA.

Ladies and gentlemen, yesterday, I sent the clerk of your committee a briefing note on CIDA's program in Algeria. I don't plan to repeat it here, but I would like to take a couple of moments to make a short statement on the rationale for CIDA's intervention in Algeria.

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In its statement Canada in the World, Canada indicated that development co-operation was an integral part of Canadian foreign policy. When CIDA defined a co-operation program with Algeria, the two governments agreed that Canadian assistance would support strengthening the private sector in Algeria.

As you know, this sector is one of CIDA's six priorities as stated in the foreign policy statement. The particular situation in Algeria seems to indicate that the choice of this sector was good; first of all because Algeria is at a stage of development where the private sector, through investments and bringing it up to speed to confront international competition, needs to participate more actively in helping the country grow; secondly because a stronger and more structured private sector will favour the emergence of a middle class and a more balanced civil society in this developing country. By helping the private sector in Algeria with capacity building through the transfer of Canadian technology where appropriate and by putting Algerian and Canadian operators in touch with each other, CIDA is contributing to opening Algeria up.

In addition, by seeking to twin Algerian and Canadian professional training institutions that must meet the respective private sector's human resources needs, we are moving in the same direction: meeting the private sector's needs and participating in opening up the country. This project, which is called the Institutional Strengthening Program and which I mentioned in the briefing note, should begin shortly.

I will be pleased to answer your questions. Thank you.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Thank you very much, presenters. I'll just start with a couple of questions, and then we'll go directly to the others here.

Mr. Dingledine, I'd like your response to the special commission concept that's been put forward.

Mr. Archambault, I guess my question for you would be how you are able to deliver CIDA projects under the conditions described to us, how difficult that must be.

Mr. Paul Dingledine: On the question of a special commission, there are a number of policy options that would be available to the minister, and that obviously would be for the minister to decide.

One of the considerations in considering any kind of international involvement is the fact that the government in Algeria has very explicitly rejected international involvement, as have the opposition parties, as have the terrorists, as have other elements.

In his statements, the minister has not rejected any commission of inquiry or commission d'enquête or whatever. What he has simply done in observing the absence of any support and cooperation from the Government of Algeria or the terrorists or the other parties, is speculate as to what could reasonably be expected to be achieved by international involvement in the crisis.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Thank you.

Mr. Archambault.

Mr. Michel Archambault: Thank you. I just want to remind you that the projects to which Paul was referring in his address were done by the embassy for humanitarian purposes, and are CIDA projects. This is one way in which we are involved in closer grassroots projects with the population. However, you are right to assume that the two main projects that I have outlined in the briefing notes are in fact difficult to implement at this point.

[Translation]

The issue of security is of great concern to us, and of course, sometimes slows us down in carrying out two of the most important projects that we have, including the private sector development fund, where we bring Canadian and Algerian operators together to build the Algerian capacity to face international competition.

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However, we can still have Algerian missions to Canada. Recently, in June if I remember correctly, a mission made up of about 15 Canadian operators went to Annaba, a region that is less affected by the violence. That does pose some security problems for us. We are, however, continuing to work with the Algerian government to overcome these matters and we are doing our best to protect the lives of Canadians and to not endanger them, while continuing this exchange between Canadian and Algerian operators. Thank you.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for having appeared before the committee. The Bloc Québécois wanted to hear from you; we wanted the committee to be apprised of the issue so that we could debate it with information in hand from NGOs and the Canadian government.

We have raised this issue in the House of Commons several times since the House resumed on September 22. I have spoken to Minister Axworthy several times about this issue that concerns us immensely.

And the Algerian authorities know that we are concerned about them, because the ambassador asked to meet with us last week. That is what we did. Ms. Debien and I met the ambassador and one of his advisors, who presented the views of the Algerian government on the issue. There is a certain number of questions I want to ask you.

First of all, I will address the representative from the government organizations. I would like you to establish the facts for us, if you are in a position to do so. One of the issues that was debated with the ambassador was the government's direct or indirect responsibility for the massacres and its responsibility with respect to other human rights violations.

As the representative from Foreign Affairs said, the ambassador, like the representatives of his government, deny participating in these massacres in any way. I would like to know if your organizations are in a position to establish a link between the massacres that have taken place up until now and the government or its agents, and to what extent this issue poses a problem that would justify an international inquiry.

I would like you to make the distinction between the massacres and the other human rights violations, because a lot of emphasis is placed on the massacres, whereas other human rights violations were referred to in your reports and in the reports of other non-governmental organizations.

I would like to know from the NGOs if other sections of Amnesty International or the International Federation of Human Rights are taking steps like those being taken in France and the United States, which are two key players and which could play an important role in determining whether or not the Human Rights Commission will set up an inquiry commission.

To the government representative, I have two questions. I would like to know what you know and if you have information on the role that the military is playing in the lives of Algerian people and its impact and influence on government, if any.

I would like to know, because Mr. Axworthy told me last week that he was advised during his trip to the Middle East to not bring up Algeria, if the idea of setting up an international inquiry commission for the reasons you pointed out is not accepted, it would not be a good idea for the Minister, like he has done in other areas, to do what he did in Europe and send a delegation of Canadian parliamentarians from the House of Commons to Algeria so that an inquiry can be conducted that way.

Those are my questions, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Who wants to start? Go ahead, Michel.

• 0945

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Frenette: As you noted earlier in my brief presentation, Amnesty International has never clearly stated that there was any collusion between the army or the security forces and those responsible for the massacres. That has not been established. Evidence seems to indicate that, but to date, there's no proof.

However, what has been established for sure is that there is some kind of indirect link in the sense that it is very clear that in many cases, the army was in a position to intervene but did not do so. Why did it not intervene?

We also met with the Algerian ambassador last week. And he presented all kinds of arguments, including the size of the territory and difficulties getting around. None of his arguments convinced us. We know very well, and it is documented in the Amnesty Report, that there are specific cases where sufficient forces were located nearby. What we have been forced to note is the refusal to get involved. What is this refusal to get involved based on? Our only reading of it at present is that the people who were victims of the massacres were people who supported the Islamic salvation front in the elections in 1990-91. Does that mean that they deliberately focused on these Islamic supporters? The question has been asked.

On the issue of the massacres and other violations, you are right. There has always been both exaction committed by the opposition armed forces and violations by the security forces and the military. In its initial reports, as early as 1992, Amnesty confirmed that, which has always angered Algerian authorities, who have always said that it was false, that it was practically indecent to compare terrorists and the forces of law and order. We are not trying to compare them and we are not interested in determining if one's violence is more serious than the other; that is not our purpose. We do however know that the violence is coming from both sides.

When the ambassador says that there are investigations and sanctions, we would really like to see concrete results of that. If it is true, why don't the Algerian authorities ever give Amnesty International the results of this investigation? The ambassador told us last week that we should understand that it is normal for soldiers to be tried behind closed doors. That is an easy way out of solving the problem. We are facing a wall of silence. We know however that when we documented certain cases, we can no longer talk about isolated incidents. We know that several types of violations are practised frequently.

Traditionally, our media has always provided extensive coverage of Islamic and fundamentalist exactions, but has provided very little coverage on violations committed by forces of law and order. I believe both have to be taken into account.

Mr. André Paradis: I would just like to say a few words about the massacres. The position of the International Federation of Human Rights is that there are persistent doubts with respect to the laissez-faire attitude on the part of the soldiers and the forces of law and order. This position is based on evidence gathered from people in villages where the massacres took place and from several stakeholders in Algerian society.

I would just like to point out that the three massacres that were the most widely reported on the news in September and October, the massacres in Bentalha, Raïs and Beni Messous, took place in the Mitidja Plain, which is near Algiers, and which is the most highly militarized region in the country.

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The massacres occurred in villages that are sometimes located at one, three or seven kilometres from very large military barracks, in a region that is full of security force outposts and where the army was very capable of intervening. They even have heavy artillery, like tanks, and even in the case of one village, the army was surrounding the village when the massacre took place.

The Algerian ambassador explained that it was difficult to intervene in that area. In other cases, he told us that the area around the villages had been mined by the armed fundamentalist groups. But how come the people in the village were able to flee, cross these supposedly mined areas and even reach the security forces' outposts to ask them to intervene, and that the security forces and the army did not ever intervene? There were some barracks and police stations that were less than 100 metres from where the massacres took place.

So I think that justifies the very serious suspicions regarding the attitude of the security forces, also given the fact that people in these regions voted for the Islamic Salvation Front, the FIS, in the election. It is at the very least unacceptable, without using stronger language, for the Algerian government—and once again these are allegations—to allow people to be massacred because they apparently voted for a fundamentalist party.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Gentlemen, if I could ask you to keep your answers a little briefer, we do have a number of questioners and we'd like to get around to everybody.

Mr. Robinson.

[Translation]

M. Daniel Turp: I do have a question for the representatives from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): We're actually quite a bit over the time, right now. Possibly we can get back around and maybe the answers will come out as we go along.

Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): Mr. Chairman, I agree with Mr. Turp. We do want to get some answers from the officials from Foreign Affairs as well, so perhaps I'll follow up on those questions as well.

I listened with care to the evidence given by Mr. Dingledine on behalf of the department, and I must say I was troubled and concerned by what I heard. He stated effectively that there are three elements to Canada's position: condemning terrorists, humanitarian support, and supporting political and economic reform. What I didn't hear was any significant commitment or even an acknowledgement of the role of the Algerian government in this human rights disaster.

I want to ask of Mr. Dingledine, on behalf of the department, what the position of Canada is on the call for a special session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to look at this terrible disaster that is unfolding in Algeria.

Mr. Paul Dingledine: On the question of the special session or any other international involvement, as I said earlier, there have been a number of formulas that have been suggested for international involvement. These have not been accepted or rejected.

What we have considered and what the minister has considered is without the cooperation and encouragement of the Government of Algeria or the other parties in the conflict, it's a fair question to ask what could be achieved. The ambassador has been a very active man, obviously, over the last couple of weeks. I can take, I think, some credit for that, because the purpose of my calling him in was to encourage the Government of Algeria to accept the legitimacy of international concerns about what was going on in Algeria and not to deal so brusquely with and dismiss so quickly quite legitimate concerns by ourselves, the Americans, Europeans, and others about this particular crisis.

• 0955

On the question of the involvement of the Government of Algeria itself—

Mr. Svend Robinson: I'm sorry. Before you get to that, I still haven't heard a clear answer on the issue of the Government of Canada response to the call by many groups—and certainly it's a call I strongly support, and my party supports—for a special session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. In the witness's evidence he didn't specifically deal with that. He talked about an international inquiry and how that would be difficult to implement without the cooperation of the Algerian government. A special session of the UN Commission on Human Rights can take place whether or not the Government of Algeria wants to cooperate, as the witness is well aware.

Again, I want to ask specifically, is the Government of Canada prepared to support the call for that special session of the commission on this issue?

Mr. Paul Dingledine: That is an answer, Mr. Robinson, only the minister can give. The government has not given a position on that particular question.

Mr. Svend Robinson: That's the answer, then. The government has no position on this.

Mr. Paul Dingledine: I don't know. Mr. Axworthy—

Mr. Svend Robinson: But that is what you're saying. If the government has a position, I would like to know what it is.

Mr. Paul Dingledine: But that's a policy position the minister will have to enunciate.

Mr. Svend Robinson: And so far there is no position.

Mr. Paul Dingledine: He has not responded to that specific question.

Mr. Svend Robinson: So we have no response on that issue. Frankly, I find it very disturbing that our government is not prepared to join its voice in calling for that special session, which doesn't require the cooperation of the Government of Algeria.

The European Parliament has recently decided to send a delegation to Algeria to look at first hand at the situation there, and I believe this is being done with the cooperation of the Government of Algeria. They have rejected other forms of international inquiry, but just recently they have accepted this delegation, as I understand it.

I wonder whether Mr. Dingledine is prepared to indicate whether the Government of Canada would be open to a similar delegation proceeding from the Canadian Parliament to look at first-hand the situation in Algeria, should we be in a position to send such an all-party delegation, similar to the European parliamentary delegation, whether this is an initiative that perhaps might meet with the approval of the Government of Canada.

Mr. Paul Dingledine: Again, I can't speak for the minister on that particular question. We are aware of the fact that a delegation from the European Parliament will be going to Algeria.

Algerian Foreign Minister Attaf was in Luxembourg recently and agreed to that. It has been suggested to us in Algiers that the Government of Algeria may be receptive to a similar proposal from us. But that is a question for Parliament and the minister to answer. I cannot answer on behalf of the minister on that question.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I would seek some further clarification on the position of the government to the extent that you're able to give it, as opposed to the minister. On Canada's and our government's position on the role of the Government of Algeria in ongoing human rights violations, we've heard about massacres and the condemnation of terrorists, but of course let's put this in historical context. In 1992 the election in Algeria was subverted. We're talking not just about massacres; we're talking about very significant violations of, for example, rights of freedom of expression, massive censorship, and what many would argue, and Amnesty and Ligue des droits et libertés have argued, is effective impunity for those who are responsible for some of these massacres.

I haven't yet heard one word from you on behalf of the government, at least, condemning the violations of human rights by the Government of Algeria. What is the position of the Government of Canada on violations by the Government of Algeria?

I ask this question knowing full well that Algeria is our largest trading partner in Africa and trade tends to dominate, and in some cases overshadow, our concern and our willingness to speak out on human rights abuses. So far there has been silence from you on behalf of the government. Could you perhaps open up a bit on our position on the recognition and responsibility of the Government of Algeria for human rights violations?

Mr. Paul Dingledine: Certainly the minister and the department and the government have regularly condemned any human rights violations in Algeria by the government. They have said very explicitly—the minister said it in his speech at the University of Ottawa a few weeks ago—that notwithstanding the brutality and the ferocity of the terrorism, this does not justify human rights abuses on the part of the government in fighting terrorism. He said that publicly and he has said that also in his meetings with the foreign minister, Minister Attaf.

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Of course I cannot speak for the Government of Algeria, but what we hear in our meetings and discussions with them is the clear distinction between the human rights abuses and the terrorism. As I said earlier, they do not accept and they do not want international involvement in the terrorism problem because they believe that will give sustenance and encouragement to the terrorists. However, in the conversations we've had with them, they accept the legitimacy of international concern about human rights abuses and they claim, as I've said and as the other witnesses have said, that when they are aware of such human rights abuses they pursue legal and proper procedures to correct them.

Without people on the ground, in the courts, in these villages when these things go on, it is extremely hard for us or the international press or our NGO colleagues to confirm irrevocably that these things are happening. But there is sufficient information out there to lead us to be very concerned and to lead the minister to speak up, both publicly and privately, condemning any such abuses in the fight against terrorism.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Mr. Brison.

Mr. Scott Brison (Kings—Hants, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The situation in Algeria is a good example of the type of conflict we've seen in the post-Cold War environment. There have been more than 100 interstate conflicts, many of which have been between states and their own people. Depending on perspective, this could be one of those conflicts between governments and their own people.

The genesis of this issue was in the 1991-92 election, when the Islamic Salvation Front was denied its victory and was effectively banned by the military and by the government. They won the election and they were not given the ability to govern at that time. That has led to this conflict.

Now, from what I can see, the Canadian government's position is one of partnership in the rebuilding of civil society and in the desire to provide stability to Algeria. We're partnering with this same group. And I share Mr. Robinson's concern about that position and our reticence to recognize the role the government is playing in this conflict.

Trade represents a national interest for Canada, but it also represents one of the levers we have to utilize in this type of engagement process. If we utilize that lever, we should be able to achieve the cooperation of the government through positive and negative conditionality as opposed to simply finger pointing at the terrorists. To what extent has positive and negative conditionality been explored, especially with levers of trade to resolve the conflict, as opposed to simply partnering with the governing party?

Secondly, we played a leadership role in the international community's intervention in eastern Zaire. From a human rights perspective and also from a national interest perspective and a trade perspective, it's very important to Canadians that the situation in Algeria be resolved fairly. To what extent is greater action being explored by the Canadian government in terms of engaging international partners in perhaps a larger scale intervention in Algeria?

I recognize there's been a proposal for an international inquiry and also a UN inquiry, which I sincerely hope, on behalf of my party, the Canadian government ultimately does support. Has there been a proposal for a framework for effective intervention in terms of reestablishing security, democratization, and civil institutions? It seems like our current participation is a bit of a band-aid approach if in fact it is totally focused on partnership with the government. Is there a framework somebody is proposing that would be a more holistic approach to this very complex problem?

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Mr. Paul Dingledine: It is the view of the Government of Canada that the long-term solutions to the problem in Algeria will come from a free and pluralistic society with democratic institutions and a market-driven economy. That ultimately will solve the problem, not perhaps in the next ten days, but over the longer term.

The Government of Canada's efforts, both the aid effort Mr. Archambault spoke about and the political effort, and I would include in that the dialogue we maintain with the Algerian authorities both here and there, our willingness to send UN observers to their election at some risk to the observers, and the third element, our economic relations, are all directed towards leading Algeria down this line towards a free and pluralistic society with a market economy. When you talk about conditionality, we have not looked at saying to Algeria, if you don't do this we will not lead you down that road, we will not give you any more humanitarian aid or provide any more trade. That option has not been explored. Our view up until now has been that we should use the foreign policy tools we have available to support the reforms we believe will ultimately solve the problem.

On the question of partnering, it is partnering with the government to the extent that you are operating in their country and you don't want to do that against their will. But sending election observers for United Nations-sponsored elections is not partnering with the government. Nor is providing humanitarian aid to victims of the terrorists really partnering with the government. In addition to supporting the economic and political reforms under way in Algeria, we are trying to provide whatever assistance we can to the victims of the terrorists.

Mr. Scott Brison: Is there not an inconsistency, given that the military played a role in quelling the will of the people in 1991-92 elections? To a certain extent, in efforts to provide democratization we are partnering with a group that initially denied democracy to the people of Algeria.

Mr. Paul Dingledine: That certainly is the genesis of the problems of the last seven years. What you are looking at now, as the other witnesses have testified, is terrorism of a brutality, ferocity and immensity that is rarely seen.

The other point I might make in response to this is that while the struggle in the early years after the election tended to be fairly simple in terms of the government versus Islamic terrorists, the situation now is far murkier. I was there in May. I spent some time talking to other diplomatic colleagues in addition to the government trying to get a fix on what was going on. It is not at all clear. In addition to the Islamic versus the government dimension of this conflict, you have all kinds of inter-tribe warfare, inter-village warfare, inter-family warfare, and just thugs. All that is mixed up together so that it becomes very difficult to draw a clear line between this side and that side.

Again, the long-term solution is democracy and a market-driven economy. That is what we are investing in.

Mr. Scott Brison: Again, I do see positive conditionality and negative conditionality as being effective levers, especially from a trade perspective. Our party's position in other Canadian engagements, for instance with China, has been as well that we can use those levers and should use those levers to create a linkage between human rights and trade policy and that they should not be separated.

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In this case, we again have a situation. Now there's talk of a division within the government between those who would be more favourable to engagement with some of the moderate Islamic groups and those government members who are not as favourable. Is there possibility of engagement with the moderate government members to try to seek a consensus and to isolate some of the other ones who are less likely to seek engagement?

Mr. Paul Dingledine: The Government of Canada relates directly to the Government of Algeria through their ministry of foreign affairs, as we do here, so I can't really answer the question except to say that on the question of what they call “outside involvement” or “international involvement” in the dispute, not only the government party in Algeria has rejected that. The opposition parties have also rejected that.

Mr. Scott Brison: One last—-

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): I believe Mr. Assadourian is next. Thank you.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre): Thank you very much for coming here and speaking to us about the Algerian issue. I was involved in this issue when I was going to school in the Middle East. Every time there was a big celebration, Algerian “freedom fighters”, or terrorists, depending on how you describe them, blew up a bomb against the French occupation.

Actually, my first question comes from that. Is there a connection between this conflict now and the conflict in the 1950s or early 1960s, when Algerians were fighting for their independence from France? I am saying that there may have been more than one group at the time of the revolutionary movement, a group that controls the government now, while the other one is left out in the cold. That's my first question.

Second, is there a class struggle between urban people and the rural areas? When the French were occupying the Algerian territory they created their own class. They used to describe Algeria as part of France and said that it just happened to be south of the Mediterranean. They said we were all the same people and what have you. I remember that too.

Also, in 1992, when these elections were ignored, what did we do then? Did we recall our ambassador from Algeria, did we call in our Algerian ambassador here in Ottawa, or did we stand by so that we're just a johnny-come-lately now? When we stood by in 1992, we didn't do anything, and now we feel sorry. Only 60,000 people died in the last six or seven years. Does it take 60,000 people to die in order for us to be active? Humanly, that's what frustrates me.

If you had acted on these issues in 1992 when the Algerian government did what it did, which created this situation.... You could have called in the ambassador of Algeria and said “Listen. We cannot tolerate this. Either you shape up or you ship out. We're going to stop dealing with you.” Or you could have recalled our ambassador from Algeria, saying enough is enough, as we did in other cases. I'm sure you know about Nigeria too. It was a similar situation. We decided to expel them from the Commonwealth. We were very active. I am very happy about it.

My question is about Algeria being a French colony. Is Algeria a member of the Francophonie?

Mr. Paul Dingledine: No.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: No? Okay. It is a member of the Arab League, right?

Mr. Paul Dingledine: Yes.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Do we deal with the Arab League on issues to do with Arab nations, or do we just ignore the Arab League component in this conflict?

Those are some of the questions I have. Thank you.

Mr. Paul Dingledine: Okay. I'm not sure that I have enough background information on Algeria to answer you in detail.

On the question of the relationship between what's going on now in the war of independence—and Mark may be able to supplement—I don't think there is a direct relationship, except that there is a legacy from the war of independence in Algeria, a bitterness and viciousness against the French as well as a class struggle, which remains very much a feature of Algerian society today. But I don't see a direct linkage between those two.

Mark, would you—-

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: I'm talking about the Ben Bella group and his opponents, the first president of Algeria.

Mr. Paul Dingledine: I can't answer that question.

Mr. Mark Bailey (Maghreb and Arabian Peninsula Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Thank you. My name is Mark Bailey and I work with Mr. Dingledine in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Ben Bella is now living in exile in Morocco. Frankly, I doubt very much whether that is really any part of a factor in what's going on now. I certainly agree with what Mr. Dingledine just said about the legacy of Algeria's war of independence from the French. I also think that perhaps some of their sensitivity to the international community is part of that legacy. It comes from that time when they were going through a really quite horrific struggle for their independence from the French.

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Mr. Paul Dingledine: On some of the other questions that I noted, I would say a class struggle is less of a dimension of what's going on now. Most of what's happening, most of the terrorism now, is outside Algiers. It's in the villages and is inter-tribal, inter-village, and sometimes personal, but generally not inter-class.

On whether we withdrew our ambassador in 1992, I would have to check on that, because I don't know exactly what we did on that.

I think we need to make a clearer distinction between the example you gave of Nigeria and the case of Algeria. In Algeria, we're looking at terrorists who are murdering 60,000 people, not the government. In the case of other places where we have withdrawn our ambassadors, it's because we have been very upset with what the government has been doing to its own citizens.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: In this case, the government is standing by when the killings are taking place. What's the difference?

Mr. Paul Dingledine: There are allegations that the government is standing by. I mentioned them, and others mentioned them.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: We were told that the soldiers were standing 500 metres away from where women and children were being massacred.

Mr. Paul Dingledine: But the Algerian government vehemently denies that this is the case. They have denied it to Mr. Turp, and they have also denied it to me. I think the Algerian government acknowledges there is potentially a problem on human rights, but they see this essentially as a terrorism problem. It is the terrorists who are murdering the people.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Do our NGO guests have something they'd like to add to that? No?

Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: You said you're going to check on 1992. I assume we stood silent, because I didn't see any people worked up and aggressively condemning the action of the Algerian government.

Do you think we stood silent as a “Gee, it's nice, now the Algerian government is doing our dirty work” reaction? They banned the Islamic fundamentalists, and we don't want any so-called Iran-type government in the region, so it's okay, it's nice and dandy. Was there international cooperation in that regard, a feeling that the job was done for us? We don't want fundamentalists in Algeria. Next to Algeria is Libya. On the other side of the Mediterranean you have Iran. We don't want any more central Europes, no Balkans, no wars going on or starting very soon, or there will be another Muslim republic there. Let's leave this Algerian problem for their own government. They're doing a good job. They cancelled, they ignored the elections. So be it. Our hands are clean, so to speak. Now we're paying for that—am I right?

Mr. Paul Dingledine: Well, I wasn't around in this job in 1992, so I honestly can't say exactly what the reaction was in 1992. That's something—

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Can you check on this one too, please? I would like to know what we were doing then to condemn the actions of the government.

Mr. Paul Dingledine: Mr. Chairman, we'll be happy to dig out what statements or what actions were taken.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): You can send that back through the clerk, and then everyone can have the answer.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: I would appreciate it. Thank you.

Mr. Paul Dingledine: And it is the period after the election that you would like to know about?

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: From the time of the elections, during the elections, after the election, when government took decisions saying there would be no more elections, that's it; and then when we stood by, I would like to know that we didn't say “Gee, it's nice, the job is done for us”. I would appreciate whatever you can provide.

Mr. Paul Dingledine: We will look up the statements and other actions taken at that time.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Thank you very much.

Could we go to Madame Guay, please.

[Translation]

Ms. Monique Guay (Laurentides, BQ): I will address my questions to Mr. Archambault from CIDA. I read through a document prepared by the department on November 28 entitled: Algeria, Briefing Notes on the CIDA Cooperation Program. I have two questions on that topic.

In your opinion, Mr. Archambault, is it a good time for CIDA to increase its development cooperation budget in Algeria from $3.2 million in 1996-1997 to just under $4 million for 1997-1998, considering what has been happening there for the past few years?

Mr. Michel Archambault: It is true that the budget is scheduled to increase, but that must be clarified. We must point out that our projected expenditures for the current fiscal year are higher because the activities we planned some time ago are more numerous than they were last year.

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We have not approved any new projects for two years. Even the Institution Strengthening Program that is referred to in this document is not currently in operation, even though it was approved some time ago by our minister. When it becomes operational, funds will be disbursed in accordance with the financial commitment the Canadian government made when the minister approved the project. At the time, I think Mr. Boudria was minister, or perhaps it was Mr. Pettigrew.

So the current disbursement of funds each year is in accordance with the evolution of operations in the field, and not an issue of commitments. For the time being we have not made commitments that go beyond those we made in the past. Each year, the minister approves a five year plan and what we call planning indicators, and we do not exceed the limit approved by the Minister. From time to time we even have to reduce the number of activities, because for the past few years, the funding that Parliament makes available to CIDA has been somewhat reduced. So sometimes we scale down our activities as requested by Parliament, which allocates CIDA's budget. The budget is then divided up by the Minister responsible for CIDA in accordance with government policy. This $800,000 increase is related to additional activities, but does not necessarily correspond to additional commitments made by CIDA.

I hope I was clear and that I did not use too much gobbledygook. I am entirely at your disposal should you require further information.

Ms. Monique Guay: Mr. Archambault, what is the difference between an increase in activities and an increase in budget? That was not clear.

Mr. Michel Archambault: Right. We decide on CIDA's program when we plan our projects. For example, when we were planning a $15 million project in 1995, we estimated, during the planning process and when we asked our minister for approval, that over the next five years, we would spend approximately $3 million per year. But occasionally there are delays and we spend only $2 million to operate a certain project, while in other cases, we can expand our activities because the project requires it and our expenditures are higher. What the minister has approved is a total of $15 million. It is a cash-flow management issue, and not a matter of more commitments. For the time being, our commitments are limited to these two more substantial projects, in addition to the Canadian Fund for Local Initiatives that is referred to in the document.

Ms. Monique Guay: Thank you for your explanation. It was clear and we understood you well. Out of this budget of roughly $4 million that CIDA will spend in 1997-98, only $270,000 will be directly injected into defending human rights and democratic development. How can you explain that it represents such a small portion of the overall budget for CIDA's program in Algeria, when requirements for defending human rights and democratic development are so much greater and so much more striking now? I would perhaps also like to hear the views of the representatives from Amnesty International, if possible.

Mr. Michel Archambault: In fact, so would I, because I will comment on that.

First of all, I would like to clarify that the issue of human rights and openness in Algeria are two faces of the same reality. When we work on matching Canadian and Algerian operators, under the Institutional Strengthening program, we twin Canadian professional and technical training institutions, community colleges, and Cegeps with similar institutions in Algeria. We create openness and development on a person to person basis. That is what we are trying to achieve through our program. As opposed to what we do in the commercial program, we are trying to bring people together so that they can benefit from networking.

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When we do this through the Private Sector Development Fund, our objective focuses to a larger extent on private sector development, but we are doing this to help make Algerian society more open.

Human rights is a rather sensitive matter. There is the issue of absorption in Algeria. As you noted in the last paragraph of the briefing notes, I indicated that there were currently no activities being conducted by Canadian NGOs in Algeria.

We often rely on NGOs in developing countries to transfer Canadian values. They are foreign policy instruments, and Canadians are Canadian foreign policy instruments. They are often the leaders of Canadian foreign policy.

In Algeria, historical circumstances are such that Canadian groups have intervened too often. What we trying to do, like the Canadian government, is encourage business as well as educational operators, because we know that the Algerian government wants that. So we have better opportunities to intervene if the Algerian government and Algerian business and educational leaders want us in their country.

That is why we would be prepared to give some funding to Canadian NGOs who would like to work in Algeria, who would like to develop partnerships with some Algerian associations or organizations. I know that it is very difficult, but we would be prepared to make a financial commitment to their effort if some of them were to take on the risk.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): We're quite a bit over our time. If we could go to Ms. Beaumier, we should have time to come back.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): I won't be long, Mr. Chair.

It's very confusing. We seem to have all sorts of bad guys over there. From what I've determined, we have authorities in the government who may be in collusion with the militia, which is in collusion with both sides. No one seems to want to take responsibility for what's happening there.

We have this special UN session, and we have this inquiry. If we don't have the cooperation of the governing party, what then? Where is the ambassador in all of this? You say you talk to him. He has come to the Bloc. What does he want? What is he asking for? No one seems to want to take responsibility or admit their involvement in what's going on.

The question I have for CIDA is, I want to know the percentage of aid that goes into both business development and humanitarian aid. We've seen in China that human rights violations have increased, not decreased, with the onslaught of trade. We also know in countries where there are human rights violations that corruption is a big part of the problem we have there.

When you talk about developing business within these countries you're not really talking about developing business and creating a new middle class. It's usually those who have influence within the government who benefit from this.

I'd like to know which percentage, then, is to humanitarian aid to further encourage and develop democracy.

Mr. Paul Dingledine: Perhaps I could lead off.

I certainly agree with you that the picture is very confusing, with a lot of different players and a lot of grief. I think the question—that is, if there was a special UN session, what next?—is a very good question, and one that perhaps needs to be addressed before the UN session gets under way. I don't think there are any answers to what happens next.

For our part, we believe, as I said earlier, that the long-term problem can be solved through democracy and a market-driven economy. In the short term, we continue to encourage the government of Algeria to accept the legitimacy of our concerns internationally about what's going on.

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You ask where is the ambassador in all this. That is what the ambassador is doing: he is responding to appeals from us to talk to Canadians, to talk to Canadian MPs, to explain to them what is going on, instead of saying “None of your business”, which we find an unacceptable answer.

I might say that our efforts to encourage the Government of Algeria to be responsive to international concerns include encouraging the Government of Algeria to field a minister before this committee. There was a possibility of that happening this week, but it did not happen. If the committee is still interested in the spring, there will be another Algerian minister here, probably in February or March, and they may be willing to do that at that time.

Michel.

Mr. Michel Archambault: Thank you for your question. I have to answer with a caveat. I was mentioning a few minutes ago the difference between what is directly affecting humanitarian needs and what is indirectly affecting the opening of the Algerian society. The major portion of our program is directed at the Algerian private sector, but through that, we really want to have an effect, an output, a result, in the opening of the Algerian society.

This being said, if you look at the figures I have provided, roughly $300,000 a year goes from the Canadian ambassador in Algiers to small organizations that deal with humanitarian needs, human rights needs. This is a punctual intervention by the Canadian ambassador in Algiers, who is there on the spot, who can see the needs, who can answer immediately to the needs as put to him. The program we have managed from headquarters here is a larger-picture, longer-term type of intervention.

Allow me please to also mention the fact that our intervention with the private sector in Algeria is focused on the small and medium-sized private sector in Algeria; therefore we are dealing with people who have 10 to 50 employees. This is the range of people we want to target in our

[Translation]

Private Sector Development Fund,

[English]

because obviously they are the backbone of a society, as we know very well in Canada, and also because these people normally do not get attention from the government as much as do the larger societies in Algeria, the state societies in Algeria.

So with the concurrence and at the request of the Government of Algeria, we have focused our efforts in the private sector towards these small and medium-sized enterprises.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: But what is the percentage of humanitarian aid as opposed to business development?

Mr. Michel Archambault: If you look at the document I have provided, roughly $300,000 is given to the ambassador every year.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: What percentage is that?

Mr. Michel Archambault: It's out of $3 million; it's therefore 10% directly focusing on humanitarian, while the remainder is focusing on

[Translation]

the opening up of the government and society.

[English]

Mr. Svend Robinson: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, I wonder if we might also get details of this $270,000 budget forwarded through the chair to members.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Mr. Robinson, if we could just let Mr. Frenette—

Mr. Svend Robinson: This is just a follow-up. If we could get the details sent to us, that would be good.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Okay, sure.

Could you send us those details, Mr. Archambault?

Mr. Frenette, you had a comment.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Frenette: Yes. My comment refers to Ms. Guay's question. As a human rights defence organization, there is no doubt that we are very pleased to see CIDA or Foreign Affairs going forward with humanitarian projects that will lead to a stronger civil society and to democratic development.

However, we also maintain that we must not settle for this quiet approach while people are being massacred. It simply is inappropriate. It is not good enough. For our part, we are trying to find out what the victims think, and I can tell you that in their view, measures such as those you have mentioned, are merely a drop in the bucket. Much more is needed.

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We must act, and we must act now.

I come back to what was said earlier, namely the famous refusal argument of the Algerian authorities. What are we hoping for? That they would ask us to go there? Let us not be naive. They know that they will be the first ones to be directly concerned, and that they will be the target of whatever commission of enquiry may be established.

There is no government of this type in the world—and if I were in their place I would do the same thing—that would ask for a commission of enquiry. I think they are using this argument—the refusal of the Algerian government—to justify its lack of action is not acceptable. We know very well that the government would agree to a commission of enquiry if it felt it was blameless. The Algerian government will resist as long as there is insufficient international pressure. You in fact mentioned that it is trying to prevent such an initiative in every way, including intimidation.

You probably know that the Algerian ambassador in Geneva even asked that Amnesty International lose its advisory status with the United Nations, because he is so angry with human rights advocacy organizations.

At the moment, the major international human rights NGOs have exerted maximum pressure. It would be difficult to do more than what is being done.

Your asked, Mr. Turp, whether all the sections of Amnesty were taking steps of this type. I can tell you the answer is yes. All the European and American sections are taking measures similar to ours.

Within the United Nations, many important individuals have come out in favour of some action. They Secretary General himself and Mary Robinson, the person in charge of UNICEF, said that international intervention would be appropriate and should be considered.

The United Nations provides a context for action through appropriate bodies such as the Human Rights Commission and through its rapporteurs. The only thing lacking is political will. That is what is missing at the moment, and we could say that no European or North American country dares show the political will required to introduce a proposal for a commission of enquiry.

The question therefore is whether or not Canada is prepared to assume this leadership or us. I think Algeria is tremendously afraid of Canada's position in this regard, because Canada can use its neutrality to enhance its initiative.

It is quite difficult to think that France would play a leadership role, because of its history in Algeria and the war of independence. Canada is in a much better position to assume such a role.

[English]

The Chairman: I would again remind our witnesses to address their answers to the questioner. We will get back and try to get around. It's difficult when we're answering questions two or three times.

Madam Debien, five minutes.

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien (Laval East, BQ): No, that's fine. Mr. Frenette has answered my question.

[English]

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: The point is that in the future, when we meet with delegations, especially those from Algeria or Nigeria, whatever the case may be, maybe it would be advisable for us to have a brief from Foreign Affairs on the trade between our country and that country and the political situation there, something in writing, two or three pages. Then we could ask the questions based on the information we have. CIDA's answers could be in that briefing. I don't know.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): I guess we could pass that on to the researchers. It's easy to come by. It's available from Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Yes, if we have it here it would be easier.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Sure. I think we can make that suggestion.

[Translation]

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau (Repentigny, BQ): I think it is my turn.

The Chairman: Mr. Sauvageau.

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: Thank you. I would like to make a comment and ask a few short questions of the official from the Department of Foreign Affairs and of Mr. Archambault, from CIDA.

I find your argument a little troubling, Mr. Frenette. You say that by intervening directly with individuals, we are advancing the cause and opening up the future to the Algerian government. Look at the first sentence of Amnesty International's paper. It says:

The last year has seen... the human rights crisis continue to worsen in Algeria.

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Since 1992, according to available statistics, there have been 80,000 deaths. Last year was worse than the previous years. I therefore think that giving certain individuals several million dollars is not the best approach, and the figures have shown this. However, we should not eliminate that, as Mr. Frenette said. However, we should perhaps consider other alternatives, such as giving 10% of the budget directly to efforts to recognize human rights. I think the budget could in fact increase, because the figures show, that it is not being followed.

If we have not managed to convince you this morning, we will try a different approach to convince you how important and relevant it is to provide funding for this cause. I'd like to hear what you think about that.

My question is to Mr. Paul Dingledine.

We've been having a few little, informal discussions during your presentation. We thought that a delegation of Canadian parliamentarians could go to Algeria to see the situation for itself. Do you think it would be appropriate to join the European Union Delegation, that is to ask them, since they may already have a work plan, whether some Canadian parliamentarians from all parties could accompany the European Union Delegation when it visits Algeria?

[English]

Mr. Paul Dingledine: On the question of the delegation to Algeria, this is something that has happened over the last few days. The Algerian foreign minister was in Luxembourg. The suggestion came, I presume—I don't know—from the Europeans that Algeria accept a European parliamentary delegation, and the Algerians have agreed to that.

The idea of a Canadian parliamentary delegation arose in the context of the conversations our ambassador had with the Algerian authorities over the weekend. One of the purposes of those conversations was to encourage the Government of Algeria to have a minister here before this committee today. But in that context this question arose.

I think it is essentially a political question for members, the minister, to determine whether the House wishes to pursue something directly with Algeria or pursue something along with the Europeans. It's not a question an official can really respond to.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Ms. Augustine.

Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke—Lakeshore, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, these sessions where the committee has to listen to the human rights situation in various countries and in Algeria in particular are always very distressing. The picture is really confusing. We hear of inter-tribal, inter-village...a deeply divided society, the situation of women and children, the lack of any kind of gender equality or recognition of that. It seems to me the problems rotate around religious and cultural mores in the society when we hear that massacres are hailed as doing God's work, that there's a struggle between good and evil in the society.

In taking all these pieces and trying to put them all together, I'm asking how Canada and the work of CIDA can affect, influence, in that atmosphere. What we can do to address the situation of women in that cultural milieu? What are we doing or what we can do to get the international agreements and the other fora in which we have human rights needs addressed? What can we do to ensure that Algeria recognizes the place of nations in human rights, respect for individuals, equality of the sexes and all those things that seem to be part of the international picture?

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How are we operating in an environment where we see so many of those abuses, and especially abuses to women, in terms of the 10% of our dollars that's put to underground kinds of activities? How are those underground activities assisting and ensuring that all of those issues are brought to the fore?

Mr. Paul Dingledine: The whole question of human rights, both in the Middle East and elsewhere, is obviously an important element of the Canadian foreign policy that is pursued, both multilaterally and bilaterally, in each country.

It's worth noting in the case of Algeria that we occupy a non-traditional place in the sense that we are far more important there than we are in most countries. We have either the fourth or the fifth largest embassy in Algiers. Many European countries do not have embassies there at all. So we are a significant player in the dialogue with the Algerians. We have influence, we are listened to, and these points on human rights are made daily by our embassy there.

More specifically, on the developmental side, Mr. Archambault will respond.

Mr. Michel Archambault: Thank you, Ms. Augustine, for the question. It allows me to also answer a prior question by Mr. Sauvageau and Mr. Robinson.

To give you an idea of what the ambassador is doing, among so many other tasks in Algeria, I will give you some examples of associations and organizations he has helped.

For example, we allotted $5,000 to the Coopérative des jeunes, a youth co-operative, to provide it with equipment and raw material to make garments in leather. This specific group needed that kind of help.

We gave $7,000 to the Coopérative féminine, similarly in the field of sewing garments. We have Les assises nationales des femmes démocrates. It's a discussion group for women. We provided it with $7,000 for a little bit of computerized informatique in order to communicate with each other. Similarly, we helped another youth group, Achats d'informatique et bureautique.

We helped the association of journalists, to allow it to go to international meetings of journalists so the Algerians could have their voices heard. That was $5,000 Canadian, a very small amount of money. But at the same time, it develops the influence of Canada in Algeria with this kind of care we provide people to people.

I have many of those examples for 1996-97, and I think we do make a bit of difference there. As Mr. Dingledine was saying earlier, a European country that doesn't have an embassy in Algiers has asked the Canadian embassy to disburse some money from that country to small associations and organizations.

So we are an example, people like what we're doing, and we are multiplying. We have a leverage effect. It is not enough, but it is what we're trying to do.

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The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Just one comment, Mr. Dingledine, about the European member of Parliament visit. I wonder if you could give the committee more information on that. When is it happening? Certainly getting us a report of what they find, what they observe, would help. Possibly if we were considering it here we might look at the areas they hadn't covered. In other words, this committee could learn quite a bit from what they are doing and what their plans are. If you could provide us with that, I think it would be most helpful.

Mr. Paul Dingledine: Mr. Chairman, I don't have much information right at this moment. This happened just last week. But over the next few days we can get you at least what is available now on what their plans are, and then subsequently more information will be available.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): I think it would be quite helpful for us to have that information.

Madam Debien.

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien: In 1989, Algeria signed the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which provides for a regular review every two years. As we know, Algeria submitted a report in 1992, almost three years late, and has not submitted any reports since that time.

However, Algeria promised the United States to produce a report in 1998. In the current situation, we might well wonder what extensions Algeria will ask for this time. According to our information, the UN Human Rights Commission is intending to send in a special rapporteur.

I have not seen the report submitted by Algeria to the Human Rights Commission pursuant to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Would the department—my question is to Mr. Dingledine—have a copy of the report submitted by Algeria? If so, I would like a copy sent to the committee.

My second question is to Mr. Frenette or to Mr. Paradis. Last spring, I personally attended some meetings of the Human Rights Commission in Geneva, and I did not hear about any report on Algeria. I would like to know whether you have this information, and also what you think of the Human Rights Commission's decision to send in a special rapporteur. I would also like to know whether a special rapporteur has already been sent.

Mr. André Paradis: As far as we know, the issue of Algeria was not raised at the last session of the Human Rights Commission.

Three years ago, the Algerian government invited the rapporteur to come and investigate the summary executions that occurred in Algeria. For various reasons, the rapporteur was unable to act on this invitation from the Algerian government. However, we know that at the moment there is renewed interest in a visit to Algeria by the rapporteur, and perhaps even some senior rapporteurs to look at specific subjects such as extrajudicial executions, summary executions, disappearances, and so on.

[English]

Mr. Paul Dingledine: I'm not aware of any specific report we have. We will check if there are any UN documents relating to human rights in Algeria, and if we have such documents we'll provide them. But offhand I'm not aware that such documents exist.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Mr. Turp.

Mr. Daniel Turp: I will try to provide you with some information. We are referring to the report by Algeria to the U.N. Human Rights Commission. These reports are supposed to be submitted periodically. I am sure it must be in the library at the Lester B. Pearson Building.

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I think this is indeed an important document for the committee. If we had it, we could see that these reports state nothing. We could perhaps get a copy of the minutes of the meeting at which committee members asked questions of the Algerian representatives. We could see what kind of answers were provided.

Personally, I think we have somewhat of a dialogue of the deaf here. When the NGOs ask the government to take action to facilitate a special session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission or to promote the establishment of an international commission of enquiry, the government uses the pretext of Algeria's refusal to do nothing. So that is not getting us anywhere.

I would like to ask the representatives of the NGOs what they would like us to do as Parliamentarians to make people aware of the situation in Algeria. A recent poll published a few weeks ago showed that over 70% of the Quebeckers questioned asked that the Canadian government get involved in this matter. I would like to know from our witnesses what they would like us to do as Parliamentarians to get something happening.

Mr. André Paradis: I think we have already stated our wishes clearly—namely that the committee recommend to the House of Commons and the Minister of Foreign Affairs that they support the request put forward by the major international human rights NGOs for an extraordinary session of the Human Rights Commission on Algeria and the establishment of some type of international commission of enquiry.

I should say that the Minister of Foreign Affairs has asked to meet with us. There will be a meeting here in Ottawa next week at which we will have an opportunity to further discuss our proposals with him.

I would like to emphasize once again the point made by my colleague from Amnesty. Originally, the Secretary General of the U.N. was the first to call for the intervention of the international community. Then Ms. Robinson, the High Commissioner of Human Rights, then representatives from UNICEF and the Office of the High Commission for refugees did the same. The reason these calls were not heeded and the reason for the current silence from the U.N. is doubtless the very strong negative response from the Algerian government. However, the main reason may be, as was said before, that the U.N. officials did not find any support or political will among the member states, particularly those who are members of the U.N. Human Rights Commission.

Mr. Daniel Turp: We take note of your comments. The committee will act accordingly. We intend to put forward a motion on this matter.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Thank you.

I would like to thank our witnesses for your appearance here today.

I'd like to remind the committee that our next meeting is Thursday at 9.30 a.m., when Minister Marleau will be here.

Thank you. The meeting is adjourned.