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38th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, November 17, 2005

1005

The Chair (Mr. John Cannis (Scarborough Centre, Lib.))

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron (Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, BQ)

The Chair

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron

The Chair

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron

The Chair

The Clerk of the Committee

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron

Le greffier

The Chair

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

The Chair

Brigadier-General G.W. Nordick (Chief, Defence Intelligence, Department of National Defence)

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

1010

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

BGen G.W. Nordick

1015

1020

The Chair

Mr. Gordon O'Connor (Carleton—Mississippi Mills, CPC)

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Gordon O'Connor

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Gordon O'Connor

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Gordon O'Connor

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Gordon O'Connor

1025

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Gordon O'Connor

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Gordon O'Connor

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Gordon O'Connor

BGen G.W. Nordick

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

BGen G.W. Nordick

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

1030

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Claude Bachand

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Claude Bachand

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Claude Bachand

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Claude Bachand

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Claude Bachand

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Claude Bachand

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Claude Bachand

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Claude Bachand

1035

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Claude Bachand

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Claude Bachand

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Claude Bachand

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Claude Bachand

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Claude Bachand

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Claude Bachand

BGen G.W. Nordick

The Chair

Hon. Larry Bagnell (Yukon, Lib.)

BGen G.W. Nordick

Hon. Larry Bagnell

BGen G.W. Nordick

Hon. Larry Bagnell

BGen G.W. Nordick

1040

Hon. Larry Bagnell

BGen G.W. Nordick

Hon. Larry Bagnell

BGen G.W. Nordick

Hon. Larry Bagnell

BGen G.W. Nordick

Hon. Larry Bagnell

BGen G.W. Nordick

Hon. Larry Bagnell

BGen G.W. Nordick

Hon. Larry Bagnell

BGen G.W. Nordick

Hon. Larry Bagnell

BGen G.W. Nordick

Hon. Larry Bagnell

BGen G.W. Nordick

Hon. Larry Bagnell

1045

BGen G.W. Nordick

The Chair

Mr. Dave MacKenzie (Oxford, CPC)

The Chair

Mr. Dave MacKenzie

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Dave MacKenzie

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Dave MacKenzie

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Dave MacKenzie

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Dave MacKenzie

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Dave MacKenzie

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Dave MacKenzie

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Dave MacKenzie

The Chair

Hon. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Lib.)

BGen G.W. Nordick

1050

Hon. Keith Martin

BGen G.W. Nordick

Hon. Keith Martin

BGen G.W. Nordick

Hon. Keith Martin

BGen G.W. Nordick

Hon. Keith Martin

BGen G.W. Nordick

Hon. Keith Martin

BGen G.W. Nordick

The Chair

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron

1055

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron

BGen G.W. Nordick

1100

M. Gilles-A. Perron

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron

BGen G.W. Nordick

The Chair

Mr. Wajid Khan (Mississauga—Streetsville, Lib.)

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Wajid Khan

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Wajid Khan

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Wajid Khan

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Wajid Khan

1105

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Wajid Khan

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, CPC)

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

BGen G.W. Nordick

1110

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson (Lethbridge, CPC))

Hon. Larry Bagnell

BGen G.W. Nordick

Hon. Larry Bagnell

BGen G.W. Nordick

Hon. Larry Bagnell

BGen G.W. Nordick

Hon. Larry Bagnell

BGen G.W. Nordick

Hon. Larry Bagnell

BGen G.W. Nordick

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

Mr. Wajid Khan

1115

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Wajid Khan

BGen G.W. Nordick

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

BGen G.W. Nordick

1120

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

BGen G.W. Nordick

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

BGen G.W. Nordick

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

Mr. Claude Bachand

BGen G.W. Nordick

1125

Mr. Claude Bachand

BGen G.W. Nordick

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron

BGen G.W. Nordick

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

Dr. David Carment (Professor, Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Project, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University)

1140

1145

1150

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

Dr. Marie-Joëlle Zahar (Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Montréal)

1155

1200

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

Dr. Jane Boulden (Canada Research Chair in International Relations and Security Studies, Department of Politics and Economics, Royal Military College of Canada)

1205

1210

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

Mr. Gordon O'Connor

Dr. David Carment

Mr. Gordon O'Connor

Dr. David Carment

1215

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

Dr. Jane Boulden

Mr. Rick Casson

Mr. Claude Bachand

1220

Dr. Marie-Joëlle Zahar

1225

Dr. David Carment

Mr. Claude Bachand

Dr. David Carment

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

Mr. Anthony Rota (Nipissing—Timiskaming, Lib.)

1230

Dr. Marie-Joëlle Zahar

Mr. Anthony Rota

Dr. Jane Boulden

Mr. Anthony Rota

1235

Dr. Jane Boulden

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

Mr. Anthony Rota

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Anthony Rota

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Anthony Rota

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

1240

Dr. David Carment

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

Mr. Wajid Khan

Dr. Jane Boulden

1245

Dr. David Carment

Mr. Wajid Khan

Dr. David Carment

Mr. Wajid Khan

Dr. David Carment

1250

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron

Dr. Marie-Joëlle Zahar

1255

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

Dr. David Carment

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

Hon. Keith Martin

Dr. Marie-Joëlle Zahar

1300

Hon. Keith Martin

Dr. David Carment

Hon. Keith Martin

Dr. David Carment

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

Dr. Jane Boulden

Hon. Keith Martin

Dr. Jane Boulden

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson)

CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

NUMBER 058

1st SESSION

38th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Thursday, November 17, 2005

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

* * *

À (1005)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. John Cannis (Scarborough Centre, Lib.)): We have quorum, colleagues, so I'll call this meeting to order.

Monsieur Perron.

[Translation]

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron (Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, BQ): Mr. Chairman, I would like us to take a few minutes to discuss a problem that I encountered last week.

I am referring to meeting no 50, when Brigadier-General Ward appeared. There were two parts to that meeting. The first part was devoted to committee business, and it took place in camera. I think that we continued in camera for the second part, when Mr. Ward made his presentation. If I remember correctly, the room was full of people, as it is this morning. The meeting should have officially been made public, but it was not. Perhaps I am mistaken, but I would like some clarification on that. So that you can make an informed decision, I am asking for unanimous consent of the committee to submit to you the agenda for meeting 50, where the two parts of the meeting that took place are clearly indicated.

Do I have unanimous consent?

[English]

The Chair: First of all, I would like to confirm if that was the case, as you described.

[Translation]

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron: That is why I want to give you the agenda.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Gilles.

Mr. Perron, one way to clarify this for the benefit of the members is to seek General Ward's consent to make it public; then we would have no problem. That would clarify everything, as it was obviously a misstatement at the time. So with your permission, we would seek his permission to make it public.

[Translation]

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron: Mr. Chairman, I do not object to the procedures that you want to follow. However, generally speaking, only committee business is held in camera, and the rest is public. I think that we made a technical mistake: no one noticed it but the second part of the meeting should have been public.

I'm going to explain my problem. In preparing for a take-note debate on Afghanistan that was held this week, I wanted to remind myself of what Mr. Ward had said during his remarks and used notes to prepare my speech. The clerk told us that it was not available and that if we wanted to look at it, we had to go to his office. I am absolutely not blaming the clerk, who came to our offices to show us the speech and the main points of that part. Moreover, I thank Mr. Chaplin.

[English]

The Chair: You are correct, and I guess an apology is due. But certainly we thank you for bringing it to our attention, and we'll take every step.

Andrew.

The Clerk of the Committee: I would suggest that if the committee were to adopt a motion to the effect that once General Ward has been made aware of this and indicates his assent, the proceedings for his portion should be made public.

[Translation]

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron: Did Brigadier-General Ward know that he was appearing in camera? I do not think he did, because the room was full. Generally, when we are in camera, the room is not full.

Le greffier: That remains to be confirmed.

[English]

The Chair: We still have to confirm that.

[Translation]

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron: Confirm it, sir.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you again very much for bringing it to our attention.

Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Are we going to hear from General Nordick?

[English]

The Chair: Just before we go to General Nordick, let me say we had requested to have before us Mr. Rock in one of our upcoming meetings. Unfortunately, Mr. Rock is not available and neither is Mr. Wright at that time, so we're going to proceed with other witnesses you have requested, to take full advantage of that meeting. That's just for information purposes.

Let me begin our meeting today by welcoming our witness to our committee, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, as we do our review of defence policy. We have with us today, from the Department of National Defence, Brigadier General Nordick, chief of defence intelligence. Welcome to the committee, General.

Brigadier-General G.W. Nordick (Chief, Defence Intelligence, Department of National Defence): Thank you, sir.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Claude Bachand: I have a point of order, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chair: Please.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: I was wondering if we had a French version of the General's presentation, and someone has just handed it to me.

Is this official?

[English]

The Chair: I just....

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Okay, I only had the English version.

It is okay.

[English]

The Chair: I know it was circulated.

Is there anything else, Mr. Bachand?

À (1010)

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: No.

[English]

The Chair: General, welcome to the committee. You have approximately ten minutes or so; there is flexibility in this committee. Then we'll go into questions from the members; the first round is seven minutes for both questions and answers.

I will ask the members to excuse me. I will ask the first vice-chair to take over, because there is a delegation from Bangladesh and they have requested to meet various chair members. They have their chair of the defence committee of their country, and they've asked me. I have requested to excuse myself to represent our committee there, and if any member so wishes, you're welcome to join me.

General, I'll be stepping out at some point in time. Please excuse me.

The floor is yours.

BGen G.W. Nordick: Thank you. Merci, monsieur le président.

I thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee. I had been asked to provide you with an overview of the defence intelligence function and how intelligence contributes to the Canadian Forces' operations. Since the subject may not be familiar to most committee members, I propose to begin by explaining defence intelligence in terms of its organization, the capabilities, and the ongoing transformation. I'll then discuss how we work within the broader Government of Canada intelligence community and with our international partners. I will close with an overview of the efforts to shape defence intelligence to meet the future needs of both the Canadian Forces and the department. I will do this all in about ten minutes.

As you can appreciate, defence intelligence serves many purposes, such as indication and warning, global and regional strategic assessment, and support to operations. In the conduct of operations, military intelligence provides insight into the physical operating environment, seeks to provide commanders with an all-source assessment of an adversary's disposition and capabilities, and more importantly, an estimate of his probable courses of action and his vulnerabilities.

At the strategic level, defence intelligence supports the Chief of the Defence Staff and the deputy minister as well as the minister and ultimately the government in making decisions about current and future Canadian Forces operations and other departmental activities, such as the procurement of new equipment. It also produces intelligence in support of international partnerships and agreements, and I will come back to this.

For the last two years defence intelligence has been going through a major transformation. The Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence are implementing what I believe are the most significant intelligence-related changes in the last 20 years. This initiative began in 2002 with the establishment of a defence intelligence advisory group, which was mandated to conduct a comprehensive review of the Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces intelligence function. This advisory group was made up of senior representatives from within the department and the Canadian Forces and was assisted by other government departments and agencies such as the PCO, CSIS, and the RCMP.

The recommendations were submitted to the Chief of the Defence Staff and the deputy minister, who in November 2004 approved them and directed the establishment of the “chief of defence intelligence”, with the mandate to implement the recommended and approved changes. One of the key recommendations was to integrate the various components of the defence intelligence community under the authority of the chief of defence intelligence and to make him accountable to the minister through the deputy minister and the chief of national defence.

Such a significant change not only allows for streamlined governance of the various elements of defence intelligence but also increases the timeliness of support provided to deployed commanders and senior decision-makers. It also ensures a single point of accountability for all the intelligence-related matters within the department and the Canadian Forces. This in turn allows for a rigorous and responsive oversight capability by the chain of command and in the department to ensure compliance with government policy as well as with Canadian statutes and international treaties and conventions.

In addition to this oversight provided by the chain of command, the department is currently reviewing options that may result from the O'Connor commission, better known as the Arar commission, and the committee of parliamentarians initiative. We fully understand the requirement for transparency expected both at home and abroad, and we seek to ensure we are operating in accordance with Canadian laws and values.

Although the defence intelligence review was completed before the defence policy statement of November 2004 and before Canadian Forces transformation started last summer, it is clear to me that the transformation we embarked on will allow me to meet the orientation taken by both the government and the Chief of the Defence Staff. Specifically, the intelligence transformation will facilitate Canada's participation in non-traditional operations such as Afghanistan.

Although we have been involved in United Nations-type operations for decades, in the past five years or so we have been increasingly committed to theatres of operations led by NATO or non-UN coalitions, where our soldiers are facing increased threats of attack. This situation has resulted in a significant demand on defence intelligence to support both senior decision-makers and deployed commanders.

I must also state the defence intelligence transformation will not take place overnight. It will take some years to increase the military and civilian capacity and to ensure the appropriate level of training and expertise. That said, I am confident we will grow a robust intelligence capability.

À (1015)

In the interim, the success we are having in tactical all-sourced analysis, coupled with near real-time access to intelligence support back here at National Defence Headquarters, has been praised by our closest allies and is due in great part to the professionalism and dedication of the men and women employed in all aspects of defence intelligence. This success is illustrated by the successive deployments of our all-source intelligence centres, which provide a deployed intelligence analysis capability to commanders, a capability that is being copied by our allies.

I'll say a few words about partnerships with other departments and agencies. The Department of National Defence and its intelligence component are a major consumer of intelligence, but we are also a major producer within the Canadian intelligence community. Success in intelligence is founded on the sharing and exchange of information, and this means that cooperation and collaboration with our sister agencies is vital. To this end, I have military or civilian representatives physically located within virtually all elements of the Government of Canada intelligence community, either as liaison officers or in seconded positions.

Working as an integral and valued member of this community is one of my highest priorities. A secure government network that supports the relatively free exchange of finished product among all participants facilitates this interchange. The recent creation of the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, composed of all members of the defence intelligence community, is an example of intelligence community interaction. This initiative allows my staff, along with the staffs of my colleagues from other departments and agencies, to bring together a variety of expertise in the production of national intelligence products. I would be happy to elaborate on this cooperation in response to your questions.

Internationally, we maintain a number of specific bilateral and multinational cooperation agreements. The most important of these are our bilateral relationship with the United States and our multilateral relationships with our closest allies. Information systems exist to support all of these relationships. Given Canada's global interests and the global scope of the Canadian Forces deployments, these arrangements are critical to us in terms of strategic decision-making and risk management, as well as for force protection purposes. I therefore spend a great deal of effort in maintaining and improving these vital binational relationships.

Finally, you can all appreciate that information technology is having a major impact on command and control, as well as on defence intelligence. There are a large number of capital projects at various stages of development, grouped under the rubric of the command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance campaign plan—that's C4ISR, and I think they were actually here in front of this committee earlier—which will influence intelligence capabilities, as well as many other capability areas.

One of these initiatives is the national fusion centre. Upon completion, this project will further integrate operational and intelligence analysis, providing decision-makers with the timely, relevant, and fused operational information and intelligence that supports their shared situational awareness and the decision-making crucial to their mission.

All of this suggests that in a post-9/11 environment, intelligence is a critical advantage, and associated capabilities will be on a growth path in many areas. This in turn will present a significant challenge in relation to the training and education of both military and civilian intelligence professionals.

Again, current intelligence training, although of a high quality, is fragmented and we have identified the need to develop a comprehensive strategy to deal with this challenge. I will conclude by saying that defence intelligence is one of the most dynamic and operationally relevant areas of defence today. The security environment is changing, and we are working to transform defence intelligence to meet these challenges. Much has been accomplished and a great deal remains to be done to build a sustainable capability for the future.

À (1020)

[Translation]

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my presentation. Thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak to you. I am now at your disposal.

[English]

The Chair: General Nordick, let me thank you for a very condensed, thorough, very enjoyable presentation. You certainly are well within your timeframe, which allows for the members to take advantage of the flexibility I mentioned earlier.

With that, we will go to Mr. O'Connor.

Mr. Gordon O'Connor (Carleton—Mississippi Mills, CPC): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Nordick, I listened to your words, but I'm not sure of the basic concept. Are you saying you are charged with creating a Canadian military independent capability for intelligence? Is that what you're to do?

BGen G.W. Nordick: In each of the departments, there is a requirement within the major departments to have an intelligence capability, and that's exactly what we have: a Canadian Forces and Department of National Defence intelligence system that fits into the broader Government of Canada and international fora.

Mr. Gordon O'Connor: How does this vary...? You're talking about transforming. How does this vary from the responsibilities of your predecessors? I don't understand the change. You're claiming there's a change, but I don't understand what the structural change is.

BGen G.W. Nordick: Before, the director general of intelligence reported to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. Today, with the Canadian Forces transformation that's actually going to occur, I will report directly to the Chief of the Defence Staff and to the DCDS. So it's a direct reporting responsibility, and inside defence intelligence itself there has been a complete realignment of the way business is done.

We had a pulling together of many of the threads of intelligence that were scattered throughout the department to give me essentially two primary divisions, analysis and collection, and a third smaller division, to write intelligence policy. Essentially it's gone to me. I have a responsibility for an end-to-end process in defence intelligence.

Mr. Gordon O'Connor: What is your linkage to the Communications Security Establishment, which is under the responsibility of the Minister of National Defence? What's your linkage there?

BGen G.W. Nordick: They are both a customer and a client that we deal with. In our analysis we deal with all source intelligence. CSE is one of those threads of intelligence that come into the Department of National Defence. All that information is fused together to create an all-source product so we can give them requirements. We specify information requirements that we would like them to provide. They go and find the information for us; they bring it back; we fuse it into an intelligence product that's given to decision-makers.

Mr. Gordon O'Connor: You referred to all the elements. You keep talking about all the elements of a defence intelligence, but maybe you could illuminate us on what the elements are of defence intelligence.

BGen G.W. Nordick: Absolutely. It is a complex environment, and the primary collection means that we are actually involved in right now are imagery, signals intelligence, to which you've just referred, human intelligence. We do open source; we deal with technical intelligence; we look at equipment that's out there in the world. We have a meteorological and oceanographic section, and we also have mapping and charting.

Those are the primary strategic collectors that exist within the defence intelligence community.

Mr. Gordon O'Connor: Cooperation with allies--what kinds of intelligence linkages do we have with the United States, Britain, Australia, and these sorts of countries?

À (1025)

BGen G.W. Nordick: The international community comes at many levels. Certainly, as in many things, our closest relationship is with the United States--there is no question--because we also share a continent with them and we have direct and vital interests.

The linkages vary between nation and nation, and they've been established over a long period of time. Many of them are formal; some are informal. Where those relationships exist, for example, within NATO or within the bilateral.... With the United States and some of our other very close allies, it's written down exactly in agreements as to how we will share information among ourselves. There are methodologies to do this, and those relationships are maintained and reviewed on a regular basis.

Mr. Gordon O'Connor: When we're cooperating with allies is there guidance, in the sense that we provide.... Let's take the example of the United States, our closest ally. Would we provide literally anything we have to the Americans, or are there things we wouldn't provide to them?

BGen G.W. Nordick: The sharing agreements are complex, and some of it is subject to government direction in terms of how that's done, because it's government-to-government agreements that are signed. There are things that are not shared in any two-way dialogue, but the intent is a maximum sharing. We in fact have extremely good relationships and good sharing agreements with our allies, but there are things that are not shared.

Mr. Gordon O'Connor: Is there somebody in charge of intelligence for the whole federal government? How does it work? Because the way you're describing your situation, you're responsible for intelligence within the defence department. Is there some kind of linkage, and is there somebody in charge who actually does it for the Prime Minister and says this is the global situation?

BGen G.W. Nordick: The primary lead on the Government of Canada intelligence architecture is the PCO, and specifically the national security adviser, Mr. Bill Elliott, who actually chairs the groups when the intelligence community in the country gets together to deal with issues. That's the mechanism by which it would come up to Parliament.

Mr. Gordon O'Connor: I assume there's some kind of committee, because you're saying you're sitting together. Does this committee work well? I'm just saying that it's the nature of humans to be tribal, and tribes tend to keep their information and not cooperate. How does this committee work?

BGen G.W. Nordick: I will tell you that, as many would suspect and hope and demand, post-911 there's been an extreme change in the mechanisms by which we actually look at what we call “lateral horizontal sharing” between the intelligence communities. It's never going to be a perfect system, because it is true that there are trade expertise areas and different pieces of legislation and different rules and policies that govern each of those intelligence communities. But in my experience, in the committees themselves and the subcommittees that work underneath them, the level of cooperation has been absolutely outstanding.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. O'Connor.

Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, when I realized that you were the Chief of Defence Intelligence, I wanted to know if that was linked to James Bond, but your staff have confirmed that you do not have individuals like that in your service.

BGen G.W. Nordick: Correct.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Bachand, we're not getting the translation through, so if you would be so kind, we'd like you to start again, because members didn't get that.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: General, I know that there are problems, you have confirmed it yourself. Not all allies pass on information. I believe that even in Canada, the various agencies do not always share intelligence.

I am surprised to see you here this morning without a lawyer. Unless you are a lawyer yourself. What are members entitled to ask you? Are you going to tell me, in answering my questions, that you cannot provide the information because it is classified? Or, are you going to give me the traditional answer and tell me that you will have to kill me after you have answered my questions? We are often told that.

Just how far can a member go in questioning you today? Is your mandate to tell me that from a certain point on you can no longer reveal anything?

Start by answering that question; I have some other ones for you.

À (1030)

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: Thanks, sir.

There is no question that there is a requirement to guard information inside the intelligence community. That is a given because of the fact that that's what intelligence is all about. Intelligence is in the sharing and guarding and protection of information. Therefore, classified information will only be shared on a need-to-know basis with those individuals who in fact have the security classifications, and those are set by government law and by agreements that we have in terms of how we gain access to intelligence.

So depending on the question, there is certainly the possibility that I will have to say that I can't deal with that question.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: General, can you tell me what the classification levels are? What do they range from? We often receive documents labelled “Unclassified”. What is there beyond that? What are the other classification levels?

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: The primary classification levels in all the intelligence communities are unclassified protected--which is often just personal information--confidential, secret, and top secret.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Okay, there are four grades.

BGen G.W. Nordick: There are four primary levels.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Perfect.

As you know, it is somewhat different in the US. Some parliamentary committees have access to highly classified materials. But they cannot tell reporters what they have heard.

That bothers me to some extent, because sometimes I would like to know more. Don't forget, General, that we are the ones making the decisions about how taxpayers' money will be used.

Sometimes we are told that it is better for us not to know everything. That is another story. The fact remains, however, that being deprived of information is frustrating for us. As members of NATO, I rub shoulders with our American friends. They often tell me that they have secret briefing sessions. They know where they are going. I assume that is a political decision.

Should I put those questions to the minister?

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: Yes, sir, you've hit the nail on the head on that one, in that the decision in terms of how information is shared is government policy. So the decisions as to.... The political systems in the United States and Canada are extremely different. They've constructed a system whereby there is congressional and Senate oversight.

That's certainly within the prerogative of government to deal with in Canada.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: In your presentation, you mentioned the Defence Intelligence Review, which I found very interesting. Do we, as members, have access to that document? Has it been completed?

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: Yes, sir.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Is it accessible?

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: The document itself was a classified document, but it has been severed and is available. In fact I'm quite prepared to go through the procedure of putting it in front of the committee if you would like that.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Chairman, may we have it sent to the clerk?

You mentioned the Defence Intelligence Advisory Group. Do we have access to documents relating to that group?

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: I'm not sure, sir. I'd have to check. There was a great deal of work done. That committee was formed to do the defence intelligence review, and it stood down after, so it is not a standing group.

The product of that study was the defence intelligence review.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: If I am not mistaken, you said that you have set up All Source Intelligence Centres in various theatres of operation. Are they already in operation?

BGen G.W. Nordick: Yes, sir.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Will members have access to the operations of these centres and to your procedures?

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: Yes, I think in general terms I could provide you with an outline of what's in that group. In fact, quite simply, the structure is a combination of all the collection methods that I talked about, fused in a single place.

So that's essentially what the all-source intelligence centre does. It's a small component of the national structure.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Will you also provide us with the operating procedures for these centres?

À (1035)

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: In block terms, I can generally talk to you about what capabilities they have and how they do their business.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Okay. Will the document be whited out?

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: No. I will ensure that what comes forward is something that is usable to you, sir.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: You also mentioned the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre. Do members have access to that?

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: That one is run by the PCO, so any issues you have with that particular centre you can ask about through PCO. Much of the structure of that was outlined in the defence policy statement in terms of what was required there. So there already is a certain amount of information available on that subject.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: If I understood you correctly, the National Fusion Centre is not operational yet. We will be briefed on the operating procedures once they are ready?

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: Yes, sir. There is a project called the joint intelligence information fusion project, which is what this is based on, and the project document for that is unclassified.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: So we can have it then. I have in my hand this document: NATO adopts standards for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. In one section, it says that Canada is involved. When you read what is written about the group that is in charge, Canada is not mentioned. Do either you or the Canadian government have copies of the NATO standards for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance? If yes, can members have access to them?

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: That I'm not sure of, sir. We are definitely involved with the NATO standards group, but I'm not actually sure I have seen that document or what its status is. I will certainly take a look to see what's available.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you.

The Chair: Do you want to ask another question, Mr. Bachand?

Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. O'Connor asked a question about the Communications Security Establishment. Who is in charge of that? It is not you.

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: No, I am not, sir. It's Mr. John Adams, who is the chief of CSE.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Is that CSIS?

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: No, the organization is separate.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: But you do benefit from the intelligence CSIS collects and passes on to you.

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: Absolutely, sir, because we also have military SIGINT--the Canadian Forces information operations group, inside the Department of National Defence.

The Chair: We've extended the time, but we'll come back to that. There's a lot of flexibility, as you can appreciate.

We will now go to Mr. Bagnell.

Hon. Larry Bagnell (Yukon, Lib.): Thank you for coming.

I thank Mr. Bachand and Mr. O'Connor for asking most of my questions.

Who does CSE report to? Where does that chap you mentioned report to?

BGen G.W. Nordick: The structure is that they report to the Deputy Minister of National Defence. They're in a separate entity, but in the same department, and they work primarily for the PCO, so they get a lot of their guidance and direction from PCO.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: How do those two coordinate with the Department of Foreign Affairs?

BGen G.W. Nordick: They're part of the committees that are set up under PCO. They're part of the group that gets together on all matters related to intelligence. So they have direct contact with them, and they have intelligence community contact with them as well.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: My understanding of the reorganization of the Department of National Defence is that it's basically being divided into homeland security and international operations. Does that affect your operation at all?

BGen G.W. Nordick: In fact, because we had started before this new transformation of the Canadian Forces began, I had to take the defence intelligence review and adjust it to meet the new reality, because we are splitting into Canada Command for continental defence and Expeditionary Forces Command for overseas operations. It hasn't changed the way I do business; it's just increased the clients, and I have to structure my product to meet a new set of clients. That's the only real change that it's caused for me, other than the fact that in a stand-up of any new organization, intelligence is one of the things they're very interested in having, and therefore it has caused a certain increase in the number of intelligence positions, which we're still working at staffing, and which will be added to the priority list.

À (1040)

Hon. Larry Bagnell: Do you collect intelligence in Canada?

BGen G.W. Nordick: In Canada, no, sir. In fact, the mandate inside Canada, or the domestic mission, is the responsibility of CSIS and RCMP primarily. We are responsible for assisting in the approaches to North America and in airspace, but we don't collect against Canadians; it's not within our mandate, and we're not permitted to do that.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: Who collects intelligence in the north? Obviously you can't use open sources because there are not a lot of people there.

BGen G.W. Nordick: Right, but it depends on collecting what and in which way. If it's on the ground, it's not a Department of National Defence requirement for intelligence purposes. If it's in the air and sea, these include approaches to North America, and therefore we have a role in monitoring air and sea activity over the top of the Arctic.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: So if there are foreign intrusions on land in the north, it's not your responsibility because they are on land?

BGen G.W. Nordick: If it's a foreign military operating on our land, then of course we are interested.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: How do you know if it's military, if you're not allowed to check who's on land?

BGen G.W. Nordick: That's one of the whole processes that is out there: you have to determine what your actual threats are, but we have not had a significant military threat against the Arctic in a long time—if ever.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: You talked about the changes since 9/11, which are great. A lot of us were recommending those.

Could you just go into them a bit more, or the types of changes they've made to improve coordination between the stovepipes of intelligence in the various Canadian establishments?

BGen G.W. Nordick: I've already mentioned the fact that they appointed a national security adviser and that he plays a role in bringing the intelligence community together. That role and function gives us a forum to actually put on the table what we, among the various committees, have in the way of intelligence, and what we need in the way of intelligence, because all of us are both providers and requesters of information. It acts as a clearing house to sort out process and procedures, and to look at specific operations and how we might cooperate together, and enables us to come to a community view about how intelligence can help deal with a specific problem. In that case, it's been extremely useful.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: So you don't think there's any need to coordinate all Canadian intelligence into one agency like the Central Intelligence Agency--it's working quite fine as it is?

BGen G.W. Nordick: You have to understand that the CIA is only one agency in the United States. It does not encompass all of the intelligence in the United States, so probably its closest equivalent would be CSIS. It's only a stovepipe inside the American defence intelligence community. The director of national intelligence is the entity where all of those are brought together, and he performs relatively the same function as our national security adviser in coordinating the community.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: As Mr. Bachand said, we're responsible for making decisions critical to Canada. When there's intelligence from any of these sources concerning the types of dangers or serious issues about which decisions have to be made on Canada's behalf, how is that transmitted to parliamentarians?

BGen G.W. Nordick: Again, in the policy in the system of government that currently exists, it's transmitted to those people who have the responsibility to make specific decisions. How they actually choose to deal with it inside government is driven by existing policy and capability. So the information we have is known inside government, but it's known inside the processes established by the Government of Canada. So if there is a requirement to look at that, it's within government to make decisions on how that information is handled.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: Do all these people on the committee from the various sources have quick access to CSE—like there's no problem getting the information?

BGen G.W. Nordick: Absolutely, sir. The access between the elements of the Canadian intelligence community is absolute. There are no restrictions on talking to anyone inside that community.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: In the security adviser's central organization, is there an analysis function so you put together pieces of intelligence from the different organizations and constantly analyze them? In the United States, for instance, had they put together all the pieces of intelligence before 9/11, they had enough to know there was going to be a problem, but it wasn't all put together. Do we have an analysis function that's constantly taking input from the various sources and seeing if there are any patterns or things that sort of fit together, which would give us an important picture of the big picture?

À (1045)

BGen G.W. Nordick: Yes, sir. There's an integrated assessment staff and analyst that works inside inside PCO, and one of the things they do is pull together threads from all the sources they have at their disposal.

The Chair: Thank you.

We will now go to Mr. MacKenzie.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie (Oxford, CPC): Thank you, Chair, and thank you, General Nordick.

It's interesting you mentioned, and I'm not sure if we all understood—

The Chair: Let me give a reminder, Mr. MacKenzie, if I may.

We're in the second round now, General, which means we go into the five-minute portion.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: Okay, thank you.

You do not collect information on Canadian citizens. Do you collect information on citizens of other countries who would represent a threat to Canada?

BGen G.W. Nordick: Defence intelligence doesn't collect in Canada, except on the approaches.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: Okay. Having said that, and you indicate you have connections with CSIS, RCMP, and so on, would you be expecting them to collect information to pass on to military intelligence to build their files on threat assessments from other countries?

BGen G.W. Nordick: If there is a threat to the Canadian Forces, they share information with us. But many of the activities they're involved in are parts of those areas about which they do not share information with the department. So we get information if there's a nexus that deals with the Canadian Forces—we will certainly see the information. But if there's not a Canadian Forces nexus, it's rare we would see that report.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: I assume the Canadian Forces still participate in organizations like the Criminal Intelligence Service Ontario and CISC?

BGen G.W. Nordick: Yes. In fact it's one of the capabilities. I apologize that I missed putting on my list that I do have a counter-intelligence unit inside. Its primary action in Canada is doing liaison with all the police forces in the country to make sure that if there is anything that potentially would impact the Canadian Forces, we are aware of it. That's actually how we have our contact with the police forces.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: I know it's outside your domain, but would you have any sense of how an average Canadian citizen could contact CSIS about an issue they may have that would be important for Canada's security?

BGen G.W. Nordick: It is outside, but I think, like all of us, I would go to their website. On the website are all the phone numbers, addresses, contact e-mails.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: Have you ever tried to call one? I would just ask that.

BGen G.W. Nordick: I haven't, sir, no, not off the site.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: Oh, okay. I suspect there may be an issue that it's difficult for Canadians to fulfill.... As Mr. Bagnell just said, it may be difficult to get the information.

I would also suggest that the system may break down and that, just like the Americans, it's a whole lot easier after the fact to pull the information together and find out what we should have had. The stuff sits in filing cabinets in places.

Having said that, our basic Canadian military intelligence deals in a military fashion with intelligence-gathering on foreign threats.

BGen G.W. Nordick: Absolutely, sir.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: That would be different from perhaps what most Canadians would envision from what they hear—intelligence being based on individuals. Your intelligence is based on organizations.

BGen G.W. Nordick: It's based on organizations. It could be based on individuals, but in an overseas environment. If an individual is a threat to a Canadian Forces operation, you can rest assured that we will have an interest in him overseas, in a theatre.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: Yes. Okay.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. MacKenzie.

We'll go to Mr. Martin, please.

Hon. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Lib.): Thank you very much, General Nordick, for being here. It's much appreciated.

Sir, one of the great failures articulated in the 9/11 commission report was an intelligence failure in the United States. Did DND look at the 9/11 commission report, go through it with a fine-tooth comb, extract from their lessons learned and apply those lessons to Canada?

BGen G.W. Nordick: We're still doing that, sir. In fact, in terms of intelligence, we're going through the report itself and all of the reports, from the Bali to the London bombings.

One of the things that intelligence is becoming is a very robust, lessons-learned process, to actually go through what was available and determine where we could have actually done things better, to eliminate stovepipes of information, the lack of horizontal sharing, or information being known somewhere else and not being shared. We are going through that process on an almost daily basis. I think that's what's allowing us to advance the sharing between the communities and between the nations.

À (1050)

Hon. Keith Martin: That's occurring within the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre?

BGen G.W. Nordick: It happens at multiple levels. Inside the intelligence community, I deal with many nations as a group or on a bilateral basis. It happens in various committees inside the government and between nations. In my experience, I haven't been to an intelligence meeting where we have not discussed some of the intelligence-related problems in some cases and how we can make it better.

Hon. Keith Martin: As you sit here today, and from your perspective looking forward, can you identify any needs that DND has with respect to intelligence gathering and processing, which you can tell us about without shooting us?

BGen G.W. Nordick: I think the reality is that there will never be a perfect system. I think all of us who work in this field recognize that it doesn't matter how much money we have or how many people there are, the odds of being able to stop everything, every time, every bad thing that might happen in the world, is not possible. My primary concern right now is not resources, it's that I can't grow fast enough to be able to meet the demand that has been put on me. Part of that is an internal institutional problem--

Hon. Keith Martin: Personnel?

BGen G.W. Nordick: --because of training the number of people. Even if I recruit them and I have the money to do that, by the time I finish their basic training, they still aren't trained analysts. That takes five, six, seven years before these people become effective.

In reality, to grow a true capability, as I said in my presentation, is going to take us time. I don't lack for resources. I don't lack for initiative. I don't lack for process. But it will take time to actually grow these capabilities to improve our level.

Hon. Keith Martin: If I could bore down into one, it deals with the need for personnel to be embedded in certain groups that may be determined to be a threat and the ability to have individuals who can effectively get in those groups, be embraced as one of them, and have the linguistic capabilities. Are we, for example, looking at our immigrants who may have specific linguistic and cultural assets, such as speaking Pushto or Arabic, which would be difficult to get out of those communities? Are we trying to find those people and bring them into the intelligence community and utilize them to get that on-the-ground, embedded intelligence we need within those cells, if you wish?

BGen G.W. Nordick: Sir, in fact what you're describing is human intelligence.

Hon. Keith Martin: Yes.

BGen G.W. Nordick: Both CSIS and the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces are active engaged in human intelligence, and that's one of the factors in this process. I can assure you that the immigrant makeup of this country is one of its strengths, and it's one of the factors we do plan on, because in order to operate in these nations language is also an issue, and getting enough interpreters, linguists, people we can trust to actually deal with the information we deal in, is always a challenge. So we do deal extensively within our population and try to take advantage of the natural assets we have in this country.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Martin. We'll go to Monsieur Perron.

[Translation]

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Brigadier-General.

If I understood correctly, you only deal with intelligence that could have an effect on Canadian Forces. That is fine, but today, in Canada and in the rest of the world, the armies are no longer conventional. The main threat for Canadians and people in the world is terrorism. Since you do not collect in Canada if it does not look like there is a threat for the army or the Canadian Forces, you must have an excellent system for cooperating with all of the police forces.

How would you describe your relationship with the municipal police forces, the provincial police forces and customs officers? Terrorists can infiltrate. How does that work?

À (1055)

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: Okay, sir. Let's break it down in parts, if I could.

First, al-Qaeda is a threat. The group al-Qaeda is a threat. The Canadian Forces does not collect in Canada. That is the responsibility of the RCMP and CSIS. But I can certainly assure you that in Afghanistan, where al-Qaeda is one of the organizations that attacks Canadian Forces soldiers, we actively collect, and we assess all sources of information that we then share with our partners to deal with al-Qaeda. The reality is that we all deal with the problems but we all have our areas we're responsible for. And in the Canadian context, we are not permitted to collect in Canada or against Canadians. So that's how the dividing line has to actually be separated.

Now, in terms of how we share this information, it's through the various committees, and through the database processes and the agreements we have to actually pass that information between entities.

[Translation]

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron: Al-Qaeda can become a threat for Canadian citizens, just as it can be a threat for all of us at this table. Surely the armed forces are involved in hunting terrorists and Al-Qaeda members in Canada.

How can you say that we have no information or that this information is not collected in Canada?

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: We don't collect in Canada. We do make use of information that is collected. So the information that is collected on those terrorist organizations is brought together in a Government of Canada picture that provides a threat assessment on all of these various groups from a Canadian perspective.

But the responsibility for collecting and the responsibility for analysis are very clear. We do all source, and we are very interested in these groups that attacked us, whether it's at home or abroad. But the responsibility for collection is clearly mandated by government in terms of who's allowed to collect.

[Translation]

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron: Is there no way to simplify that? Your process with the RCMP and the army seems rather complicated.

Would it not be possible to concentrate all of your intelligence-gathering methods under one single authority for the protection of Canadians and the armed forces?

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: The problem for all intelligence entities is that in addition to sharing, which is one of the things we were mandated to do because it gives us our strength, you also have different methods of collection, and you have to protect both methods of collection and source. That's what is critical here. So there are mandated lines, because if everyone knows everything about the given method of collection and the given method sources of information, then the risk to those sources is higher. So in their stovepipes.... So the RCMP have their human intelligence collection and their sources and they share the product of that intelligence with us. It's the same thing with CSIS and the same thing with others.

[Translation]

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron: I still have three short questions before I finish. When do you think the National Fusion Centre will become operational?

How much does your intelligence-gathering system cost Canadians? In other words, what is your budget?

When you are in Afghanistan, for example, what is your relationship with non-governmental organizations, which can also represent intelligence sources?

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: The full-up national fusion centre that's on the plan right now will probably not come into existence before about 2008-09, depending on whether we have to build a building or renovate an existing structure.

There is a budget for that. I'm sorry, I don't have the number at hand, but I can certainly get it and provide it to you. The amount of money that was there is in the project definition. I just have to go back and confirm that.

Á (1100)

M. Gilles-A. Perron: I'm talking about the budget for the existing renseignements aujourd'hui.

BGen G.W. Nordick: For my budget?

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron: Your budget, yes.

BGen G.W. Nordick: I'm not sure whether I'm permitted to release that, actually, so I'm going to have to go and just confirm it. It's made up of a whole bunch of different threads that come through the various departments. At hand today I actually don't know what the total budget is.

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron: And the NGOs?

BGen G.W. Nordick: We deal with all the NGOs overseas because they rely on us to tell them if there's a threat when they're operating in our area, and they are sources of information because they do meet people and talk to people and can give us information about what's going on inside a region.

We're very careful not to destroy their neutrality, and in many cases the NGOs in fact hold us at arm's length because they are worried that if they come too close to the military then what happens is they're considered part of the coalition and then become a target of attack. So it's always an NGO-by-NGO relationship that's developed in terms of how close they want to be or how distant they want to keep from us, but we are quite willing to and we do deal with them very frequently.

The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Perron.

We will go to Mr. Khan.

Mr. Wajid Khan (Mississauga—Streetsville, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

General, thank you for being here. I was just preparing my questions and I'll read some out to you.

Can you comment on the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of the human imagery intelligence and electronic cabilities, and is the MI set up today to fulfill the mandate, if there is a mandate, to provide counter-intelligence capabilities against espionage or sabotage?

BGen G.W. Nordick: In terms of where our capabilities are today, in the “Defence Intelligence Review”, which is the paper I will table for you to have a look at, you'll see that specifically one of the areas of concern was that the Canadian Forces did not have a robust human intelligence capability. One of the pieces that's being rectified as a result of the defence intelligence review is our defence human intelligence capability. There is still a lot of work to do. We made some superb strides and we actually are making headway in terms of this process.

In terms of imagery intelligence and signals intelligence, Canada is recognized as being among the most effective nations in the world in that regard. Our capabilities there are substantial and excellent.

Mr. Wajid Khan: Are there any other areas in the intelligence cycle, i.e., a cyclical set of procedures for the production of intelligence info--four phases, direction, collection, analysis, and dissemination--that the MI community has any weaknesses in, and, if so, how can we rectify the situation?

BGen G.W. Nordick: The largest weakness in that particular part of the cycle is in fact the analysis part. That's just straight numbers. It's not a question of capability. The people we have are excellent. Under the defence intelligence review, our analytical capability will more than double, but it's finding those people and training them--getting them to the level where they're effective analysts--that will take some time. The steps are in place to improve that particular part of the cycle.

Mr. Wajid Khan: How do we and where do we look for these people?

BGen G.W. Nordick: The sources are almost everywhere. We want academics, young people coming out of college, ex-military, people with expertise like that of the NGOs or others. We want people who have a broad range of experience in the world, languages--a whole range of things. So when we're looking to hire people, the range of possibilities or areas that we look in are almost unlimited.

Mr. Wajid Khan: Can somebody coming out of university apply?

BGen G.W. Nordick: Yes, sir. In fact, it's through the public service that we hire, so we follow the public service process to actually bring people into service.

Mr. Wajid Khan: I have a question specifically about Afghanistan. One of my colleagues asked a question about the tribal circumstances. I have some experience in that part of the world. Are we successful on the ground, and how is the cooperation between neighbouring countries, such as Pakistan? I understand that the commander there is working in operations very closely, but are we sharing intelligence with them as well?

Á (1105)

BGen G.W. Nordick: You've touched on a key point, which is where the future is in terms of our relationship in Afghanistan. One of our key partners over there is in fact the Afghan government, including the Afghan security forces, both the police and the army. One of the things the coalition, and in particular Canadians, have to look at as we look to go back in there in some strength is how we build that relationship--that relationship of trust and sharing and the ability to actually work together. Because we have to reach that stage if we want to be able to disengage and leave a functioning country behind us.

Mr. Wajid Khan: Thank you very much, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Ms. Gallant.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, CPC): Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, General Nordick.

You mentioned that there's a very workable system of information sharing between the agencies. What is this process? For example, what if our forces were to encounter a Canadian in theatre fighting for the opposing forces? In the Ottawa Citizen there is a series on Canadian-trained mercenaries who are operating in different countries. If you wanted information on this Canadian, you'd gather the information perhaps from human intelligence on the ground. Then you'd want to find out more about this person, perhaps because he's leading an al-Qaeda cell.

What are the steps that you would take in order to obtain this information from CSIS or whichever other agency you may feel may have what you need?

BGen G.W. Nordick: Forward in the theatre.... We talked about the all-source intelligence centre. Inside that, there are communications means and means of information technology and information management that allow that organization to reach back into the entire Government of Canada intelligence community. So they would go directly back and ask the question of all the entities back home. It would go through what we call our Afghan intelligence response team, and they would ask the question of the relevant agencies at home--whether we know anything about this person and what information they would be prepared to share.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Just break it down a little bit more for me. They e-mail or phone DND HQ here, and somebody in that centre makes the call to the appropriate agency. They get the information back to DND HQ, and it's sent back to theatre?

BGen G.W. Nordick: That is one method of how it might happen. There are other possibilities where we have people from other agencies embedded in the all-source intelligence centre and they just go right back to their parent agency. So we have a variety of means of making those connections.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: So you have this information on this person. Perhaps you feel it's important to pass this information along to CSIS. Is that an automatic, that you would report that there's a Canadian in theatre? You have all the information you need. Is there a mechanism whereby you would make sure that our people back home who need to know have that information?

BGen G.W. Nordick: Yes, we would.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Done through the same sorts of channels that you described?

BGen G.W. Nordick: The same sorts of channels. There is regular interaction within the intelligence community to ensure that kind of sharing takes place.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: In the RCMP there is a rigid auditing system that keeps track of each time information is accessed from CPIC. Is there a similar system built within DI whereby each request DI makes for information from another agency is recorded?

BGen G.W. Nordick: Yes.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: How does DI keep track of each request for information from other agencies it provides information to?

BGen G.W. Nordick: We use an information management process so that any request for information that comes in is logged. We determine what the source is, who's actually going to action it. They action it, and it's recorded as being information out. It doesn't matter whether it came from another agency or whether it came internally; it's very important for us to make sure we are dealing with our clients, that we understand what their information needs are and ensure that information need is met.

So the control mechanism and the response mechanism are one and the same.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Would you please describe the auditing process for keeping track of these requests to make sure that requests are not inappropriate or the systems being accessed by people are not being abused?

BGen G.W. Nordick: As to the audit process, the systems are not connected together, so there is no way for someone from another entity to come in and go directly into the database. So the first level of audit is the air gap that exists between all systems.

The second level of audit is that the analyst who's responding to the request for information reviews the information and will sever that information if there is a requirement to sever. So we each, in our own turn, know the legislation we work under and we will sever that information as it is passed.

Á (1110)

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: But is there not an auditor who looks at all the logs from all the different analysts?

BGen G.W. Nordick: That function is performed for me internally by one of my directorates. They physically are responsible for making sure that the information we pass is current, correct, and proper.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: What would happen if you were to discover or it were to be reported to you that there had been inappropriate access made?

BGen G.W. Nordick: The process for any activity inside the Canadian Forces in relation to a failure like that is that there are, under the National Defence Act, mechanisms for summary investigations, breach of security investigations, audit investigations that would immediately come into play in the event of discovery of an inadvertent or improper release of information.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Has that ever happened?

BGen G.W. Nordick: There are investigations, both procedural and specific, that go on, on a regular basis, because it is not a cut-and-dried world. Oftentimes it's not even a question of it having been released. The question may be asked before it's released, to say, “Look, what do we do about this? What's the policy on release of this type of information?”

That's most of the way this is handled. We actually go through the investigation process to determine whether we can in fact release it.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson (Lethbridge, CPC)): Thank you, Cheryl.

Does anybody on the government side have a question?

Larry.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: Because Canada is so good at peacekeeping and we're all over the place with our troops, it must be hard to have enough resources in your branch to do all the intelligence gathering. So I assume you must have to rely on other intelligence services in some theatres.

BGen G.W. Nordick: You're absolutely correct. Because Canada really has a world view, we cannot accurately cover every single problem and every single aspect. We have to prioritize what we concentrate our analytical effort on inside the department.

That is why our relationships with our allies are absolutely critical, because they do provide us with a great deal of intelligence in areas we cannot afford to concentrate on, based on resources.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: How do we judge how good it is? It appears that the United States had a problem with their intelligence, for instance, in weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. How do we know the intelligence we're getting from various other countries is reliable?

BGen G.W. Nordick: One of the things that happens inside the intelligence community is that it is today effective, and is even growing in effectiveness, in terms of the challenge function. We often review one another's assessments. We often have analyst-to-analyst discussions to come up with a common view as to whether the information that's being presented is correct. We will often challenge things that are told to us, and we'll have people challenge things that we put out.

So that really does start to reduce some of the problems in terms of the veracity or the accuracy of the information that's being provided. It's still based on the best information that's available, but we have challenge mechanisms now to make sure we do the best we can with what we have.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: I guess a problem would be if the country we were using found something that was not in their particular interest to release to us or was more in their interest to keep to themselves. Then that would be a downside of that scenario.

BGen G.W. Nordick: It would be, but if the area is one of common interest, I've not seen that ever happen.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: I have one last question. What's your relationship with Interpol?

BGen G.W. Nordick: Interpol is primarily a police entity, and therefore we draw on their resources because they have a lot of open stuff, but primarily our work with Interpol is done through the RCMP and CSIS.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: Do you think Canada provides enough support to Interpol?

BGen G.W. Nordick: Actually, sir, I don't know enough about it to be able to comment. We certainly are pleased with the product we get, but I don't know what our participation is.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Mr. Khan.

Mr. Wajid Khan: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

General, should we be looking to construct a more substantial MI presence in the military, and does it call for an individually dedicated corps badge such as for the British army?

Á (1115)

BGen G.W. Nordick: We do have an intelligence branch that does have a distinctive badge. But I would say to you, first, that it is a community because there are so many disciplines that are inside it and they come from different training backgrounds and different pieces. One of the strengths of it is the fact that there are a collection of individuals who come to the table with very, very different backgrounds. So I'm quite happy that we deal with it as a community. It's a community of practice, and it comes from a variety of places. All use smart people, regardless of what hat badge they're wearing, to make this organization work.

There is no question that it needs to grow. And in fact that's recognized under the defence intelligence review. There's a considerable amount of effort going on in the department right now to determine how much it should grow and how much we can actually afford to do inside limited manpower and limited budgets. I accept that the will is there to grow it. The question at the end of the day will be, how big?

Mr. Wajid Khan: I'd like you to comment on the sharing of intelligence between Britain and Pakistan, because they were very quickly able to get three people, and that information about intelligence was provided to Britain by the government in Pakistan. Do we have the ability to have this exchange of information with countries around the world, such as Britain has?

BGen G.W. Nordick: Every nation, and again it comes down to resources and other things, needs to build those types of relationships around the world. The question always comes down to a matter of priority. You're going to have to list where your vital and national interests are, and determine how far and how extensive those relationships will be with those countries. And that's a problem of a small size. One person in 135 countries right off the bat is a very extensive capability.

So we do have those types of relationships. It just depends on whether they've been labelled as one of our primary interests.

Mr. Wajid Khan: Thank you, sir.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Okay, there's an official opposition spot here. I'll take a couple of minutes of that, and then if there's anybody else from the government side...and then we'll go to Mr. Bachand.

You made a comment in your presentation to do with deployed intelligence analysis capability. Maybe you could relay to us, if you can in an open meeting, just exactly how that was used in the present situation in Afghanistan. As we move into a different area of Afghanistan and get into more and more dangerous situations, how is the intelligence gathered to be able to relate back to our generals, who make the decisions, on what kind of deployment, what kind of perimeter of security we need, what kind of equipment we need there to keep our people safe?

Now, we've seen in the past where intelligence that wasn't, I suppose, accurate has caused some pretty major foul-ups, and it's absolutely critical that our people have the information and it's verified. How do you do that in a hostile environment such as this?

BGen G.W. Nordick: The first thing I would just lay out is that before we go to a mission area, we do what's called a baseline threat assessment. So one of the things that's done is if the government says we're interested in going to country X, we will go through a baseline threat assessment that looks at all the sources of information around the world that we have on country X--that is, its environment, the health hazards, the military situation, the political situation. Many of those elements are pulled together into an assessment that's provided to the government. There are no recommendations made in there; it's a straight “here's the situation as we know it”. That's very valuable for both the military and for the government to make their decisions on whether they will go to a country. And if they are going to go, that threat assessment also tells them the range of equipment and capabilities they're going to have to take along with them.

Based on that, we'll decide whether the force is armed or unarmed, what kinds of vehicles they have to take along, what capabilities they need to go. So it's a very valuable product that's provided to them in terms of making that decision. That's primarily how it's done.

In the nation, when things change as activities happen in the country, we regularly revisit that assessment to make sure that the government understands what the threat level is in a nation. And the same thing happens for key visits and key activities that are going to occur, changes in the mission area itself: we will actually go through that threat assessment process. So that is a primary function that defence intelligence performs to keep this current.

Á (1120)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): When you're deployed and this activity obviously continues, is intelligence collection part of the duties of the troops who are placed there on deployment? Is it separate? How does that work? Are there only special patrols?

BGen G.W. Nordick: The layering of intelligence collection in a theatre of operations is multifaceted. For example, we talked about the all-source intelligence centre. First of all, that's the analysis capability. It takes all the sources and produces an assessment at the tactical level. The product comes out of that.

The collectors, the things that feed into the all-source intelligence centre, are all of the capabilities I talked about earlier. Remembering that we have specific collectors like the Coyote reconnaissance vehicle that's out there, many types of intelligence are collected. Soldiers on patrol collect intelligence. NGOs who we talk to give us information. All of those sources are brought back into the all-source intelligence centre, and they produce a threat assessment or a threat capability and reports on activities that are happening at the tactical level.

That information helps the commander on the ground make his decision, but I also have full access to it back here. It informs us on our strategic decision-making as well. It's the same thing with the information that I collect at the strategic level. If it's relevant, I push it right down to the tactical level.

We have an integrated system, in our case, between Afghanistan and Canada. It's absolutely integrated. The strength of our system is because we're small and these things are all under one agency. We have incredible sharing and an incredible fusion that is in many ways the envy of our allies.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): The U.S. has a public system of levels of alert, and they use different colours. Is there such a system in Canada? I know that it's not public, but is there one that goes through the security or the police forces and the military?

BGen G.W. Nordick: We haven't gone to that extent. We are very well aware of the U.S. alert levels. Within military operations, there are threat levels that are raised and that are established for all theatres of operations. But I'm not aware of any within the Government of Canada, and I have not encountered any that would be along the same line.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Okay.

Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Chairman, I would like to come back to human sources. You touched upon the subject briefly.

When I was deployed to Bosnia with the Royal 22^nd Regiment, things were relatively peaceful. It was rotation no. 9, and the situation had stabilized. However, I had the impression—and soldiers confirmed this later—that a good part of their work involved intelligence gathering.

I will give you an example of what I mean by general intelligence. I would like to know if a private, and right up to an officer, is supposed to tell his superior officer about everything that goes on. As civilians, we went to the cafés where we mingled with the locals. We would hear that a demonstration was to take place three days later at some location. Quite often, the officer would tell me that they found this type of information very important.

This is my first question. When a private is deployed to a theatre of operations, does he know how to move the intelligence up the chain of command all the way to headquarters?

My second question is more specific. Do military attachés working in various embassies have any role to play when it comes to intelligence? Apart from their contacts, is one of their basic duties to gather intelligence? There is a group of embassies with a number of military attachés working in them. I wanted to know if they were supposed to transmit any intelligence they might come across to headquarters.

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: Yes, sir. In fact, you're correct in both areas. Every soldier out in an area of operations is a collector. One of the things that we do through training is to teach people how to do tactical questioning. Sometimes before they go out, we give them information we're interested in. We'll tell them a range of things we're interested in, and often the reports they write when they come back are extremely detailed. Often there are nuggets of information in there that weren't asked of them, but they're very perceptive, very intelligent, and they come back with excellent sources.

Those are parts of the mosaic of intelligence that are pulled together to make all-source intelligence. They're a critical part, because if you look at a battle group that's over in Afghanistan, there could be up to 1,200 people out there collecting on any given date. We call that tactical human intelligence. That's what they're actually doing on the ground out there.

I have a very close relationship as well with the attachés. I help train them before they go overseas, in terms of helping them with their own personal security, because they're also subjects of espionage and counter-intelligence. We teach them how to take care of themselves in many of the theatres, and we do accept reports from them on a broad range of subjects. Because they are overt—they are open and operate in the open—they're not doing covert collection. Nothing they do is in the way of James Bond or being a spy or anything along that line. They are there, accredited inside the embassy, but they have contacts with a broad variety of people and they regularly report back to us on a whole range of subjects.

Á (1125)

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Are there any counter-espionage tactics, particularly for military attachés? If a Canadian military attaché meets an American military attaché, I don't think there would be much of a risk. However, if a Canadian military attaché meets a Chinese or Russian military attaché, is he aware that he must be careful about everything he says, because it will be taken down and sent along to their embassy?

Some embassies are known to be more involved in espionage than others. I often mention the Russians and the Chinese, but other embassies might also be involved. Are your military attachés allowed to intentionally mislead a Chinese or Russian military attaché? Is that done?

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: First, you're absolutely correct. Canada is an extremely credible country in the world. It's highly developed. It has a superb infrastructure and many world-class capabilities. So there's no question that our attachés will be approached and people will be seeking information from them. So one of the processes we teach them is how to deal with other nations and how to do this. But we do not use them to deliberately get involved in intelligence operations, in disinformation or any processes like that.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Sorry, Mr. Perron, we're out of time for this session.

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron: One little one, 15 seconds.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Well, make it very short.

[Translation]

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron: On page 4 of 8 of the English version you say:

Although the defence intelligence review was completed before the defence policy statement of November 2004 and before Canadian Forces transformation started last summer, it is clear to me that [...]

Does that mean that the transformation of the Canadian Forces has already begun following the defence policy statement?

[English]

BGen G.W. Nordick: The order of march that happened was that we had a defence intelligence review that was ongoing, then a defence policy statement that came out from government, then a Canadian Forces transformation. That was the order in which the activities that affect me on a daily basis happened.

We were already starting our look, post-9/11, at the defence intelligence community when the government published the defence policy statement, which did have some impact on the way the intelligence community would operate, internal to the Government of Canada. Then last summer the Chief of Defence Staff initiated with the minister and the government a transformation of the Canadian Forces that has some impact on defence intelligence. That's the order they occurred in.

[Translation]

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron: Thank you, sir.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Thank you, sir, very much.

We're going to suspend for a couple of minutes while we change witnesses, but we very much appreciate you being here today. I think your information was very helpful to our study.

Á (1129)

Á (1139)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): I call the meeting back to order.

Continuing our 58th meeting, reviewing the defence policy, we have today Professor David Carment, from Carleton; from the University of Montreal we have Dr. Marie-Joëlle Zahar; and then from the Royal Military College we have Dr. Jane Boulden.

We have time for all of you to make a presentation if you wish, and then we'll turn it over to the members here to ask questions. Hopefully, you can keep your comments short to begin with and give us an opportunity to have lots of time to question.

So whoever wants to start, go ahead.

Dr. David Carment (Professor, Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Project, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University): Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak before the committee.

My notes are taken from a document that was produced for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, which in turn had been produced from a document I was asked to produce for the defence portion of the international policy statement.

I'm going to speak about defence policy and state failure, but the work I do is much broader in scope and encompasses risk assessment and early warning.

State failure is defined as the collapse of authority of the central government to impose order. It is also the inability to provide basic political goods, especially security, dispute resolution and norm regulation, and political participation, to many if not most of its citizens.

In the defence portion of the international policy statement, failed states are identified as a dual challenge because the humanitarian suffering in these situations is an affront to Canadian values and because failed and failing states plant the seeds for regional and global insecurity. According to this statement, the ability to respond to the challenge of failed and failing states will serve as a benchmark for the Canadian Forces. The document calls for a more effective mix of maritime, land, air, and special operations, a Canadian Forces capability that is more relevant to addressing threats from failed states, and a Canadian Forces that is more responsive, acting quickly in times of crisis.

Finally, the statement identifies several principles that will guide the decision to enter a failed or failing state. These include a mission that supports the goals and objectives of Canada's foreign policy; a mandate that is realistic, clear, and enforceable, including a clearly defined concept of the operation; an effective command and control structure and clear rules of engagement; sufficient international financial and political support for the mission; adequate and properly equipped forces; an effective process of consultation between mission partners; and a clear exit strategy.

An effective Canadian defence strategy for responding to failed and failing states must include long-term, coherent, and structured policies of preventive action in advance of failure and stabilization and intervention capabilities under conditions of state collapse. This includes all aspects of public safety, a safe and secure environment for aid workers, and the development of legitimate and sustainable security institutions.

In particular, there is a wide range of military tasks. These include but are not limited to assisting in disarmament and demobilization, demining assistance, restoration of infrastructure, and conducting concurrent enforcement operations. Maritime and air forces may have particular diplomatic, limited deterrent, enforcement, or intelligence-gathering functions, while land forces will generally conduct the detailed control of the operation at the tactical level. Maritime and air forces will thus help to create the conditions for the conduct of land operations, and their joint efforts will be designed to create an environment that assists the civilian agencies in achieving their mission.

Due to the complexity and uniqueness of each state failure situation, it is difficult to apply a specific formula or set-piece approach, for each will require individual analysis and attention. In this regard the role of the Canadian Forces should be a key component but not the sole element in Canada's response to both failed and failing states.

The role of the CF in failed state operations is considered “military operations other than war”, referring to the full range of military operations short of major theatre war. These operations include rendering humanitarian assistance, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones, evacuating nationals from threatened regions, reinforcing key allies, and conducting limited strikes and armed intervention.

The “Canadian joint task list” establishes a framework for describing and relating the multitude of types of capabilities that may be required by the Canadian Forces in various situations. When the situation of a failed state arises, the Canadian Forces, as we heard, rely on the risk analysis developed by the Canadian joint task list using capability-based planning, a solid tool for identifying core priorities and appropriate operations.

In 2005 the Canadian government gave the Department of National Defence the largest increase in 20 years. This money provides National Defence with $13 billion in new funding over the next five years, including $3 billion to support the expansion of the Canadian Forces by 5,000 regular force and 3,000 reserve force personnel. The Government of Canada must continue this path towards a larger sustainable force capable of deploying in a range of circumstances. There's $3.2 billion to address sustainability, including training and operational readiness, but purchasing new equipment is not enough.

Á (1140)

To be effective in the 21st century's strategic environment, Canadian Forces must heed the lessons learned. Has anything been done in this regard? The document I provided for you lays out the lessons learned.

The simple answer is yes. The Department of National Defence's international policy statement has laid out a clear strategy for responding to failed and failing states. This relates to the need for long-term commitment, comprehensive intelligence, rapid mobility, self-sufficient command, and interoperability. Let me turn to each of these points, and then I'll sum up.

First, international long-term support for stabilization as well as for nation- and peace-building operations is at best inconsistent, a fundamental lesson learned. If a new crisis arises during a stabilization mission, resources may be conceived as being better utilized in the new mission than in the often slow-moving stabilization mission.

In the Canadian context there has traditionally been support for peacekeeping operations and peace support operations. However, there is a misplaced desire to be involved during the first stages of the emergency, at which time the media are focused on the conflict and when the issue is atop the international agenda. Over the years, as a result of Canada's waning resources, the approach has been to apply those resources in an early-in, early-out fashion, leaving little time or resources for effective, long-term, sustainable nation building.

The current operation in Afghanistan is a step in the right direction, towards a strategy of long-term nation building with a focus on supporting the host government. To this end, a public relations campaign has been put in place to engage the Canadian public and to ensure its willingness to support long-term reconstruction in Afghanistan. Public relations experts are needed not only for the public opinion battle at home but also abroad during a mission.

Let me turn now to the second requirement, intelligence gathering, as you've already heard. In this regard, intelligence gathering is being enhanced, from the strategic planning stages to tactical implementation on the ground.

The most important capabilities in this regard are planning and cooperation. Planning begins with a proper risk assessment. Detailed intelligence assessments considering the historical tendencies, the political will and structure of the current government, and the military capability of the belligerents are required. More in-depth intelligence gathering is also crucial for determining mission capabilities. Forecasting potential threats and creating contingency plans will allow the Canadian Forces to respond more quickly and more decisively in potential emergencies.

Thirdly, in order to respond quickly and decisively, Canada must continue to focus on rapid, mobile, lightweight tactical self-sufficient units. As Canada will most likely be part of a multinational force, tactical self-sufficient units are key assets to the Canadian Forces. In addition, the standing contingency task force, Canada’s disaster assistance response team, and stabilization and reconstruction teams are to be supported for their rapid deployability.

To be sure, Canada cannot rely on its allies for intelligence or strategic-level command capacity. Thus, the fourth capability of independent command is essential for communicating with all national and multinational partners in the planning and implementation stages. The Canadian Forces must be able to rely on its own sources for decision-making purposes.

At both the operational and tactical level, command capability is not currently a high priority for Canada because we operate almost exclusively within coalitions or alliance forces. If the Canadian Forces are to continue to work under the leadership of others on occasion, then, as mentioned, a focus on tactical self-sufficient units is important, because it is at this level Canadian Forces are most commonly used by allied forces.

Let me turn now to the fifth and final capability, that is, interoperability. Responding to failed states is obviously complex, and the Canadian Forces must have the capacity to handle diverse and continuously changing situations on the ground and in the political arena. If Canada is to remain committed to working with alliances and coalitions, then interoperability will be necessary for effective cooperation and integration.

Á (1145)

Interoperability is defined as the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to, and accept services from, other systems, units, or forces, and to use the services exchanged so that both parties can operate efficiently together.

Let me sum up. For the last ten years or so, Canada has staked its international reputation on the development of soft-power tools, strategies, and ideas. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, the Human Security Report, and the recommendations of the high-level panel serve as examples of how Canada has moved academic research and ideas into the mainstream of foreign policy. Such ideas, while important for agenda-setting, norm development, and multilateralism, are by themselves insufficient to address the problems of failed and fragile states.

With the release of the international policy statement, a more clearly defined set of actionable policies is now in place. In particular, Canada has chosen to work with far fewer countries through its bilateral development assistance programs, is set to put in place operational tools that heretofore have not been part of its soft-power agenda, such as START, or the stabilization and reconstruction task force, and has decided to extend its defence capabilities far deeper and far wider than it ever did during the latter half of the 20th century.

Canada is entering uncharted territory. Precision, focus, and a sense of purpose are now more essential than ever before. With a concentration of efforts on operational issues, Canada and its allies will be expected to provide proof of the effectiveness of such strategies, provide corrective measures where necessary, and, above all, demonstrate to the Canadian public that long-term investment and prevention is the key to a more stable international environment.

Thank you.

Á (1150)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Thank you, Professor.

Dr. Zahar.

Dr. Marie-Joëlle Zahar (Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Montréal): My comments are going to be more broad, because I come to this not as a defence specialist but as an analyst of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. I'm currently involved in a project that looks at Canada's involvement in the development of norms under the responsibility to protect and the implications of that for Canadian policy in all realms, including defence.

I would like to raise four points before you today. First, I want to press the need to very clearly disentangle fragile or failing and failed states. I would like to argue that there are very good analytical, empirical, and practical reasons to do so.

I'd also like to address intervention in failed states. In this respect, I want to make three points. The first concerns the whole issue on the legitimacy of armed intervention and the impact of this legitimacy on the deployment and safety of Canadian troops in theatre. The second highlights the need for a balanced geographical scope of military deployment and civilian activities to shore up failed states. The third concerns the need to listen to local populations and to seriously involve them in any intervention scheme, which is something that I believe we do not have a hold on.

First of all, on the issue of fragile or failing and failed states, there is ample empirical evidence that these two categories of states present radically different challenges in terms of both nature and scope. Fragile states have structural problems that might be more or less severe. Any state could be said to be fragile at any given point in time; we can only remember what happened to the United States when Katrina hit. Providing fragile states with assistance is important, but the nature of such assistance is more likely to be either developmental or governance oriented. It's support for institutions. The activities under this heading will tend to be more long-term preventative efforts. They are unlikely to include a coercive component, with the exception of clear aid conditionality.

But which fragile states and which failing states are of most concern to Canada, and why? Here I would like to put before you that in spite of efforts to make it clear, the current policy statement is still displaying some serious tension. On the one hand, from a human security perspective, all such states ought to be of concern to Canada. On the other hand, from a purely security perspective, states likely to fail and become sources of regional or global destabilization are prime candidates. I think this tension has serious implications for the way in which we try to develop coherent policy.

On the other hand, failed states have broken down at some basic level. State failure may mean one of at least three things: the incapacity to deliver on basic public goods, as in major and natural disasters; the failure of authority structures and of the state's capacity to exercise a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, as in the eruption of internal conflict; and/or the incapacity to exercise legal powers effectively and impose the rule of law. These failures can occur either individually or simultaneously. Each and every one can put part or most of the state's population at risk and might require forceful outside intervention. In such cases, intervention will very likely have a military component, will include an element of urgency, and, as my colleague already mentioned, will necessitate coordination with civilian agencies.

What about intervention in these failed states? I would first like to address the legitimacy issue, which is one I'm particularly concerned with. The responsibility to protect that Canada has promoted and had a very central role in bringing about has established broad conditions under which such intervention can occur. Basically, this occurs if and when states abdicate or lose the capacity to shoulder their responsibilities towards their citizens. Sovereign state rights are therefore incumbent upon the effective exercise of state responsibilities. When the state abdicates responsibilities, the case for intervention is clear. However, I would argue that it's much murkier when the inability to shoulder responsibility follows from the decay of state capacity.

Á (1155)

The criticism often levelled in academic circles is that such interventions are a form of hypocrisy, to the extent that intervenors tend to be unwilling to get involved in serious preventative efforts upstream of the actual decay and collapse. Therefore, this highlights an intrinsic link between prevention and intervention, and between the work of foreign affairs and defence departments--not only in Canada, but more broadly.

What does this mean for Canadian foreign policy and for our defence policy? It suggests the need to seriously reconsider the criteria we use to provide development and capacity-building assistance in fragile states. If we stand by and let them fall, it is likely that this will not only have an impact on the need to deploy Canadian troops in such locales, but also on the way in which these troops will be perceived as welcome or unwelcome.

In such instances, the safety of Canadian troops might be partially tributary to the coherence of Canadian foreign policy. Where there was no prevention, intervention will probably be resented. Also, if the root causes of failure were capacity-based, any intervention that is mostly or purely military will not only be resented by populations, but probably fruitless.

Coherence between the three Ds is necessary if we want to avoid putting soldiers in harm's way. In that sense the IPS has actually gone forward in terms of trying to bring the various elements of Canadian foreign policy together. I still think there is more work to be done.

On the issue of the geographical scope of deployment when intervening in failed states, much has been said about the need to re-establish security first. I have absolutely no quibbles with this priority; however, I do worry about recent suggestions that efforts should be focused in urban areas, as opposed to rural areas.

The argument, as I hear it, especially in discussions ushered by foreign affairs recently, is that cities are at the heart of unrest. They should therefore be the focal point of efforts to re-establish security. Urban centres are also often the seats of government, an additional reason to restore security there first.

I'm not certain this is a wise approach, and it is for defence reasons. Let me raise two points in this regard. While most fighting occurs in and around cities, insurgencies continue to use countrysides to mobilize human and material resources and to establish secure bases to which they can retreat and in which they can regroup. No statewide security can be achieved if military deployments focus on cities to the exclusion of the countryside. You are all aware of what's happening in Afghanistan currently. I don't think I need to belabour the point.

Second, an important dynamic that is often overlooked in analyses of state failure is the link between local governance problems and regional contexts. For example, conflicts and the economic incentives that foster them often spill across borders. Therefore, the re-establishment of order and security in a state is only as strong as the control of national borders. No military deployment that seeks to reinstate security can overlook this fact.

My final point is about local populations. Most interventions seek to restore peace, order, and good governance in target states. For this to succeed, it is necessary to be attentive to the perceptions of local populations. This is currently an underestimated and near-constant failure of particularly military interventions in such theatres.

The gap between intervenors and locals does not only pose the famous problem of ownership of the whole reconstruction process, it also seriously affects exit strategies. Problems stem from the incoherence of outsiders' policies in the target states--as per my earlier comment on the failure of prevention upstream, and then the keenness on intervention downstream; the distance, both physical and perceptual, between locals and interveners, a distance often inversely proportional to the size of military deployments; the nature of military activities in many high-risk contexts, in that waging wars risks losing hearts and minds, and we must not be fooled about this--there are trade-offs; and then finally, the gap between local expectations of what outsiders can do and what is realistically achievable on the ground, given the very difficult contexts we are getting involved in. Unfortunately, this gap is often fed, if not created, by the discourses of our own politicians.

Â (1200)

In closing, I think this means that as Canada forges ahead to develop a policy on failed and fragile states, we need to do four things. First, to be operationally useful, we need to develop better criteria. And I'm not convinced that the criteria of the IPS are particularly airtight as to which states are of utmost concern and how we are going to decide whether to intervene in theatre A, B, or C.

Second, we need to push for more coherence across the three Ds to ensure the effectiveness of any military intervention in failed states.

Third, the re-establishment of security remains a priority. It must, however, be thought of more comprehensively. Cities are important, but rural areas and national borders are key to sustainable security.

Finally and fourth, the perceptions of local populations are central to the success of the entire enterprise. Ultimately, these are the partners who will ensure sustainability and permit exit.

Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Thank you, Doctor.

Dr. Boulden.

Dr. Jane Boulden (Canada Research Chair in International Relations and Security Studies, Department of Politics and Economics, Royal Military College of Canada): Thank you very much for having me here as part of this hearing.

Most of my work relates to United Nations military operations and how Canada is involved in that process, but in particular it relates to United Nations military operations and post-conflict work. Most recently, in the past few years, I've had a focus on Africa. That's to give you a sense of my background and where I'm coming from.

I had a little bit of a sense of what the two others would do, so I've tried to find a third option, as they say. I'm going to go over three points, the unifying theme being three-D, but more at the international level, a broader sense of how the three Ds can be taken to the international level and also how they might operate at the international level.

So the first point--and there are some echoes of what the other two have done, but I have a slightly different take on it--is that one of the things we've learned in the past 10 to 15 years is that one of the most important things in post-conflict situations is to be there quickly, to put in a presence in those very early phases after a peace agreement or a ceasefire agreement. We can't ignore that moment, because the credibility and legitimacy of what comes in after those agreements are in place can be severely hampered and lost if there's a long lead time in which other actors and other events are allowed to occur that effectively undermine the process.

This means that the initial post-agreement period is critical. It's the nature of the United Nations that it's very difficult for them to get there quickly, and I think that's unlikely to change. It takes time to get troops organized. It takes time to establish which agencies should be involved, who should be the lead agency, and so on. So how can we overcome that gap, and what, in particular, can Canada do to work towards that?

The response is twofold. The first is to work to improve our own ability to get there faster. But this isn't just about boots on the ground, getting the military there, although that's a key part, because the security aspect of the equation, as Marie-Joëlle was alluding to, is critical overall; it's one of the key elements of the early post-conflict period. But it's not just the military. My proposal would be that we should think about getting three-D in there quickly as well. So it's not just boots on the ground, but right away getting the other aspects of the equation in there, determining what assistance is needed for political institutions being recovered or rehabilitated. And it's not just police; it's the judiciary and prisons, for example. So there has to be a multi-dimensional quick response.

The second way we can work on this issue is to help regional organizations develop their ability to get there quickly and to get there quickly in a multi-dimensional way. That's a big challenge. If you've been following the African Union at all in its involvement in Sudan, we can see how difficult that is. If we take Africa as the example, regional organizations there have come a long way, but they are extremely resource challenged, shall we say, and it's a lot to ask them to be able to get a number of troops on the ground quickly as well as to do all the rest. But we can do a lot, Canada in particular, in helping them improve their ability to do that.

The second main point is to pursue the idea of peace consolidation a little more. This is in some ways what we would call peace-building, except peace consolidation refers, in particular, to the post-conflict period, whereas peace-building could easily be used as a preventive measure or an ongoing measure even while the conflict is in motion. Peace consolidation involves all of those processes we would think of as peace-building, but with the emphasis being on ensuring that we're going to create a situation where we aren't going to have to return two years later, five years later, ten years later. We can think of some examples--for instance, Haiti, and there are a number of African examples--where we've been back again and again, partly because we've left too early. There are of course a whole host of other reasons as well.

Peace consolidation then involves again the whole multi-dimensional package, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration. But I would argue it is broader than that; so it's not just DDR, but it's then the whole economic recovery that has to support this process. It's not just police, but it's prisons, judiciaries, and so on. So what are a few ways in which Canada could help move this forward?

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At the international level, the idea of three Ds is very difficult. For a number of years, the idea of getting better coordination between the international financial institutes and the UN has been a topic of discussion, but it's gone at a snail's pace. We're talking about the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, for example--the international financial actors. There's every reason they should be more deeply involved at earlier stages of the conflict, but it's very difficult to do. There is a lot of institutional inertia; there are a lot of bureaucratic turf wars that go on.

Canada is actually a player through the G-8, through its role in international financial institutions, and also as a traditional peacekeeper that could perhaps help to move this process. But don't underestimate the struggle. Think of how difficult it is to think of three Ds at the domestic level, and multiply that at least a hundredfold at the international level.

The third point is to sustain the three-D approach over time in specific areas. And this goes to David's point about not diverting, which we have a tendency to do, and so does everybody else. We get in there when the media are there, when the crisis is at its height, and then the next one comes up, and we shift. If we're going to have an impact, I think we have to work towards avoiding that and accept that we're going to be there for the long term.

As part of this process, I would argue that one thing we should do is develop a greater information expert base at home. If, for example, we're going to be in Afghanistan for another ten years, then we should be working on developing our own geographical expertise on the region, on the country, on the institutions, the history, and the players. That kind of expertise is what I'm talking about, and we should do that kind of thing not just geographically, but on issue areas.

What about DDR--disarmament, demobilization, reintegration? We and other academics have some sense, for example, of what we can say are the lessons learned from coming through that process. But if we did it in a more sustained and more focused way, and brought in international experts and talked with people who've been there on the ground, for example, we could work towards developing a stronger expertise, which would be of use not just to us when we go into these situations, but to the United Nations, and in situations where we're going in in coalitions with the United States and other countries. And it's not just DDR; it's any number of these things. We can take the police-judiciary-prison connection, that package, and work on that. It's an area where Canada has a lot of expertise and experience, and again it would allow us to contribute, not just to our own process, but to the international and coalition operations as well.

I'll stop there and open it for discussion.

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The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Very good. Thank you all very much.

We'll start our first round of seven minutes each.

Mr. O'Connor.

Mr. Gordon O'Connor: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think my first question will be for Professor Carment. Before the coalition entered Afghanistan, and before the coalition entered Iraq--I know they're different coalitions--were either of those states considered failed states?

Dr. David Carment: Is this a simple question of yes or no, or is there something behind it that I should be aware of?

Afghanistan was clearly a failed state. Setting aside Marie-Joëlle's concern about the distinction between fragility and failure, Afghanistan certainly was. Iraq, I think, is a definitional issue, whether we want to think of it as a failed state or one that had failed many of its people--the leadership certainly had. It was divided territorially, de facto north and south, with the Kurdish separatist movement in the north. I would be confident of putting them in a category that would classify them as failed, if not fragile. Whether that really matters, I'm not sure, with respect to empirical questions.

Does it matter with respect to policy? If we take at face value the claim that approaches to fragility and failure require strategic forecasting capability, then we need to be fairly clear on what we mean by failure and fragility in advance of preparing an operational approach to these problems. In other words, we need to be absolutely certain about what we're looking for. And I think we have a fairly reasonable working definition within the Canadian government and within various academic research units that are working on the question of fragility and failure.

In short, the answer to your question is yes, both would have been classified as failed in advance of the interventions there.

Mr. Gordon O'Connor: Yes, there is a deeper implication to it all. The tone of all three of your presentations is that we should basically crusade through the world, intervene in failed states and save people. I may be giving you a short version of your positions.

But aside from all the moral issues here, one of the really practical ones is that I don't think Canadians are prepared to raise a huge military that is going to wage war across the planet. So what it comes back to in terms of this issue of failed states is this: if you consider Iraq and Afghanistan before the interventions to be failed states, then you probably would consider North Korea to be a failed state, Iran to be a failed state--and I can keep going on with an endless list. Does this mean that we, as Canadians, should be preparing to intervene in all these states? Basically, that's what I'm getting at.

Dr. David Carment: That's a very good point, and one that I think is of great importance to the Canadian public, trying to explain to them why we should be doing the kinds of things we're asking people to do. I don't see it so much as crusading as a strategic imperative.

The national security strategy of the United States lays out clearly that linkage between failure--and collapse, for that matter--and international regional stability. You may not accept the claim that there's a direct link between the activities of terrorist organizations abroad and their impact on Canadian security at home, but one can make a fairly obvious link to the activities of weak, fragile, failed states to creating insecurity abroad, not just in Canada but in other weak and fragile states.

Let me just very briefly lay that out for you. Weak states--and I won't name them, for fear of giving offence--often provide support to other insurgencies in countries near to them or abroad. For example, connections between two terrorist organizations or separatist movements between two states are often the basis for creating consolidation or solidarity within a weak state. The South Asian subcontinent has been host to that kind of activity for the better part of 30 years, if not 40 or 50 years--the export of violence, in other words, from one weak state into others.

A second case in point would be the absolute failure of a state. That lack of governance, that lack of security, and that lack of capability within that host government serve as the basis for the training and recruiting of terrorist organizations. The obvious example there is Afghanistan. Not every failed state has the conditions where that could take place.

A third linkage is where the divisiveness or the onset of civil war creates opportunities for extremism. Individuals or groups who cannot be driven to support activities that we might characterize as terrorist at the outset of a war may certainly come to support them at the end of it. Let me give you an example. In the Horn of Africa, which has been characterized by some as a breeding ground for terrorists, I would say that, right now, the situation is such that it has not gelled into an obvious breeding ground for extremists, or, for that matter, terrorists, but it certainly has the conditions to do so--in Somalia and on the frontier between Somalia and Kenya, in particular.

Those are just some of the reasons I think we need to demonstrate to the Canadian public why this linkage really matters. I could go on, but I think the problem is not just an analytical one; it is a real one. A threat is emerging. Failed states are not only a threat to themselves but also to their neighbours within the regions in which they are expected to interact. We mentioned Sudan. It's not only a threat to its own people but also to the countries around it by virtue of extracting or demanding resources to deal with its problems, in part, and these countries don't have the capacity to do that.

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The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Do either of you have a quick comment?

Dr. Jane Boulden: This may not be the right thing to do, but I think you're touching on an important issue, which is what are our security requirements, and do they include being involved in these kinds of states?

I wouldn't put myself in the crusader category. I think part of what Marie-Joëlle was saying was that there's a problem in securitizing, for lack of a better term, the whole weak, failing state idea, which is I think what you're getting at as well. This is not to take away from what David said, but I think it's an important point. If you were to have said to me off the top, what do you think is the most important security issue for Canada today, one of my top points would be nuclear terrorism. But that's not related to three-Ds, so it's a different discussion.

Mr. Rick Casson: Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I very much enjoyed your presentation. However, I dream of the day when we will live in a perfect world and will be able to reconcile the opinions of the academics with those of the 18-year-old soldiers who are currently serving in Afghanistan.

We, the politicians, have the responsibility for managing the public purse, and we must make major decisions. We are bombarded on all sides by generals giving us their opinion and by you who are expressing yours. When I am asked what a member of Parliament really does, I say that he does his best.

These briefs are extremely complex. I agree with your prevention approach, but what type of prevention is it? Why did George Bush talk about rogue states when he addressed the American Congress? Is it because he wants a better world, or because he is dictated by American interests? That is the first question we must ask ourselves.

The process leading up to an intervention is incredibly complex. I don't mean a military intervention, but a preventive intervention to warn people. This is done by the UN and by NATO.

How do we approach this? We are governed by our own cultural characteristics. For example, democracy is important to us. However, in some countries, they give democracy short shrift. We sometimes have a hard time understanding that. Should we impose the Canadian or North American model of democracy and dictate how these societies are to behave? In order to make them fit the mould before a military intervention takes place, a whole host of measures are brought forward, for example, economic boycotts, blockades, condemnations by the UN. It happens in increments, and at some point, we have to act.

That is what happened in Afghanistan. The Americans could not ignore the al-Qaeda camps in that country. Things had to change. Moreover, they had to protect the Afghan society, even if its concept of democracy is not the same as ours. It was obvious that the Afghans were being subjected to terrible treatment. So we moved in. In my opinion, this country had failed and the situation had to be corrected.

However, when that stage is reached, a number of advantages must be taken into account. We had a take-note debate on Afghanistan last Tuesday evening. I listened to General Ward who appeared before the committee. The contingent that is currently in Afghanistan is made up of 97 per cent armed forces personnel while the other 3 per cent are diplomats or work in development. I believe that is a problem. I would like to know how you feel about it.

Some will say that Kandahar is the most unstable region and we must first ensure military stability. It is quite simple: Canada's mission is to re-establish order for a viable government, while training local security forces and re-establishing the rule of law. I also understand that. However, to my way of thinking, there is a problem with the current composition of the Canadian contingent.

On the other hand, things are progressing in a positive way. The provincial reconstruction team is a relatively new concept, as is the defence “3D” policy that is under review. Moreover, the participation of the NGOs was greatly appreciated. They came to tell us not to forget that they represent the fourth part of this policy.

What if I were to make all three of you members of Parliament? What would you think of that? Could you put aside your academics' hat and try to reconcile all of this while keeping in mind the interests of your country, those of the academics and those of the young 18-year-old boy or girl who is currently on the ground in Afghanistan? Is that person in the right place?

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Dr. Marie-Joëlle Zahar: I will try to answer your question indirectly, by citing the example of a region where I think we made some monumental mistakes, and that is the Middle East.

In the mid-90s, for financial reasons, CIDA and Foreign Affairs decided to shut down half of our programs to aid development, democratic organizations, the transfer of expertise, etc. in most of that region's countries, in order to focus on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

All of a sudden, in 2001, we awakened to the fact that Islam is the source of terrorism. However, if today Canada were to decide to send troops to one of these countries,-- to Jordan, where things are getting worse, and where we have yet to send anyone, or to Lebanon, which, since last year, has been very unstable,-- people in those countries would be asking us, with good reason, where we were 10 years ago, when they needed us. They asked for little, yet we were not there, and now here we are with our tanks, our troops, etc.

That is why I said earlier that we must be consistent in what we say and in what we do. If we feel that some countries are important for Canada's security, that must apply in all areas. We can't only say that they are important to us when things go awry. However, I agree with your colleague who says that we can't be everywhere.

However, we have not yet come to some understanding on the whys and the wherefores of our involvement. We are trying to be all things to all people, by talking about formal considerations that would have us intervening everywhere and some aspects of security that would limit us to certain areas. That does not work.

I wish I knew the answer. If I were you, and could come up with some magic formula, then I would be wealthy. Unfortunately, that is not the case. That does not mean however that we should not continue to examine the issue.

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[English]

Dr. David Carment: I'm sympathetic to your point, but I see part of our jobs—not just my job, but your job—as being to convince the Canadian public that a preventive approach is the most appropriate avenue for Canadian foreign policy to pursue on fragile states. How do you go about doing that? You need to demonstrate success. You need to convince the Canadian public that there's a need for long-term forecasting so that you don't have to deploy your troops; and that you have in place a preventive structural set of instruments—whether it's ODA or some other form of Canadian foreign policy—so that the worst-case scenario is not realized. We only put our troops in harm's way when everything else has really failed.

Mr. Claude Bachand: So it's a failure to put troops on the ground, at the end.

Dr. David Carment: We're responding to the worst-case scenario where armed violence has already occurred. What if we put to the Canadian public the need to think more holistically, more preventively? Keith Martin has advocated with respect to looking at this from a practitioner's point of view, a medical point of view, in which we look at the demand side and not the supply side. What is it that these countries need, and what is it that Canada can provide?

If we cannot provide leadership, then maybe we should get out of the way. We're not in a position to provide leadership on North Korea. We put in our 5% in Afghanistan, we put in our 5% elsewhere, and we work in coalitions. But maybe there are times when we need to demonstrate success to the Canadian public and tell them where their taxpayer dollars are going; tell them that we've deployed our troops; tell them that we've put our ODA on the line; tell them how we measure and evaluate success; and show them proof of that success. We need those kinds of tools in place if we're going to do this holistically and in a way that's consistent with DDD.

By the way, I don't believe three-D in Afghanistan is a true reflection of what this Canadian government is capable of. I think it was in-country, it was not something that was applied as a whole-of-government measure. Most of the decisions were taken within Afghanistan by three key personalities within DND, CIDA, and Foreign Affairs. If we're going to take seriously the need to think preventively, we need to change the attitudes of not only the Canadian public, but the bureaucrats who are not currently in a position to work closely together and must step aside when they see their interests not being served in a particular situation. The analysis drives the solution. Up until now, we've been putting solutions in before the analysis has demonstrated that we are in fact in a position to do something.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Thank you, Professor. Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Rota.

Mr. Anthony Rota (Nipissing—Timiskaming, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I've got a couple of questions based on what Dr. Zahar said.

I was recently in Afghanistan and I saw almost a fortress system where you concentrate your forces within the city, then you work out from there. What you described is bang on. The cities are consolidated, they're secured, then in the countryside, basically, the terrorists or rebels will form out there and then come in and try to create instability.

I'm not quite clear, and maybe it's my lack of military strategy, how you would prevent that or what would be the alternative to doing that. Would you go from the outside and work in? It's a vast territory, with caves, with terrain that is very difficult to control. I'm looking for an answer, I guess much like Monsieur Bachand. What would you do in my place, or how would we handle that?

I'm not trying to be smart; I'm curious. I'm wondering how you would do that.

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Dr. Marie-Joëlle Zahar: I think Afghanistan is your worst-case scenario, for a number of reasons. There is the nature of the terrain, the regional neighbours. Let's not kid ourselves, a lot of these countries, even though they work with us sometimes, are not always nice guys. There's also the nature of the state, the fact that the warlords have had a couple of decades to establish and entrench themselves.

Having said that, I think that if we are serious about Afghanistan, much as if we were serious about the Democratic Republic of Congo, we need ten times more troops on the ground, if not twenty. Currently, the troops are doing an amazing job in the cities, but ultimately, the moment they turn their backs, things are back to what they were before.

Let's think in terms of the way you're going to sell it to the Canadian public, because I think David is absolutely right. We need to show success. We've already been there almost five years now. If ten years down the road we've expended considerable sums of money and we can only show a secure environment in Kabul and maybe Kandahar, how can you justify that?

It seems to me that this is an argument for what my colleague Jane was saying about the need to work internationally. We need to build serious coalitions with a staying power, but that also means we need to make choices. We cannot be involved in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and in the many conflicts in Africa simultaneously and succeed.

This is going to be the academic who is maybe a bit idealistic, but there needs to be a rethinking of the division of labour at the international level, which is not happening currently. Regional organizations need to be strong to be able to shoulder their part of the task. Not everything can be done by NATO or by western countries, and currently it's only a handful of countries that have the means to get involved seriously, especially on the military side of these countries.

Personally, I can analyze and I can say I'm not hopeful. Unfortunately, I don't have an answer for you.

Mr. Anthony Rota: Thank you. And don't stop being idealistic, because we need that vision out there and something to strive to, so keep on with the ideas coming in.

The other question I had was regarding borders and how crucial it is to establish, because I know in the Congo or even in Afghanistan, as the troops go by it's very nice and everybody's peaceful, and then at night they come in through the borders and replenish their supplies.

I guess my question to you is.... Political borders have been established over the last 100 years, over the last 50 years, and a lot of them have been as a result of either military spoils or decisions made by someone sitting at a table saying they'll take from this river on or from that artificial border. When we go into a conflict area, do we respect political borders, do we look at working with making these changes? Do we look at what national traits we have to look at, and then go from there?

That's not an easy question to answer, but I think maybe it's something we should be looking toward. It's not an easy decision to make. There are a lot of alliances and relationships that have been formed, sometimes artificially, sometimes simply out of geography, if nothing else. How do we work with that, or what do you see happening in that situation?

That's open to all three. I don't want to put one or two on the spot.

Dr. Jane Boulden: Are you asking whether we should be going in and maybe thinking about changing the borders of the states?

Mr. Anthony Rota: Exactly. When I think of Yugoslavia, we basically did that there. We said, “You three can't get along. You've got your own countries now.”

If you look at Afghanistan, you basically have a bunch of—the term “warlords” comes to mind, but I'm not sure that's the appropriate one—probably small rulers in different parts. Do we say this seems to be working well, so will we break it up into twenty little regions or twenty little provinces and abolish Afghanistan altogether? Do we have the right to do that, and how exactly would we work to get them to work together?

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Dr. Jane Boulden: It's an extremely difficult question.

On the border issue, the whole structure of the international community is predicated on the fact that the borders aren't violated. If we go down the road of trying to negotiate moving them, the reason we're not doing that and no one else is doing that is because the consequences are so massive.

An example is northern Somaliland, which has declared itself, for at least ten years, an independent country, not recognized by most of the world as an independent country, even though in that region of the world it's probably one of the most stable zones. One of the reasons it's not recognized is precisely because other states are afraid to open up that can of worms.

I understand the instinct, and everybody has it. It would be a lot easier if we could just shift these borders around and do this and it would solve this part of the conflict. To do so creates too many consequences on the other side of the equation.

But the broader question about how we go in and deal with the fact that these groups are inside these borders, which I've just argued we probably can't change, is an opening to how it is that Canada is often considered a very good player in this equation. Canada does have experience in dealing with multicultural institutions and a nation and how it is that we work electorally, for example, to make that work--minority situations, and so on--not just based on our own experience but based on our knowledge of other experience as well. It's one of the reasons Canada is a good player.

That said, these are extraordinarily difficult situations, because, as you know, this is being done in an arbitrary manner. These conflicts have been ongoing, sometimes under the radar for quite some time before they actually get significant enough to come to anybody's attention. So there are longstanding entrenched interests, which in the context of most of the time being in failed states means you then compound the problem, because there isn't any other option for a lot of these groups than to keep fighting what they're fighting.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Thank you.

Your time is up, I'm afraid, Mr. Rota.

Mr. Anthony Rota: I could go on for a while.

Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Ms. Gallant.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It was confirmed today that Iraq was a failed state, through the definitions given, but it is consistent with Canadian foreign policy to support military intervention after diplomacy and development initiatives do not succeed.

Parliament didn't have the opportunity to debate the Iraq issue prior to the Prime Minister's commitment of troops to Afghanistan, thereby leaving none available for helping out the coalition of the willing, aside from the key positions that we did fill in command and control.

While our government did commit military officers in key positions without really letting the public know, the Prime Minster and other Liberal MPs seemed to admonish the United States in its liberation of the people of Iraq, and I can't help but think there was some other reason for the Canadian leadership to not want outside forces in Iraq.

A Canadian UN envoy to South Korea who's also a key adviser to the current Prime Minister has been implicated in the Iraqi oil-for-food scandal. The Western Standard magazine mapped out how the current Prime Minister may have even profited from the Iraqi oil-for-food scandal.

Given that supporting failed states is consistent with Canadian policy, in your opinion of what you know of the situation, could personal financial gain at the highest levels of the Canadian government explain why Canada was such a vocal opponent--

Mr. Anthony Rota: On a point of order, Mr. Chair, that's a really interesting question in thesis, but I don't think that's a valid question.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: May I finish my question, please?

Mr. Anthony Rota: I'm not sure we want you to.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Could this explain why Canada was such a vocal opponent of foreign forces going into Iraq?

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): I've considered the objection here, but is there a response? Would you like to respond?

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Dr. David Carment: I'll take a shot at the overall claim being made that Canada was not supporting the United States. I think that's open to question in two cases. One is that by virtue of taking a leadership position in Afghanistan that is relieving American forces so they can devote their energies to Iraq. I think also the evidence would show that through the activities of ISAF, and in particular the maritime capability that Canada provided, there was interdiction, which indirectly contributed to the war on terrorism and also the war in Iraq.

I'm not sure what we'd gain by knowing that Canada did or did not contribute to the war in Iraq directly. What we do know is that Canada cannot be everywhere all the time, doing everything that we ask it to do or expect it to do. There are priorities that need to be set. Someone mentioned earlier North Korea. It doesn't strike me as an obvious case of a country where Canada could or should be involved. Why? Because it's a high priority for the United States, and they're likely to devote all of their energies to addressing whatever problems may manifest themselves in the near future.

Where we should be thinking about directing our attention is towards countries that matter to Canada. We need to work out an agenda that helps us better identify countries that are of importance to Canada. Are they ones within Africa? Are they ones within Latin America? I could tell you stories about countries that are off the radar screen for the World Bank and the IMF but are of importance to Canada and also extremely unstable. Should we make Haiti a priority? If so, why? We need to provide the Canadian public with an explanation as to why we are going there. If we expect Canadian forces or Canadian assets to be deployed for 25 years in these places, we owe them that explanation.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Ms. Gallant, you have 24 seconds left.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: I'm finished, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Thank you.

Mr. Khan.

Mr. Wajid Khan: Thank you, Mr. Chair, professors.

My question is going to be broader, but I'd like to also ask Dr. Boulden a specific question.

You talked about having a stronger understanding at home before we go abroad. I have not heard mention of the Canadian diaspora. We have many experts from all over the world living within our own borders, and I feel that they're not engaged as they should be. I would like you to comment on that.

As well, you talked about the regional players in failed to failing states. Is it possible for us to increase their capacity so they can be effectively engaged in those areas?

And Professor Carment, if we were to take your definition of failed to failing states, most of the world would be a failing state. There are also disputes everywhere within our own...Kurds and other Kurdish people, etc. Let me just make a comment on Iraq. Iraq was perhaps one of the freest societies before the war with Iran and so on. There was a freedom of education, within the context of the Middle East.

I believe, and I'd like to have your comment on it, that lack of international involvement and the dispute settlement resolutions, some in the Middle East and also in Southeast Asia, have destabilized a lot of the world. Do you believe that there's been an international failure contributing to the difficulties of...? I don't want to mention countries, but I'm sure you understand by now. Canada had put a resolution forward in 1948, and the Kashmir issue is still not resolved and the Palestinian issue is still not resolved.

That also brings me to this point. You talked about the quick engagement in failed states. After the Second World War, the world built Britain. We engaged in Germany. We engaged in Japan. Why did we not engage in Afghanistan at that time when the war had just stopped? And do you believe that if we had engaged there--invested our energy and time, etc.--the situation would be better? In other words, perhaps there would not be the Taliban today.

Dr. Jane Boulden: I'll go first in answering the specific questions.

On the role of the diaspora, I agree entirely. I think it's an important asset for Canada that we don't use enough, and that we could build it into the broader effort to develop our own information capacity here.

In terms of regional players--you know this is going to sound facetious, but it isn't--the answer is very much the same in response to a lot of the discussion here, which is that they need more resources, more money. And it comes down to the broader question we've been debating, which is what are our priorities? And we have to ask ourselves if it's about.... It's not just money as such, but people and equipment, and so on—resources broadly defined. If we took those same resources and applied them to our own capabilities, would there be better value added than applying it to the regional organizations? Possibly, but then we lose the capacity-building for those regional organizations, so there may be situations in which the rest of the western countries aren't going to respond, but ten years from now perhaps they might be able to.

In Africa especially, it's a tough struggle, because the resource question is so huge. It's also the case that there are areas of the world in which there are no adequate regional organizations to support, and that raises a different set of questions, which is, do you try to create such a process or is it better left to create itself?

Just briefly on Kashmir and related issues, I think you were touching on a broader question that we often debate in class, which is what have we achieved if we—broadly defined—are in Cypress 40 years later, and in Kashmir almost 60 years later? I don't have an answer to that. There are a number of answers to it. They depend on your objectives. Is your objective to stop the fighting and to allow the others to take the lead in terms of resolving their own conflict? Then we've succeeded. The fact that they've failed to resolve the conflict in that context is a separate issue, but if the objective is to actually find a long-term, just, and stable solution to the problem, then we've failed.

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Dr. David Carment: On the question of diaspora, I just wanted to alert you to the results of a poll that was taken, in which I had a hand, asking questions of Canadians regarding the importance of diasporas, and also of fragile states, the results of which appeared in the National Post two weeks ago with front-page coverage.

I framed that question on fragile states, and quite frankly I was surprised by the result. A slim majority of Canadians are willing to put Canadian assets in harm's way, even if that means giving up something at home with respect to health or education, for example—which is an interesting, surprising result.

But questions were also asked of the Canadian public about the potential contributions the diaspora groups make to the Canadian economy—and quite frankly, the result we got on that was also surprising. There is the blow-back or the downside as well, which is the perceived insecurity that is created by virtue of some diaspora groups using Canada as a potential base for supporting their activities abroad. On balance, of course, the contributions outweigh the negative consequences, but we need to put fragility in the context of these larger global issues with respect to how remittances are used within the homeland for both positive and negative reasons.

There is interesting work being done by the North-South Institute on the role of diasporas, and we held a conference on this issue, an important one that tapped into Canadian-wide networks that are using their ethnic connections as a basis for developing or contributing to Canadian foreign policy objectives within the IPS. So I think the news here is very positive, on balance.

On the question of Kashmir, I would just point to the evidence here, which—

Mr. Wajid Khan: It was more Afghanistan, per se.

Dr. David Carment: Was it Afghanistan?

Mr. Wajid Khan: It was Afghanistan. If we had engaged right after the war, would the result be different today?

Dr. David Carment: I guess the world is full of “what ifs”. We now have a chance to make a difference, and I guess we need to heed the lesson learned. I would ask that people not dwell on the past, but rather think if there situations out there that are emerging Afghanistans. And let's examine the potential for instability as it exists 10, 15, 20 years down the road.

The CIA produced a report you may be familiar with; it came out about two or three months ago, and identified Nigeria as a state that may collapse within the next 10 to 15 years. Take that for what it's worth, but we need to be looking forward as much as we are looking backward.

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The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Thank you, Mr. Carment.

Mr. Perron, then Mr. Martin, and that will use up our time.

[Translation]

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron: According to your statements, that are somewhat philosophical but nonetheless interesting, I think you would agree with me that the Canadian Forces, in order to become efficient, should find themselves some specialization niche.

Second, what should Canada's role or position be before it becomes involved in a conflict or provides aid in the case of a natural disaster? Should we seek shelter under the NATO, UN, African Union, etc., umbrella or should we go it alone?

I was surprised to see that there is something else that you neglected to mention. How do you see the role of the NGOs, what is the purpose of the NGOs?

Thank you.

Dr. Marie-Joëlle Zahar: I will start by answering your question about the NGOs. I want first comment on whether or not the Canadian Forces should develop niche capabilities.

It seems to me that instead of talking about niche capabilities, which implies expertise in limited areas, I would be more inclined, personally, to talk about clear criteria for intervention. In other words, how can Canadian Forces intervene effectively? There are places where, for example, the magnitude of the situation and the limits on our resources are such that Canada would be a secondary or minor player. Those are perhaps not the best places to get involved. There are also situations, like the one in North Korea that my colleague mentioned earlier, that are already under the control of highly interested superpowers and where, as a result, the Canadian presence would go virtually unnoticed.

So I would think about niche capabilities in the sense that there are situations that are of no interest to the superpowers and that are not particularly demanding in terms of resources. We could make a difference there. That is how I would answer your question about niche capabilities.

As for whether we should enter into complex operations alone or with the UN or with regional organizations, etc., I think that it essentially depends on a specific situation. It is clear that there are situations where we must work with the UN. There are other situations where regional organizations are sufficient. Let's take the example of NATO in Bosnia. That was the right organization for the intervention. As regards Africa, we must provide a support role if we go into any African theatres.

I would like to add a comment that is not directly linked to your question, but that is a fact. It deals with the way that our domestic policies can sometimes influence the support that we provide to other organizations. For many years, I have been involved in training organized by CIDA on capacity building for African armies. Those armies must work together, both the anglophone and francophone countries, but the training was provided exclusively in French, which made any pan-African integration very difficult.

So beyond the question of niche capabilities and whether or not we should act alone, we must also think about the way that we can either assist in these situations or unintentionally perhaps undermine their capabilities. In those cases, perhaps we were not very helpful, because the African Union needs to operate as a complete unit. We cannot necessarily force capabilities on the francophone side, for example, without influencing overall quality.

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[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Just a short one, if anyone else wants to?

Dr. David Carment: I just think it's important to distinguish between international non-governmental organizations like CARE, World Vision, and so on--which are going to be there regardless--and the smaller ones, which are often attracted to conflict like bees to honey. We need to be a little more concerned about these NGOs if they are working in hostile conflict zones.

The Department of National Defence has developed the provincial reconstruction teams in part to address the security issue, but I would encourage this committee to look at something very interesting that is under way at the Canadian Forces experimental centre. It's called effects-based operations and effects-based planning. You state at the outset what your desired end result would be, and identify the kinds of resources required to achieve that end result or effect. Those resources include the non-governmental organizations. It requires immense coordination and information-gathering at the outset, but it's an important contribution Canada, the United States, and Australia are making to their understanding of how to deal with these fragile states, and to be sure NGOs are an important part of the equation.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Thank you.

We'll finish up with Mr. Martin.

Hon. Keith Martin: Thank you very much, Professor, for being here today. I'm sorry; I had to go on a radio show for half an hour back home. We're all trying to do double duty all the time.

I'm of the firm belief that our responsibility to protect has to be married up with an obligation to act. As you've articulated, Dr. Zahar, it's one of the big challenges. I know, Dr. Carment, you've worked on this for a long time. It's a major international challenge.

Specifically, what do you think Canada can do to mobilize the international community to convince them to put together a grade of responses--from the diplomatic to the economic sanctions, right through to the military interventions--that would be required to prevent the mass murder of innocent civilians? Do you see that occurring in a venue outside of the UN--for example, through a regional organization such as NATO or the African Union, which we're trying to strengthen right now? It is seen to be able to do certain things in certain places, but completely unable to deal with issues, whether it's Zimbabwe, Sudan, or trying to head up what's going on in Ethiopia.

Dr. Marie-Joëlle Zahar: I honestly think we should not be unrealistic about the capabilities of some of these organizations. The UN, which has been around for fifty years or so, is still incapable of acting decisively and in a coordinated manner, in spite of a huge bureaucracy and substantial resources one can bear to some of the regional organizations. So I would caution against putting too much hope, for fear of ultimately of not only dashing the hope quickly, but also of killing any potential for further development of these organizations. If we ask the African Union currently to be able to deal decisively with Zimbabwe, we're condemning it to becoming irrelevant, much as happened to the Arab League when people thought it should be able to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict and it was not equipped to do it right.

What can Canada do? What is our responsibility? I have recently argued in an article that appeared in the “Canada in the world” issue of the International Journal that we need to be much more coherent about the need to revise, strengthen, and develop multilateralism. It is clear the UN has some good things that need to stay--let's not throw out the baby with the bath water--but the UN needs to evolve. I think Canada needs to be a sound critic and a good friend of the UN, pushing for that evolution to take place. I do not think that regional organizations alone, if the UN were to disappear, would be able to solve the issues. We still need an umbrella organization that makes the world more than just a coalition of some strong and some weak states, regional organizations, and so on.

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Hon. Keith Martin: I don't think that's going to happen in our lifetime, quite frankly. I'm not a pessimist by nature, but realistically, how do we prevent the crises--whether it's eastern Congo or Ethiopia--right now? What do we do today, to try to mobilize?

Dr. David Carment: I think the answer is quite simple, but also ambitious and maybe too academic. Quite simply, implement the IPS. We've dealt in the last ten years in the realm of soft-power ideas, mostly academic and focused in nature, and derived from ideas from international law, and so on. Now we're being asked in the IPS to actually implement some very lofty goals, objectives, and ideas.

I think it's quite simple. We need to operationalize these ideas. We need to put in place tools such as a stabilization reconstruction team. We need to decide more clearly where Canada can make a difference and what kinds of assets should be deployed to make that difference. We need to put in place long-term diagnostic tools--the analytical, the intelligence capability that Canada has, both within the academic community and with the government--to ensure that we have long-term development assistance programs in place, focusing on countries really in need.

Right now, Canada devotes approximately two-thirds of its ODA to a handful of approximately 25 countries; in the past we've spread that across 150 or so, without any clear evidence that that aid was in fact having an effect.

Hon. Keith Martin: And most of it is spent in Canada.

Dr. David Carment: We need to think about that. I don't know whether that's politically manageable from an academic's perspective, but what I've suggested is if you take a demand-side-oriented approach, as opposed to a supply-oriented approach to state fragility and failure, and look at the drivers of conflict, and try to match up what Canada is capable of providing in response to these needs, and use a diagnostic to inform that approach, it may be that what we have to contribute may not always match what those countries need. That's when we step aside or decide to take a leadership position: when those resources match those needs.

What I'm suggesting here is that with greater concentration of our resources, whether it's aid, defence, or diplomacy, in fewer countries we will be asked—you, me, and everyone else—to demonstrate that we're actually having an effect. We will be asked to demonstrate that we're successful, and success is its own reward. Let's just get on with it and implement the IPS.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Does anybody else have a short question?

Dr. Jane Boulden: Just quickly, when you're asking what do we do today, I would echo David's remark about implementing the IPS, although I think that's not necessarily a today thing; it's a longer-term impact. In the short term, I would say we need to do more of what we're doing now, and do it better, and as well as we can. Because it is a fact of international life that our ability to influence the international community—which I think partly was the point you were getting at—relates directly to our ability to say to them that we're going to be there doing x and y; we will take the lead on Hait on these issues; we will be contacting these states to ask them to do this, and we're talking to you about doing this--x, y, and z.

The more we do out there, the more we're going to be able to motivate others. I'm not saying we're not doing that at all now, but our ability to do that has certainly diminished over the past ten to twenty years. So my short-term response would be let's ramp that up to the extent we can over the next five to ten years while we're doing what David and Marie-Joëlle said.

Hon. Keith Martin: In all those areas, not only military.

Dr. Jane Boulden: Yes, that's right, not just military, but across the board.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): Thank you, Dr. Martin.

Thank you, panellists, for coming in and helping us with our study. We appreciate it. Your information was very thoughtful and has given us some food for thought, I'm sure.

We're adjourned, committee, until 4:30. We'll meet again in Room 269 on Agent Orange.