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I call this meeting to order. Welcome to meeting number 22 of the Special Committee on Canada-China Relations. Pursuant to the order of reference of Wednesday, September 23, 2020, the committee is meeting on its study of Canada-China relations.
[Translation]
This meeting is in hybrid format, pursuant to the motion adopted by the House on January 25, 2021.
[English]
I would like to welcome the Honourable Harjit Sajjan, Minister of National Defence.
Thank you for being here.
We also have, from the Department of National Defence, Jody Thomas, deputy minister; Rear-Admiral Scott Bishop, commander of the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command and chief of defence intelligence; and Major-General Cadieu, director of staff, strategic joint staff.
Finally, from the Communications Security Establishment, we have Shelly Bruce, chief; as well as Scott Jones, head of the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.
[Translation]
Thank you, everyone, for being here this evening.
[English]
Mr. Sajjan, the floor is yours for your opening remarks. You have five minutes. Please proceed.
Committee members, good afternoon.
I'm joined here by my officials from both National Defence and from the Communications Security Establishment.
Thank you for inviting me to share some thoughts on Canada-China relations from a National Defence perspective. This is actually my first time appearing before your committee, and I’m grateful for this opportunity.
I want to thank you for the important work you are doing to help Canadians better understand our relationship with China.
First, let me say that Global Affairs Canada is the lead on Canada's bilateral relationship with China.
While our interactions and activities at National Defence have always been in line with foreign policy, we’re more of what I would call a “key partner” in Canada’s whole-of-government approach. Global Affairs drives our relationship with China. Public Safety is our domestic security lead. The Communications Security Establishment oversees our cyber-defence. National Defence is responsible for the regional security and engagement piece, among other key functions.
Canada recognizes China’s importance in world affairs, especially in regional and international security. We share deep ties economically, culturally and especially people-to-people. Many Canadians have Chinese roots, and many Canadians frequently travelled to mainland China before the pandemic to visit family and friends.
Despite these ties, our bilateral relationship is complex and presents challenges. In our defence policy—Strong, Secure, Engaged—we committed to being a reliable partner in the Asia-Pacific region through strong partnerships and consistent engagements.
The world is changing rapidly, as is China’s geopolitical role. That is why we are constantly assessing our approach to China. Any behaviours and activities that run counter to Canadian values and interests—and those of our allies and partners—require us to look at the relationship with eyes wide open. We are doing that.
Mr. Chair, here and around the world, we are adamant about supporting the rules-based international order. We will always work to uphold it and the stability it brings.
We believe that all countries benefit when we observe the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. We will always stand up for freedom of navigation and overflight, while respecting the rights and jurisdiction of coastal states. We know that freedom of navigation is vital, and 90% of the world’s trade travels by sea. That’s why Canada opposes land reclamation projects and building outposts in disputed areas for military purposes. We support lawful commerce, freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight in accordance with international law.
We will continue supporting our allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region, especially in the face of unilateral actions that undermine peace and stability. One way we signal this support is by maintaining an active naval presence in the region.
At the moment, HMCS Calgary is deployed in the Indo-Pacific region with a Cyclone helicopter on board to carry out Canada’s forward presence activities under Operation Projection. Shortly, the ship will be chopped into Operation Artemis, which is the Canadian Armed Forces’ mission to fight terrorism and to make the Middle Eastern waters more secure.
Under Operation Neon, we are also contributing to multinational efforts to implement the United Nations Security Council sanctions against North Korea, sanctions that China has also agreed to uphold.
Along with these naval activities, Canada has been a proud dialogue partner with ASEAN for four decades. ASEAN is the key group of nations in Southeast Asia working to uphold the rules-based order.
Canada is also seeking to deepen its level of engagement with ASEAN by pursuing member status on two expert working groups of its Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus on maritime security and humanitarian and disaster relief.
As said during a December ADMM-Plus meeting, Canada is looking to expand its navy, air force, army and special forces ties with ASEAN countries through high-level bilateral engagements, staff talks and participation in military exercises. We will keep prioritizing exchanges with ASEAN members in military education, including through our military training and co-operation program.
Mr. Chair and members of the committee, Canada’s relationship with an evolving China is a complex and challenging one. In all of our dealings with China, we will continue to be guided by our values, to defend human rights and to protect our interests at home and abroad. We will always work with like-minded countries to uphold the rules-based international order that brings stability and security to the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
I want to thank the committee for its time today, and I would be glad to respond to any questions.
[Translation]
Thank you very much.
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Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, Mr. Minister, for joining us today for this meeting.
Again today, the [Technical difficulty—Editor] committee made public its 2020 report highlighting the growing importance of cyber-attacks by foreign actors to the security of Canadians. This is based on reports, communications from the Communications Security Establishment, which, among other things, identify two main players: Russia and China.
I'd like you to tell us what is being done to ensure that our networks are as protected as possible, including in the context of COVID-19. Indeed, as we know, there has been a lot of telework, which has resulted in greater vulnerability, which may not have been as present in the past.
I'd like to know what cybersecurity measures are being taken to protect our infrastructure and systems.
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We have significant concern when it comes to cyber-actors around the world, and especially when it comes to Russia and China.
Our agency especially, the Communications Security Establishment, has a tremendous capability, and we now actually have the authorities to take the appropriate action. Before the Communications Security Establishment Act was in place, when we came into government we had the capability to do so but didn't have the authority. For example, we had to wait for a cyber-attack to occur—the equivalent of waiting to get punched in the face before you can take any action—even though you knew the attack was occurring.
One of the things we did here was that within the new CSE act, when we see an attack coming, we have now the authority to take further action to be able to shut it down. In addition, we also have the ability as a government to take offensive action.
Now, putting the authorities in place is one thing, but we also have now made significant investments by creating the cyber centre as well, under CSE, making sure that we concentrate all our support there. That's one aspect of it: making the appropriate investments there. It's about having the right people to maintain that capability and making sure you have the right authorities, but also investing in the right capabilities to be able to round it off in making sure that Canada is safe from cyber-attacks.
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We looked at Arctic sovereignty and put it in our defence policy in accordance with maintaining our sovereignty. It was going to take investments.
We had already started with the investments, for example, making sure we had the Arctic-operative patrol ships. In fact, we have the first one actually operating in the region and conducting tests. We're going to have six now, not just five. We will have 15 surface combatants as well, through a fully funded defence policy.
NORAD modernization and continental defence was the last pillar. We have outlined it in our defence policy. We are now moving forward with this. The reason we waited to do it is that we had to work in conjunction with the U.S. on this. We also wanted to make sure we did the proper costing and put the funding into it. This way, no government can come in and start cutting funding. Just like we secured [Technical difficulty—Editor] policy, we're going to do the same thing for the Arctic.
We also want to make sure the people in the north get the appropriate support as we make further defence investments up there.
I'd like to thank the minister for being with us this evening. I'm very pleased about that.
I'm going to pick up on Mr. Lightbound's question about the Arctic.
We know of China's growing interest in the Arctic. Despite the fact that, in practice, it has no possession in either the north or the south, it has an interest. As we know, the Chinese tried to get their hands on a mine in the Northwest Territories. The decision not to allow this acquisition has been made.
However, I want to come back to the importance of defence, especially since Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic is not even fully recognized by our main ally, the United States.
How do we plan to deal with the wishes of China and Russia related to the Arctic, given the fact that Canadian sovereignty is being challenged by a certain number of states, including the United States, and the fact that Canada's military capabilities are far below those expected of us by the United States and NATO?
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That's a really important question. When it comes to protecting the Arctic, we can't just look at it strictly from a defence nexus when we look to our sovereignty. We need to always look at a whole-of-government approach to ensure we're not preventing access to various industries. It is extremely important that we make the right investments.
When it comes to the state of where we're at, when we work with the U.S., we probably couldn't be in a better position, because of our NORAD treaty. NORAD is the only binational command in the world where you have a U.S. commander who is selected by the U.S. but also must be approved by the prime minister, just like the deputy commander, who is always Canadian, has to be authorized by the president.
Through this, we manage the security of our airspace. What we're trying to do now, and what we will be doing, is looking at modernizing NORAD and taking things to a whole new level. This is not just strictly about technology investments; this is about looking at new things we need to put in as part of this relationship, and how we possibly look at America. We need to be mindful that the Arctic.... Originally, we were just looking at it in terms of airspace. We want to go from space all the way to under water.
Significant work is currently being done in the research development world right now, in a classified sense, to make sure we figure that piece out and link it to the procurement piece, with our new ships that are coming online. It would then be linked to the ongoing command relationship.
That's what NORAD modernization, or a continental defence, will look like. Once we have that, we need to make sure we send a very strong message of deterrence.
When it comes to some of the other disagreements we have with the U.S., we have a very good relationship and are able to work things out. We have to always be mindful that our relationship with the U.S. can't be even remotely compared to how we work with China.
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I fully agree with you, Mr. Minister, however, when we compare the relations between Canada and the United States and Canada and the People's Republic of China, we realize that the People's Republic of China is making enormous investments in its defence, so much so that this is the second largest budget in the world.
As I pointed out, China is now a concern, even for NATO, although it's far away from the North Atlantic region. As I also mentioned, NATO and the United States are raising concerns about Canadian defence investments.
How do we respond to these concerns that are being expressed to us, given the views of China and Russia, among others, on Canada's North?
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First of all, Mr. Chair, when it comes to China's investments in defence, we have concerns with that as well, how we work with NATO.... This is where, Mr. Chair, I'll clarify the relationship.
Yes, there was a significant concern when it came to defence investments. This is why we conducted a very [Technical difficulty—Editor] policy review and then, once we launched our defence policy, demonstrated the.... In addition to what the previous government was going to add to defence, we added $63 billion.
Probably the most important thing when it came to our defence policy was that we didn't just put the policy out; we actually added the money to it. For the 20 years of the defence policy, it will be carved out of a fiscal framework, so that now defence doesn't have to worry about the money for the 338 projects that are there.
We're going to be doing the same thing for NORAD modernization. When it comes to the level of investments, both NATO and the U.S. are very happy with the level of investments we're making. Obviously, we have more work to do. That's where NORAD modernization comes in. As I've always said at NATO—and I spoke with the NATO Secretary General many times about this—as we look at supporting NATO in a Europe—
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Thank you very much, Chair.
Thank you, Minister, for joining us. There are lots of interesting questions arising from your visit.
First of all, I have a concern about the whole issue of security in Canada—that is what we're talking about here—and, in particular, cybersecurity. We know that China and other countries, including Russia and perhaps Canada, have capabilities in cyberwarfare, as I guess it's called sometimes—the capability of doing cyber-attacks. We recently had electricity turned off in India, allegedly by Chinese state or non-state actors. We have, of course, the history of interference with the Iranian centrifuges, which occurred I think in 2010 or 2014, and allegedly recently.
I have a question for you. I know that [Technical difficulty—Editor], but can you tell us how vulnerable Canada's key infrastructure might be to interferences of that sort? Hydro dams are very important. The Internet is very important. Communication is very important. What capabilities does Canada have to protect itself from these kinds of vulnerabilities?
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Mr. Chair, it's a very important question.
At the end of the day, we need to make sure we protect our valuable assets and our industry. That is why, through the communications security act, we have the authorities available to be able to engage with industry so that we can work with them to make sure they have the right cyber-capabilities.
In fact, the cyber centre works very closely with the various sectors and, more importantly, with almost any company that wishes to get additional information. What we want to do, as we look at not only the sectors, is to make Canada cybersecure. The only way to do that is to make sure, as companies develop and as industries develop—as sectors further develop as well—that they have the right cyber-capabilities from the get-go, advised by the cyber centre. Currently I'm very confident with the capabilities that we have, but it's an ongoing support that we need to provide.
I'm happy to have our chief, Shelly Bruce, provide a greater—
Good evening, Mr. Minister. In your presentation, you mentioned Canada's efforts abroad to support the sovereignty of various countries. That's great, but here at home, from the beginning, we've been talking a lot about Chinese interference in the territory. In 2015, the communist government designated the polar region, the deep seabed and outer space as China's new strategic frontiers and noted that they were rich in opportunity. The Pentagon issued a report [Technical difficulty—Editor] warning that the Chinese government was mapping the Arctic seabed.
Have you been made aware of Chinese submarines in the Canadian Arctic?
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Mr. Chair, as we stated earlier on, this is a whole-of-government approach. In fact, we'll work together to make sure we have all the right support. For example, on the defence side alone and as the member knows from the time when he was a critic for defence, when it comes to our Arctic offshore patrol ships, we actually had the
Harry DeWolf operating up in the north, conducting its trial.
We do have a presence there. We have now put up additional satellites so that we have a greater reconnaissance and outlook up there. We're doing some really cutting-edge research up in the north as well.
Plus, when it comes to the Coast Guard, we have made significant investments and we will be doing more to make sure we not only have the right presence, but that we provide the right support.
However, we need to make sure we have that layered approach. It's extremely vital, Mr. Chair. It's probably the most important piece. The investments we're making into the future right now are about aligning our space capabilities all the way down to under the water and into a command and [Inaudible—Editor] that will work with NORAD modernization.
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Thank you. As you know, the time we have is short, and we want to get this done quickly.
With regard to telecommunications, there is a dispute with Huawei. Everyone is aware of the 5G issue and other issues with the company.
Three years ago, we were told—this was at the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, if I'm not mistaken—that a telecommunications network would be installed by Huawei in Canada's north and that the company's objective was to work with indigenous peoples to provide telecommunications services. But we know very well that this was a way for China to establish itself there.
Can you tell me if if Huawei has or is the process of establishing a telecommunications network? I'm not talking about 5G here, but about Huawei's telecommunications.
I'd like to say thank you and welcome to the minister. Shukriya ji.
Minister, as we know, climate change is real. In fact, it's a real danger in the world. Canada is recognized as a strong ally globally in terms of disaster response and humanitarian assistance. In that regard, as an Australian-born Canadian, I would very much like to thank you for your direction to send help to Australia last year during the terrible, disastrous wildfires. Thank you so much from the bottom of my heart for that.
Can you please tell us about the work of the disaster assistance response team and their operations on deployments around the world?
Thank you.
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Thank you very much. I'm happy to talk about DART and all the work we have been doing in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific region. Climate impacts that region, and nations there know this extremely well. When they see sea levels rising, not just their livelihoods but their entire existence is at stake.
Back in 2015 we increased our presence in the Pacific. Having a greater presence there with the Canadian Armed Forces, especially our navy, gave greater confidence to those nations that we would be there for them. DART therefore plays a very important role when it comes to disasters. We do an analysis of when the team needs to be sent. It has to be requested. Then, when it is sent, it provides the necessary humanitarian support [Technical difficulty—Editor] great work. This is one area we have been trying to expand with our colleagues, especially working with Japan and South Korea in the region. We're looking at how we can partner up with other nations, especially Australia, and how we can work together to provide greater support [Technical difficulty—Editor]. Sometimes it's about airlift, and we've done that in other places.
Also, let's not forget that we have the heavy urban search and rescue teams that our government restarted funding for. These teams are designed to respond to disasters.
We're looking at various options for how we can provide greater support. Through those discussions, we'll have a better idea, but this is one area that we are paying very close attention to.
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First of all, I want to make it very clear, Mr. Chair, that it wasn't the Minister of Foreign Affairs. We never actually had any discussion about this. I can't talk about whatever internal discussions might have happened at the lower levels of Global Affairs, but one thing I can tell you when it came to defence and this exercise is that I wasn't aware that it was actually taking place. It was based on the agreements that were done, as I stated, and signed by the previous government. That work was continuing.
Obviously, after our two Michaels were arbitrarily detained, I gave direction that we were not to continue with any type of further relationship. That's exactly what we have right now.
When it comes to the relationship with China, we work very closely with our allies in how we make decisions based on the work. Originally it was about humanitarian and disaster response, on which we could work together. [Technical difficulty—Editor] made at the exercise that we conduct at RIMPAC. It's one of the largest naval exercises, and China would not be invited to that.
We work very closely with our Five Eyes partners on what types of relationships we build, because ultimately it's only through multilateralism that you're able to have the biggest impact.
I'm surprised you referenced the Washington office, and the supposed Conservative staff, which kind of opens up something that I'd heard around this town. In fact, it's an open secret that your government doesn't like the fact that it was started under a Conservative government. It's an open secret that you'd like to find a way to defund it.
In fact, this John McCain award that is being proposed—potentially or apparently from the news reports—to the heroic president of Taiwan gives you an excuse to do just that, to cut its funding while maintaining your close relations with Beijing.
What say you to that, since you're so quick to label these Conservative organizers or employees? I didn't know that was an issue.
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That couldn't be further from the truth.
In fact, when Peter MacKay was there, I actually said to him, in front of everybody, how important this was, and that I wanted to make sure this continues. If you actually recall, and if you take a look at the Canadian Taxpayers Federation and the report it put out in a news release, it talks about this.
I want to make sure that Canadian tax dollars go to the Halifax International Security Forum, because at the same time, when you were talking about the same organization, the business side of it is headquartered in Washington. When you were asking me that question, I didn't know what exactly you were talking about. I support the Halifax International Security Forum.
I don't know what's so funny about this, because it's extremely serious. One, it provides a lot of economic benefit. We invite people from all over, and if you—
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I'm glad we're going back to the topic at hand.
Canada is a Pacific nation. When I became Minister of National Defence, it was very clear that we did not have a significant presence in the Pacific. In fact, it was quite consistent that we didn't have a regular presence at the Shangri-La Dialogue. We committed to not only increasing our presence with the military, but being there reliably on exercises, working very closely with our partners.
A perfect example I can give is what we call Operation Neon, the section's monitoring against North Korea. In Vancouver a conversation was convened by foreign ministers, led then by our then foreign minister, , with other foreign ministers, the secretary of state and me. The secretary of defence from the U.S. also attended and provided the military outlook. Through this we were able, with all the foreign ministers, to look at the military challenges and emphasize the importance of diplomacy. To do this, we needed to have credible military presence in the region against North Korea. That's exactly what we did.
Through the convening of that conversation, we were able to have a greater presence in the region and we have consistently provided both aerial and ship support for monitoring these sanctions. This gives greater confidence to the members of the nations there that Canada will be there. That's exactly what we have done. We need to continue this. We have significant security concerns in the region, but if we also want to have a voice we need to be there. That's exactly what we're doing now.
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One thing I can say with absolute confidence is that our folks at CSE work very closely with our allies in protecting Canadians and our allies [
Technical difficulty—Editor] against intrusion. A lot of great work happens behind the scenes that we can't talk about with Canadians, for good reason.
I've already talked about the authorities with the CSE act, but it is important to mention that the authority we finally have allows us those capabilities, which require the appropriate investments we are currently making. For example, the creation of the cyber centre allows us not only to have a tremendous capability to protect Canadians but also to start building a culture of resilience inside Canada, so we can make sure that everybody is cyber-safe.
As little as this may sound, it has a significant impact. You can work with small businesses and even individuals to make sure they're cyber-safe. Everybody's walking around with their phones, even kids these days. It's extremely important to educate them on how to change their password regularly and make other choices to make sure they stay safe.
Thank you to the officials for appearing tonight.
To begin, Ms. Thomas, I think anyone who looks at Canada-China relations obviously recognizes the importance of multilateralism. I'm wondering if you could shed some more light on exactly [Technical difficulty—Editor] on the issue of multilateralism. Are the Five Eyes allies the most important avenue through which we respond to China, or are there other partnerships and relationships you would point to that are critical?
I'm not asking you to rank them. I think it's important for us as a committee to recognize, from a defence perspective, where exactly the energy is focused. Is it focused through the Five Eyes allies or other relationships?
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Certainly Canada's primordial defence relationship is NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO has an interest in China, there's absolutely no doubt, but the majority of our exercising in the NATO environment, which I would invite either of the military members to comment on, is focused on the Atlantic and the North Atlantic.
The Five Eyes partnership certainly is very important for us in the Indo-Pacific. We have other alliances. The has been asked to join ADMM-Plus, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus, which focuses on the Indo-Pacific, as an observer this year. That's been a critical move forward, as was mentioned earlier.
The partnerships provide different strengths and benefits, depending on the activity and the geographic nature of the world. Of course, we share a NATO relationship with two of the Five Eyes. There is an Indo-Pacific interest with all of the Five Eyes. Our activities are always in a coalition. We are a country that believes in multilateralism. We rely on and work with our allies for all the activities that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces undertake. I don't think there's a ranking or a difference. It depends on the focus and the need.
I'll stick with Foreign Affairs for my last question, Mr. Chair.
We've seen the federal government take steps in recent months to ensure as much as possible that any products sourced from the Xinjiang region of China that may have had as their source forced labour are not allowed to enter Canada. However, it is unfortunately still the case that websites like eBay and Amazon.ca—I just saw it myself tonight on Amazon.ca—advertise Xinjiang cotton. For those who might not know, Xinjiang cotton is a major source of the global cotton supply.
What can the Canadian government do further to what it's already done? Important steps have been taken, but I think there's clearly a call here to do even more to ensure that products and/or services that are the result of forced labour do not end up coming into Canada, period.
I know you might pivot now to talk about Employment and Social Development Canada and how it's their responsibility, and how Public Safety has a role. I get that. I get that there are various departments working on this, but can Foreign Affairs also be involved in looking at this? Is this happening? To what extent are you coordinating with other departments on this matter? It's a very critical issue facing the country right now.
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I wasn't in Ottawa at the time, but in Brussels.
I'm pleased to answer on behalf of the department because I keep in touch with my colleagues.
If I remember correctly, it was very soon after the arrest of the two Michaels, who were of great concern. A full and comprehensive assessment of the intentions of the Chinese authorities had not yet been conducted. So we wanted to keep all the channels open and keep all the commitments in place to make sure that we had access to all the mechanisms of dialogue [Technical difficulty—Editor] as a result of this escalation and arbitrary arrests.
At that time, we were still doing our assessments and we weren't trying to escalate, but we didn't want to back off either. That assessment was necessary to really understand the situation and to be in a better position to free the two Michaels as soon as possible through the dialogue mechanisms available to us.
You've probably been following this committee's work, including on the contracts awarded to a Chinese conglomerate for visa management in the People's Republic of China, which subcontracted them to a Chinese state-owned company. It was done without much security screening.
I'd now like to take you to the department's plan to order Nuctech to equip 170 embassies, consulates and high commissions. The company was founded by the son of former Communist Party secretary general and president of the People's Republic of China, Hu Jintao. In addition, a number of concerns have been expressed by the U.S. government regarding corruption cases involving the company, particularly in Namibia.
In light of all that, were security checks done before this project was launched?
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That would be great. I'd rather you do that than take up the time saying nothing. Thank you very much.
This may involve you, Mr. Jones.
Microsoft, in March of this year, announced that there were multiple malicious actors compromising their Exchange email service. They blamed it on a group they called Hafnium, which they said was associated with China and [Technical difficulty—Editor].
Your organization issued a report on March 6, the next day, warning Canadians—or giving an alert—to apply their patches and look for signs of compromise.
Was CSE and your centre independently aware of that attack, and what kind of response would Canadians be able to expect regarding this kind of attack?
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Obviously, we're very interested in the development of China's military capabilities. It's something we watch quite closely, and we've been watching it for quite some time. I would not characterize that we're specifically concerned over the last five years, but looking at the broader trends of how China has evolved over the last couple of decades, it causes us some concern when we look at the trajectory it has been on.
If you look at China in the 1980s, there was a large, conscript military not really capable of doing much, primarily focused on coastal defence. That's a very different military from the one we see today. China has made significant efforts to modernize its military force, introduce modern, new capabilities and transform the way it commands and controls those capabilities to be a far more effective fighting force.
We also see that China has expanded into new domains that we're quite interested in, including the space domain, with a significant increase in their operations in space. If you take a look at the 1980s, China didn't operate satellites. Today they've launched over 540 satellites in space, so we're watching that very closely.
Overall, it's a trend over the last 20 or 30 years that has caused us a lot of concern. As China has built up its military capability, we're also very interested in how it is using it, because—
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Thank you, Major-General.
I'd now like to turn to Ms. Bruce, from the Communications Security Establishment, the CSE.
During his testimony, the minister spoke several times about amendments to the act. He was talking about Bill , which I worked on when I was on the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. Offensive external response capabilities were assigned. We also identified an issue that wasn't necessarily addressed by the provisions of Bill C-59, which was strongly siloed operations. We currently have with us representatives from the Canadian Armed Forces, CSE, and the Canadian Centre for Cybersecurity. There are often communication problems between these organizations.
Has this situation improved? Can you say that there is currently close co-operation between the military and civilians in Canada?
Since this is my first comment this evening, I would like to acknowledge all the witnesses and thank them for joining us. I have met and talked to several of them on other occasions.
My first question is for Ms. Bruce, from the Communications Security Establishment.
Given the COVID-19 situation, could you tell me which key issues CSE is currently working on? I know that, in keeping with your strategies on what is secret or top secret, you may not be able to tell us everything, but I would like to know what issues you are currently working on.
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Thank you for your question.
[English]
Mr. Chair, CSE is really very attentive to the fact that more and more Canadians are online—not just Canadian citizens, but also businesses, students and the academic sector. We are taking very strong actions to make sure we can help to educate and keep that increased threat surface more secure for Canadians.
We've been detecting phishing campaigns that have been used by non-state actors that are aiming to defraud Canadians, or to steal their information and play on their anxieties. We've put in place a number of activities to help reduce the risk.
For example, when we identify sites that are purporting to be Government of Canada authoritative sources, we work with the private sector to take those sites offline and reduce the risks of Canadians coming into contact with disinformation.
We have also been working with different partners in the government to find ways to help eliminate the idea that their accounts can be spoofed. We are providing our threat feeds to other private sector organizations to allow them to build apps that Canadians can download.
We're also working extremely closely with the health sector. We have provided to them a great number of indicators of compromise and advice and guidance that can help them withstand and be more resilient in the face of the kinds of attacks we're seeing, like ransomware, directed at organizations that simply can't afford to go offline for any length of time.
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Again, thank you for your question.
[English]
Mr. Chair, we have a very close working relationship with the Five Eyes, as was described by the , on both the foreign intelligence and cybersecurity sides.
We have a very strong rapport and exchange of information on all levels of activity, from research and development all the way through to intelligence and technical exchanges. I would say the relationship is as strong as it has ever been.
We're actually celebrating our 75th anniversary this year. Some of those relationships date back all the way to the beginning of our existence. It's a long history and a very solid relationship.
At the 2018 G7 summit in the Charlevoix region, it was decided that Canada would coordinate the G7 rapid response mechanism. At the same time, in its departmental plan 2021-2022, Global Affairs Canada states that it will coordinate “responses to foreign interference and hostile activities by state actors, economic-based threats to national security, international crime and terrorism, weapons proliferation, and regional and local security crises.”
Can you tell us what this rapid response mechanism is, whether it is in place, and whether it is effective in ensuring a G7 response to all of these interferences and threats, as departmental plan 2021-2022 states?
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I think that's a question for me, since it falls under my responsibilities at Global Affairs. Thank you for your question.
Yes, this mechanism has been put in place and is very successful. We would certainly like to continue to improve it, and it is very important to do so because we are increasingly faced with misinformation. The trends and tactics of our adversaries are constantly changing and developing very quickly and they are very complex.
The mechanism calls on the G7 network, which has been joined by other partners, and a national network that includes partners and experts from within the federal government, but also from outside. We are working together to improve our capacity and to better understand and counter this wide range of foreign interference and encroachment. Sometimes, a collective response from the allies is possible. This effort to increase our capabilities and our understanding of everything that's happening in cyberspace is very much appreciated by our allies and is a great accomplishment.
:
This is an issue that the Government of Canada has been consistent in conveying to both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Whatever the differences and the different perspectives, any solution to the tensions across the strait needs to receive the support of people on both sides of the strait. What we've seen in recent months is quite concerning, and we have at all opportunities raised our concerns about the increase in kinetic activity that pushes the boundaries of the current status quo across the Taiwan Strait.
The question is speculative, and you'll appreciate that I'm not going to speculate on the consequences of a hypothetical, but it's a grave concern not only to Canada and like-minded countries, but to many of our partners in the region—many of the neighbours. The PRC and countries like Canada around the world should look at dialogue and opportunities to encourage both sides of the strait to seek a peaceful resolution to the long-standing issue.
Canada will continue to speak out for Taiwan's inclusion in international fora where statehood is not an issue and where all people should be represented. The government has been very clear on that with respect to the WHO, the ICAO and other fora. It's very important under the kind of scenario we're seeing, where limits are being tested, that we continue to make it clear to both the people of Taiwan and the people of China that, again, any resolution to the tensions in the strait has to be found through peaceful means.
I have one final comment and question.
Mr. Epp, it could be argued that the only thing we provide China is about half a per cent of its economic output, about four-tenths of 1% of its GDP. In other words, we purchase about 70 billion dollars' worth of products from China per year. Per capita GDP in Canadian dollars is about $10,000 a year. In other words, our $70 billion employs about seven million Chinese workers. We know that 20 million people a year are moving from China's rural areas into cities, a phenomenon that has been going on for more than a decade and is predicted to go on for some time in the future, and this is something confirmed by the Chinese ministry of housing and urban-rural development.
Has Global Affairs done an analysis of this phenomenon related to the existential need for China to grow at a certain rate, GDP currently [Technical difficulty—Editor] to ensure that internal migrants are gainfully employed? If so, what can you tell us about the conclusions of this analysis?
:
Mr. Chair, that's a very specific question. I will say, off the top of my head, that I'm not aware that such a study has been done, but we're a large department. I would be happy to look into it and let you know if we have.
More generally, the point is an important one. It plays to a number of concerns with respect to social cohesion and stability in China, as others have said—I think including when he was before the committee in January. I mean, China has in many ways some fragility, and a lot of that fragility has to do with the large gap in incomes. Even as China has developed and grown richer, it's also seen a much greater income gap, and that disparity between urban centres and rural is, I think, well known to many of the members of this committee who have travelled to China and been briefed on that before.
In the mix, there has also been.... As urbanization has rapidly accelerated in China, it has created other issues beyond social and political, including environmental. However, it's also offered opportunities for Canadian exporters in areas where Canada is highly sought by Chinese consumers, whether that's with respect to our products or our homes, building, construction, etc.
:
I call this meeting back to order.
The first issue to deal with is in regard to the motion for the production of documents. The clerk would like to confirm one aspect of the motion that was adopted on Wednesday, March 31, 2021. As the deadline for the production of documents was changed to 20 days, the deadline for Mr. Stewart and Mr. Poliquin to appear, should they fail to produce the documents, should now be 27 days as opposed to 17 days. The motion would change to include the part that says “within 27 days of this motion passing”.
Are there any objections to this? The clerk is simply looking for confirmation. Seeing no objections, I'll consider that adopted.
[Translation]
Also, the schedule of the committee has changed, as you know. We now meet only once a week, every Monday, for three hours. The clerk has distributed the proposed schedule to reflect this change.
Are there any comments on this?
[English]
The clerk has informed me that next Monday, April 19, 2021, Ms. Bartholomew, chairperson of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, has confirmed her appearance. She's currently on a two-witness panel. The clerk and analyst would like to know if members would prefer to hear from Ms. Bartholomew for a full hour on her own.
Mr. Harris.
I agree with that observation. It's a privilege of members of Parliament not to be, I guess, cross-examined by committees, or required to appear before committees.
I put my hand up for another reason. I'm not sure that we clarified, after discussing that we wanted Ms. Bartholomew for an hour.... I don't know where we fit that hour in, or whether that hour was to replace Mr. Waterhouse and Alexander Bowe, or we just have her another time at some other place. Was that clarified at all by the committee?
Mr. Chair, I have two points. First of all, I think we should set aside the hour as planned to hear from either Mr. McGuinty or other members of that intelligence review committee of Parliament. There are other parliamentarians on that committee who may be willing to appear if Mr. McGuinty is not willing to appear voluntarily and if we're not able to find a workaround.
I would suggest that we send a follow-up letter to Mr. McGuinty, underlining the strong desire of members of the committee to hear from him. That doesn't violate any of the rules. At the same time, we extend the opportunity to the next appropriate...or to other members of that committee.
Further to Mr. Bergeron's comments and others in terms of this question of being able to summon people, it seemed from what the clerk has said and what I've seen in other cases that the House of Commons can direct a person to appear before the committee. It would be within the powers of the committee to, for instance, adopt a motion and refer that motion to the House, which then, if concurred in, would direct Mr. McGuinty to appear before the committee.
I just want to have some clarity on the rules. I'd be interested in the feedback of other members. Clearly it's not something I can do without the support of other members.
Madam Clerk, could you just clarify the formulation of that? If the committee were to adopt a motion like, “That the committee direct David McGuinty to appear for one hour before the special committee and report this motion to the House”, would that motion, if concurred in, provide the appropriate instruction?
I just want to speak to that suggestion of Mr. Genuis's that a motion be presented to the House. I don't think that's a very wise thing for parliamentarians to do unless there were some extreme circumstances requiring a member to appear. Mr. McGuinty's not being asked to appear on some matter that he alone has knowledge of. The committee has issued a report. The report is available. My experience of Mr. McGuinty in front of committees is that he tells you what's in the report, and he doesn't tell you very much else. He talks about the report. He appeared before the public safety committee recently.
It would be a bad precedent to set that we would ignore the privileges of members of the House, because these are part of our privileges as members. We should be very loath to make it a common practice or even a precedent such as this where it doesn't appear to be crucial that Mr. McGuinty present himself to be examined by this committee on this matter. As a member of Parliament, I think it would be unwise to set a precedent like that.
Mr. Lightbound's suggestion is fine if he wants to be asked again—or other members of the committee. If the purpose of this is to have an opportunity to talk about the report and what's in the report, that's fine. We can have it on our agenda, and someone from the committee can come and lead us through the report or whatever, but I don't think we're going to hear anything that the committee learned through its report other than what's in the report itself.
:
I have two points to make.
First, I think that the matter is not as trivial or anecdotal as it initially appears. As I mentioned a few moments ago, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians was created to ensure a certain transparency and civilian control over national security activities. Consequently, it is peculiar, to say the least, that the chair of this committee refuses to demonstrate that transparency by appearing before his peers.
I understand Mr. Harris' point. I think we need to be careful before we set such a precedent. That is why I would be inclined to agree with Mr. Lightbound's wise suggestion to offer another date to appear before us and to present his views and the views of the committee on Canada-China relations from a national security perspective. We could even offer him an in camera appearance, although I know that is not the preference of my colleagues. Before we go there, I think we need to provide another date. If he continues to refuse, we can look at other avenues afterwards.
I agree with much of what has been said by everybody else. By querying the procedural mechanism by which someone could be summoned before the committee, I did not mean to suggest that it should necessarily be the first option. However, since we're having this discussion in public, it's good to just acknowledge the options that the committee has available to it. Those are real procedural options. They're not inventing something that doesn't exist in the rules. There's a history. I believe it was used for a certain former NDP leader. There is a procedure by which the House can summon a person to appear before a committee, and that can happen for a member of Parliament if the House is acting, as opposed to the committee.
I agree with Mr. Bergeron's point. This is a serious matter, not because Mr. McGuinty's own conduct is in question here, of course, but because the spirit in which that oversight body was created was to be a committee of parliamentarians that would provide parliamentary review over security and intelligence activities.
In that sense, this is information that members of that committee, and that committee only, can provide. It's not as if we can just substitute a different expert here, right? This is a particular body with a legislative mandate to be a connection between parliamentarians and security decision-making. Therefore, it's important that the committee hear from members of that body, and to honour the mandate of that body, that we be a little insistent.
I support the suggestion of Mr. Lightbound to send a follow-up letter to offer some flexibility in terms of timing. It is perhaps still possible for the committee to meet outside its regular time slot. Maybe the whips' offices aren't that keen on it, but we can try to be flexible on our end to accommodate his schedule. Maybe we just communicate to him the seriousness with which members of the committee are looking at this issue, and that at the end of the day it doesn't have to be next week but we have set aside an hour to hear about the work of that committee, if not from Mr. McGuinty then from other members of the committee.
Theoretically I suppose we could extend an open invitation for members of the committee to appear, whichever ones wish to. I think it would be more orderly to hear from the chair. I hope we're able to do that, but we have other options whereby I think we can hear from and about the work of this committee in some way, shape or form.
Thanks.
Mr. Lightbound provided a very reasonable path forward, and I think Mr. Harris echoed a very reasonable point of view. In the interests of moving ahead here, because I see us going around in circles, I think you know where most committee members sit on this issue. However, I would add that I doubt there's a single member of the committee who has read the annual review that was just tabled in Parliament.
If I'm not mistaken, I think that was today. I could be wrong about that.
Let's first read the report of the committee—the national security committee of parliamentarians looking at issues of security—and then the committee can decide whether it's appropriate to move forward. On this idea that we would just automatically summons Mr. McGuinty through Parliament, I'm not sure what this is all about.
I think you know where most members of the committee sit on this. I see it's nine o'clock. I'm not sure if this is the last issue we're dealing with, but we keep going around in circles.
My colleague Mr. Fragiskatos said in English what I was going to say. I totally agree with him and with Joel Lightbound's proposal.
I would also like to add that we can invite members of the committee other than the chair. First, I would like to point out that the report presented today is redacted. As you know, all members have the secret or top secret clearance. So they will not be able to comment or analyze the elements that are not in the report. The report has been reviewed and redacted by a committee.
I will conclude by saying that this committee is made up of parliamentarians. It is made up of members of Parliament and senators from the parties represented in the House and it has a history of operating in a non-partisan way. We can always ask that another member of the committee be allowed to appear, but knowing the situation, I will be surprised if we get a positive response, because the same director will have to inform them. We can try, but if Mr. McGuinty doesn't show up, I'd be surprised if any other members would agree to appear before our committee.
Thank you.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Dubourg.
[English]
I'm attempting to draw the consensus of the committee. Is it the wish of the committee that the clerk write to again, indicating that the committee strongly desires to have him appear before the committee, or, if he's not available, that we'd like another member of the committee to appear?
Is that where we are? Does anyone object to that? Are there any concerns about that? Seeing none, that's what we'll do.
Thank you very much,
[Translation]
Madam Clerk, you may proceed.
Thank you.
Mr. Bergeron has asked me for some time to move his motions.
Mr. Bergeron, you have the floor.
:
In another committee I objected to the wording that was in the original motion because we couldn't even have made the amendments that we made tonight to the previous motion without them being submitted in writing prior to the meeting.
This is a little different, but I guess it would be.... He's talking about substantive motions or substantive amendments, and I'm not sure what substantive means in that context. I gather that it would make it very difficult or take a long time in some cases for amendments to be moved, which happens quite often in committees—there are amendments and motions, or spontaneous motions in some cases.
If the suggestion is that what would have to happen in the committee before the motion is voted upon is that it would have to be distributed in writing in both official languages, I'm assuming that would take some time, and I'm wondering whether it's necessary to do that.
When we had this debate in other committees, it was suggested that for the purpose of translation, you could repeat the motion or have the clerk repeat the motion, several times if necessary, to ensure the full understanding of it. I'm of the view that this would normally be adequate. There may be situations where someone would be required to say, “Look, I want to be very sure that this motion is correct,” and ask for the committee's approval to have it put in writing before it's voted on, but I don't know if it's necessary. The translation that we have, the interpreters that we have for [Technical difficulty—Editor] are very good, and if there's a problem with the translation then that can be raised as a point of order or a point of privilege.
I'm not sure it's necessary, but I'll be interested in hearing what other members have to say.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, Mr. Bergeron, for raising this.
I don't see this particular motion so much as an issue of language as it is an issue of the ability of the committee to be nimble. There are times when issues are raised and the committee wishes to respond to them with a substantive motion. For example, this adventure, as it were, that we're on with the Public Health Agency of Canada started when, in the context of the motion on the meeting itself with the officials, I moved a motion that received unanimous support to ask the officials to report back by that Friday. That was done unanimously, so there was clearly no issue with it, but it was a case of our responding to live events and therefore verbally crafting motions on the fly that respond to something we're hearing from a witness.
We have all learned that it's a good practice to provide written notice whenever possible, and of course that's required in certain situations, when a motion is not related to the subject matter being discussed.
I think the practice has to be equality of languages, so if it's being stated verbally in one language, it has to be available verbally in both languages, and if it's being submitted in writing in one language and sent around, it must then be sent around in writing in both languages.
I don't see the value. I see some big risks in putting this additional stricture on the committee, and I think the focus needs to be on nimbleness and also preserving the principle of equality of languages.
[Translation]
With pleasure, Mr. Harris.
[English]
I'm not talking about the kinds of communications or emails that you could send to the clerk or the analysts asking specific questions on procedure or things like that. Like I said, in my official languages committee, we had an article. It was only in English, and that article was so important that we said that we should take part of that article—it was on a website—to put in the report. It's important that those kinds of documents that we're going to use, that we're going to refer to in the report, should be in both languages. It has allowed all members to know exactly what's going on.
At that time, what we did was send that article to the translation bureau to get a French version, so that we could give it to anyone so they would be able to understand what was going on.
The motion that our colleague is introducing seems very clear to me. It talks about a reference document.
To take Mr. Paul-Hus' example, if he really likes the book he has in his hands and wants to give us one page of it for discussion purposes, to help us in focusing our discussions, I agree with him that we're not going to distribute the entire book. However, if he distributes one page and it's in French, it seems perfectly reasonable to me that it should be translated into English for our colleagues. If that page is in English, it seems reasonable to me that it be translated into French for our colleagues. This is exactly the same practice we use in translating documents from witnesses before they are distributed.
We are talking about reference documents. As I understand it, that does not mean any old document, like an email or an informal exchange. It means a document that we refer to, one that influences our thinking and our work. It seems very clear to me. If you want a reference document to be distributed, it cannot be distributed in one language only. It must be distributed in both official languages. For example, we make sure that a substantive article in Le Devoir, for example, is translated into English before it is circulated to francophone and anglophone members alike. Likewise, we make sure that a substantive article in The Globe and Mail is translated into French before it is circulated to anglophone and francophone members alike.
That seems very clear to me and follows the normal practices of our committees. There was perhaps a small oversight in our routine motions. They actually only address documents distributed or submitted by witnesses. Our thinking is not shaped only by the documents submitted by witnesses. It is also shaped by certain other documents [Technical difficulty—Editor], such as the absolutely tremendous briefing notes that the Library of Parliament prepares for us. Those notes are not circulated in English only or in French only. They are circulated in both languages, because the documents are important for the reflection that eventually must lead us to a decision.
In my opinion, it is self-evident that these reference documents can be circulated to the members of the committee only if they appear in both of the country's official languages.