The National Energy Board is the federal regulator for offshore oil and gas drilling and production in Canada. At the same time, the areas off the shores of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador are administered by joint federal-provincial offshore petroleum boards. The NEB has a close working relationship with these offshore boards and with other regulators in Canada and around the world. When an accident happens anywhere, we learn from each other. This is considered standard operating procedure for all safety regulators.
We have also been working with land claims agencies, such as the Inuvialuit Game Council, and for the past 20 years with communities that could potentially be affected by Mackenzie Delta and Beaufort Sea drilling.
The most recent authorization for offshore drilling issued by the board was for Devon Paktoa C-60. This exploratory oil well was drilled in about 11 metres of water, between December 2005 and March 2006. The previous offshore well drilled in this area was the Imperial Isserk I-15 well, which was drilled in 1989. This was also a shallow oil well. It was drilled in just 10 metres of water.
The earliest possible date on which future drilling may occur in the Beaufort Sea, if the NEB approves it, will be 2014. It will be at a depth of 700 metres. This contrasts with the BP Macondo MC252, in the Gulf of Mexico, in 1,500 metres of water, which is the subject of the current emergency response.
There are currently no active authorizations or approvals for offshore exploration or production activities under the board's jurisdiction.
[Translation]
What brings us here today is an accident of major proportion in the Gulf of Mexico. The NEB is actively monitoring this situation. The focus now is to stop the leak and protect the environment. Once this is done, people will be able to focus on explaining what happened, why, and what has been learned. On Tuesday, May 11, the NEB announced that it is starting a review of Arctic safety and environmental offshore drilling requirements in light of the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Full details of this review will be announced and this process will be public and consultative.
[English]
The NEB administers the current Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act, known as COGOA; parts of the Canada Petroleum Resources Act, known as CPRA; and the Canada Oil and Gas Drilling and Production Regulations. These have very strong wording. These acts call on the NEB, when it considers whether to grant an authorization, to ensure that oil and gas activities are safe, that they protect the environment, and that they conserve oil and gas resources. Before any project is approved, the NEB must satisfy itself that the operator's drilling plans include robust safety, emergency response, and environmental protection plans that meet the board's high standards.
To make sure that we meet the strict requirements of the acts, the NEB relies on a team of skilled and experienced experts. The NEB has 85 people who focus entirely on safety, engineering, the environment, geoscience, socio-economic issues, and lands. NEB staff review every single application to make sure that workers and the public will be safe and that the environment will be protected.
[Translation]
In addition to making sure that applications meet the requirements of COGOA and its regulations, NEB staff conduct stringent environmental assessments to make sure that projects under our jurisdiction comply with the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. An authorization for drilling and production activities will not be granted unless a comprehensive environmental assessment has been completed. Any project that is approved by the NEB is subjected to a number of conditions in areas such as safety, the environment and emergency response. To make sure operators comply with these conditions, NEB staff are out in the field conducting inspections and auditing the company's management plans.
[English]
For offshore projects, the operator also needs to obtain a certificate of fitness from an independent certifying authority to ensure that the vessel and drilling equipment are appropriate, are in good condition, and are capable of undertaking the proposed activity.
After drilling has been approved, the acts administered by the NEB board allow it to take over the management and control of any work or activity if the board is not satisfied that an operator is living up to its commitments. The acts provide for a fine of up to one million dollars, imprisonment for up to five years, or both. The board can also suspend or revoke authorization for failure to comply with the provisions of the acts, the regulations, or the authorization.
In the case of spills or incidents under the board's jurisdiction, the NEB is the lead federal agency. The operator is fully accountable and responsible for spills and damage. A critical requirement under the board's legislation is the need for companies to provide proposed emergency response and contingency plans. The board assesses these plans before any authorization to drill can be issued.
The board also has emergency response management programs. Our staff has participated in 22 spill-response exercises over the past five years. I have a number of examples in my speaking notes, and I'll just refer to them here. I'll just outline the first one, which is actually happening today in Inuvik. It is an orientation and communication exercise for a Beaufort Sea oil spill. That is just one of the examples of the many things that must happen as we move towards the possibility of offshore drilling in the Beaufort Sea.
With respect to liability, NEB-regulated companies are fully responsible for anticipating, preventing, mitigating, and managing incidents and oil spills of any size or duration. If there is a hydrocarbon spill and the operators are at fault, they are 100% responsible for paying all costs and damages. There is no limit to how much they would have to pay. If there is a hydrocarbon spill and the operators are not at fault, they are still responsible for paying costs and damages, up to a limit of $40 million.
Before drilling, the operator must provide the NEB with a financial security, which is available to the NEB to cover the cost of a potential cleanup. The National Energy Board determines the amount of the security deposit. There is no set maximum amount.
In addition, under the terms of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement, an operator is responsible for restoring damaged wildlife and for compensating Inuvialuit hunters, trappers, and fishers for their loss of subsistence or commercial harvesting opportunities. The NEB may require the operator to provide financial security for this amount up front.
[Translation]
In conclusion, the purpose of my testimony here today is to tell you why we at the National Energy Board believe we have in place both an adequate regulatory framework and the necessary emergency response assets. At the same time, we have a fundamental responsibility to review the lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
:
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to your committee today.
I have some prepared remarks relating to the April 20 incident on the Transocean Deepwater Horizon drilling rig and on the resources and expertise BP is bringing to bear in the spill response effort.
Just over three weeks ago, 11 people were lost in an explosion and fire aboard the Transocean Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, and 17 others were injured. My deepest sympathy and condolences go out to the families, friends, and colleagues who have suffered such a terrible loss, and to those in communities along the gulf coast whose lives and livelihoods are being impacted.
The root cause of this tragic incident is unknown at this time, and figuring out what happened and why it happened is a complex process. We are cooperating with the joint investigation by the departments of Homeland Security and the Interior and investigations by the United States Congress.
In addition, BP has commissioned an internal investigation, whose results we plan to share so that we can all learn from these terrible events. As a responsible party under the Oil Pollution Act, we will carry out our responsibilities to mitigate the environmental and economic impacts of this incident.
I would like to acknowledge the support that BP is getting from the industry, from federal, state, and local authorities, and from the affected communities. The response is being managed within a unified command that was established within hours of the accident. Overall there are approximately 13,000 people involved. And I know that the Government of British Columbia has also offered emergency response technicians to the United States Coast Guard.
BP responded quickly and aggressively to the spill, and we continue to attack this very aggressively on three fronts: in the subsea, to stop the flow of oil and secure the well; on the surface; and on the shoreline. Our number one priority is to shut off the flow.
In the subsea, we are pursuing multiple options in parallel. We are working on an operation, known as “top kill”, aimed at stopping the flow of oil from the well. This essentially works by injecting multi-sized particles to plug the blowout preventer, or BOP, followed by using heavyweight drilling mud and ultimately cement to permanently seal off the well. This is a proven industry technique and has been used worldwide, but never in 5,000 feet of water.
We are also working on two relief wells. Work on the first relief well, which began on Sunday, May 2, continues. As of May 10, it had reached 9,000 feet, and it is expected to take some months to complete. The second relief well will commence at the end of this week.
Moving on to containing the flow, we are also continuing the work on a subsea oil recovery plan using a containment dome that will sit over the leaks and direct oil upward though a pipe. A containment dome measuring about four feet in diameter and five feet high is being readied to lower over the main leak point. This small dome will be connected by drill pipe and riser lines to a drill ship on the surface to collect and treat oil. It is designed to mitigate the formation of large volumes of hydrates.
In summary, BP continues to do everything it can in conjunction with governmental authorities and other industry experts to find a solution to stem the flow of oil on the seabed or contain it before it reaches surface.
On the surface, BP has launched a massive operation. BP's team of operational and technical experts are working in coordination with several federal and state agencies, organizations, and companies. As I said, approximately 13,000 people are involved in the response, including shoreline defence and community outreach.
Over 1.5 million feet of boom has been installed to contain the spill and protect sensitive coastal areas, with more than a million more feet available.
Over 500 response vessels are being used, including skimmers, tugs, barges, and recovery vessels. These include specially built oil spill response vessels with two oil-water separators. This allows for continuous response operations, as separated water can be decanted back into the boomed area. There are 37 aircraft, both fixed-wing and helicopters, that are deployed to support the response effort.
We are also attacking the area with coast guard approved biodegradable dispersants, which are being applied from planes and boats. We have also developed and tested a technique to apply dispersant at the leak point on the seabed. The EPA is carefully analyzing options for the possible future use of this technique.
To protect the shoreline, we are implementing what the United States Coast Guard has called the most massive shoreline protection effort ever mounted. Fourteen staging areas, in four states, have been set up to protect sensitive shorelines. We have rapid response teams ready to deploy to any affected areas, to assess the type and quantity of oiling so the most effective cleaning strategies can be applied.
The community response has been superb. We have 1,000 local vessels contracted for a variety of tasks and more than 4,000 volunteers who have been trained to assist.
We intend to do everything in our power to bring this well under control and to mitigate the environmental impact of the spill. I can assure you that we, and the entire industry, will learn from this terrible event and emerge from it stronger, smarter, and safer.
This concludes my remarks, Mr. Chairman.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee.
As a Canadian association we're able to provide broad industry views on policy and regulation, as well as information on the state of the industry. We're not able to talk, obviously, about the circumstances of the Gulf of Mexico--as I say, we're a Canadian organization--and neither are we able to speak specifically to company plans.
CAPP appreciates the opportunity to convey our initial thoughts both on the emergency response assets and on the current policy and regulatory regime for offshore oil and gas drilling and production, as noted in this committee's invitation to appear. We're also prepared to contribute further information as may be required or useful as this study proceeds.
CAPP and its members certainly believe that the incident in the Gulf of Mexico is a tragic and unfortunate event. It is in the interest of all stakeholders that we collectively take the time to consider the findings and recommendations arising from this investigation of the incident. This measured approach will allow us to fully understand the circumstances under which this incident occurred and assess whether there is an opportunity to improve our regulatory system or industry operating practices. Canadians, governments, and industry all have a vested interest in achieving the right outcomes from this study.
We have a number of key themes for this study today. To provide some context, the International Energy Agency projects that world energy demand will grow by about 40% over the next 20 years, with crude oil and natural gas expected to meet 40% of that growth in demand.
Global offshore crude oil production represents about 38% of the world's energy supply, and the Canadian offshore crude oil production represents about 12% of Canada's crude energy supply.
The offshore regulatory regime and industry operating practices have evolved over a number of decades, resulting in a robust regulatory system in place today.
All forms of energy development do pose environmental and safety risks. The challenge for government policy, and regulators and indeed industry collectively, is to take reasonable measures to mitigate the risks such that incidents are unlikely to occur, and then to be prepared to respond in the event an incident does occur. Again, as I said, we need to make sure we take the time to learn from the gulf incident prior to determining what the next steps might be.
With respect to the emergency response assets, we believe we should be targeting both an understanding of prevention and an understanding of the measures of preparedness. Both government's and industry's focus is on prevention first. That means understanding the risks and the measures that can be taken to control those risks.
Industry approaches all activity with a goal to complete that activity without incident or injury. Risk is assessed and mitigative measures are applied to achieve a risk level that is as low as is reasonably practicable without eliminating the possibility of conducting an activity. Companies having gone through that assessment will determine whether or not they think there is reason to proceed, and if they do, they will propose those risk strategies as part of their application, which is then subject to the judgment of acceptability by the regulator.
In addition to meeting corporate and regulatory expectations with respect to prevention, companies must also demonstrate capability to respond to any incident with a view first to containment, and ultimately recovery and cleanup. Response capability means ensuring access to necessary equipment. It also means ensuring an effective management system, typically referred to as an incident command system, which integrates companies and regulatory agencies to provide and define leadership responsibilities and execution throughout the duration of an incident. Training is a key component of competent response capability, and companies are required to conduct response exercises on a frequent basis.
With respect to Atlantic Canada response capability, operators typically employ a three-tiered response capability system with respect to equipment. Tier one would involve company-owned equipment on site. Tier two would involve equipment contracted and locally situated onshore, and companies may have their own stock of equipment onshore. Tier three would be internationally situated equipment. This provides for immediate response capability and scalable access to more equipment as needed. All this needs to be lined out before approvals are obtained.
The Eastern Canada Response Corporation is an entity that provides a third party supply of that equipment in Atlantic Canada and it is an entity certified by Transport Canada under the Canada Shipping Act.
With respect to northern Canada, there is currently no industry spill response equipment in the Arctic offshore, as there is no activity at the moment. Industry would put in place, and would expect to be required to put in place, a spill response plan, with equipment, and presumably with a similar strategy as employed on the east coast with tiered response capabilities. These plans would certainly be fit for a purpose to meet the expectations of Arctic operations, and operators would be required to have their spill response capability in place to receive approval to drill or produce.
With respect to the regulatory requirements, every offshore operator must have authorization from a requisite board to pursue offshore activity, and authorization submissions from operators must include a safety plan, an environmental plan, and a contingency plan. All three plans must provide extensive details on how a company will meet expectations with respect to equipment, personnel, and processes in the areas of safety, environmental protection, and contingency.
All plans must meet the regulations of the federal and provincial governments and the guidelines of the offshore petroleum boards, and plans are approved prior to activity occurring. The application for authorization also must include, in the case of a drilling installation, a description of the drilling and well control equipment, and in the case of production installation, a description of the processing facilities and control equipment.
Drilling a relief well is also an option and can be pursued in the event of a blowout. Companies would have those plans identified as they make their applications. I think it’s important to understand that companies don’t view that as the immediate response. It needs to be ready and available as quickly as possible, but they also need to be looking at what they can be doing throughout the incident.
The offshore boards from Newfoundland and Nova Scotia and, presumably, the NEB, when there’s activity in the north, would do regular inspections of the operators to ensure equipment is in place, it meets regulations, and it is functional, and functional in real-time circumstances.
The northern operators are additionally required to follow the same-season relief well capability policy. It’s a policy that was established in 1976 and requires companies to demonstrate their ability to drill a same-season relief well. We've already heard that the board is intending to review that policy, and in fact is expanding that review in a broader sense. CAPP supported the premise of the review and we support the premise of the broader review. I’m sure our members in the association would be interested in engaging in that.
With respect to the regulatory adequacy, the industry has been operating in Canada's offshore since the late 1960s. During this time, hundreds of wells have been drilled, and there have been incidents; there have been four blowouts, two in the north and two in Atlantic Canada. I think the most recent ones in Atlantic Canada were in the 1980s. Anytime we have incidents, we and the regulators take the opportunity to learn from those.
I think one can take from this that there is an effective regulatory regime and sound operating practices by industry in place to manage the risks. Having said that, it doesn’t mean we should be complacent. As such, we support this study and the intent of it. We support the NEB's plans to do a review as well. We would also point out, and I think you understood it from the NEB, that there are periodic reviews of any of the regulations that are in place.
In recent years, the regulatory regimes around the world have been moving from a more prescriptive model to a goal-oriented model. Canada has also been moving in that direction. Goal-oriented regulation is not intended to decrease the standards or weaken the regulation. It is intended to put a higher onus on industry to be accountable for its decisions and to be compliant, and it also requires the operators to design their operations to be the most effective and fit for purpose, allowing both for innovation and incorporation of new practices. Industry remains accountable for what they do and the regulator remains accountable to ensure that we meet the goals of the regulations.
To conclude, risk management is a fundamental premise of public policy. It's evident everywhere, from rail and air travel to our road system, so it's not unique to the oil and gas industry.
The current regulatory system is designed to minimize and manage risk in a way that is deemed to be sufficiently protected and recoverable such that Canada's offshore resource can be developed.
Industry accepts that the study and other regulatory reviews that occur from time to time may identify opportunities for improvement of regulatory requirements. In fact, we continually contribute to those reviews to provide our advice around that.
So we would encourage a balanced approach, drawing on the learnings from the gulf, to any changes contemplated that provide for an appropriate level of protection while still enabling the possibility of development of this important offshore resource.
Thank you.
:
Hello. My name is Lawrence Amos. I am a harvester from Sachs Harbour, Northwest Territories. I am also the treasurer for the Inuvialuit Game Council, the land claims body that represents the collective Inuvialuit interests in wildlife.
l am here today on behalf of the chair, Frank Pokiak, who was unable to be here. He sends his regrets.
With me is Norm Snow, executive director, and Steve Baryluk, resource management coordinator.
The Beaufort Sea, our ocean, means everything to the Inuvialuit. It means there is a future for our people to live off. The wildlife in our area is very significant, but so is the ice. The animals that are there need the ice. These animals evolved and adapted to the arctic conditions, and they would have a lot of difficulty living anywhere else. The Beaufort Sea has a lot of wildlife that the Inuvialuit depend on. These include beluga whales, seals, many kinds of fish, polar bears, and all the creatures that make up the ecosystem that they depend upon.
Also important are the bowhead whales. The Inuvialuit last hunted a bowhead whale in 1996, but we still have the right to harvest them if we choose. Our ocean is the summer feeding ground for the bowheads. Our relatives, the Inupiat in Alaska, depend on bowheads as a significant part of their annual food source. We must ensure that they are not impacted by what happens in our waters.
The Inuvialuit know that the ocean is a very difficult place, not only for animals but also for man. We have a lot of respect for the ocean and the animals that live there because we know how difficult it is to live there. These animals that come from the Beaufort Sea have provided clothing, food, and other valuable resources for our survival since we have lived there. There was nothing wasted from harvested animals. Even if animals are struck and do not recover, we know they go back into the cycle of life.
The Government of Canada should respect the Inuvialuit culture to the fullest and try its best to protect this fragile environment. The government should he happy that Canada has a culture that can survive in this harsh environment. Any oil spills or well blowouts would have a devastating impact on the Beaufort ecosystem and on the ability of the Inuvialuit to continue their traditional lifestyle.
We as Inuvialuit are not new to offshore oil and gas development. We experienced the previous cycle of offshore exploration thirty years ago. Many Inuvialuit worked in the offshore industry at that time, but now companies are moving into deeper waters in the Beaufort that have never been worked in before. The same concerns about the risks of oil and gas development that existed back then still exist today. This is why the Inuvialuit Game Council, on January 21 of this year, reaffirmed its position on the existing government's same-season relief well policy for the Beaufort Sea.
The Game Council continues to support the requirement for same-season relief well capability, or an equivalency that would provide an equal or greater level of protection for the environment and wildlife in our region. The Game Council does not support any exemption to the same-season relief well policy, recognizing that it was developed for shallow water drilling.
When the National Energy Board started its hearing process to review the same-season relief well policy, the Inuvialuit Game Council registered as an interested party. We have been involved in consultations with Imperial Oil on their plans for their Ajurak Beaufort drilling program.
They have been assuring the Inuvialuit people that a blowout is very unlikely to happen and that if a kick was experienced, they would have a blowout preventer in place that would prevent a blowout. These blowout preventers are similar to the ones used in the Gulf of Mexico, but with more rams, which provides some redundancy.
To date, we have not heard from BP specifically on what their plans are for their similar drilling program in a licensed area adjacent to Imperial's. We have been given to understand that it would be similar to Imperial's Ajurak project and likely using the same drilling system. With the recent blowout in the Gulf of Mexico, the communities will likely have less faith to take industry at its word.
The council has been dealing closely with the issue of the same-season relief well for the past five or six years, prior to and during Devon's drilling of the Paktoa well in 2005-06. At that time, the developer was required to build an ice pad for a relief well before drilling into the risk zone. The ice pad was unable to be constructed because of the landfast ice forming later that year, likely as a result of the changing climate. The company was granted a waiver on the relief well requirement by the National Energy Board. The Inuvialuit Game Council was not informed that this waiver had been granted, and when we did find out the council was upset. Since that time, the National Energy Board has made significant efforts to fix this issue, is more attentive to the Inuvialuit Game Council and the community concerns, and communicates with us regularly.
With respect to the Gulf of Mexico tragedy, it is clear that the blowout preventer did not work. In the Gulf of Mexico, the capacity to respond to a spill is far greater than anything available in the Arctic, both in terms of equipment and manpower. In light of this, it has really hit home that there is no way that a similar response would be possible in the Beaufort Sea, or anywhere in the Canadian Arctic, should a major oil spill ever happen. This is why the Inuvialuit Game Council has been, and continues to be, very concerned and very supportive of the same-season relief well requirements now in place as a last resort should an uncontrolled blowout occur during offshore drilling.
Quyanainni . Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today.
(Interpretation):
I am very pleased that you have invited me here this morning to speak on the important subject of offshore oil and gas drilling and production in Canada.
My name is Raymond Ningeocheak, and I'm vice-president of finance for Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated.
Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated is the organization that signed the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement in 1993. We represent Inuit living in Nunavut, and that is about 85% of the population of our territory. I'll speak to that later on.
As an organization, it is our responsibility to ensure that our land claims agreement is implemented and that Inuit interests are protected and advanced.
Nunavut is a maritime community. The word itself means “our land”, but with the possible exception of Baker Lake, all Nunavut communities are coastal regions. I want to emphasize this.
I will not speak too long, but I will give some geographic facts to you.
Our shores make up 35% of the world’s arctic coastline--twenty times more than Alaska. We include three of the ten largest islands in the world. Our northern tip is only 770 kilometres from the north pole.
Inuit are traditional and current harvesters of the resources of the sea. This reality is reflected in the Nunavut agreement. We need to remember that the preamble states that Inuit assert an aboriginal title to the Nunavut settlement area “based on their traditional and current use and occupation of the lands, waters and land-fast ice therein”.
Later, the preamble states that one of the objectives of the Nunavut agreement is:
to provide for certainty and clarity of rights to ownership and use of lands and resources, and of rights for Inuit to participate in decision-making concerning the use, management and conservation of land, water and resources, including the offshore;
There are 42 articles in the Nunavut agreement, and 14 of these refer directly to marine areas. Article 15 is the most obvious, because its title is “Marine Areas”, but there are direct references to marine areas in 13 other articles.
In other words, marine areas are at the heart and centre of the Nunavut agreement. The facts are there.
The articles are as follows: article 5, “Wildlife”; article 6, “Wildlife Compensation”; article 8, “Parks”; article 9, “Conservation Areas”; article 11, “Land-Use Planning”; article 12, “Development Impact”; article 15, “Marine Areas”; article 16, “Outer Land Fast Ice Zone--East Baffin Coast”; article 23, “Inuit Employment Within Government”; article 24, “Government Contracts”; article 25, “Resource Royalty Sharing”; article 27, “Natural Resource Development”; article 33, “Archaeology”; and article 34, “Ethnographic Objects and Archival Materials”. So you can refer to those.
Sometimes we wake up only when something happens. We don't think about it until something disastrous happens. Right now, we have seen the Gulf of Mexico oil spill that is really serious. When is it going to be cleaned up? How long is it going to take and how long is it going to have an effect on the resources and on the Inuit of the north?
We are lucky that nothing like this has happened so far in the Arctic. We know what happened with Exxon Valdez in Alaska. We were not prepared for the Exxon Valdez spill, and 20 years later it is still affecting the environment and the animals up there.
In the Arctic, our infrastructure is undeveloped. Our remoteness and lack of local resources mean that any spill would be much more difficult to respond to, in a timely way, than further south.
As someone said earlier, the ice pack up north makes it more difficult, too, because they're not up there right now. There has never been any training or education in case of a large-scale spill in the Arctic. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans is currently planning a small-scale exercise in conjunction with “Operation Nanook”, but as I mentioned, this is small-scale.
Our closest response team would be in Goose Bay, Labrador, in terms of air support from the Department of National Defence and wherever the closest coast guard might happen to be.
We are very concerned about the spill in the Gulf of Mexico today.
I'm having difficulty with my eyes. I'm trying to hurry, so I made a mistake here. I'll have to go back to where I missed. Thank you for your patience, Mr. Chairman.
We are really looking at this from the Nunavut perspective. As I said, the presence of sea ice would make any effective response even more difficult.
We understand that in Canada the National Energy Board commenced the consideration of drilling policy applicable to the Beaufort Sea in February, but broader consideration is required. This is a broad question, and events in the Gulf of Mexico show that spillage has effects far beyond the energy sector. As well, there are international considerations. The spillage has effects beyond us.
The oceans wash on all shores. Not long before the Gulf of Mexico blowout, on March 31 of this year, President Obama said he would allow the development of oil and gas leases off the coast of Alaska, notably in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas. In the east, Greenland recently licensed approximately 12 offshore exploration licences in Davis Strait, near Baffin Island.
Besides reviewing our own drilling regulations and requirements, we must ensure that we are comfortable with the practices of neighbouring countries. Minister Prentice is quoted on CBC Radio news on May 10 as saying that he has discussed Greenland's exploration licences with the home rule government and that the environment will be protected.
We are pleased to hear that the issue has been raised with the Greenlandic government, but we would like more information on exactly how the environment will be protected. We are not comfortable with simple assurances. The terms and conditions under which development occurs in the Arctic from exploration to drilling to shipping must ensure the protection of our environment and the continuation of our traditional way of life.
We must not endanger opportunities in other emerging industries, such as commercial fishing. There is a lot of fish up there between Greenland and Canada. There is a lot of harvesting in that area, so of course we are concerned about this.
Nunavut Tunngavik urges the committee to do the following things.
One, endorse the general principle that any future offshore oil and gas drilling and production in the Arctic should proceed only on the basis of the most rigorous international environmental standards available. This would need to include adopting best practices from around the world.
Two, beyond this general principle, support the adoption of supplementary environmental protection measures that address unique Arctic circumstances and vulnerabilities.
Three, reject the Canadian government's December 2009 relaxation of mandatory offshore drilling regulations. There was a decision, as reported in the Ottawa Citizen of May 11, to ensure that environmental management of oil and gas drilling and production contain mandatory and reliable safeguards applicable to all projects.
Four, endorse the proposition that the timing and pace of development of oil and gas should balance two primary considerations: the energy security of Canadians and the socio-economic well-being of Inuit and other permanent residents of the Arctic, and should contribute to a larger Canadian and global strategy to reduce dependence on hydrocarbons and thereby mitigate climate change impacts.
Five, recognize that the participation of Canadian Inuit, who have local knowledge of unique and fragile Arctic conditions and geography, is vital to decision-making on Arctic emergency response--for example, on site selection for placement of remote response infrastructure.
Six, review, in light of recent oil spills, the adequacy of the ship-source oil pollution fund as set out in the Marine Liability Act.
And seven, carefully review and consider the recommendations in the Arctic Council's Arctic marine shipping assessment 2009 report.
For western Arctic people living up there, the current is slower than the eastern Arctic Ocean. In the Kivalliq and Qikiqtarjuaq regions it is very much faster, considering the environment is different, and we also need to consider the icebergs.
Thank you for this opportunity, Mr. Chairman. If you have any questions with regard to this presentation, we are here.
:
I'll take my six, with pleasure.
The question here today is that, while it's not pleasant, I think it's responsible for us to consider what it would look like to have the disaster that's happening in the gulf right now happen in Canadian waters. That is what is before us. That is the question before us. Is it possible, and if it were possible, what would it look like to have a massive oil spill such as what's going on in the gulf? The only difference, I suggest, is that it would be worse, particularly in the Arctic.
In terms of the cleanup, we're hearing from the senior person at British Petroleum that we don't know if we can get oil out of ice, yet the oil companies are asking to drill in areas that are predominantly ice-filled waters.
It seems to me that what happened in the Gulf of Mexico was something that the oil companies said couldn't happen, and in fact, in British Petroleum's submission, said it had a one in 300,000 chance of happening. Well, it's not one in 300,000 any more.
Would you agree, Ms. Drinkwater, that the relief well regulation is, in a sense, a safety rule, something put in place to mitigate a blowout, something put in place to allow the company to stop a blowout from doing what it's doing in the gulf right now?