Good day, Mr. Chair.
First I want to say that it's an honour for me to be invited to speak to you about the Canadian Forces' preparations for the Vancouver Olympic and Paralympic Games security between January and March of 2010. I am very pleased to do this.
I have prepared a very short brief describing the types of activities in which we are taking part, the planning underway, schedule of main activities and an overview of the operational structure in which security planning is taking place. However, first of all, I believe it would be proper to speak about the context in which operations are occurring and the way in which, internally, controls are continuing to be developed and expanded.
To be clear, the RCMP is the organization responsible for planning and implementing security operations for the games, and the Canadian Forces are providing support.
[English]
This is not a unique circumstance. In fact, the Canadian Forces contribute to security efforts and logistics support for most major national special events, working in support of the RCMP or other law enforcement agencies. We did so for the Montreal Olympics in 1976 and for Calgary in 1988.
Today is different, because the need for security is of heightened concern, and the means by which it is assured are more complex and comprehensive than was the case before. The importance of security and of having confidence that we do it well is perhaps best expressed not by those of us charged with the task but by others who have been seized by its importance, certainly for the Olympics.
Dr. Jacques Rogge, president of the International Olympic Committee, made the following statement three months after Vancouver was awarded the games:
The games have survived many things, from boycotts to organization that was not as good as it should have been. ... But we have to ensure that there are no security breaches and that is why I put security at the top of the list of priorities.
[Translation]
Clearly, security is an important responsibility of the host country. However, we understand that all eyes must remain on the sporting events and the athletes. Ensuring this balance between adequate preparation and the guarantee that this preparation will have no impact on the normal and smooth operation of such events is at the heart of a modern approach to defence and security planning in Canada.
Over the past few years, we have implemented a much more exhaustive security architecture and it was used during the G8 Summit in 2002, at the 2007 North American Leaders' Summit and at the Francophonie Summit last year. Those experiences were enriching for us all.
The 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Games represent a complex challenge in terms of security. They are not the first, but they will help to reinforce an architecture through a government-wide approach that will allow us to achieve the desired results, meaning safe games.
[English]
The Canadian Forces and the unique capabilities that we provide form part of that effect. I talk to you today in response to your request for information, but I do so as the commander of Canada Command, a relatively new organizational structure of the Canadian Forces and one specifically created to support delivery of the effect I've just described.
Certainly for the first time in our history, and in underscoring a “Canada first” approach to operations, all CF domestic operations are placed under a single commander, and at present I have both that privilege and responsibility. So if you have questions, I am the individual either to give you the answers you need, to find the answer if I don't have it, or to tell you why your question can't be answered.
I would now ask that you turn your attention to the slides before you, which I have prepared for your reference as an overview of Canadian Forces support to the security requirements of the games, showing how our activities come about and how they are embedded within an integrated security approach.
As you can see on slide 2, the involvement of the CF in supporting both the planning and conduct of security operations in Vancouver results from a formal request by the Minister of Public Safety to the Minister of National Defence, which occurred in August of 2007. The list you have before you is of those general military capabilities that are being provided in response to that request and in support of the RCMP.
Based on that response, the next slide shows the intent of the Chief of Defence Staff. He identifies the priority of the mission and the general scope of the military contribution. His intent also notes the requirement to sustain appropriate readiness to support other domestic needs should these arise elsewhere in the country. And, finally, it defines and tasks his direct subordinate commanders--me and the commander of NORAD.
As I said in the introductory remarks, this operation is undeniably complex, but it does afford significant opportunity for us to plan, practise, and conduct it in a more comprehensive manner than was the case in the past. This truly is a whole-of-government effort that is improving governance structure and planning amongst departments, as well as with our U.S. partners, and one that is moving us all to a more considered and deliberate method of preparing for special security events of this or a similar nature.
The role of the Canadian Forces and of the Department of National Defence in doing that is appreciable, but it is guided by these two specific limitations. I've already mentioned them, but they bear repeating. We are in a support role to a lead agency, the RCMP, which sets the security requirements. Our contribution and certainly the physical presence of the CF and the action we take will be low profile.
The next slide is really just to show you the organizational structure that is in place for Vancouver 2010 at the federal level. It may be of use in focusing some of the questions you have with respect to the whole-of-government effort of which I've spoken.
The slide after that then relates to the ground and shows how it has been divided by the RCMP into two distinct areas of operation or responsibility, which are referred to on the slide as AORs. These are the Vancouver area, which encompasses the greater Vancouver regional district and all of the venues that are identified in the lower left corner of that slide, as well as the Cypress Mountain area on the north shore of Vancouver; and the Whistler AOR, which contains the venues not only in the community of Whistler itself but also in the Callaghan Valley to the west and along the length of the Sea-to-Sky Highway on the east side of Howe Sound, through Squamish, Whistler, and on to Pemberton.
My final slide shows the timeline of preparation and when the Olympic and Paralympic games will occur. The countdown clock is right across the street, and I'm sure you see that every day. We're now at 347 days to go. This also shows the major Government of Canada exercises that are getting us ready and when they occur. We have completed Exercise Bronze. That was done last year as a regional table-top exercise to establish a common baseline understanding of what departmental plans are required and what linkages must be established between them.
Exercise Silver then occurred last month. That was a major live play of numerous security injects to stress procedures and to afford the opportunity to modify and refine plans as required. This was the largest whole-of-government exercise ever conducted in Canada. It came hard on the heels of Exercise Bronze and was deliberately set so as to replicate the conditions that will exist during the games: winter in the Lower Mainland of the west coast and in the sea and air approaches.
Exercise Gold, which will occur in November, will be a validation exercise to confirm we all have it right, we being the whole-of-government structure that will be deployed to ensure a safe and secure games.
[Translation]
I would now be pleased to answer your questions. You have before you some slides that you could consult for your information or, if you wish, to help you formulate your questions.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for coming here today.
I have a series of questions, Mr. Chairman. I will put them on the floor.
What level of communication has occurred with the Americans regarding the coordination of our security for the games with the Department of Homeland Security and Border Services? How is that information managed and coordinated between the different agencies and different orders of government?
With most of our helicopters involved in our mission in Afghanistan, how will the military air needs in Afghanistan balance those of the Olympics to ensure that air surveillance for this complex geographic area and search and rescue responsibilities are sufficiently met?
The federal government has agreed, with the Province of British Columbia, to be responsible for any increase in the security budget, currently estimated at $647.5 million. If the budget is based on a potential medium-security threat, are there any projections for what a budget might look like under a high-security threat?
How much would a high-security threat cost? What resources would be needed? Could you elaborate on the contingency fund and available resources of personnel reserved for such a plan? What impact would the current wage agreement dilemma between the government and the RCMP have on the overall forces manpower? Who would be responsible for providing those additional resources since the RCMP and Canadian Forces are significantly stretched as it is?
Finally, with the population influx, there are increased security implications regarding prostitution and human trafficking. Has this been calculated into our overall security strategy? Who is responsible for the execution of that strategy?
:
Sir, I'll start with communications with the United States. I've made the point that this is undeniably a whole-of-government effort to establish that communication, so there are far more linkages established than simply a military-to-military connection with the United States. I am aware that this is being done with police services, it is being done with Health Canada, and it is being done by all of the agencies I am aware of that are engaged in this planning process.
There is no doubt we have a deep relationship on a military-to-military basis with the United States. The geography of where the games will occur--Vancouver--make them very close to the international border; therefore, there are very substantial plans under way within the United States both to ensure their preparedness and also to liaise with us in a military sense. That coordination has been extensive. It will continue. We will ensure that we each know what the other is doing with respect to the plans they're making for the games.
The military-to-military relationship is essentially led by the relationship between my command and U.S. Northern Command. We have been close in our discussions with them to ensure we each know what's happening so that if there were to be a need for support, measures would be in place so it could happen effortlessly, provided the government asked for that level of support. So very extensive communications have been going on, to my knowledge, by all agencies with their American counterparts.
Your second question had to do with availability of helicopters. Sir, there is no doubt that 2010 will be an extremely busy year for the Canadian Forces. We have had to ensure that we coordinate the assignment of resources to make sure we can accomplish all the missions that are on our plate for that period. One of the real benefits we have is the fact that we will have had about three years of planning this event before the Olympics occur. So there has been a long planning process to make sure we're being as efficient as we possibly can, and it's a short-duration engagement--the deployment and employment piece will be of short duration.
Yes, those resources are being called upon for many requirements, and some very extensive discussions have been going on to ensure that we are able to meet that requirement. That's one of the real benefits of having the opportunity to plan in advance.
Sir, in terms of explaining what a whole-of-government process for the response is, we have been very pleased with the means by which the RCMP has adopted an integrated fashion to be able to do this. So it's not only within the Canadian Forces that we have been ensuring the most efficient assignment of resources, but we've been doing that also with our security partners across the whole of the federal government. So the planning time that we have, the efficiencies we're able to achieve by doing that, and the new way of looking at how we would deliver in an integrated fashion have certainly helped to ensure that we do not over stretch.
The third question you asked, sir, was on the extent of the types of deployments and contributions we're making, and that obviously is dependent upon the level of security response that would be required. We are planning, in conjunction with the RCMP's request, to have a level of contribution that will be scalable. By scalable I mean that we are ensuring we have both deployed and placed at readiness forces that could respond to a fairly broad range of threat scenarios that could materialize. The RCMP will lead in determining what they believe the threat envelope is. We are putting in place a program in conjunction with them that would be scalable to that need.
I would not be able to comment upon the monetary costs of that; I don't have any information to do that. I am aware that the personnel resource costs are already part of the planning cycle that we're involved in.
I would like to start by congratulating our two witnesses who were recently promoted. Vice-Admiral McFadden was named Chief of the Maritime Staff, deservingly so. This is one promotion in an already distinguished career. He is just one step away from being Chief of Defence Staff. Perhaps one day we will see a sailor become Chief of the Defence Staff. For the moment, he is Rear-Admiral of the Maritime Forces. The commodore becomes rear-admiral and director of maritime strategy at headquarters. I want to congratulate both of you on your promotions.
I would like to ask questions about the presence of troops. Since you are in the armed forces, I will not ask you how many RCMP or CSIS officers there are. However, I'd like you to give me an idea of the number of troops.
A press release from National Defence on February 25 talks about the presence of troops. Does what we see here correspond to what is in Vancouver? Among other things, from the navy, there is talk of a frigate, two coastal defence ships, two patrol ships and 19 rigid hull inflatables. Naturally reservists in the Canadian Navy Reserves took part in the exercise.
Will the military equipment that I have just mentioned be identical to what's planned for the 2010 Olympic Games?
:
Sir, as to the overall extent of the whole of government's budget, I could offer you nothing more than what has already been said. I certainly could provide more information with respect to the departmental budget, the Canadian Forces contribution to that. Our budget has been identified as $212 million. That $212 million is to be able to provide the types of unique capabilities the RCMP will have requested. I think that request was formally made in August of 2007, as I said. The budgetary requirements based upon that request were $212 million as soon as it was assessed. It has remained $212 million through the intervening period, so we are on track to deliver the capabilities for the cost we said we would.
On the point I'd made about that being a scalable response, the intent is to ensure that the resources drawn upon to be able to provide that effect can both be reduced or augmented without there being a substantial increase in additional resources. But you have to pick a point where you say that's what we believe a reasonable planning activity rate is; those are the resources we would commit to that. If we were substantively wrong, because of a major crisis or if intelligence information were to identify there was a very substantively greater threat than we had anticipated, I have no doubt we would do what was necessary to ensure the games were safe. For the budget allocations we have at the moment, I can give you more details with respect to the $212 million, but as to what contingency is built in for the whole of government, there are better folks than I who would be able to answer that.
Your other question was about the cost of participation in things like Exercise Gold. The means by which we are preparing for the games are included in what we have identified as being the cost for Canadian Forces participation. So the exercise cycle to get us ready is a cost that we've already accounted for.
On your question with respect to whether the Canadian Forces are engaged in the World Police and Fire Games, there has not been a formal request for Canadian Forces participation, which would leave me to believe that local police services believe they have the capabilities and do not need to call upon unique capabilities, except for the elements we have as a matter of course: standing forces that contribute, for example, the national response team for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response. We contribute to that team all the time, so that's a standing commitment. But apart from that, to my knowledge, there has not been a request for additional support.
I will respond to your first question first, which concerns planning between the United States and Canada.
[English]
You're referring to a document that was a plan signed into place in February. It's called the Civil Assistance Plan. It's not the means by which American forces could operate on our side of the border; it is a plan to allow effective coordination if there were a requirement established by the government for one or the other to draw upon aid.
The Civil Assistance Plan really brought together many of the arrangements that already existed into one more efficient mechanism by which collaboration could occur. It's not an agreement and it doesn't allow the movement of forces. It's a plan. The movement of forces occurs when the governments decide that's what they want and they request and an answer is given. The Civil Assistance Plan simply puts in place a more efficient means by which we can execute that order.
As I said at the start, there is no doubt that we are engaged in very deep conversations with the United States to understand what capabilities they will put in place and to ensure they understand what capabilities we have in place. I envision no circumstance at the moment that would see dramatic movement across the border one way or the other, but, sir, you're asking me to predict the future, and we're all notoriously bad at that. What that plan puts in place is an efficient means by which military-to-military cooperation could occur were a decision made by the governments to do that.
I would make the point that it's perhaps surprising that we've gone south of the border more frequently than we've seen it happen the other way around. In fact, the first exercise of the Civil Assistance Plan, based upon a request made by the United States government to Canada, was us going into the United States in anticipation of Hurricane Gustav. We deployed a C-17 aircraft and took patients who were medically at risk out of New Orleans and flew them to Little Rock, Arkansas.
That was a request of the American government, approved by the Canadian government, but the mechanism of the CAP, the Civil Assistance Plan, allowed the effect to be brought to bear within two hours of the request having been made.
The formalized mechanism happens because governments decide. What the Civil Assistance Plan puts in place are many of the things that had been there before. I took a task group into the Gulf of Mexico many years ago as a result of the devastation from Hurricane Katrina. The Civil Assistance Plan establishes the mechanism by which, once the approvals are in place, coordination can happen more efficiently.
:
Sir, perhaps I could start answering that question by explaining some of the culture of the Canadian Forces. What do we mean by a good exercise? A good exercise to us is one where we turned over lots of rocks, identified lots of things that we wanted to make better so that we learned lessons from them. They could be observed; we could put a process in place to actually be able to implement those lessons learned. From the perspective of the Canadian Forces, with any exercise that occurs, if you get to the end of it and it all went very well, there are two things: you either didn't make a tough enough exercise, or you weren't tough enough on yourselves in figuring out how you do it. I should say that is, to some degree, a culture of the Canadian Forces. We want to wring every last drop of benefit that we can out of exercising.
Those three major exercises that I talked about—Bronze, Silver, and Gold—are the whole-of-government exercises. They are the big ones in the calendar where a great many agencies are brought together—there's a tabletop exercise, a live exercise—so that the problem in all its complexity can be addressed. Those aren't the only exercises being done. The Canadian Forces have numerous exercises that we will do, both in preparation for and subsequent to those major ones, and the same is true of the RCMP. The integrated security unit in Vancouver will do far more training cycles than those major events that are pulled together.
Both Bronze and Silver went well, in that, for example, in Silver, we had over 1,000 people actually participating in the exercise. In excess of 100 different agencies, departments, or organizations--a little over 50 operations centres--actually stood up in being exercised during that week. I've no doubt that was a very busy week for a great many people. There are lots of things that we will have identified with respect to the plans that are in place to allow us to respond to an incident, a security concern, and there are bits now that we will improve upon, not just within the Canadian Forces but in many other departments that will do the same thing. What we are involved in this week, in fact, is in bringing together the lessons learned that we have observed within the military organization to support the RCMP and within the RCMP's integrated security organization, so that we both see the world the same way with respect to where we go from here. That series of out-briefs will occur later this week. We've already gathered the lessons out of an exercise in the middle of February. We're pushing that timeline very rapidly, because what we want to do is make sure that when we get to Gold, it is a validation exercise. That's not the time for us to figure out there are more things that we need to do.
We were undeniably brutal during Silver. That's what we intended; that's what was advertised by Mr. Elcock, who is the coordinator for security requirements of the games and also for the G-8. His office was the one that put the exercise program together. We set very high targets. The level of cooperation that we've seen during that exercise has never, to my knowledge, been achieved before in an exercise. That's success as far as we're concerned. There's lots of stuff that we will now take for action to make changes. That's a good thing.
:
Vice-Admiral, it's a pleasure to have you here.
I want to thank you for both coming, gentlemen.
I am not as optimistic as you with regard to equipment. In fact, we know that, given the climate in Afghanistan, much of this equipment will be outdated and likely unusable for the Olympic Games. So, with regard to resources, we will need to reinforce our capacities. Unless government tanks can be sent to Vancouver, I don't think we have the necessary capacity to respond to everything. That's why I hope that we will have a plan B. The condition of the equipment being used in Afghanistan and that could be sent back to Canada concerns me somewhat. I think that we need some reassurance here.
[English]
I'd like to talk to you about tactical control radar. That is an issue in itself.
As you know, there are two units right now, and their principal mission is to train the CF-18. They're coming in support of the different radar lines. First of all, there was a notice of proposed procurement on MERX on November 17, 2008. That was for kind of a mobile system that's more helpful for providing a better view for the CF-18. If they don't have that kind of capacity, it might have an impact on security during the next Olympics. Those systems date from 1993, and it's impossible right now to even get parts for some of the components. Do you have faith that we will be able to have that kind of equipment? What capacity will we need to really be assured that we'll be okay for the security of the Olympics?
You've talked today about a whole-of-government approach to this particular operation. I'd like to talk about the joint operation, should it become necessary, between Canada and the United States.
In the past, prior to 2006, there had been such joint exercises conducted between the Department of Homeland Security and what now falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Safety in Canada. In support of those civil agencies, the military came into play. In the past, on the Canadian side, these exercises were abject failures. When Canada chose to participate in the exercise, and when there was a minister to be found at the time it began, our computer system in the Office of Critical Infrastructure crashed, for example. The computer system was the basis upon which the entire critical infrastructure mechanism was to work.
Would you share with this committee the types of experiences that you've had recently, in the lead-up to the Olympics, in terms of joint exercises with the United States?
:
I could probably give you a fair amount of detail of the military-to-military exercises that we've done in preparation. I'll give you one example of the level of complexity, in keeping with the changed circumstances of the modern reality and the threats that we address today.
We were always very good at doing military-to-military exercises with the United States, for example, in my own line, navy to navy. We did lots of those. We are now conducting combined exercises, on both coasts, that will bring in not just Canadian Forces and the United States Navy but also coast guard resources. How those conversations now occur is a matter of course. We address not just the defence relationship but the means by which military forces can be brought to support security requirements as well as requests made appropriately by law enforcement agencies. Many of the exercises that we're doing now in a military-to-military relationship automatically bring in for certain the United States Coast Guard, so there is at least a three-way conversation. That becomes an opportunity for a broader discussion.
Every year there is the Rhode Island war game chaired by the United States military. At the Rhode Island war game that will occur, I think in April of this year, the scenarios that we will play will be scenarios appropriate to the Vancouver Olympics. We will have the participation of the Canada Border Services Agency, the RCMP, Public Safety Canada, Transport Canada, and Health Canada. They will participate in both observing and contributing to how that exercise unfolds. A war game sounds like quite an aggressive term, but it means you can create a fantasy world in which you can play and add levels of complexity.
That movement of engaging far more partners in what are very complicated discussions is indicative of where we are going with respect to that type of inter-agency joint and combined exercise program to both develop understanding and ensure that when there is a request for military forces to be engaged in support of law enforcement, we've actually thought through lots of the things, not just from our perspective but from the perspective of the agencies we will be supporting. In the security realm, we will always be operating in support of someone else's regulatory authority. Not just for the conduct of the Olympics, but simply as a matter of course, that dialogue is becoming much more sophisticated than it ever was.
:
Sir, Commander NORAD is responsible for aerospace surveillance control and defence; therefore, how that defence will be effected is Commander NORAD's recommendation to the Chief of Defence Staff. The Chief of Defence Staff is the individual charged to say these are the assets that should go in place to be able to achieve that.
I would caution against drawing the direct connection that we've used it before and therefore it should always be used. Understand that the environment in Vancouver is that of a major urban, built-up area. It's a much more complicated environment in which to use a ground-based missile system than a less built-up area. It's not simply a question of the ability to prevent what has been identified as a threat from proceeding to its target, but that there will be consequences of an engagement. Therefore, the Commander NORAD will make his recommendations to the Chief of Defence Staff as to how he intends to ensure that level of security.
I would say that the conversation now becomes, as in all things, more complicated, in that we're not just talking potentially about an air defence mission—in other words, an armed attack upon Canada—but the employment of NORAD in support of an RCMP requirement to prevent the commission of a crime. A small aircraft operating in a certain way could be assessed by the RCMP as the commission of a crime. The mechanisms by which force is brought to bear are some of the things we're working through at the moment.
As for your specific question on how that kinetic effect occurs, I couldn't comment upon, sir, apart from saying that we are exercising it, and I do not have concerns that the kinetic effect can be brought to bear.
:
There are both security concerns and safety concerns. By safety concerns, I mean that it's Vancouver and it's winter. I grew up on the north shore, and the Sea-to-Sky Highway seems to close down on a fairly frequent basis.
From a security perspective, I suppose the worst thing we could imagine would be the same types of things that we've just seen in Mumbai. There is, to my knowledge, no indication of a specific threat vector that would be to that extent, but we will ensure that what we have is a scalable response capability in place to support law enforcement.
But I suppose the level of concern from security is really with the movement of very substantial numbers of people. It's the activity that brings with it the level of concern. There will be hundreds of thousands of visitors, the vast majority of whom will be there to enjoy the games. I presume there will be some who will also have other interests.
The harm that could be done as a result of a wilful attempt to do harm is the reason why the Canadian Forces are being asked to bring our skill sets to bear in support of police forces. The wilful harm vector is the greatest concern we have. It also potentially could be the least likely to occur, but the consequences are the most catastrophic, which is always the difficulty.
It's winter on the west coast, so I expect stuff will happen. A capacity to be able to absorb that shock will have as little effect upon the good functioning of the games as there can possibly be.
:
Great. Thank you very much.
I'd like to thank the committee for being so prompt, because it allowed us to get through the full speaking order.
I'd like to thank you gentlemen as well for your responses. It's a huge task you have on your hands, but it sounds to me like you're well on your way to getting it done properly.
I'd just like to dismiss you now. We want to deal with a notice of motion that Mr. Wilfert has put forward. But before I do that, are there any comments you'd like to make to wrap up? No? Thank you very much, but you might want to stay there and listen to this motion, because it might affect you anyway.
Mr. Wilfert, we have a notice of motion, so I'd like to deal with that. It was presented in the right timeframe in both official languages. Sir, I'll let you read it and move it, and then we'll have discussion.