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37th PARLIAMENT, 3rd SESSION

Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, May 5, 2004

1535

The Chair (Mr. Paul Steckle (Huron—Bruce, Lib.))

Mr. Cam Dahl (Executive Director, Grain Growers of Canada)

1540

1545

The Chair

Mr. Denis Couture (President, Fédération des producteurs de cultures commerciales du Québec)

1550

1555

The Chair

Mr. Éric Darier (Genetic Engineering Campaigner, Greenpeace Canada)

1600

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp (Elk Island, CPC)

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Denis Couture

Mr. Ken Epp

1605

Mr. Benoit Legault (General Manager, Fédération des producteurs de cultures commerciales du Québec)

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Denis Couture

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mr. Ken Epp

The Chair

Mr. Louis Plamondon (Bas-Richelieu—Nicolet—Bécancour, BQ)

1610

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mr. Louis Plamondon

Mr. Denis Couture

Mr. Louis Plamondon

Mr. Denis Couture

Mr. Louis Plamondon

Mr. Bernard Bigras (Rosemont—Petite-Patrie, BQ)

1615

Mr. Cam Dahl

The Chair

Hon. Georges Farrah (Bonaventure—Gaspé—Îles-de-la-Madeleine—Pabok, Lib.)

Mr. Denis Couture

Hon. Georges Farrah

Mr. Denis Couture

Hon. Georges Farrah

Mr. Denis Couture

1620

Hon. Georges Farrah

Mr. Denis Couture

Hon. Georges Farrah

Mr. Denis Couture

Hon. Georges Farrah

Mr. Denis Couture

Hon. Georges Farrah

Mr. Denis Couture

Hon. Georges Farrah

Mr. Denis Couture

Hon. Georges Farrah

Mr. Denis Couture

Hon. Georges Farrah

The Chair

Mr. Dick Proctor (Palliser, NDP)

1625

Mr. Denis Couture

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. Denis Couture

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mr. Dick Proctor

1630

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mr. Dick Proctor

The Chair

Mr. Dick Proctor

The Chair

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur (Lambton—Kent—Middlesex, Lib.)

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. Denis Couture

1635

M. Éric Darier

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. Denis Couture

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. Denis Couture

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

M. Éric Darier

The Chair

Mr. Denis Couture

1640

The Chair

Mr. Denis Couture

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Cam Dahl

The Chair

Mr. Benoit Legault

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Benoit Legault

M. Éric Darier

1645

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp

The Chair

Hon. Mark Eyking (Sydney—Victoria, Lib.)

Mr. Denis Couture

Hon. Mark Eyking

Mr. Denis Couture

1650

Hon. Mark Eyking

Mr. Denis Couture

The Chair

Mr. Denis Couture

The Chair

Mr. Benoit Legault

The Chair

Mr. Bernard Bigras

Mr. Denis Couture

1655

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mr. Louis Plamondon

Mr. Denis Couture

1700

The Chair

Mr. Gilbert Barrette (Témiscamingue, Lib.)

Mr. Denis Couture

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mr. Gilbert Barrette

Mr. Denis Couture

Mr. Gilbert Barrette

Mr. Denis Couture

Mr. Gilbert Barrette

Mr. Louis Plamondon

Mr. Gilbert Barrette

Mr. Denis Couture

Mr. Gilbert Barrette

Mr. Denis Couture

1705

Mr. Gilbert Barrette

The Chair

Hon. Mark Eyking

Mr. Denis Couture

The Chair

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. Cam Dahl

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. Éric Darier

1710

Mr. Cam Dahl

The Chair

Mr. Denis Couture

The Chair

M. Éric Darier

The Chair

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. Denis Couture

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

1715

Mr. Éric Darier

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. Éric Darier

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. Éric Darier

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. Éric Darier

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

Mr. Éric Darier

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur

1720

Mr. Éric Darier

The Chair

Mr. Éric Darier

The Chair

Mr. Éric Darier

The Chair

Mr. Éric Darier

The Chair

Mr. Éric Darier

The Chair

Mr. Éric Darier

The Chair

Mr. Éric Darier

The Chair

Mr. Éric Darier

The Chair

Mr. Éric Darier

The Chair

Mr. Éric Darier

The Chair

Mr. Louis Plamondon

M. Éric Darier

1725

The Chair

Mr. Louis Plamondon

Mr. Denis Couture

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Éric Darier

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Éric Darier

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Éric Darier

The Chair

Mr. Dick Proctor

Mr. Éric Darier

1730

Mr. Dick Proctor

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food

NUMBER 020

3rd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Wednesday, May 5, 2004

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹ (1535)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Paul Steckle (Huron—Bruce, Lib.)): Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we're going to continue our study on thepotential effect of world trade negotiations andthe Cartagena protocol on grain trade.

Today we have a number of guests with us, primarily from the grain sectors of this country, and we have a person here from Greenpeace Canada as well.

Firstly, from the Grain Growers of Canada, we have Cam Dahl, executive director; from the Fédération des producteurs de cultures commerciales du Québec, or converted to English, the grain producers of Quebec, Denis Couture, president, and Benoit Legault, general manager; and from Greenpeace Canada, Éric Darier, genetic engineering campaigner. So there we have it.

Are you the first one to lead off today, Mr. Dahl? Good.

If you take a lot of time, you will leave less time for questioning.

Mr. Cam Dahl (Executive Director, Grain Growers of Canada): I'll try to keep it short.

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is very much a privilege to be before you again. As you know, my name is Cam Dahl. I am the executive director of the Grain Growers of Canada.

Ken Bee, GGC's president, sends his regrets. He would like to be with you today, but he is getting ready to put in a soybean crop, and that is occupying his time.

I will not take a lot of time to review the introduction to the grains wars of Canada. This information is included in the brief you have all received. I would like to emphasize, however, that our voice exclusively represents grains and oilseeds farmers. We do not represent any other sector of the agriculture industry.

My presentation today is divided into two parts. A discussion on the current status of the WTO negotiations is followed by a review of the biosafety protocol and the potential impacts this treaty could have on Canadian farmers.

International trade negotiations are one of the most important issues for Canada's grains and oilseed farmers. Our industry continues to be hurt by market interference caused by foreign domestic subsidies as well as export subsidies and significant tariff barriers. Foreign interference in world markets is not only limiting access for raw commodities; it is also preventing the sale of processed agriculture products. This takes jobs away from Canadians and takes money out of the hands of farm families.

Net income for Canada's grains and oilseed producers continues to be depressed below the natural prices that would be obtained in an undistorted world market. According to the latest estimates from the OECD, European wheat farmers receive 46% of their income from government, U.S wheat farmers receive 30% of their income from government, while at the same time Canadian safety net programs deliver 18%.

The U.S Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy recently found that in 2002 U.S wheat was exported at an average price that was 43% below the cost of production, U.S soybeans were exported at an average price of 25% below the cost of production, and U.S corn was exported at an average price that was 13% below the cost of production.

Because domestic prices for grains and oilseeds are determined on the world market, these distortions affect all grains and oilseed farmers, even if they do not export. Even the price for farm-to-farm sales is negatively impacted.

The single most effective way of correcting the problem caused by foreign interference in world markets and to move Canada past crisis management in agriculture is to level the playing field and gain free and fair trade for our agriculture products. No one in Canada, especially grains and oilseed farmers, can afford to let this WTO round fail.

Grains and oilseed producers must receive the following three concessions from our trading partners. First, we need to see significant increase in market access for grains and oilseeds, as well as for their value-added products; we must see the elimination of export subsidies; and we must see significant reductions in distorting domestic support. All three of these pillars are critical and inter-related. We must see real progress on all fronts.

The benefits of trade liberalization are real. The brief you have been presented outlines how trade liberalization will benefit farmers in Canada as well as producers around the world. The brief also describes the cost if Canada were to choose not to trade.

In a nutshell, focusing only on our domestic market would push about 25,000 grains and oilseed farmers out of business. That is simply not an option.

Our brief also includes a discussion on the need to better define the conditions under which developing countries will have access to special and differential treatment through the WTO. We have significant concerns with the current practice that allows WTO members to self-designate as developing countries in order to receive perpetual special and differential treatment.

This practice makes no distinction between countries at widely different levels of development. A continuation of the current system will limit the progress that can be made toward the goals of agriculture trade liberalization and our ability to achieve the development agenda outlined in the Doha mandate.

We strongly believe no nation should be permanently exempted from WTO disciplines. In the context of our current discussions, this particularly applies to the net-agriculture-exporting countries that have designated themselves as developing nations.

Members of the committee have received a copy of a submission on this issue prepared by Canadian and U.S agriculture representatives. This letter was addressed to the Canadian Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food, the Canadian Minister of International Trade, as well as the U.S Trade Representative and the U.S Secretary of Agriculture. We trust this cross-border policy formation and cooperation will carry significant weight in the development of a solution to this issue.

The Grain Growers of Canada are hopeful there will be a negotiated framework by the end of summer 2004.

We are pleased with recent progress and the increased flexibility shown by some of the key players. For example, the European Union has recently agreed to the setting of an end date for export subsidies. This is a significant move away from their initial negotiating position.

This progress raises some questions regarding the Canadian position and the potential for Canadian flexibility. European flexibility on export subsidies provides a good example. One of the conditions for this change in position is increased disciplines on export-state trading enterprises. This runs contrary to the official Canadian position, which raises a question: has the time come for Canadian policy makers to examine our position to see if flexibility is needed in order to gain liberalization concessions? This same question applies to other aspects of the Canadian negotiating position, such as the stance on the disaggregation of domestic support and the de minimis provisions.

The Grain Growers of Canada ask that this key policy question be addressed by members of Parliament and members of the cabinet, as well as through established industry consultative bodies such as the food and beverage sectoral advisory group on international trade, better known as the SAGIT.

Our brief before you closes today with a discussion on the Cartagena protocol on biosafety. We are very concerned that gains made at the WTO negotiating table will be lost to other bodies whose purposes are being bent by those who wish to block trade rather than promote liberalization. The Cartagena protocol on biosafety provides a clear example of our concerns.

We support the objective of the protocol, which is to provide assurances that living modified organisms are traded in a safe and responsible manner with due regard to the protection of biodiversity. We want to re-iterate our strong support for the Canadian science-based regulatory system. We believe our system is an example to the world regarding protection of the environment as well as of human health.

The Canadian agriculture industry, including the Grain Growers of Canada, continues to have grave concerns regarding key outstanding questions in the protocol text that will result in significant negative impacts on our sector and on the Canadian economy as a whole if they are implemented. The focus of many of the parties to the protocol appears to be on imposing additional restrictions on trade, with no consideration being given to facilitating trade of the products that have been deemed to be safe. This is unacceptable to the Canadian agriculture sector.

In October of 2002, the Canadian agriculture and agrifood chain wrote to the Government of Canada asking it to delay ratification of the protocol until the concerns regarding the outstanding questions were resolved. We are grateful that the government followed this request.

Following the first meeting of parties to the protocol in Kuala Lumpur, stakeholders of the Canadian agriculture and agri-food industries have concluded that the significant outstanding concerns will not be resolved. We believe ratification of the protocol will impose unknown and unpredictable risks on the Canadian agri-food industry and will significantly restrict our ability to export. For this reason, we ask that the Government of Canada not ratify the treaty negotiated under the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity.

Our brief outlines the reasons for this request in greater detail, but I'd like to summarize a couple of key points. Members of Canada's agriculture and agrifood industry are concerned that non-scientific parameters will be solely used as non-tariff trade barriers. A number of our major competitors on the world market, such as the United States, Argentina, and Australia, have indicated they have chosen not to ratify the protocol. Canada's trading position will be disadvantaged if our exporters are forced to abide by a new regulatory burden not required by competing nations.

Because of uncertainties in the protocol, members of Canada's agriculture and agrifood industries are concerned that ratification will jeopardize the export of Canadian grain and food products, even if these exports are not grown from the products of modern biotechnology. In our view, ratification of the protocol would compromise Canada's ability to challenge non-tariff trade barriers under the World Trade Organization. Ratification of the protocol will impose new legal obligations and additional liability on Canadian exporters as well as on the Government of Canada.

Members of the committee have received a copy of a submission from the Canadian agrifood chain. This submission includes representation from farm families, grain handlers, grain exporters, agricultural researchers, technology developers, food producers, and manufacturers. We trust this substantive representation will play a significant role in the Canadian discussion surrounding ratification of the protocol.

¹ (1540)

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the WTO is taking small steps down the road towards the goal of a less-distorted world market for agricultural products. The Grain Growers of Canada will continue to encourage our government to aggressively build on the progress that is being made. This may require a review of the Canadian negotiating position to determine if increased Canadian flexibility is necessary.

Some have suggested that an aggressive stance at the WTO may mean that Canada will unilaterally make concessions without obtaining significant liberalization from our partners. It must be emphasized that this is not the position of the Grain Growers of Canada. We are not asking for unilateral action on any part. Rather, we advocate that all WTO countries move together towards a more liberalized trading environment.

While we view with optimism recent progress at the WTO, we are concerned that these gains could be negated in other venues. The Cartagena protocol on biodiversity provides an example of our concern. We must ensure that systems developed under international conventions, like the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, are based on sound scientific principles so that they cannot be misused as non-tariff barriers to trade. We believe that the concerns of trading nations will remain unresolved, and therefore ratification of the protocol represents only risk and offers no benefit to Canada. For these reasons, the Canadian agriculture and agrifood industries ask that the Government of Canada not ratify the protocol.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd be happy to take your questions.

¹ (1545)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Dahl.

We'll continue hearing the presentations. Mr. Couture, perhaps you could go next.

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Couture (President, Fédération des producteurs de cultures commerciales du Québec): Good afternoon.

The Fédération des producteurs de cultures commerciales du Québec is pleased to have an opportunity to present its statement in regards to the trade injury suffered by the Quebec and Canada grain growers and withdrawal of the Government of Canada towards them. The growers wish to express to all the members of the House of Commons' Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food their most sincere gratefulness for inviting them at today's work session. In our opinion, the members of the committee respect the recommendations the Prime Minister's Task Force on Future Opportunities in Farming.

In October 2002, Mr. Robert Speller, then president of this group, sent in his final report to the Prime Minister, Mr. Jean Chrétien at the time. The report was resulting from a broad consultation across the Canadian agricultural community that had begun in the spring of 2001. The consultation led to a statement by Mr. Speller in his letter of presentation introducing the report. Mr. Speller explained that the farmers did not feel listened to by the government and the relationship between both parties could be impaired if nothing was done. We believe that Mr. Speller was just right about the situation and, unfortunately, his apprehensions turned out to be true; the relationship with the farmers has gone bad.

In this context, it becomes necessary that the growers have an opportunity to report to the committee members the harm they develop because of the subsidies granted to their competitors of the United State and Europe and withdrawal of the government of Canada from support policies.

As for the trade injury suffered by the Quebec and Canadian grain growers, since the beginning of the 1990s, the Canadian farmers underwent a pronounced withdrawal of the Government of Canada. The total farm support of the federal government has dropped from $6.1 billion in 1991-1992 to $2.1 billion 10 years later. Figures from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) confirm this tendency. The OECD establishes that Canada reduced its support to farm income between the periods 1986-1988 and 2000-2002 by US $90 (US $271 to US $181 per capita). The United States and Europe showed a totally different tendency by passing from US $282 to US $332 and of US $326 to US $279 respectively.

The government's withdrawal hurts the grain sector particularly badly. In Canada, the government's support is no greater than 17% of total cash receipts in grain production. The same indicator shows in the United States and Europe variation between 22% to 40% and 35% to 51% respectively. Furthermore, these subsidies considerably reduce the world-wide prices. Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada has conducted research clearly showing that, in the 1990s, American and European subsidies contributed to 26%, 17% and 30% respectively of the global decline in the price of wheat, coarse grains and oilseeds. It is therefore obvious that American and European subsidies have had a double and devastating effect on grains farm profitability. The subsidies have artificially improved the competitiveness of American and European growers in addition to lowering grain prices. The Grain Growers of Canada estimates losses at about $1.2 billion a year for grain growers.

We are also worried about AAFC's potential withdrawal from grain research in Eastern Canada. We have often expressed our concerns to the minister, but no statement has ever been made whether or not human and financial resources would be preserved or even reinforced in the Quebec research centres. Some of AAFC's recent decisions in that regard have compromised several research projects for which FPCCQ is an important financial contributor. It is important that the committee's members be informed that the FPCCQ invested more than $2 million in grains research between 1998 and 2004 .

To remedy the income crisis that grain growers are living, the Government of Canada proposes the Canadian Agricultural Income Sensibilization (CAIS) Program. Obviously, CAIS is not appropriate as a program to meet grain growers' needs. In this program the individual farm's production margin stands as a reference for calculating the pay out. This margin is calculated by subtracting direct production expenditures (fuel, fertilizers, etc.) from sales of eligible farm products. A five-year average of that production margin will bring a reference margin to every producer. If the production margin for the year falls under the reference margin, compensation is paid to fill this gap.

¹ (1550)

On this point, we want to guarantee the production margin we've had over the past five years. The net farming income for Quebec grain growers over the past 10 years has been negative. Even if it is guaranteed that we will maintain the income we've had over the past five years, that will not be enough to enable us to support our families. With negative incomes, no business can operate. That is why we say that production margins must absolutely rise.

The Federation has carried out a simulative analysis using representative data from Quebec grain farm operations. Based on those figures, CAIS would not kick in very soon despite the fact the grain sector has been struggling in a hard crisis for many years now. Given that the grain production margin remains stable but low, there would be no need for compensation under the program.

Nevertheless, in a context where the sector is suffering significiant trade injury that pushes grains prices down, production margins do not allow producers to meet their production costs. Consequently, CAIS does not fit the grain sector's needs. More precisely, for the period 1994 2004, a grain grower would have got an average of $10,000 yearly in government compensation, which represents about $34 per hectare, whereas our American and European neighbours receive approximately $300 a hectare.

There is no doubt that growers are suffering significant trade injury and that CAIS will be inefficient in lessening the negative effects. The FPCCQ proposes two potential solutions. One would consist in adjusting the reference margin to reflect prices in an undistorted grain market. Then, CAIS would apply a corrective factor to the reference margin calculation. This adjusted reference margin would then be the one to which the actual production margin would be compared. Should the reference margin adjustment be impossible to work out, policy makers could consider a special program intended for grain growers. A program called TICP, that has been developed and proposed by AAC by the Grain Growers of Canada, would certainly meet the objective.

In conclusion, the FPCCQ sincerely hopes that this statement will allow the members of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food to fully realize the magnitude of the problematic situation lived by the Quebec and Canadian grain growers. The events of the last months left growers with a sense of being abandoned and misunderstood by the Government of Canada, exactly as Mr. Speller mentioned in his report to the Prime Minister in October 2002.

You now have the choice to leave the Canadian farmers to their fate or to recognize their social and economic contribution. In the growers' opinion, the best way to recognize this contribution would be to modify the calculation method of the CAIS reference margin to reflect the impact of the high level of American and European subsidies. If this scenario is unrealistic, the FPCCQ finds it hard to see what would prevent AAFC from developing a specific program for the grain sector. The TICP proposed by the Grain Growers of Canada would be a good alternative.

The growers also hope that AAFC will soon commit to maintaining or even reinforcing major grain crop research. We wish to assure members that the FPCCQ is available to support AAFC in its work in the most effective manner possible.

In closing, we would like to express our gratitude and thanks to the members of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Agriculture for welcoming us today to their working session. They have shown the openness that Quebec and Canadian grain producers have long expected and hoped for. With their welcome and attitude, Committee members are instilling new hope in the farming community.

Thank you, we'll be available to answer your questions.

¹ (1555)

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Couture.

Now we turn to Mr. Darier from Greenpeace.

[Translation]

Mr. Éric Darier (Genetic Engineering Campaigner, Greenpeace Canada): I thank this Committee for giving Greenpeace the opportunity to share with you our views regarding biosafety and the future of Canada's agriculture.

As you know, mad cow has been a big blow to Canadian agriculture. Greenpeace fears that the current pro-GMO policy of the government could potentially be the next fiasco in waiting. The Committee should urge the government to rapidly change course.

As you probably know, Greenpeace is an independent organization whose objective is, through creative and non-violent means, to reveal global environmental problems as well as promoting necessary alternatives to guarantee a green and peaceful world to future generations.

Greenpeace Canada has around 100,000 supporters. Greenpeace is active in nearly 40 countries and has approximately 2.6 million supporters globally. In view of the high level of scientific uncertainty regarding the safety of GMOs, Greenpeace suggests the implementation of the precautionary principle and demands the end of release of GMOs in the environment.

Greenpeace is deeply concerned by the pro-GMO policy of the federal government and in particular by the failure to ratify the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which entered into force in September 2003; second, by the signing of a trilateral agreement with the United States and Mexico that de facto legitimizes the contamination of Canadian agriculture exports of up to 5% by GE crops and therefore undermines the biosafety objective of the Cartagena Protocol; third, by Canada's partnering with the United States in a complaint to the WTO against the precautionary policy of Europe regarding GMOs; fourth, by the official adoption of voluntary labelling norms regarding GMOs while nearly 90% of Canadians want mandatory labelling and while about 40 countries have already enacted labelling regimes; Canada is also stalling negotiations at the Codex Alimentarius concerning international labelling norms of GMOs; fifth, by the on-going process to authorize Monsanto's genetically engineered wheat when 90% of our international customers have already indicated that they won't buy any Canadian wheat if GE wheat is approved, and when over 80% of Canadians wheat producers have already said no to GE wheat.

The federal government is so blinded by its own pro-GMO policy, that now it seriously threatens not only biosafety and the environment in general, but also the medium and long-term interests of farmers and the future of agriculture in this country as well as the international reputation of Canada.

Greenpeace is convinced that the federal government should entirely revise its pro-GMO policy in view of a new reality which includes in particular: first, the near universal consumer rejection of GMOs, and therefore, the absence of a market future for agricultural GMOs; second, the risks of contamination by GMOs, which threaten organic agriculture, which is one of the fastest growing agricultural sectors because of a strong demand; third, the absence of independent and credible scientific proof on the safety of GMOs for the environment and human health; fourth, the existence of serious structural gaps in the federal regularly systems regarding GMOs. I would draw your attention here to the 2001 report of the Royal Society of Canada and more recently the critical report of Canada's Auditor General on the Canadian Food Inspection Agency.

Consequently, Greenpeace demands that the federal government: first, immediately announce a moratorium on GMOs in agriculture in Canada; second, freeze all requests for authorization of new GMOs and in particular genetically engineered wheat; third, hold public consultations on GMOs studying the relevance to Canadians of promoting GMOs as well as the need for implementation of the precautionary principle; fourth, implement mandatory labelling of GMOs at least as strict as the system in place in Europe; fifth, ratify immediately the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety; sixth, implement a strict liability regime in case of genetic contamination.

º (1600)

In conclusion, Greenpeace asks you, as members of this committee, but soon also as candidates in the forthcoming federal election, to position yourself clearly on the issue of GMOs.

Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Darier.

At this time we'll go to our questions. Mr. Epp, for seven minutes.

Mr. Ken Epp (Elk Island, CPC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate all of you making your presentations here.

Let me start with Mr. Dahl. I don't know whether I got your message or not. Are you proposing that the Government of Canada should introduce a regime of a regular and consistent subsidization for grain growers in this country through direct cash payments?

Mr. Cam Dahl: There already is a safety net program in place. What the grain growers, and in fact the rest of the agriculture industry, have asked for is a program that would mitigate the impact of foreign interference or trade injury until such time as we can gain a victory at the WTO and eliminate the impact of those foreign subsidies on our own market.

Mr. Ken Epp: I'm aware of the fact that there are these safety net programs, which usually only kick in when you are having a disaster; they don't affect the normal production.

Yet a farmer who has a good crop, say the conditions are all right in an area, ends up selling his grain at a loss, at least so we're told. It's always a mystery to me how a businessman can, year after year, stay in business if he's operating at a loss. At any rate, that's what he says: the cost of production exceeds the value I'm getting for my grain at the terminal.

I still want to push you. Beyond the disaster relief program in place now, or even the levelling off of annual income, are you suggesting that we should have a per-acre or a per-tonne of production payment directly?

Mr. Cam Dahl: My friends from Quebec outlined some of the shortcomings of the current program in place, and the fact that it's based on a falling income. That income has been falling because of the impact of foreign subsidies.

Our proposal, the trade injury compensation program, was not based on a per-acre, a straight basis like that. The program was designed to make up for that loss. Using Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada's numbers, it calculated that the impact of that foreign interference is about $1.3 billion every year.

Mr. Ken Epp: Yes, I picked up on that.

I'd like to ask our friends from Quebec, then, if they would respond to these same questions.

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Couture: Ultimately we want our producers to be able to be as productive as American producers. Grain price support is what's giving us trouble in terms of production.

Over the past five or 10 years, Canadian growers have received a subsidy of between $4 and $5 a tonne, whereas American producers over the past 10 years have received $40 for the same quantity. With $5 a tonne, I can't compete with an American grower who's receiving $40.

It's simple: we're asking the Canadian government to give us the same income security tools. If the Americans stop subsidizing their growers, we won't make that request to Canada. The problem now is that the Americans are still doing it.

[English]

Mr. Ken Epp: Let me reword the question, then. What form does the subsidy take in the United States and in Europe? Is it a per-acre payment, a per-hectare payment, or a per-tonne payment of production? On what is it based? How do they subsidize their farmers?

º (1605)

[Translation]

Mr. Benoit Legault (General Manager, Fédération des producteurs de cultures commerciales du Québec): I'm not an expert on the programs in effect in Europe and the United States. There's a bit of a mix of everything you've just mentioned. In some cases, payments are made based on unit area. In Europe, they're increasingly trying to move toward decoupled programs. In the United States, they're also making attempts in that direction. Their last advance was to develop a program under which they in fact used old tools such as the target price. Under that system, they're trying to evaluate observable losses under today's market conditions.

However, the intervention will be made based on the areas they have available to them over an average of five years or yields observed over a certain average period of time. The Americans thus say that their programs are decoupled, and that they therefore aren't linked to production, because, in terms of intervention, the observed price drop is based on pegs, yields that are in fact an average over past years.

[English]

Mr. Ken Epp: Thank you. That helps.

I'm going to ask you two gentlemen from Quebec: are you proposing the Canadian government should introduce a similar system; that is, one based on either acreage, or average production in aggregate, or average production for a particular farm operation, or simple production per tonne, or whatever? Are you promoting and asking this committee to report to the finance minister that there should be a big budget item that would include those kinds of payments for our agricultural producers, particularly the grain farmers?

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Couture: In view of the agricultural policy framework put in place through the Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization Program, CAISP, we're simply asking the following: we would like the reference margin applicable to all Canadian farmers, and more precisely to grain growers, which has resulted in net negative incomes for us, to be increased by the equivalent of the U.S. subsidies. Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada has calculated the margin for each of the past years. It is an average of amounts ranging between $20 and $40 a tonne, depending on the species. So if a grower got $140 a tonne, he's asked to increase that amount in his financial statements by $20 or $40, depending on the species grown, to calculate his target threshold, then he calculates his payments based on the results of his farm for future years. That's all we're asking. We're simply asking that our reference margin be increased by the equivalent of the subsidies obtained by U.S. growers.

[English]

Mr. Ken Epp: I have half a minute, so I'm going to have to ask for a really short answer to this question.

Canadian producers are pretty good: they produce about five times as much as we need in our own country. That's wonderful. What's in it for us as Canadians to be subsidizing farmers so they can produce 80% of their market to simply ship out of the country at a loss? Why don't we simply say you can't get our grain unless you pay the price of production plus a little bit for the farmer so he can feed his family? What's wrong with that?

Mr. Cam Dahl: I think that's one of the reasons why included in the brief we gave you were some comments on what would happen if Canada chose not to trade. The brief goes through a little detail, but in a nutshell, it would cost us about 25,000 grains and oilseed farmers across the country if we chose only to produce for our domestic needs. Our industry is dependent upon the world market, and we must be able to trade. This is why the WTO negotiations are so important for our industry. We must have a victory at the WTO.

Mr. Ken Epp: Mr. Chairman, please put me on for the next round. I have many more questions.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Epp. We only wish other members could bring their own clocks along, so we would have promptness.

Mr. Plamondon, I will remind you when your seven minutes are up, thank you very much.

[Translation]

Mr. Louis Plamondon (Bas-Richelieu—Nicolet—Bécancour, BQ): Mr. Chair, I'm going to share my time with my colleague, Bernard Bigras, in the first round of questions.

Quebec grain growers, like those in Canada, are in a dramatic situation. I was going to refer to our two countries, but I don't want to shock my friend Gilbert or my friend Georges. But I believe Gilbert and Georges also had a visit from the grain growers, a quite dramatic visit with overtones of despair. Their situation is extremely tough, and you've just given a good explanation of it.

The fact is that you don't absolutely want to receive subsidies, but, as others are receiving them, you can't be competitive unless you obtain the same thing. Furthermore, you understand the intentions of the Canadian government, which wants to abolish subsidies in the next round of WTO negotiations, but you also know that, if an agreement is reached in July—and it seems that the Americans and Europeans are now talking about cutting their subsidies—it could take three, five, seven or even eight or 10 years, based on what's being said. Subsidies won't be stopped all at once. It could take roughly 10 years.

The problem is that, in the meantime, you're completely left to your own devices. You'll receive no subsidies, since the Canadian government, which wants other countries to do the same thing, has reduced assistance for agriculture from $6 billion to $2 billion. However, the others aren't doing the same thing, and you find yourselves in a dramatic situation that prevents you from being competitive.

Ultimately, you want a temporary support program to be implemented pending subsidy cuts by competitor countries. You explained the matter when you referred to a new way of calculating the reference margin, but you also mentioned the TICP type decoupled program. Could you give us more details on that subject? That appears to be an approach to consider.

º (1610)

[English]

Mr. Cam Dahl: The trade injury compensation program was a proposal that was developed by the Grain Growers of Canada over two years ago—I think it was back in 2001. The program was based on Agriculture and Agri-food Canada's numbers on the impact of foreign subsidies. What we had done was de-couple the proposal from the current production levels to ensure that the proposal would be green according to the WTO rules and would not be countervailable. The program was designed using historical production numbers to compensate producers for the injury caused by foreign interference in the world markets, and the range was about $1.2 billion.

[Translation]

Mr. Louis Plamondon: The second part of my question concerned that program, and I think you've answered it in part. After checking, we know that that decoupled program, TICP, was not in violation of the TWO's present rules, isn't that correct? That means that, if you implemented it, you had a right to do so.

Mr. Denis Couture: Ultimately the aim of that program was to replace U.S. subsidies as long as they existed. The idea was to give Canadian growers the same subsidies based on the same figures and the same data. We don't want more than them; we want the equivalent of what they have.

Mr. Louis Plamondon: If they go down one year, you go down; if they go up, you go up. And you're not afraid to compete with the Americans.

Mr. Denis Couture: We don't want to offset a lack of efficiency by subsidies. We're asked to enter into free trade agreements and to be competitive with all foreigners. Consequently, we're asking the Canadian government to be competitive with regard to agricultural subsidies, to give us the equivalent of what others have in each area of production. It's simply that.

Mr. Louis Plamondon: The message is very clear. I'm going to let my colleague continue.

Mr. Bernard Bigras (Rosemont—Petite-Patrie, BQ): I'm going to make a brief preamble. I think I still have a little time.

I'll get right to the point. Mr. Dahl, I understand your position on the Cartagena Protocol: you want Canada not to ratify it. However, the fact is that the protocol went into effect last September.

Since the protocol is going to apply, among others, to canola growers who export to Japan, Japan being a party to the protocol, doesn't Canada have an interest in being at the table and in negotiating in its own interest, rather than not ratifying the protocol, as you would like? Don't we have a considerable interest in being at the table to influence decisions rather than in staying away?

º (1615)

[English]

Mr. Cam Dahl: Thank you very much for the question.

I think Canadian exporters will have no trouble complying with the import conditions of parties to the protocol. In fact, Canada has been innovative in this respect, in defining the documentation that will be required for trade between parties and non-parties. I of course am referring to the trilateral agreement of Canada, the United States, and Mexico, which was negotiated in cooperation with the International Grain Trade Coalition among the three countries. I think it's an example of the type of cooperation and facilitation of trade in products that have been deemed safe in which Canada showed significant leadership.

It's important to note that the trilateral agreement is completely within the structure of the protocol, or is consistent with the protocol itself, in that the protocol outlined the conditions or the ways in which agreements between parties and non-parties would be constructed in order to facilitate trade.

The protocol was never designed to be something that prevented trade. That wasn't the intent.

The Chair: That's the end of the questioning.

Mr. Farrah, you have seven minutes.

[Translation]

Hon. Georges Farrah (Bonaventure—Gaspé—Îles-de-la-Madeleine—Pabok, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I can share my time with colleagues if I have any left.

Welcome to the committee. I'm quite aware that there is a very particular problem in the grains sector. In view of your remarks on CAISP, which does not meet your expectations because of the negative margin—you explained that very clearly—have you approximately determined the amount your industry would need to get through this very difficult period for all growers?

Mr. Denis Couture: The trade injury as a result of subsidies amounts to $1.3 billion in Canada's grains sector alone. That's not for agriculture as a whole, but only in the grains sector. Under the agricultural policy framework, $1.1 billion is being offered to address all the income security problems for all agricultural production in Canada, including avian flu and so on. However, we have a trade injury of $1.3 billion in the grains sector alone.

How can we be satisfied when we're offered $1.1 billion for all the problems in the agricultural industry, whereas we already permanently need $1.3 billion in our sector alone? Those figures are enough to confirm that the program is not satisfactory. Perhaps it can play its role in the agricultural sector as a whole, but not in the grains sector.

Hon. Georges Farrah: If I understand correctly, the situation is not a one-time crisis such as, for example, mad cow, border closings, an extraordinary disease or avian flu in British Columbia. Your problem is that, even if specific action were taken, that wouldn't solve the problem as long as there is a subsidy differential. Consequently, ongoing action has to be taken to enable you to compete more with the Americans. Ad hoc intervention is a bit of a band-aid: it won't solve the problem.

Mr. Denis Couture: An American grower knows that he gets a $25 or $40 subsidy per tonne of grain every year. So he can let his production go on the market at $25 less because he knows the gap will be filled.

As grain prices are decided by the U.S. market, by U.S. grain growers, they are the ones who decide how the cards are dealt, and we sell at a loss every year. It's just that little difference we want to overcome, not the rest.

Hon. Georges Farrah: I'm not an expert in the field, but my colleague said a moment ago that we exported 80% of our production to foreign markets. Is that figure correct? In any case, it's not very important. But despite that situation, is some grain imported from other countries, even though we are more than self-sufficient and have a surplus?

Mr. Denis Couture: In Quebec, we have to import 10% of our corn from the U.S. to meet our needs. As for small cereals, it's very little. Soya is exported and processed in Ontario because they have processing plants. But the price is obviously the American price.

The general basis for all grains is corn. Corn is mainly produced in the United States, and the prices of other cereals are based on corn prices.

º (1620)

Hon. Georges Farrah: I imagine you've also had meetings with Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada.

Mr. Denis Couture: Yes.

Hon. Georges Farrah: What progress has been made in discussions, if there have been any discussions? What are the department's arguments with regard to your specific demands?

Mr. Denis Couture: We've been trying for two or three years to negotiate the problems of the grains sector, as mentioned in the Speller Report. Two years ago, the Canadian government granted $1.2 billion for 2001-2002 for transitional assistance to the agricultural industry, and we were told that that was because of injury in the cereals sector. However, the $1.2 billion was given for 5% of eligible net sales to all Canadian producers, all production combined. So, even though that amount was supposed to go to the grains sector as a result of the trade injury, it was sent to everyone. It probably suited them to send the money to everyone, but we didn't get any, or we got very little.

Hon. Georges Farrah: Despite the fact that it was initially intended for grain growers.

Mr. Denis Couture: We used the issue to get money out of the Federal Treasury, but when it was distributed, it was sent to all growers, whether or not they had production problems. The reference margin was increased by 4.25% for all growers. Even if a grower had sold at twice his production cost, he received a cheque from the federal government.

Hon. Georges Farrah: If I understand your comments on the WTO negotiations, to which we are a party, we often hear that, ultimately, by being ardent defenders of the abolition of subsidies, we may be more Catholic than the Pope, as the saying goes.

Mr. Denis Couture: That's exactly it.

Hon. Georges Farrah: We immediately accept the fact that we have to abolish our subsidies, whereas our competitors, who are at the same tables, say that they're going to do it, but don't really do it. As a result of that, we're not competitive.

Mr. Denis Couture: As a grain grower at home, at my farm, I get the impression that they wanted to stop subsidizing grain growers so that they could solve the government's deficit problem. At the WTO, there's a desire to reduce agricultural subsidies. The U.S. government did that for a year, then it came back and announced $2 billion, $5 billion, $10 billion in additional farming subsidies, 85% of which is allocated to grain support. Eighty-five percent of U.S. agricultural subsidies is allocated to grains. In Canada, scarcely 20 to 25% of subsidies go to grain support.

When we tell you about competitiveness, it's on this point that we want the Canadian government to be competitive. If the Americans continue subsidizing grains, we want to be given the same time as long as that lasts. Once the problem is solved, we want it to fall to zero and to be on the same footing as the others. There's no problem with that.

Hon. Georges Farrah: I'd like to ask a final question, Mr. Chair. As regards our efficiency when we compare ourselves to these various countries which unfortunately subsidize to a much greater degree than we do, as a result of which there is a distortion, I believe we have shown here in Canada and Quebec as a whole that we are sometimes more efficient than other countries.

Mr. Denis Couture: We don't have any problems. Canadian agriculture is competitive with other countries in all areas. It's not just in support that it's not competitive. With regard to farm production, profitability and efficiency, there are no problems. We can compete with anyone. However, when it comes to subsidies, on our farms, we don't have the means.

Hon. Georges Farrah: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Farrah.

Now we'll move to Mr. Proctor, for seven minutes.

Mr. Dick Proctor (Palliser, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I wanted to start with the gentlemen from Quebec, because I've been curious since I've been on this committee—since 1997. We have had farmers from western Canada almost from the day I arrived here concerned about low grain prices, but we didn't, until the past few months, have much representation from grain farmers in the province of Quebec. I'm trying to understand. I know you have a different program. I know that ASRA, we generally believe, has worked well for farmers, by and large, in your province. What I'm trying to understand is why it has become an issue now.

Are there changes to the ASRA program that have impacted negatively on grain farmers in the province of Quebec?

º (1625)

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Couture: From 1985 to 1995, there were federal programs designed precisely to address the problem of grain prices. We were able to get good support through, for example, GRIP and the ASB program. Furthermore, an additional $2 billion from the Conservative government for grains was specifically applied in support of grain production. Since 1997, federal programs have tended to support agriculture as a whole, not grain growers specifically. Grain production is the basis of agriculture. It's the source. It's like putting gas in a car: if you don't have any, you're going nowhere. If there's no grain to care for an animal, the animal doesn't grow. The Americans have understood this, and they subsidize grain production first. They don't have to do it for the other sectors because everyone can buy grains at low cost.

Why have we risen recently in Quebec? In the past three years, the federal government has told us that the agricultural policy framework will be a marvel of the world with regard to agricultural subsidies and will solve all the problems. We've been good players and we've taken part in the consultations, but when we see the results of what's being delivered to us... It was announced that, starting January 1, 2003, the old programs would no longer operate and would be replaced by the agricultural policy framework. We have only known for the past month or two how CAISP will work. When we look at how it works, we see it will give us very little money. We're making our voice heard now because we've just learned how it's going to work. We could have done it sooner, but we weren't aware how it would work. We are now, and that's why we're speaking out now.

[English]

Mr. Dick Proctor: But at the same time, before we had the AFP we had AIDA and CFIP, and those programs didn't seem to satisfy anybody—particularly in western Canada, but most farmers. Again we didn't hear from grain farmers in the province of Quebec around this table. I'm still puzzled as to why we're hearing about it now, all of a sudden, many years after we heard about it in western Canada—in English Canada, I guess.

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Couture: Quebec grain producers are generally represented by the Union des producteurs agricoles, which represents all Quebec farmers. As there is a specific program for Quebec grain growers which does not appear to meet our needs, we have decided to react specifically to our problem. CAISP is not as bad for the other sectors because it guarantees them their reference margin. That's not bad news for producers as a whole. They often get a little more than they had. That's quite easy to understand. U.S. grain growers receive 85% of U.S. government subsidies, whereas Canadian grain growers receive 25%. So Canadian livestock producers get more than U.S. livestock producers. That's good news for them, and I don't want to take anything away from them whatever. However, since I get only 25% of Canadian subsidies, I have to protest because the system doesn't work.

[English]

Mr. Dick Proctor: Thank you.

Cam, you were here, I think, on Monday as an observer, and I have listened to your paper. You were talking about reduction in trade-distorting subsidies—export enhancements in Europe and the United States—but it was heard at the table on Monday that even if they got an agreement as early as July, it could be several years before those reductions begin to take effect.

Do you have an interim solution? What does Canada do while we're waiting for those subsidies to come down?

Mr. Cam Dahl: I think our friends from Quebec have outlined a couple of options. The Grain Growers of Canada have brought forward the trade injury compensation program. The intent of our proposal was never that it be something that was permanent. The intent of the proposal was to have something in place until those reductions at the WTO.

Mr. Dick Proctor: So you would see, would you, a support program in Canada that would rise up, if you will, to meet where our major competitors are, and then, as everybody began to reduce support and subsidy payments, we would come down in lock-step with them?

Mr. Cam Dahl: The intent is not to be permanent.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Right.

You mentioned in your paper—I don't know if you referred to it, but it's in your paper—how well Canadian pulse farmers have done in India; yet you will know better than I that the U.S. Farm Bill has identified pulses as a crop to be subsidized. I think the year you have in your paper is 2001. Has that had an impact on Canadian pulse crops?

º (1630)

Mr. Cam Dahl: It hasn't yet, because the prices have been strong enough that the deficiency programs have not kicked in in the U.S. So while pulses were named in the recent farm bill, there hasn't been an enormous amount of money flowing to them, but if it did occur, it would have an impact.

I think especially the example of pulses moving into India is a wonderful example of what can be accomplished if we have open trade. Not only has it directly benefited grains and oilseed producers; we've also seen, and Saskatchewan has seen, a significant increase in the smaller processing plants to bring these products to market. Not only is it putting money on farmers' kitchen tables, it's providing jobs for their kids and keeping people in the rural communities. I think it's a wonderful example.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Yes.

Do I have a minute, Mr. Chair?

The Chair: You have no time left.

Mr. Dick Proctor: No time? Go ahead; catch me in the next round.

The Chair: We will go to Mrs. Ur for five minutes.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur (Lambton—Kent—Middlesex, Lib.): I thank you for your presentations today.

Do you believe one of the problems we're having with this discussion today is that we don't have a definition of developing countries?

Mr. Cam Dahl: There is a process: it's that at the WTO a country is able to self-designate as a developing country. That's the process.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: But if it's self-designating, would it lead to some countries benefiting through special and differential treatment that actually should not fall under that umbrella?

Mr. Cam Dahl: That's the concern. I think if you look at a country like Brazil, for example, and compare it with a country like Haiti, for example—I probably shouldn't use countries' names—there are obviously significant differences in the level of development, and there are obviously also significant differences in the impact on world agricultural trade.

Our concern is twofold. One aspect is that a country like Brazil is one of the our major competitors on the world market, so the ability of the world to grant special and differential treatment to countries like Haiti—to the least-developed nations, who need it—and the probability of its occurring will be decreased. And the probability of our accomplishing our development goals in the Doha round will be diminished if we don't find a way of somehow differentiating between them—and I understand perfectly that this is a very difficult question.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: With major competitors such as the U.S. and Australia having chosen not to ratify the protocol, and Canada stepping up to the table as we always have done, are we put into the same framework we've been in of holding different positions, with WTO and all the rest, including tariff reductions: always first and foremost doing as we're asked to do, and always being the leaders, with the followers not coming to the table as they say they will?

Mr. Cam Dahl: We are very concerned that major exporting countries have not ratified the protocol, and we are very concerned that if Canada takes on an additional liability, our exporters and our industry will be put at a competitive disadvantage, absolutely.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: Right.

As you indicated, the Grain Growers of Canada has said that the CAIS program is not beneficial to them—I've heard this from my producers and from you, Cam—and the minister has indicated that after a one-year review.... With that in mind, have you spoken to Agriculture Canada and to the minister, and what is their stance back to you when you tell them that CAIS is not a beneficial program for the grain growers?

Mr. Cam Dahl: As my friend said, this has been a two-year negotiation. It's not just grain growers who have made this position clear. As you're all well aware—

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: But you've been one of the more clear groups.

Mr. Cam Dahl: —this is a very unified position in agriculture.

We haven't been able to get the amendments we've been looking for, but we are hopeful. Again, the minister has committed to the review that hopefully will start this summer and this fall. So we are hopeful that we will be able to bring those changes forward.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: Mr. Couture.

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Couture: What concerns me is the number of years growers will have to endure this situation. The CAISP has been in effect since 2003. So grain growers will get no or virtually no financial support for their production. We're going to plant the 2004 crop, and the review will start in late 2004 or early 2005. As a result, the program won't have applied to grain growers for three years.

Some growers are probably wondering whether they're going to be able to find the money they need to plant their fields this spring. If no program pays support to grain growers by next spring, what cash will producers have, and what will grain growers' financial position be with respect to planting the fields that will enable people to feed themselves? The situation will be very serious.

º (1635)

M. Éric Darier: May I make a comment?

[English]

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: Just one...

Cam, is market revenue still there for the grain growers in Ontario?

Mr. Cam Dahl: My understanding is that for this year, yes, it is.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: For 2005.

Mr. Cam Dahl: Yes, that's my understanding. I'll double-check on the dates.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: So you're still able to access that.

Do you have a provincial program in Quebec for the grain growers, through ASRA?

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Couture: In Quebec right now, we have a program that operates on the basis of insurance. I'll explain it. It's a bit like home insurance.

If your house burns down every year and you systematically have to rebuild it, your insurance cost will ultimately be equivalent to the cost of a house.

[English]

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: It's the same as in Ontario.

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Couture: Yes, but as our houses have been burning down every year for 10 years, our insurance program has posted a $200 million loss and the premium cost, which is higher than an employee's normal wage, can no longer be borne by producers. How can we manage to overcome this kind of situation? With a farmer's income in the order of $37,000, we have to pay out $40,000 for the premium. The premium costs us $3,000 more than the profit we should be able to make. All our wages are taken up by the premium. We'll never be able to continue this way.

From 1985 to 1995, the federal government systematically remedied the problems of Canadian grain growers. However, compensation has been minimal since 1995 or 1997. Under the CAISP, a very small portion of lost revenue will be provided.

[English]

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: Mr. Darier.

[Translation]

M. Éric Darier: You raised the question of the non-ratification of the Cartagena Protocol. That's interesting because my colleague on my right said that his industry didn't want the protocol to be ratified, but that it could adapt to the trilateral agreement that had been reached outside the protocol. In his opinion, it's consistent with the Biosafety Protocol.

I don't see why ratification of the protocol would go against farmers' interests, particularly since, as I explained in my presentation, Canada is sending a lot of messages to the international community, among other things to its overseas markets, to the effect that it is not proceeding with ratification, but is implementing a trilateral agreement that constitutes de facto recognition of a 5% contamination not only of GMO grain exports, but of all exports. That 5% figure is not mentioned in the Cartagena Protocol.

In this specific case, for example, non-ratification causes real injury to agriculture.

[English]

The Chair: I'm sorry, your time has expired.

Just because the question was asked, Mr. Couture, perhaps you could explain further about the returns on both crop insurance and ASRA. I'm not sure if I heard correctly or if I misinterpreted what you may have said. Is it the ASRA program that has become not affordable to you any more, is it the crop insurance program, or is it both? I know that both programs can be costly in any province, but what about in your case?

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Couture: The problem for us is the income security program for grain prices, which provides for large amounts year after year. It's an insurance principle: the provincial government pays two-thirds of the insurance premium and the grower one-third.

The cost of that third of $40,000 a year for a human-scale farm, that is to say a family farm, and the income granted to the producer to grow grains is $37,000. So his income, his wages for the work he does, is completely spent on insurance premiums because the program intervenes year after year.

º (1640)

[English]

The Chair: You said $40,000, and you have a return of $37,000. When you say “family farm”, does that mean 5,000 acres or 500 acres? What are we talking about here? It's just so that we understand, because $40,000 on 10,000 acres is a lot different from on 1,000 acres.

This is just for the record. We record what is being said.

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Couture: For Quebec, we're talking about a grower who produces approximately 1,500 tonnes of grain on an area of 300 hectares, so 750 acres.

[English]

The Chair: Did everybody understand that? It's 750 acres for $40,000.

I didn't want to be difficult, but we need to understand, because there's a big difference.

Yes, Mr. Epp.

Mr. Ken Epp: Thank you.

I want to switch gears a little bit. Part of this protocol, of course, is dealing with LMOs, living modified organisms, or GMOs, genetically modified organisms, or GE, which is not to be confused with General Electric. But before I go to our friends at Greenpeace, I would like to ask each of the other two for a very brief statement, one minute or less, on whether the signing of the protocol is going to be harmful to the agricultural component of our economy and to individual producers or whether it's going to be helpful.

That's my first question.

Mr. Cam Dahl: I think I'll give you a very quick answer. Given the grain industry's assessment of where the protocol stands today, and the results of the first meeting of the parties in Kuala Lumpur, we believe ratification would be harmful to our industry.

The Chair: Does someone from the Quebec group want to respond to that?

[Translation]

Mr. Benoit Legault: The position is different for Quebec, of course. We're not a region that exports a lot, except for soya. However, our position is quite similar to that of the Grain Growers of Canada on the problems that that can cause, mainly for soya, since it's the main crop we export. It would cause problems with export costs if Canada embarked on a process such as that.

But that's a small volume relative to the four million tonnes that Quebec can produce. So this problem concerns us much less than the western Canadian growers, or those of Ontario in the case of soya.

[English]

Mr. Ken Epp: Before you answer, just as a little follow-up here, Quebec has a large production of soy, does it not? This is one of the areas where genetic modification has come in.

[Translation]

Mr. Benoit Legault: In Quebec, we export approximately 250,000 of the 400,000 metric tonnes we produce. So we export roughly 60%. In that 250,000 tonnes, there's a lot of soya intended for human consumption which is therefore not necessarily involved in the GMO question.

We've also developed a GMO-free soya export market. We have a system that makes it possible to segregate crops, and we can therefore certify that certain grains contain no GMOs.

That's why I say we're in a particular situation as a result of which the problem concerns us to a certain degree, but to a lesser degree, because of the nature of our soya production.

M. Éric Darier: I think that, for agriculture, the medium- and long-term cost of not ratifying the protocol is probably higher than that of ratifying it. You raised the question of soya. Quebec is in fact a standout in foreign markets, in large part through the export of GMO-free soya. There's a very strong foreign market for GMO-free products. I don't think the general problem with GMOs is limited to the protocol as such.

I'm thinking, for example, of the growing opposition among growers and among many associations that represent agriculture in Canada, of genetically modified wheat. I think they know perfectly well that, if Canada authorizes genetically modified wheat, that will cause very significant losses for their market. That's one of the concerns.

The problem with the Canadian government's present position is that very ambiguous and very pro-GMO messages are being sent outside the country. Non-ratification is one, and the trilateral agreement with Mexico and the United States is another. A third is the idea of joining the United States in their action against Europe before the WTO. That sends out a whole series of messages which, I believe, constitute the greatest threat for agriculture and for the export of Canadian agricultural products over the long term. I think it would be preferable for the Canadian government to change its policy in this area.

º (1645)

[English]

The Chair: Your time has expired, Mr. Epp.

Mr. Ken Epp: I know. It's right on.

The Chair: Right on.

Mr. Eyking, five minutes, please.

Hon. Mark Eyking (Sydney—Victoria, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I guess my question is mostly to the Quebec grain growers.

If you're talking about us somehow subsidizing your margin to get it higher, for instance, so that when there's a drop you get a higher threshold, and if there was some sort of equation to make a subsidy for the grain growers—let's not talk about just Quebec but eastern Canada, because growing conditions are very similar—wouldn't you have to take it into consideration that the costs are less to grow grain in eastern Canada than they are in maybe Europe?

For instance, a lot of your grain is being consumed right in Quebec, so probably your transportation costs would be lower. Just using your climatic conditions and your scale of production, wouldn't you have to put that into the formula before you say okay, we're going to look at the highest-subsidized grain products in the world and try to get everybody up to that margin?

Two, even if you brought up that margin, would we still keep the CAIS program and what not, so if the margin dropped... To me, it sounds as though you'd be double-dipping. You'd want your margin to be up, but if there was a loss in production, you'd also want that to be there.

I guess that's my second question.

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Couture: We're asking for support of $20 to $40 a tonne. Now, in Quebec, in view of our production costs, we'd have to get a price of approximately $185 to $190 a tonne in order to live off our grain production. The market revenues are $140 a tonne. The increase in federal government support would raise our margin to $160 or $165 a tonne. Our insurance programs will have to make up the difference so that we can get a price of $185. So we won't have too much money; we'll simply cover a portion of the grain production cost. Not everything will be covered by the increased margins; it will just be the difference with U.S. subsidies. The purpose is not to cover production costs, but to obtain equivalent support from both federal governments for grain production.

The crop insurance program will always be something other than a price problem. The crop insurance program covers crop replacement where climatic conditions have prevented the producer from harvesting. It applies where the producer has taken the necessary care to obtain the best possible yield, but where the climate has not been on his side. The crop insurance program thus serves to replace a harvest where the harvest has been damaged.

[English]

Hon. Mark Eyking: You mentioned your costs of $180 and your revenues of $140, with $40 being the average spread. Now, are you talking overall, about all the different grains? Are you talking about barley, oats, and wheat, or is it just an average figure for all grains in Quebec? I imagine you're selling some barley to beer growers and you're selling wheat to poultry growers. Is this a ballpark figure for all grains produced in all parts of Quebec? Is it certain grains to certain parts? Where does that figure come from that you're losing $40 on a tonne?

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Couture: We lose $40 on the production of grain corn, which is the main crop in terms of tonnes in Quebec. We produce virtually no grains used in beer production. Those grains come from western Canada. In Quebec, we don't have the necessary climate to produce the grains used in beer production. We have disease problems. We could produce them, but we rarely have a product of sufficient quality. The price difference can mainly be seen in the case of corn. In the case of small grains, the gap is even greater between the market price and production cost. When I say small grains, I mean barley, oats and wheat.

º (1650)

[English]

Hon. Mark Eyking: My last question: how many acres of those grains that are in jeopardy do you grow right now in Quebec, and if things stay status quo, in five years time how many acres do you think you're going to be growing there?

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Couture: We have approximately 900,000 hectares of grain production in Quebec. You have to multiply by 2.5 to get the equivalent in acres. If we don't get enough income within four or five years, how many acres will be left? My impression is that the acres will continue to be cultivated, but not by agricultural producers. They'll be cultivated by farm workers, and large companies will finance field planting operations and sell the harvests instead of the producers who are there now.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Eyking.

If Mr. Bigras will allow, I'm going to have you tell us, if you could, how the cost of production is arrived at. We know the cost of fertilizer per tonne is an established cost. Your fuel cost, your machinery cost... What about land amortization, capitalization of land? Where does your land fit into the equation? What are you charging against land, and are land values going up, are they staying constant, or have they come down?

You have to have a formula. It's based on something. I presume it's probably province-wide, or is it regionalized in your cost-of-production formulas?

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Couture: We conducted a survey of 100 producers and calculated their total costs and average costs for the 100 farms by crop, which gave us the production cost of each agricultural commodity. We do the same for livestock production in Quebec. We do a survey of 100 farms that have produced in a given year, and we gather all the figures. We ask them for their expenses on diesel fuel, pesticides and so on, and we divide that by the number of tonnes of grain produced, which gives us the production cost for each agricultural commodity.

[English]

The Chair: Does that include taxes and interest on mortgages? What does it include? Does it include that part of it?

[Translation]

Mr. Benoit Legault: Overhead includes depreciation of equipment and machinery. For the land, there aren't really any costs, apart from interest that is part of the financing costs of that land. Of course, there are rental costs. In Quebec, approximately 30% of lands are leased. These costs are part of variable costs. As you said, that includes tax costs and miscellaneous costs, which are more fixed than variable, based on areas.

[English]

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. Bigras, you have five minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. Bernard Bigras: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'm going to share my five minutes with my colleague Louis Plamondon. My question is for Mr. Couture and Mr. Legault.

It has been observed that fewer GMOs are used in Quebec than in the rest of Canada. I have figures, and you'll correct me if I'm wrong: only 31% of Quebec corn is genetically modified; only 28% of soya is genetically modified, and that's limited to six regions; 65% of canola is genetically modified, but that's a fairly marginal crop since it's grown on only 7,500 hectares and is limited to a single region.

In view of its particular nature, doesn't Quebec have a comparative advantage in their national trade, regardless of whether we're talking about a stricter biosafety policy, the Cartagena Protocol or a labelling policy? Wouldn't our particular characteristics enable us to gain access to foreign markets which, as experience shows us, increasingly demand food safety? Does Quebec have a comparative advantage in that regard?

Mr. Denis Couture: What concerns us the most are crop seeds. Most crop seeds offered to us come from large American companies. If we were told tomorrow morning that we were no longer using those seeds, who would supply us with high-quality seeds that would meet the disease and production requirements we have in Quebec?

If we're guaranteed that money will be invested so that we can supply ourselves with seeds of the same quality, perhaps we can do what you say. But since we don't have that guarantee, as we told you earlier, and since the Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food has reduced its support for agriculture from $6.1 billion to $2.1 billion, who's going to take the place of those large companies and replace our seeds or do the research that will enable us to stay competitive?

We can't allow ourselves to regress 10 or 15 years because we've decided to stay home, whereas everyone around us is going to do something else. That's why we have a little more difficulty.

If we're assured that major investments will be made to enable us to regain our competitive edge, I think we'll be able to head in that direction. As producers, however, we have to have that guarantee.

º (1655)

[English]

Mr. Cam Dahl: Just to quickly add a small point as well, I think the Quebec and Ontario soybean markets, which very effectively deliver GM seeds into the crushing market as well as non-GM into the food and Japanese markets, is a shining example of what can be accomplished in a marketing system and marketing structures that have reasonable tolerance levels and reasonable guarantees.

Our concern is that things like the prototype don't necessarily fit into the qualification of reasonable.

[Translation]

Mr. Louis Plamondon: I'm very pleased to have suggested that the Quebec section come and submit its complaints here. I realize that your viewpoint is news to a number of members around this table.

After you visited the Quebec members to increase their awareness, I asked the question in the House, and the Parliamentary Secretary answered it. You can see that he answered without any knowledge of the file: he said there were programs and that they were sufficient.

When the minister appeared here, he also seemed to give the same kind of answer. He said that there were programs, that the new policy framework would correct the deficiencies, that the pieces would fall back into place within a year and that you would have enough support.

However, we realize that the situation you describe is particularly dramatic. As you said, it will take three years to be settled, and you can't even pay your insurance today.

In your brief, you cite a letter signed by Mr. Speller following the consultations in which he said:

Unless these problems are resolved with haste, we risk seriously harming our relationship with the agriculture and agri-food industry. Immediate actions would turn this situation around, and would show Canadians that governments really do listen to the suggestions made by industry stakeholders.

It was Mr. Speller who said that and who signed that letter. You've had no news since then.

I'm concerned because an election is coming. This could be postponed for two months. Will the minister be the same after the election? Will we have to explain the matter again? Do you want our committee to take quick steps with the Canadian government, mainly with the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food?

We can send a letter and recommendations, of course. Have you planned any action in addition to your visit to the members from Quebec and this visit to the committee?

Mr. Denis Couture: As we mentioned in our report, our first choice would be for the Canadian government to decree a sufficient margin to enable us to live starting in 2003. Agricultural producers have not yet completed their CAISP assistance application form for 2003, which ended on December 31. If they completed their applications in accordance with the present regulations, grain growers would draw very little money.

Consequently, we want the government to take quick action by amending the CAISP regulations so as to enable growers to increase their reference margin based on U.S. subsidies and to trigger the program starting in 2003.

If we wait for the review that's been promised to us for next year, we probably won't get the increase until 2005, 2006 and perhaps 2007, if we're lucky. We can't wait that long. The government must absolutely act immediately. If it's afraid of making a mistake, it can reamend its regulations at the appropriate time to make them better, but it must act quickly in order to give growers hope and to enable them to plant their lands and to tell the banks that the program will meet their needs and offset the revenue shortfall.

» (1700)

[English]

The Chair: Your time has expired; in fact, I gave you a lot more time.

Mr. Barrette, for five minutes, if you wish to take that.

[Translation]

Mr. Gilbert Barrette (Témiscamingue, Lib.): I'm going to share my time with my neighbour.

I'm not going to start a polemic, but simply say that, two days ago, we heard from representatives from Agriculture Canada and that, according to the WTO negotiator, prices are fixed on a world scale. You said earlier that it was the Americans who did that.

Mr. Denis Couture: In general, since corn is our main crop, we set its price based on the Chicago exchange. The Europeans are also in competition with us. We then establish references based on that crop.

[English]

Mr. Cam Dahl: It is the global market that sets the prices.

[Translation]

Mr. Gilbert Barrette: I also asked the question concerning the letter containing a number of arguments that our visitors put before us. I don't imagine you meet them often or that they are aware of these issues, but they nevertheless do not seem to know that we had received that letter. They didn't really seem aware of its content. That surprised me somewhat. And yet I'm convinced that you sometimes talk to them about these questions.

Mr. Denis Couture: In fact, we submitted our main demands to former Minister Vanclief. However, we changed ministers, and I think it's normal for the new officials to be less aware of those demands. Obviously some information should be passed on.

As I told you, everyone who works for Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada across Quebec is aware of the demands concerning what the federation can do in Quebec. I think Cam Dahl is responsible for the matter on a Canada-wide basis. He could tell you more about that.

Mr. Gilbert Barrette: From what I understand, you haven't met those people recently to outline the problems you're facing as growers. Is that correct?

Mr. Denis Couture: I don't know who represented Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada nationally. I don't know the names. I can't say whether I met them or not.

Mr. Gilbert Barrette: Who was the negotiator?

Mr. Louis Plamondon: They were senior officials from Agriculture Canada. They necessarily didn't know that you had visited us. When demands are submitted to us, it's up to us, the politicians, to inform them of them.

The WTO negotiator, a representative of Environment Canada and a deputy minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada were present.

Mr. Gilbert Barrette: You haven't met them recently. Otherwise, I would have asked you what their reaction was to your observations, to your comments, in short, to your experience.

Mr. Denis Couture: Charles Cantin, who is the senior advisor to Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada for Quebec, is the person with whom we discussed the problems we're facing. He's well informed of the grain growers situation. And he took it upon himself to make contact with the officials of the Department of Agriculture.

I don't have any direct contact with them, but I do with the people who represent Quebec.

Mr. Gilbert Barrette: I'm asking myself a question. I know people at home who were dairy producers and who became grain growers. When you know what goes on in that sector, you wonder what could have led them to opt for that form of production.

Mr. Denis Couture: It's normal, we see it in a lot of places. A producer who milks cows morning, noon and night until the age of 50, who's attached to his farm and wants to stay there, but has no one to take over, won't abandon his land. In those conditions, he'll opt for a form of production that requires a little less of his time and that gives him a little more freedom. He'll decide to grow grain because it's virtually all he can do with his land if he doesn't want to abandon it.

It's not necessarily profitable, but he wants to continue cultivating his land. He has worked and earned a living for a long time, and he wants to stay on his land.

» (1705)

Mr. Gilbert Barrette: I'm going to hand over to my colleague.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Eyking, one question, for half a minute.

Hon. Mark Eyking: First of all, you not only have to mention Minister Speller's comment, but I think you've got to put it in context. It was not just about the grain growers, but I think that it was also about a lot of non-supply-management crops.

First of all, the CAIS program is under review after every year. I guess my question is did you receive any money for the $1 billion package that we put out? Are you eligible to receive any of the package that the Prime Minister announced a month ago? And all of those subsidies you were getting for grain between 1984 and 1990 or whatever, were they from the Quebec government or the federal government?

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Couture: No money has yet been paid to growers for 2003 out of CAISP, the new program under the agricultural policy framework. We're receiving our forms, filing applications and calculating our production margins. Growers are being asked to get out their tax returns for the past five years in order to determine their production margins. The work is still in the accountants' hands. Once the production margin is known for each farmer, we'll see what happens in 2003. If the program starts, there will probably be a payment later in the fall, we're told. We may even have to wait until December before receiving the first payments for 2003.

[English]

The Chair: That's it for Mr. Eyking for the moment.

Mr. Proctor, five minutes.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Thank you very much.

Cam, to go back to you, you make it pretty clear in your document—although you put it in the form of a question—that on export state trading enterprises, you think that Canada should change its position at the WTO in exchange for key liberalization concessions.

The other one that Canada is sticking with in the WTO negotiations—at least to this point, so far as we're aware—is supply management. So let me ask you if the Canadian Grain Growers think that we need to change our position on supply management.

Mr. Cam Dahl: It has always been the position of the Grain Growers that we do not believe we should be trading off one sector for another.

Does that answer your question? That is our position.

Mr. Dick Proctor: So you think that we need to re-examine our position on the Canadian Wheat Board?

Mr. Cam Dahl: I wasn't specifically focusing on STEs.

Mr. Dick Proctor: I know.

Mr. Cam Dahl: The reason I included those examples in the brief is that those are issues in the negotiating position that are directly related to the grain sector.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Right.

Mr. Cam Dahl: Those are the areas we want to focus on.

In addition to STEs, there is also this disaggregation question and the de minimis question. Again, we didn't want to prescribe the answer to that question. I know that we do have a position as the Grain Growers on the domestic issue of the Canadian Wheat Board, but we do feel that it is time on some of those questions to ask policy-makers and to have policy-makers ask the question, “Is it time to revisit our position?”

Mr. Dick Proctor: But just so that I'm clear on your position, are you talking about state trading enterprises, and not supply management?

Mr. Cam Dahl: Yes.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Mr. Darier, we haven't laid a glove on you this afternoon yet. I just wanted to ask you a couple of questions.

What do you think the impact will be... There were six points in your brief. Point number one was “Immediately announce a moratorium on GMOs in agriculture in Canada” What would the impact be of that?

A few minutes ago, folks were talking about canola in the province of Quebec. Of course, in western Canada it's a whole different operation. What do you think the impact would be if that were to happen?

Mr. Éric Darier: I think the first impact would be to send a message internationally that Canada is taking seriously biosafety and is willing to re-examine its policy regarding GMOs. I think that would be the first thing.

Secondly, I think that when we talk about a moratorium, obviously there would have to be a transition and a promise to get enough non-GE seeds to do that transition anyway.

But I think more importantly, the government and the public need a broad public debate on whether we went too fast or too far down the GE road. Therefore, we need that space to have that debate, because we don't want to go down the road of GMOs and find within a couple of years that all of the external markets are closed. I think that the reason why the GE wheat growers are so concerned is that it could be a disaster down the road commercially, let alone in terms of biosafety. This is a deep concern. It's why we should make sure today at this committee that the committee raise the alarm bell with government to say “Listen, things have changed. For the past five years, the international market doesn't want GE.” That's quite clear. Even our consumers don't want GE. Even the U.S. consumers, when you ask them the proper questions, actually don't want it either.

So I think that we should face reality. The future of agriculture is to be able to sell what consumers want, and I think that farmers in this country want to be able to produce things that have a future.

» (1710)

Mr. Cam Dahl: I won't comment in general, but I would like to comment on what some of the environmental impacts might be. I'll take Saskatchewan as a prime example.

The introduction of GE canola, or GM canola, and herbicide-tolerant crops has allowed farmers in Saskatchewan to shift out of the use of summer fallow to zero-till agriculture. That would not have occurred without the introduction of herbicide-tolerant crops. I would hate to think what western Canada, and Saskatchewan in particular, would have looked like in the droughts of the last number of years if we had not moved to a zero-till cropping rotation, which herbicide-tolerant crops have allowed us to do.

The Chair: Mr. Couture.

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Couture: I think the purpose of introducing GMOs was to solve a problem. Canadian agricultural producers have been asked to use fewer pesticides, and they tried to obtain more disease-resistant and herbicide-tolerant plants from the major companies. I think that GMOs solved this problem in part. It's true that the public has trouble accepting the term itself, but the result is that we have plants that defend themselves better. We understand that that's not accepted. I think it's the same in medicine. Today, in an attempt to cure disease, medicine is forced to find better tools and we want to invent new drugs more quickly in order to obtain better solutions to various problems.

Earlier we heard that we should take the time to ensure that these new technologies won't have any negative impact on biosafety, but they shouldn't all be rejected.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Darier, do you want to comment?

[Translation]

M. Éric Darier: In the case of GMOs, in Quebec in particular, we have Bt corn, the main characteristic of which is that a pesticide has been introduced into the plant itself. You have to watch out when they say they've reduced the use of herbicides and pesticides. It's not because they're no longer spraying the plants that they're not using pesticides.

You have to take an overview. You have to examine the use of GMOs, not only in the first years, but also over the long term. One of the reasons why GMO wheat was rejected in the Prairies is that its resistance to a herbicide, the one used for canola and soya, causes problems for farmers, particularly in crop rotation from year to year.

[English]

The Chair: Ms. Ur.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: Mr. Couture, are the grain growers in Quebec part of Grain Growers of Canada, the umbrella organization?

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Couture: Yes, and one of our members has been vice-president of the Grain Growers of Canada since last fall.

[English]

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: I think you've done very well joining forces under one umbrella. You've come to committee with a stronger voice, and I appreciate that.

You're not going to get off too easy, Mr. Darier, because I have a few questions. I've saved the best for last.

Do you really believe that GMOs aren't being looked at in other countries, and Canada is going to sit back and wait until everyone is forthright? If you're suggesting that in some of your statements, I think you're dreaming in technicolor here.

I want to put it on the record that farmers were environmentalists before it was ever cute to be called an environmentalist in the country. They live on the land. They earn their money from the land. So it is a real concern when I hear some statements being made—especially when you mentioned mad cow and GMOs in the same breath in your opening statement. That's comparing apples and cabbages, not apples and oranges. So I think it's really important to keep that in mind. I almost feel that there's a little bit of fear-mongering here on GMOs.

My one question to you is, how many people at Greenpeace have agricultural backgrounds to give you expert advice?

» (1715)

Mr. Éric Darier: First of all, thank you for raising those questions. If I could just answer the last one, we do have access. As I said, we are present in 40 countries. We have scientists with us, and lots of documents are produced by some of our experts on sustainable agriculture. So we do have that expertise.

My introductory statement was to illustrate that if the government carries on with this policy on agriculture, you could end up with the kind of disaster that happened with mad cow.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: Mad cow has nothing to do with GMOs, sir.

Mr. Éric Darier: No. I'm trying to illustrate that—

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: But you can't illustrate prions in GMOs; they are two different things. I'm not a scientist, though.

Mr. Éric Darier: Well, I'm illustrating the risk of adopting a GE policy. If you get it wrong, if something goes wrong down the line, you can end up with policy issues and problems similar to those we're all having to face now in the case of mad cow.

Another thing that is important to remember is that out in the world there are only really three countries who produce the overwhelming majority of GMOs: the U.S., Canada, and Argentina. There's very little market out there for GE products. In fact, over time I think there has been a closing off of those markets because consumers don't want the product. So the real problem for Canadian agriculture—for the government specifically, not so much for the farmers—is does it carry on trying to sell products nobody wants?

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: I think what we have to look at is just the way it's being sold. We have been very fortunate here in Canada that we haven't gone hungry too often because of the good Canadian farmers and the quality of food we produce. Not all people around the world have had the same experience, and with the increase of world population some of those people may have to look at how to improve the capacity to increase the amount of food produced.

I think it's imperative that we all sing from the same hymn book on this and base our thinking on scientific information, not on some grandiose idea someone's cooked up to say that we're trying to eradicate the world by putting GMOs on the table for our consumers. I think that's far from being correct.

Mr. Éric Darier: In that case, because we're running out of time, I will give to the committee two documents we produced about issues of starvation and so forth. There are already lots of alternatives in the world. We've reviewed existing alternatives in about fifty countries that are already making a lot of differences in the world. We don't need GMOs--or pesticides, for that matter. That will give you an idea of what we're talking about.

Thank you.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: I have one last question. When you talk about pesticides, I have had experience with them. You say we don't need pesticides. I used to grow vegetables before I came to Ottawa, and we had this situation where the consumer only wanted beautiful white heads of cauliflower. Nobody wanted to see any of the green protein on a cauliflower that gets left behind by the remains of the little bugs. Consumers didn't want that either. The fact of the matter is, we had to put some kind of spray on that cauliflower or broccoli so consumers didn't get that extra protein with it.

People can't have it both ways here. You have to take into consideration that farmers want a good-quality product so they can make money to survive to put good food on the table for consumers.

Mr. Éric Darier: In terms of the huge growth in organic agriculture, I can only speak about Quebec, but I know lots of people who increasingly would rather have fruits and vegetables that are not perfect looking but that they know are healthier for them and better for the environment. And this is a world trend. Look at Europe in terms of the organic market. In Britain, it's growing every year. I think this is where things are going, for all sorts of reasons.

Mrs. Rose-Marie Ur: I think we're going to have to end by agreeing to disagree.

Thank you.

» (1720)

Mr. Éric Darier: Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

I'm going to insert a question or two here, continuing on with you, Mr. Darier.

How many of the 100,000 supporters you have are farmers?

Mr. Éric Darier: I don't have the statistics. I can't tell you that. There must be some. I know some farmers are members in Quebec. I don't know them all personally.

The Chair: What would happen if Mr. David Suzuki became an instant convert to the view that GMOs are good for people? And given that his testimony to whatever cause he puts his mind to carries a great deal of weight, what would happen if all of a sudden the world needed a great deal of crop tomorrow? What would be the demand on our food stocks tomorrow, if Mr. Suzuki had this kind of instant conversion for some reason?

Mr. Éric Darier: Well, I can't comment on Mr. Suzuki. He has his own organization. I would let him speak about this.

The Chair: Would you agree that the views of certain personalities—whether in entertainment or in sports—carry a great deal of weight with many people in terms of what kind of golf club they swing, what kind of a baseball bat they use, and what kinds of products they consume? These personalities have a huge influence on what people do.

We know there are GMOs and GEs. I would like you to explain to the group here what the difference is between a GE product and a GMO product.

Mr. Éric Darier: Do you want me to answer that last part, or do you want me to answer your general comments?

The Chair: No, I know what it is, but perhaps you would tell this group what it is.

Mr. Éric Darier: A GMO is a genetically modified organism, and GE, genetically engineered, is the same thing. The first is the noun, the other is the process.

The Chair: Well, I just can't for the life of me.... I mean, look at what's happening throughout the world. We talk about science, and about how everything ought to be science-based.

I've asked this question of others before, I'm going to ask it of you now, and I'm going to ask it of people in the future: Has anyone ever died because they consumed a GMO or GE product?

Mr. Éric Darier: I think you're going at it the wrong way. I think you should go and read again the Royal Society's report, which gives the federal government 51 recommendations. These were from 14 scientists, the best minds in the country. Some of them did the biotech research. They called their report Elements of Precaution precisely because there has to be a science base but also a precautionary base.

So just go and read the report, commissioned by the federal government, that was done by an independent body of scientists.

The Chair: If we exercised a total precautionary principle on medicines today, we wouldn't be consuming a single medicine.

Mr. Éric Darier: Well, the issue of the precautionary principle is not about having total certainty, but the safety is—

The Chair: No, but we should apply it all the way if we want to apply it, and we don't do that.

Mr. Éric Darier: We indeed should apply the precautionary principle. A lot of countries are trying to do this.

The Chair: At any rate, I needed to get you engaged. I wanted you to understand—

Mr. Éric Darier: Thank you very much. I appreciate this.

The Chair: —that we haven't died. We came here today to talk about the Cartagena protocol, which has to do with the very thing we're talking about.

Mr. Éric Darier: And the precautionary principle.

The Chair: These are very reasoned arguments being made, and I can tell you, on behalf of the government and on behalf of all members here, we're not about to sell out—whether it's GE wheat or whatever it is—in a time and period when we have not assured ourselves that we can have segregation or that we can also, at the same time, maintain markets that we have built throughout the world.

I'm sorry, I've engaged too much of your time.

I'm going to give you a very short one, Mr. Plamondon.

[Translation]

Mr. Louis Plamondon: I have to say that I buy my best seed from U.S. companies. If there's a place that can supply me with seed that's as good, in theory, I don't see any objection to using it. Mr. Darier, do you have a place to suggest to him where he can buy his seed?

M. Éric Darier: I don't think it's likely a lack of seed. It's simply the fact that, in agriculture in Canada, there's a very large concentration among businesses that control inputs. Some of those businesses, including Monsanto and its affiliates, control an enormous amount of the seed market. So the agricultural world is put in a position of dependence on certain major businesses; technological choices are made that weren't perhaps the best choices from the scientific standpoint and we say to ourselves now that there are no alternative solutions.

There have also been a lot of budget cuts in public agricultural research for the past 15 or 20 years. I think it would be healthy for farmers and for the future of agriculture for there to be alternatives and for the future of agriculture not to be left in the hands of a few businesses.

» (1725)

[English]

The Chair: Do you want to respond as well, Mr. Couture?

[Translation]

Mr. Louis Plamondon: Would you like to add anything, sir?

Mr. Denis Couture: As you know, we're now experiencing the phenomenon of globalization. The multinationals aren't just Monsanto and the other seed producers. There are large multinationals virtually everywhere, in retail and many other areas. We can't just attack those doing business with the agricultural world and leave the others alone. The multinationals are everywhere: McDonald's, Price Club and so on. They're in all industries. There aren't 25 brand names in the automobile industry. There are only a few, but we have major car manufacturers. They aren't just in the agri-food world: they're everywhere.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Epp.

Mr. Ken Epp: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You actually touched a bit on one of my questions for the representative from Greenpeace, and that was on the science that's involved.

Maybe you can't answer the question in its entirety here, but you could send me something that would illustrate and convince me that you are using scientifically accepted methods. I would like to know about your protocol and the labs or whatever you use to determine that food is genetically modified.

When I looked at your little booklet here, which uses an unhappy face to red-flag foods, I was totally shocked and saddened to see that my favourite New England clam chowder was indicated with a face like that instead of like this, and yet every time I eat it, it makes me look like this.

So I'd like to know, on what scientific basis have you red-listed my favourite New England clam chowder?

Mr. Éric Darier: I'm delighted you're asking this question, because in fact it's what a lot of Canadians want to know, where the GMOs are in their food. Some 40 countries now have mandatory labelling, so at least their governments decided to use labels. In Canada, the government favours voluntary labelling, which means that only companies who want to do it will do so.

So in terms of your question, you won't get an answer, because the government doesn't want you to get that answer. We at Greenpeace have provided a service to Canadians by making this guide. We wrote to companies and asked them to tell us if their food contained GMOs or not. We also told them that should they not respond to us, anything that contained corn, soya, or any of their derivatives would actually be listed on the red list.

Mr. Ken Epp: So we don't know whether this clam chowder is good for me or not. Judging by the taste, it's very good for me.

Mr. Éric Darier: Maybe you can ask the company.

Health Canada actually said that 70% of processed food in the country contains, or may contain, GMOs. I think that's a good indication.

Mr. Ken Epp: In other words, this may contain GMOs, but it doesn't necessarily.

Mr. Éric Darier: That's right.

The Chair: We'll have to cut it there.

That was a very unsettling question, because I had clam chowder for dinner. I may have to see a doctor yet tonight.

Mr. Proctor, for the last word.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Just on the business of mandatory labelling, Éric, every public opinion poll has Canadians, something in the 90% range, saying yes, we would favour mandatory labelling. The government hasn't done it, and it doesn't look like it's going to do so anytime soon.

What is Greenpeace's view on that? I know you support mandatory labelling, but do you see this changing? And what is happening in some other countries?

Mr. Éric Darier: I think the pressure internationally is there. As I said, some 40 countries are in the process of putting in mandatory labelling. I think the pressure internationally is going to increase. It's not going to go away.

At Greenpeace we're pleased to be on the side of the 90% of Canadians who want labelling. We hope this government, or another government, will actually do what Canadians want. It's rare to find a topic in politics that has the support of 90% of the population, so one would think that one would do it. If people don't care what's in their food, well, they don't have to read the label, but some of us do care.

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Mr. Dick Proctor: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, gentlemen, for appearing. You've given us a very interesting afternoon. Some points were very enlightening. However, there are still some unanswered questions, so we may have to bring you back another time. Again, thank you.

The meeting stands adjourned to the call of the chair.