NDVA Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, April 1, 2003

¿

0910

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.))

Lieutenant-General M.K. Jeffery (Chief of the Land Staff, Department of National Defence)

¿

0915

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance)

LGen M.K. Jeffery

¿

0920

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen M.K. Jeffery

¿

0925

The Chair

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.)

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. David Price

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. David Price

¿

0930

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. David Price

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

LGen M.K. Jeffery

¿

0935

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen M.K. Jeffery

¿

0940

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.)

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Joe McGuire

LGen M.K. Jeffery

¿

0945

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance)

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen M.K. Jeffery

¿

0950

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. David Price

LGen M.K. Jeffery

¿

0955

Mr. David Price

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Claude Bachand

À

1000

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire

À

1005

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Miss Deborah Grey (Edmonton North, Canadian Alliance)

LGen M.K. Jeffery

À

1010

Miss Deborah Grey

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Miss Deborah Grey

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Miss Deborah Grey

À

1015

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Miss Deborah Grey

The Chair

Mr. David Price

LGen M.K. Jeffery

À

1020

Mr. David Price

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen M.K. Jeffery

À

1025

The Chair

Mr. David Price

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. David Price

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. David Price

LGen M.K. Jeffery

À

1030

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen M.K. Jeffery

À

1035

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

LGen M.K. Jeffery

À

1040

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen M.K. Jeffery

À

1045

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

LGen M.K. Jeffery

À

1050

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen M.K. Jeffery

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen M.K. Jeffery

À

1055

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

LGen M.K. Jeffery

The Chair

Á

1100

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

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NUMBER 018

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, April 1, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿  (0910)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I've been advised by the clerk that we do in fact have enough members in the room for quorum, so we'll get started as quickly as possible.

    On behalf of the committee, it's my pleasure to welcome Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffery to the committee. He is Chief of the Land Staff and certainly no stranger to this committee, having appeared on many occasions.

    General, on behalf of the committee, welcome. We're very much looking forward to your comments on Canada–U.S. defence relations.

    If I could, I would advise members of the committee as well that I'd like to take a little bit of time at the end of this meeting to talk about some important issues of committee business.

    With that, General, you have the floor.

    Lieutenant-General M.K. Jeffery (Chief of the Land Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you, Mr. Chair. It's a pleasure to be back before the committee. If I may, I'd like to take a few moments to provide you with a perspective on Canada–U.S. defence cooperation from a land force point of view. You will appreciate that you have heard many witnesses who have addressed much of the subject, so I'll try to keep my remarks brief and rely on your questions to focus on your areas of greatest interest.

    In addressing this subject, I would emphasize that given my responsibilities as a force generator, I am primarily concerned with the development of land forces and the creation of conditions for success, while the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff is responsible for operational planning and command and control of operations, including domestic operations. Having said that, I'll try to cover a swath to ensure that you have a good understanding of the army perspective.

    The essence of military cooperation is an achievement of interoperability between two forces. Interoperability relates to the capacity of allied forces to operate together effectively in the execution of their missions and tasks. It involves a broad range of aspects, including command and control, and particularly the development of agreed plans and means of coordinating issues; understanding of and agreement to doctrine and procedures; standardization of those technical areas critical to interoperating; and periodic training to develop and confirm the ability to actually work together.

    Interoperability is equally important in the domestic and international forums, but most of our army-to-army interoperability has tended to focus on the international aspects. A major component of interoperability and standardization planning is done in multinational venues that include the United States. Indeed, I believe Kenneth Calder addressed a number of those aspects when he appeared before the committee.

    Interoperability is not only a continental concern, but affects all operations where we may work with other nations, whether they are traditional allies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or countries we may work with in such organizations as the United Nations. Our allies are equally concerned with interoperability. As such, both NATO and what we refer to as the ABCAArmies' Standardization Program—that is, the American, British, Canadian, and Australian—have well-established and extensive standardization or interoperability programs.

    Our army is extensively involved—as is the U.S. military—in over 25 active working groups and numerous subcommittees and specialist panels within these programs. Products include standardization agreements, including both matériels and interoperability, and non-matériel areas of doctrine, tactics, training, tactical and procedural publications, equipment loans, interoperability guides, information sharing, and the sharing of lessons learned both in training and operations.

    The primary forum for army-to-army cooperation is Canadian–U.S. army staff talks. These annual talks serve as a means of identifying interoperability issues, sharing information, and facilitating cooperation and collaboration. The most recent meetings focused on command and control interoperability, and our principal collaboration on doctrinal development relates to digitization, command and control, and what we refer to as ISTAR, or Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance. There's also agreement to share information on homeland defence, and action is underway to produce a matrix of venues or activities for army-to-army cooperation in this area.

    Separate from the regular staff talks, there is also a Canada–U.S. Army reserve officers' conference. This allows a better understanding of each nation's army reserve capabilities and advances individual and collective training initiatives.

    Despite all the plans and interoperability agreements, training is vital to developing and confirming the ability to actually work together. Given the proximity of Canadian and U.S. facilities, low levels of training go on across the border on an ongoing basis. The Canadian and U.S. armies routinely use each other's training areas and facilities, and as many as 7,000 regular and reserve Canadian personnel train at U.S. training facilities annually. In addition, there are a variety of small unit exchanges. These are predominantly at the tactical level, providing exposure of personnel at sub-unit and below to doctrinal and operational procedures, along with the equipments of each other's armies. These mutual exchanges ensure that the experience, professional knowledge, and doctrine of both parties are shared for maximum mutual benefit and ultimately enhance their ability to interoperate.

    Higher-level training is conducted through a variety of fora, principally under the joint combined training program. The principal army focus is on a biennial ABCA exercise and periodic joint seminars, the most recent having been conducted last year in Kingston. This exercise, which was a combined interoperability demonstrator, or CID, entitled CID Borealis, addressed the technical aspects of digitized command and control interoperability. It was a major step forward in Canada–U.S. army technical interoperability. The next step is the next exercise, which is planned for 2004 and is to be hosted by the United States. It will likely include a division-level command post exercise, and also focus on command and control.

    In addition, the army, on occasion, participates in other joint and combined exercises such as Exercise Marcot, which is an annual exercise involving the U.S. and Canadian navies, the air force, the U.S. Marine Corps, and our Canadian Joint Task Force Headquarters.

    Of course, planning for interoperability and achieving it are two different things. I believe the recent highly successful deployment to Afghanistan is a testament to our interoperability efforts. The ability of the Operation Apollo battle group to fit seamlessly into the U.S. forces is indicative that, in most interoperability areas, we can make it work. It is this same interoperability that will be key in our cooperative security agreements here in Canada.

    With respect to Canada–U.S. army interoperability within North America, planning has historically focused on the high-end requirements of conventional operations, and predominantly this is back to the time of the Cold War. This is understandably being revisited, and a framework is being developed to guide cooperation for all potential operations. However, given the civil natures of initial response in both nations and the realities of geography, the likelihood of major army-to-army combined operations on the North American land mass is not high. Such plans will therefore be general in nature and provide the agreed modalities for nation-to-nation cooperation, rather than detailed operational plans. Our challenge is to ensure that when that day comes, the two armies can work together effectively.

    Mr. Chairman, I hope that provides at least some insight into the nature of current land operational plans and the extent of activities underway to ensure interoperability between the Canadian and U.S. armies. From an army-to-army perspective, we have good tactical and operational interoperability and good cooperation, but continued effort is essential to maintain that level. The extensive transformation envisaged by the U.S. Army in particular as it exploits technology in the future could very well serve to make interoperability much more problematic.

    With respect to potential cooperation on domestic operations, land force responsibilities are unlikely to change appreciably, but we can expect clarity on this issue with the work being done by the Binational Planning Group. However, as the forces of last resort, both the U.S. and Canadian armies' priorities are to be prepared to interoperate if called upon to do so as part of a national domestic response.

    Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks. I'm certainly more than prepared to try to answer any questions the committee may have.

¿  (0915)  

    The Chair: Thank you very much, General.

    We'll start with our regular seven-minute round, beginning with Mr. Benoit.

    Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you again for being here today, General. I want to congratulate you on a remarkable career. You will be retiring very soon; the change of command is in May, I understand. I just truly want to congratulate you for presenting some very forward-looking ideas. I think you did a marvellous job of running the army in the last few years, and I want to congratulate you for that.

    I hope we can get into some of the forward-looking ideas you have presented in a while, but I want to start by asking you about something that was reported in the paper today. I read that ten of our fourteen liaison officers at U.S. Central Command in Qatar have left or have been asked by the government to leave. I would like you to tell me what you can about that, and whether what's happened in the past couple of months between Canada and the U.S. has strained operations like that.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: First, Mr. Benoit, thank you for the kind words, but I would like to emphasize that from my vantage point, the work is far from done. I think what we have been able to do within the army over the last couple of years is a positive step forward, but there are many more ahead, and I certainly look to my successor, General Rick Hillier, to carry on that work.

    You actually have me at somewhat of a disadvantage. I did not see the article to which you refer. Certainly the level of staff activity at all of the coalition headquarters where we have staff and liaison officers is something that is changing on a regular basis. I would suggest to you that as our areas of involvement change, it is not surprising that our involvement in planning of specific operations or indeed even in getting information on specific operations changes. Thus, the reduction in liaison officers in that coalition headquarters.

    I cannot address the specifics of that. Those issues are managed by the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, and to be very honest with you, I'm not clear on what the actual magnitude of the changes is or about the timing of those changes. I was aware that some were going on, but I cannot confirm the veracity of the article to which you refer.

¿  (0920)  

    Mr. Leon Benoit: I understand the Canadian involvement in Qatar, at U.S. Central Command, was planned sometime ago, long before we knew there would be war in Iraq. Could you tell me a little bit about that operation, and why Canadians were in Qatar? What was their role? What are they there to do?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: I believe the committee is well aware that, as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, the war against terrorism, we have had forces committed for a good length of time. The principal headquarters for that was in Tampa. CENTCOM headquarters is where we have our commander for Joint Task Force South West Asia. That person is a Canadian one-star brigadier-general or commodore. Currently, Brigadier-General Angus Watt has been providing that command and control.

    Bear in mind that Canada had not committed to or made a decision on its involvement in any potential conflict in Iraq when the decision was taken by CENTCOM to forward-deploy the headquarters into Qatar as part of the ongoing military operation. When the decision was taken, then with the agreement of the Americans, it was decided that we would have a liaison staff at that headquarters to ensure that, should Canada decide to participate with the U.S. and others in Iraq, we would be able to maintain a relatively seamless military involvement.

    Now that the government has made its decision, understandably the need for that liaison staff, and perhaps even the presence of that large staff, is indeed an issue in question from a coalition point of view. I honestly do not know what the end state is. My understanding was that we would maintain some but not all of those who were deployed.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: How many Canadian army personnel on exchange programs are in Iraq or in the area of Iraq right now?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: I honestly cannot answer the specific question. As the minister has said publicly, we have 31 Canadian Forces exchange and liaison officers in the CENTCOM area of operations. We don't track where all of them are on a day-to-day basis. Certainly the DCDS keeps a fairly good tab on them, as he must, but I honestly couldn't tell you precisely what army people are there at any one time.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Of these 10 of 14 liaison officers who have left, were they part of the group of 31 who were considered to be on exchange programs with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: No.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you. That was my understanding, so I just wanted to clarify that.

    In terms of the operation in Afghanistan in the summer, has the question of how many Canadian troops will be going been settled?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: No. As the government has announced, the plan is for a brigade headquarters, a battle group, and staff at the ISAF headquarters, the International Security Assistance Force headquarters. As we speak, the recce team is in fact en route back from Kabul. They are due to arrive in Ottawa tonight, I believe, and we'll be engaging in discussions with them over the next few days as they brief us on what they found in theatre.

    We are working on a planning basis of about 1,500 troops, but that could be slightly higher or slightly lower depending on the specifics. As you would understand, the challenge is to do it within what the government has directed in terms of overall intent. I need to manage and the Chief of the Defence Staff needs to manage an overall force package that makes sense in terms of being able to do the mission. Equally importantly, however, it has to have sufficient capacity to ensure the force protection of our people while they're there. It's that delicate balance that we're trying to achieve.

¿  (0925)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

    Mr. Price, for seven minutes.

    Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you for being here, General. I, too, want to echo that we're going to miss you. It has been interesting to have somebody who does think outside the box and is willing to be a little more controversial. I think it's interesting, and it has added a lot.

    I come from a small town called Lennoxville. It's rather unique in the sense that it's one of the few places in Canada that has what they call a diamond. Our two national railways criss-cross right in town, and we've had a couple of derailments. In fact, we had one there recently—last weekend, actually.

    You'll find that this is going in a strange direction, but you'll see why.

    On the weekend, I was down taking a look at the trains that were off the track, derailed. A lot of people were around, and all of a sudden, we had a train coming up the track coming up from Halifax. People got a little nervous. They thought we were being invaded, because there were probably roughly a hundred British armoured vehicles on that train that was heading through.

    I have couple of questions. First, where would they be going? I'm sure it was an exchange program of some kind.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: I accept that they were British armoured vehicles, but they could also be Canadian, and I'll explain why. On the basis that you said they were British, we have had an agreement or a memorandum of understanding with the British Army for a good number of years. It's in excess of twenty years, although I can't give you the exact date off the top of my head. As part of our overall burden-sharing, we have allowed other nations to train in Canada. You'll recall that we had the Germans training in Shilo, Manitoba, for many years, and we've had NATO air forces training in Goose Bay.

    The British Army has had a major training unit in Suffield, Alberta, one of our largest training areas, and they still continue to maintain that. Indeed, it is a key part of their operational readiness program because of the difficulty of training at the level they require in the constrained or confined trained areas in the United Kingdom. Their highest level of training is actually done in Canada, and that has continued right up to the present. Indeed, it's my understanding that it is the British Army's intention to continue that for the foreseeable future, and they periodically have to rotate their equipment for long-term maintenance purposes.

    You could also have seen a lot of Canadian army equipment moving as well, because we are assembling about a brigade's worth of troops and equipment in Wainwright, Alberta, right now, for the first brigade training event that we've done in a good number of years. As I've expressed to the committee before, we have concerns about the lack of collective training. We are finally getting back to that level. It's not all that we'd like, but given the resources and the tempo particularly, it's an important first step in the direction of maintaining regular collective training. So you're seeing two sets of movement all at the same time.

    If I can link those ideas, given the committee's interest in general defence cooperation, we certainly have explored in the past and will continue to explore opportunities for the Canadian and British forces to work together, and there may even be the opportunity to do it with our American allies as well, given the proximity of the United States.

    Mr. David Price: That was my next question. In a training operation like that with the Brits, would the Americans also be involved in the brigade-level training operations that you're going to be doing?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Again, it's a matter of opportunity. There will actually be a small level of American participation in our brigade training event, mostly U.S. Army reserves or National Guard. They're going to be providing us with a few helicopters and those kinds of things, which gives them an opportunity to train equally. Whether or not this could become a higher level of exercise in the longer term still remains to be seen. I would like to think it will, but both armies have to do a number of things before we can get there. But the opportunity is there.

    Mr. David Price: Just in passing, these vehicles were British. Some of them still had licence plates on them, most of them had a little British flag on the back, and they were fairly new. I was surprised at that, given that they're for training exercises. They even had a couple of tanks on the train.

    Would you happen to know how the Brits got that equipment here? Was it brought on their own ships?

¿  (0930)  

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: I honestly don't know. I have no idea.

    The Chair: You're not expected to know, General.

    Mr. David Price: You talked a lot about interoperability. Voice procedures in our communications between the Canadians and the Americans have been different over the years. I know there were a significant amount of differences awhile back. Are they much more interoperable now as far as the use of voice procedures and communications is concerned?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: The short answer is yes. I will say that no matter how well one writes procedural manuals and how well one achieves a level of agreement, every organization has a cultural norm within it that sometimes is difficult to break. Each army will have its own slight twist on what has been agreed to as the same procedure. I think that's understandable and natural. But within what I think is the realm of reasonable possibility, we have a similar if not identical approach.

    Having said that, I would suggest to you that, in this day and age, those kinds of communications are actually going the way of the dinosaur. That's not to suggest that there will not be actual voice communications from time to time, but in terms of large volumes of information, our communications are increasingly all done digitally. That's a higher level of difficulty, a higher degree of difficulty, and thus the reason for working very hard from an interoperability perspective.

    If I can draw you a picture, in the past, and certainly when I was a young officer, it was not unusual for me to be given the job of liaison officer and to go to work with one of our allies. The basic procedure was that you got their standard operating instructions for their communications, their codes, and so on, you got a map, and you got their plan marked on your map, and you became the conduit between the two commanders. That's how we would do a lot of the communication of information on any operation.

    The Chair: Thank you, General, Mr. Price. I'm sure we'll have an opportunity to get back to that.

[Translation]

    Mr. Bachand, you have seven minutes.

    Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I would also like to congratulate the general, this time in French, for a brilliant career which was also difficult. It was not an easy time to be a general in an army, as there were cuts and all that, but I am sure he did his best and managed quite well.

    In his presentation, he mentioned that the minister had said that there were approximately 31 people in Iraq, and it's true. Are you saying, General, that you do not know personally where these soldiers are, nor what they are doing? You referred to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, who, for his part, would know. As an army general, if there are troops and infantrymen currently in Iraq, do you know who is there, in which corps they were integrated and what they are doing? Can you answer these questions?

[English]

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, perhaps I can clarify what I said. I said there are 31 Canadian Forces members in the CENTCOM area of operations. I also mentioned in my earlier remarks that I am a force generator. I train the troops, organize the army, and prepare them for operations. When they either leave Canada or are engaged in domestic operations, they come under the command of the Chief of the Defence Staff directly. The person who coordinates all that for him is the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. In that regard, because of my responsibilities, I am required to stand back and allow him to do that.

    Do I know where each of the army exchange and liaison officers are deployed in terms of where they go? Yes. Do I have that information at my fingertips? No. In the same way that I can tell you, with a little bit of time, where every soldier is within the army irrespective of rank or position, I know. You would expect me to know that, but I don't carry that information around with me on a minute-to-minute basis.

    I maintain constant situational awareness of what is going on in all of our operations, as you would expect me to. However, I do not maintain the same high level of minute-to-minute control that the Chief of the Defence Staff does with those particular deployed forces, because I basically would be repeating or duplicating his effort. It's an issue of degree here.

    And I don't want to speak for the CDS, but I will also suggest that, given the circumstances with the exchange officers, they are part of another army, for all practical purposes. We maintain sufficient control to ensure that they are working in accordance with Canadian laws and procedures, but we have given up a level of immediacy of control by virtue of attaching them to those units. It's only at significant decision points that we usually exert that control.

¿  (0935)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Chairman, the general tells me he knows which people are there and where they are, but he is not the one who deals with control and command. He also says he does not have this information at hand, but he seems to say he has it.

    I would therefore like to ask the general if he can provide this information in the coming hours, by calling his office, for example. I would like to know in detail whether the PPCLI is there, whether there are members of the RCR or members of the Royal 22^e Régiment, and what units they are in.

    We see the war live on CNN. We know where all the British and American troops are, and I think Canadians would like to know where their own soldiers are. Quebecers would also like to know.

    You said you did not have the information at hand, but are you willing to provide it in the coming hours?

[English]

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, this is an issue that is starting to get well beyond my position. This is an issue that the minister has addressed publicly. It is an issue of security and force protection for our troops deployed. I have that information. We classify that information. That information has been made available to the minister and the government, and it really is a government decision in terms of whether or not they release it. My recommendation to the CDS—and I believe this was his recommendation to the government—is that they not release that information, given the potential dangers to our people. We do not release a variety of information—you will remember the discussion on things like snipers in Afghanistan—again for the same kinds of reasons.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Chairman...

[English]

    The Chair: Mr. Bachand, this is an important issue that the general is addressing.

    Do you have any further comments on that, General?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: No.

    The Chair: Go ahead, Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: I also have important questions, and we only have seven minutes. So we must hurry.

    There is one thing I do not understand. CNN tells us where all the American combat units are on the major fronts--they don't hesitate to do it--, but you are telling us that you cannot tell us where the 31 Canadian soldiers are because it could be dangerous for their security. They take part in operations in which there are attacks on Iraqi cities every day. It seems to me it is not dangerous to say that three PPCLI people are in this or that combat unit and are currently near Baghdad. It is not true that it is dangerous for these people. It is dangerous enough for them to be there.

    Does the answer you give me mean that the Iraqi could target only Canadian soldiers? I think that when they are integrated into British or American troops, they do the same work, and the Iraqi do not distinguish between a Canadian and an American, especially if they are wearing the same uniform. That's my other question.

    Do these people wear the uniforms of the combat units they are integrated in? Do they wear the maple leaf, the Canadian flag, on their shoulders, or do they wear the American or British flag?

[English]

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that there's a fundamental difference between identifying units and identifying people. No one denied we had 3 PPCLI in Afghanistan. No one denied that unit was deployed at a number of operations. That information was made public. But when it comes down to identifying specific individuals engaged in specific activities, that's the point at which we suggest we're going too far.

    I'd also suggest it's not just the security of the individual. I'm not suggesting for a minute that a Canadian in a U.S. or British organization in Iraq is somehow going to be targeted separately from anybody else—and, yes, they are wearing Canadian uniforms, as they should. But the reality is that it's not just them, it's their families and loved ones back here who also can be targeted. We've seen examples of that, albeit perhaps not with Canadian Forces personnel, but in other domains. Families can be targeted because this has become a very difficult and emotional issue within the nation.

¿  (0940)  

    The Chair: Thank you, General, Mr. Bachand.

    Mr. McGuire.

    Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    General, since September 11, North American security imperatives have taken on a new importance and a new rethink. What is Canada's role in the future in the North American context?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chair, that is a question that has many dimensions, with only a small part being military. In my view, it is something that is going to unfold in the months and years ahead.

    From a U.S. and from a Canadian point of view, the security of our respective nations and the security of our respective societies is important to all of us. The issue, as I imply from the question, is very much the degree of cooperation between principally Canada and the U.S. in that broader context.

    As others have stated in front of the committee, we are working with the U.S. to look at how our existing cooperative arrangements, of which there are many, should change. North American Aerospace Defence Command is well established and has worked very well since the late 1940s. We have established the Binational Planning Group at NORAD Headquarters, where the maritime and land dimension of that cooperation will be developed, and to allow a level of coordination of activity between Canada and the U.S.

    What the long-term implications of that are, I wouldn't even want to speculate. That's getting into an issue that goes well beyond the military portfolio. Ultimately, the question for Canadians is the degree to which we wish to ensure seamless defence and security of North America, and the degree to which we as a nation are prepared to work closely with the Americans to achieve that, given all of the concerns.

    I think that's about as much as I can really say at this stage.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: In terms of interoperability and the fact that the U.S. is putting such gigantic resources into new technologies and so on, how can we keep up? What niche roles are we going to be playing in the future, just to remain a vital part or important part of any new NORAD, for example?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Clearly the technological piece is a challenge, not just for us but for every military and, I would say, every organization in the world. Given the U.S. defence budget in terms of its size and what they have been able to achieve, they are clearly in a class by themselves. I don't believe we or indeed probably any other nation in the world can keep pace with them, certainly at the level of investment they have been putting into their military in the last few years.

    I do believe we need to ensure that certain parts of our military are kept technologically up to date in order to at least allow us to work together. I spoke earlier about command and control, and that's one area where we have to invest. I go back to my response to an earlier question about my anecdote of a liaison officer. Today, you wouldn't be doing that. Today, what you need to have is the integration or at least the ability to integrate communications and information systems in order to pass large quantities of information between two militaries in a very short period of time.

    So there is an area needing technological investment. If we do not engage in it, the link is broken and the ability to work with such a high-tech organization as the U.S. Army is minimal to nil. That's an area in which I don't think we have a choice.

    The more global question suggested in the question about niche roles, the idea that somehow we can carve out a piece of this larger whole, is one that requires a lot of discussion. I personally believe it is fraught with considerable danger. As I've said to many people, the reality is that land warfare is a team sport. It requires that all of the component parts up to a certain level are able to work. As a military, an army, we are already at a fairly low ebb. The best we can achieve in operations is a brigade or a brigade group. Most armies consider that to be the start of military capability, so we're already clearly low here. To go lower, to somehow isolate and focus on one small part within that, may make sense in an academic environment, but it doesn't make sense as an act of operations or war. Therein lies the challenge, and thus the reason for how you balance those difficulties of limited resources and the need for a homogeneous operational capability.

    That's what we've tried to do in the strategy and plan that we've developed as we've moved the army forward. It requires a level of technological investment to keep us relevant within the size that we have. It's a stretch. I think it can be done, but a limiting factor obviously is money.

¿  (0945)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McGuire.

    Mrs. Gallant, for five minutes.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): Is JTF-2 on the ground or ready to be deployed in Iraq?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: The first thing, Mr. Chairman, is that I am not responsible for JTF-2. It belongs totally to the DCDS, so I have no accountability for or involvement with it. Secondly, the deployments of JTF-2 are always classified, so even if I knew, I would not be in a position to respond to the question.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Okay, thank you.

    Delta Force, the special forces in the U.S., is deployed right now in Iraq. Their government has had no problem in telling us that. Why is it that we have not had word as to whether or not JTF-2 involved?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, that sort of question is a political question, not a military one. Those decisions are made by the government, not by the military.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

    What is the current chain of command for JTF-2? Can you tell us from the very start? Does it begin with the minister or the Prime Minister and continue right down to the commander or the forces on the ground? Or are you aware of what it is?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Given that I am not responsible for and indeed have never been responsible for JTF-2, I'm not sure I'm the best person to answer that question. JTF-2 reports to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, and he to the Chief of the Defence Staff. From there on, it follows the same responsibility and accountability chain as any military issue. All military forces report to the Chief of the Defence Staff.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: As commander of the land forces, if they are operating together with troops under your command, are you not necessarily made aware of that?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: As I said before, Mr. Chairman, I do not command troops in operations. I am a force generator. When we put troops into operations, they come under command of the Chief of the Defence Staff.

    Let's take an example domestically. When we had the Red River floods or the ice storm, even though the bulk of those troops were army, those troops reported to the CDS through the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff for those operations. We deployed a battalion into Afghanistan. That battalion reported through the commander of Joint Task Force South West Asia and to the DCDS. They did not report to me.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: If you do have the knowledge on this question, would you please explain whether or not lay people can distinguish between the U.S. forces and the Canadian ones when JTF-2 forces do deploy alongside U.S. troops, insofar as their uniforms or whatever disguises they may be wearing are concerned?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: I don't know that I can answer that question, Mr. Chairman. I'm not sure it would be appropriate to answer that question.

¿  (0950)  

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Just at this point in time, or in general?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: In general, but specifically at this point in time.

    I think you know me well enough, Mr. Chairman. I'm not trying to skirt the issue. With this issue, though, if this is a point that the committee really wants to get into, I suggest that it's better addressed to the DCDS.

    The Chair: That's fair enough, General.

    Please continue, Mrs. Gallant.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Okay, so deployment isn't necessarily part of your purview.

    Insofar as the U.S. forces alongside Canadians along our common border are concerned—they're there right now for national security—is there an exit strategy for the U.S. forces once the supposed immediate threat dissipates?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Can I just confirm something, Mr. Chairman?

    In terms of the question, when you say “along our common border”, are we dealing now with domestic deployment of U.S. forces?

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: That is correct.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Okay.

    First of all, I'd like to very quickly clarify one thing. I said I am a force generator. I am responsible for the training and operational readiness of the army. That means all of the people within it. Once I bring them up to the level at which they are capable of doing their job as soldiers and as formed units, and once the government makes the decision to deploy them into operations, I hand over accountability and command to someone else. That doesn't mean I'm no longer interested, but there is a fundamental shift, so that accountability is up to that point.

    As we approach that handover point, I have to be comfortable—and, indeed, I am the Chief of the Defence Staff's principal military adviser for land operations—in terms of whether or not this is the kind of operation we commit to. So we're clear on that transition.

    In terms of Canada and the U.S. and troops along the border, I have no specific knowledge of what the U.S. plans are. From discussions with my U.S. counterparts, I do know the deployment principally of the Army National Guard and U.S. Army reserves—because there are no active component troops deployed along the border; those that are deployed are principally National Guard or U.S. Army reserves—is an operation that the U.S. will not be able to maintain for an extended period, in my view. It is having a fairly significant effect on their reserve forces.

    I don't know that there is an exit strategy. I'm certainly not aware of it. I think that's a question that ultimately the government will have to turn its mind to, probably post-Iraq, but that's speculation on my part.

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Mr. Price, for five minutes.

    Mr. David Price: Just to continue along on the communications side, you said that more and more communications are really heading in a digital direction. If we look at our NATO partners, a lot of those countries really aren't anywhere near that level yet. Granted, with the American side and with the British, too, we're probably okay there.

    On the NATO side, the two basic languages would be English or French. On the French side, is there a common voice procedure for using French with our NATO allies?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: First of all, if we're dealing with a NATO environment, a NATO context, the two working languages are English and French, as you rightly state. Any procedure that's agreed to in one language is agreed to in the other, so there is a commonality, there is that foundation. That standardization notwithstanding, the de facto lingua franca for operations within NATO has become English. That doesn't mean French cannot be used, but practically speaking, many of the nations don't have that capacity, unlike Canada. Therefore, you don't tend to see it being used at the levels at which you have interoperability. That doesn't mean French or English, and indeed other languages, can't be spoken within whatever the alliance is, but you tend to default to English at the points at which you fit them together.

    Increasingly, however, alliance or coalition operations involve countries other than NATO countries. We've seen that within the UN. To use the current, in-vogue Americanism, coalitions of the willing can come from any part of globe. They don't necessarily even have the agreed-upon procedures of which you speak, so interoperability becomes a constant challenge in terms of how you achieve it. That's the reason we have focused our principal efforts in recent years on ABCA—America, Britain, Canada, and Australia—because we believe that if we can work in that group, but principally with the Americans, our interoperability capabilities will be sufficient enough to allow us to work with probably anybody. In a sense, the Americans become the high-water mark or the standard that everyone ascribes to achieve, and that achieves some level of commonality.

    In my view, the problems we're having today will all be overcome principally through technology. Many of the communications problems we have today come because we're using a variety of different generations of communications, from very tactical to strategic. Most of them are what we refer to as stand-alone. They're not compatible with other systems. I would suggest that what you're going to see as we move to more and more web-based approaches, is that the problem will become moot. Irrespective of the physical communication means, nations will be communicating through something much like what you use on a day-to-day basis. It will be done on a computer- or web-based approach, much like the Internet, and you will be able to communicate with anybody, whether they're two miles away or on the other side of the globe. I would suggest that within a decade at the outside, translation technologies—which are already there—will increasingly allow people to communicate in their own language and have that translated very quickly.

    So we believe already that many of our day-to-day interoperability challenges—which are of the Industrial Age—will be overcome by the Information Age and that a web-based approach and technology will be the solution. It won't be neat and tidy. I wouldn't suggest that and we're not going to get there tomorrow. But I think the reasonable prospect is that we'll have the core of that in place within a decade.

¿  (0955)  

    Mr. David Price: Yes, I agree with you. Some countries are going to have difficulty. In fact, if we look at some of the countries over there now, and some that I have visited, Romania is a good example. Their troops that are training right now have a year to learn English. If they don't learn English, then they can't deploy with their units to any NATO operations.

    So it seems we're still at the very basic, in some ways.

    The Chair: Mr. Price, I'm going to have to cut you off there.

    Mr. Bachand, for five minutes.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    It seems obvious that it's the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff that we should meet here as soon as possible, because I feel we are not moving on very much. But I will nonetheless risk other questions.

    The Americans said they would deploy another 120,000 men in the Iraqi theatre of operations. Can you tell us whether Canadian soldiers are currently in interoperability with them in training and will be deployed in the units of these 120,000 Americans who are to go to Iraq soon?

[English]

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, of the 31 Canadians within the CENTCOM area of operations, some of those are with U.S. forces. I'm not sure I can respond to any more than that. Should additional U.S. forces currently not deployed be deployed, some of them could have Canadian exchange officers with them. However, it would be speculation on my part, because I honestly do not know what the American intentions are with respect to deploying additional forces into theatre. So is it possible that some of those could have Canadians with them? Yes, it's quite possible.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Okay. Now I will address the uniforms issue.

    I am told there is an order allowing Canadian soldiers to wear foreign troop uniforms in a theatre of operations. According to this order, Canadian soldiers could wear British or American uniforms. Can you tell me if this information I got this week is accurate, and especially if this order really exists? Is it possible that they could do that? And also tell me if we received new adequate clothing for the current theatres of operations. In Afghanistan, they walked around with green uniforms in the middle of the desert. If you tell me they received their new uniforms, that's fine. If this is not the case, I think there's a problem. In my opinion, it would be a mistake to put a Canadian in a green uniform in a combat unit whose members are all in a brown desert outfits.

    So, can you tell me if the order exists and if Canadian soldiers have their own clothes?

À  (1000)  

[English]

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, our normal approach and policy is that Canadians wear Canadian uniforms. To my knowledge, Canadians are deployed wearing their full uniforms. It is possible, under the authority of the CDS and in special circumstances, for the CDS to grant the wearing of other uniforms. I can't think of an example of when one would want to do that or when the CDS would approve it. Certainly, to my knowledge, the CDS has not authorized anybody to wear non-Canadian uniforms.

    We have the new arid region or desert-coloured uniforms for our forces deploying, and those uniforms have been released for use by those with our allied forces. I honestly cannot confirm that every one of those people has that new uniform. If that's something the committee wants to know, I can certainly find out. But the uniforms certainly have been bought and released for those soldiers, so my expectation is that they will be wearing Canadian desert-coloured uniforms.

    The Chair: Be very quick, Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: I want to know if they have the Canadian flag on their shoulders, and I also want to know if there is a difference between command and control. You said they remained under Canadian command. In my opinion, they are under American or British command, but you maintain control. For example, you can tell your soldiers not to engage in a specific operation. Am I wrong when I say that?

[English]

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: The answer, Mr. Chairman, is both. Command and control is a layered approach. All members of the Canadian Forces are commanded by the Chief of the Defence Staff. It doesn't matter where they are or who they're working for. Ultimate command is vested in the Chief of the Defence Staff, and there are very specific things that go with that command. He can and often does delegate various levels of it to other commanders, including allied commanders in this case. That imposes on those other commanders a responsibility to confer with the Chief of the Defence Staff on what the Canadians can or cannot do in certain environments.

    So it's a layered approach. And that's not unique to us. That's a shared or common approach across most allied militaries.

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Mr. McGuire, for five minutes.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: Just to continue, you were saying in your previous answer that it's highly dangerous to be looking for niche roles for the Canadian army in regard to North American defence, and that you can make do with what you have now, but it's pretty tight. How much larger should our army be and how much more do you think might be necessary in terms of resources in order to be a little more comfortable in playing an effective role in North American defence?

À  (1005)  

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: I'd like to try to approach that question in two stages. First of all, on the issue of size generally, this is clearly a political question, not a military question. At the end of the day, it depends on the security risk and the threat to the country, obviously, but it also is an issue of national will. Whether we're dealing with that domestically or internationally, what is the commitment of the Canadian people to international and indeed national security?

    I will tell you that from my vantage point of having being the army commander for almost three years now, we are at a pretty low ebb of investment, given where we are, in my personal view. The country continues to demand that our soldiers do more and more, but we are stretched to do even that. We're at a point at which our capacity is at its lowest ebb. But at the end of the day, this is a political issue. It's an issue of what the people of the country are prepared to invest in their security.

    When you talk about coming to a domestic perspective and about national security, or in the American vernacular, homeland security, it's much more of a challenge to answer that question. We are not dealing with a traditional threat. If you go back a number of years, this is not a question of the Soviet hordes coming over the pole into northern Canada. We're not dealing realistically with large, conventional threats to the North American or Canadian land mass. We're dealing with a variety of different kinds of threats that, in the jargon of the day, we refer to as asymmetric threats. They are really a range of terrorist or indeed even other kinds of activities, including criminal activities, which are increasingly a challenge.

    The difficulty is that the military is only one of many players in this particular security issue. Indeed, we are not the force of first resort, we are not the first responders. We are, as we should be, the force of last resort. On the land, much of the response obviously falls to police, security services, intelligence services, and fire and ambulance services, in terms of dealing with problems. The military is there to deal with major security issues that get beyond the police, or indeed with what is really consequence management after something has gone wrong, to help as we do in most domestic operations.

    How big a military or how big an army held in reserve, if you will, is necessary to deal with those sorts of issues? That's a very difficult question. Indeed, I would suggest that there is no answer to it. It's an issue of judgment and risk assessment. On balance, it's like you or I determining how much life insurance we need. It's a personal call, and the nation has to make that judgment. How much insurance do they need against the threats? It's an issue we will grapple with in the years ahead, and one I think the country will have to grapple with. I do believe this is an area in which reserves in particular have a real role to play, and we're seriously looking at that. But I think I've said as much as I really can. I don't think there's an easy answer. There certainly is not a simple answer to the question.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McGuire.

    Miss Grey.

    Miss Deborah Grey (Edmonton North, Canadian Alliance): Welcome, General.

    When you talk about interoperability and our relationship with the United States—and this again probably ends up being a political question, Mike—do you think this war will affect our relationship with the U.S.? Just from watching the news and hearing all kinds of commentaries—I certainly saw the ambassador the other day—I'm wondering how keen they will be to interoperate with us.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: As was implied in the question, Mr. Chairman, it's very much a political issue. I think it's important, though, for me to say that in our dealings with other militaries—and I would highlight our dealings specifically with the United States military—we are dealing with professionals.

    In a democratic society, military leaders are responsible for following the direction of the democratically elected governments. That's the way we're trained and that's the way we think, and it's no different here from what it is in the United States. When I'm dealing with my U.S. counterpart or senior U.S. military leaders, notwithstanding whatever political frictions there may be between the nations, we're dealing with issues in a direct, professional, and largely friendly, collegial environment. As a result of political direction, there may be limits on what we can do together or even say to each other. However, we understand the rules of the game, and in my experience, it has never become an issue of friction or animosity between professional leaders.

    I will say that of all activities that mankind engages in, I can think of none other that unleashes the extremes of emotion that warfare does. We should not be surprised that both here domestically and indeed in the international community, this war has unleashed a variety of different emotions. They're going to be something we as a nation and we as a member of the global community are going to have to work through. I would hope the war does not become a long-term source of friction, but that's the challenge we all face. Governments in particular face it as they manage the way ahead.

À  (1010)  

    Miss Deborah Grey: We know we have at least these 31 people in the actual theatre, and I think all of us are grappling with that. Are we at war or are we not at war? It's a little difficult to justify the fact that we're not at war when we do in fact have troops over there and we continue to see their faces and life stories in the newspaper and on television. But as you know and as you mentioned earlier, we will be deploying troops to Afghanistan later this year. Were you consulted before that decision to deploy?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: I'd like to address two points. The short answer to the last part in terms of consultation is a yes, but I think it requires some explanation.

    The ongoing military planning for potential future operations is just that. It's ongoing, it's virtually constant. In the discussions, I was only involved within a certain context. The minister has made public statements that stand on their own merits. The options for deployment into Afghanistan were clearly laid out, and I was involved in all of those discussions. The decision, however, is ultimately a political one. I was not involved in the final decision. That's not unique, however, because I never am. The final advice to the government, to the Prime Minister, comes from the Chief of the Defence Staff, by law. It's at that level that those final decisions are made. But was I consulted leading up to that? Most certainly.

    Miss Deborah Grey: Were you surprised when the announcement came out, yes or no?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: I was not given forewarning of the announcement.

    Miss Deborah Grey: Okay, thanks.

    Let me briefly ask about post-traumatic stress disorder. As you know, the training is ad hoc, is given to individual units, and is not addressed cohesively. In other words, it's at the request of the unit. For those who may be going to Afghanistan, are preparations underway to deal with PTSD upon their return?

À  (1015)  

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: The short answer is yes.

    On your comment about training be ad hoc, clearly we have been guilty of that at times in the past. There's no question about that. I would argue the point, though, that our training today is ad hoc. Indeed, as we move forward, my objective is to make that training increasingly more cohesive. That's the reason for the brigade training event and issues like that.

    We have learned a lot in the last decade about operational stress injuries, of which PTSD is only one. I'm not shy in saying we still have a lot to learn, but we are making improvements. We're still having too many of those casualties, but I think the 3 PPCLI deployment was an example of the effort we put into it. We have already learned lessons from that, and that will improve our preparations for our troops for all future deployments as a result.

    The Chair: Thank you, Miss Grey.

    Miss Deborah Grey: Let me just say congratulations on a great career. And give my greetings to Anne.

    I was thinking there could be a career for you in politics when you said, “The answer is both.” Good luck to you.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    The Chair: Mr. Price.

    Mr. David Price: General, the command centre for the war on terrorism was at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa. It was moved over to Qatar, and along with all of the partners involved—I hate to say “coalition”, because that seems to be the other.... Anyway, roughly 20 countries were involved in the war on terrorism, with all of their militaries represented. I'm not sure how many went to Qatar, but now we're in the process...the U.S. has a command centre there for a war in Iraq, and it is in the same physical location as the command centre for the war on terrorism. Our people are now being moved out of there because the Americans are dealing with Iraq and they're not dealing with the war on terrorism, and vice versa.

    Where is the command centre for the war on terrorism now? Where are our Canadians operating out of?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: We're getting into one of those areas that is complicated, and I don't mean that pejoratively in the least, because we find it complicated.

    Whether you're talking about NATO or World War II, when it was our side against their side in relatively pure black and white terms, the relatively simple days of the past are no longer the case. The events of the last decade or more have shown how difficult it can be. Take the Kosovo air campaign as one example. Even within the broad NATO construct, you had sovereign nations—all of whom have a vote at the table—with different perspectives on what's permissible in military operations. While there may be political agreement on the overall political objectives in a conflict, there's disagreement in terms of what's allowable, and therefore on what different nations are prepared to contribute. For the military chain of command, that creates a significant challenge. It's what the respective governments expect, so you have to try to work out a construct, but it almost becomes a situation in which you have to figure out militarily which nation is allowed to do what.

    We now bring ourselves to the war on terrorism. As a result of that, a coalition was built up over time, under what we refer to as Operation Enduring Freedom, the war against terrorism, with CENTCOM being the overall commander and working out of Tampa. That is where the headquarters still exists, and our commander for Joint Task Force South West Asia works out of Tampa as part of that war on terrorism.

    From a U.S. perspective, when they decided they were going to go into Iraq or when Iraq became an issue, General Tommy Franks was given the responsibility to also manage that as well, and he decided to move part of his headquarters forward into that region, into Qatar, to command and control the Iraq operation. Clearly recognizing the political dynamic of this, he recognized that he could not have a connection between those two, because there were political consequences. In Tampa, then, there is a physical partition between those nations that are working only on the war on terrorism and those that are working on Iraq. Similarly, there is a physical limit...indeed, by and large, there have been no forces working in Qatar to my knowledge, except those working in Iraq.

    Some exceptions were made, and we were one. I explained earlier that the exception was made in order to maintain continuity. Given the lack of a political decision at that stage, a liaison team was sent to try to maintain situational awareness, such that if the government directed us to go into Iraq, we would be prepared to do so. Since that is now not the case, at least part of that team is being withdrawn.

    I don't know if that helps to explain things. I just emphasize that this is not simple. It creates for us very difficult situations in terms of what each nation is allowing its military to do, and therein lies one of the challenges.

À  (1020)  

    Mr. David Price: So it is back in Tampa then? That would really be the—

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Yes, it is. That's correct.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Price.

[Translation]

    Mr. Bachand.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I will now ask my questions on Afghanistan.

    General, I often heard you say that the number of rotations required of your soldiers surpassed their capacity, and I feel you defended them quite well when you said a lot is demanded from these people. I often heard you pronounce the word “sustainability.” I have just checked with the translator, and it seems they translate this by soutenabilité. You often referred to that.

    Earlier, you spoke of the fact that the minister had consulted with you on Afghanistan. I would imagine that you must have recommended to the minister not to carry out a mission in Afghanistan given that the effort would be too great for the Canadian army. Can you tell me what you recommended to the minister when he consulted you, or is this also a state secret?

[English]

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, in responding to this question, I think it must be clearly and frankly stated that when any of us give advice to ministers, it's confidential information. It is just that. It's advice to ministers. Having said that, I think it's important to understand the context here.

    There really are two parts to a military recommendation. The first part is whether or not we can do something. The second is whether or not we believe we should do it. Sometimes we lose sight of that and suggest that it's all lumped together.

    I was asked a question in terms of the replacement of 3 PPCLI in Afghanistan. Could I have replaced the battalion? The answer is, yes, I could have. Was my recommendation to replace the battalion? No, for just the reasons that you implied in your question. The issue of overall sustainability of the army was of such a concern to me that I did not believe it was reasonable to do so. But even that has to be taken in context.

    I'll go back to an anecdote that I believe I've used here before, but which warrants repeating. When he was Chief of the Defence Staff and appeared in front of this committee, General Maurice Baril said words to the effect that it is an issue of what the overall objective is. In 1939, we sent many of our fathers and grandfathers to war, and those who came back often didn't come back for five or six years. That's sacrifice. If the circumstances warrant it, we can do that, but we need to understand as a nation that people are paying that consequence.

    So when I look at something like Afghanistan, can we do it? The answer is yes, but we're stretching ourselves, no question about it. I responded earlier to the question of overall capacity. This army is small, and it's not getting any bigger. Even though our resource sustainability has improved as a result of the welcomed increase in funding, it doesn't give us any more people. We haven't gotten any bigger. But these are professional soldiers who are loyal to the country. They can do it, but it comes at a price. And therein lies the difficulty. At the end of the day, the question of whether or not that price is worth it is not mine alone. It's one the government and the nation have to answer.

    The Chair: Be very quick, Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: So, if I understand you, you say that the Afghanistan operation which is coming up will simply add to the problem. You told the minister that we could do it, but you recommended not to do it because it would add to the problem. Is that what you just said?

[English]

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: There is no question, Mr. Chairman, that the deployment to Afghanistan will make our overall tempo and sustainability problem worse from a people point of view.

À  (1025)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

    Mr. Price.

    Mr. David Price: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I just have a couple of short questions.

    Just to follow up on MacDill or Tampa, do we have a liaison officer there in the special forces section? Do we keep somebody there on a regular basis?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: I don't know the answer to that question, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. David Price: Thank you.

    The other question is in regard to the exchange programs that we have going now. We do go back and forth with the U.S., but I know Mexico has showed a lot of interest. Do we have people in Mexico now, and do we have Mexicans here?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: The answer is no to both. As part of government policy, we are increasing our involvement in our engagement in the Americas. Indeed, I believe you are aware that I am the chairman of what they refer to as the Conference of American Armies. It's an engagement of armies of all the Americas. Indeed, the commanders' conference for the Conference of American Armies will be in Ottawa in late September or early October. It's part of our commitment to an engagement in the overall Americas.

    As part of that, we have looked at opportunities for increasing engagement with many of our Latin American partners in particular. Indeed, we'll be putting some officers on some courses both in the United States and in some of the Latin American countries this year, to learn Spanish, to get to know the region, and to make the contacts with various nations as we improve our involvement in that area. But these are just the initial and quite small steps at this stage of the game.

    Mr. David Price: The Mexicans have historically not gone out of their country. They haven't really worked very much with other countries. They do some exchanges with the Americans, but just in training. I know they've expressed interest in getting involved with Canada. They see Canada as being much more of their size and stature.

    We do have Canadian officers at our embassy there. I know they do a lot of exchange interrelationships with the Mexicans. Have they actually approached us yet about getting involved in an exchange program?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: We have some work ongoing right now with Mexico to identify some possibilities, but it's at the preliminary stage and I think it would be inappropriate for me to comment. Clearly, I don't want to put the Mexican government in any difficult position, because those things have not been agreed to.

    I was in Mexico City about three weeks ago. I spoke to General Ricardo Vega Garcia, who is, interestingly, their army commander, their chief of defence, and their defence secretary all rolled into one, which is an interesting dynamic.

    I see Mexico as a nation that, after a long period of being fairly introverted, is trying to join the world community in a way it hasn't in the past, and I get that message clearly as I speak to their senior officers. Mexico has a relatively large army with a very professional officer corps, but its base is relatively focused in its approach and is therefore relatively low-level-trained. It is an army that is principally focused on domestic security issues. It is not an army that has been focused on principally international operations, as ours has been.

    Initial discussions indicate to me that they're interested in taking some of the initial steps to get involved in things like peacekeeping or peace and support operations under the UN flag, and those kinds of things; to build experience in the world; to basically start to build bridges to allow them to get further out of their traditional domestic approach. But as I say, these are initial discussions.

    General Ray Henault was down there about seven or eight months ago, if memory serves me, and he had earlier discussions, and we've been clearly and consistently sending the message that we'll help in any way we can. We invite them to send officers on some of our courses to help them, like those at our Peace Support Training Centre or its kinds of courses, and to provide any expertise that we have that might be able to help them to improve.

À  (1030)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Price.

    Mr. Benoit.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: General Jeffery, I have quite a few questions for you, so I'll try to keep them short.

    First of all, are you aware of any time before when Canadian military personnel have been involved in a war that the government doesn't support?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: I'm not sure that—

    The Chair: Mr. Benoit, I think we have to understand that the general is not a historian.

    General, if you want to comment, feel free.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Of course, the simple answer is no, but I go back to my earlier comment. In terms of complexity, these aren't simple black-and-white questions, and simple black-and-white answers are therefore rather difficult.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: We're talking about the Canada–U.S. military relationship here, yet it seems odd to me how little Canada is involved with the United States in overseas deployments. It seems extremely odd that for two countries that are so close, are such good friends and good allies, there is so little involvement together. If we look at the situation in the Balkans, Canadians aren't operating with the Americans. If we look at our operation in Afghanistan for the summer coming up, we're not involved with our American allies. To me, that seems very odd.

    The operation that we are involved in is an operation that has a large command and control component, yet you've pointed out today that it is one of the areas in which Canada is weak. We need a lot of improvement in that area in terms of equipment and so on. You said that in the area of communications, we have stand-alone systems and need updating in that area. It seems to me that these two things are exactly the main things that will be called on in the operation in Afghanistan. Could you comment on that?

    And I just want to add a question to that for you. When you laid out the various types of operational commitments that Canada could make in Afghanistan, did the one chosen fit closer to the top of the list or the bottom of the list in terms of operations that the Canadian military would be best suited to do and be best able to do right now?

    And there are a few questions in there. I understand that.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Very quickly, in the sequence in which the questions were posed, in terms of the Canada–U.S. relationship and affiliation around the world, I would suggest to you that the relationship is an historic one. I remind you that in the Second World War, in Korea, and indeed up until 1970, our involvement militarily had always been with the United Kingdom. When we deployed troops in World War II, we were part of the British Army. It wasn't until late in the game that we formed a complete Canadian army. In Korea, we were part of the Commonwealth Division. In Germany, we were part of the British Army of the Rhine. It was only in 1970, following a government decision to consolidate forces in southern Germany, that we even moved into the American sector. We were engaged with the U.S. and other forces during that period and started to build those ties.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: But we've become very close since then.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: When we withdrew our land forces in particular in 1991, we recognized then that there were no traditional exchanges or real contacts operationally with the U.S. military. That has been a source of discussion between me and my U.S. counterpart, at some length. There have been discussions between General Henault and his U.S. counterpart as we try to build that closer relationship. Of course, since September 11, it has become even more imperative, but it takes time.

    We are making progress and looking for opportunities. Indeed, I would suggest to you that Afghanistan is historic in the sense that it is the first time in the modern era that we have ever worked that closely with the U.S. Whether or not we will do it again obviously is a political decision, but that's the sort of challenge before us.

    So am I surprised? No. The limiting factor now, though, is capacity. In order to do those kinds of things, we have to have the ability to do them, and therein lies the challenge.

    In terms of communications, as I've expressed to the committee, the communications area is clearly a major area of challenge. I've spoken before about modernization and trying to take the army forward. I believe you're well aware of the projects we already have in place. We are introducing a world-class communications system as we speak. Part of that is a world-class command and control system. It's going to take us two to three years to get the army fully outfitted to that level.

À  (1035)  

    Mr. Leon Benoit: But it won't be there for the Afghanistan operation.

    The Chair: Mr. Benoit, actually, your time has expired.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: No, it won't, Mr. Chairman, but that's the harsh reality, and no amount of money or anything else will make it go faster. It's already coming in, but it's a matter of how quickly we can absorb it. We will be there with the communications piece, but we won't be there with a full command and control piece because the communications piece is not there yet.

    The Chair: General, I have a number of questions that I'd like to ask you. In a general sense, they relate to the interoperability issue.

    I think people who are watching what is happening right now in Iraq cannot help but be concerned about the friendly fire incidents that have occurred there. I'm sure investigations follow each one. Obviously, friendly fire between two forces has a number of dimensions—friendly fire incidents within the American forces or British forces, and those between the two forces as well.

    Are we going to be in a position to look at or to examine the results of investigations that are done in connection with those incidents, in order to determine how we can seek to reduce those incidents in the future if we're working with the Americans or indeed the British? They're clearly a very disturbing result of conflict, but when you have a quarter of a million service personnel in a theatre of operations and they're conducting combat operations, there are obviously going to be some problems. Do you have any comments?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Could I just get you to clarify something? When you say “we”, are you referring to whether or not Canada will be privy to the U.S.–U.K. investigations?

    The Chair: Yes, that's right.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: I don't know the answer to the question in categorical terms, but I would expect the answer is that, yes, we will be, in due course.

    We have a good regime of sharing lessons learned and information. Clearly, at the initial stages, much like the investigations we've done here, in particular in the issue in Afghanistan, those investigations, until they were complete, were “close hold”, but then the full investigations were released publicly. I anticipate the same thing will occur here. Certainly, our experience with some of the incidents in the last Gulf War indicate that this will be the case, and we will milk those reports for the lessons they give us.

    I will suggest to you that the whole issue of friendly fire is not a new one. It has occurred in every conflict as long as we've had conflicts. In some respects, our ability to prevent them is much better. We have an inability to track these things from older wars, but there are probably fewer friendly fire incidents today than there have historically been. With all of the modern technology, though, comes increased complexity, and many of the friendly fire issues arise because of that complexity.

    I'll give you one example. We now have weapons systems, and even direct-fire weapons systems, that are of such capability that they fire well beyond what normal human visibility will achieve. The idea of seeing the enemy as you have in a traditional conflict is not the case anymore. We're dealing with people who are using high-tech systems to see over the next hill, who are engaging targets that are sometimes tens of kilometres away, and that will increasingly become the case. When you're trying to identify a particular target at that distance in the heat of battle, at night, in fog and smoke, with the stress and pressure of being in combat, mistakes are going to happen.

    I don't condone anything here—no soldier does—but I think one needs to understand that you are dealing with an area of complexity. Because you're dealing with high-tech weapons systems, though, the solution again has to become high-tech solutions. We have already seen some of those high-tech solutions in other dimensions. Air-to-air IFF—interrogation, friend or foe?—is but one example. Systems like that are being developed, and we have a stated requirement for such systems. But because of the unique environment in which land warfare is conducted, there are no simple technological solutions. And putting literally hundreds of millions of dollars into systems that won't work isn't the right solution either.

    So I think we have to recognize that we're going to have more of these problems for the foreseeable future. Ultimately, a combination of better procedures and better technology will minimize them further, but I don't think we will ever totally eliminate them.

À  (1040)  

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

[Translation]

    Mr. Bachand.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

    I have attended a few meetings of the Conference of Defence Associations, where I saw the minister deliver his text, but unfortunately, I was not there when you delivered yours. However, I have read it carefully, and it seems you have a new way of establishing the Canadian army's capacity. You focus on five concepts: the concept of commanding, the concept of detecting, the concept of acting, the concept of protecting, and the concept of maintaining power.

    It seems to me there is a connection to make with the American way, with ISTAR. Am I wrong when I say that interoperability could also lead us, not to imitate, but to look very closely at the way the American army establishes its doctrines on the capacity of our army and its own? I know this is a rather broad issue. I will not ask you to detail everything, because there is a great deal of details in the document, but are the five concepts I just referred to a new way of seeing the Canadian army's capacity?

[English]

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: The short answer, Mr. Chairman, is yes. What we refer to as five operational functions—command, sense, act, shield, sustain—is an attempt to try to reduce complexity and use simple language to explain what each element of an army does. We are prone to using jargon and terminology that baffles even military people at times, whereas simplicity has a virtue of its own, and we're trying to get there.

    Fundamentally, the issue comes to that sense function. We use sense because it's like the senses of the human body—the ability to see, smell, hear, and be able to perceive things around you. Ultimately, in modern warfare, in information warfare, situational awareness—the knowledge of where everybody is, friend or foe—and a good understanding of the overall environment is key to the kinds of warfare and the rapidity of operations that we envisage. In order to establish that situational awareness, you need modern sensors. They are not a panacea, and I'm not suggesting that. You need a variety of inputs, but you certainly need some of those key technologies.

    We are working with not only the U.S. military, but with other militaries, as we collectively grapple with the same problem. Fundamentally, we need to ensure that we get to a place where our overarching concepts and approaches are at the very least similar, if not identical.

    There will be uniqueness. Our military, our army, is an outcome of our history and our society, and it is organized based on a variety of factors, some of which we have limited control over. To suggest that any given doctrine or approach that fits the American, British, or any other army automatically can fit ours is not true, but it should be in the same basic ballpark. The challenge is to develop a concept that works for us and that is also part of a larger concept and doctrine. That is clearly where we're trying to go.

    My remarks here today in talking about the various interoperability fora, and particularly the ABCAArmies' Standardization Program and interoperability program, are about where we're getting most of the investment, and that's where we're going to get most of the return.

À  (1045)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to wish the general an excellent end of career. I am eager to speak with him at the end of his service, because I have the impression he could tell me much more if he were not on duty. I want to congratulate him for the work he accomplished in the army, and also for the work he accomplished before the committee, because I know that for him, coming to the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs is like going on a battlefield. I think he did quite well. I also think he is a fundamentally honest man, within the limits imposed upon him. I wanted to thank him for his participation.

[English]

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

    General, I have a quick question in connection with the various agreements that Canada has with the United States. As you well know, we have something in the order of 80 treaties, 250 memoranda of understanding, and 140 or so bilateral fora. In your view, is it time that we look at some of these various agreements and treaties to review what's relevant and what's not anymore, and come to some sort of rationalization of these various mechanisms that we have to regulate the defence relations between the two countries? In particular, if you have any comments about the....

    There is obviously a lot of interoperability between the two allies at a military level, but it seems necessary to me—and you may be better placed than others—to determine whether or not we have the level of political interoperability. That's needed from the standpoint of things like the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, for instance, or the level of familiarity, shall we say, of American legislators with respect to the Canadian Forces and Canadian legislators with respect to American forces.

    Do you have any observations on those items?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: If I may, Mr. Chairman, on the specific question on whether the many protocol agreements and so on should be rationalized into a simpler, more coherent approach, I think that ultimately has to be part of our objective. However, I would caution against any attempt to try to go after that rationalization as a specific objective. I believe that's more an outcome than a particular objective itself.

    One can look at this nationally from a Canadian vantage point and nationally from an American point of view, and then obviously in terms of our overall and evolving bilateral relationship. It seems to me that we're dealing with the evolution of a mass society in which we've reached a point at which we need to simplify our approach in every respect.

    When you look at the government's approach to managing security, then given the potential risks in an environment in which we have potentially increasing security, terrorist, and other types of threats, the much slower, much more bureaucratic approach that we have historically used is not sustainable. In short, we have too many compartments, too many stovepipes, and no matter which domain you're talking about, you have to break a lot of those down.

    The same is true in the United States. In some respects, from my limited vantage point, it seems to me that as Tom Ridge looks at homeland security in all of its contexts, if he hasn't already recognized it, he will quickly recognize that one of the major impediments is actually internal government bureaucracy at a variety of levels, because you just can't get that sharing of information quickly.

    Each nation has those problems to varying degrees. When you then put them together and try to determine the approach to potentially taking a shared or collective approach to security and how to fit those together, it is another order of magnitude, because you don't necessarily have easy places to align Canadian and U.S. approaches to the same problem. Whether you're talking about the political, the various departments of federal or provincial governments, or the municipal level—and the military is only one part of that overall equation, of course—it is a spaghetti junction-type problem.

    It seems to me that what is needed more than anything else is a clear, long-term vision of where Canada and the U.S. want to go from an overall security point of view. At a minimum, I think it has to start with the two nations independently looking at their vision in terms of what they're trying to achieve and what price they're prepared to pay. With ten provinces, three territories, untold federal departments, and even more municipalities across this country, just trying to rationalize that...if you want to ensure that something happens in part of Canada, with all of the necessary agencies knowing that's going on in order to respond quickly, then that historical and traditional bureaucracy has its limits.

    Are we prepared to pay the price of changing some of that to deal with the security issue? I think that is one of the fundamental issues that Canadian society and future governments are going to have to address, and the military solution to this just falls out of it, frankly. It's not a military problem, but it's a major societal challenge.

À  (1050)  

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Mr. Benoit.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: In an earlier question, General, I asked how many people would be involved in the operation in Afghanistan, and you answered that you don't know yet. Isn't it unusual that you wouldn't have a little better idea of what an operation will be before the government announces it?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: I believe what I said, Mr. Chairman, was that I don't know the specific number. I also responded either to that question or another question when I said we're planning for something in the order of 1,500, plus or minus. That is exactly what my advice to the CDS was and what his advice to the government was, and that's the broad ballpark figure that we're talking about.

    From my vantage point, from a capacity point of view, that's approaching the high end. I wouldn't want the number to be much larger than that. However, I go back to the issue of overall balance. We have to give them enough to make sure they can do the job and maintain good force protection. So it could creep up beyond that, but I would hope not.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: In terms of the operation itself, this morning you pointed out a need for investment in command and control and you pointed out that we need a lot of investment in terms of communications, yet it seems like the operation in Afghanistan requires these two areas specifically. Again, I go back to the question that I asked earlier, to which you didn't get a chance to respond: When you and others put out a list of possible missions that Canada could be involved in, was this particular operation toward the bottom or the top of that list?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, the question implies that the military has some sort of internal priority, and that would be a misrepresentation of reality. As security situations evolve around the world, the military view is to determine what we could apply to those situations in terms of what we have and what would be best suited for the kinds of operations in question. The issue is then one of political priority—for reasons you ladies and gentlemen know better than I—in terms of where that effort should be put.

    In short, all of the security situations that we have seen evolve over the last decade, including Afghanistan, Iraq, and so on, have had military options prepared for them. In many cases, they have been placed in front of government for their choosing, and it's that overall political priority that determines where we go.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, but I was asking about what the military is best suited to do then. That is what I had intended in the question. As for whether or not this operation is at the top of the list in terms of what we're best suited to do, it would seem not to be, given some of the answers you gave earlier or some of the things you pointed out earlier in terms of shortfalls in the ability for command and control, communications shortfalls, and so on.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that our limits are largely issues of capacity today, irrespective of what theatre we are going to. If the question is meant to be one of somewhere else rather than Afghanistan, I don't share that view. We would have equal difficulty or equal ability going into any other theatre. The force package may be different because of the uniqueness of the circumstances, but by and large, if we had been asked to contribute to other theatres, what we would be sending in terms of overall members, the size of the contribution, and the general construction of the contribution, would be of about the same size and composition. It might be mechanized infantry versus light infantry, depending on what the particular task was, but it would be of that order of magnitude. The shortages or limitations that we have are in specific areas, and they would exist no matter where we go.

    And I'm not being cute with you, but I will tell you that combat service support, our logistics sustainability, and our overall numbers and capacity of communications are areas of weakness. That's in part because of the number of theatres we have and the number of missions we face. That doesn't mean we can't do the job, although it does mean we're stretching what we have.

À  (1055)  

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Do you consider that this is going to be a very difficult mission for the Canadian military to perform, or a very difficult operation for the Canadian military?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Any mission in that region of the world is difficult by definition for anybody, just in terms of getting there and sustaining a force in that region. And then there's the risk issue on top of that. It's a challenge.

    The Chair: Mr. Benoit, maybe you can get in one more quick question.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: How are we going to get our troops and their equipment there?

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Specifically, I don't know, but it's either by air or through a combination of sea and air. Those details are being looked at as we speak.

    As I mentioned earlier, our strategic recce party is actually due back in Ottawa tonight. With that information from in theatre and indeed from Europe, from some of our European allies, we'll have a better sense of what we're dealing with. We can then make those plans and move forward.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

    Thank you very much, General. You've received many accolades from members sitting at the committee table, and I'd like to echo those that have been expressed. I can tell you that, from my position as a committee member and as chair, I've really appreciated all of the knowledge and experience you've brought to these committee proceedings. You've been very helpful in terms of the work of this committee on a number of occasions, and in dealing with a number of issues. I'm sure I speak for all of the members of this committee when I say we wish you all the very best for the future. Thank you for being here today.

    LGen M.K. Jeffery: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    If I may just add one thing—and it goes back to my earlier comment that there's a lot of work to be done—I command the army and in many respects represent the army, but I want to make it very clear that it's not one person, it's the collective efforts of a large number of dedicated professionals that have gotten the army where it is and indeed will keep the army going.

    My only concern—and my plea to you and the committee—is to ensure that the people of this country understand what they're getting for their money, and to ensure that the support continues for the future. If that does not happen, the nation will not have the quality, professional organization it has today. It's not guaranteed. It requires constant investment and care. That's what's needed for the future, and I implore you to send that message.

    Thank you very much.

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

Á  (1100)  

    The Chair: At the beginning of the meeting, I indicated that there was an issue that the committee should deal with, and that issue simply is the future of this study of Canada–U.S. defence relations.

    We've had indications from the Board of Internal Economy that we will not be allowed to travel to the United States, and it seems as though the Canadian Alliance has taken a position of not allowing us to do so. I think most of you would probably agree that a study of Canada–U.S. relations that does not include a dialogue with our American neighbours is a rather fruitless exercise, to say the least.

    What I'm suggesting is that we have an emergency meeting of the steering committee to determine whether or not our work in this area will continue, or whether or not we will have to move on to another subject area and drop the work we're currently doing in this area. I will try to notify members of the steering committee as quickly as possible about a meeting, but failing the ability to get the support that we need to travel, I don't really realistically see how we can continue to proceed. With that, I'll be in touch, and we'll have a discussion behind closed doors on where we go from here.

    The meeting is adjourned.