HAFF Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, November 27, 2002

¼

1840

The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.))

The Clerk of the Committee

Mr. Ken Epp (Elk Island, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Rick Borotsik (Brandon—Souris, PC)

¼

1845

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Rick Borotsik

Ms. Libby Davies (Vancouver East, NDP)

The Chair

Mr. Gregory Tardi (Senior Legal Counsel, Legal Services, Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel Office, House of Commons)

The Chair

Mr. Martin Champoux (Legislative Assistant, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister)

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada (Brossard—La Prairie, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.)

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.)

Ms. Margaret Young (Committee Researcher)

Mr. James Robertson (Committee Researcher)

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Jacques Saada

The Chair

¼

1850

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

¼

1855

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Ken Epp

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

½

1900

½

1905

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Jacques Saada

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Jacques Saada

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Jacques Saada

The Chair

Mr. Rick Borotsik

½

1910

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Rick Borotsik

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

½

1915

The Chair

Mr. Rick Borotsik

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Ms. Libby Davies

½

1920

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Ms. Libby Davies

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Ms. Libby Davies

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Ms. Libby Davies

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Ms. Libby Davies

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

½

1925

Ms. Libby Davies

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Ms. Libby Davies

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Ken Epp

½

1930

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Ken Epp

½

1935

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Ms. Margaret Young

½

1940

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Ms. Margaret Young

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Ken Epp

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

½

1945

Ms. Margaret Young

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan

½

1950

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

½

1955

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Jacques Saada

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

¾

2000

Mr. Jacques Saada

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Jacques Saada

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Ms. Libby Davies

The Chair

Ms. Libby Davies

The Chair

¾

2005

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

---

CANADA

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

---

NUMBER 009

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Wednesday, November 27, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¼  (1840)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.)): Colleagues, I call this meeting to order.

    We're here pursuant to the committee's mandate under Standing Order 108 (3)(a)(iii), consideration of matters related to the inclusion of a code of conduct in the Standing Orders of the House. This is a short round table meeting on that topic. For the benefit of people who are watching it, when it says “the inclusion of a code of conduct in the Standing Orders of the House”, this is consideration of the ethics proposal that has been placed before this committee. We have already had one public meeting, televised, with the Honourable John Manley, who is the minister responsible for this legislation. We also had a detailed briefing meeting, in which our staff provided us with materials on ethics legislation in the other provinces and other jurisdictions. Our last meeting was a most interesting one, in which the witnesses were the ethics commissioners for Saskatchewan, Alberta, and the Northwest Territories; the commissioner for the Northwest Territories, Ted Hughes, was previously the ethics commissioner for British Columbia. I think, colleagues, you'll agree, that was a very interesting meeting.

    I would go around the table and ask people to say who they are, including staff who are present.

    The Clerk of the Committee: Thomas Hall, clerk of the committee.

    Mr. Ken Epp (Elk Island, Canadian Alliance): I'm Ken Epp. I have the dubious distinction of having served on this committee, on and off, ever since I have been here. We worked on the Lobbyists Registration Act in 1995 and the Milliken-Oliver report. The committee at that time was seized of exactly the same thing we're working on now, to produce a code of ethics for members of Parliament and senators. So we went through, I think, about a year and a half of work at that time and produced a very good report, which, of course, was shelved the next time the House was prorogued, and it's now being ressurrected. I'm very keenly interested in this topic and glad to be able to participate.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik (Brandon—Souris, PC): My name is Rick Borotsik. I'm the whip of the Progressive Conservative Party and a member of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, and certainly one who is most interested in the ethics package, the code of conduct package, whichever way you wish to describe it.

    I would just like to say, Mr. Chairman, that the number of people turning out at this round table is not necessarily indicative of the interest that's out there. I can assure you that the majority of my caucus members are very interested in the ethics package. They are very interested in putting their opinions forward, and in deference to the chair, I would like to simply say that this meeting was on short notice, so not a lot of people were able to get out of their commitments for this evening, and there are a number of commitments, as you're aware, in the House calendar. There are a lot of committees and a lot of other functions going on. So I would say, Mr. Chairman, that we should, as a committee, attempt to have a round table scheduled some time in advance, so people can shape their agendas around that.

    I agree with you, I think one of the most interesting meetings we had was with the three commissioners just recently. There are a number of issues, and I'm really interested in hearing Marlene' s presentation, but as I see it, spousal disclosure is going to be a major part of where we will probably end up going on this package. The other aspect is the appointment of the commissioner and the term of office of the commissioner. These, I think, will be issues we're going to deal with.

    I'm pleased to be a starting part of this. And, Mr. Epp, I have no doubt there will be some closure to this issue when this committee finishes its deliberations and we will have the package come forward.

¼  (1845)  

    Mr. Ken Epp: I think this time it might happen.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: It's going to happen, I can assure you.

    Ms. Libby Davies (Vancouver East, NDP): I'm Libby Davies. I'm the NDP representative on the committee this evening. I'm from Vancouver East, and I look forward to the discussion tonight.

    The Chair: We also have some observers.

    Mr. Gregory Tardi (Senior Legal Counsel, Legal Services, Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel Office, House of Commons): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Greg Tardi. I'm senior legal counsel with the Office of the Law Clerk, Legal Services, here in the capacity of an observer.

    The Chair: Greg, we appreciate your coming.

    Martin.

    Mr. Martin Champoux (Legislative Assistant, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister): Thank you, Mr. Chair. My name is Martin Champoux. I'm here as an observer from John Manley's office.

    The Chair: Thank you.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada (Brossard—La Prairie, Lib.): Good evening. My name is Jacques Saada and I am the member of Parliament for Brossard-La Prairie. If you don't mind, I will be coming and going between this meeting and the Board of Internal Economy.

[English]

    The Chair: Okay.

    Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.): I am Geoff Regan, member of Parliament for Halifax West and Parliamentary Secretary to the Government House Leader, a member of the committee. As Rick was saying, there have been quite a few other meetings already, and we had caucus meetings discussing this, where there were very large turnouts and a lot of interest. I heard this meeting was being postponed at one point today, and then I learned later that it was back on.

    The Chair: When it gets back to me, I will explain what happened.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): I am Marlene Jennings, member of Parliament for Notre-Dame-de-Grace--Lachine, situated on the island of Montreal, and also Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for International Cooperation. I came from the foreign affairs committee, which is completing a study on North American integration, to attend this round table, and I want to thank the committee for holding the round table.

    Ms. Margaret Young (Committee Researcher): I am Margaret Young, Parliamentary Research Branch.

    Mr. James Robertson (Committee Researcher): I am James Robertson, Parliamentary Research Branch.

    The Chair: I thank you all very much.

    Let me explain. The steering committee of our committee directed me to organize various activities associated with our study of the ethics package, one of them being a round table open to members of Parliament. They instructed me to do that in a relatively short period of time. As the regular committee members here know, originally we thought of tonight, but then it clashed with a number of things. We then tried to move it to next Tuesday, and then to next Wednesday, and we were thinking of moving it to the following Tuesday and Wednesday. That proved to be impossible. We brought it back to today. That's why it's at short notice, and as the advertisement for the meeting said, the committee will be glad to organize another such round table.

    I would propose we proceed as follows. Marlene Jennings has a presentation, which I have certainly seen. Marlene, we would be grateful if you would speak to your suggestion, and then perhaps we could ask you questions and give you some indication of what has been happening in our committee on matters that relate to your presentation. Is that okay with you?

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: That's fine.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada: Point of order, Mr. Chair. It will take just a moment, Marlene; I apologize.

    I would like a clarification on something. Given that we have not been able to schedule for Tuesday or Wednesday next the meeting that we are holding tonight, and given that this will bring us already to the second week in December and that we do want to organize another session, which I find legitimate, does that mean that we accept in principle, from the start, that this will be postponed to February?

[English]

    The Chair: That might be what will happen. I'd take some direction. It is impossible to find a Tuesday night or a Wednesday night, which are the nights the steering committee directed me towards, before Christmas. The standing committee is finishing its work. Each party is organizing its Christmas party at a different time. We have a common agreement not to clash with those. The other alternative, Jacques, is that we organize a meeting while the House is sitting and invite MPs to come. If the committee wants me to try that, I will. Okay?

    Marlene Jennings.

¼  (1850)  

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Thank you, and I would like to thank all the members of the standing committee for this opportunity to share with you some of my ideas on the ethics package. Before beginning, I'd like to explain a little about who I am, and that would explain my interest in the area.

    I'm a lawyer by training, and in 1988 I was appointed by the Quebec government as a member of the Quebec Police Commission, which had been established in 1968. I was the first woman to be appointed a commissioner, and I was the first non-white. In 1990 the Quebec government undertook a major overhaul of its regulatory, administrative, and quasi-judicial systems regulating police forces that came under provincial jurisdiction, scrapped the Quebec Police Commission, and established a three-tiered system of police ethics with a code of ethics. It was the first province in Canada to establish a formal code of ethics for police officers. Other provinces followed afterwards.

    Its model was completely innovative. It was completely independent. It was a civilian oversight of law enforcement. The first level was the police ethics commissioner, with three deputy commissioners. I was appointed deputy commissioner and remained in that position from 1990 until I ran for federal politics in 1997. It was, as I said, innovative, and we had many jurisdictions across the world coming to look at the Quebec model.

    You had the police ethics commissioner, with the deputy commissioners, who had exclusive jurisdiction to receive, examine, and investigate complaints from any person alleging that a police officer had violated the code of ethics. Once it was investigated-- just to explain the system--the ethics commissioner and deputy commissioners virtually acted as what we would see as police officers and as prosecutors. We investigated the complaint, and as with police investigations, the investigations were not public. Once the investigation was completed, there was a determination as to whether or not to bring charges. They were called citations. Those citations were tabled before a quasi-judicial tribunal, which was called the police ethics committee, made up of civilians, lawyers, and police officers. They had exclusive jurisdiction to hold a public hearing, like a criminal hearing or any quasi-judicial hearing. As in criminal cases you have the charges of the Crown versus the accused, in this case it was the police ethics commissioner versus the police officer being charged. We had the burden to bring the evidence before the committee, and if the committee, upon completing their hearing, deemed that the police officer had in fact violated the code, they had the authority to impose sanctions, which went all the way up to dismissal from the force. Police chiefs and the government had no discretion in the matter. If the committee ordered a dismissal or a suspension or a demotion, the police chief for the police force concerned had to impose it.

    As a result of my experience there, I helped found the Canadian Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement. We were consulted by the Solicitor General when the Solicitor General was looking to modernize the system of handling public complaints for the RCMP. I was also consulted by the consultants who were hired by National Defence, as a result of the Somalia inquiry, to look at establishing a system of police ethics for the military police. A whole system came into place that was similar to the system that exists in Quebec right now.

¼  (1855)  

    I was also a member of the International Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement from 1988 until I ran for federal politics, and in the last three years before I had to resign as an active member I was vice-president; under the rules, at the next election I would have automatically become the president. As such, I had been consulted by French authorities, Belgian authorities, the U.K., Israel, Hungary, and South Africa on a system of ethics that could be used for policing or for other areas. The U.K. adopted similar models, as did South Africa and Belgium. So I have a bit of experience and some ideas on the issue. That's who I am.

    The second point I want to make is that I embrace wholeheartedly the idea of a code of ethics for parliamentarians. I have not given reflection to what the contents of that should be, but I do embrace it. So my comments will not address what should be in the code of ethics. What my proposal addresses is the mechanism I feel is required to implement any code of ethics for parliamentarians the house deems required and adopts.

    I have brought along copies of my proposal. Unfortunately, although I am fluently bilingual, I did not have sufficient time to translate it--I usually do my own translation. I do have it here in English and would like to distribute it. However, if your rules are similar to those of other standing committees, where no material is distributed to members until it's available in both official languages, that's fine. I will table a copy with the clerk.

    The Chair: We'd be glad to have it translated and circulated. If you want to make it available informally, that's up to you, but as a committee, we would not circulate it unless it's translated. I'd be glad to take a copy, and we'll see that it's translated, and all members of the committee will get it.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Thank you.

    Mr. Ken Epp: Just leave it at the table and we can pick it up.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Sure, if you want to take a copy right now.

    The ethics counsellor was created when the Liberals came to power in 1993. One of the problems is, obviously, that the office was not independent, appointed by the Prime Minister, reporting to the Prime Minister, but beyond that is the fact that you had a twinning of functions. The counsellor received the declarations of assets, the disclosure statements of the members of the executive and parliamentary secretaries, public office-holders, and at the same time investigated those same individuals. The fact that you had a twinning of these functions led, in my view, to a weakening of the credibility of the office itself. Therefore, I think it is fundamental, if one wishes to put into place a system of implementation of a code of ethics, whether it's for parliamentarians or for police officers or for doctors or lawyers, that you have a separation of the functions. Each officer has to be independent of the other, with exclusive jurisdiction. It creates tension, which I think is healthy.

    Let me give you an example. My proposal is that you would have an independent ethics advisor. That advisor would have exclusive jurisdiction to receive mandatory statements from all parliamentarians, including those MPs who, by virtue of the Prime Minister's appointment, are also public officers, ministers, secretaries of state, parliamentary secretaries. That independent ethics advisor would provide advice and counsel to any parliamentarian who so requests. Any such communications shall be confidential, except when the parliamentarian voluntarily and formally waives this seal of confidentiality, in accordance with whatever procedure the House would prescribe. And the advisor would have to report annually to the House of Commons.

    If it goes by the act of Parliament and the same system is adopted in the Senate, fine, but I'm looking at the House of Commons. I think the mandate of such an advisor should be a minimum of five years, a maximum of ten years.

    The second tier would be the independent parliamentary ethics commissioner. That ethics commissioner would have exclusive jurisdiction to receive, examine, and investigate any complaint from a parliamentarian that alleges that the conduct of another parliamentarian is in violation of the code of ethics for parliamentarians. The independent ethics commissioner, upon examination of any complaint, may deem that it warrants inquiry. The purpose of such an inquiry would be to determine whether indeed the conduct of the parliamentarian who is the object of the complaint constitutes a violation of the code of ethics for parliamentarians. The independent ethics commissioner would have authority to call witnesses and receive pertinent evidence, so as to establish the basis for such a determination. I propose that hearings be public, except when, in the judgment of the ethics commissioner, a closed hearing is required either to ensure the integrity of the evidence or to protect the safety of the witness, for instance.

    The ethics commissioner shall report his or her findings and conclusions to the House of Commons, and if that commissioner has deemed that the evidence shows--and I think that the standard of proof should be quite high--that the conduct of the parliamentarian was in fact a violation of the code, he or she may make recommendations as to sanctions, remedial action, whatever, and can also propose improvements to the parliamentary rules and procedures regulating parliamentary affairs.

½  (1900)  

    One of my experiences as both a member of the Police Commission and as deputy commissioner is that at times the behaviour has been completely in conformity with rules and procedures, but those rules and procedures no longer correspond to reality and need to be modernized and updated. In such a case you find that the person has not violated the code of ethics, but that it or some rule or procedure should be modernized.

    It would be Parliament, in this case the House of Commons, that upon receipt of the report, would determine whether or not we are going to implement the recommendations.

    The last point would be on the issue of public office-holders. Under our constitutional system the Prime Minister has executive powers. We have an executive, we have a legislature, we have a judiciary. With the executive powers, the Prime Minister does have the exclusive right to appoint ministers and public office-holders. This being so, I believe, if a parliamentarian's behaviour is the object of an investigation, the report should go both to the House and to the Prime Minister, but the authority for following the recommendations, implementing them, deciding not to implement them, where it concerns sanctions on the parliamentarian, should remain with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister would have the duty and the responsibility of justification. If it's an ordinary parliamentarian, the House would make that determination, and I think, constitutionally, we have no choice, because the executive power for the appointment of public office-holders and for sanctions remains with the Prime Minister. So I think that has to be there, but to ensure that there is accountability and transparency, the report is public, and the House can decide that it wishes to debate it, it wishes to make recommendations to the Prime Minster, whatever. Yet the ultimate decision, if the parliamentarian is a public office-holder, a member of cabinet, secretary of state, parliamentary secretary, would remain with the Prime Minister.

½  (1905)  

    The Chair: Marlene, thank you very much for that. You obviously have a great deal of experience. It's not for me to comment, but it's interesting how it impinges on the discussions we've already had.

    Jacques Saada, then Rick Borotsik.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada: Mr. Chair, first of all, I do want to thank Marlene for having taken the time to prepare all of this and for presenting it to us tonight. I must say that I am very much partial to the idea of separating the roles of the advisor and that of the commissionner, or whatever title we might chose, but I still have one question in this regard.

    If both offices are so independent from each other--and I understand that their terms of reference would be specific, that each would have a specific area of authority--is there not a point at which it would be important for the ethics advisor to be able to disclose the information that he has in his position in order to protect the member of Parliament within the investigation that is being made by the ethics commissionner?

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I believe that it should be up to the member of Parliament to decide. In order to ensure that parliamentarians have full confidence when they ask for advice to the ethics advisor, it must be up to the parliamentarian to decide whether to wave the seal of confidentiality.

    Mr. Jacques Saada: That is also how I understood it.

    I have a second issue to raise. In all of this, Marlene, you mentioned MPs and Senators. One question that is frequently raised is that of the spouses.

    Can you tell me what you think about that?

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Since I said from the start that I would speak only about the tools that we should be using in my view in order to implement the code of ethics, my proposal does not deal with the issue of the content of the code. I am a parliamentary secretary and, under the code that already exist for us, I have had to make a disclosure and my spouse, my husband has also had to make--

    Mr. Jacques Saada: I understand that.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: So, personally, I do not have any fundamental objection to the spouses being required to make a disclosure.

[English]

I would be prepared to live with whatever decision the majority of the House takes. If the majority of the House deems that it should only be the parliamentarian, I'll live with it. If it deems that the spouses must disclose as well, I will live with that. I'm not tied to either one.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada: I would like to raise one small detail. I am sure that it is only a typo, but I want to make sure that I have understood correctly. In the part that concerns the remedial action, on page 3, at the bottom of the page, there is a chart. It reads:

[English]

    “By the House of Commons alone”. “By the Senate alone”. If you go down “By the Senate alone,” you have a motion to the Senate, not the House of Commons, right? Okay.

    The Chair: Rick Borotsik, then Libby Davies, then Ken Epp.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to Marlene. That was well prepared and based on an awful lot of experience.

    There are differences between a law enforcement review agency, if you will, and this particular code of ethics. Obviously, you had other issues to deal with, breach of trust, excess force. Lots of issues you dealt with we certainly would not be dealing with in this particular code. But I am intrigued by your proposal. When we had our session today, one of the things that came to the forefront from all three of the commissioners was that they saw their job more as you've identified here, as an advisor, an individual a parliamentarian could approach and say, this is the scenario, this is the situation, I want your advice as to whether in fact it is a conflict, and if it is, what I should be doing in order not to become caught up in that conflict. And I see that as a position. Is there a possibility in your model that the advisor and the ethics commissioner could be one person? Because it is in those other jurisdictions. One individual is both the advisor and the commissioner who ultimately has the power to take it further, to sit as judge and jury, if you will, and go through the whole process. Could you see it as being that one individual, as opposed to two?

½  (1910)  

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I have a fundamental problem with the same office being the advisor and the investigator and the jury. Most police commissions and commissions for other sectors of activity were created in the sixties and the seventies, and they usually had a triple mandate. They had the power to regulate the jurisdiction they were over, whether they were police or in another area. They had administrative authority, similar to that of the Auditor General, to go in and do audits and develop rules and procedures as to how you're supposed to have your filing, the physical lay-out, etc. And they had quasi-judicial powers. They had the power to investigate, hold public inquiries, and make recommendations and blame the conduct of an officer or blast a whole police force and recommend sanctions. One of the problems was that over time, the public lost confidence, because of the the twinning, the overlapping of these jurisdictions. And the people who were regulated by the regulations or by codes or whatever also lost confidence.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: One of the other things that was mentioned quite loudly in our session was the appointment of the individual, regardless of whether it would be an advisor or a commissioner. In almost all jurisdictions that appointment is made by the individuals he is representing, meaning the parliamentarians. One had a two-thirds requirement of approval, the other was a simple majority. The people he was representing had to have respect for the individual, so they had the right to appoint. That is not one of the proposals in this particular package. How do you see that? Do you think it should be an appointment of the parliamentarians themselves? Because we have to respect the individual enough to be able to go to him or her and say, here is my problem. How do you see that?

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: When I originally put my thoughts down on paper, the first point was the selection. I say it is to be made by order in council following mandatory consultation with all parties. I've since had discussions with members of my own caucus, and a very important point has been raised. If we go that route, it could be open to legal challenges, and you could actually envisage legal challenges by third parties. So I started to rethink that part, and I honestly think we should be looking at creating a position or two positions similar to what we have with the Speaker. Possibly through our Standing Orders, we should look at creating the system of implementation other than through legislative means, in order to protect us from the possibility of challenges. I think the only people who should be able to file a complaint are parliamentarians. If any third party thinks they have grounds or evidence that a parliamentarian has violated the code of ethics, I think they have to bring it to a parliamentarian and convince that parliamentarian to bring it forward. I think that will force us to deal with the system honestly and carefully and thoughtfully, rather than something like, I got into a fight with Rick Borotsik because he didn't support my motion, and maybe I'm a vengeful person, and so two weeks or two months down the line I file a complaint.

    Whatever the code of ethics is, it should have a mechanism for the ethics commissioner who receives the complaint to deem that the complaint is frivolous, to deem that it is vexatious. That's why I say the level of evidence needs to be fairly high, because we're dealing with parliamentarians. We are the ultimate authority. We can say the Supreme Court of Canada, with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, has gained an enormous place in our legislation, but whatever they decide, we can come back and legislate again.

½  (1915)  

    The Chair: Can I make a comment on that? One of the commissioners, in answer to a question--I think it was Rick's question--about who can lay a complaint, why members of the public shouldn't be able to lay a complaint, said, in his experience, there was never any problem finding an MP who would lay the complaint.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: Opposition MP is what he said.

    The Chair: In other words, the public could find a member of Parliament to carry a complaint forward.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: One of my experiences as a member of the Police Commission and as a deputy commissioner for police ethics was that one of the weaknesses in our system was that when we found the complaint was clearly frivolous or clearly vexatious, there was no authority to even recommend a sanction against the individual who filed that vexatious complaint. So the person who ended up being the victim of that complaint had their reputation sullied and had no means to even go before a civil court and file for defamation or for damage. If there is that mechanism, it provides a break, so that people will think twice. That's why I said I could get into an argument with one of my own colleagues or an opposition colleague, decide I'm going to file a complaint, and make up any kind of allegation. So I think the committee needs to look at that aspect as well.

    The Chair: Libby Davies, followed by Ken Epp.

    Ms. Libby Davies: Thank you very much.

    Marlene, thank you for coming and presenting such a thoughtful model that can really be looked at in a very pragmatic way.

    I wanted to go back to the Quebec model you spoke about. I do agree totally that the roles have to be separated between the advisor and the investigator, or the commissioner who receives the complaint. Otherwise, there would be a real conflict of interest. Not only would it place that person in a difficult role, I think it would also inhibit members of Parliament from going to even get advice, and it seems to me that's a big part of it, to get sound advice on potential problem areas.

    You referred quite a lot to the civilian oversight. To be the devil's advocate, why should we be exempt from any sort of civilian oversight? I hear what you're saying about bringing a complain forward, that it would be one of your peers who does that, but basically, you're saying the commissioner would conduct an inquiry, and then recommendations would go to a committee of the house, so it would be, in effect, a committee of your peers that would make a decision. In your mind, is there anything to say why we should be differentiated from what apparently has been a fairly strong model for all other kinds of agencies?

    Second, with your three tiers on the last page, the commissioner gets to decide whether or not there's going to be an inquiry. That person would investigate, and then decide whether there are grounds to proceed or not. If there are, there would be an inquiry. If they make a decision not to, what would happen then? What if, for whatever reason, the commissioner says there's not enough there to investigate? Does that complainant have any other recourse to say, well, I don't agree with you? It leaves that side of it unsaid, so maybe you could respond to that as well.

½  (1920)  

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: That's a really good point, Libby.

    On the civilian oversight, the ethics advisor and commissioner would be non-parliamentarians. That's where you have your civilian oversight, in the sense that they're not parliamentarians and they are independent. They have their own authority established under either legislation or standing rules, but they have it in the same way the Speaker of the House, under our Standing Orders and rules and procedures, has supreme authority unless the house changes the rules. Right now, when the Speaker says, I am not receiving that motion that's been tabled in the House, it's not received, or that point of order is out of order. So it is civilian, in the sense that it's non-parliamentarian. When we talk about civilian, it basically means people who are not in the profession that is covered by the code. So it was non-police officers. When you talk about judges, you're talking about non-judges.

    Ms. Libby Davies: Did you not say that when an inquiry took place, it actually went before a committee?

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: A civilian, a lawyer, and a police officer.

    Ms. Libby Davies: So it wasn't peers within the police department or whatever. Even that part of the process was a civilian oversight.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: We're legislators. We're elected to legislate and to adopt or to reject policies the governing party brings before us. We have our constitutional role to play. That's why I think we should have the burden, once there's been an investigation and a finding, if that finding is negative towards the parliamentarian whose conduct was the object of the complaint and investigation, of the determination as to whether or not we're going to implement those recommendations. And then we turn around and we are accountable, individually and collectively, to our electorate.

    Ms. Libby Davies: So the fact that we're elected is, you're saying, where the accountability lies.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I think there needs to be a difference, yes.

    Ms. Libby Davies: And could you answer the second question? If the commissioner decides not to investigate further and have an inquiry, what recourse is there for anybody at that point?

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I think the committeee should look at the possiblity of establishing some kind of mechanism whereby the complainer could go before a committee or before the House on a motion. If the ethics commissioner deems that the complaint is not worthy of an investigation, obviously, there would have to be a report. The decision would be made public and would be tabled in the House with the the reasons that decision has been made. But I do think you're right that the parliamentarian who filed the complaint should have some mechanism for review of that decision, and this committee should look at what that mechanism should be. Should it be a motion before the House that the House has no choice but to examine, debate, and vote on? Or do they refer it to a committee, and the committee makes that determination? I think it's a good point, there should be some mechanism, because a mistake can be made, new evidence can turn up.

½  (1925)  

    Ms. Libby Davies: Or sometimes the areas are very grey, right?

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Because it's not black and white.

    Ms. Libby Davies: There might be borderline cases.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: If a complaint is borderline, it should normally go to some kind of investigation.

    The Chair: Ken.

    Mr. Ken Epp: Thank you very much, and thank you also, Ms. Jennings, for appearing here. It's nice to see you a little closer. Usually, we're more than two sword lengths apart.

    I found it interesting in your preamble to hear of your experiences with the Police Commission. One of the things I think is different here is that Parliament actually is the highest court of the land. I wonder whether, as a lawyer, you think it's a good idea for us, as parliamentarians, to introduce perhaps a lay element, citizens who might be chosen by some mechanism, to help with enforcing the code of ethics. Is that a strange reversal? What would be your response to that?

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I think it is imperative that we have an independent ethics counsellor or advisor, an independent ethics commissioner, and that the individuals who occupy those positions not be parliamentarians. I think, if they were parliamentarians, it would not take as long as it took for the internal investigative systems of handling complaints that used to exist in the judiciary, in the police, in law enforcement, to become discredited, both with police officers, if it was the issue of police officers, and with the public, precisely because it's internal, and therefore there's always the suspicion that the individual holding that position is not impartial, is not objective, and right off the bat, it undermines the credibility of the office. My concern is with protecting the credibility of the office. I was elected June 2, 1997. I see that Mr. Wilson is here, the ethics counsellor, and I've watched over close to six years now the difficulties he has faced, not because he's not an honest man and, in my view, an objective one, but simply by virtue of the manner in which his office was set up. It inevitably had to lead to a discrediting of the office itself. I think it's really unfortunate. Since I've become a parliamentary secretary, I've had the opportunity to consult with his office, and I've found that the thinking is clear, it's objective, but because there were the problems with being appointed solely by the Prime Minister, reporting solely to the Prime Minister, combining receiving the disclosure and investigating, that led to an undermining of the credibility of that office. So I think the individuals who hold the office, whether it's one or two, need to be non-parliamentarians.

    Mr. Ken Epp: I find it curious that you would want to have two individuals here. Here's the practical dilemma. As a parliamentarian just wondering about something you're about to embark on being within the rules or outside the rules, you don't normally go to the ethics advisor or ethics commissioner, because either what you're doing is clearly okay and there's no problem or it's so clear that you shouldn't do it that you just don't. But every once in a while there's going to be a line, and that's when you need advice. What would happen if you go to the independent advisor and he says, I think that's okay, but afterwards somebody lodges a complaint about what you've done, and now you go to another person and he says, wow, I don't believe you could be so unethical? Now your advice turns out to be good for nothing, because it came from a different person. That might be an argument for having a single individual, because if the person has given you advice that this was okay, when you actually follow that advice and do it, you've got at least a line of defence: I did this on advice by this individual, and I got it because I knew that I needed advice. You can defend yourself. Otherwise, you'd just be hung out there to dry.

½  (1930)  

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: That is an excellent question you've just posed. That is precisely why it should be two individuals. I have gone to the independent ethics advisor making my mandatory disclosure, and six months down the line I say, I've been asked to do this, or, I thought of doing something, but I' m not sure; is it okay under the code of ethics? The ethics advisor takes all the facts, does checking, comes back and gives me an informed decision that in their view, this is perfectly coherent with and respectful of the code of ethics, not a violation of the code of ethics. Probably that would be documented, by the way. Then, a year down the line, you learn that I did whatever it was and you go to file a formal complaint with the independent ethics commissioner. I then have the opportunity, if I so wish, to waive the seal of confidentiality the ethics advisor is under. That ethics advisor would then file the document to show that I went to him or her and that I was clearly advised that the action I wanted to take was, in the view of the ethics advisor, not a violation of the code of ethics. So that's a defence.

    If the ethics commissioner decides, I'm not sure about this, I'm going to dig a bit further, and then conducts an inquiry, should the ethics commissioner decide that indeed the action was a violation of the code of ethics, then--and you can find jurisprudence just about across the board, with doctors, lawyers, any profession--that is what we call mitigating evidence, and it's a legitimate defence. The ethics counsellor could then find that the conduct in question was a violation of the code of ethics, but given that it was done on the advice of the ethics counsellor, no sanctions should be imposed. What that does then is create what we would call a bank of jurisprudence for the ethics advisor. And the ethics advisor, if I've waived the seal of confidentiality, could appear before the ethics commissioner and explain the reasons it was not, in their view, a violation. Once those final decisions come out, it creates a bank of jurisprudence, and that's where you have a code of ethics that is not static, but continues to evolve, and it creates what I call that healthy tension between the advisor and the commissioner.

    Mr. Ken Epp: That's a very good argument. You won yours and I won mine.

    I think this is one that maybe we should all ask, not only the parliamentarians who are here today, but all 301 of them. How comfortable do we actually feel building a code of ethics and a whole regime for lodging complaints and getting a resolution and recommendations, even up to losing your seat and so on, when in fact--and I guess our researchers could help us here--in my recollection, there hasn't been a single case of an ordinary backbench parliamentarian acting so unethically that it would have warranted a hearing? It's always been in the higher echelons, in the executive branch, where these difficulties have occurred. So why would we want to go this route?

½  (1935)  

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I can think of maybe two former members of Parliament who had to resign their seats. They were just backbenchers, and were found guilty of influence peddling and that. These accusations came about when they were members of Parliament. I'm just giving you an example to say the fact that one is a backbencher does not mean one does not commit errors of ethics.

    The Chair: Ken, if I could, Marlene is a parliamentary secretary, and I was a parliamentary secretary. When I became one, I found the advice side of what we're discussing extremely useful in the general case. It was a very thoughtful process, and it made my wife Jill and I think very carefully. Not that it was particularly complicated, but it made us address things we had not addressed before. So the advice side of this thing I think is very important.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: If I could add something on the advice side, I'm going to reveal part of my personal history. I have a brother and sister who are neither legally my brother and sister nor biologically my brother and sister, but they are my brother and sister. They are biologically brother and sister and became foster children in my home when I was a very young child. They were raised as my brother and sister, and they are my brother and sister. In fact, I'm closer to my younger brother than I am to my older brother, who is my biological brother. When I was appointed parliamentary secretary, since under the code of conflict my brother is not my brother, I did not have to make any declaration. But because he is my brother, even though under no law would he be considered my brother, I spoke to the ethics counsellor and had a long discussion. I said, I think I need to divulge this, because my brother is a business person and in the past has had dealings with the government and may in the future. We had, as Peter said, a very thoughtful discussion, and ultimately it was decided that I needed to declare the relationship.

    The Chair: Okay.

    Margy.

    Ms. Margaret Young: Although you haven't read the proposals, on your own you've come up with many of the same things that are in the package. So congratulations on that score.

    I wanted to continue with Mr. Epp's line of questioning--I won't accuse him of taking the words out of my mouth. It was suggested that if it's just one person who's both the advisor and the ethics counsellor, that person is somehow undermined if they're also investigating. I'm worried about the opposite. I'm worried about the position of the advisor being undermined if there is this other body that can make contrary decisions. Perhaps you might be interested to know the process is a bit simpler under the proposal. It's that the written opinion of the ethics commissioner, as long as all the facts had been provided, would be an absolute answer. So you would have the ethics commissioner investigating and saying, yes, the facts are square, so the complaint is dismissed. So it would be a little simpler.

    Mr. Epp's example was a good faith example. Suppose you had a member of Parliament who had some concerns and went to the advisor, and the advisor said, I think you have a potential problem--let's say it's using influence or whatever; I think, given what your holdings are and what you're proposing to do or what you're doing, you are not in compliance, and I recommend A, B, and C. Let's say the member doesn't want to do that, but walks away. Basically, his thinking would be, I'll take my chances with the independent ethics commission if and when I ever get a complaint, and it may never come to light. Does that not in some way undermine the position of the ethics advisor?

½  (1940)  

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Honestly, I don't think so. That could happen whether we had two offices or one office. If we had one office, the individual could simply not make a full disclosure and it may never be found out. So I think that that hypothetical could exist under either situation. I still come from a point that for me is fundamental, is almost in my bones after so many years of working with governance bodies. The advice function needs to be separate from the investigative function. I think there is a danger, as you said, if the ethics advisor continually gives advice that the ethics commissioner, if there are complaints, finds to be wrong. Then possibly we have the wrong person in the position, and we might want to think about changing that person. But I don't think it's any different from the Superior Court, Court of Appeals, Supreme Court, where it's a check. When the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Canada overturns a lower court decision, it then provides more food for thought and guidelines for the lower court for future cases. That's how I see it, and that's why I think it's a healthy thing to have two offices.

    Ms. Margaret Young: The chairman has granted me a supplementary question.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Go ahead, I'm enjoying this. This is the first time I've been a witness since I brought a complaint before the Minimum Wage Commission in Quebec when I was a teenager and won the case.

    Mr. Ken Epp: I just want to ask you a really quick question. You talked about the hearing part being public, and yet the proposal here is that it's going to be a private one, because if a person isn't guilty, then you don't drag his name through the mud, which in politics means a person's guilty when charged.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: The committee can decide, if you go with the tiered system, that it's not a public hearing. But I warn you that whatever system we put in place, the decisions will have to be public. Once only the decision is public and not the actual process that leads to that decision, you will have doubting Thomases everywhere, including in the House, calling into question the grounds and the credibility of that report. So I think we need to look seriously at having an open hearing, as the committees are open hearings, but at the same time, depending on the nature of the complaint or the evidence to be heard or the witnesses to be called, I think the ethics commissioner has to have full authority to decide that the inquiry should be in private. That is something we have seen often under commissions or boards, where they have had that authority.

    The Chair: We should go back to Margy, because it was her turn.

½  (1945)  

    Ms. Margaret Young: You talked about the creative tension between the ethics advisor and the independent ethics commissioner, but in the model you presented there is also a potential tension between those two and the committee. The proposal on the table is a little simpler, in that it's the ethics advisor who investigates and committee. So there is a tension, if you want. It could be a creative tension, it could be good, it could be bad, but there is, in a sense, an appeal or a check on the advisor. I would just point out that there is not a committee system in the provinces, and it still seems to work, but at the federal level, there at least is a committee system. Would that not be, in your view, an adequate balance of tension, so that, for example, if the committee felt the advisor had got it wrong, they could not only state so, but make recommendations for the House to change the Standing Orders and the code?

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: That could function as an appeal or a review, if it's the committee itself that receives the report and decides that maybe the ethics counsellor has got it wrong. That's where that third level comes into play, the supreme authority of Parliament and of the House. As I said, for me, it's fundamental. The advice and counselling function needs to be separate from the investigative function. As was raised both by Mr. Borotsik and by Mr. Epp, what if the member who brought the complaint, or it could be the committee, feels the ultimate report is not correct or adequate? I think that's where the ultimate authority comes to the third tier, which is the committee or the House or whichever function we choose for that final appeal or determination.

    The Chair: Colleagues, it's my intention to finish about 8 o'clock, if that's okay. I have a short question, then I have Jacques Saada, Geoff Regan, and Libby Davis.

    Marlene, I wondered if you'd just think aloud about what you said about an order in council appointment being open to legal challenge, the way in which these people are appointed. What did you mean by that?

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Some members of my caucus have raised the issue that if we go via a piece of legislation, that legislation can be contested. The ethics counsellor's jurisdiction could be contested by saying he's refusing, under mandamus, to exercise his authority, or the ethics commissioner. Theoretically, you could have court challenges asking for--

    The Chair: Simply because it's in law.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I have not researched that. That point has been raised to me by some of my colleagues who are lawyers. I'm suggesting to the committee, given that this was an issue raised to me, that you may wish to get your legal experts to look at whether or not that point is valid.

    The Chair: Thank you very much for that.

    Jacques Saada.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada: Mr. Chair, this is not my third round, only my second, but I will be pleased to yield to my colleague Geoff.

[English]

    The Chair: Okay. Geoff.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: Thank you, Jacques.

    I think many of us are probably trying to grapple with the new provisions and options we're looking at, as well as the many different viewpoints I've heard from colleagues about them. So as we go through this, I think it's helpful to test some of the ideas that are brought forward. On the question of civilian oversight, for example, what strikes me is this question. Is there a body in Canada, do you think, that has more civilian oversight, with the public watching them, the media watching? There are friends across the way--I won't say opponents--watching them. I don't think there is. That's something to consider for a moment.

    Also, if you're a minister or a parliamentary secretary, you must have a blind trust. You can't be involved in investing in various things and not knowing what's going on. But if you're not in cabinet, if you're a backbencher or the opposition, we aren't proposing to stop you from being able to invest in various companies or businesses, provided that you don't allow that to conflict with your actions in Parliament. But if you're investing in something, you go to the ethics advisor or ethics commissioner and say, look, here's what I plan to do, what do you think? He says, I think you're okay. I think you ought to be pretty darn confident. You want a guarantee, basically, you want to be able to say, with that guarantee, I can go ahead with this. And if you don't have that guarantee, what's the point of the ethics advisor?

½  (1950)  

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: That's like saying, what's the point of having a civil code in Quebec? If I want to conduct a business transaction, buying a piece of land or building or buying shares in a company, and I go to a law firm and seek a legal opinion as to whether I can do this under the law, under the civil code or the legislation for corporations, whatever piece of legislation it is, and I'm told yes, in my expert view, I can do that. I do it, and then somebody sues me--it's the same thing.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: We're not dealing with 6 or 7 million people in this case, we are dealing with 301, soon to be 306 or so. There is a question in my mind as to whether we can maintain a better simplicity, in view of the nature of the organization, the kinds of things we're dealing with, etc.

    Also, it seems to me that one way to solve this problem with the case where someone has been given advice and doesn't follow it is to compare the case of the commission, where the commissioner can require compliance, I think. Maybe we need a provision whereby the ethics advisor, if they're saying, here's what I want you to do, can require compliance and follow up to check on that. Maybe that's one of the ways to deal with it.

    Finally, I don't think cost should by any means be the overriding factor in whatever decisions we make about this, nor do I believe we can ignore the question of cost, because we do have a responsibility to taxpayers to try to provide a good system at the lowest cost possible to taxpayers.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Before I address that, I want to come back to the issue of what other group of people or bodies have more civilian oversight than we do. There is none, except that our oversight takes place every four to five years, concretely, given consequences that could call into question whether we are re-elected. That is every four to five years, when a national election is called. I'm talking about the case of backbenchers.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: We've seen cabinet ministers resign, in spite of the fact that there's not an election. I think the same thing could easily apply to members of Parliament. When the person becomes so embarrassed and publicly exposed in what they're doing, they're forced to resign. The public humiliation and the public outcry force it. I'm just grappling with it.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: You're grappling, I appreciate that.

½  (1955)  

    The Chair: I've been advised that if the tax department gives you advice, they cannot come after you later if the advice is wrong. Is that a different case?

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: If we have separate offices, the ethics advisor has given advice, and the parliamentarian has followed that advice, that's where waiving the seal of confidentiality comes into play. But I think you still need to have to have some kind of check, in case that advice was wrong.

    The Chair: Okay.

    Jacques Saada.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada: Mr. Chair, it is an issue that we have already raised with the ethics counsellors who came from different provinces to meet with us. It was mentioned earlier and I am really concerned with the answer that you have given us, Marlene, regarding the fact that the inquiry that could be made would be public.

    Contrary to a police officer, for example, or any other trade or profession, we are public figures. We are scrutinized by the public; we are not necessarily prominent, but we are public figures. Obviously, any publicly made allegation--and I believe that Ken was right in this regard--results in some people finding us guilty even before anything else happens. It seems to me that it is a complete aberration that we would allow publication of allegations until it has been proven, to the satisfaction of the people concerned, for example the commissionners, that there is indeed something to it, some misdoing.

    My question goes even further. Not only the ethics commissionner should keep the file confidential, but also, if I am not mistaken, the proposal provides that the name of the person who filed the complaint will not be disclosed to the person who is the object of the complaint. So we find ourselves in a situation where--

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I have not seen that proposal.

    Mr. Jacques Saada: No, I understand that, but I am presenting all these facts in order to explain the problem and the way that I see it. We have someone who, without necessarily being identified to his colleague, can file a complaint. The whole process is taking part in front of the public at large. Who is the looser in that process? It is the person being accused, even though no evidence has been provided yet, and the heart of the matter is that no guilt has been established. I believe that the only way to avoid that is to require the complainant, all the people involved and the person affected by the complaint to keep the matter entirely confidential and to provide for sanctions in case the secret is not kept, while the guilt or innocence of the person involved is being determined.

    I do not want to belabour the point, Mr. Chair, but let me just give a very simple example. Let us imagine that 25 days before an election—without getting into the technical problems, such as whether I am a member of Parliament or not, and so on—, by sheer coincidence, a letter lands on the ethics commissionner's desk. Some allegation is being made. If we follow a completely open and public process, I am finished. In 25 days, it is impossible for me to turn the situation around. It does not make sense. It becomes an instrument in the hands of people who could be motivated by political aims and not by the desire to implement the code of ethics and a standard of morality that must be the basis of everything that we are doing as members of Parliament.

    I do not agree that the process be public. If a police officer is involved in a public process, it is quite conceivable that he would be allowed to keep working, with pay, or he could be put on leave without pay, but who would know and recognize the police officer when he is walking in the street? Nobody. By contrast, everyone will recognize the MP, believe you me. I have a serious problem with that.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I would like to raise two points. I did not have time to read the proposal yet, but if you are saying that the identity of the person who is filing the complaint would be kept secret, even from the person whose conduct is the object of the complaint,--

¾  (2000)  

    Mr. Jacques Saada: Exactly. That is exactly what is indicated in the bill.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: --this raises a serious problem. As for the arguments that you have raised on the issue of the public inquiry, these are good arguments. It is a subject matter that the committee could examine in depth, and it could decide that inquiries would not be public. That is something that you could easily decide upon. But precisely, because you have made good arguments, the only thing that I want to add is that you must realize that this process would be perceived negatively by the public.

    Mr. Jacques Saada: The process, perhaps, but if we do not put it into place, it is the individual being complained about that will be hard hit.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Yes. If we are prepared in a majority to assume the responsibility of our decision, if we believe that there are good reasons for the inquiry and the hearings on the complaint not being public, for my part, I am prepared to accept it.

[English]

    The Chair: It's not our purpose tonight to decide these things, but to get on the record the questions and the ideas, and that's exactly what we're doing.

    Libby Davis.

    Ms. Libby Davies: I wanted to pick up on this point as well, following Mr. Epp, because it seems to me there's a clear difference with the commissioner who receives the complaint, conducts the investigation, and having determined that there is some foundation to the complaint, decides to issue a hearing. Up until that point it would not have been public. That's a very important point. I would argue that we are in the public realm, and so we are held up maybe to a higher scrutiny. Look at what happens now. It's public anyway, and there's no process. It's all smears and allegations, it's controlled by the media, and it seems to me we've got the worst of all possible scenarios right now. It's very public, and the person who's actually being complained about has very little recourse to defend himself in a due process kind of way. So I actually would not be so concerned about that being public, as long as there's due process.

    The other point I wanted to raise is this. Marlene, you may not be able to answer this, but maybe the researchers can. Do we know from other jurisdictions whether most complaints have to do with business connections? Is that where most of these kinds of ethical issues arise? Or what is it? I'm just curious to know. Has anybody tracked that, either in Canada or in other parliamentary jurisdictions?

    The Chair: From the commissioners we heard the other day, it does seem to me that a great deal of it has to do with business and your profession and sorting that out. At the provincial level, not the federal level--we will have at least one witness who will be dealing with the federal level later on--a very high percentage of their work was in Marlene's tier one, that's my impression. It is advice, prevention, solving matters in some way that is appropriate. In fact, I think one of them even mentioned a member deciding to resign, not because there was something wrong, but because he or she wanted to pursue a certain track.

    Libby, go ahead.

    Ms. Libby Davies: That's fine.

    The Chair: I will wind this up in a moment, colleagues, but going back to the point we made about checks and balances, I've been advised about the position of the jurisconsult in Quebec. Quebec, we have learned, does not have a commissioner of this type, but my understanding is that the members of the National Assembly can go to a private company and get advice there. The jurisconsult in Quebec provides that if a member of the Assemblée nationale seeks advice and the facts presented are correct, the member is protected against legal challenge if he or she has followed that advice. I thought we should have that on the record here.

¾  (2005)  

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I thank you for that. I think that's a point the committee should look at. With the example Mr. Epp raised, if the member followed the advice, should that be a protection against any procedure against him or her?

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    Colleagues and observers, I want to thank you for this evening. This has been a very useful contribution to our exercise. As I pointed out at the beginning, this is now our fourth meeting. We have others planned, we have other witnesses we will be hearing from. It is our sincere hope that we'll move the House of Commons, as the Senate is looking at this matter itself, towards something very useful.

    Marlene has one more comment, I believe.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I just want to thank the members of this committee for listening to me and for the thoughtful questions you asked, including the staff. You've forced me to reflect on some points I had not looked at in the area of parliamentarians, as opposed to another area of activity, and I feel a heck of a lot more confident, as a parliamentarian, knowing you specifically are the ones looking at it. It's inspired confidence in me that you're asking a lot of good questions and you're reflecting. So I want to thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you very much for that, Marlene.

    Colleagues, at our meeting tomorrow, which is at 11 o'clock in our usual room, 112 North, the first hour has to do with this topic, and then we move on to consideration of the reform of private members' business we are discussing.

    The meeting is adjourned.