HAFF Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, June 10, 2003

Á

1145

The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.))

Mr. Ken Epp (Elk Island, Canadian Alliance)

Á

1150

The Chair

Mr. Mitch Bloom (Privy Council Officer, Machinery of Government, Privy Council Office)

Mr. Ronald Wall (Director, Parliamentary Operations, Legislation and House Planning/Counsel, Privy Council Office)

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin (Acadie—Bathurst, NDP)

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond (Beauport—Montmorency—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île-d'Orléans, BQ)

Á

1155

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond

The Chair

Mr. Rodger Cuzner (Bras d'Or—Cape Breton, Lib.)

The Chair

Â

1200

Mr. Jacques Saada (Brossard—La Prairie, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

Â

1205

The Chair

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

The Chair

Mr. Ronald Wall

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Ronald Wall

Mr. Ken Epp

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

Â

1210

The Chair

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada

The Chair

Â

1215

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

The Chair

Mr. Mitch Bloom

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada

Mr. Ronald Wall

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada

Mr. Ronald Wall

Â

1220

Mr. Jacques Saada

Mr. Ronald Wall

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond

The Chair

Ms. Margaret Young (Committee Researcher)

The Chair

Â

1225

Mr. Michel Guimond

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp

Â

1230

The Chair

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Catterall (Ottawa West—Nepean, Lib.)

Â

1235

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp

Â

1240

The Chair

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

The Chair

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

The Chair

Mr. Gerald Keddy (South Shore, PC)

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp

Â

1245

The Chair

The Clerk of the Committee (Mr. Thomas Hall)

Ms. Margaret Young

Mr. Ken Epp

Ms. Margaret Young

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp

Ms. Margaret Young

The Chair

The Clerk

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Gerald Keddy

Â

1250

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada

The Chair

Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds—Grenville, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Gerald Keddy

The Chair

Mr. Gerald Keddy

Â

1255

The Chair

Mr. Joe Jordan

Mr. Ronald Wall

The Chair

Mr. Gerald Keddy

The Chair

Mr. Joe Jordan

Mr. Gerald Keddy

The Chair

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

The Chair

Mr. Gerald Keddy

·

1300

The Chair

Mr. Joe Jordan

The Chair

Mr. Gerald Keddy

The Chair

Mr. Gerald Keddy

·

1305

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Gerald Keddy

Mr. Ken Epp

Mr. Gerald Keddy

Mr. Ken Epp

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

The Chair

Mr. Rodger Cuzner

The Chair

Mr. Gerald Keddy

The Chair

---

CANADA

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

---

NUMBER 053

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, June 10, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Á  (1145)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.)): If we could begin, colleagues, the order of the day is Bill C-34, an act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act (Ethics Commissioner and Senate Ethics Officer) and other acts in consequence, and we're at the clause-by-clause stage.

    I believe you have with the agenda both the list of clauses and, under clause 4, a series of amendments that are numbered by party. The top one is CA-1, in the name of Ken Epp.

    What I would propose, colleagues, is simply to proceed through the items listed under clause-by-clause consideration, and I'll move from one clause to the next, expecting you to stop me when you think I should. I'm obviously going to stop at clause 4 to consider the amendments we have before us.

    (Clauses 1 to 3 inclusive agreed to)

    (On clause 4)

    The Chair: Now we come to consideration of clause 4 and CA-1 in the name of Ken Epp. Ken, would you refer to that. Colleagues, you can see where it fits in the bill, lines 6 to 9 on page 5 of the bill.

[Translation]

    In the French version, we're dealing with lines 5 to 9.

[English]

    Mr. Ken Epp (Elk Island, Canadian Alliance): I would like to take the opportunity to appeal to my fellow committee members here to make a very important correction to this bill. It's often stated that this Ethics Commissioner is going to be independent. It's one of our greatest concerns, and I think it should be the concern of every member of this Parliament if you think of the fact that while there are some of us in opposition and some in government right now, this can and will change. There has never yet been a party in power indefinitely in this country. Eventually it will change, so I would encourage all of you on the other side to think a little in advance as to your own protection for such time as you're not in the position of privilege you now are.

    The reason for this amendment is that instead of the Prime Minister recruiting the Ethics Commissioner, this procedure would change it so the thing would be taken out of the PMO and given much more to the members themselves. We're proposing here that the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, this committee, conduct a search and inquiry according to a procedure either they determine or that is determined by resolution of the House. In other words, the initial recruitment would be done not by the Prime Minister but instead by an all-party committee of the House, such as this committee. This would make it more independent not only in appearance but in reality. Remember, one of the purposes of going through all of this is to increase public trust in government by having an Ethics Commissioner who is truly independent of the government currently in power.

    If that commissioner was not chosen really, totally independently, it would mean that when he or she gave a ruling on an investigation, we'd come to the same thing we have now with our good friend Howard Wilson. Probably none of us have any problems with him as an individual, but he couldn't escape the charges that he was a lapdog and that he was part of the damage control team simply because he was appointed by the Prime Minister and answered to the Prime Minister. I think that this is a very important resolution.

    So we're saying in proposed new paragraph 72.01(a) that this committee will do the initial recruitment.

    Second, in proposed new paragraph 72.01(b) we're saying this committee, before it reports to the House on the choice of the person, will select the candidate by a two-thirds majority vote in this committee. This is totally acceptable; we have advice that there's nothing wrong with requiring such a majority, notwithstanding that for most votes it's a simple majority. In this one we could say two-thirds is required.

    And again, in speaking in favour of this I would urge you to consider, what Ethics Commissioner applicant would want the job if they didn't have overwhelming support in this committee? All we're doing is codifying what should have been there anyway and what I would hope will be there when the process actually comes into place.

    The last part of this particular amendment says that when this is sent for ratification in the House, it will have to have a two-thirds majority of the vote of the members present there.

    Now, I notice that some of the other members have put in amendments to that effect as well. I've just received these and was only able to spend a few minutes looking at them while we were waiting for the vote, so I haven't really had a chance to study them in depth. I wish we'd had a day between receiving them and actually doing this clause-by-clause, but I think that one of these amendments should be accepted.

    I of course am speaking in favour of mine right now. There should be a vote of two-thirds of the members present. And again I repeat, what person would want the job if on day one it's only a squeaker, like an election in New Brunswick or something? You want it to be decisive; you want it to be a really solid vote of support for that person from all parties on both sides of the House.

Á  (1150)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Ken.

    And colleagues, I've asked the appropriate questions about the two-thirds majorities, particularly the one in the House, and although there are complications with that, this is procedurally in order.

    I'll go to Yvon Godin first, but before that, for the record, could Mitch and Ron introduce themselves.

    Mr. Mitch Bloom (Privy Council Officer, Machinery of Government, Privy Council Office): Yes, I'm Mitch Bloom; I'm with the Privy Council Office.

    Mr. Ronald Wall (Director, Parliamentary Operations, Legislation and House Planning/Counsel, Privy Council Office): I'm Ron Wall, also with the Privy Council Office.

    The Chair: Thanks, gentlemen.

    Yvon Godin.

[Translation]

    Mr. Yvon Godin (Acadie—Bathurst, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I support this motion. Given everything that's gone on in the past, the need has been expressed for an ethics commissioner for members in order to win over the public's trust and to keep the public informed of the actions of parliamentarians.

    I'd like the members of the government party to know that they shouldn't expect the Liberals to remain in power forever, or even for the next 100 years. As we saw happen in New Brunswick, the political landscape can change in the blink of an eye. One day, some of you may be sitting on the other side of the table. Therefore, it's important to ensure that all Canadians are able to place their trust in Parliament. That's my take on the situation.

    The same holds true if we change the way we do things and accept a 50 per cent plus one vote. We can't leave it up to the Prime Minister to tell his MPs, ministers and everyone else that this is the way things work or that this is how the government will act. If we don't change things, there will always be some lingering doubts.

    The issue here is appointing an ethics commissioner to oversee MPs. If the commissioner reports to Parliament, then a two-thirds majority vote must be required, that is the majority of MPs must agree on the choice of ethics commissioner. I don't see any alternative, otherwise, we are not doing our job. We would be better off eliminating the position and admitting that we don't need an ethics commissioner in the first place. The person appointed would not have the respect he or she deserves and three or four years down the road, the question would be revisited. People will claim that the commissioner isn't trusted because he or she was appointed by the government or that the Prime Minister forced the government's hand with this appointment.

    We want to earn the trust of Canadians. It should be remembered that, according to statistics, politicians are the least trusted officials in Canada. That's unacceptable. Moreover, it's totally unacceptable that something isn't being done to change this perception.

    The best way to alter people's perception is to adopt concrete initiatives, such as deciding to have the ethics commissioner chosen by a two-third majority vote of Parliament. It's critically important that the ethics commissioner be chosen by Parliament, not by the government.

    I hope that my comments will prompt all committee members to support this motion so that we can present this proposal to Parliament. We're talking about an ethics commissioner for members, not an ethics commissioner for government or for ministers. The ethics commissioner would work on behalf of all Members of Parliament.

    Why then object to the commissioner being selected by a majority vote by members? The majority needs to be large enough to dispel any doubts in the public's mind. Regardless of who the Prime Minister may be, we have to dispel any doubt that the Prime Minister will be the person appointing the ethics commissioner. The Prime Minister could be representing another party for all I care. We need to stop fighting one another on this issue in the House of Commons and accusing members of not doing their job. If the ethics commissioner fails to do his job, then Parliament, and not just the government, will have an opportunity to make its views known.

[English]

    The Chair: Merci, Yvon.

    Michel Guimond.

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Guimond (Beauport—Montmorency—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île-d'Orléans, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I too would like to voice my support for this amendment. However, I do have a question for my colleague Mr. Epp. His amendment clearly says: “but only after the following steps have been taken:”. My question concerns the step set out in paragraph (a):

(a) The Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs has conducted a search and inquiry, according to such procedure it may determine or as may be determined by the House of Commons by resolution, as to those persons who...

    I'd like Mr. Epp to explain to me what he means by “search and inquiry”. I'm left with the impression that committee members are being cast more or less in the role of headhunters.

    If this process were in place today, how would Mr. Epp suggest the House go about passing a resolution? How would this work? Would we become headhunters, so to speak? Would we receive expert advice? Would we chart our observations? Would we be responsible for interviewing prospective candidates? I'm merely trying to understand how the process would work.

Á  (1155)  

[English]

    The Chair: Ken Epp.

    Mr. Ken Epp: Thank you.

    I think there are a number of different scenarios that could play themselves out. The way it is right now, by whatever process, the Prime Minister comes up with a name. Is that a friend of the Prime Minister's? Is it a political patronage appointment? How does he come up with the name?

    There is a way of doing that. We feel that instead of prescribing it right in the bill, we should give the flexibility to the procedure and house affairs committee to come up with a proposal themselves--well, they would do it in any case--or if they wanted to, they could even get the concurrence of the House for the procedure by report to the House and by concurrence in the House on that report.

    You may say that we'd just be headhunters, but I think it could quite properly be advertised: we're looking for an independent Ethics Commissioner. There could be an advertisement and it would get some publicity, I'll guarantee you, because it's a new position now. I think there would be quite a bit of publicity and people would know about it and say, hey, I think I can apply for that.

    I see nothing wrong with this committee vetting a list, choosing the top candidates, and actually interviewing them. I think that would be a very good procedure, but at this stage I wouldn't want to set that in stone because this committee may come up with yet another method. Maybe they'd want to have the shortlisting done by an external group. I would give them that freedom, provided the committee of the day agreed to that.

    In any case, it's far superior to just the Prime Minister of the day coming up with one of his favourite friends and saying, this is it. I'm not suggesting that this is what happens in the appointment of other officers of Parliament, but it is a possibility that could happen; this would guard against it, so it's an improvement.

    The Chair: Thank you, Ken.

    Michel, I understand some headhunters shrink the heads when they've collected them. Do you think this presents some prospects for this committee?

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

    Mr. Michel Guimond: This is the reason I made this joke a year and a half before the election. I'd like to offer my services.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    The Chair: Rodger Cuzner.

    Mr. Rodger Cuzner (Bras d'Or—Cape Breton, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, this is something that was discussed at great length here in committee. Certainly, I think the process that's being put forward goes beyond even the checks here.

    As Mr. Epp had indicated, the name is put forward by the Prime Minister, but through consultation that candidate has to receive full support from the leaders of each of the parties. So really, there would have to be unanimous support for the candidate coming through that process. Then it would go to the House, and we would be able to vote on it on the floor of the House by a majority. That reflects how all matters are passed in the House, by a simple majority, and I'm very confident in the system.

    The Chair: Jacques Saada.

  (1200)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada (Brossard—La Prairie, Lib.): First of all, Mr. Chairman, a consultation with the leaders of the different parties in the House should suffice, since Members have a certain amount of confidence in their leaders.

    I feel that with this proposal, we run the risk of Americanizing the way we do business in committee. In the United States, committees do indeed have a similar responsibility. However, I have many reservations about giving a committee, whether this or any other one, randomly selected responsibilities. We operate here in an entirely different manner.

    In order to uphold our commitments, it's important for the House to have its say. In my opinion, consulting the party leaders guarantees the credibility of potential candidates. This approach should suffice to ensure the integrity of the process.

[English]

    The Chair: Mr. Epp.

    Mr. Ken Epp: Mr. Chairman and fellow committee members, let's really stop to think about what these two gentlemen have just said. They say that right now everything is fine. It isn't. It isn't because it's inadequate to have in the legislation just that there shall be consultation with the parties, and I'll tell you why.

    I was for many years involved in union/professional association negotiations for collective agreements; that was part of my work. We had some consultation clauses in there, and sometimes they worked and sometimes they didn't, depending on the whim of the person who had the bigger stick. We had too many situations where consultation meant someone wrote you a memo and told you what they were going to do or they called you into the office and said, this is what we've decided; now we've consulted.

    Unless you say specifically that the consultation must include reaching unanimous consent among the House leaders, then it is improper in this place to say this is what's required because it isn't, and I say that most respectfully.

    Consultation has a whole, wide gamut of meaning, and I think if you want to say that it requires unanimous consent of the House leaders of the recognized parties in the House, then put forward such an amendment. Of course, we prefer this, but that would be an alternative. Just to leave it as straight “after consultation” falls very much short of the process we're looking for.

    Again, it could be that you folks on the other side will be in power for the next 20 years, but remember, you are also the ones--or do I have to speak through you, Mr. Chairman?

    The Chair: Ken, you're doing very well, thank you very much.

    Mr. Ken Epp: You're also the ones who have brought this bill forward. Why did you bring it forward? Why don't you leave it the way it is now with the present ethics counsellor appointed by and answerable to the Prime Minister only?

    You're doing this to correct a perception, and I think that if you keep things the way they are, doing the same thing again is not going to change the perception of the public, whereas if you go to something like this, where there is somehow an explicit form for all-party agreement, then the trust on the part of the public out there is going to increase.

    I just appeal to you to do this. It's totally doable.

    As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, I think that under the present rules, even if this amendment weren't done, probably most of the time we'd get the same person or a similar person anyway. I would think we would get the majority of the parties voting in favour of the person put forward just as we voted for Howard Wilson. We supported him way back; we had trust in him as a person.

    I think putting it into the bill, codifying what should be happening anyway, can only increase trust.

    The Chair: Thanks, Ken.

    Yvon, speak briefly if possible because I want to call this amendment.

[Translation]

    Mr. Yvon Godin: I'll be brief, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Cuzner indicated that the selection would have to be approved by the leaders, but consultation is only just that, namely consultation. I'd like an expert definition of the term, because all of the definitions that I've seen, whether in agreements, or elsewhere, refer to...I can consult you, but this doesn't mean that I agree with you. I'm not saying Mr. Cuzner misspoke, but my interpretation is somewhat different.

  (1205)  

[English]

    The Chair: Rodger, very briefly if you would.

    Mr. Rodger Cuzner: In his presentation last week the minister cited a specific example where consultations had taken place with all leaders. There was not unanimous consent or support, and since the name put forward did not have the confidence of the leaders, the name was withdrawn. There was a specific case he referred to.

    I don't know if you need more information on that. Ron?

    The Chair: Ron Wall.

    Mr. Ronald Wall: Monsieur Godin is correct that the consultation does not require the formal agreement of the party leaders, but as Minister Boudria indicated and as Mr. Cuzner has just said, unless there were broad support among all the parties, particularly given the position, the person's name could not go forward.

    The provincial commissioners have testified that they need the support of more than just the governing party. They need the support of all parts of their houses for such a person to be effective.

    The Chair: Ken Epp.

    Mr. Ken Epp: Could you just clarify something. You said the name could not go forward. Wouldn't it be more accurate to say it normally wouldn't go forward?

    Mr. Ronald Wall: Yes, that's exactly what Minister Boudria indicated.

    Mr. Ken Epp: Thank you.

    The Chair: I'm going to call CA-1.

    (Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings])

    The Chair: Can we go to NDP-1, which deals with somewhat the same lines in the bill. Yvon Godin.

[Translation]

    Mr. Yvon Godin: The only difference is that it doesn't say the choice is left to the committee. It mentions 66 per cent of the Members present.

    The gentleman was saying that a person wouldn't want to become ethics commissioner if he or she did not have the backing of the majority of members of all parties. If that's true, then the ethics commissioner will feel even more reassured if he or she receives the support of 66 per cent of the members. That's more than just consultation and it's more than a 51 per cent majority.

    I think that in order to better serve the public and members, it's important to have the support of at least 66 per cent of members, for the same reasons given earlier, except that the decision is not left to the committee. Earlier, there was mention of having the support of the majority of committee members, but in this case, we're talking about 66 per cent of the Members of Parliament. As a parliamentarian, I have troubling accepting that this is the way things are routinely done. Our job is to initiate changes. That would put an end to the in-fighting and ensure that we do not have to revisit the issue in a year's time.

    Perhaps I sound like a broken record, but I believe this is important. We'd no longer have to raise our voices in protest in the House of Commons, because it will no longer be a matter involving the committee or the House leader, but rather the government, the authority responsible for appointing the person in question by a majority vote of 50 per cent plus one.

    We need to act for the sake of democracy and to gain the public's respect. I can never say this loud enough, because it is my fervent belief. The ethics commissioner should be chosen by a 66 per cent majority of Members of Parliament. Otherwise, there's no point in having an ethics commissioner at all, because the same doubts will persist. And, it's these very doubts that we must dispel from people's minds.

  (1210)  

[English]

    The Chair: Rodger Cuzner.

    Mr. Rodger Cuzner: Mr. Chairman, for pretty much the same reasons stated with respect to the last amendment, the government will not support this amendment. As the committee knows, Standing Order 111 provides for a simple majority for appointing all officers of Parliament, and this is supported unanimously in the 2001 modernization committee report. The Ethics Commissioner would be selected the same way other officers of Parliament are.

    The Chair: I'll call NDP-1.

    (Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings])

    The Chair: Colleagues, in the absence of our PC colleague, I am quite willing to jump to BQ-1 now if you are.

    Michel.

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Guimond: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Our amendment takes a different direction that the current bill. Amendment BQ-1, which I have moved on behalf of my party, stipulates that the Commissioner has the power to investigate potential breaches of ethics, not only by MPs, but also by MPs acting in their capacity of ministers.

    There's no need for me to re-read the amendment, because I'm sure you have at least a Grade 3 education and can read as well as I can. The amendment specifies that the objective is not only to regulate the conduct of Members of Parliament, but also the conduct of all parliamentarians, including ministers.

    Before you turn the floor over to someone else, I just want to say that I spoke to this amendment at the start of our proceedings, that is when the committee heard from ministers Boudria and Manley.

[English]

    The Chair: I raised this issue myself in a general way the last time we discussed this.

    Jacques Saada.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada: Mr. Chairman, I have certain reservations about the wording of the provision itself as well as about the Bloc's proposed amendment. I understand very well the fundamental difference between parliamentarians and Members of Parliament. The first is a generic term, while the second is specific. However, I'm not satisfied with the answer I received when this issue was broached for the very first time. When we talk about the conduct of MPs, we're talking about something much broader than ethics as they pertain to MPs.

    I'm concerned that the provision itself, as well as the proposed amendment, may be too broadly worded. Whether or not I agree with the Bloc's proposed amendment aimed at including ministers, I want to be certain that we're not giving the commissioner too broad a mandate.

[English]

    The Chair: Rodger, the general point I had in mind has to do with whether it is truly possible to imagine a minister being treated under the members' code alone. That was the sort of thing where I tried to think of an example but couldn't.

    Anyway, Rodger Cuzner.

  (1215)  

    Mr. Rodger Cuzner: I don't know, maybe one of the officials might want to cite an example as well. The provisions in this particular proposed subsection are very much the same as what they have in the U.K. and it's quite reflective of what's called for in the Milliken-Oliver report. If you wanted to cite an example, would that be of benefit to most?

    The Chair: Mitch Bloom.

    Mr. Mitch Bloom: After last Thursday I went and did a bit more research, looking at the U.K., which is the best example here because their system virtually mirrors what we have here. I looked at the guide for the Commissioner for Standards, where he explains how he sees his functions. Of course, he makes it very clear his functions do not extend to the Prime Minister's code, which is even more substantive than this Prime Minister's code, but he did highlight examples.

    Again, it becomes a function of what the code is like, so it's difficult for me to predict, not knowing what the House code will be. For the U.K. he cited motions in the House and votes in the House. Activities around question period were particularly problematic in the U.K., which led to a whole series of rules being introduced about five years ago. These were all activities that were within the ambit of being a member of Parliament and outside the scope of the executive activities of being a minister.

    Again, if I don't know what the House code will cover, it's difficult to be more specific.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Yes, please, Jacques Saada.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada: I'm not certain that the response supplied by Mr. Mitch Bloom really answers my question or that of Mr. Guimond. Could someone tell me if the expression “govern the conduct of parliamentarians“ applies exclusively to matters of ethics?

    Consider the following, very simple example. I represent my constituents. Imagine if I were to refuse to speak to a voter for some reason. It could always happen. Would the commissioner have a mandate to investigate this type of incident? My conduct is in question, but not from an ethical standpoint. Do we have any assurances that the commissioner's mandate will be restricted to issues involving ethical considerations?

[English]

    Mr. Ronald Wall: I agree with you; I think you're exactly right. That's why Bill C-34 has that additional language that says the House code applies to members, including ministers, when they're acting as members. The amendment would take out the part where they're acting “as members”, and it would therefore create some confusion about whether the ministers' code or the House code was applying.

    What Bill C-34 does is to create greater certainty that when they're acting as members, the House code applies, and when they're elsewhere acting as ministers, the ministerial code applies.

    The Chair: Jacques Saada.

    Mr. Jacques Saada: It's about the fact that you have this phrase “as members”. In the example I gave you I was also a member. If this doesn't satisfy me in terms of making sure this thing is not fishing too wide, isn't there a way to introduce wording that is going to reassure me in terms of specifically referring to the ethics of my behaviour and not my behaviour as a member of Parliament?

    In other words, I'm perfectly at ease with the commissioner having a key role as far as regulating or governing my ethics as a member of Parliament is concerned but not for my behaviour as a member of Parliament, which goes far beyond the notion of ethics.

    Mr. Ronald Wall: Well, you're correct in that as well, but the details you're talking about will be in the House of Commons code itself. All Bill C-34 does is say the House of Commons is going to set up some rules governing conflict of interest for members of the House of Commons. Those that are done, for example, are under the Standing Orders, and a draft of that document has been prepared that lists the details of various forms of conflict of interest behaviour.

    Bill C-34 doesn't have any of the specific rules. That would all be done in a House code if the House were to proceed with that.

    Similarly, the Prime Minister's code is a document that's been tabled by the Prime Minister, and all Bill C-34 does is say the Ethics Commissioner administers the provisions of the Prime Minister's code and makes sure they apply to ministers when they're acting as ministers. It sets out two different systems, two different structures, for handling the different aspects, whether you're wearing a hat as a minister or a hat as a member.

    The risk of this amendment, I think, is that it removes that clarification as to which hat you're going to be wearing.

  (1220)  

    Mr. Jacques Saada: Are you saying that

[Translation]

    “perform the duties and functions assigned by the House of Commons” is a reference to the duties and functions defined in the code that is to be adopted by the House of Commons. Correct?

    Mr. Ronald Wall: That's correct.

    The Chair: Mr. Guimond.

    Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Bloom ultimately provided the response I was seeking. The commissioner derives his powers from the code of ethics that will be adopted. Therefore, we are indeed talking about duties and functions assigned to him by the House of Commons for governing the conduct of parliamentarians. We're not talking about conduct in the broader sense of the word. Remember, we're talking here about an ethics commissioner. If you believe it's important for the commissioner to play a role in terms of ministers' conduct, then you will back my amendment. If you believe ministers should be treated differently, then you'll defeat the amendment. If you do not want to see ministers receive special treatment, then vote in favour of the proposal; if you believe they should be treated differently, then vote accordingly.

[English]

    The Chair: I'll call BQ-1.

    (Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings])

    The Chair: Colleagues, before I proceed to the next amendment on our list, I think this is the appropriate place to draw your attention to something. You all received a letter from Howie Wilson, the ethics counsellor, and you have that material. This was not received in the normal way, as a normal part of the amending procedure of this legislation, but given the fact that Mr. Wilson has been very cooperative with this committee, I think we should at least mention the items he's concerned with.

    This particular part of his letter deals with proposed subsection 72.04(3) of the bill and suggests a new subsection, 72.04(3.1). I will read it in English and then I will ask Margie to comment on it briefly. By the way, this is the best way I can think of to do it at the moment in courtesy to Mr. Wilson. The new proposed subsection would read as follows:

Such officers and employees as are necessary to enable the Ethics Commissioner to perform the duties and functions of the Commissioner under this Act or any other Act of Parliament shall be appointed in accordance with the Public Service Employment Act.

    My understanding of that is that they would in fact be members of the public service.

    Margie, do you want to comment on that?

    Ms. Margaret Young (Committee Researcher): Yes, they would be members of the public service; they would be government employees and they would be subject to whatever hiring rules are in force for the public service. This is my understanding.

    The way it is now, the current bill does not say that the Ethics Commissioner's employees do not receive such benefits as, for example, coverage under the Public Service Superannuation Act. They would be part of the pension scheme of the public service. It would just change the flexibility the Ethics Commissioner has with regard to the hiring of his staff.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Is there any discussion of this, colleagues?

    Michel Guimond.

  (1225)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Guimond: If we receive 30 other letters of a similar nature, will we afford them the same consideration, Mr. Chairman? We are parliamentarians and we are elected officials. I suggest Mr. Wilson get himself elected to represent a particular party and that he submit some proposals to his caucus. I could have people with other concerns submit 30 more letters. I would rather we focus on the amendments on the table.

[English]

    The Chair: I know, and as I explained, I felt it was a courtesy. This is a person who has worked diligently under difficult circumstances and who has cooperated with this committee on this legislation in the past. I felt it was appropriate to have it as part of the record.

    Is there any further discussion? I would like to move on.

    Jacques Saada.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada: Mr. Chairman, on the one hand, I appreciate Mr. Guimond's concerns, but on the other hand, we need to recognize that these recommendations were made in conjunction with an appearance before the committee. We did not necessarily single them out. Was this intentional, or merely an oversight?

[English]

    The Chair: I said I understand those points, but I as chair am mentioning these things on the record because I think that in this particular case.... Unless there's huge concern in the committee, unless it's something that seizes the committee, it's not going to take up a great deal of time, okay?

    We're on NDP-2. Yvon Godin.

[Translation]

    Mr. Yvon Godin: The amendment's focus is similar to Michel's amendment, the difference being that the wording is more direct. The amendment reads as follows:

conduct of its members, including ministers of the Crown and parliamentary secretaries, when carrying out the duties and functions of their office as members, and, as the case may be, ministers of the Crown and parliamentary secretaries, of that House.

    It should be remembered that a minister can wield tremendous influence, either in terms of doling out financial assistance, either in terms of the work done by an agency. A minister can always claim to have acted as a Member of Parliament, or for the welfare of his constituents. This issue is unclear and it would be best to include this wording. No one would then be able to hide behind the ethics commissioner. Currently, a minister can play hide-and-seek, and wear two hats. If one hat doesn't fit, he can simply put on a new one. I think everything should be spelled out clearly.

[English]

    The Chair: I call NDP-2.

    (Amendment negatived)

    The Chair: We're on CA-2. Ken.

    Mr. Ken Epp: Thank you very much.

    This amendment CA-2 is again, I think, a very important amendment. One of the concerns the public has with ethics in government is that it seems when there are problems, 99.999% of them come from ministers. I have not in the last 10 years become aware of any problems that have arisen from members of Parliament acting as members of Parliament if they are not ministers or parliamentary secretaries, etc., yet here we have a bill that proposes to fix all the problems with members of Parliament. This amendment is designed to more tightly pull the web around ministers who are in a position to make these errors we want to hold them accountable for.

    It's on page 7 of the bill, and the significant thing here is that first of all we're saying there can be rules and obligations established not only by the Prime Minister but also by the Government of Canada. In other words, different ministers in the different portfolios they hold may have requirements within those departments that have to do with ethical conduct, and those rules can be established not necessarily just by the Prime Minister. It broadens the scope of who can make these rules for the public good, and also in a way it reduces the Prime Minister's direct involvement in this stuff, which is one of the sources of considerable objection from the public and certainly from members of Parliament.

    The second part that's changed here is the replacement of two words in the third-last line of proposed subsection 72.05(4), line 18. The surrounding text now reads “the administration of any ethical principles, rules or obligations established by the Prime Minister for public office holders, and applicable to ministers of the Crown, ministers of state or parliamentary secretaries, ” and then there are the two words “is not” followed by “within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Commissioner under subsection (1) or the committee.”

    In other words, whenever the person is acting as a public office holder, he is now being taken out of the area of jurisdiction of the Ethics Commissioner for the purposes of this bill, so exactly what we're trying to solve is hereby excluded. I think we should remember that the other day when the minister, Mr. Boudria, was giving testimony here in committee, he explicitly said that a minister is always a minister.

    Put it this way. I'm not convinced that it would be wise of this committee to, with this, basically give ministers a wholesale exemption from the code, which I think is the result here. If the minister is always a minister and this says “the administration of any ethical principles”, etc., established by the Prime Minister is “not within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Commissioner under subsection (1)”, it means the end of the public disclosure. It means the end of actually reporting to the public when something goes wrong, so we never will know as people.

    I won't go into the details, but we all know the eight or ten cases we've had in the last ten years. We never will get answers to them, so what's the purpose of this whole exercise?

    My amendment, as you can see, replaces the words “is not within the jurisdiction” with “are all within the jurisdiction”. In other words, this brings every minister acting as a minister or not into the circle of ethics rules that are going to be prescribed in our code of conduct.

    I think this is a very important amendment, and notwithstanding any instructions you may have received to automatically vote against any opposition amendments, I would urge you to exercise independent thinking here and actually carry this amendment because it is of utmost importance. It is the difference between making this bill a workable, trustable document and set of rules and just basically going through a farce of a procedure here with no results in the end.

  (1230)  

    Now, I've stated it very strongly, and I certainly would welcome any questions and comments from those on the other side, who have numerical control over what happens here. Do you have any questions? Engage me in debate on this thing. Don't just sit there and vote against it.

    The Chair: Rodger Cuzner.

    Mr. Rodger Cuzner: It's probably not fair to comment on what the minister was thinking when he said that a minister is always a minister. I would think he was probably looking at the fact that the criteria that surround a minister's conduct are probably more stringent, because his conduct bears greater scrutiny, than what we're going to propose as a code of conduct for members. But still, the bill makes provision for both groups, where members will fall under the scrutiny of the House code of conduct and where ministers will be responsible under the code put forward by the Prime Minister.

    The Chair: Marlene.

    Ms. Marlene Catterall (Ottawa West—Nepean, Lib.): I'm sorry, I know we're anxious to proceed with this, Mr. Chair, but I think Mr. Epp has made some unfortunate comments that really don't stand up to scrutiny in the light of the work this committee has already done on this issue. Remember that we reviewed a draft bill and reported to Parliament on it. We worked through a number of issues as a committee. I don't think anybody was following instructions; we were putting our minds towards producing the best results for Parliament and the public. I really find those kinds of comment quite unfortunate.

    Mr. Epp has urged those of us on this side to debate. Well, I would urge him to review the principles of responsible government. One of the fundamental principles of responsible government is that the Prime Minister and no one else is accountable for the actions of his ministers. He chooses them, he gives them their mandate, and he is responsible for their performance and for their conformity to a code of decent conduct as to whether they're avoiding conflict of interest.

    This was the point made by the ethics counsellor we now have, who said that he could not be responsible for disciplining ministers. Only the Prime Minister could do that; only the Prime Minister can be accountable for their actions and their performance.

    I think we heard the same thing again with respect to how this issue was treated in the British Parliament. I am not aware of any other Parliament where it's treated any differently, because it is such a fundamental principle of responsible government.

    Nonetheless, the issue of how we reconcile the two codes with respect to ministers was raised with the minister when he was here, and some suggestions were made as to how this issue might be addressed in the legislation. Although it's not in this particular clause, I would appreciate, once we've disposed of this, knowing what if any recommendations are being made as to how to rationalize the two codes with respect to ministers.

    Thank you.

  (1235)  

    The Chair: Ken Epp.

    Mr. Ken Epp: Thank you.

    I appreciate that point of view, and I know that technically this is correct. The problem is, how do we as parliamentarians, both backbenchers...well, non-cabinet ministers and non-government; I'm thinking about government versus Parliament. How do we ever get answers to questions that remain unanswered?

    Now, there may be a cabinet shuffle and there may be more members shuffled than just those involved in a current controversy. But as soon as that happens, under the present rules in the House we are not permitted to ask any questions of the minister about his previous portfolio, while the minister who's currently in the portfolio says, it wasn't done under my watch. As a result, we never get any answers and this stuff is never exposed.

    Then add to that the fact that both before and after this bill, all the work of the ethics counsellor or commissioner with respect to public office holders remains secret as being between the commissioner and the Prime Minister, and there never is a public disclosure made. As I understand it, that's not going to change under this bill. The only public disclosure is the part that is done for members of Parliament, and I find that objectionable.

    I would also like to say with respect to the selection of the commissioner requiring a two-thirds vote and to whether there is a single set of rules for all of Parliament, cabinet ministers and others alike, all we need to do is look at the model in British Columbia, where there is a two-thirds majority vote. There is an all-party committee that selects the commissioner, and the same rules apply to all members of Parliament, including the cabinet. So when the member opposite says she doesn't know of any other jurisdiction where it's done differently, well, there's one example I know of, British Columbia, and it was brought to the attention of this committee.

    I think we err here, and if the members aren't prepared to accept this amendment, then I don't know, with all this work over the last 10 years, Mr. Chairman, whether we will have accomplished what we really set out to do. That is to bring true accountability and transparency to the whole process of government, to the letting of contracts and all these different aspects that so heavily weigh on us here.

    I guess that's my piece.

  (1240)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Ken.

    Colleagues, you will note that the next amendment, NDP-3, deals with the same line, so I'm going to call this amendment now. We can continue with this discussion, including a response to Marlene, in considering NDP-3. Then for your point of view, Gerald, what we will do is, we will come back to PC-1 but we will do one more before to give you time to get your head around it.

    Colleagues, I'm going to call CA-2.

    (Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings])

    The Chair: Rodger, I'm in your hands. Do you want to add to Marlene's remarks or do you want to do that when we've heard from Yvon Godin on this motion?

    Mr. Rodger Cuzner: No, I'll let her remarks stand.

    The Chair: We're on NDP-3, then.

    Yvon Godin.

[Translation]

    Mr. Yvon Godin: We're proposing to delete the word “not” so that the administration of ethics principles and the like applicable to ministers of the Crown and parliamentary secretaries is within the jurisdiction of the ethics commissioner, for the same reasons given earlier. In my opinion, the text, as worded, is confusing and if anyone tries to hide behind someone else, surely it will be because of this provision.

[English]

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Rodger Cuzner.

    Mr. Rodger Cuzner: I think the bill clearly identifies that the ministers are subject to the Prime Minister's code, so we won't support the amendment.

    The Chair: I call NDP-3.

    (Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings])

    The Chair: Colleagues, we'll now go back to PC-1; we'll do PC-1, PC-2, and PC-3 at this time.

    Gerald Keddy.

    Mr. Gerald Keddy (South Shore, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The first amendment replaces lines 8 and 9 on page 5 with “House of Commons. The opinions and recommendations of the leaders of every recognized party shall be tabled in the House....” I don't have to put the rest of it in there. You can finish it for yourselves.

    I think the point of reporting the recommendations to the House is especially that it puts the recommendations of the opposition leaders on the record. They may or may not agree with the appointment, and this is an opportunity in the process for us to ensure that their recommendations are not necessarily ignored.

    I would expect there would be a lot of consultation and discussion among government and opposition leaders, and I think it just makes it a more open process. If the Prime Minister gets to appoint the Ethics Commissioner, any reservations or protest on the part of the opposition should be made public and tabled in the House of Commons.

    As the bill exists right now, the final appointment is still in the Prime Minister's hands, and I would expect that opposition leaders would be respectful of the process. Obviously, they've been consulted on it and they've followed the process along. You can't exclude any member of the House from playing politics, but I don't look at this as an issue that is strictly political. It really does make the process more open and responsible for Canadians. There's a point to be made that if we have a public tabling in the House, Canadians will know whether the Prime Minister appointed someone against objections from the opposition.

    The Chair: Gerald, thank you very much. As you will realize, we discussed this line previously but in a different context.

    Ken Epp.

    Mr. Ken Epp: I think we all acknowledge that in the end, according to our Constitution, the appointment must be made by the governor in council. I think we accept that.

    What we're talking about here is what kind of process is gone through before that appointment can be made. That really is the question, and this is a follow-up on the same type of thing my amendments addressed. That is, what prior conditions should exist so as to enhance and increase the trust of the public and particularly members of Parliament on both sides of the House, people this Ethics Commissioner is going to have a great deal of influence on? I think we need to make sure this is as open and transparent as possible.

    Prior to your appearance here, Mr. Keddy, we already went through the fact that consultation does not require consent. It doesn't require unanimous consent, and it doesn't even really require consent in the strictest legal sense of the term. It simply means you've talked. I think it would indeed be unwise of a commissioner to accept the job...but there's nothing preventing the Prime Minister from appointing the person. There could be a worst-case scenario where the person who is appointed has support on the government side only.

    So I would concur in this. I would just like to ask a little question of our advisors here and then, if I may, follow up with another comment.

    My question is this. According to this amendment, the opinions and recommendations of the leaders of every party shall be tabled in the House of Commons. Could that be done by including minority reports in the report that is presented to the House? Upon concurrence in that report or even just by its being tabled in the House, that information would be furnished and, really, the conditions of this would be met.

  (1245)  

    The Chair: Thomas.

    The Clerk of the Committee (Mr. Thomas Hall): I'm not fully sure I understand the question, but the so-called minority reports, actually dissenting opinions and supplementary opinions, can under the Standing Orders only be attached to committee reports.

    Ms. Margaret Young: I don't have Standing Order 111.1 in front of me, but once the rules are changed, that's what will apply to a committee studying the appointment of the Ethics Commissioner. I think that committee's report is where, in Mr. Epp's opinion, a minority report could be appended. Is that what you mean, Mr. Epp?

    Mr. Ken Epp: Yes.

    Ms. Margaret Young: Yes, but do they report?

    The Chair: Ken, do you want to continue with that?

    Mr. Ken Epp: On this same topic, maybe I can get in another question that's closely related to it. That is, under the bill that's proposed here, does the vote in the House occur only after this committee reports? That's what is proposed here, right? And is there a requirement that this committee approve it before it's reported?

    Ms. Margaret Young: The bill makes no mention of referral to a committee. However, this committee has given an indication that it plans to amend the Standing Orders to require that the appointment of the Ethics Commissioner be considered in the same way officers of Parliament currently are, including the Auditor General, the Privacy Commissioner, the Information Commissioner, etc. It's that step that is not here because it couldn't be here, but it will be in the Standing Orders.

    The Chair: Thomas.

    The Clerk: Standing Order 111.1 doesn't require a report. It doesn't mention a report, but under Standing Order 108 the committee can report to the House on anything it studies.

    Mr. Ken Epp: In other words, this amendment proposed by Mr. Keddy would be totally in order because the appointment process would then come to where a report was required. I think, respectfully, folks, that this would be a very good step, that we do this reporting.

    Then I have one more question, and this one will be directed to Mr. Keddy. In the last sentence of your amendment you say “The appointment of the Ethics Commissioner shall then be approved by resolution of that House.” I think this presupposes it. I really wish you had put in there “shall be considered” for resolution of the House, because the House may decide not to carry it. That gives us a little bit of a dilemma in terms of voting for this motion exactly as it stands.

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: That's the wording that's in the bill now, “after approval of the appointment by resolution of that House”, and I expect the Ethics Commissioner will be approved by a resolution of the House the same as for the Speaker and so on.

    The only other comment I would add there, Mr. Epp, is that now it says “after consultation with the leader of every recognized party”, and the intent is, we know there's going to be consultation now. The intent of the motion is just to make sure that consultation is made public at least in some form, that there is a report delivered to the House prior to the vote.

  (1250)  

    The Chair: Jacques Saada.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada: I have a very simple question. When an officer of the House is appointed -- I'm not certain officer is the correct term --, such as the Auditor General, for example, are the names of the candidates not selected not supposed to remain confidential?

    A voice:Precisely.

    Mr. Jacques Saada:If that's the case, doesn't that automatically negate the proposed motion? If a disagreement arises over a name and that candidate is rejected, then confidentiality rules will not be respected in the case of that person's rejected candidacy.

[English]

    The Chair: Gerald, do you want to make a note of that?

    Joe Jordan.

    Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds—Grenville, Lib.): That picks up a little on what I was going to say. Perhaps, just to bring some level of comfort to Mr. Epp, we should go back to what we're trying to do here. I went through and read these amendments and formed my opinion on them prior to coming in here. I go back to the testimony we had, very passionate and informed testimony, that what we're trying to put in place here is somebody who's 95% counsellor and 5% cop and that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

    Those things make a lot of sense to me. If what we were trying to do was put in place an independent investigator like Kenneth Starr in the States, then of course some of these things would make a lot of sense. But I disagree with you at that point, and that's the basis for our subsequent disagreement on virtually every one of them.

    One problem with this is what Mr. Saada touched on, that these things can get political despite characterizations of it as us somehow holding hands and singing Kumbaya as we go through. The opposition--and I would do it too--use every rule to their advantage. We make changes, so estimates are debated in the House, then the opposition brings in motions, and people freak out--and that's fine. But these things become very political.

    I'd be very reluctant to subject somebody who is and could end up being a private citizen to that process in this public a way. You would have people commenting on this person's credibility and character, yet they don't get to defend themselves at all. This is tabled in the House and will be kept in various forms of technological record from now till the end of the earth.

    So on the surface you can argue there's a certain logic to this, but I think that at the end of the day the pain outweighs the gain on this particular amendment.

    The Chair: Gerald Keddy.

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: I would offer a subamendment on that to address that particular issue.

    The Chair: Does Gerald have consent to amend his own motion?

    Some hon. members: Agreed.

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: I would be willing to put after “House of Commons”--period-- “As pertaining to the successful candidate”--and that addresses Monsieur Saada's reservations--“the opinions and recommendations of the leader of every recognized party shall be tabled in the House”. That leaves the other, unsuccessful candidates out of the fray, which I think is important because there's no need to address the other people who made the short list; that just gets into a whole other issue.

    Again, I stress that I would hope we could have some type of magnanimous proposal, perhaps on behalf of the Leader of the Opposition and the other official parties, where we would recognize that the Ethics Commissioner has a very important role in Parliament. We've tried to make the role change slightly, but it is still an extremely important role. I don't think it's to the benefit of any particular party leader to go out and slam the Ethics Commissioner on the first day he or she is appointed to that post.

    There will be a vote in Parliament, and if we're going to have a vote in Parliament, we can at least give the opposition leaders an opportunity to put forth any reservations they may have. I would hope they would use some judicious judgment when they do that.

    It will certainly occur in the press anyway. It's not like this is going to be done in isolation, folks. People are going to be watching this appointment with a magnifying glass. It will be under a microscope. In my opinion--and I'm not trying to put in a deleterious amendment here--this makes the process more open. It allows the opportunity at least for the opposition leaders to have some say in the process and for all members of Parliament to be better informed of the final decision.

  (1255)  

    The Chair: Rodger, I'm going to treat it as though we're dealing with this in a friendly fashion. The amendment we're dealing with includes the words Gerald mentioned, “as pertaining to the successful candidate”, okay? I'm not going to treat the subamendment separately.

    Joe Jordan, you can have a very short question.

    Mr. Joe Jordan: That was my point of clarification, that with the friendly amendment, once you have a successful applicant, they're now an officer of Parliament. Then you could have the opinions tabled. That addressed my concern.

    My question, then, for the officials is, could they do that now, where it would just require unanimous consent of the House? Could an opposition leader stand up and ask consent to table an opinion on the candidate? But that would require unanimous consent of the House--or would it?

    Mr. Ronald Wall: A member can get around that simply by rising on a point of order and saying, Mr. Speaker, I want to inform the House that so-and-so. There are avenues available procedurally for each party to make their case known under the Standing Orders should there be questions in the House.

    The Chair: It seems to me this is before the vote, so in other words, you're actually recognizing a successful candidate before the vote, yet he or she is not a successful candidate until after the vote.

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: Maybe we should take the word “successful” out and say “the final candidate”.

    The Chair: We're in your hands.

    Mr. Joe Jordan: That comes back to my problem.

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: Essentially, you are absolutely correct, Mr. Chair, in saying that this candidate is not the successful candidate until after the vote; he or she is a successful candidate of the process up to this point. I'm not averse to taking it or leaving it--

    The Chair: The friendly amendment, then, is “the final candidate”--if that's okay, if that eases it.

    Rodger Cuzner.

    Mr. Rodger Cuzner: I think there's still concern on our part. The bottom line is, there's nothing in the bill that precludes the opposition from voicing, presenting, or tabling any kind of disagreement they might have with the selection.

    The Chair: Yes, Gerald?

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: I appreciate Mr. Cuzner's finding that under Standing Order 108 you can get up on a point of order and bring this before the House, but the point of the amendment, quite frankly, is to try to take that type of sparring away from the process. I'm not trying to add sparring to the process.

    We'll find a way, don't worry; opposition will find a way to bring it up, without question. So why don't we put it in the process, take that friction and aggressiveness out of it, and find a way to say, okay, it's going to be tabled in the House, therefore maybe we would be more amenable to agreement?

    I will come back again to this. We all vote on the Speaker. Sometimes there's some pushing and shoving in that process. There is generally someone who's the government's choice, and they will pursue that. The opposition parties may look at it slightly differently, but at the end of the day we're all in agreement that the Speaker of the House is the Speaker of the House, and we're not going to deliberately try to sway that person in his or her role.

    This would allow, I would hope, for a more workable process, one that's less antagonistic.

·  (1300)  

    The Chair: Joe Jordan, 10 seconds.

    Mr. Joe Jordan: I just want to say, I can understand where Mr. Keddy is going with this, but I still have a problem with the reports being tabled and made public if the person is unsuccessful. They were a candidate but they're always a private citizen, and under the rules of the House and the privilege we enjoy it's not a fair fight.

    The Chair: We got that.

    The motion is on PC-1 with the friendly amendment Gerald indicated.

    (Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings])

     The Chair: Colleagues, I know it's getting very close to time. Gerald, I'm not sure how this will play, but I would like to do PC-2 and PC-3 before we finish if it's humanly possible. So could we try that, Gerald, if you would?

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: We can try.

    The whole question here of the term of office is one we looked at and batted around quite a bit.

    Again, you have to appreciate the fact that I'm trying to get up to speed on a bill we're doing clause-by-clause on.

    Amendment PC-2 would essentially lengthen the term of the Ethics Commissioner. It now says “holds office during good behaviour for a term of five years and may be removed for cause” and he or she may or may not be “reappointed for one or more terms of up to five years each.”

    I have some real questions on who the Ethics Commissioner may be, what the term of appointment is, and how we pick the candidates. With respect to the length of term, this amendment would essentially remove the second term.

    The Chair: There's no reappointment.

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: There's no reappointment, but it lengthens the first term, which is versus two terms of five years each and a possibility of someone being there for ten years. I think after ten years, quite frankly--after five years, probably--there are a lot of things that could happen to an Ethics Commissioner. It's much more difficult for that man or woman to be at arm's length from colleagues, the same as us when we sit at committee with one another. We get to know one another better, and we see another side of that person besides what we see as a result of the adversarial nature of how the House is set up.

    More importantly, the Ethics Commissioner will no longer be beholden to the Prime Minister for a second term, and I think that's very problematic with this bill. As it stands now, the Ethics Commissioner will be beholden to the Prime Minister for their second term.

    It increases the length of service, so it gives them a more realistic term--we're saying that perhaps five years is too short--and they would have some overlap into another Parliament. If we want an Ethics Commissioner who is separate from the Prime Minister...and quite frankly, I think most of us do. Otherwise, we could see a repeat of some judgment calls made by the ethics counsellor where the ethics counsellor--and I'm not going to cite instances--investigated the Prime Minister and then reported to the Prime Minister.

    It puts the Ethics Commissioner in a difficult situation. It's something we as a Parliament and certainly as a committee should try to avoid because it puts that person in a very unnatural situation.

    If we change the length of the term and if we look at a seven-year term, that's a compromise between the five and the ten, and there'd be one term only. That takes away some difficulty from the Ethics Commissioner, who may have to report on some very difficult issues to his ultimate boss, who will end up reappointing that person, perhaps. I think that's a very dangerous situation we've allowed ourselves to get into, and this would negative that.

·  (1305)  

    The Chair: Ken Epp.

    Mr. Ken Epp: Now, we went through this at some length when we were discussing this point. I'm sure you haven't had time to read the blues of all the committee meetings.

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: No, I missed the blues.

    Mr. Ken Epp: I would like to say that the compromise we came up with, which appears here in the bill, is actually a pretty good one in the sense that the person could serve for seven years. After five years they could easily be reappointed for a two-year term--or a three-year term, whatever--because the bill says “one or more terms of up to five years each” on the reappointment. So the first appointment is for five years, and then after that there's a reappointment for up to five years.

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: But it can be one or more terms.

    Mr. Ken Epp: Yes, but this is the whole thing. We argued at the time--I'm actually doing the Liberals' work here--that if this person is doing a satisfactory job on behalf of all of the members, then that reappointment shouldn't be a difficulty for any of us. The reappointment process is the same as the initial appointment.

    The Chair: Yvon Godin.

[Translation]

    Mr. Yvon Godin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Alexa McDonough had already tabled a bill calling for a term of office of seven years. Therefore, we support this amendment. Indeed, if the ethics commissioner was appointed to a single seven-year term, he would not need to do anything to get himself reappointed. In my opinion, he would be content to do his job, given the finite nature of his mandate. It would be quite another matter if he were appointed to a term of five years, with the possibility of being appointed to a second, five-year term. We were unable to secure the changes we wanted so that a two-thirds majority of Parliament is required for appointment. The ethics commissioner will, therefore, be chosen by the government, and not by Parliament. If he doesn't make waves, he just might be given a second term by the Prime Minister. If we want this position to have any kind of credibility, all we need to do is adopt the same rules that already apply to many other similar positions, where the appointees serve one five-year term. Such arrangements lend the incumbent credibility and authority, because there is no need to convince anyone that the person deserves to be reappointed. The person serves one, five-year term, period.

    I think members of the government party should agree to at least one amendment, if only to show that the committee serves some purpose.

[English]

    The Chair: Rodger Cuzner, please.

    Mr. Rodger Cuzner: Mr. Chairman, this particular aspect of the bill probably received as much discussion as most, I would think. The recommendation that came forward was five years renewable, and it reflects the process that's followed in every province. We won't be supporting the amendment.

    The Chair: Gerald, be brief if you would.

    Mr. Gerald Keddy: Again, I think the whole point of appointing an Ethics Commissioner is to find a way to do a better job, and if you don't approve this amendment, then I question why we're bothering with the bill at all.

    It's absolutely essential that the Ethics Commissioner not have to go back to his or her boss to get their job back. Put in a term that's reasonable and responsible, a one-term thing, where they don't have to reapply. Then there's no axe hanging over their head that says, you will support this government--or any other one--or else.

    We're trying to do something here for the future of Parliament. It's not just for the next six months or the next year the House sits.

    The Chair: I'll call the amendment, PC-2.

    (Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings])

    The Chair: Colleagues, I'll stop at this point. We resume at 3:30 in this room. The idea is to continue with clause-by-clause and then, if it seems appropriate, we will flow through to consideration of the code itself.

    The meeting is adjourned until 3:30.