CIMM Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, September 18, 2003

¹

1535

The Chair (Mr. Joe Fontana (London North Centre, Lib.))

Mr. Robert Marleau (Interim Privacy Commissioner, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada)

¹

1540

The Chair

¹

1545

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy (Calgary—Nose Hill, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Robert Marleau

¹

1550

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

Mr. Robert Marleau

¹

1555

The Chair

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.)

º

1600

The Chair

Mr. John O'Reilly

The Chair

Mr. John O'Reilly

Mr. Robert Marleau

º

1605

Mr. John O'Reilly

Mr. Robert Marleau

Mr. John O'Reilly

The Chair

Mr. Inky Mark (Dauphin—Swan River, PC)

º

1610

Mr. Robert Marleau

The Chair

Mr. Jerry Pickard (Chatham—Kent Essex, Lib.)

º

1615

º

1620

Mr. Robert Marleau

º

1625

The Chair

Mr. Pat Martin (Winnipeg Centre)

The Chair

Mr. Pat Martin

Mr. Robert Marleau

º

1630

Mr. Pat Martin

The Chair

Mr. Robert Marleau

The Chair

Mr. John Bryden (Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Aldershot, Lib.)

Mr. Robert Marleau

º

1635

Mr. John Bryden

Mr. Robert Marleau

The Chair

Mr. John Bryden

Mr. Robert Marleau

º

1640

The Chair

Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral (Laval Centre, BQ)

º

1645

Mr. Robert Marleau

Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral

Mr. Robert Marleau

º

1650

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

º

1655

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

Mr. Robert Marleau

The Chair

Mr. Massimo Pacetti (Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, Lib.)

»

1700

Mr. Robert Marleau

Mr. Massimo Pacetti

The Chair

»

1705

Mr. Robert Marleau

The Chair

Mr. Robert Marleau

The Chair

»

1710

Mr. Robert Marleau

The Chair

Mr. Robert Marleau

»

1715

The Chair

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

The Chair

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

Mr. Robert Marleau

The Chair

Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral

»

1720

Mr. Robert Marleau

The Chair

Mr. Inky Mark

Mr. Robert Marleau

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

Mr. Robert Marleau

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration

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NUMBER 070

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Thursday, September 18, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹  (1535)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Joe Fontana (London North Centre, Lib.)): Good afternoon, colleagues and guests.

    Before I begin our orders of the day, I'd like to take this opportunity to welcome some new procedural clerks who are joining us today and observing what their future may look like. We want to wish you a very productive future as clerks in the House of Commons.

    I can tell you that some of us believe that Bill has been around too long.

    Some Hon. Members: Oh, oh!

    The Chair: No, in fact, we are most privileged in the House of Commons to have the most professional people assisting us in doing our jobs. In fact, the former Clerk of the House of Commons, Mr. Marleau, is also here. I'm sure some of you will aspire to his position as chief Clerk of the House of Commons. Anyway, we wish you the best in your new careers, and thank you so much for your dedication and interest in wanting to serve the country and Parliament. Thank you very much.

    Colleagues, as you know, we are resuming our discussions with regard to a national identification card. We have before us the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Mr. Robert Marleau.

    We welcome you, Robert, back to Parliament, and we look forward to your comments. I'm sure we will have some questions for you, because this has been an issue of interest not only to privacy commissioners across the country, but also to privacy commissioners we met in our travels in Europe. It seems that the whole world is talking about national identification cards. It is an issue that is important to Canadians, and obviously an issue that Canadians want to hear about from not only their parliamentarians but also from their Privacy Commissioner.

    Mr. Robert Marleau (Interim Privacy Commissioner, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I must say that when I sat down at this table I did have a few flashbacks. Right now, the flashback feels more like my first year at university when I showed up for my first class.

    I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you. I would like the committee to note that there was some considerable demand for my commentary over the last couple of months, but because the committee had so kindly invited me, I have chosen not to make any public comment until I have had the opportunity to appear here.

    I will make my comments in both languages, as is my habit, so I will be going back and forth in my text. I believe the statement has been circulated—if you wish to follow along with me—although I have added a few things this morning.

[Translation]

    I appreciate the opportunity to address you on this matter. I would like just to make some opening remarks and then, of course, as mentioned by the chairman, I will put myself at your disposal to answer questions.

[English]

    Let me say at the outset that I personally support the concept of a national debate on this matter. Informed citizens make informed decisions; they can only give or withhold their consent in matters of their privacy based on what they understand.

[Translation]

    The question of whether we need a national identity card may be the most significant privacy issue facing Canadians today. Such a card would require the collection, use and dissemination of personal information on a massive scale. We need to consider the benefits, risks and costs carefully.

[English]

    This debate is not just about cards, but also about an elaborate and complex national identity system—with the word “system” underlined—with databases, communication networks, card readers, millions of identification cards, and an array of policies and procedures to address issues such as security, privacy, and of course manageability.

    The financial implications of this would be enormous. Our research indicates that just creating the system could cost between $3 billion and $5 billion, and operating it would require substantial additional ongoing costs. One would not normally go to the Privacy Commissioner for an appraisal of the financial costs of a program, but it's not really so far removed from my specialized area of interest, because I would be much more supportive of an investment and resources in systems that are respectful of privacy. I believe that's not the case with the national identity card. In fact, the financial costs of this system are overshadowed by the costs to Canadian privacy rights and to the relationship between Canadians and the state.

    Identity cards allow us to be identified even in situations where we have every right to remain anonymous. Unless technological limits are built into them and strict controls placed on their use, they inevitably reveal more information about us than is required simply to establish our identity, or for authorization in a particular situation or transaction. Without technical limitations and strict controls on their use, they are a powerful tool to link together our various activities and produce profiles of our lives.

    Moreover, it's highly unlikely that a national identification system could be developed without compulsory participation, serious inaccuracies, and significant disruptions and inconvenience to individuals. I ask you to think, if it is compulsory, what about non-compliance?

[Translation]

    We need to ask ourselves whether these kinds of costs, and not just financial costs, are justified by any significant benefit. It is claimed that a national identification card would help to combat terrorism. Precisely how, though, is not clear, unless we are prepared to abandon tradition and make every daily transaction of every Canadian available for scrutiny and analysis by the State.

    It is also said that an identification card would help combat identity thefts. Again, how that would work is not at all clear. A comprehensive infrastructure of electronic card readers and trained personnel would be very complex technically, and very expensive to deploy. And the system would still rest at some point on foundation documents like birth certificates and driver's licences, so an identity thief who clandestinely obtained foundation documents could still apply for a card in someone else's name.

    Finally, it is claimed that a national identification card will make it easier to cross the U.S.-Canada border. But if U.S. authorities are asking for the type of information that is typically on a passport, with or without biometrics, let us use a passport, rather than create a new card required by every citizen, not just by those who want to travel to the U.S.

¹  (1540)  

[English]

    In my brief I suggest that this committee consider certain essential questions about a national identification system, because simply asking them brings out the enormous implications of such a scheme--the practical and technological challenges of creating and managing it, the need to develop a comprehensive legal and policy framework, and the implications for privacy. These questions include: who would be issued an identification card? Everyone? Canadians at the age of majority? If children are issued a card, at what age? Would participation in and identification by the system be voluntary or mandatory? Would non-compliance have legal consequences? What would be the scope of the data that would be gathered about individuals participating in the system? Who would be allowed to demand production of a card from card carriers for proof of identity? Who would contribute, view, and edit data in a national ID system? What types of uses of the card and its attendant system will be allowed? What legal structures would protect the system's integrity as well as the subject's privacy and his due process rights and determine the government and other parties' liability for a system misuse or failure? Who would bear the full weight of privacy rights accountability and responsibility for a national identity card? And finally--and here, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully submit that this is relevant to your particular deliberations--what are the alternatives to a national identity card? In my submission I've not tried to answer any of these questions. They are not mine to answer.

    My view is that the challenges of putting in place a national identification system that is effective, affordable, and respectful of privacy are enormous. A strong case for the benefits of a national identification system has simply not been made. To the extent that benefits would exist, they would be marginal at best.

[Translation]

    As I said, it is not up to me to answer these questions, but in my opinion, the challenges involved in implementing a practical yet affordable national identification system which is in compliance with Canadian's privacy rights are tremendous. There have been no irrefutable arguments made in favour of such a system, and, had such arguments been made, I believe that they would have been, at best, marginal.

[English]

    Accordingly, unless these questions are fully answered for you, my recommendation is that this committee reject the idea of a national identity card as unworkable and unjustified.

[Translation]

    So, unless these questions are answered for you, and in light of all that I said, my recommendation to this committee is that it reject the idea of a national identity card as unworkable and unjustified. As Saint-Exupéry said: “We ask not to be eternal, but that acts and things not suddenly lose their meaning.”

[English]

    I would be happy to take your questions.

    The Chair: That's a good model for Parliament and governments, I would say.

    Thank you very much for your very forward submission to us, Mr. Marleau. I'm sure we have a lot of questions.

    In fact, this is of interest to some other guests who are here. I'd like to take the opportunity to welcome our guests from Mexico, who are here to study Canada's privacy and access to information regime. It's very timely, Mr. Marleau, that you have an audience from another country that in fact is trying to learn from what Canada is doing.

    So I want to welcome our Mexican friends and trade partners: Lina Ornelas, Ricardo Salgado, Jorge Nacif, Edgardo Martinez, Manuel Matus, and Mr. Mauricio Ibarra from the Mexican embassy. Welcome to you all.

    Diane Ablonczy.

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    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy (Calgary—Nose Hill, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Marleau. What a pleasure it is to see you. We saw your knowledgeable face for so many years at the table in the House of Commons. We have missed you and we are really glad to see you again. Thank you for this excellent and very clear presentation.

    I have a number of questions. We'll see how many I can get in.

    First of all, I've obtained a document from the ADM working group on document integrity. The document lists biometric pros and cons of fingerprints, the use of iris scans, and facial recognition. Unfortunately, except in the case of one or two obvious cons, the remaining disadvantages of using each of these biometrics are blanked out. So I've been unable to determine exactly what the department has been considering and what drawbacks it has identified.

    I wonder whether you have in fact seen this document—hopefully the part that has not been blanked out.

    I see you shaking your head.

    So I wonder if you could direct the committee to any kind of document or study that fully and completely explores the pros and cons of the use of biometrics.

    Mr. Robert Marleau: Ms. Ablonczy, for the record, I have not seen the document. I've checked with our head of research, and our office hasn't received the document in either its blanked out or full form.

    My statement didn't talk very much about biometrics, but the submission we made does touch on biometrics. From my perspective, in talking about the pros and cons of biometrics, it is a means or a current technology. It is not necessarily perfected.

    In a discussion with a colleague about biometrics, I recalled an instance in 1983 when I bought a 1978 Chrysler Brougham. It was loaded and it was like a big paquebot, which is what I used to call it, or a cruise ship. It had a 440 engine and 4-barrel carb and all of those sorts of things. It even had an 8-track tape player in it, so I had to go to garage sales to find tapes.

    So biometrics is a current technology that may have a role to play in the context of an ID card, or passport, or driver's licence. It is still, in part, unproven technology.

    What we have done is to look at where it has been in use. It is not 100% infallible. We can give you some of our data from a study done in the United States on simple face recognition. That particular technology had a success rate of 99-point-something percent. But if there's a 0.6% or 0.8% failure rate and you consider that 25 million passengers go through airports in North America, that tiny failure rate means about 170,000 people a year are not recognized or fail the biometric test. In a given airport, that's 450 people a day who would have a false alarm on some current facial recognition.

    My main concern about biometrics is not so much its failure rate but what happens to the individual when the system fails. You present yourself to an immigration office, you're rejected on biometrics, but you are who you say you are, and your picture says who you are. How long will it take you to get out of the rejection database? What processes will be in place to verify the mistake or the rejection rate?

    I will gladly share with the committee what we have on file on systems that are being used and what the failure rates are. I guess that goes to your best pros and cons of biometrics.

    Right now, an immigration officer looks at a picture and he or she makes a judgment call. If your fingerprint or your iris scan is part of that identification process, he may still see Ms. Ablonczy, but the system may say it's the wrong iris scan. We may be substituting human judgment for technology, and that part of it gives me some concern. Until we have more secure performance rates, I think we have to go slow on biometrics.

¹  (1550)  

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: One expert I met with, who has his doctorate in strategic studies and international affairs and who teaches at the University of Calgary, pointed out that a number of countries have had identity cards. South Africa, for example, had identity cards. Their government still fell. Some people would say that was a good thing. But certainly the cards didn't stop people from fomenting violence. Israel is another example, with identity documents and very strong security measures, but it still must be constantly vigilant about attack. This individual pointed out that known terrorists stay in safe havens. They obviously are not at liberty to travel, or at least not without some safety and protection. This individual pointed out that having cards with fingerprints or some other biometrics actually could create a false sense of security, with people not understanding that a lot of terrorists have legitimate documents; for example, the terrorists that participated in the attack on the World Trade Center.

    I asked this individual this question and now I ask you. I want to do the right thing for my country. I want security to be first and foremost in what we do. But I have not heard anybody make a compelling argument as to why national identity cards with biometrics would significantly enhance our security. I asked this individual, “Do you know anybody who has made that compelling argument and really gone to bat for this?” He said, “I knew you would ask that. I've looked, and I can tell you that no one has.” So I ask you, is there anyone on the other side who has made compelling arguments we can look to in order to make an evaluation of the other side of the argument?

    Mr. Robert Marleau: Ms. Ablonczy, I would say that there certainly are people on the other side of the debate. One of them is Mr. Dershowitz in the United States, who will be coming forward for the forum on the ID card and biometrics in the next little while.

    When you position an ID card with biometrics in a terrorist or security context, there can clearly be advantages in proving you're not a terrorist, that you are who you say you are. But terrorists are not likely to be in the database. My concern is about extending security umbrellas to include monster databases to prove who you are against someone who is not in the database and likely never will be. What's likely to be in the database is a successful terrorist who manages to copy and fake what is proposed to be a foolproof card. Terrorists cross the planet in safe havens and often have access to a considerable amount of resources and probably can muster the resources and the expensive technology to copy biometric cards.

    But I would say that it would only be a matter of time. I understand that the new Canadian immigration card, which is almost state of the art, falling short of biometrics, has already been compromised. For every initiative we take, there's always a smart criminal out there who is going to try to beat the system.

    I want to stress that in terms of the privacy commission, when we approach issues such as this, security is something we look at. We're all Canadians, and I would not want to take an advocacy position on privacy rights that would compromise the security of Canadians. I've taken a slightly different position than my predecessor on video surveillance cameras, and we're still looking at that. There are women who walk through parking garages at night and feel quite comfortable, and pleased, to have security cameras in certain situations. The technology is an issue.

    What is really fundamental in a security sense is, what do you do with the information you capture? What is it for, how is it managed, and what is the objective? In a security context, I would argue that a national ID card database would capture very few terrorists and criminals. It's the first place they are going to avoid, I would predict. There are a large number of refugees we can't account for in the country. They're not going to come forward and register. In the alternatives question that I laid before the committee, what could the security forces--CSIS, RCMP, and immigration officers--do with $3 billion to $5 billion in order to enhance the security of Canadians?

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    The Chair: Mr. O'Reilly.

    Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Marleau, for appearing.

    I guess I should thank you for swearing me in, in 1993. I think you were the first person I met when I came here, and I thought you were the most important person in my life at that time.

º  (1600)  

    The Chair: Did he ask you for ID?

    Mr. John O'Reilly: No, he didn't ask me for any ID.

    Since then, of course, Marleau and Montpetit has become my Bible, and I hope all the people behind who are studying will certainly use that as their reference.

    The argument seems to always come to terrorism and identification of terrorists. I don't think that's really what the national ID card is all about, but it always seems to come down to that. In my own mind, I believe we've gone too far already, as far as our identity and our information being available is concerned. If you give me your social insurance number, with a good computer I can find out what your electronic tax filing was last year and probably pull out your personal medical history.

    So there are certain things that are already available, and I think we've probably gone too far. I wonder if there's any information that would be on an ID card that's not already available. That's my overall concept of the program.

    We've all looked, as a committee, at the biometrics and the facial recognition. During some of the time I spent on the parole board, we used facial recognition, because five years from now a person looks entirely different or can change themselves quite a bit--although I look around and after ten years here we all seem to look about the same, but maybe it's because we're all aging very casually.

    So I'm not sure exactly what the purpose of the ID card is. You've asked us many questions that we have to struggle with as a committee, but one area of our population that is disadvantaged in identification is people who don't have access to their birth certificate or a driver's licence--they don't drive. They don't have a passport--they don't travel. They don't have a picture ID or a credit card with a picture on it. We ourselves have a House of Commons card with a picture on it.

    You can get a credit card with your picture on it. In fact, I applied for a Sunoco credit card many years ago and they sent me 73 of them in a box, all with the same name and different numbers. So we know that mistakes can happen--it almost destroyed my shredder.

    But when we're trying to figure out what the use of the ID card is, I think there are people who, for example, would be under the care of guardians, people with Down's syndrome, for instance, who wouldn't have the availability of any form of picture ID, who could benefit from this. So I think perhaps in an application that's voluntary the card could be of advantage to some people in our society who have the misfortune of not being able to be identified any other way.

    If we're talking about people with passports, that's fine if you're a traveller, but not everybody has a passport. In fact, I think 53% or less of the Canadian population have or need a passport.

    So I don't know your answers to that, and I also want to know how you arrived at the $3.5 billion--or $3.25 billion, or whatever, because there's not much difference, for me, when you get up there. We have people in the industry who stand to make an enormous amount of money from us going into this. Obviously every time we go to a biometric company or someone who does that type of stuff, we get wined and dined--I guess that would be the thing--and they're very positive about it and very concerned that their product is infallible.

    So maybe I have a little different light from there, but those are my questions.

    The Chair: Just as a correction, John, I don't believe I've ever gotten wined. I've gotten some sandwiches, but I'm not sure about....

    Mr. John O'Reilly: There were a lot of people whining when we were there. That's what I meant.

    Mr. Robert Marleau: You will appreciate, Mr. Chairman, that wining and dining is a very touchy subject for me.

    On the issue of the disabled and the disadvantaged and people who seek bank accounts and credit cards whose income levels may be borderline, I think those are issues that our society and our governments can address. I understand that it has been done in some of the provinces for the disabled particularly or disadvantaged people. So on the voluntary basis, that's a question of a need. It's a question of something that I need, given my position or situation in society, and there can be very simple safeguards in the level of security. But I reverse the question: How many of those would you put in a national identity card bank database and the information as to why you have this card be available to whom and for what?

    In terms of the umbrella, that's where my concerns come, but if someone needs an identity card to go about their daily business and wants one on a voluntary basis and can be guaranteed some safeguards about why they need an ID card, I think you have to ask them that question as well in terms of how much of that they want to share. Some of that is health related. Some of that could be family situation related, such as whether you're adopted. All of those kinds of issues come to play as major privacy issues.

    On the voluntary side, my office would be happy to do a privacy impact assessment on any such program and provide advice to the government on what we feel would be the appropriate safeguards and needs for those kinds of situations, and we do that now for public sector activities.

    On the issue of costs, we didn't do a scientific analysis; we took reference points.

    HRDC here in Canada, in 1999, in responding to the Auditor General's report, I believe, about the SIN card, mentioned that it would cost them close to $3.6 billion to overhaul the system, plus incremental expenditures. That's for the SIN card alone, and the SIN card doesn't gather a whole bunch of other stuff that a national ID card could.

    In the U.K. currently, the debate is alive and well on this entitlement card that they're proposing, and there are advantages. There's abuse and social security fraud, but the cost estimate there, translated into Canadian dollars, is $7.2 billion, or £3.5 billion. The U.K. figures have also been criticized by an independent expert who was retained by the U.K. commissioner of information and privacy as being far too low. So it's a bit of a debate on costs, but there are reference points.

    The government in the U.K. is also considering making each citizen pay for his or her own card, and the figure they're discussing is £39 or $85 Canadian for a mandatory card. It's going to be mandatory, but the citizens are likely going to pay for it. So that estimate takes it up into the billions, and some studies say the U.K. card could cost close to £100, which is about $218 Canadian.

    The U.S. recently toyed with the idea of a national ID card, and the Bush administration has rejected it. But there, they were talking that it would require close to $50 billion and an annual operating cost of between $3 billion and $6 billion. There's a larger population and maybe a different demand from a security standpoint, and so on, but those are the reference points that we used to arrive at the range of $3.5 billion to $5 billion.

º  (1605)  

    Mr. John O'Reilly: Would you be in favour of a system like the Province of Alberta presently has, where the province issues drivers' licences and they also issue a non-driver's licence so that you can have photo ID? Would that perhaps be another answer towards providing ID to people who need it?

    Mr. Robert Marleau: My reaction to those programs is that if people need it, they should have access to it. The key for us at the privacy commission is that they give informed consent when they apply for one of these cards, as to the data that's being gathered, what it's used for, and what disclosure may be made of it. I think that comes as a package. There is a need and you could have such a program, but the privacy safeguards have to come with it.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you for giving us a good road map here, by the way.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Inky, by the way, welcome back. We've missed you, but we know while you were away you kept giving us some great amendments as we reviewed the citizenship bill. I'm happy to see you're healthy and back with us again. You're an invaluable member to our committee, and we appreciate the fact that you've been able to come back healthy and raring to go.

    Mr. Inky Mark (Dauphin—Swan River, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chair, for those kind words. It's nice to be back.

    Robert, it's nice to see you again. Like John, you swore me in when I came to the House in 1997.

    Welcome to your colleague as well.

    I certainly do agree with you. I've always taken the position, on behalf of the PC Party, that we would be opposed to national identification cards. I'd certainly agree with you that we need to reject the idea, first, because it's not really necessary and it's a really complicated system.

    The committee needs to learn from an existing ID system that is in place, that of the registration for firearm owners in this country. I think we can learn a lesson from that. As you know, when we talk about cost, that's into its second billion. When we talk about compliance, there is a compliance problem with that identification card as well. In terms of accuracy, it is just full of holes. So there are lots of lessons the committee needs to look into on how successful that one has been. Even on the numbers side, we're not sure exactly how many people have complied.

    Diane asked you about biometrics, but it's more important that the Privacy Commissioner does take the time to do an impact analysis of the big picture of really what it would cost. I think that was the negligence of the government in 1993 when it implemented the identification system for firearm owners in this country. It never really did the work that you have already done with the set of questions you presented to us today. In fact, the government of the day wouldn't even listen to the parliamentary study that was done in 1993 in terms of some of the problems that would arise from putting in place a national registration system.

    My concern is about privacy and civil liberty issues. In a free society there is always the danger that we get too much government, too much supervision. So what should be the balance between privacy and state? How much should the state have access to our private matters?

º  (1610)  

    Mr. Robert Marleau: Well, that's a big question, Mr. Mark. Theses are written on that very question. I'll give you a more personal reaction to that question rather than the position of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner. I'm still ramping up on some of the issues, as you can well appreciate.

    A state has to take leadership in any program it introduces to protect the rights of the citizens it governs. In other words, it ought not to be for the citizen to fight for privacy rights, and it ought not to be for the commissioner to come forward before the Federal Court of Canada, standing by a citizen, to say his or her rights have been violated.

    In my annual report this year I commend the government, and Treasury Board particularly, for the privacy impact assessment policy. Under that policy, where any major program in government is being reviewed, and databases are being combined, changed, added to, or expanded, they must submit to my office a proposal on this program. We have an opportunity, before it comes into play, to comment and to recommend on how to better enhance the protection of privacy rights of Canadians.

    I must say, in my short time there I've been really impressed, not just by the quality of the work by my staff, which is a very small staff when you pit it against government, but also by the quality of the dialogue between the departments on the issues of privacy. I'm much more comfortable now than I was going in about that dialogue.

    No minister sets out to deliberately breach Canadians' privacy rights. I don't believe that for a second. But I think the state has to be on the leadership side of that discussion, not as an afterthought and not as a consequence of what I have now done.

    That's a personal view. In the context of good governance and what we call POGG, peace, order, and good government.... I think peace, order, and good government means the state has the leadership in all three categories, and within that is included privacy rights for Canadians.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Jerry.

    Mr. Jerry Pickard (Chatham—Kent Essex, Lib.): Bob, I really want to say welcome back, and congratulations on the new hat you're coming back under. I think it will be a real challenge for you, and I know you'll do a very good job. All of us in the House were extremely pleased with the work you did in the House while you were there, and we look forward to working with you now.

    I really do think your statement that the government be the leader in matters of privacy concern to the citizens...and all of those issues are quite important. The problem seems to be, though, that there are costs. We haven't looked at benefits. You raise the question, are there any benefits? In my view, there are some really great benefits that could be achieved if all levels of government and people would work together in order to look at the possibility, the potential, and deal with security and privacy at the same time.

    To me, the question of privacy, the way it is right now, is the fact that there are lists of people who are in certain services that have certain benefits because of who they are or what they've done. For instance, you have the benefit of a driver's licence in this province because you've passed a driver's test. Being a Canadian citizen, you have the benefit of a health care system, you have the benefit of the old age system, you have the benefit of all government services and systems. We have rules of privacy to protect or to put a firewall between health services, old age services, driver's services, and all of those factors that do exist. To my mind, all of those lists still do exist. Every list we refer to is referred to and sorted in a department in the federal or provincial or municipal governments.

    So I look at the idea you've put forward on costs, between $3.5 billion and $5 billion, to put a card in, and I think about what you've mentioned on the SIN card. Would a national identity card allow the removal of SIN cards and give a person a national identity card? Could that national identity card remove the need to issue drivers' licences if there are lists available of who can drive a car? Would it be possible that a national identity card would alleviate provinces in terms of being able to issue health cards, or drivers' licences, or other cards that are issued department by department? And even if the card does one specific thing, and one specific thing only, it clearly identifies who the bearer of that card is. It is not a list where you push it in and a list pops out on the services the card delivers, but the card identifies clearly, without question, the person.

    I know you've challenged the error rate on some of it, and I think we've gone through a tremendous amount of study with the experts in discussions on the security of the card as well as the ability of it to identify people, but looking at those lists, is it possible that on the other side of the costs, which you point out, there could be a tremendous benefit and savings that would far exceed the costs of putting the card into place? That's one.

    Two, under the systems we have, and if lists were kept separately in those government offices of their services, where people are receiving those services, do you not see that a national identity card would not allow overlap of that information from one department to another?

º  (1615)  

    Three, I think there are some real values that haven't been mentioned about that card. I'm not sure that terrorism identification has anything to do with a national identity card. Quite frankly, on the argument about people coming into the country, they usually are not Canadian in the first place, but you did mention illegal people in Canada.

    If you were required to have a card, then receiving any service in this country, such as getting a job or doing other things, could be restricted very dramatically, and the people who are allowed to work and the people who are allowed to get services would be clearly identified by that card as Canadians. Therefore, the huge, enormous fraud we hear about in different systems could be avoided.

    So I think there are many benefits. I know I've thrown a whole lot of things at you, but I think there are many benefits, and we can put the securities in place for privacy.

º  (1620)  

    Mr. Robert Marleau: Thank you, Mr. Pickard, and thank you for your warm welcome.

    I don't want to be dramatic here, but I only have to look at my own wallet—and that's only half of it—to see that there can be some benefits to a single card with the kind of information I need to go about my daily life with. One of these cards, which I won't name as I'm not doing advertising, records how many bottles of Cabernet Sauvignon I bought at the LCBO last month—not just the bottles, but the brand. Because of that I don't use it at the LCBO.

    We're not naive to the point that a card with some universality.... I'm not going to say universal, because I think reasonable people will want to put reasonable limits on what the card would carry. A card that would deal with entitlements is what's being explored in the U.K., dealing with whether you would be entitled to a particular social service or a driver's licence.

    But as I said at the beginning of my presentation, what those things represent is not a card. It's more than just “the” card. It's the information and the database and the system required to support it for it to be effective—because it had better be effective. And in guaranteeing privacy rights, who has access, shares, and updates that data? When there is a mistake, what are your redress rights?

    Imagine a card with all your health information, driver's licence, and my firearms PAL.... It would be easier to go to Canadian Tire with an ID card that has all of that on it.

    But there is safety, or there are firewalls between each one of these cards, because they can't talk to each other. For me, as a private citizen, the one card I talked about that I use at the LCBO cannot use the knowledge that is gathered in another databank for this other card I have in my wallet. There is kind of a natural firewall there that I feel good about. What you have to ask Canadians is, “Am I willing to put up with that discomfort? How many cards do I want to carry, and how secure do I feel about the programs I join and don't join?”

    You make a good point about the people who defraud government or the private sector, that if they didn't have an ID card they might not be able to be as effective in their fraud.

    But I'll put it to you this way. You talked about partnership between all levels of government. It's a complex country, as you know better than I do. It's a federation, and there are split jurisdictions across the country in terms of birth certificates and drivers' licences. The aboriginal community is another context that would have to be looked at.

    In the context, let's say, of missing refugees and identity theft, I would say to you, sir, that apart from government, the private sector has a responsibility here. In the days when someone stole your chequebook with your name, address, phone number, and account number, and then managed to cash a cheque by forging your signature, did you call it identity theft? No, you called it forgery and fraud. Now if the same information is on a magnetic strip and somebody manages to use our credit card, everybody seems to call it identity theft. Just because it's been put on plastic and digitized doesn't mean it's identity theft. It's the same fraud, but in the form of electronic forgery.

    The private sector, as it rolls out new technologies, has to be a partner with governments in trying to find some cure for, or to minimize the impact of, these kinds of fraudulent activities.

    But do we want the Government of Canada imposing or requiring a mandatory card for all Canadians to solve this issue by having those Canadians who are honest, don't defraud, and don't abuse services have to submit to the same kinds of identity requirements we feel we need to catch criminals?

º  (1625)  

    The Chair: Pat Martin.

    By the way, welcome back to our committee.

    Mr. Pat Martin (Winnipeg Centre): Thank you very much. There's all kinds of goodwill flowing around here today.

    Welcome to you, Mr. Marleau. I want to say how much I appreciate both the tone and the content of your report, because on behalf of the New Democratic Party, I certainly share many of your concerns. I would put it even more strongly with regard to some of the concerns we feel. We have very serious reservations. To put it simply, much about this identity card idea smacks of Big Brother. It invokes images of jackboot fascism almost in the minds of some who came from countries where this was a legitimate fear.

    You asked the very questions that I think need to be answered. Would it be mandatory to carry this card with you? Who would have the right to demand to see such a card? Flowing from that, what would then be the consequences if you could not or would not produce that card? Surely it's one of the basic tenets of a free society that I can go out for a walk tonight down the street in just my jogging shorts, carrying no identification and no wallet.

    First, what's the point in doing it unless it's mandatory? It wouldn't achieve anything if it was optional to carry. And second, how are we going to enforce it? Who would have the right to demand to know that from you? If you have to carry it, you might as well just put a tattoo of a bar code on my forehead and then everybody will know everything about me all the time. You can be scanned.

    The Chair: Bill has already suggested that as a possible solution.

    Mr. Pat Martin: Oh, that is an option. That's good. Some of the chips, frankly, are so small now. The one they're talking about putting into banknotes doesn't need an electronic source. It runs on sunlight and can contain massive amounts of information, far beyond who I am and where I live or what my birthplace was.

    To cut it short, I'd like to talk to you about this at length. The only people I can find who want this, that I've found proof of, and I just learned of one more today, a third one.... One is the Minister of Immigration. Two is Allan Dershowitz, and three is the Prime Minister of England. I've just read this article in the Guardian that had many of the costs and the split in their cabinet. It's a real division in the cabinet in the Labour Party in England. Many are raising these same problems.

    Allan Dershowitz is a guest speaker at our big conference. We're bringing him in for a speaker's fee of $35,000 to set the tone, I suppose, of the whole conference, to predetermine the outcome of the conference. A high-priced Hollywood O.J. Simpson lawyer is going to come to Canada and tell us that this is a good thing.

    Not to make a speech about it but to ask your views, could you expand a little further on the reservation you raised about who should be allowed to demand production of such papers, and what could be the possible consequences of being unable to produce those papers?

    Mr. Robert Marleau: I'll try to answer that question directly. I try to stay away from some of the references to the past. We should look at this as a debate about the future. This is Canada now. Technology is advancing, and we're never going to get away from the technology. My view of the relationship between technology and privacy is that privacy has to be able to define the framework in which the information it gathers is used and disclosed. So it's a kind of box around the technology, rather than something that fights the technology.

    If an ID card were adopted for Canada, it must be mandatory or it's useless, in my view. If it's voluntary, nobody should be able to demand it. If it's voluntary, I should show it when I feel I need to and want to. That is a debate you have to have as well. If it's a context in which we want to advance the social progress of our society by diminishing some of the issues that Mr. Pickard raised, then we should maybe look at a much more limited scope. But once you get into mandatory--and I alluded to it in my remarks--you're dealing with issues of non-compliance. Then you're into peace, order, and good government issues, which I think go to the core of Canadian traditions and Canadian society. If you're going to punish non-compliance, then you have to address the consequences of that. It's not unlike some other debates you've had to deal with in the House, even in this Parliament, where it's neither black nor white, it's kind of in between. But if it's not mandatory, then it will serve and it will be efficient for certain segments of society.

    One of the comments from the department that I read--I can't attribute this to the minister--was that people from certain ethnic origins, certain immigrants, would like to have some form of card, because for them it's a visible assertion of their citizenship, and they're proud to be Canadians. But I dare say, I don't care if it has biometrics, a picture, and a monster database, it won't make it easier for that Canadian citizen to cross the American border. What are they going to look at? They're not going to look at the card first. If there's a bias in the treatment of our citizens crossing a foreign nation's border, the ID card won't address that bias.

º  (1630)  

    Mr. Pat Martin: I'm very pleased that you raised the point about aboriginal people. There is a history and a tradition of aboriginal people not wanting to be fully enumerated, because as soon as people found out that you had four children, they seized them and threw them into residential schools. So there is a real problem with aboriginal people and the trust associated with being enumerated.

    There's a saying that those who would sacrifice the right to personal freedom and civil liberty for the sake of safety and security deserve neither. That's certainly the point of view of the NDP. If there is any time left, perhaps you could comment on that.

    Is there time?

    The Chair: There's time for a brief comment.

    Mr. Robert Marleau: I should have mentioned this. My office's concern on the voluntary card side is what we call creep. You start with a card that does this on a voluntary basis, and then gradually there's creep with regard to its use. I only have to point to our own Canadian experience where the creep of the SIN card is pervasive, and the number of complaints that this office has received over the years about its abuse is very large. Many Canadians don't even know. Many Canadians will produce their SIN card if asked. They just presume that they should. So there is the creep aspect in terms of voluntary cards as well.

    The Chair: John Bryden.

    Mr. John Bryden (Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Aldershot, Lib.): I just wanted to follow up on the illegals without any kind of documentation that might exist in the country right now. Using the 10% rule in comparison to the United States, there should be at least 300,000 individuals. I agree with you that it has to be a mandatory card. I pick up on Mr. Pickard's observation that these 300,000 without documentation would suddenly require an ID card in order to get the services they now can access and just to move in society. If the government decided to go ahead with mandatory ID cards, wouldn't that create a great surge and desire for identity theft? Wouldn't these 300,000 people suddenly have a desire to get the identity of various Canadians who may be vulnerable to having their identity stolen?

    Mr. Robert Marleau: I think that's an excellent point, Mr. Bryden. You only have to look at the green card situation in the United States of America—where you need a green card to get work—and the whole difficulty of managing the green card. There is a very large underground movement for the sale and acquisition of cards for people who are not entitled to them.

    So yes, I think you would initially create some kind of market that is not there now. But I suppose you have to do a cost analysis for the returns you would get.

º  (1635)  

    Mr. John Bryden: I would take it perhaps a little bit further than you have contemplated.

    The need for this ID card would be so acute, particularly now that we have criminal elements in society who would need the super secure authority of a national ID card, there would be a great desire to get it. My worry would be that there would be all kinds of Canadians who are living alone, who may be living on the street, and who have identity or documentation of some kind, but have no direct relatives or people who would notice if they disappeared.

    My concern about this is that we might be creating a situation where people could actually be killed, eliminated, or made to vanish for someone else to acquire an ID card that could be used to get a passport, or to get all kinds of services, or to do any other things. I would be very, very afraid of that.

    Mr. Robert Marleau: I think the criminal element knows no limits to achieving its ends, if it wants to.

    I think we're talking more about the manageability side, Mr. Bryden, and how you would roll that out, compensate for it, and deal with it. But at that point you're a long way down the road from some of the issues that I put before the committee in terms of questions you have to ask.

    So you raise a fundamental issue that I don't want to diminish. I would classify it as a manageability issue. We would have a card and the data we've decided to put on it and the databases, and we would have those elements in our society who somehow have to fit in, and then the criminals. At that point, I think you're looking at manageability issues or at how you make it work.

    Your concern is that it would create an instant illegal market for it. To what extent there will be illegality, we would all have to use our imagination.

    The Chair: I guess what John has just brought up is the ultimate identity theft.

    I just want to correct something John said, but only as it relates to the number of 300,000. I don't want to give anybody the impression that there are 300,000 illegals in this country, which I'm not sure you meant. I know you were using the formula, but the American experience is much different from that in Canada. I don't think we've ever seen or heard those numbers before.

    So I just wanted to correct the record on your behalf, John, that we're not talking about 300,000 illegals. I don't want to get into the numbers game, but just to make a point, it is definitely not in the range of those six-digit numbers.

    Mr. John Bryden: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    If I may just take another step in the line of reasoning I'm working on, I would have thought that one of the other dangers of a national identity card is that it would make it that much easier to get a passport. In other words, in order to have a useful national ID card, the national ID card would require the same identity guarantees a passport does. Not only is that an enormous thing, but once those identity guarantees are established for a national identity card, then automatically you should be able to get a passport. I would have thought this would tend to create a danger of compromising our passport, because it would be easier to commit fraud at the ID card level than the passport level, particularly when you bring in a program like this.

    Mr. Robert Marleau: I would assume that with regard to the passport and the kind of ID card that can be envisaged, the passport would be one of the databases that my ID card has a reference to, rather than the other way around. So I would need an ID card before I need a passport, and in order to get a passport, I would likely have to produce the ID card. I think that's your line of thinking. In that kind of context the passport becomes almost subservient to the ID card, and some have said—I don't like to use this term but it is a term that has to be used in response to your question—that the ID card would de facto become a form of internal passport in Canada. But I qualify that by saying it doesn't have to be. On the manageability side you can put limits on who can demand it, what it's used for, and all those kinds of things. But again, creep is a big issue.

    In the eyes of foreign countries such as Senegal or France, it would not necessarily diminish the value of our passport. It may make it easier to get a passport. Once you have data that is digitized.... It's harder to forge a signature than it is to copy an electronic file. When you copy an electronic file, you copy it perfectly. Again, we want to think about the consequences of digitization and access to it in its management and the impact that has on these kinds of documents. If you succeed in stealing someone's identity in a digital form, you can replicate it. Even with facial recognition, where there are digital issues, you can manipulate that. There's technology to manipulate a digitized photo. It's a mixture of things.

    If the passport needs to be reinforced in this country for security reasons, with biometrics or whatever might be looked at, then I think the committee might want to look at that dimension. Some of the demand is international. Let's not just say that this is a Canadian debate. It's a much larger debate. Maybe our passport needs reinforcement to satisfy those outside our borders who feel it is weak. Canadians would feel good about that, I think.

º  (1640)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Madeleine.

[Translation]

    Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral (Laval Centre, BQ): Mr. Chairman, you're very generous to let me speak even though I arrived late.

    Good afternoon, Mr. Marleau. I think that everyone has congratulated you. I am pleased to congratulate you myself. I have the privilege, like many of us, to have known you since 1993. Moreover, I even have your photo in my office, the first swearing in ceremony was the most important one, particularly since it took place on November 15.

    I am pleased to have this opportunity to be able to discuss the national identity card with you somewhat. When the minister first talked about this issue, it was clear, from the moment he raised the issue publicly, that the objective was to produce an instrument that would make it possible for every citizen to clearly show his or her identity. As the discussion unfolded, we heard all kinds of outlandish things, for example, this idea of putting a tremendous quantity of information on a little card. Personally, I am completely opposed to that idea. I don't think that my identity has anything to do with my blood group or the financial institutions where I do business.

    There is, however, one thing that concerns me a great deal. There have been some public surveys. I do not know whether or not these surveys were carried out prior to the events of September 11, but now we see that most people are more or less in favour of this idea. I am wondering if this is the case because they are still reeling from the shock of September 11 or because there are not adequately informed. It is clear to me that we have not yet made the public sufficiently aware of the issue. We have, however, heard from all kinds of thinkers and intellectuals who are against the identity card, but that does not appear to be having any impact on the public at large.

    As the Privacy Commissioner, you have both a legal and moral responsibility. Is it part of your mandate to inform people about privacy and the dangers inherent in an identity card? I think that this is one instrument. I do not want this whole issue to be blown out of proportion, on either side, and the only way to avoid that is to provide people with information that is as accurate as possible, judicious and easily understood. That is my first question.

    Secondly, it would be no big thing to have an identity card if there were no central registry. It is the information that can be linked that poses the problem. If the purpose of the identity card was to state, for example, that I am really me and that you are really you, would there really be any need for a central registry? I think that there may not be any need for a central registry.

    Those are my two questions. And once again, I would like to thank you for joining us this afternoon.

º  (1645)  

    Mr. Robert Marleau: Thank you very much, Ms. Dalphond-Guiral. Moreover, if I recall correctly, when you were sworn in, you had your granddaughter in your arms.

    Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral: She is a big girl now.

    Mr. Robert Marleau: She must have grown up.

    I will begin by answering your first question. I realize that you were detained because of other duties, but at the beginning, in my presentation, I said that, personally, I supported this debate. I support this debate because I believe that it will serve to better inform Canadian citizens, and a better informed citizen can make better decisions. In giving consent with respect to matters that have an impact on his or her privacy, he or she does so in an informed fashion. So I support this debate. I have been invited to participate in it, and I am pleased to be here before the committee to share my thoughts with you. I provided you with a series of questions that I dare hope will assist and guide you in your deliberations.

    As for the matter of the debate, I think that when we talk about security, we must acknowledge that the world has changed since September 2001 and that this has had an impact on our daily lives. We see what happens when we try to enter the Parliament buildings in the morning and we don't have the required card. This is unfortunate, but this is reality throughout the world.

    However, in the surveys that I have read and that have been released by Mr. Coderre's department, this question has been asked point blank: if an identity card made it possible to catch terrorists, would you agree to sacrifice some of your privacy? My personal opinion is that our society, Canadian society, is community-minded, and I believe that we would be quite prepared to sacrifice one or more aspects of our privacy for the good of the community. That is, to some extent, the Canadian attitude. But when you ask who will have access to the registries, when you get into the details and you are no longer talking about a simple card, Canadians have other opinions, I believe.

    I believe that the departmental surveys asked questions that were quite narrow. That is why I am advocating a debate. We must not underestimate the people in these types of questions. I can assure you that in the cases that I see in my office, the complaints that I receive, regardless of whether they are well-founded or not, arise from a concern for privacy. Indeed, we all respond differently when we feel that we have been injured, but I fundamentally believe that we are attached to privacy as Canadians.

    But of what use is an identity card without a registry? There is the photo, the printed card. Aside from that, what good is it if I can copy it and no one can check whether or not it has been copied? So, if you simply have a photo card stating that you are Canadian and that your are Ms. Dalphond-Guiral, there could be abuse, somebody could substitute the photo and try to use it elsewhere.

    As I said, there are some technological benefits, benefits that entitle the cardholder to certain services and there are savings on both sides. One card weighs less than 12 cards in my wallet. There are benefits. But there are no longer any benefits if we do not have a registry. The benefits result from the registry, and we have to ensure that it is primarily the cardholder and the agency that will be using this card that are going to be the ones deriving the most benefit. However, privacy must be absolute, in my opinion. It must be the first priority.

º  (1650)  

[English]

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Sarkis.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Marleau.

    I too would like to welcome you here. I was one of those in 1993 who was sworn in by you, and you were kind enough to allow a huge group of my supporters to be present in the room at my swearing-in ceremony. So I'd like to take this opportunity to thank you.

    Before I go to my question, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to report to you on the Bill C-18 situation. As you know, last Thursday I was asked if it was possible to bring Bill C-18 back to the floor. The answer to that is yes. I spoke to the minister and to the House leader, and they both agreed that if the committee can't finish its work before the October break, they are prepared to put Bill C-18 on the floor again.

    The Chair: Well, the committee will decide that next week. Thank you, Mr. Parliamentary Secretary.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: We can decide next meeting, but you have the answer now.

    Mr. Chairman, my question has to do with a statement you made, that you would value human judgment over technology any time. But I have a few examples for you. One is mine, and the other one happened two weeks ago.

    Two Canadians went to Florida to perform religious ceremonies, or to speak to a religious gathering. They were turned back from the States after being detained for 16 hours simply because they had travelled on the wrong day. Some religious people can't travel in certain countries on certain days. I happen to be Christian, and I can travel on September 11, but if you are a Muslim, you can't travel. That's human judgment.

    The other point I want to make is that I am a member of Parliament, and I have a Canadian passport, a special passport. It says in this passport that I'm a member of Parliament, born in Aleppo, Syria. The U.S. has a problem with Syria. Last year, in November, you'll recall, they asked us, as members of Parliament, to be fingerprinted when we crossed the border. After a few discussions with the U.S. ambassador here, they changed their minds, or they elaborated further on the conditions as to when and why they had to fingerprint.

    I was travelling to Washington in May with my colleagues to discuss border security and immigration issues. They checked my passport and said, “Oh, gee, you went to an Arab country. Why?” I told him, “Because I'm a member of Parliament.” He turned the page over and saw another Arab visa, and asked me why I went to that country. I gave him the same answer. He turned to the next page, and the next page, and saw two more visas for Arab countries. Again, the same questions, same answers.

    At this he got annoyed and said, “Sir, you have told me four times that you're a member of Parliament.” I said, “Sir, you have asked me four times the same question, and I have given you the same answer. Tell me if I did something wrong.” And this was soon after my colleague Ablonczy had crossed the checkpoint at the Ottawa airport.

    Then he said, “When are you coming back?” “Next Thursday,” I told him. “Ah,” he said, “that's okay,” and he allowed me to go there.

    When we went to the States, I talked about this with a congresswoman there. I told her I had to be fingerprinted when I crossed the border because I'm a Canadian of Syrian origin. She didn't know that, and yet she's a member of an immigration committee. I asked her how she would feel if we in Canada put in a law whereby we had to fingerprint her coming in simply because she was black. ”That would be terrible,” she said. I told her, “Well, that's how I feel about what you're doing now against me.”

    The point I want to make is that if you use biometrics for my thumb, for my fingerprint, for my iris, that machine doesn't know where I come from, where I was born, the colour of my skin, or my religion. It just notices the fingerprint you put in the machine. My fingerprint and the biometrics card are the same. What's in my iris and what's in the machine are one and the same.

    You mentioned 99.6% accuracy, and 0.4%, and you mentioned the 160,000-some citizens, or 450 per airport in the country. Well, that's for one iris, maybe, or one fingerprint. If you combine those two elements in one card, you'll probably get 99.9%.

    I don't want to feel like a second-class citizen in my own country, not because I'm a member of Parliament but because I'm a citizen of this country. Since 1975 I've been a citizen. I have four kids, and they all were born here, but I've been here longer than they have.

º  (1655)  

    The Chair: And they're all better looking, I'll guarantee it.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Maybe they take after my wife.

    The other point I want to make is that my colleague from the NDP mentioned the fact that if you have the card, the police will stop you and ask you to show them your card or else. But let's face it, the U.S.S.R. was called the “evil empire”, and I never heard of someone in the U.S.S.R. stopping someone on the border or on the street, saying, “Hey, Joe, give me your ID.” If you did something wrong, of course, they probably would ask for it.

    I was born in Syria, and I came here at the age of 18. Nobody asked me in Syria to show them my ID, and yet they have ID there. I think we're pushing the idea too much that we'll be a police state here, with everybody--the KGB, RCMP, CSIS--running around wanting to know who is doing what. I mean, who cares? If you're a criminal, you're a criminal. What's the worry? If someone asks me for an ID card, I'm not worried. I say, “Sure, here it is, check it.”

    So I don't understand the logic behind why we should be so much against it, and I don't understand your judgment that human judgment has it over technology. As I said, a fingerprint has no colour, and my iris has no colour. I would rather go with that than human judgment, which often can be wrong. I just gave you two examples, of the Muslim clergy going to Miami and being detained, and of me crossing the border and being asked for fingerprints and having my passport checked with regard to the countries I've travelled to as a member of Parliament.

    Mr. Robert Marleau: On the issue of human judgment over technology, to use a phrase that you're very familiar with, I'll check the blues and see if I said I felt that human judgment was more reliable than technology.

    The issue with technology that I was trying to underline is that we tend to end up relying on it. As we use it and as it becomes pervasive in our lives, we tend to accept it totally as being accurate at all times.

    Let's take a spell checker. If you use Word on your computer and you spell check, and you use a word that is spelled more than one way--for example, two, to, and too--the spell checker will pick it up, and if it's spelled any one of those ways, it's not a mistake. So if you don't reread your text and you meant it to say “I went to Montreal” and it's spelled “two”, you have to exercise your judgment over the technology to see if it's the right word. I just use that as a somewhat banal example to say that when technology is in place, it is human nature to rely on it.

    You're quite right; it won't necessarily make a difference what your nationality of origin is. However, in the context of our relationship with the United States, it's most unfortunate that, because of the events of September 2001, our relationship is changing. We have had the longest undefended border.

    I lived in Cornwall. As a student of the college in Cornwall, our drinking holes were across the bridge and we went back and forth freely all the time.

    It's unfortunate that we're getting to where it is now, but it's a reality of the post-World Trade Center attacks.

    But don't underestimate that the U.S. border guard, or the U.S., will be satisfied by simply checking your iris scan, and not wanting, for other reasons--colour, accent, colour of eyes, or whatever it is--to know what your country of origin is. So your passport information will not likely be less than it is today, if supported by biometrics, and the human judgment will still apply. If the border guard is suspicious because you look like an individual of particular ethnic origin, it doesn't matter that the technology says you're okay; you're still going to be asked why you were in Syria or why you were in a country with which that country has some difficulties.

    So, in my view, the card doesn't solve that, those questions that you were asked; you're going to get them anyway. You're going to get them maybe for other reasons. It may help a little bit that the U.S is satisfied that we have a secure identity system with biometrics and through some kind of protocol between the two countries they have access to the data bank.

    Those are the issues.

    The Chair: Massimo.

    Mr. Massimo Pacetti (Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    It's a pleasure meeting you, Mr. Marleau.

    I have just a quick question. I find that the ID card is something we can't avoid. It's part of technology. I have certain issues with a lot of these things, but one of them is not the privacy, because I think we are either going to be ahead of or behind the curve on this one, and there's technology out there anyway. There's Interac. When we take money out of banks, they can follow us. There's the Internet, when we purchase something, or the sites we visit.

    I don't think up until now anybody has really said we're going to amalgamate all the information. I'd love it, because then I could carry around just one card instead of a whole wallet, but I think privacy is everywhere. I think one of my colleagues also said, if you get hold of somebody's social insurance number, you can access their income tax files. It's already out there, so I think we have to work together and come up with a plan, instead of trying to work against each other. That's my point.

    On the privacy issue, it's like Sarkis also mentioned. If you have nothing to hide, I don't think it's necessarily a privacy issue.

    I guess that's more a comment than a question, really.

»  (1700)  

    Mr. Robert Marleau: I appreciate the comment. It's a little bit in the range of discussion that Mr. Martin raised.

    You mentioned the Internet. An ID card with biometrics is not going to help you a lot if you're purchasing something online, and it certainly won't help you with the telephone marketers in this country. There is a dimension of technology used there where a lot of Canadians have interactions and make purchases online and the ID card is irrelevant, other than if you link the number of the ID card to a verifiable database that says who you are. But then the seller has even less guarantee that you are who you pretend to be or claim to be. I take your point.

    I said earlier on that I see privacy as a box around technology. If the technology breaks out of that box, there is a violation, an abuse potential, a misuse. When there is a privacy violation, you can never get it back. Two people are in divorce proceedings. One bank gives information accidentally about one individual's account to the other spouse or partner. How do you repair that? You cannot. Once it happens, it happens.

    What I am talking about in terms of the new technologies is that they have to fall within what are our societal values on privacy. That's really the debate you have to have. I didn't try to give you answers. God knows, I don't have them. We don't individually hold all the answers. When you look at technology, when you look at efficiencies of government programs through technology and the sharing of databases, I believe that good governance demands leadership on the privacy side.

    Mr. Massimo Pacetti: I feel it is happening all the time.

    The Chair: We have a few minutes left. I just want to ask some questions to try to fill in the gaps.

    Mr. Marleau, you've challenged us to look at alternatives. You've challenged us with your views of balancing privacy with security and also the needs of the state and the needs of the individual. That's what this committee is doing. By the end of this exercise, the people around the table will probably be the best experts on security or on national ID.

    Not only have we seen the technology that we've all spoken about, but we've visited certain countries. It must be a cultural thing because Europe, as we know, has had national ID cards for over 40 or 50 years. They are also debating whether or not to introduce biometrics. In over 100 countries around the world there is a national identification system, and I like the word “system” because what we've found out is that you can't have a card without a system, a national registry.

    Who is the caretaker of that national database? In fact, we went to one establishment—I'm trying to remember where—that looked like a converted prison and in fact it was. I think it was in Spain. That's where the national database was housed because they didn't want any other arm of the government to gain access to the privileged information that was on a particular system.

    Canada is entering this debate along with other countries. We're not the only ones that are talking about national identification and how best to protect against identity theft, fraud, people getting services to which they are not entitled, and how to protect against that. Part of the discussion, I hope, will also include our present foundation documents, which are precious and in fact are very valuable to an awful lot of people, including the passport.

    Because you started to use some examples, I want to ask you in your role as Privacy Commissioner how Canadians are protected. You said that you use one card at the LCBO but you use another card at the Canadian Tire store. How do you know, as an individual—maybe you know as the Privacy Commissioner—that those systems are not now merged and that in fact the one card you have doesn't know you actually went to the Canadian Tire store on such and such a date to purchase such and such a thing? How do you know that the Canadian Tire card giver doesn't know that you go to the LCBO and that you like a particular wine? How do we know? What guarantee, as the Privacy Commissioner, can you give Canadians that in fact those systems are not now being sold or integrated? We found that systems are being stolen all the time. Hackers are getting into systems, and as we know, we have SIN cards that now can give you all the information on anybody, practically, that you would want.

    What assurance is there now that Canadians have privacy? I know that is your job, but part of our debate is how to protect privacy while at the same time doing something else, that is, providing a certain amount of security either to the country and/or to the individual with regard to their identity.

    That is my first question, if you could.

»  (1705)  

    Mr. Robert Marleau: Your question is, how do I know whether or not the LCBO is sharing information with Canadian Tire? The answer is I don't know.

    What protections do Canadians have against that? It's called the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, which Parliament adopted in 2001. We just tabled the annual report in the House yesterday, and there's a whole section on what we call PIPEDA, in terms of what we do at the commission to protect the privacy rights of Canadians. Starting on January 1, 2004, the authority of the act is extended to the entire private sector, not just the public sector, where there is some kind of gathering, exchange, or selling of information. That includes mom-and-pop video shops that gather your name, address, phone number, and driver's licence number; magazines that may be trafficking in their subscriber lists; and insurance companies. The list goes on. It's going to touch Canadian society in a way that has never happened before. The act does give us power of audit where there are reasonable grounds to audit. We haven't done any yet because we haven't had reasonable grounds to go out there, particularly in the private sector. This Parliament has already put in place strong legislation that says if you feel your rights are being violated, you can turn to our commission, and there will be an investigation and a finding. PIPEDA in particular is going to be used by Canadians in the next decade or so in a whole bunch of transactions.

    The issue there, though, with the card that the LCBO takes is that when I signed up for that program, I was informed of what data would be captured, what use it would be put to, and whether it would be shared with Canadian Tire. If I had this information and I checked off that I agreed that they could share it with Canadian Tire, there is no problem. But if I was not informed that it was going to be shared with Canadian Tire, then there's a problem.

    The Chair: As Privacy Commissioner, as long as there is full disclosure, you wouldn't have a problem with regard to a particular card.

    Mr. Robert Marleau: Before disclosure there should be consent.

    The Chair: Let me ask you another question, which is perhaps more relevant. We've looked at an awful lot of national ID systems. We've talked about a simple card to prove one on one to that border guard that Robert Marleau is actually Robert Marleau. You present your card, and your iris, your face, or your fingerprint is on that card. You'll be able to verify one on one the person actually handing the card to that person. The use of biometrics makes it easier from a technology standpoint. But if that system was not linked to anything, other than it was a one on one to verify that you are who you say you are, and therefore there is no database, the reader can't do anything but verify that you are the person you say you are. Would you have a problem with that?

    I only say that because we thought we were going to get an exemption in the case of the U.S. Now it appears that Canadians who want to go to the United States, on business or for necessity or whatever, might have to start carrying a passport with a biometric identifier. As of 2005 our Mexican friends will probably have to do the same thing. I don't believe the U.S. is going to be satisfied with just being able to verify who you are, as Sarkis said, but in fact is going to want to test you and your biometrics against a massive database of known people around the world to make sure you are not one of those people.

    That's the conundrum we face. Would you have a problem with a system that only could verify that Robert Marleau is who he says he is and that's it, or do you have a problem if it's linked to a database that can then be intruded upon by anyone? I think that is a fundamental question that Canadians face. Canadians don't appear to have a problem with having this card if it's going to allow them to move freely across a border, but if you start telling them there's going to be access to this and encryption isn't going to be able to prevent the firewalls from breaking down, then all of a sudden Canadians start to get off base with regard to a national ID system.

»  (1710)  

    Mr. Robert Marleau: The one-on-one system you describe is probably the most privacy-protected, if I can put it that way. But I think the other issues Mr. Assadourian raised aren't solved by the one-on-one system. If you have the right iris matching the iris biometric on the card, will the border guard simply take that and say, “Okay, you're on your way”? The U.S. would have to be satisfied that this kind of system meets their minimum security standards or protocols of how to clear people; how to assign them; and how to collect the biometric and all of those sorts of things. They're just not going to take this at face value.

    So I question the manageability of that. It's the least privacy-intrusive, but there's another dimension to this that we're experiencing in Canada right now. We have a program for the most trusted travellers right now, and we've worked closely with CCRA and Transport Canada, and we've given some privacy impact reports on that. That system seems to be working in the ATI.

    So in that sense, there's a way of voluntary pre-clearance. When I ask what are the alternatives, that is an alternative for those who have a need.

    The Chair: But that's voluntary.

    Mr. Robert Marleau: But they have a need.

    The Chair: Can I just ask you one question, and then I'll take some others?

    With regard to the privacy issue, and going back to Sarkis's example of himself, should we have on our passports where we were born, as some people have suggested? How would they know that Sarkis comes from Syria, or how would they know that Joe Fontana is Italian? How would they know that anybody is anybody, save and except the basic information saying I am who I say I am, with the colour of my eyes, my height, and so on and so forth, including maybe a biometric, and perhaps leave out their birthplace? Someone suggested that some countries don't have the place of birth on their passports.

    Once you're a Canadian, you're a Canadian, and it doesn't matter where you came from way before. Has that ever been raised as an issue? Is the situation of Sarkis and the other examples talked about a consideration that one needs to deal with?

    Mr. Robert Marleau: There are privacy dimensions to that. To the Privacy Commission's office, the least information you give is the least information you should give. The less you give, the less is being stored and the less is being used.

    But it's also an international policy issue. What are the protocols between countries in terms of information a country requires in a passport? It's a little bit like your one-on-one example. Should a passport be more like a one-on-one exchange? That's a larger policy issue. Let's say the passport doesn't state that you were born in Syria—but you look Syrian. What's that going to solve when the border guard looks at you and says, “Where were you born, sir?” Do you say, “I don't have to answer that; it's not in my passport.” Is that going to get you in? I don't think so.

    I think that's the issue you have to debate. How does biometric technology enhance the exchange or hinder it? We're having a hard time seeing where the enhancement comes from where people start to exercise human judgment. There are slips in technology. If you fail a biometric test—and I know Mr. Assadourian is raising the issue of facial recognition, not biometrics—in a one-on-one situation, and there's no other data proving who you are, you're not going to get in, period. At least if there were some form of database that could be checked against your one-on-one situation, they might say, “Oh, yes, it was a mistake”. You would have recourse or an appeal mechanism. But if you failed it, what are they going to do? They're going to take Joe Fontana's name and put it into this database in a foreign country. And what happens then? What are your appeal mechanisms in a foreign country?

    So those are the kinds of issues I raise around the technology. When I talk about recourse rights, they're real. Some businessmen in this country need to go to the United States every day. They can't afford a rejection, as they could lose thousands of dollars. If one of the truck drivers who goes back and forth at our borders gets rejected because the technology has failed him, and it takes him six, seven, or eight months to get back behind the wheel to drive to California, there are some real costs there.

    So those are the issues I raise.

»  (1715)  

    The Chair: Ms. Ablonczy.

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: I have two quick questions, if I may.

    The Chair: Ask one little question, if you could, Diane.

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I want to go back to my question because you didn't get a chance to really finish it. It concerns experts who advocate putting in a national ID card system with biometrics.

    You mentioned Alan Dershowitz, but he's not an expert in international studies and strategic matters. He's a lawyer. He's a brilliant, persuasive lawyer whom the minister has brought in to make the case for the minister, so to speak. I'm sure he'll do an excellent job, but he's not in the community of strategic studies and international security.

    If you have anybody who has made a compelling case and advocates it strongly, I would be interested in reading or following up on that person.

    Mr. Robert Marleau: We'll check our research. Nobody comes to mind at this point. No doubt some have made some cases. It is a debate. We'll endeavour to provide you with what we have on file with that dimension. I certainly don't want to give the impression that we've only brought one side of the debate to the table.

    I would like to underline to the committee that I did not suggest you reject the proposal just because it's a national ID card. I suggested that if you did not get satisfactory answers to the questions I've raised you should reject the proposal. I am for continuing the debate. It should last as long as you feel it should.

    We will try to look at our research and provide to you and the committee whatever we have on the compelling side or on the pro side.

    The monitoring I've done of the media, such as editorials, letters to the editor, and articles since I've been in office in July—and there were a lot of them this summer—are overwhelmingly against. There are those who advocate the efficiencies of one card, and it would be a lot easier for me to carry one card, but I think it's card-simplistic in terms of the debate. You have to look at what's behind the card. The system, to me, is enormous.

[Translation]

    In French, I said that it was tremendous.

[English]

    The Chair: I'm sorry, we're running out of time.

    Quickly, Madeleine, Inky, and then Sarkis. We have to go.

[Translation]

    Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral: Mr. Marleau, on October 7 and 8, there will be a forum of biometrics experts. Will you be with us?

»  (1720)  

    Mr. Robert Marleau: The minister was kind enough to invite me to the forum and I will be there. I will not be part of the round tables, but I am assuming that I will have an opportunity to ask questions and perhaps to answer some. I will be there, yes.

[English]

    The Chair: Some of us also, I hope, because we're interested, obviously, in this matter.

    I should, for the record, point out that the committee will have an interim report next week as to what we've heard from Canadians thus far and also what we've learned from other countries, because I think that might be an important ingredient to put forward before the conference. We'll be doing that next week.

    Thank you.

    Inky.

    Mr. Inky Mark: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    As you pointed out, this is not only about post-9/11 but also about trade and our economy. If by political design the Americans decided that yes, you're going to have to have biometrics and yes, you're going to have to have a passport and you really don't have a choice if you want to cross our borders, what would your opinion be of that?

    Mr. Robert Marleau: That takes me a little bit out of my field in terms of international negotiations, diplomacy, and Canadian government policy. I've watched the debates of the House over the years as a very privileged officer of the House, and I trust that the ministry and the parliamentarians will do what they have to do in order to minimize the impact on our citizens crossing the border.

    But it's not just the U.S. There are other countries that can be just as firm about what they demand to enter the country. Just look at visas. Some countries require visas and some don't. That's all part of the diplomatic process.

    In terms of the identity card use in Canada, though, there are some larger issues about trade. I'm sure some financial institutions will be happy if I produce my identity card when I open an account because they can have some reassurance that I am who I represent myself to be. But there are issues too around commerce and trade within Canada, particularly with financial institutions and fraud that I think the private sector has to look at to resolve, rather than necessarily looking to government in a universal application of an ID card to solve some of their commerce problems.

    The Chair: Finally, Sarkis.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Thank you very much.

    Just having to do with your privacy, Mr. Marleau, if you don't want to answer, you don't have to.

    We have two ways of doing this, compulsory or voluntary. If it were voluntary, would you apply for it?

    Mr. Robert Marleau: No, sir.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Thank you. You didn't have to answer that.

    The Chair: And if it's compulsory, he may not apply for it either.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    The Chair: Mr. Marleau, on behalf of the committee, I want to thank you very much for continuing the debate. As you said, there are an awful lot of questions. We are in the middle of a debate with Canadians. We are learning a lot with regard to the world too, because we are a small community and what the rest of the world does impacts us. It's not only about Canadians who live inside our country, but Canadians who want to travel to other parts of the world are going to be subjected to identification systems, and more importantly, it's the people who want to come to Canada.

    So we're very interested in the international context, because the international community has yet, as we understand it, to make a standard that will be applicable to everyone else.

    We also know that the privacy commissioners from around the world have gathered and have opinions on where privacy and technology and these issues are going. I know a presentation was made before on behalf of Canada, but if there is some information from your organization on privacy commissioners around the world, I think it might be useful to have our committee review some of the documentation. We have spoken to your counterparts elsewhere, and they seem to have the same opinions you have.

    As I said, we're interested in asking Canadians the very questions you've asked of us, to assure ourselves that if we should recommend such a thing, we have in fact covered all of those. I think that has been helpful and insightful to us.

    That was pretty good for the first day on the job, or at least the first presentation, Mr. Marleau. You've done very well. Thank you so much.

    We're adjourned until Tuesday.