CIMM Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, April 8, 2003

Á

1110

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard (Chatham—Kent Essex, Lib.))

Mr. Kevin Curry (Vice-President and General Manager, North America Public Sector, Unisys Corporation)

Mr. John Souder (Director, Registry and Personal Identification Solutions, Unisys Corporation)

Á

1115

Á

1120

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Á

1125

Mr. John Souder

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. John Souder

Á

1130

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy (Calgary—Nose Hill, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Kevin Curry

Mr. John Souder

Á

1135

Mr. Kevin Curry

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

Mr. John Souder

Mr. Kevin Curry

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.)

Á

1140

Mr. John Souder

Mr. Kevin Curry

Mr. John Souder

Mr. Kevin Curry

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

Mr. Kevin Curry

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral (Laval Centre, BQ)

Á

1145

Mr. John Souder

Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral

Mr. John Souder

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.)

Á

1150

Mr. John Souder

Mr. David Price

Mr. John Souder

Mr. Kevin Curry

Á

1155

Mr. David Price

Mr. John Souder

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Ms. Libby Davies (Vancouver East, NDP)

Mr. Kevin Curry

Ms. Libby Davies

Mr. Kevin Curry

Ms. Libby Davies

Â

1200

Mr. John Souder

Ms. Libby Davies

Mr. John Souder

Ms. Libby Davies

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mrs. Lynne Yelich (Blackstrap, Canadian Alliance)

Â

1205

Mr. John Souder

Mrs. Lynne Yelich

Mr. John Souder

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Â

1210

Mr. John Souder

Â

1215

Mr. Kevin Curry

Mr. John Souder

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. John Souder

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Â

1220

Mr. Kevin Curry

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Kevin Curry

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

Â

1225

Â

1230

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral

Â

1235

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Ms. Libby Davies

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Â

1240

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Roy Bailey (Souris—Moose Mountain)

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mr. Roy Bailey

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mrs. Lynne Yelich

Â

1245

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

Mrs. Diane Ablonczy

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard)

---

CANADA

Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration

---

NUMBER 052

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, April 8, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Á  (1110)  

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard (Chatham—Kent Essex, Lib.)): Ladies and gentlemen, I'll call the meeting to order.

    Today we're fortunate enough to have Unisys Corporation as witnesses: Mr. Kevin Curry, vice-president and general manager, North American public sector; John Souder, registry and personnel identification solutions; and Bill Ellis, plant relationship executive in federal systems.

    Gentlemen, welcome. We really appreciate your being here, and we look forward to your testimony.

    There will be other members coming, but just to get under way and keep the meeting flowing along, we can start, and as people come in, we can pick up and fill in on whatever issues they may have missed.

    For other committee people who are unaware, several members of the committee were able to meet in Washington with folks from Unisys, and they did a great demonstration there. It's unfortunate that everyone didn't have an opportunity, but I think we can fill in some of those gaps here.

    So I'm going to turn it over to you, Kevin, and we'll go ahead on that base.

    Mr. Kevin Curry (Vice-President and General Manager, North America Public Sector, Unisys Corporation): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. Chairman and members of the standing committee, on behalf of Unisys Corporation, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration about national identification.

    My name is Kevin Curry, and I am vice-president and general manager of the North America public sector business of Unisys Corporation. Unisys is a worldwide information technology services and solutions company. Our people combine expertise, systems integration, outsourcing, infrastructure-server technology and consulting with precision thinking and relentless execution to help our clients in more than 100 countries quickly and efficiently achieve a competitive advantage.

    Unisys Corporation is a U.S.-based corporation with a global focus on government, as our government business constitutes one-third of Unisys Corporation's revenues. Canada is the sixth largest market in the public sector market, and we are very committed to growing our business and our presence in Canada.

    Unisys currently employs about 307 Canadians, with offices in Vancouver, Calgary, Winnipeg, Ottawa, Halifax, Toronto, Pickering, Montreal, Quebec City, and Fredericton. On an annual basis our spending is about $60 million Canadian on Canadian goods, services, and salaries. It is our goal to invest and grow our Canadian business.

    Unisys Canada has been providing solutions and technology to the Canadian government for over 80 years, including engagements with federal, provincial, and municipal governments. Our clients include the Department of National Defence, Statistics Canada, Citizenship and Immigration, HRDC, the Province of Quebec, the Province of New Brunswick, Ontario courts, Prince Edward Island courts, and Nova Scotia and Toronto police services. As well, we have many private sector clients in Canada.

    The United States and Canada share many common interests that include our borders, our seaports, our airports, and trade. As a result of 9/11, both countries have a heightened alert to our vulnerability to terrorist threats. Our governments are working collaboratively to ensure we protect these interests and are working to prevent future terrorist threats.

    Unisys has core competencies that include identification, access control, security, and biometrics, all of which are very important to this topic today. We are working with governments around the world, leveraging these core competencies to address domestic security concerns.

    There are many debates that surround the topic of a national identification card. On one side of the argument are citizens and governments that struggle with issues such as privacy, legislation, policy and procedures, misuse of information, and protection of citizen data, as well as shades of George Orwell's Big Brother, where government has too much control over citizens' rights.

    On the other hand, there are benefits to be derived from freedom of movement for North Americans, prevention of identity fraud, and strengthening of the economy to free movement of goods, people, and services.

    Unisys is not here today to support either side of the argument but to share our experience around this controversial issue in hopes of adding value to your decision process. We are at the committee's disposal, and in the future, should any additional information be required. As well, Mr. Chairman, if there are other opportunities for other members to come to Washington, D.C., to see some of the things we showed you during your visit, we would welcome the opportunity to host the committee once again.

    With that, let me introduce my colleague Mr. John Souder, who is responsible for our registry and personal identification solutions program. John has been involved in many large civil identification projects around the world.

    I thank you once again for the opportunity to present our testimony.

    John.

    Mr. John Souder (Director, Registry and Personal Identification Solutions, Unisys Corporation): Thank you, Kevin.

    Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to present testimony on the subject of national identification. My name is John Souder. I am the global practice executive for the Unisys registry and personal identification solutions program.

    Unisys has successfully implemented various identification and secure document solutions around the world over the last ten years. During this period, Unisys has gained valuable knowledge and experience from those engagements. As a result, the skills and abilities developed have uniquely positioned Unisys as the leading systems integrator for these complex and technically challenging projects. Unisys's qualifications are uniquely aligned with identification and secure document solutions, because these projects involve much more than just card biometrics or information technology.

    As Kevin indicated, my presentation today is not intended to either support or oppose a national identification system. Rather, my intent is to review our experience in implementing such systems for other governments, to address typical issues and concerns, and to help clarify misleading statements, either for or against such systems.

    Overall, our experience suggests that national identification systems can and do directly benefit citizens through faster, improved, and more secure access to government services and benefits.

    What is a national identification system? A national identification system can take many forms. It can consist of just a central database, such as a demographic database. It can include an identification system, automated or manual. It can include a secure document such as a passport or a driver's licence. Or it can be a combination of all these components. However, it is important to understand that a national identification system is more than just technology or an identification document. A national identification system is more importantly composed of appropriate legislation and its resultant policies and procedures.

    Obviously, to be a successful implementation, a national identification system requires a well thought out legal structure that assures each citizen that their government will protect their data and their right to privacy and the freedom of movement. It also assures that appropriate policies and procedures are in place to support quick resolution of issues and concerns when raised--for example, what appeals or adjudication processes are available to those who encounter problems during registration, or later, when using the document for authentication purposes; when can law enforcement request that a citizen present his or her identification document; how and where is data stored and when is it accessed and by whom; and will the system be voluntary or mandatory.

    Equally important, a national identification system can help ensure that each citizen will not be the victim of identity fraud or theft. In fact, several relevant smart-card-based identification systems have been successfully deployed globally.

    One such system in Spain offers citizens access to several government databases and services via a multi-factor security approach. A citizen can easily access general information without using his or her identification card. If the citizen wants to review more personal information, then he or she can do so with their identification card, which stores and uses digital certificates.

    Optionally, each citizen can elect to use another level of protection, via biometric verification using fingerprint templates stored only on the card. There is no national database in this scenario.

    Another often ignored benefit to a national identification system is the ability of law-abiding citizens or immigrants to be quickly identified and allowed to go about their business when circumstances would require that they be held until proper identification could be presented.

    A good example here is a story shared with Unisys recently by Professor Allan Dershowitz. Professor Dershowitz related how one of the first African American students to attend Harvard University was stopped by security over and over again while entering and on the campus. Fortunately, the student had in his possession a Harvard identification card that proved he was a student and allowed him to move on his way. While obviously inconvenient by our standards today, this identification card did provide the student with freedom of movement about the campus.

Á  (1115)  

    Another system, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, utilizes a state-of-the-art secure multimedia solution built around a multi-purpose smart card. The government multi-purpose card is part of Malaysia's multimedia super corridor designed to transform Malaysia into a knowledge-based society and increase Malaysia's productivity and competitiveness in the region. The multi-purpose card supports five applications: national identification, immigration, health care, driver's licence, and a Malaysian electronic payment capability, basically an e-purse.

    The multi-purpose card provides improved security and enhanced service to Malaysian citizens, not to mention a single card for most government services. For example, the immigration application facilitates quick exit and entry of Malaysian citizens when travelling abroad or returning. In addition the MEPS Cash feature allows for quick payment of tolls, parking, and public transportation, including payment of traffic fines, which helped reduce an existing source of widespread fraud.

    While many governments struggle with the debates surrounding national identification systems, many have already implemented systems. National identification systems vary from country to country. For example, South Africa's system, which began implementation in 2002, is primarily an automated fingerprint identification system that helps ensure there is only one unique record for each citizen. Malaysia's is a comprehensive system that includes a multi-purpose smart card and an identification system. Finland's system is voluntary and only includes digital certificates for authentication, no use of biometrics. Again, it's important to understand that these systems need to be designed around a country's specific needs and requirements.

    If systems are deployed because of a desired technology, and there have been such systems, they generally fail to meet expectations. In fact, some technology deployed is not used as it was intended, either because of the cost of readers or the extensive time required to read the information stored on a document.

    Frankly speaking, large-scale civil identification projects are challenging both technically and managerially. Enrolling an entire population in a given timeframe is complex. Doing it while ensuring data integrity is even more challenging. Issuance is equally challenging, where you adopt a central production model, an over-the-counter or a hybrid model.

    A number of other issues will require attention. What identification number should be used? Will the card be multi-functional? Will interfaces to a legacy system be required? What is the integrity of the existing data? With multiple databases, how are the data synchronized and which database becomes the master database? How will the project be financed? How will the project be structured? Who has the responsibility and the authority for making these decisions, an individual or a committee?

    Equally important are the post-implementation issues. What level of user training and ongoing support is required? How will public consultation and awareness issues be handled? How will the agency manage the public response to minimize the impact of peaks and valleys in demand? How will the agency transition from the old system to the new system? When is the new system to be operational? What minimum requirements have been defined that will serve as a benchmark or an acceptance test to ensure these requirements are met? What disaster recovery procedures are in place and what are planned?

    From a global perspective it seems that there are two key issues that always seem to rise to the forefront when national identification systems are discussed: an Orwellian state and the potential single point of failure. In my humble opinion, we are already there. Consider for a moment that financial and commercial entities often know more about us than our government. Our purchases are recorded and analysed when using loyalty cards or credit cards. Information on our purchasing habits is sold to marketers. How does this national identification system potentially make this any worse? In fact, I suspect that it has the ability to prevent some of these abuses, which would be welcomed by most citizens. However, citizens have already shown their willingness to sell their personal and private data for as little as $300 just to acquire a computer.

    In my previous job over a decade ago, while training law enforcement crime laboratory personnel on how to use an automated fingerprint identification system, I learned about how a recent victim of rape had been found by her violent attacker. The unsuspecting victim--

Á  (1120)  

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): I'd like to interrupt for a moment. We have interpreters who don't have the script. As a result, it's a little difficult for them to keep up with the pace you're going. Giving them a copy of the script would help and also slowing down the pace a touch.

Á  (1125)  

    Mr. John Souder: Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Ladies and gentlemen, we have a group called the “multifacets” group who are involved in a program here in Parliament. Because the federal government has so many different services and so many different activities, they have an opportunity to see how the Speaker and the Speaker's office operate, how the committee operates, the different facets of the House of Commons, and the different facets of various departments. They all came in together.

    We certainly welcome you. Would you like just to stand up? They're employees of the federal government and they're looking at different operations. They've come to visit our committee, so welcome, ladies and gentlemen.

    Sorry for the interruption, John.

    Mr. John Souder: As I was saying, in my previous job over a decade ago, while training law enforcement personnel how to use an automated fingerprint identification system, I learned about how a recent victim of rape had been found by her violent attacker. The unsuspecting victim was seen in a checkout line at a grocery store, where the attacker captured her name and address information from her driver's licence while she was cashing a cheque. This could have been prevented.

    Current identification documents do not offer much protection, let alone privacy. For example, anyone can buy a software development kit that allows a person or business to decode all available ID information from the driver's licence. This can and should be prevented.

    Undoubtedly, information shown visibly on any identification document and/or stored in various government or commercial databases is subject to abuse. Unauthorized persons or commercial entities can access this information. Unprotected data can be shared without the citizen's knowledge and, what is somewhat alarming, it can be analyzed and correlated for intelligence purposes, etc. While these are valid concerns, they can be overcome by public awareness, by stringent legislation, and by stiff penalties in the form of reasonable jail sentences and large fines.

    The European Union's privacy directive is a good example of what can be done, and it offers several important principles. Data is protected and access is granted only with clear consent. Data collected is proportional; in other words, only data that is actually needed is collected. Data is accurate and kept up to date, and data is kept only for a limited time.

    In fact, if we look at smart card technology in a practical way, it actually offers privacy and data protection currently not available with existing systems and processes. For example, if we encrypt personal information like address and date of birth inside a smart card and allow only blind verification of the data, security is enhanced for the business via smart card authentication while personal privacy and data protection are also enhanced for the citizen.

    Data stored in databases can be encrypted also, which requires explicit and specific access to view or distribute this information. Auditing use and access to information can provide a mechanism to protect the data and quickly identify and find those who abuse such protections.

    Frankly, a national identification system will not stop terrorism and it is not foolproof. As we learned after September 11, several of the terrorists were living in the U.S.A. legally. Criminal background checks will only catch those terrorists who have been booked or are already on a watch list. A national identification system can, however, provide various levels of assurance the government knows who it is dealing with relative to the establishment and subsequent use of an identity.

    Linking identity to a birth certificate is a start. Linking identity to birth certificates and flagging each record as no longer valid for purposes of establishing identity can help reduce fraud. Enhancing security of a national identification document without addressing birth certificates and other source documents is often the norm.

    While some national identification systems do not include identification documents, those that do so do not always choose smart card technology. For example, Costa Rica chose to use a more traditional identification document that uses a two-dimensional bar code for storage of basic demographic data and two fingerprint minutiae templates. The fingerprint data is intended solely for reliable and convenient offline verification, thus providing an additional layer of security for the citizen and the business community.

    Contrary to many views, a national identification system can, however, significantly reduce identity fraud and theft. As we are aware, identity fraud is rampant both here in Canada and in the United States. A CBC news article reports that the Canadian Council of Better Business Bureaus estimates identity theft costs $2.5 billion to consumers, banks, credit card firms, stores, and other businesses.

Á  (1130)  

    I respectfully submit that the Government of Canada should act slowly and deliberately when considering a large-scale civil identification project. Clearly identify and define your strategy, goals, and objectives. Simply put, understand where you want to go and what you want to do before embarking on the journey.

    This Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration is commended for its willingness to hold public hearings on this sensitive topic, and as a fellow North American, I am pleased to have the opportunity to participate.

    Continue to get all the committees and agencies impacted by a project involved early, and make sure you have a well-balanced public and legislative advisory and evaluation team. For example, consider citizens, finance departments, information technology, other senior executives, and domain-expert consultants where appropriate. Issue a request for information to solicit industry feedback before beginning a procurement cycle. Do not err by soliciting pricing or detailed configurations, but rather state the problem and let the vendors propose solutions.

    Again, please note, newspaper and magazine articles alike are littered with projects that went bad. It is important to understand that large-scale civil identification projects are challenging, both technically and managerially. There are many risks involved politically, culturally, and technologically. However, if managed correctly and appropriately, these projects can be a huge success. They can in fact improve our freedom of movement, strengthen our economies, and change the debate from one of oppression to one of opportunity.

    Once more, thank you for the opportunity to present testimony. Both Kevin and I will be pleased to respond to any questions you might have.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Diane, would you like to start off?

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy (Calgary—Nose Hill, Canadian Alliance): Yes, thank you.

    Thank you for your presentation. We very much enjoyed meeting with you when we were in Washington a couple of weeks ago, and we enjoyed our tour of your facility there.

    I wonder if you can tell us about emerging technologies. We've heard of where you've been. I'm just curious to know whether there's anything in the pipeline we may not have heard about and you're just exploring. Technology changes so quickly, I'm just curious to know if there's anything on tap or coming available in the next couple of years that might be of interest to us.

    Mr. Kevin Curry: We can answer that as a two-part answer, if you will. John, I'll let you talk about the smart card technology and where that's going. The second point would be the biometric component, and that is evolving daily. There are quite a few different types of biometrics, and we can touch on that as well.

    John, can you take the first part?

    Mr. John Souder: Probably the most significant enhancements or improvements are coming in the area of biometrics technologies today. If you're talking about a large-scale identification project, typically most governments have gone with fingerprint identification systems. The reason is that it's the only proven technology today that actually has the scope for large-scale populations.

    Some of the developments that are taking place, however, are in the area of facial recognition. There are passport systems and immigration and border control issues. It's where you have an infrastructure that's already in place, so being able to use photographs for these types of projects would be very helpful if you could. There's a lot of development and investment going into facial recognition technologies. There are some other technologies out there--iris scan, hand geometry, and voice recognition, for example--but the leading technology out there where you're going to see continued investment and development is probably facial recognition.

    On the card technology side, smart cards are probably the newest development. They have probably been around for 10 years. They primarily started out as something called the memory card, but now they have a processor on it; they have a cryptoprocessor on it, so they're much more advanced. They also have a much larger storage capacity, so you can put a lot more information. For example, you could put multiple biometrics on the card. There's also another technology called the optical card, which you actually use as your immigrant card currently, the maple leaf card.

    Another area in technology that's coming along is artificial intelligence, and some of the software advances there allow you to spot patterns of behaviour and that sort of stuff. For example, you can have programs that watch for different behaviour if you're monitoring a border or maybe if you're sharing information among databases, as we do with the CAPPS program in the U.S., which is an airline passenger screening system. It shares information on the credit card history and some other things, so when they start to pull the information together, they can highlight potential threats.

    There are all sorts of developments in some of these areas that are taking us to new and interesting places.

Á  (1135)  

    Mr. Kevin Curry: To John's point, one of the reasons we're seeing such a focus on the area of biometrics is exactly because photographs exist today for your DOB records, for motor vehicles, for your driver's licence, for criminal histories through law enforcement, for past offenders, and for photographs of terrorists who are threats at a country level. So you actually have the ability to be able to check, if you will, information and coordinate information among multiple agencies.

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: That's interesting. We're learning so much about this, and it's good to talk to experts who know.

    We were told by one of the people we spoke to in our Washington briefings--a woman with the American Immigration Lawyers Association--that if it took only 30 seconds to scan and identify each entry or exit from the U.S., it would back up traffic at the border for five days. Whether that is true or not I don't know, but that was the information we received.

    I'm wondering about the speed of identification and if there is any reasonable possibility, if you have vehicles with four or five people in them, in all weather conditions, to identify people with any known technology in the kind of short timeframe that would still allow the two million border crossings a day to go ahead without unreasonable interruption.

    Mr. John Souder: Those are interesting challenges, and frankly speaking, it depends on what the border crossing point is, whether it's a road or an airport. In an airport it's a little bit more controlled. You can use different technologies that aren't as lengthy. Thirty seconds would be a very long time in an airport. In fact, if I remember correctly, our immigration department doesn't like to go beyond seven seconds, and even that's considered slow by most of us.

    On a vehicle crossing point, it's much more challenging. As you said, you could have four or five people in a car. So for a technology to be able to identify all of the occupants, if it takes 10 seconds per person, it could take 40 to 50 seconds. So there has to be a significant amount of investment and development in that area before it's a workable solution.

    Mr. Kevin Curry: I would add that there are a lot of interesting things like frequent traveller programs where a lot of the background checks and such are done up front, so with people who are frequently on airplanes or travelling across the border there's a way to expedite them because they've already had the clearances. Their cards allow them to go right through.

    There are ways to circumvent some of the process, but you're right, it is an issue.

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Sarkis.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much. It's good to see you again. I'm sure you're not in charge of the weather here. When we were in Washington, the temperature was 70 to 75 degrees.

    I have one question. It stems from an incident that happened just before I came to this meeting. It has to do with training. We've been hearing a lot of witnesses on technology and how the system works, but nobody has told us how to train people to use the technology or to use the commonly referred to intelligence on the ground. The U.S. has big technology, but if you don't have intelligence on the ground, it doesn't do you any good.

    Just to demonstrate the point, I came here with my colleague, Diane. I was stopped down in the lobby. She was ahead of me and she was not asked for ID. I was asked for ID. I asked the gentleman if he asked her for ID and he said no. I asked why not--I'm her colleague, and she's a member of Parliament like me. There was a lady in the elevator who had coloured skin and she was asked for ID too.

    I don't care what kind of fingerprinting you do, if the person is not trained or doesn't have the sense to use his brain...after nine and a half years here, they question a member of Parliament for an ID. How are you going to make the system work if you don't provide some training in your business for a person in pursuing IDs?

Á  (1140)  

    Mr. John Souder: That's a very good question, sir.

    Frankly, the answer is in training the people. The identification request should be for each person coming through, not just for one or another person. It should be consistent. That's the only approach that should be used in a security situation.

    Interestingly, it's one of the areas in some countries where facial technology has not been used, and let me explain. In fact, Canada actually addressed this during a project for metro Toronto social services. They touched on this as one of the potential issues for social services benefits, where a photo can give you the gender of the person and also the race. Obviously, with that information, there's the potential for bias, as opposed to another technology like fingerprints, where a person doesn't see that--it doesn't reveal the gender; it doesn't reveal the race.

    These are some things to consider when you're looking at these projects. Some things are probably used because you have a great infrastructure in place and you can use them, but what are the potential abuses that exist there?

    Mr. Kevin Curry: John, you're involved in the TSA project. Ted Miller mentioned the level of training going on there with the airport people.

    Mr. John Souder: Yes, we are in the process of working with the Transportation Security Administration in the U.S., and a significant amount of time and effort is being incorporated and invested in training.

    An American citizen had been travelling a lot.... I've travelled a lot over the years, and I think Kevin has as well. I mean, the remarkable difference that training has made with the new TSA folks in the screening part of the airport is a day and night difference for us.

    It's no longer frustrating for me to go through security checkpoints. When you need to take your laptop out of your bag, they let you know you need to do so. They're polite, they're courteous. This all comes back to consistent training, making sure the customers understand what they're there for, what they're trying to achieve, that they want to get through these things as fast as anybody else, and that they want to have security as well.

    Mr. Kevin Curry: And as you're probably aware, that was a massive undertaking for the U.S government, to start up a brand-new agency. Most of the security screeners that were in place before were private security firms, and the government ended up taking it over and federalizing the program, hiring some of them and replacing quite a few as well, people who were not qualified and could not meet the standard they were trying to set.

    These people had gone through extensive training and were working at the airports in a very aggressive timeframe. It's very doable. You're right, though. You have to be able to plan to train these people and be able to address most of the issues, and, quite frankly, even train some of your own people internally. It's a kind of a train the trainer program, if you are to have that knowledge transfer and be able to be self-sufficient as well.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Do you have a program to train individuals as you're pushing the program that you're doing, fingerprinting, whatever, which is fair game, but do you also have a program to train those who would be using the technology?

    Mr. Kevin Curry: Yes, that would be part of an implementation, and every implementation is different. Obviously, there are things that need to be taken into consideration, like language, as well as locations. Is it going to be centralized? Is it going to be a decentralized, over-the-counter type of operation? If it's the latter, you need to be able to train in multiple locations and have more people out there to distribute the training. But the answer is yes.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Thank you, Sarkis.

    Madeleine.

[Translation]

    Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral (Laval Centre, BQ): Good morning, gentlemen.

    This debate on a national identity card is a relatively recent thing. Some people only see advantages to introducing such a card, while other harbour some very grave concerns. The pressure is considerable. I think we can acknowledge amongst ourselves that the US is exercising considerable pressure on others to resort to every means possible to reduce terrorism and make life difficult for criminals. That's understandable.

    However, as I see it, a national identity card, even one that is state-of-the-art, implies the establishment of a registry of some sort. I may be a terrorist, but I could have the proper ID card. When I present myself to border officials, I am really the person I claim to be. However, if there is no central registry, how will they know that I have some knowledge of chemical compounds, that I have conducted experiments and that they should therefore keep a close eye on me? I have a problem with this and maybe you could shed some light on this area.

Á  (1145)  

[English]

    Mr. John Souder: That's a very good comment and right to the point. As I've said in my presentation, a national identification system will not stop terrorism. That's a fact.

    One of the things that's often presented is that we want to do background checks. There's an assumption that when we're doing background checks, that will identify a potential terrorist. Well, if I'm a smart terrorist, I'm going to make sure I don't have a felony record, or I'll be recruiting those who don't.

    I mean, the idea of being hidden or a sleeper is to assume an identity that fits into a society and that goes unnoticed and has nothing that would pop up. So it's important to understand that the national identification system, at least in my humble opinion, doesn't really address the problem of terrorism. It really, in my opinion, can help with the problem of identity fraud and theft that's growing and that we've seen grow year over year for the last several years.

[Translation]

    Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral: I totally agree with you that terrorism has been around for quite some time now and control measures are not about to resolve the problem. That's a given.

    Mention has been made of the costs associated with fraud. However, not everyone is guilty of committing fraud. Putting in place a state-of-the-art system worthy of the 21st century is an extremely costly proposition. In light of this fact and if we compare the cost of establishing a system like this versus the real costs associated with fraud, is it really worth the effort? Is it worth it, given the impact that identify cards may have, not just on the incidence of fraud, but on individual citizens as such?

[English]

    Mr. John Souder: I guess there are two points. There's the potential Big Brother impact, and the other impact is the economic impact, which I feel more comfortable answering.

    I can give you an example of some of the costs that might be involved in a typical system, and I'll reference a 1999 Government Accounting Office study in the U.S. that took a look at these systems. Basically, the estimate that was provided to the U.S. government back then was that smart card technology could vary in cost anywhere from $2 to $15 per card. Also, the cost of the supporting infrastructure, the applications, the devices, everything, would be basically $10 per card.

    If you had a population of 30 million and you chose a mid- to high-level secure card that, for argument's sake, is $10 per person times 30 million, you have $300 million in the card cost alone. Then the supporting infrastructure would be 30 million times the $10 a card, another $300 million. So you're looking at a potential cost of $600 million.

    If you look at that fraud cost number, it's $2.5 billion. So $600 million to stop $2.5 billion in fraud is a quick payback period, I think. From an economic standpoint, it makes a lot of sense, but from a civil libertarian perspective, there's a lot of risk inherent with such a system, yes.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Thank you.

    David.

    Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you, gentlemen, for your presentation on a very interesting subject.

    I was on the committee when we travelled west and discussed it with people out there. It's a scary subject for some people. For myself, I think there's a lot of value in going in that direction.

    I'll ask you a couple of questions I've asked before; one was to our privacy commissioner.

    In Quebec, I have a driver's licence, I have a medicare card, and I have a birth certificate. The driver's licence and the medicare card both have the photo taken at one spot. So basically there is already an infrastructure there that handles the photo part of it for both of those cards. Obviously, the birth certificate would come into play somewhere along the way with the driver's licence, since that date is on the driver's licence.

    What I asked the privacy commissioner was why couldn't the three be tied together into one card at least. That would be a good start. His argument was that if you get one stolen, they're all stolen. It would be better to have three cards. I don't go with that argument.

    Can you give me some other arguments against that?

Á  (1150)  

    Mr. John Souder: It's a very good question. As I mentioned earlier, it is probably the two biggest items of debate when these systems are talked about by governments. One is the fear of violation of personal privacy and rights, and the second thing is, is it a single point of failure? That's really what the privacy commissioner is addressing there, I think.

    What I would say is that when you do a multi-application card, you have the ability to put digital certificates, something we sometimes refer to as a public key infrastructure. You can put certificates on those cards for each of the applications. So in theory you would have a public key for a driver's licence. You would have a public key for health care. For example, if a law enforcement officer pulls you over, you're using the privileges of the driver's licence and the law enforcement officer would have access to the information in that file on the driver's licence. But if you go to a health care provider, he would have access to the information on your health. They would not be able to access the files in each other's areas.

    So you have the fire walls set up in these applications. A person could get the card, but unless they had get the keys to unlock the information, they don't have anything.

    Mr. David Price: That was exactly my next question. You talked about infrastructure just before the answer to Madeleine's question. I realize that cards aren't really that expensive, but the readers and infrastructure are expensive.

    Mr. John Souder: Yes.

    Mr. David Price: Granted, you said the infrastructure cost would be about the same as the cards. That's if they're all the same types of readers.

    If we're going to different types of readers, would that increase substantially the cost of infrastructure?

    Mr. John Souder: Yes.

    Mr. David Price: Does that mean double, or does it just mean an incremental cost, depending on the different types of information you needed to get out of the cards?

    Mr. John Souder: In my previous example, it's making the assumption that you are using only one biometric and only one card type.

    The information I was using is publicly available. It's the GAO report from 1999. So it's something you could go back to and check and verify the facts I'm giving you today.

    If we talk about different card technologies--for example, if you want to use an optical card, then you would have to have a different reader than for a smart card. If you wanted to use two-dimensional bar codes, as we do on some drivers' licences in the U.S., you would need another type of reader for that.

    The cost on a smart card reader is basically in the $10 to $20 range now, whereas a 2-D bar code ranges anywhere from the hundreds to a thousand dollars for these devices.

    Optical card readers range anywhere from $2,500 on up right now. There are some new devices that hopefully will be on the market in the next year or two that will bring the cost down to around $300.

    So you're talking about now putting these readers out into the community, and if you use multiple biometrics, which has been proposed in some projects, the cost of the different biometric capture devices and reading devices for verification purposes can add to the cost.

    It's not an incremental cost that I can say. The cost can vary, depending on what technology is chosen. For example, if you're going to do just a two-dimensional bar code on a smart card or a digital thing, the cost of printing a two-dimensional bar code on the back of the card is no cost really at all, because you're using an existing panel from the printer that prints black. In theory, there's no cost. It's a fractional cost. It's like a thousandth of a cent. In reality, it doesn't cost much. But if you're going to add an optical card to the feature, now you're adding the chip cost, if you started with that; now you're adding the cost of an optical media. So, yes, it can jump all over the map, unfortunately.

    Mr. Kevin Curry: The other point I'd make to you is you're paying some level of cost today to produce these cards--to maintain this equipment, for the card stock, and so on--for three different cards. There are some economies of scale to be realized there as well, so you have to weigh one against the other.

Á  (1155)  

    Mr. David Price: Is there a norm--it would have to be an international norm at this point--on development of the types of readers, basically, more than the cards themselves, so that different companies are putting out the same types of equipment that can read any card?

    Mr. John Souder: Yes, there are actually several efforts under way right now in the international community. One is in the ISO community. There are two committees that are setting standards globally. One is a committee called M1. It refers to the biometric standards. There's another committee, the B10, which is establishing standards for the card side. ICAO, which is another international standards body, is also working on standards. In fact, they already have a standard in place for passport and travel documents.

    There are two types of travel documents, a type 1 and a type 2. One of those is the same type sized document that we have right now for a driver's licence, so there's a lot of discussion as to whether we can adopt that standard and make it an international standard.

    Secondly, in the European Union, for example, with the driver's licence they went to, they started looking at this back in 1996 and 1997, and they put out a federal standard for all the European member states that said the document would have this look and feel. Basically, it was personalized for each country. They would put their national insignia on it. But what was good about it is it allowed law enforcement and immigration officials to recognize the document easily among the member states.

    So there are standards, again, in work--to answer your question.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Thank you very much.

    Libby.

    Ms. Libby Davies (Vancouver East, NDP): Thank you very much for coming today.

    I guess I'm one of the skeptics. I have a lot of concerns about where a program around a national identity card would really lead us.

    First off, obviously there are strong arguments for specific identity cards for specific uses, whether they're mandated or voluntary. Where I have a lot of difficulty is where we go from, basically, smart cards to biometrics, and we move from voluntary and specific use into mandatory, more universal use. I believe most of the examples you gave involve more voluntary use, but part of the debate is, when it becomes mandated by the state, where does that leave us?

    What we've heard is that even within the U.S.--and presumably as a corporation that is in this business, you're very much aware of public opinion where government is at--there's no contemplation, as far as I know, of a mandatory national identity card. So I'm curious to know what you see as the reasons that's not on.

    Mr. Kevin Curry: It's the same issues we're dealing with here today--same debates, same issues.

    John mentioned the AAMVA, the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators. They've pretty much set standards for the driver's licence, and there is some communication with the Office of Homeland Security and amongst AAMVA members to try to set a standard for that driver's licence document that would be upheld by all states. Therefore, by default, you would end up with some level of standardization, some level of a card.

    Ms. Libby Davies: Would it be integrated in some way through states?

    Mr. Kevin Curry: Well, the DMVs talk to each other anyway, as well as to law enforcement, today.

    If, for example, a police officer were to pull you over to the side of the road and take your driver's licence, from that information he'll communicate and try to check to see if there are any existing warrants for you. It goes to local law enforcement, and then it goes up against the state, which goes up against the FBI, which goes out to INTERPOL, and they make sure you're not a bad guy. If they have you right there, they could make the arrest there, if you're at large, rather than have you--

    Ms. Libby Davies: I think that's one of the concerns, though, when you have information that then is used, theoretically, for a local purpose, like a local law enforcement officer, and then it goes through a whole continuum of actually ending up in some sort of international arena, and how people can then be targeted.

    You gave the example of the student at Harvard. That's one of the key concerns, that people would still be targeted.

    The second question I have is, given where the technology is now, is there, either within the industry or mandated by legislation, anything to do with ethics or protocols?

    We've just had a huge debate in our Parliament about human reproduction technology, and as you know, it's very much an ethical debate as well. It seems to me this is part of the same discussion. This is about how we control identity and how we mandate people to use that information.

    So I'm curious to know whether, even within the U.S. or other countries you are dealing with, do you operate within certain legislative parameters in terms of use, application, freedom of information, or privacy, but particularly, how is that situation in the States?

  (1200)  

    Mr. John Souder: I can answer that one. I'll share, first, what's outside the U.S., because it's probably the most predominant--and I made reference to it in my testimony. That's the European data privacy initiative.

    The European Union has some very stringent data privacy protection, so the collection and the sharing of information is regulated. So it's much tougher for countries to collect data.

    For example, in Spain, on the Spanish social security card, by constitution they cannot have a database on a citizen. So to solve the problem of fraud using the card, they've put a fingerprint on the card, where the citizen maintains the biometric. The government doesn't have it in a database. It's purely stored in the card, and it's optional. So the citizen can choose to elect that security feature or not.

    What's interesting is, because those European security or privacy initiatives are so stringent, other countries have been adopting those. We had two recent bids that we worked on earlier this year and late last year. One was the United Arab Emirates and another one was Hong Kong. Both of those countries adopted the European privacy initiatives and made it a mandatory requirement for any of the companies bidding on the national identification systems. So from an international perspective, there is some leaning towards one set of legislation.

    Ms. Libby Davies: Are the Spanish the most restrictive in terms of the rules and the use?

    Mr. John Souder: No, it's just one example.

    I would recommend taking a look at the European directive on privacy because it is legislation. You can find it online. It'll give you a good idea of how they've handled it. I listed four items. On the information you're asking for, you have to tell the citizen why it's being asked for, how it's going to be used, and where it's going to be stored. You can't put it anywhere else. If that's what you're using it for, that's what it has to be used for. It can only be kept for a limited time, so you know as a citizen that the information cannot be kept for more than a year, for example. The citizen has the right to check to make sure that is the case.

    In the U.S., unfortunately, privacy is not at the same level. I'm going to speak frankly from my own perspective. We have a lot of lobbyists from marketing organizations who want access to that information on our buying habits, etc., so there's this big battle going on between citizens who want some additional privacy and commercial entities that want continued access to that information. In fairness to them, they want to market to me; they want to help me make purchasing decisions. So if they know I like flying, they'll send me information on flying and things I can buy that are related to flying. So am I willing to give up my personal information so I can get that tailored marketing information? In my perspective, I'd rather have the option to opt in than automatically opt out.

    Ms. Libby Davies: Do I have time for one short question?

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): I'll try to give you a second run once everybody has had an opportunity, Libby.

    Lynne.

    Mrs. Lynne Yelich (Blackstrap, Canadian Alliance): I think you've made a couple of good points. We first need a very well thought out legal system, and next we need the strategy, goals, and objectives of this national ID. That's my concern. We don't seem to have any of those. If today we were to ask you to set up a national ID system, where would you start, how long would it take, and how much would it cost?

    Wouldn't it make more sense to strengthen what we have? If I were government, I'd give you our social insurance system and ask you to fix it so we had a good ID system and every social insurance number was linked with the person who had it. I'd ask you to make it fraud-proof, so we wouldn't end up with 5,000 more social numbers than people--like we have now in this country. Maybe it's 5 million; I'm not sure what it is.

    As you said, we need a strategy, goal, and objective. Many people never leave this country. It may sound funny, but there are many people who don't travel, so the most they need is a driver's licence. There are even people today who don't drive, so they only need a health card. The big thing is to link the ID with that particular purpose.

    So don't you think it would make more sense to start with something like our social insurance number and have you link it and make some sort of a national ID system? Don't just start at the top and start a system.

    I see your clients and your registry here, and I wonder how many of your clients have decided to opt out. Have people started with you and then said, “This is going to be too costly. This isn't what we want”? Have you had that as well?

  (1205)  

    Mr. John Souder: There are a lot of questions there, and very good ones too.

    Our approach typically is to sit down with each customer. We don't make assumptions on what their needs and requirements are. It's very important that we sit down and understand what you're trying to accomplish so we can actually come back and make the right recommendations.

    To give you an example, right now we're working with the AAMVA, the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, to point out ideas on how they can use the existing infrastructure and what they can do today, in lieu of a system, to help improve the situation. Those sorts of activities and recommendations are ongoing.

    When we talk with governments that are looking at the smart card technology and suddenly discover the cost, we find they go with the projects but typically take a look at what their available budget is and what they're trying to achieve and then compromise on security, maybe eliminate a biometric system, or just enhance an existing system. It varies from country to country as to what their priorities are.

    In Costa Rica, Panama, and Dominican Republic we have systems. When we first started talking to them they were interested in smart card technology, but when they looked at the cost they decided to go with their traditional document. They felt it would still meet their needs for the immediate term and allow them to put systems in place.

    So we can do it. We like to work with each customer and identify what their requirements are. I can't emphasize that enough.

    Mrs. Lynne Yelich: The only other thing is data entry. That always concerns me because it's only as good as what's entered. For example, it was noted in a history book that I was born in 1952. Now when I try to tell people I was born in 1953, they say “No, you weren't. It says right there in the history book you were born in 1952.” I'm always wondering about the people who enter the data. It's not going to be foolproof. The person looking at this smart card is going to say, this is the way it is, the same as with my little experience.

    I have some concerns about that. I don't know how you'll ever alleviate those.

    Mr. John Souder: It has to be done up front, at least in my humble opinion. You have to have the legislation in place and then policies and procedures that say a citizen has the right to go through an appeals or adjudication process where they have the opportunity to review that information on a frequent basis, to make sure it stays correct.

    The largest challenge by far is keeping information up to date once it gets in a database, and sometimes databases aren't always that user-friendly. I've just been going through the process of a security application in the U.S. It was an electronic database form that I was filling out. My aunt came from the U.K. and she doesn't have a middle name. I could not complete the application because it required a middle name.

    Speaking frankly from a personal perspective again, we're supposed to be information technology companies, but we allow these little idiosyncrasies to occur sometimes. I have to wonder how we allowed them to happen.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Thank you.

    Possibly I can ask a couple of questions of interest to me as well.

    On facial recognition, I'm led to believe that the only real basis for a person to substantiate some of the information on facial recognition, the strength of it, basically, is the fact that a person can stand and look at that face and make an identification at the same time that our data does this. With fingerprints you can't do that and you can't confirm it fingerprint, fingerprint. On iris, it's the same type of thing; there's no way of someone doing that. With iris identification, they've also pointed out that the irises in right and left eyes are different, and therefore you'd have to have double information on each person, or at least both irises.

    Possibly you could equate that as well with where our international bodies, ISO and others, are going with regard to international.... What would make it difficult in any system is if Europe went one way, the United States went another, Australia went another, and Canada went another, rather than putting together international advisory groups at least to move on the same types of recognitions so that our machinery, which is going to identify people, could be done on a consistent basis throughout the world--if we go in that direction.

    Two, it seems to me that there are two general directions. One is to prevent stolen identities and the other is to protect people's identity. I think they're both very different issues. On the stolen identity side, you commented that the Better Business Bureau said that $2.5 billion in fraud annually could possibly be dealt with through a secure card.

    There's probably far more to that, if I look at all government programs that exist. There's probably a lot of dollars in government programs. When I hear statistics like we have twice as many health cards in Ontario as people who are qualified to receive health care, it does send bells off in my mind about costs. And I would guess that for many other types of services, guaranteeing those who might have it, at least a personal identity, could determine who that person is. Is he or she a Canadian citizen and are they entitled to those benefits? And the only entitlement would be that being a Canadian citizen, you are entitled to health care benefits.

    That takes me to one other question. Everybody is always going to have a list. If you have a driver's permit in any of the provinces in Canada, you're going to be on that list. They can identify you to the name on that list, at least through a card. All the information of whether you have a driver's licence or not is not required to be on that card and it could be identification of that person. People who have done the testing have those lists of who have passed tests, and you could do that kind of equating.

    So is the fear--and I ask you this one directly--of a card having a lot of lists attached to it being transferred from one agency to another a critical issue? Or could we have cards that just clearly identify someone, and whatever agencies have lists would then keep their lists and be able to identify that person on the basis of who they are and what their entitlements are?

  (1210)  

    Mr. John Souder: All I'd say to that question first, sir, is the best example would be to give you a comparison between the Spanish social security card and the Malaysian multi-purpose card, because while they appear to be the same, they're not. The Spanish social security card basically gives the citizen access to different government databases. So the information is kept in the originating government database. Basically the card just acts as a key to unlock the information in those databases.

    On the other hand, in the Malaysian smart card, some of the basic information is actually stored in the smart card. It is in firewall application spaces, so you would have your driver's licence number, the information that would relate to your driver's licence record, and typically what's printed on the front would be stored in the chip. So that is information that's actually on the card.

    As you're setting up these systems you can pretty much define the system to go one way or the other, or a combination of both.

    Working backwards, on the benefits side that you were talking about in the section question, I can give you an example from my experience working with the U.K. government here recently. What was interesting is when we were taking a look at the health information--I forget what sort of national information at this minute, but it's basically equivalent to your health information number--they noted it was 60 million numbers, whereas they have 40 million citizens. So there were 20 million extra apparently. They knew they had 9 million to 10 million--if I remember correctly--additional numbers that were valid administratively, but the other 8 million to 9 million were numbers for which there was no logical reason.

    They went through and determined that some of them were identities that had been set up that haven't been used yet. So it's interesting, because it's not just the U.K. alone, but it does exist in other countries, including the U.S. and I'm sure in any country we look at, if the government is willing to open the books.

    In these systems you can do a certain amount of screening of the data in cleansing the data, but frankly, if you don't have the biometric to where you can actually go through and make sure you only have one unique record, the cleansing is only as good as the existing systems today, I would argue.

  (1215)  

    Mr. Kevin Curry: Another example you could draw of that is in the state of Illinois. They actually incorporated facial biometrics into their driver's licence profiles. In doing so they were able to do from one to many types of searches, and they found many people who had multiple driver's licences under alias names. So you're able to eliminate that component, which you wouldn't be able to without having positive identification with a biometric component.

    Mr. John Souder: In going to your first question on the biometrics and the different types, yes, each one has its challenges. As you indicated with the facial, there are different ways that different countries and even county agencies have looked at it. In the San Diego County welfare fraud system, which we implemented back in 1994-95, the county actually did in fact use fingerprints for identifying potential duplicate enrollments. What they did on the caseworker's screen is they brought up the demographic data and the photos first to allow the caseworker to adjudicate the questionable cases, and then they had the fingerprint information in case they couldn't do the determination. Then they would request help from a law enforcement agency to where they could bring in the fingerprint expert.

    The question there was a lot of these agencies were encouraged by some of the vendors to actually train and have fingerprint experts on their staff. We did it the other way because we didn't think it was appropriate and necessary for the county to actually have to have a fingerprint expert there when there was other information they could look at first.

    There are also studies that have been done looking at facial where a third of the time the people who are questioning the photo can't make the determination in close calls or are unwilling to do so. Each one of them carries pros and cons, and you have to look very carefully at each potential biometric and what your application is to really drill down and make a selection.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): The only other part was the international side where ISO-IAO were setting international standards.

    Mr. John Souder: Yes, ICAO right now is taking a look primarily at facial. They also are making space there for a fingerprint as part of the biometric. The iris has been used in some cross-borders, but I think it's going to come back to governments. I think the U.S., with its Patriot Act, asking other government to have a biometric identifier by a certain date, is going to force this issue to the forefront, because right now--if I remember the legislation correctly--they give the other government the opportunity to select the biometric of their choice.

    That doesn't address having one standard or two standards that will facilitate the adoption of an international standard. Hopefully the International Organization for Standardization will come to that. My experience is that unless some governments or certain government agencies take a strong stand and push it one way or the other, it's probably going to continue to be in debate for years to come.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Diane, did you wish to add anything?

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: No, I have nothing further.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Everybody's all right here? How about on this side? Is everyone all right?

    I think we covered most of the important issues. We certainly appreciate the information you've brought forward. It's a debate. Obviously when we finish all of the fundamental debate there is a public perception of--and I think it was you who mentioned it, Kevin--Big Brother. What, if anything, can be done to alleviate that particular concern? No one wants to feel they're into a situation where protection is not paramount for them.

    I think it is a perception that has to be dealt with. I think organizations like yours, who are in it, may have advice for the committee on that side of it. What is your response to the question that Big Brother is taking over and everybody will have access to all of my information?

  (1220)  

    Mr. Kevin Curry: I think a lot of it is public awareness, educating the public and being able to bring it to them, versus them having to read about it in the newspaper. We need to try to take it to the public, and then let them understand the real issues at hand, such as a lot of what you're debating today, and the pros and the cons. Information is a very valuable asset to everybody. I think as you're saying yourself today as we go through, your analysis as you go through, you're getting a lot of good information from a lot of places that is allowing you to make an intelligent decision, and it determines what you think will be best for your citizens. I think that's good information for them to have as well.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): I want to thank you on behalf of the committee for two things: one, for extending the hospitality of your organization in Washington to several committee members who were able to attend; and secondly, for the invitation to any other members who wish to see your operations in Washington, the welcome there.

    Also I want to thank you for coming to Ottawa and helping better inform us about the technology that exists. It's a tough question we have to deal with, and one that I think will be well debated in the next while anyway, not only by governments but also by the public.

    So thank you very much. We appreciate that.

    Mr. Kevin Curry: Thank you very much as well. If there's anything we can do to help in the future, we're at your disposal. Thank you.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Thank you.

    Ladies and gentlemen, the next item on the agenda is a motion that has been brought forward by Diane Ablonczy. That has, I believe, been circulated to all committee members.

    We do have a lot of new people here who have not been on committee for a long period of time. I do have some historical background as to what happened, some of the committee hearings that were done. I was asked if I could circulate this. It would be helpful I think if anybody has not been involved in any of the hearings on what the court has deliberated on. So that's information.

    The reason I have to ask permission is I don't have a French copy for the committee. I apologize for that, Madeleine. I was just asked 30 second ago. So I would be at your direction as to whether I can circulate that or not.

[Translation]

    Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral: I think I'll have to say no. Are you fine with that?

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): You're very kind.

[Translation]

    Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral: It's not a question of being kind, it's a question of being fair. Wouldn't you agree with me?

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): If you'd rather not have it circulated, Madeleine, that's fine. There's absolutely no problem for me. What it does is it creates a different situation.

    All right, I'm going to turn the floor over to Diane. If you would like to just lay the motion on the table, then we can proceed with that.

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I'll just read the motion. I know you have a copy:

That, given the judgment of Mr. Justice Kelen of the Federal Court of Canada on February 21, 2003 that found the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to have misled this Committee, this Committee feels it is its duty to place this matter before the House at this time since privilege may be involved and to give the House an opportunity to reflect on this matter.

    I will say, Mr. Chairman, that this is not a motion I bring forward lightly. I know it's always difficult, and unpleasant even, to deal with these kinds of issues. The reason I do so is really out of concern for the integrity of this committee and therefore concern for the integrity of Parliament.

    As all of you are aware, the Federal Court found that this committee was misled by the minister and his department and that the recommendations we made with regard to processing immigrant applications that would be caught in the retroactivity of new rules should take place. The minister purported to accept that recommendation but then, the court found, did not do what was necessary to carry out our recommendation with regard to processing those applications.

    I don't want to get into a lot of legality here. I'll just point out a couple of things. On page 63 of the 22nd edition of Erskine May it states: “it is of paramount importance that ministers give accurate and truthful information to Parliament”, and I'll emphasize this part, “correcting any inadvertent error at its earliest opportunity”. The court found, first of all, that this committee was not given accurate and truthful information and that the error was not corrected when it was discovered.

    On February 1, 2002, the Speaker ruled that the authorities are consistent about the need for clarity in our proceedings and about the need to ensure the integrity of the information provided by the government to Parliament.

    There is a question being put to the Federal Court of Appeal, but I would like to point out that the question is still based on the finding of fact by Mr. Justice Kelen and does not appeal the finding of fact, i.e., that this committee was misled by the minister and his department, nor does it appeal the finding of fact that the applications that were caught in this change of regulations were not processed in a timely manner. So those facts were found by the court. They're not under appeal.

    It really does affect the integrity of this committee and our ability to do our job. I know that we all take it seriously. We may disagree on matters of policy or procedure, which is normal in political life, but we all make our very best effort to do what's right for Canada and for the people who are involved in legislation. So it is a real concern to me, and I hope to all of us, when we are given incorrect information; when the fact that we were given incorrect information is validated by a court, which spent a lot of time looking at the evidence; and then when innocent people are adversely affected.

    I would just point out one more thing, Mr. Chairman, and that is that this whole matter is now spawning other allegations and lawsuits against the department. It is also reflecting on Parliament and on our fairness to immigrant applicants and to the hopes and dreams of a lot of people.

  (1225)  

    So it did seem to me, Mr. Chairman, to be appropriate that I put this matter before members of the committee. My motion would affirm that we feel it's our duty to place this whole matter, which I've outlined briefly, before the House, since a question of privilege may be involved--our ability to do our jobs as members of Parliament in a manner consistent with our duty to Canadians--and to give the House an opportunity to reflect on the matter.

    I think that's all the background I need to give, unless people have questions of me. I'm sure there will be other comments to be made.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

  (1230)  

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Thank you, Diane.

    At this point in time, so everyone on the committee is aware of what has transpired to this point, I think it's my responsibility to review a bit of what has happened.

    First, there was a motion submitted to the committee by Ms. Ablonczy previously that didn't follow the parameters under which the committee could operate. Therefore the motion was withdrawn. This motion, which comes forward now, follows the guideline the committee can follow.

    It is my responsibility as chair to receive that motion and allow the committee to entertain what they would do with it. In the events that occur, the matter may be reported to the House by the committee.

    I would also go back to this. It is that the chair entertain a motion that will form the text of the report. It should clearly describe the situation, summarize the events, name any individuals involved, indicate that the privilege may be involved or that a contempt may have occurred, and request the House to take some action. The motion is debatable and amendable and will have priority of consideration in the committee. If the committee decides that the matter should be reported to the House, it will adopt the report and it will be presented to the House during daily routine of business.

    So the committee really must decide at this point in time whether they wish to entertain this motion and debate it here--whether it should be debated and referred to the House or not. These are the parameters of the motion we're dealing with.

    Diane's motion is in order and she has presented it to the committee.

    Sarkis.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    As usual, our colleague from Calgary--Nose Hill did a thorough job in her work. As you mentioned, the first time the motion was introduced it was not appropriately done. She's changed it.

    Also, she mentioned she spoke about the case and the way she put it is correct. This is the final word from her.

    My question to you, Mr. Chair, is if we vote on this as is...from what I understand from your statement, there will be two votes, one to entertain the motion or not, and consequent to that, to vote the motion out or in. Am I right? Correct me if I'm wrong.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): What I would suggest is that because the motion is in order, I think we have to entertain it. By entertaining the motion--it is on the floor--Diane has spoken to it, and any member can speak to it. That is their privilege. At that point we would have a vote on whether we adopt the resolution or reject it.

    As chair, it is my responsibility to make sure the motion is in order, which has already been done by our staff. So it is to be entertained on the floor.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Okay, thank you very much for your clarification, Mr. Chairman. At this point it's probably most advisable, since she made her presentation, to vote on it and then we'll see if it goes any further.

    My position would be that I'm going to vote against it, just for your information.

    So I'm calling for the vote.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): You're calling the vote?

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Oh, sorry. I thought nobody was going to talk.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): I think, in fairness, we should allow discussion before we go ahead.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Okay. I thought nobody was going to talk. Sorry about that.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Go ahead, Madeleine.

[Translation]

    Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral: I'll be brief, Mr. Chairman. First off, I want to thank Ms. Ablonczy for looking into this matter. If the Court of Appeal in fact upholds Justice Kelen's decision, I think it would be our duty to bring this matter to the House's attention, because Parliament is a respectable institution. Some improprieties may have occurred, but these need to be addressed.

    However, based on the information I have, namely that the appeals process is under way and the case will indeed be heard on appeal, I wouldn't feel right at all supporting the motion at this stage. From the standpoint of Canadian law, any person convicted of an offence is entitled to appeal the conviction provided the Court of Appeal agrees to hear the appeal. Judging from the information I've received, that would appear to be the case here. Therefore, perhaps Ms. Ablonczy could allow her motion to stand until the Court of Appeal has ruled.

  (1235)  

[English]

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: Well, Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned in my remarks, the findings, the fact that this committee was misled and that its recommendations, although accepted by the minister, were in fact not carried out, are not being appealed. This matter is not being appealed by the minister, so the findings of the court are a final judgment.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Are there any further comments?

    Yes, Libby.

    Ms. Libby Davies: Just very briefly, I'd like to speak to the motion.

    I will be supporting it, and I just want to state two things. First of all, I think it's important to note that if this motion were approved, it says the committee feels it has a duty to place this matter before the House at this time since privilege “may” be involved, to give the House “an opportunity” to reflect on the matter. I think this is a very important distinction. By approving this motion, we are not here at this committee passing judgment on what information was misleading or not. What we are saying is there is a basis for this being communicated to the House so that the House can review the matter and make that determination. So it is actually a two-step process.

    I wasn't here at the original presentation from the minister. I was not on the committee at the time. But like everybody else, I've read about it and I was here when the minister subsequently came back. I think there is certainly a basis for looking at the question of whether or not the committee was misled. That's what was contained in the judgment.

    So on that basis, I would be supporting the motion.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): I will speak as a member of the committee who was here and part of all of that testimony. I know that various recommendations were made by the committee in order to change the workload, and requests were made to increase staff, so that we could do what we could to deal with as much of the witnesses' testimony as we could. It was clear to me that we were asking for a lot of resources as a committee in order to deal with the issue. We talked of the overseas areas where we needed more staff. We needed to deal with this issue as well as possible.

    In my view as a committee member, there appears to be one issue that seems to be paramount in this case, which is that the department and the minister both felt at the time that a lot of applications would be withdrawn under the guidelines that were there. Those applications, which were obviously in the thousands, were not withdrawn and reapplied for under the new system. So from my view, I thought they were giving testimony that was appropriate, and which they believed in at the time. Sometimes when you project into the future, things don't necessarily happen as all of the people would like to plan for and to do. As a committee member who went through it, I have the view that both the deputy minister and the minister tried to give us the best information.

    The extra resources that the committee had asked for did not come about. That is one of the major problems in the transition from the old system to the new.

    Again, it has to be viewed by committee members, and the question that Diane has put on the table brings it back to the committee to make a decision. If members would like to go through the legislative history done by the courts, I could read it into the record. If not, I think we could bring this issue to a vote. As Diane has said, there are appeals, which may not be directly on the question, but they may bring out other information as well. So in many respects, we can look at it from whatever position you as a committee wish to, but I'm at your command as to whether I go ahead and read the legislative history into the record to the committee or we can have a vote.

  (1240)  

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that you give the report to the clerk to keep for the committee's record. That would be as good as reading it into the record.

    In the meantime, if nobody else is going to make an intervention, I'd like to ask for a vote if possible.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Thank you.

    Is that the direction of everyone on the committee?

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: The question I have is that I haven't actually seen it, so I don't know if it....

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): I can't circulate it because it wasn't in French and English.

    An hon. member: Oh, oh!

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Again, I'm not trying to bias anyone one way or another.

    I will submit this to the clerk, and the clerk can read it into the record if you wish. It will take 15 to 20 minutes to read into the record.

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Then it will be 1 o'clock and we will have no time to vote.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Okay, so I'm going to call the vote.

    Roy.

    Mr. Roy Bailey (Souris—Moose Mountain): I appreciate all the work that my colleague has put into this. To me, at this point, it's not just the fact that we're going to vote yes or no, but rather that this gives an opportunity to this committee to work together so that this won't indeed happen again. This shouldn't be a partisan vote at all. The question that if you--

    Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: It's not a partisan vote.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): The minister was here and gave his testimony, and I'm not going to let this one go out of control.

    Mr. Roy Bailey: All I have to say is that by doing this on a partisan vote, you're negating the work of a very important committee member here to have further study, and this will happen again in many committees; it's not just in this committee. I think that's wrong and I think it throws out the very valuable input of my colleague.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Lynne.

    Mrs. Lynne Yelich: I was here when we were doing this, and I thought it was a very serious issue. We spent a lot of time deliberating on those numbers and saying, this can't be done, I'm sure it can't be. The minister and the department assured us, oh yes, it can as long as they have real resources.

    We make recommendations, we go through all the work, we attend these committee meetings, we make these suggestions, and all of a sudden they can get away with saying, well, that's the way it went. I think this is quite a serious matter, that all of our work and deliberation over this specific part of this immigration bill was not taken seriously.

  (1245)  

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): Thank you.

    Diane.

    Mrs. Diane Ablonczy: If I could, I'll just add one final thing. I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, your argument about the offence. I would just point out that the same argument was made to the court. In spite of their argument that this happened and they guessed the best they could, etc., the court still found that this committee was misled, and that's really the bottom line.

    It seems to me--and honestly, I'm not trying to score points off the minister just because I'm an opposition member on this; that's just not my motivation--that if we vote against this motion, we're sending a signal to the minister and his department that we don't care whether we were misled, that we're indifferent to that, that we're going to do nothing about it, and we will just accept that kind of disrespect. Furthermore, it sends a broader message that members of a committee will just accept that kind of thing, and the message will filter out not just to this minister and this department but across the board.

    It seems to me that as members of Parliament we have a responsibility to put our foot down and say no, you are not going to do that to us. It's not as if we're guessing here. The court, after much anxious consideration, has determined conclusively that we were misled. Is seems to me, painful though it is and difficult though it is for some of us to cause problems for one of our own ministers in the case of my colleagues in the government party.... I understand how difficult that is, but there's a much bigger issue here, and that is whether we're going to sit around like sheep and be told whatever someone wants to tell us and do nothing to say this is unacceptable. I just really feel it's extremely important for our parliamentary integrity that we do this and take this very reasonable step to place the matter before the House.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): As a committee we have to decide whether there was intention to mislead. That's really what the issue is, so I'm going to call the vote.

    (Motion negatived)

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Jerry Pickard): I hope everyone, as Bill has reminded me, has a great Easter and a safe vacation, and we'll see you back after Easter.

    On the 29th we will have a visit to Canadian Bank Note, looking at the issue of cards a little further. That's when we come back.

    Thank you, everyone.