SNAS Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Sub-Committee on National Security of the Standing Committee of Justice and Human Rights

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, March 13, 2002

º

1600

The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough--Rouge River, Lib.))

º

1605

Hon. Paule Gauthier (P.C., O.C., Q.C., Chair, Security Intelligence Review Committee)

º

1610

º

1615

The Chair

º

1620

Mr. Sorenson

Ms. Paule Gauthier

º

1630

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

The Chair

Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg--Transcona, NDP)

º

1635

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. Blaikie

º

1640

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. Ray Speaker (Member, Security Intelligence Review Committee)

Mr. Blaikie

Ms. Paule Gauthier

The Chair

Mr. Pratt

Ms. Paule Gauthier

º

1645

Mr. David Pratt

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. Pratt

The Chair

Mr. Pratt

º

1650

The Chair

Mr. Pratt

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. Pratt

The Chair

Mr. MacKay

Ms. Paule Gauthier

º

1655

Mr. MacKay

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. MacKay

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. MacKay

»

1700

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. MacKay

Ms. Paule Gauthier

»

1705

The Chair

Mr. Regan

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. Regan

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. Regan

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. Regan

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. Regan

The Chair

Mr. Sorenson

»

1710

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. MacKay

Ms. Paule Gauthier

The Chair

Mr. MacKay

Ms. Paule Gauthier

»

1715

Mr. MacKay

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. MacKay

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. MacKay

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. MacKay

The Chair

»

1720

Ms. Paule Gauthier

The Chair

Ms. Paule Gauthier

The Chair

Ms. Paule Gauthier

The Chair

Ms. Paule Gauthier

The Chair

Ms. Paule Gauthier

The Chair

Ms. Paule Gauthier

The Chair

Ms. Paule Gauthier

The Chair

Ms. Paule Gauthier

The Chair

»

1725

Ms. Paule Gauthier

The Chair

Ms. Paule Gauthier

The Chair

Ms. Paule Gauthier

The Chair

Ms. Paule Gauthier

The Chair

»

1730

Mr. MacKay

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. MacKay

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. MacKay

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. MacKay

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. MacKay

»

1735

Ms. Paule Gauthier

Mr. MacKay

The Chair

Ms. Paule Gauthier

The Chair

Ms. Paule Gauthier

The Chair

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CANADA

Sub-Committee on National Security of the Standing Committee of Justice and Human Rights

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NUMBER 002

l

1st SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Wednesday, March 13, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

º  (1600)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough--Rouge River, Lib.)): As I see a quorum, I'll call the meeting to order.

    We're very pleased to have before us the Security Intelligence Review Committee, represented by the chairman, the Honourable Paule Gauthier, and a member, the Honourable Ray Speaker. We also have with us today our colleague the Honourable Andy Scott, who's the chair of our mother committee, the justice committee of the House of Commons.

    I will just say welcome, on behalf of all the members, to SIRC and staff here today. This is the first meeting we've had in quite a while. It's a pleasure to have you here. We realize that you do work for Parliament that Parliament itself would otherwise have to do. We have your annual report for the year 2000-2001. We also have part I of the estimates introduced into the House, which may come up today as well.

    I understand you have an opening statement. You could do that, and then we'll go to questions.

º  (1605)  

[Translation]

    Hon. Paule Gauthier (P.C., O.C., Q.C., Chair, Security Intelligence Review Committee): Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. My colleagues and I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

    We understand that you are a newly reconstituted committee. We recognize some familiar faces from previous sessions and we hope to become better acquainted with all of you.

    I would like to begin by introducing my colleagues who are here with me today. They are Committee Member Ray Speaker, SIRC Executive Director Susan Pollak, Deputy Executive Director Rona Shaffran, and Senior Counsel Thomas Dastous.

[English]

     In my remarks I want to address three issues. How does SIRC fit into the national security picture from the point of view of governance and accountability? In other words, what do we do and who do we report to? Second, I will address the committee's planned activities and priorities for the fiscal year 2002-2003, as set out in our formal estimates. Finally, I want to situate the review committee and its mandate in the context of the extraordinary events we have witnessed since that terrible day last September, six months ago.

    First, let's talk about the mandate. The Security Intelligence Review Committee was established under the CSIS Act in 1984 to provide full and independent scrutiny of CSIS's activities and to report annually to Parliament and the Canadian public on our findings. The committee comprises five privy councillors appointed by cabinet after consultations between the Prime Minister and the leaders of all parties having at least 12 members in the House of Commons. The committee's day-to-day operations are the responsibility of the executive director, Ms. Susan Pollak, who is assisted by a staff of 15 people. We maintain facilities for our researchers and analysts within CSIS headquarters.

    SIRC has two lines of business. Under subsection 38(a) of the CSIS Act, Parliament gave SIRC the mandate to review the performance by CSIS of its duties and functions, to ensure that its powers are used legally and appropriately, in accordance with the law, operational policies, and ministerial direction. In this role, SIRC has the absolute authority to examine all information concerning the service's activities, with the exception of cabinet confidences, no matter how highly classified that information may be.

    It is also empowered to investigate complaints from the public about any CSIS action. In addition, people denied a security clearance for federal employment or denied federal contracts on security grounds can complain to SIRC. In this role, SIRC's members act as a quasi-judicial tribunal. SIRC can also investigate when a person seeking admission to Canada or applying for Canadian citizenship is affected by detrimental security findings.

    Finally, SIRC periodically provides reports to the Solicitor General on matters of special importance that are distinct from, but related to, its normal audit or investigative functions. Once a year the committee reports the results of its reviews and audits to Parliament through the Solicitor General. The review is, in effect, a report card on CSIS to members of Parliament and to the people of Canada. Upon receiving our report, the Solicitor General has 15 sitting parliamentary days to table it before you. He or she may not alter the contents of any of our reports.

    Let's talk about the activities and priorities. As I said earlier, the review committee has two key functions, to conduct external reviews of CSIS activities and to investigate complaints about the service. On the review side, in 2002-2003 SIRC will, as is customary, conduct a series of audits covering the service's key program areas. These examinations are conducted on a rotating basis and give SIRC a picture of how the service functions as a whole. They also allow us to monitor and report regularly on the service's most sensitive and vital activities. These include, but are not limited to, the collection of foreign intelligence, as defined under section 16 of the CSIS Act, the implementation of Federal Court warrants, and the functioning of service liaison offices abroad.

º  (1610)  

     The review committee is also responsive to events, both national and international. We can divert research resources to respond to specific incidents and matters of high national priority. An obvious example of this requirement is the expanded effort across the government to counter international terrorism. The review committee has adjusted its research priorities to ensure adequate coverage of the service's greater role in the area.

    The complaints side of SIRC's operation is mostly responsive, driven by the type and volume of complaints received. In the upcoming fiscal year we anticipate a significant increase in the number and complexity of cases coming before us. This is a continuation of a three-year trend. The rising burden has a significant impact on SIRC budget and operations, since, by their nature, the number of complaints we receive is extremely difficult to predict. Nevertheless, I can confidently predict that two recent changes in Canadian law will affect the complaints side of SIRC's operations. Both the Anti-Terrorism Act and the Charities Registration Act contain provisions for naming individuals and entities having connections to known terrorist groups based on CSIS information. The new legislation is bound to generate additional complaints against the service.

    I wish to turn to how I see the review committee in the current international context, one obviously much changed from a year ago. The events of September 11 brought to the foreground the competing demands we place on our security intelligence system. We want to be kept safe from violent threats. At the same time, we do not want those responsible for our security to endanger our civil liberties and the rights of individuals. It is difficult to balance these two imperatives at any time, but today it is perhaps a more challenging job than ever before.

    Parliament created SIRC some 18 years ago to help keep that balance. SIRC must adjust to changing realities. It has, and will continue to do so. However, its essential task remains unchanged, because the essential requirements of democracy have not changed. As we wrote last October in our report to Parliament, SIRC embodies a legal principle at the core of Canadian democracy, that citizens have rights to privacy, civil liberties, and freedom from untrammelled government power.

    The Parliament of Canada has entrusted SIRC with critically important tasks. We act as your eyes and ears to ensure that the nation's civilian intelligence agency gives government the advice it needs and that it acts appropriately and within the law. To carry out those tasks, we will monitor, assess, and report on the entire spectrum of CSIS activities, wherever they take place. My colleagues and I can assure you that we will continue to do this in a methodical, meticulous, and fair-minded way. We look forward to a fruitful relationship with the committee in the weeks and months ahead.

    Alors, à nouveau, merci beaucoup de nous avoir invités aujourd'hui à comparaître devant vous.

º  (1615)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Madame Gauthier.

    We will go to questions now, and Mr. Sorenson for 10 minutes.

º  (1620)  

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Madame Gauthier, and thank you, all, for appearing before us today.

    I also want to welcome, as maybe our chairman did before my arrival, the Forum for Young Canadians. I think you have an excellent opportunity here today to see how Parliament works. You are fortunate to have seen the things you've seen today. We've honoured a parliamentarian. All sides of government have honoured a man who spent 40 years trying to make this country better. We all go about doing that in different ways. As a member of the opposition, I believe we have a role and an impact. Members of SIRC have a very important role in making this country better, making sure the rights of every Canadian are appreciated and honoured, and making sure our intelligence gathering agency is up to the job. Even the fact that you could sit in on this meeting this afternoon and discuss some of the things we'll be discussing will serve you well in the future. Welcome.

    Madame Gauthier, you mentioned that the world has changed, and that is a statement that has been used more times than we can count. September 11 has changed everything. It has changed the way we approach day-to-day living. It has changed the way we do business. It has changed, perhaps, the feelings we have when we travel. Everything has changed. I would say that even the responsibilities of the RCMP are now viewed by the Canadian public as expanded. We have two different front lines of defence dealing with terrorism. We have CSIS gathering intelligence to report back to government, and we have the RCMP, which will take that information and use it to help defend this country and make sure it is a safe country in which to live.

    Two weeks ago, when we had a recess from Parliament, I was asked to speak at Augustana University. I was amazed that the majority of questions were asked about CSIS. I was expecting something quite different, but they were concerned still about terrorism and about our intelligence gathering agency.

    Bill C-36 will increase your workload dramatically. How are your resources? Are they adequate for dealing with what will probably be an increased workload?

    Also, could you give us a little more information about the nature of the amendment to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and what impact this amendment will have as you go about your responsibilities in your mandate within CSIS?

    Another question I would like to pose to you is in regard to an article that was printed probably a week ago. I think the information was gathered through an access to information request. A concern was raised about the liaison committee in the RCMP or in CSIS, that communication was not being passed on in an adequate way. That could very well jeopardize the RCMP's responsibility in taking that information and using it.

    I'm not sure if I'll have more time after you answer these questions.

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: I think your questions pretty much cover all the important issues.

    The first one was concerning our staff. At the moment I can say it is adequate, but with the new legislation, new responsibilities will be added and we'll need more staff. So we are very sensitive and looking at it very carefully. We've asked for more resources already, but at the moment we still manage.

    Second, there was only one amendment to the CSIS Act, and it was very tiny. It's concerning the notion of a threat to the security of the country, and CSIS is allowed to gather information when the threat is related not only to religious violence or political violence, but also to ideological violence. That's the only change. Where there's change for CSIS is that they receive a lot more resources, a much bigger budget. So it means expanding their activities, and in expanding their activities, we will have to expand ours to review what they're doing.

    We know the collection of information is extremely important, the sharing of information is also very important. They will have to collect information and share it with the RCMP. The necessity for sharing is greater than before. They will also be sharing information at the international level. So for us, indirectly, it is more work.

    As you know, CSIS will participate in the preparation of a list of terrorist organizations, so if somebody or an organization is not happy seeing their name on the list, we know there will be complaints to us. We could be asked to go before the Federal Court as amicus curiae or expert witness, because we are the ones who really have access to all the information. So we think that our workload there will change. It's the same with the charities, because when a charity loses its certificate, again, a complaint can be made before us. These are all examples where we know we will have more work to do where CSIS will be involved.

    Another one, maybe of less importance, but we don't know, because it's so new, is the possibility for public servants to act as whistle-blowers. They will provide us with the information, and what do we do with it? We now have rules of procedure that we can use, but maybe we'll have to change them so that we can hold an investigation after that or go through a complaint process. There are many possibilities and many things we see developing.

    The last question concerned liaison. Through the years, at some points RCMP and CSIS did not work well together, but it was more on specific cases than at the senior levels. On the other hand, we also know that when there have been big events, like the summit in Quebec or the visit of the Pope, where they have had to work together, it has been a success. At this particular time there will be, as you know, a special working group, NSD, and CSIS, of course, has a role to play there. It should work well, but that's something we will certainly monitor very closely.

º  (1630)  

    The Chair: When you ask a triple-barrelled question, you get a triple-barrelled answer.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that. I at least tried.

    The Chair: You've done very well with your shotgun.

    Mr. Blaikie.

    Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg--Transcona, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    In your annual report you say CSIS has been transformed in the last decade from a primarily anti-espionage organization to one in which anti-terrorism work has become dominant. This is understandable, particularly since September 11, but even before. Also, it raises a number of concerns. Does this mean that espionage has disappeared? Is anti-espionage work suffering?

    But my main concern is really the anti-terrorism stuff. I think it's important that the security work CSIS does, the RCMP does, and you do, the whole security sector, if you like, not be brought into disrepute, which happened 20 or 25 years ago. I certainly remember a time, when I was younger, when I and many others felt the security sector was far too quick to come to conclusions about people. At that time everybody they didn't like or who was politically unacceptable was a communist. All kinds of people were labelled communist who were the farthest thing from communist you could ever find. That brought the system into disrepute. Of course, CSIS didn't exist for part of the time I'm speaking of, and the creation of CSIS was, in part--I was here when it was created--an attempt to get beyond that era.

    The concern I wanted to share with you today and get your response to is that in the anti-terrorism era we will slip back into a version of that era. Instead of everybody being seen as a communist, everybody who's engaged in political dissent of one kind or another will be seen as a terrorist. It might even be worse, since we seem to have powers now to deal with terrorists that the government didn't have at its disposal to deal with alleged communists 20 and 25 years ago. They just watched them and accumulated, I presume, roomfuls of boring material about their lives and the meetings they went to, etc.

    I think there's a real concern out there now in the anti-globalization movement, anti-free-trade circles, etc. These are legitimate political perspectives. We've had raging debates in the House of Commons on free trade. Many of the people who are in the government now and who oversee CSIS made many of the same accusations against free trade that people on the streets make now: it's destroying the country, it creates injustice, there's too much power to corporations, etc. Yet there's a cult building, if you like, and I hope it's not in the security sector. This is where I think you have a responsibility to make sure it doesn't happen that somehow people who hold these views are now beyond the pale, that they are a legitimate object of the kind of surveillance and infiltration and attention, generally speaking, that was once reserved for communists. This has the potential to create a whole new generation of activist young people who think the government is their enemy, because the government treats them as their enemy through their security sector, or at least that's the fear.

    I hope this would be very much top of the line with SIRC, to make sure that isn't happening and that CSIS spends its time going after real terrorists, not just people who happen to not like government policy or people who like to protest, or for that matter, people who might even like to engage in things that are unacceptable in the course of the ordinary criminal law, but who are, nevertheless, not engaged in acts of terrorism. Of course, this is most relevant to the whole debate about Bill C-36, but I want to leave some time for you to answer the questions, so I'll stop.

º  (1635)  

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: It's certainly a priority for us to make sure this does happen.

    As to whether anti-espionage is less important than it was, I would answer, no. It's just a question of allocation of resources, and with the new budget and new resources CSIS just received, I guess they will be able to put focus on anti-terrorism activities, but continue with their activities of anti-espionage as well, because it's still there and it's still important for our country. We monitor that very carefully and make sure one activity does not detract from the other.

    On the possibility that too many groups or people will be seen as terrorists or treated as terrorists, as the communists were seen in the past, I think the danger is always there, but today, in the year 2002, there are new mechanisms that were not in place in the years you were referring to. You have the CSIS Act, so CSIS can collect information, but they must collect it in accordance with the provisions in this legislation. They cannot do whatever they want, they have to obtain a warrant. Also, there is SIRC reviewing all their activities to make sure they respect the definition of what is a threat to the country. These safeguards were not there before 1984. With the new legislation, as I mentioned, SIRC will be involved in the preparation of the list of who is a terrorist or who is not a terrorist, and these people will have the opportunity to appeal to the Federal Court or to complain to us. So there again there is some protection.

    Really, the concern for us and for the public, I think, is with the RCMP, because we don't have any power to review the RCMP and there is no organization like SIRC reviewing the activities of the RCMP. So we don't know what is done on this side. There is the public commission, but it's not structured the same way as SIRC.

    Mr. Bill Blaikie: As a supplementary, I think in the things you've described, where people are actually charged or labelled or whatever, there's a lot of protection. I guess it's mostly a matter of unwanted attention, and it's partly attitude. I think SIRC, to the extent that it can, should have a role in trying to create the right attitude within the larger security community, even within the police community. There's a tendency--and I understand it--when you have police facing off against protestors, for the protesters to be seen as the enemy, so it becomes a matter of containing them, as opposed to trying to say, how can we do this best, so that democracy is respected, and so is private property, and so is the safety of the people who are meeting, and all those things? I'm just very concerned.

    I thought, after the creation of CSIS, we entered into an era in which a lot of the things that worried me about the security sector in the past were dissipating. I have a very real concern that we're on the road back to something else. I think you people have a very important role to play in making sure that doesn't happen.

º  (1640)  

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: Ray, do you want to say something?

    Mr. Ray Speaker (Member, Security Intelligence Review Committee): The point Mr. Blaikie makes is a good one. Rather than the political overtone, it becomes a religious overtone as well at this time. I think we have to be very cognizant of that and vigilant, to make sure that doesn't happen and we maintain the intent of the act Parliament passed. We are aware of that and have discussed that, in large part. I could see CSIS or the RCMP, just because of their vigilance, falling into the trap you've suggested. Our job, as watchdog, is to raise that concern, if it does happen, so that you, as members of Parliament, can deal with it. You are the authority, in the end, that can put the thing back on track.

    Mr. Bill Blaikie: It's the stereotyping, I think, that we have to watch, stereotyping protesters, stereotyping people from a particular religious group, or whatever.

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: Yes, exactly.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Pratt, for 10 minutes.

    Mr. David Pratt (Nepean--Carleton, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I too would like to thank our witnesses for being here today and for sharing their comments with us.

    With the whole matter of this new effort with respect to counter-terrorism--and I say this with all sincerity--I hope Mr. Blaikie's concerns are somewhat assuaged by your comments about the protections that are in place. I don't think we're dealing with the situation we faced in the 1970s, where the RCMP was essentially out of control, the old security service. We have much greater protections in place now than existed then.

    One of the questions I'd like to put to you flows from one of Mr. Blaikie's questions, on the whole business of counterespionage and the fact that counter-terrorism seems to be the order of the day, for good reason--it certainly has been over the last little while. There remains, I think, a fair bit of concern with respect to issues related to our economic security and the effect of industrial espionage.

    I represent an area that, I think it's safe to say, is pretty much at the forefront of information technology, defence technology, telecommunications technology, fibre optics--you name it. There's a tremendous amount of work being done in that area within the National Capital Region. I'm wondering if you feel confident that we have the protections in place to ensure that we are not losing critical information within industry, if industry is briefed up to the point where they're sensitive to issues of protection of copyrights and patents and sensitive industrial information that could be of great value to some of the people we're competing against. Can you respond to that issue?

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: I can assure you that the service--not that I want to be protective of it--is very well aware they have the activities of counterespionage and counter-terrorism. During our last meeting we asked CSIS many questions concerning counterespionage. They were very sensitive that it's still there, that they should continue to do their work, that they should have the right resources. So I think we can say they continue to do their work in that field.

    I want to make a little comment on industrial espionage. When industrial espionage--I'm sure you know, but just to make sure we understand the same thing--is between two corporations, CSIS has nothing to do with that. It is when a foreign country is involved indirectly through a front organization of some kind that is doing espionage on an industry, but otherwise, it is not involved.

    CSIS is also active in informing industries where there are some dangers of espionage. They give briefings and they prepare the people who travel, and when they come back, they debrief them.

º  (1645)  

    Mr. David Pratt: Certainly, I think it's safe to say as well that in some cases companies can be virtually arms of government with respect to their activities, and that can create problems as well.

    But moving off that, if I could, there's a standard question that I ask high-profile people who come to this committee, and it's on the issue of foreign intelligence. I'm wondering if you or Mr. Speaker have any thoughts on where we should be going in Canada on that issue. CSIS seems to be moving more and more into the area of foreign intelligence, and there were some concerns raised back at the time of the Macdonald commission about the fact that we should have a debate on the whole issue of whether or not Canada should have a foreign intelligence agency, since we're the only G-8 country without one.

    In asking that question, I've had some interesting comments come back from people. For instance, at the defence committee I asked for comment from two generals, one of whom was responsible for military intelligence. One said they didn't think a foreign intelligence agency was necessary, the other said they did. So there are obviously divergent opinions on this whole matter. But I'm wondering, in the aftermath of September 11, with the global reach of terrorism and the information needs of the Government of Canada in making informed security decisions, deploying Canadian forces, working with our allies on dealing with terrorist cells, whether or not we need to be more aggressive with respect to our foreign intelligence capabilities.

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: On the specific question of whether Canada needs a foreign intelligence organization, it's a real political issue, and I don't think I'll get into that.

    As far as CSIS is concerned, we all know they are allowed by the legislation to collect information abroad. They have not done it on a very large scale so far, because maybe they didn't feel it was necessary, and they didn't have the resources to do it. But as we all know now, the collection of information, and particularly the sharing of information, will be done not only at the national level, but more and more at the international level. I suspect they will have to be more active in that field, and probably more in the sharing of information or joint operations with our allies, being in a foreign country without the other country knowing, but not in the sense of foreign intelligence as with the CIA, that's not what I'm talking about. I think today they have to be more active with foreign intelligence.

    Mr. David Pratt: Do I have time for a supplementary?

    The Chair: You have about a minute and a half.

    Mr. David Pratt: We were invited by the South African government to talk to them about their intelligence system and help them with some of the things they were doing. They have a foreign and a domestic intelligence minister, two ministers. They looked at it as two portfolios, rather than one. Under section 12 of the CSIS Act there's a lot of authority, and under one authority, most likely, we could do what we have to do. At one time I supported the idea of two separate functions. I'm of the opinion now that they should be together and work through the act, through the CSIS body. That's my opinion, not our committee's opinion.

    Do I still have time for that supplementary?

º  (1650)  

    The Chair: Very briefly.

    Mr. David Pratt: Mr. Speaker, when you speak of not being involved in covert operations, it's largely the collection of information from open sources and working through liaison offices, that sort of thing. However, I presume as well that based on the logic--maybe I'm putting words in your mouth--if we were to need a human source capability on the ground for a more covert type of operation, you would also probably feel that would need to reside in a separate agency, that the two functions would not sit well with one agency. It's obviously the reason other countries have separate foreign and domestic intelligence agencies.

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: The way the legislation is today, it would allow CSIS to have a source in a foreign country. They have arrangements with other organizations in many countries. If the arrangements are written in such a way that it is allowed and possible, I think they could do it. That's why the foreign arrangements under section 17, I think, where we have all the foreign arrangements, will have to be reviewed in the light of the new era we are living in.

    Mr. David Pratt: Thank you.

    The Chair: That's an interesting question. Maybe we can come back to it in another round.

    Mr. MacKay, for ten minutes.

    Mr. Peter MacKay (Pictou--Antigonish--Guysborough, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Madame Gauthier, Mr. Speaker, I thank all of you for being here. We truly appreciate the job you do in a very difficult time. I think increasingly, we are seeing the value of the oversight role you play, particularly at a time when I think our institution is under examination. Your independence and your work are greatly appreciated by parliamentarians of all stripes.

    I wanted to ask you a couple of specific questions about recent changes. I know there have been some in regard to your mandate and some in regard to your staffing arrangement. As I understand it, you've had some people leave, and one question would concern the adequacy of the number of staff you currently have for fulfilling your role. I'd like to give the opportunity to speak to that, and I guess that goes to your budgetary restrictions as well. Do you feel you are adequately staffed? That would include inside and outside counsel, because I know you have occasion to contract out some of the work that is required.

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: First, our mandate has not changed at all. Our responsibilities might expand, as I said earlier. We have to review their activities, so if there are more activities to review, we have more work. If there are more complaints before us, again, we'll have more work. So these two roles might increase, but the objective of our mandate is still the same, to keep the balance. At the moment we have 15 people, and as I said, that's sufficient, but we know it will not be sufficient, and we have already asked for more money for more resources. We're still waiting. So the staffing is fine for the moment.

    Inside counsel and outside counsel are for the complaints and the process. It depends on the complexity of the case, the circumstances, so we decide that on an ad hoc basis.

º  (1655)  

    Mr. Peter MacKay: I guess I worded my question poorly. I would suggest it is an expanded mandate, given some of the implications of Bill C-36, and I know you've touched on that already in your remarks here today. Will that workload continue to expand? Is that your anticipation? I know you've just said there are such considerations, given the number of complaints that might be received, given the nature of operations, given the unusual circumstance where we have a heightened threat of terrorism within our territorial boundaries, given our international obligations, national defence. It's at times like this, I suppose, that Parliament needs to hear directly from you as to whether we are giving you the tools necessary to do this important job you are asked to perform.

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: We are concerned with the resources we have and will need, but we monitor the situation. We have already asked for more resources. So far, we can manage, but we don't know about the future.

    Mr. Peter MacKay: I have a question flowing from this that I want to put to you with respect to concerns and complaints expressed in the past about sharing of information between CSIS and the RCMP in particular. I realize that part of that equation is outside your oversight. Do you care to comment on this concern that has, in my view, repeatedly come up, that information is sometimes withheld? Reasons for that have been expressed, but is this something you've encountered?

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: Oh yes. Sharing of information will be of the utmost importance. As you know, in the past there were fiascos, cases of bad relationships between the RCMP and CSIS, but when we look at these cases, it is one case and then another case, and it depends on the personalities of the people involved. It's more at the operational levels than at the senior levels. At the senior levels there is full cooperation. They are big organizations, and it's difficult to keep control of everybody. This can happen again, but we also know that when there are very important events, they are well organized, they understand their mandates, and they know what they have to do together. I gave examples like the summit, and it was so during the Oka crisis. There have been other examples where they worked very well together.

    We will monitor this very closely, and we will look at this new body called NSD, how they will work there together, but we think it's possible.

    Mr. Peter MacKay: I have another question with regard to a fairly important operational standard, and that has to do with warrants. I understand from the annual report that there are certain types of warrants that can be marked urgent and warrants that have fairly broad application, in that they empower a CSIS agent to exercise searches against more than one individual. Have there been any actual changes in the warrant application process? Also, it appears that no warrants were refused. What sorts of irregularities, if any, did you encounter in your review of those warrants?

»  (1700)  

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: As you know, each year we do a very thorough examination. We look at all the warrants, but we pick a few warrants, go through all the files and all the process, and make sure all the clauses have been complied with. I cannot say there were big changes in the process concerning warrants during the last year. I know the writing of the clauses and conditions contained in the warrants has been reviewed by CSIS and presented to the court and accepted by the court. So there is a review of all these clauses and conditions.

    As to the urgent warrants, these, because they are urgent, are for a very short period of time and for a particular activity or event. If they want to keep the warrant for a longer period of time, they have to go back through the whole process for the obtaining of the warrants. We didn't see any difficulty with that.

    As for the warrants with broad powers, when they appear before the court and there are many people involved, in the CSIS files you see the names of these persons, but there is not one warrant, let's say, for Peter MacKay and another for David Pratt and another one for Paule Gauthier. If we are part of the same group, they will ask for one, but in CSIS files we see the names of these persons. That's why we said to you it's misleading, because you might think it is just one person in each warrant who is subject to the surveillance, but there could be many persons. It is in that sense that we wrote that line in the report.

    Mr. Peter MacKay: I did have a concern about the number of people. Is there a limit, or should there be a limit? It seems to me that this is a rather unusual ability, to name a potentially large group of people and say there were 32 warrant applications, but you have encompassed, by virtue of this ability, hundreds of people, potentially.

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: I would have to check to give you the right answer on that. To my knowledge, there is no limit on the number of persons who can be included in a warrant. We were very concerned about groups. If they feel a group is of some interest to them, they must go back to the court and be more precise. There should not be a blanket warrant for an issue-based target, as we call it.

»  (1705)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

    We'll now go to five-minute rounds. Mr. Regan.

    Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the witnesses as well.

    I would like to follow along what my colleague Mr. Pratt was talking about in relation to the foreign intelligence issue and ask whether you have produced any document on the issue of foreign intelligence. What was your position in that document, if you did? Is it possible to provide us with a copy of the document, if there is one?

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: There are some documents we could probably provide you with.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: Are they recent, though?

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: No, but I must say that each year we review the activities of the service, wherever they go or whatever they do. So we have access, but sometimes it's inside something else.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: Okay. If you could provide those, that would be most appreciated.

    I want to raise the issue of Bill C-36, the Anti-terrorism Act, and ask you what impact its provisions have had on your review and adjudication functions.

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: Bill C-36 is very new, and it will be some time before it starts. We suspect we will receive complaints from people or organizations not happy with the fact that their name is on the list of terrorists or charities not happy with the fact that they are no longer considered charitable organizations, but we haven't received any yet.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: The act also contained an amendment to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act that affects your mandate, I understand. Can you tell us how it affects your mandate and if you've considered what impact it will have on the performance of your oversight functions?

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: As I mentioned earlier, there are no changes in the CSIS Act, except for one word, “ideological”: “political, religious or ideological objective”. That's the only change in the CSIS Act. But indirectly, I don't know. Maybe you want to refer to something else now.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Sorenson, a five-minute round.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: In the operational audit of 2000-2001 you give two complaint case histories. Case 1 is the complaint of an individual who was denied security status; they worked for the service and had their security clearance revoked. In the second case the complainant says they, as part of the service, I take it, were asked to investigate dangerous people and report; that caused a great deal of stress and they felt they were put into a dangerous situation.

    You've also mentioned that you can anticipate there being individuals whose names appear on a list who may appeal to SIRC to have their names stricken from that list, but there have been no such cases brought forward yet. Is it possible that someone may appeal to SIRC as to why there isn't a name on the list? If somebody had their name put on a list, it could be detrimental to their business, to everything else, that's a given. But what if CSIS has not put the name of a group on the list that they feel has absolutely been raising terrorist funds,? Is that the kind of thing you would look into as well?

»  (1710)  

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: Under section 41 of the CSIS Act, if you file a complaint with us, there are conditions that must be met before we say we have jurisdiction to review the case or to investigate. First, you have to write to the director of the service and tell him what you are not happy with, and then you wait for his answer. If you're still not happy, you can come to us. Second, at our discretion, we decide if the complaint is frivolous or not. We still have some discretion to accept a complaint. So it's hard to say what we'll do, because we need to have a particular case before us before we can make a judgment on it. We are certainly aware of the possibility of fishing expeditions, and we are careful with that too.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: But if there were an inference of political interference as to why a name wasn't put on the list, would that count? That might not be frivolous.

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: As you say, maybe it's not frivolous, but you must have the case before you can exercise your judgment on it. I hear what you say, and maybe it would be an interesting case, but we'll have to wait and see.

    The Chair: Would you like a second round, Mr. MacKay? Go ahead, five minutes.

    Mr. Peter MacKay: I wanted to follow up again very briefly on the issue of the warrants. You noted, Madame Gauthier, that you review a percentage of the actual warrants, and that's understandable. It's akin to looking in some of the containers that come into our ports to see if there are problems. No one is suggesting that every warrant can be reviewed every time; that's very much the role of the judge in the first instance. But I do find it somewhat curious that no warrants were rejected at all. Maybe that's a tribute to the CSIS agents, and one would hope it is a case of efficiency. But I also know, having dealt with warrants, that there is often a voluminous amount of supporting documentation and evidence. I'm looking for a sense of what percentage of warrants are actually reviewed. And given what you told us earlier about these issue-based target warrants, which I still struggle with a little bit, seeing there are no limitations on the number of people who could be targeted, how thorough is the current process and how comfortable are you with it?

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: We are comfortable with the current process. It's true that no warrants were refused, but they've been working on this basis for 15 years, and it has improved quite a bit. They know the clauses that are accepted, the conditions. There could be other reasons, but that's certainly one. They are more experienced in preparing the warrants.

    We look at all the warrants, and then, depending on the targets, we choose. We cannot look at all of them in a detailed way each year, so we go on a rotation, and depending on the issues of the day, we choose the most important ones.

»  (1715)  

    Mr. Peter MacKay: I'm not asking you to define it to an exact percentage by any means, but can you give us any idea of the percentage of warrants you would look at annually?

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: We look at all the warrants, and then, as I said, we decide on the few to review deeply.

    Mr. Peter MacKay: I see. Okay.

    This is again more of a process question. The Inspector General, it seems, performs a similar function at times. Are you aware of instances where there may be some overlap in functioning? I guess the flip side of that would be, are there times when you can coordinate what you're doing with the Inspector General?

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: We keep in constant touch with the Inspector General. So far, we have tried not to do the same research as his office would do. At the beginning of each year we know what we will be looking at, and we share the information, so in that sense, we are able to avoid the overlap. On the other hand, the Inspector General is part of the Solicitor General's apparatus. He is different from us, he does some work that we don't do, and we don't see any difficulty with that.

    Mr. Peter MacKay: Finally, I have another process question. Your committee fairly frequently, along with oversight, performs an adjudicator's function. Have there been instances where a conflict of interest, or at least a perceived apprehension of bias, has arisen in these two sometimes competing roles? I was thinking of it in the context of the Zundel case.

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: That's the one case where some conflict could be perceived. The SIRC committee prepared a long report after a long investigation of the whole Heritage Front affair. In the course of this review the name of Mr. Zundel came up. So it could have seemed we were biased, that the committee had already made up its mind on Mr. Zundel's case. We were able to work with that, because there were new members on the committee who were not involved at all with the Heritage Front program and could hear Mr. Zundel's case.

    Mr. Peter MacKay: Thank you very much.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. MacKay.

    The chair has two or three questions. To follow up on the Inspector General, the current incumbent was a long-serving and trusted staff member of SIRC, so this might be a wonderful opportunity for SIRC to assess any inefficiencies that may be there in reviewing CSIS as to efficacy, efficiency, or duplication. I do recall the admonition that came from a former Solicitor General, I believe, who said, please don't take away my Inspector General, because I need the Inspector General there. So we do recognize that function, but I would ask you to keep an eye on the potential for duplication and inefficiency and exercise oversight of CSIS from more than just an accounting point of view, from an efficacy and efficiency point of view as well. You've already answered a question, and I just wanted to leave the issue with you.

»  (1720)  

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: Certainly.

    The Chair: I wanted to ask a specific question about communications between the RCMP and CSIS. You are seeing it from the CSIS side. Can I confirm that in every CSIS office there is an RCMP liaison person, or is it just in some CSIS offices, or is it in none?

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: There are liaison officers, I would say, in each region.

    The Chair: In each regional CSIS office there is an officer of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police acting as liaison.

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: Yes, and at the headquarters.

    The Chair: At CSIS headquarters?

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: Yes.

    The Chair: Is there a CSIS person in the RCMP offices?

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: I don't think so. I don't really know.

    The Chair: So CSIS provides the real estate and the Mounties provide the liaison person, and the liaison function at the ground level occurs principally through that mechanism of the RCMP officer and the CSIS office. Is that where it happens?

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: We'll have to check that. I know RCMP officers, liaison people, are in CSIS offices and they have access to some of their....

    The Chair: Some of us have, at one point or another, had an opportunity to see the empty desk, but whether it was ever used and how it was used, we never knew. If liaison is a challenge from time to time, then, I am curious about the actual mechanism, how they do it. That would come up at a subsequent meeting. If you can provide--

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: We can provide you with the information on the mechanism. We have that, we have reviewed the mechanism. It's not fresh in my mind, so I can't give it to you now, but we have it, we know about that.

    The Chair: We are cognizant here of the fact that the RCMP and CSIS have different mandates, and it's quite natural for them to have different organizations on the ground, operating on different wavelengths, doing different things, and they may pass each other on the street from time to time. It's probably just that the taxpayers, not being fully aware of those distinctions, might think it sounds awfully stupid and inefficient to have two white vans staring at each other across Yonge Street. We may want to pay some more attention to that in the future, so they can know better how it works.

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: It's one thing to ask somebody in your office or the CSIS officer in the other office. If they know what they're looking for, they can have access to all the documents, but it's no good if they don't know what they're looking for. So they need more than just being there. They must know about their mandates, what they are looking for, they must have a joint will on a specific task.

    The Chair: To give it some colour, I'm assuming that the greatest potential for lack of communication occurs when there is a criminal investigation going on with some security overlays. Then you have the CSIS intelligence gathering going on at the same time, as occurred, perhaps, in the Air India investigation. But where you have separate criminal and intelligence activities going on, the Mounties wouldn't ordinarily pop into CSIS too often. We may want to look at that in greater detail later. We'd appreciate anything in writing you can find.

    In your annual report, on page 8, you described the revised environment resulting from the new ministerial direction, which is described as a comprehensive direction. Needless to say, we here at the committee have not seen it, and we haven't decided that we even need to see it. One of your comments relates to evolution of the decision-making at CSIS, management level, operational level, and the apparent evolution to greater discretion in the hands of the director of CSIS. Could you put some meat on the bone of what you're referring to, so we can understand whether or not this is an issue we want to look at more closely?

»  (1725)  

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: First, it was a question of language. It was the old ministerial direction, so it had to be changed. It has to be consistent with the CSIS Act, so this has been done. That's the starting point. From there, on operational matters, the minister has given more discretionary powers to the director, but the director is still accountable to the minister, he must report to the minister. There are still operations that need the approval of the minister.

    So in a sense, it is easier to manage, it's more modern in language, but there are still ways to keep the director accountable and occasions where the director still must ask permission.

    The Chair: Is it possible for you to give us an example of an area of discretionary decision-making the director might undertake now that he might not have undertaken previously?

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: I thought we gave you examples in the report.

    The Chair: The report doesn't appear to contain an example.

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: I know we have examples, because I read them. Maybe they are not public, and that's why they are not there.

    The Chair: Yes. CSIS has never been very anxious to show the practical effect of the ministerial directions.

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: Now you understand the process, so let me go back to the office and look. If we can give you examples, we will.

    The Chair: I'm not trying to gore anyone's ox here. It's just from the public interest point of view. We realize that SIRC is on the job and the Inspector General is on the job, but if the director of CSIS is, on his own initiative, now making more discretionary decisions that he might not have made in the past, I think my colleagues would like some examples of what they are.

    There is also the possibility that in the context of this new ministerial direction, the ambit for discretion and the use of the discretion may accumulate, and if that is the case, I think we might want to note it as a committee, and you might want to note it as the review agency. I'm not suggesting for a minute that we're going to evolve into an FBI, J. Edgar Hoover situation, but if there's been movement in the dynamic, I think we'd like to know what it is and understand it better.

    Can I assume that you've had the benefit of reading the full ministerial direction yourself? Yes. Okay.

    That exhausts my questions.

    Mr. MacKay.

»  (1730)  

    Mr. Peter MacKay: Thank you.

    A thought came to mind in listening to the chair's questioning. You explicitly stated in your opening remarks that the Solicitor General may not alter contents of the reports. How much actual contact would you have with the minister in the run-up to this or during the course of the year? Are there periodic occasions when you would have an audience with the minister or he or she would pick up the phone and call you?

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: We meet with him for working sessions. We pick a few issues we want to discuss with him and we go through the agenda.

    Mr. Peter MacKay: I would fully expect that if there were problems within the department brought to his or her attention in your findings through your oversight capacity, even if those were addressed internally, they would still wind up in the report. Your greatest power is that of disclosure.

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: You must also know that during the course of the year, if we feel we must report in writing, under section 54, we can report to the minister on a specific issue. Sometimes we would not go public with that, because it could be very sensitive.

    Mr. Peter MacKay: Could you go to the Parliament as well or independently of the minister on such an issue? Is there a provision anywhere in the act to report to Parliament on a special occasion?

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: Reports under section 54 most of the time would be on operations, the process, things we think put the service at an disadvantage. We will tell the Solicitor General, there is a problem there, make sure they change that.

    Mr. Peter MacKay: I'm not suggesting you would ever jeopardize an ongoing investigation, but if--Heaven forbid--a CSIS agent or operation breached certain laws or warrants were exceeded or acquired on dishonest or inappropriate information, is there a mechanism whereby you could inform Parliament?

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: As you know, CSIS must report on these things to the Solicitor General. If there were a situation where we felt the public should know, where we had tried with the Solicitor General under section 54, for example, and nothing had changed, we'd been trying and trying with no success, I think we would find a way to put it in the annual report. You would then ask questions and it could develop with some sharing of information. We would find a way. There is no specific section in the act where it says, if such a situation occurs, this is what you should be doing, but we must report to Parliament each year, and we must report thoroughly on everything we see during the year.

    Mr. Peter MacKay I understand that process. I'm just concerned that something may happen six months after you report to Parliament--I'm not trying to be overdramatic--of such significance that Parliament should be informed. What you're telling me, I understand, is that there is no direct reporting mechanism other than to the minister.

»  (1735)  

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: Because of section 54, that's where we would try it. Of course, if we were to appear before you, we would probably take the opportunity to convey to you our concerns. We would let you know in such a way that you would be ready for questions.

    Mr. Peter MacKay: Okay, understood. Thank you.

    The Chair: For the record, your last section 54 report is shown as May 1999. All the other reports in your appendix are not shown as section 54 reports, but would rather be reports on your work. Have I got that correct?

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: That's possible. We don't issue section 54 reports on a regular basis.

    The Chair: I realize that, and I don't expect to see a whole list of section 54 reports, but the last one was a couple of years ago.

    Before I adjourn, besides thanking you for coming again, I did want to note the reconstitution of this subcommittee as a subcommittee of the justice committee again. Our mandate might be a little bit more focused than previously, perhaps because of September 11, but members will, of course, be the judge of where we go. I regard the subcommittee as a valuable link of Parliament to SIRC. The main committee, the justice committee, often has difficulty setting aside time to deal with all the elements in its justice envelope, so I hope we can renew our working relationship here. I know our research staff can be in touch from time to time with your staff, and that's a valuable linkage. I look forward to being able to work with you. We'll probably see you more frequently than in the past.

    Ms. Paule Gauthier: We hope so. We thank you very much for inviting us and giving us the opportunity to work with you. We look forward to coming back.

    The Chair: That's great. Thank you.

    We're now adjourned.