ENVI Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Monday, April 30, 2001

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[English]

The Chair (Mr. Charles Caccia (Davenport, Lib.)): Since we have a quorum and the agenda is heavy, I would like first of all to welcome our witnesses, Dr. Pearse from Vancouver and David Atlin from the Ecogifts organization.

Because of commitments that have unexpectedly emerged for the afternoon, we will try to conclude by two o'clock so as to allow members to attend their caucus meetings after three o'clock.

Without delay, let me thank Dr. Pearse and Mr. Atlin for their appearance, and invite Dr. Pearse to make an opening remark, to which we'll listen with great attention as usual.

Professor Peter H. Pearse (Economics and Forestry, University of British Columbia): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm sure this committee is aware that last spring, about a year ago, Minister Anderson asked me to provide some recommendations for the implementation of the compensation provisions under the Species at Risk Act. He left me a fairly wide scope of flexibility as to how to do this.

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Over the ensuing months, I consulted quite widely with the stakeholders, especially people whose lands were likely to be affected by the habitat protection provisions in the Species at Risk Act, but also others, including environmental groups and aboriginal groups and others.

The representations that were made to me took a wide variety of forms. In many cases they were formal briefs followed up by interviews. In other cases it was simply letters. There were e-mails and telephone calls and conference calls and virtually all manner of communications in order to get this job done with a maximum of flexibility and to do it expeditiously.

I believe I received a representative sample of stakeholders' opinions on the compensation issue. The conclusions and findings are summarized in my report, called Sharing Responsibility. I'm sure you all have copies of this. I found in the course of my investigation that the general objective of the Species at Risk Act was widely accepted by Canadians. I think this was supported as well by public opinion polls and so on.

There is widespread support for the basic objective of protecting the full range of plant and animal species in Canada. Some representatives of resource industries went even further and pointed to certain benefits that they might well derive from this legislation. These had to do with the opportunity to team up with government experts to protect endangered species and also to get the benefits of being recognized as being protective of the environment.

I must say that support was qualified, and the most frequent qualification was that provisions for compensation be implemented. Indeed, from the point of view of those whose land is most likely to be affected, the condition was that compensation be generous. There were some objections to this, and I must say that this was a minority. The objections that I heard were based on the principle that landowners had a duty or a social responsibility to protect the species on their land. Some people even felt that if people had endangered species on their land, they must be responsible for their endangerment, and therefore did not deserve any compensation.

There were some people, including provincial governments, who were concerned that compensation would raise the cost of species protection and encroach on the funds that could more usefully be spent on protecting habitat. The most frequent rationale for compensation, overwhelmingly, was fairness, that it was not fair for landowners to bear the full burden of the costs associated with serving a public purpose such as protecting endangered species and biodiversity.

But there were other reasons as well for compensation, some of which I heard and had explained to me. One of them is fiscal discipline. That is, many landowners felt that governments would be irresponsible if they did not have to pay compensation for encroachments on private property. There was a third rationale that compensation strengthens property rights and that property rights are an important institution of our economy and our society, which we depend on.

My report sets out principles and procedures that I recommend to the government for implementing the section in the Species at Risk Act that provides for compensation.

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The first point I want to make on that issue is that the provisions for compensation are very brief and general. There is one short clause, clause 64, in Bill C-5, that simply says the minister may provide compensation for losses suffered as a result of any extraordinary impact of the legislation. Many of the representations that were made to me centred on this business about “extraordinary”, not surprisingly. So my report attempts to put a working definition on that adjective to make it implementable.

My report sets out a number of principles that are, as far as I know—and I must say, I'm not in close touch with the response to my report over the last four or five months—not very controversial. They have to do with the principles of protecting species that are entrenched in our international agreements and in the Species at Risk Act itself, and indeed in the federal-provincial-territorial accord for the protection of endangered species.

A second principle is that habitats are better protected through the voluntary effort of those who occupy the land than through the imposition of regulatory restrictions by government. That is a widely held belief and understanding. It is widely advocated by those who are likely to be affected, not only because it's more respectful of their property, but also because the whole process is likely to be more efficient if they are involved in a cooperative way to achieve the objectives of protecting species and their habitats.

The third principle is that this idea of fairness requires compensation, which is provided for in the bill.

Finally, there are a series of principles having to do with respect for property rights, respect for a constitutional division of responsibilities between the federal, provincial, territorial, and aboriginal governments, and the agreements they've entered into. There were wide concerns that the procedure should be clear and as certain as possible, to avoid ambiguity and uncertainty—simple—that they should build on existing structures and procedures as much as possible, and, most important, that whatever recommendations I made should be designed to promote voluntary and cooperative measures, rather than reliance on restrictive regulatory control.

My report sets out criteria for eligibility; criteria for the kinds of encroachments under the Species at Risk Act that should call for compensation; a definition of “extraordinary” and hence a criterion for qualification in an encroachment; and a criterion for sharing. It also sets out recommendations for the procedures that should be followed to evaluate damages, to settle disputes, and to achieve fair compensation arrangements.

I want to particularly emphasize something I believe I have a heavy responsibility to emphasize, to this group particularly, that the more we get into this compensation issue, the more it becomes apparent that the government is treading on some rather sensitive issues that call for caution.

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My report repeatedly urges the government to be careful about implementing these compensation arrangements, not because I have reservations about the principle of compensation, but because I'm afraid that in many cases—and in many of the conversations and meetings I've had with groups over this issue—we tend to look at the compensation in isolation, on the ground that when governments encroach on people's property, they should be compensated. It's a very attractive principle, one that, I must say, I support. But in this case, we have to recognize that this cannot be considered in isolation, because the whole thrust of the Species at Risk Act is to rely on voluntary cooperative arrangements. Compensation is to be brought into play only in very special, and hopefully very rare, circumstances.

Virtually everybody I talk to agrees that the cooperative voluntary arrangements to protect the critical habitat of species are going to be a better approach than reliance on governmental restrictions of the kind we see in the United States. That is a very widely held idea. I must say it's one I share, not only because I've been persuaded by all the stakeholders I've been talking to, but also because I know that's true in my own little woodlot, that I can protect endangered species much more efficiently and with less cost than some bureaucrat, as competent as he or she might be, setting out on paper a set of restrictive regulations to achieve the same thing.

My point is that when we are talking about compensation, we are in danger of blunting the incentive to cooperate, because these compensation arrangements will only come into play when voluntary agreements fail. In fact, the extent to which they are brought into play will be a measure of the failure of the Species at Risk Act.

There is another reason I think governments should be specially cautious on all of this. This has to do with the very sensitive overlapping constitutional responsibilities of federal, provincial, territorial, and aboriginal governments on this whole issue. The federal government clearly has responsibilities in the protection of wildlife, and especially fish, migratory birds, and so on. But provinces do as well, and so do aboriginal and territorial governments. All these other governments have programs in place and resources in place to protect endangered species. They also have very varied and extensive legal contracts with resource companies, ranchers, and so on.

For the federal government to intervene with a compensation arrangement not only treads on sensitive areas in respect of the federal-provincial working arrangements, but also could threaten to undermine provincial arrangements with resource companies and others through the tenure systems they have in place for regulating the resource industries.

So my report goes on at length, probably excessive length, in urging the government to be cautious in this, not only in the generosity of the formula, but also in the extent to which it is applied. We don't want to weaken incentives to cooperate. We have to be very careful about a break with established law and policies in Canada. This does involve a very significant discontinuity in the long history of regulatory law and arrangements in Canada. It's a break with the established practice of governments regulating, using restrictive measures, and not compensating.

It's a delicate issue that has implications not only for the Species at Risk Act, but also for all kinds of other arrangements the federal government has in place with resource industries and others, and incidentally, as well, for provincial arrangements and the regulatory control. We have to see all this in the context of a wave of regulatory intervention by all governments, federal, provincial, and municipal, in the regulation of land use in Canada over the last couple of decades.

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None of the regulation, as far as I know, involves compensation, except for this one. I think this is a commendable innovation in Canadian regulatory policy, but it is one that has to be dealt with very cautiously.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you for bringing these thoughts to the table for a good exchange.

Mr. Atlin, would you like to make your presentation and then we'll open up for questions?

Mr. David Atlin (Partner, Integris Real Estate Counsellors, Ecogifts, Environment Canada): Fine, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was asked just this past Tuesday to appear before the committee, and for that reason I have been unable to submit a paper in advance. I apologize, and I will be having one put forward.

The focus of my remarks is on compensation. More particularly, I was asked to discuss the ability to quantify compensation and highlight the experience, both within Environment Canada and the private sector, to manage the appropriate tasks necessary to ensure fair measures of compensation.

Briefly, I'm a real estate appraiser. I was recently a member of an expert group on behalf of Environment Canada advising on the establishment and implementation of a valuation review program for the ecological gifts program. Subsequently, I've been appointed as the alternate chair and Ontario region senior appraisal specialist of the appraiser review panel for the ecological gifts program for Environment Canada.

Real estate valuers are regularly asked to apply a market value of land and to improve properties and partial interest in land. Market value is defined as the most probable price the property should bring in a competitive and open market with all conditions to a fair sale with a willing buyer, a willing seller, and knowledge.

With that in mind, I'd like to introduce a couple of brief concepts to evaluation. The evaluation work revolves around a well-established set of principles, guidelines, and for members of recognized organizations such as the Appraisal Institute of Canada, there are some minimum reporting standards.

I want to focus on a couple of principles that might be relevant. Real estate is typically evaluated to its highest and best use. It is defined as that use which at the time of appraisal is most likely to produce the greatest net return, in money or amenities, over a period of time.

The implications of that statement are far-reaching. In essence, value is derived principally from existing or potential uses. The flip side, of course, is the interference with the use contributing to value may have an impact on the market value. There are a number of other principles that we can discuss in detail later.

Valuers are often mandated to measure loss in value. The most common occurrence, but not the sole reason for this work, is under the auspices of expropriation. There a number of expropriation acts in Canada and all share the common principles of making the landowner whole. It's important to know, not because I'm recommending expropriation, but because it provides an organization for the thought.

Compensation typically falls into three categories. If there are lands taken, they are paid for. If there's a diminution in the value, the remaining lands due to the expropriation are compensational. If there are disturbances or interferences in the use during the course of an expropriation, that's also compensational. Typically, the expropriating authority pays reasonable transaction costs.

Some examples of reasons for value diminution include interference with a loss of certain uses that provide a contribution to value, an increase in costs associated with the use, loss of land efficiencies, or simply the creation of a nuisance. Not all reasons presented in this list are appropriate to all properties, nor will all properties have all reasons.

An easement is defined as a right, privilege, or interest that one party has on the land of another. There are other similar types of restrictions in other parts of the country. This is the form of land control, or a similar type of control, that may be used in enforcement provisions under this proposed legislation.

A common technique for evaluating easements, as recognized by the Income Tax Act and other categories, is the before and after approach—simply, the appraisal before the restriction as compared with the appraisal after the restriction.

This discussion leads to the conclusion. There are already well-defined and tested approaches to the valuation problems associated with the measurement of compensation for loss of value. Furthermore, there's certainly a body of professionals across Canada experienced in the quantification of loss and value.

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In order to fully appreciate the experience already enjoyed in Environment Canada alone in relation to the issues pertaining to value, I think a brief description of the ecological gifts program might be helpful. The ecological gifts program is a tangible example of an incentive program that rewards landowners in the form of tax incentives for donating ecologically sensitive lands to crown agencies, municipalities, or qualified environmental charities. Donors and recipient agencies submit appraisals for the gifts of land or partial interests to Environment Canada, which passes reports on to the appraisal review panel. This panel is charged with the responsibility to recommend values to the Minister of the Environment, whose responsibility it is to certify values for tax purposes.

I'll just talk briefly about how the panel works, and that'll be the end of my remarks. I was hired in the summer of 2000 as a member of this expert group. The objective of the assignment was to protect all the stakeholders of the program, including the Government of Canada, recipient agencies, landowners, and taxpayers, this with respect to the valuation of land gifts. Over a four-month period the expert group met with various federal departments, non-governmental organizations, stakeholders, agencies, and so forth. There were consultation programs Environment Canada staff had run prior to our engagement, and we had access to that information as well.

We produced a final report of the ecological gifts program expert group to Environment Canada. The recommendations focused on minimum standards, approaches to the valuation of land and partial interests in land, and the formation of the appraisal review panel. In conducting their work the appraisal review panel members review valuation reports prepared by evaluators from various parts of the country. Expertise beyond traditional real estate appraisal is called upon when necessary. Valuations can be accepted as presented, rejected, or modified. The process allows for communication between reviewers and donor representatives, and appeals to recommendations or redeterminations of the panel are permitted.

Finally, donors who feel that the comprehensive process of the appraisal review panel results in an unfair value for tax purposes always has the option of appealing to the federal tax court, a step that has not yet been taken by anyone. In essence, a valuation review program is in place now. It has been tested, and it has performed well. This of course is within the context of a voluntary donation framework. Certainly, as the program matures, there will be recommended modifications leading to improvements. Nevertheless, Environment Canada now enjoys certain expertise with respect to land valuation and valuation review issues.

In summary, values are based on existing or potential use and efficiency of use. Today the experience that I have with Environment Canada is focused on voluntary programs. The valuation community in Canada is experienced well beyond voluntary programs.

The Expropriation Act sets out well-defined categories of compensation, and there are established and tested appraisal principles to help organize the valuation process.

Finally, the early success of the appraisal review panel for the ecological gifts program demonstrates an ability to review valuations in a robust manner. I'm confident that a program can be established with the goal of ensuring that any loss in value attributable to an imposition on a landowner that restricts, eliminates, or modifies a use as part of the proposed Species at Risk Act legislation can be fairly determined.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you. It's very interesting to see how you proceed.

We have a list so far consisting of Mr. Mills, Mr. Comartin, Mrs. Kraft Sloan, and Mrs. Redman.

In the absence of Mr. Mills, would you like to start, Mr. Comartin?

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Mr. Joe Comartin (Windsor—St. Clair, NDP): Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair.

My first question I would address to both of you. We've had a fair amount of discussion over the limited provision in the legislation with regard to compensation, and we've had indications that we'll get more extensive guidelines in the regulations, but there's been an ongoing debate here from various witnesses as to the preferred method. I'd like your comments on whether you would prefer to see how compensation would be provided detailed in the legislation as opposed to it being in the regulations, which is what is being proposed at this point.

Prof. Peter Pearse: Well, Mr. Comartin, my mandate was not to propose any change in the legislation, but rather it was specifically to recommend procedures that might be embodied in regulations pursuant to the act. As a result, I don't have any particularly useful opinion about how that might be rejigged in some fashion, but based on my investigations I do think that what is really important is that one way or another it should be absolutely clear and as devoid of uncertainty as possible. Beyond that I don't have any useful opinion on that question.

Mr. David Atlin: If I may interject, in my capacity as a valuer, I am indifferent. I think property can be valued, and there's a set of principles for it.

My experience with the ecological gifts program to date tells me that property is very unique, and to do the job right you need flexibility. It's going to be very hard to define an exact set of rules that are always going to work out over time. If that's any guidance, maybe regulations are an easier tool to work with to improve it over time than entrenching something in legislation.

Mr. Joe Comartin: My next question is perhaps to you, Dr. Pearse. We've had various comments from people, and I'm just going to quote one from Peter Miller, who is a lawyer with Imperial Oil and part of a group that's come before us. He wasn't claiming that the whole issue of compensation isn't just about money, and he was certainly a strong supporter of the cooperative approach. However, if I understood him correctly, he was saying in effect that your approach just wasn't fair in that you were placing by your methodology too much burden on the individual landowner or corporate landowner. Could I have your comments on that? How would you respond to that type of accusation?

Prof. Peter Pearse: First of all, it's a view that I've heard frequently. As I of course expected, many people thought that it was too niggardly and that it did involve too much of a sacrifice on the part of the landowner.

If this were an expropriation situation, I would have no difficulty agreeing with that criticism, but it's not. It is an almost unprecedented provision by the government for compensation for regulatory encroachment. In that sense, as I mentioned in my introductory comments, it's a 180° shift in government policy here. I think that, partly because of that but for other reasons I mentioned as well, the government has to be very cautious in this. Far from being unduly niggardly, it has unprecedented generosity in that sense.

I've chosen that number because to make the act work, we have to preserve incentives to cooperate. Every time you raise the compensation by a percentage point, you weaken the incentive to cooperate. It would be very easy to undermine the whole thrust of this legislation by too generous a compensation arrangement.

That said, perhaps I should say that as to the specific number of 50%, while it has a certain equitable ring to it, there's nothing sacrosanct about that precise number. I'd be the first to assure you that there is nothing very empirical behind the calculation of that number of 50%. It's a question of a reasonable sharing with the public in a situation where you want to preserve the important incentives to cooperate.

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Mr. Joe Comartin: I'll play the devil's advocate a bit. We heard of an experience in British Columbia where there were certain claims that were going to be made along the same lines, environmental considerations being taken into account, and although there was full compensation available, it didn't seem to hinder the cooperative effort that went on. In fact, the funds that were set aside were not likely to all be used up.

I wondered if one of you knew about the experience. It just seemed that experience was somewhat contradictory to the position you're taking.

Prof. Peter Pearse: Are you speaking about recent experiences of the federal government in British Columbia?

Mr. Joe Comartin: This was the British Columbia provincial government.

Prof. Peter Pearse: Well, if you're referring to compensation for mining claims in British Columbia, then I am aware of that, and that was basically, as I understand it, an expropriation.

Mr. Joe Comartin: You don't see that as being analogous to what we have going on in this type of circumstance, where it was just habitat we were trying to protect. You see the two as being completely different.

Prof. Peter Pearse: If I understand the example you're referring to, it was compensation for the loss of mining claims. The government actually expropriated the rights to exercise, a sort of de facto expropriation, as I understand it. So full compensation would have been appropriate, and that's not inconsistent with what I've said here.

Mr. Joe Comartin: I have just one more question, Mr. Chair, and then I'll pass.

You said that this was practically unprecedented, but is there any precedent where some other approach was taken, where you're affecting personal property rights or land values, or where, because of the motivation of the government, if I can put it that way, or their goal, less than full compensation was awarded?

Prof. Peter Pearse: The reason I say it's “almost” unprecedented and “not entirely” unprecedented is that, in the first place, there are some formal provisions for compensation of this type for regulatory intervention. For example, in the province of Nova Scotia, there is a specific act to provide for compensation to private landowners for intrusions having to do with the protection of wildlife. That's the only act of this ilk that I know of in Canada.

There are some other examples in the United States. My report refers to five U.S. states that have provisions for compensation for regulatory interventions on private lands. But overwhelmingly in Canada, provincial, federal, territorial, and municipal governments have not hesitated to regulate with no provisions for compensation. For example, look at all the municipal acts that restrict people in the way they can use their lots, the houses they can build, whether they can keep chickens or not, and the endless regulations that go on in cities, none of which are compensated.

In my province of British Columbia, the province has over the last couple of decades introduced a wave of regulatory restrictions on agricultural lands, on forest lands, on wetlands and so on, none of which are compensated. The same is true throughout Canada in terms of provincial government interventions.

So this should be seen in a climate. Landowners, especially farmers and ranchers, are very sensitive to all of this regulatory intervention, but none of it is compensated. This is very different in that respect.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Comartin.

We have Mr. Mills, Madam Kraft Sloan, Madam Redman, and the chair.

You have five minutes, Mr. Mills.

Mr. Bob Mills (Red Deer, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much for coming, Dr. Pearse. Certainly I think we agree with an awful lot of what we find in your report. But the area of compensation is one that has become a lightning rod, certainly for the people I've been talking to, and much of the rest of your report is lost because of that.

I'd just like to address that. I'll make a couple of comments. You'll hear where I'm coming from, and then possibly you can reply to that.

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I firmly believe compensation, consultation, and communication are all part of this, but if you don't have that compensation as the end, when all else fails, then I just can't believe that we will have anything better than the “shoot, shovel, shut up” of the United States.

In my area, I know there is a lot of volunteer protection of all kinds of things. I think your best environmentalists are, for the most part, your farmers and ranchers, who understand the land the best.

In Alberta, for example, I have a pipeline going through my land. I farm it, I use it, but I'm paid compensation every year as long as that pipeline is functioning. If an oil well is built on my land, I'm paid surface rights, compensation to full market value, for as long as that oil company uses that piece of land. Of course, I'll get it back when they are finished with it, if that ever happens. So there are examples.

In your report, when you talk about the 10%, the 50%—and you know what that's about—I don't see how we can justify that as being fair, how we can say that if a landowner loses the productivity of that land, it's fair that he should get only up to 50% compensation. Why should not all Canadians, as an end result—it won't happen very often—contribute to preserving that endangered species? If that was in the legislation, you'd have no opposition to endangered species legislation. It would banish any opposition.

Prof. Peter Pearse: Mr. Mills, the fact of the matter is that the rough justice you've referred to about governments coming in and intervening and restricting people's use of the land for the public purpose without compensation has been the rule up to now.

I'm treading on uncertain ground here to some extent, but my understanding of the Surface Rights Act in Alberta, which I think you referred to, is that it is essentially an oil company taking an interest in the land in the form of an easement, for which compensation is paid. That's not inconsistent with my recommendations. But I believe it's true in Alberta, just as in most other provinces, that the Government of Alberta has never provided compensation for restrictions on the use of land.

Mr. Bob Mills: If I can just interject for a second, another example is a storm sewer put across a piece of land by the county, by a government. They restrict the use of that land; you can't build on top of that storm sewer, you must be x number of feet away. But I still own that land. It's there. They paid me for that land, for putting that storm sewer there. Now that's government paying me for intruding on my land and they are restricting what I can do on that land. Isn't that the same?

Prof. Peter Pearse: I don't think so. This is a legal issue, and I'm treading on uncomfortable ground here. My understanding is that in the case you're referring to, it's like building a highway across somebody's land. The government expropriates an interest in the land, whether it's a piece of property in its entirety or an easement of some sort.

What we're talking about here is something different. You're not taking any property rights away from the landowner. This is an essential point. The government is just saying they're going to stop you from doing certain things on your land in the public interest. There is no limitation on the property right except—

Mr. Bob Mills: But that affects my income.

Prof. Peter Pearse: Yes.

Mr. Bob Mills: That's having a dramatic effect on me. If you're telling me I can't graze cattle on a half-section of land or something, that might well mean I can't stay farming.

Prof. Peter Pearse: That's true. I'm afraid that is the rule in Canada.

I have a piece of property on which recently has been discovered an Indian midden, which I am not permitted to build upon. This is in British Columbia. I wouldn't be surprised if there are laws like that in most provinces of Canada. But there is absolutely no compensation for that. The government isn't taking anything away from me in the way of my property rights, it's just taking away my right to use it in certain ways.

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It's true in municipal arrangements as well. Anybody who has a house in a city knows all the restrictions that apply to anyone building a house in a municipality, none of which are compensated for, but if the government comes along and takes a slice off the corner of your property to widen the street, it will compensate you for that. Or if it puts an easement over your property and takes an interest in the land, it will compensate for that.

There's a fine line between an expropriation and a regulatory restriction. I think it's a bit blurred in law, but as far as I know, the latter has never been compensated in Canada unless it was specifically provided for. So this is really a precedent in terms of public policy.

The Chair: Thank you. We may come back on a second round, if we can.

Madam Kraft Sloan, please.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan (York North, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank you two for coming before our committee.

There has been a lot of discussion around voluntary measures versus a more regulatory approach, and just so that everyone is aware, on page 11 of your report, you do say:

Canadians accept the view that governments should take regulatory action when necessary to advance the public good, and our laws reflect this.

Then you talk about land use regulations and how these are a little more problematic and a little more touchy and sensitive to deal with.

At the top of page 12, you go on to say:

Moreover it is widely accepted that governments are entitled to make regulatory decisions requiring individual sacrifices for the public good. The compensation provisions in the Species at Risk Act should not, in my opinion, be seen as a repudiation of this view of the proper role of government.

I want to put that on the record as a little bit of a clarification, because we've been talking a lot about moving in the voluntary way.

Regarding one question that I have for you, Mr. Pearse, in your work, certainly you've talked to a lot of landowners and people from industry and things like that. We've been hearing about—and certainly the member opposite has brought this up—the shoot-shovel-shut-up syndrome. I wonder if you have any documentation on this, and if you would be able to table that or suggest a reference for the committee.

Prof. Peter Pearse: There has been a good deal of literature on the subject. Although I boxed up most of my files on this subject, I'd be happy to paw through that and see if I could pull out some of the literature on this.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Yes. We have made a number of requests from witnesses and have yet to see anything. It would be very helpful if we could have something in print on this.

Prof. Peter Pearse: Even examples of cases where endangered species have been destroyed?

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: I think in many situations we have been hearing anecdotal evidence. Certainly as a member of this committee I often hear anecdotal evidence on many other issues—for example, the whole issue of harmonizing federal and provincial environment regulations. We have never really seen any documented proof of this sort of thing. So there's often a lot of anecdotal information that people bring forward, but I think it's important that we see what is documented in a more rigorous way so that we can actually see what kind of problem this truly is.

My other question with regard to your work is, first, did you take a look at any other international examples of compensation with regard to endangered species, and if you have any insights, could you share that with the committee, please?

Prof. Peter Pearse: My international examples were mainly in the United Kingdom and the United States. We've already spoken about the United States, and I haven't much more to add to that. I will see if I can find some references for you.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Okay.

Is there anything you'd like to share with regard to what they do in the U.K. on compensation and endangered species?

Prof. Peter Pearse: Off the cuff, I'm really not comfortable trying to describe that to you. I have reviewed it, but it was some time ago. I'm afraid I couldn't give you a very orderly review at the moment, but there are some interesting innovations in the United Kingdom.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Okay, thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you, Madam Kraft Sloan.

Madam Redman, please.

Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

Mr. Pearse, thank you for your excellent report. It made very interesting reading.

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Do you agree that compensation should be part of this bill?

Prof. Peter Pearse: Yes. In fact, the emphasis on the voluntary aspects of this whole legislation seems to me to call for compensation, but it has to be done very carefully for the reasons I've already described.

I support the idea of compensation for the same reason that I support it in other forms of expropriation, as we were talking about earlier, that when governments intrude on people's private property for the purposes of pursuing some public objective, the person whose property is affected should not be the only one to bear the burden. I would like to see this principle expanded. This is a precedent, and it's a good one.

Mrs. Karen Redman: Mr. Atlin talked earlier about the need for flexibility when we're looking at compensation, and you had talked about certainty. I wonder how you feel about the comments Mr. Atlin made that the regulations may be a preferable place to have this compensation piece of the bill fleshed out because it would lend itself to greater flexibility than entrenching it in the actual act.

Prof. Peter Pearse: I understand the point. It's a fine balance between flexibility on the one hand and lasting certainty on the other. To me, flexibility suggests an opportunity to change it over time. The objective of certainty calls for some degree of reliable consistency over time. So I understand the point, and I recognize the value of flexibility.

I don't have anything to add to that—I really haven't considered it—other than the fact that it should be as clear as possible. It may be something to be said for regulations on those grounds in the sense that regulations can often be more detailed and specific than can legislation.

Mrs. Karen Redman: Your report offers a great starting point for a discussion on a topic that you've acknowledged time and again is really quite complex, and certainly I think that's the feedback we're getting from people who are reacting to it. Can you reiterate where you got the trigger of 10% in the compensation of 50%? You mentioned earlier that it's not sacrosanct.

Prof. Peter Pearse: The 10% hinges on the call in the legislation for compensation where there is an extraordinary impact, and I've had to put some kind of definition on “extraordinary impact”. My report explains that after considering the pros and cons, my judgment takes me in the direction of 10%. For anything less than that, I'm suggesting here that the responsibilities of proper stewardship of land should require landowners to take a certain amount of responsibility, but not an extraordinary responsibility.

I'm suggesting that anything over a reduction in the value of one's land by 10% should become eligible for compensation. That's where the 10% comes. It's a question of putting some kind of specific definition on the word “extraordinary”.

With respect to the 50%, which is the next question, how much compensation once you meet the threshold of 10%, I've tried to balance the need for a substantial public commitment to share the burden and, against that, a need to preserve the incentive to cooperate rather than resort to the compensation.

Mrs. Karen Redman: Can I take from your comments about that formula not being sacrosanct that there may be, in your view, other formulas that could be considered when looking at this issue?

Prof. Peter Pearse: If somebody said that it should be 45% or 55%, I would be hard put to give a persuasive answer that my number was better than either of those numbers. My point is, there is a certain amount of judgment that goes into these things, and there is no empirical process that I can go through to make it more definitive. There is a certain amount of arbitrariness in those numbers, and I wouldn't defend them precisely.

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But I would urge the government not to stray too far away, because if you go much below that, you're running the risk of the public not sharing significantly and substantially in the costs. If you go much above it, you're running the risk of weakening incentives to cooperate.

Mrs. Karen Redman: I'm not trying to put words in your mouth, but is it a fair depiction of your report to say “Compensation if necessary, but not necessarily compensation” when we're looking at how we implement this bill?

Prof. Peter Pearse: No, I wouldn't put it that way. I'm trying to offer definitions for eligibility and the kinds of losses that should be compensated, necessarily, and not, to use your words, “not necessarily”. I've tried to offer criteria here that would provide some certainty to people's rights to compensation.

What I thought we were talking about was the numbers, and I would urge you that if you have any disagreement with either of those numbers, the 10% or the 50%, don't consider one in isolation of the other. You can spend an awful lot of time—usefully, I must say—thinking about these relationships.

If you feel 50% is, for example, too low—and I'm sure many people do think 50% is too low—it's after all on the low side of the compensation of all the precedents that I refer to in my report, in the United States and elsewhere, and in Nova Scotia, for example. But my 10% is lower—in other words, the threshold is lower—than all of those other precedents.

So I'm just saying we shouldn't look at one in isolation from the other.

Mrs. Karen Redman: Chair, am I out of time?

The Chair: One more.

Mrs. Karen Redman: Thank you.

I'd like to ask you something, Mr. Atlin, if I could, and thank you as well for coming. You're clearly an expert witness, having had much participation especially on the appraisal review process for the Ecogifts program, which you've already mentioned. There have been individuals and groups suggesting that the process used in the Ecogifts program should be used to design a valuation process for compensation as well. I'm wondering how you would react to that suggestion.

Mr. David Atlin: I've heard this suggestion before. In terms of the exact model that's used for the voluntary Ecogifts program, you couldn't just pick it up and place it into this as compensation measurement. But the valuation principles are identical. The types of expertise that the Ecogifts program relies upon are identical. So are there opportunities to extend the program, learn from the program, and modify it? I believe there would be, but there would have to be modifications to it.

Mrs. Karen Redman: Thank you.

You looked like you wanted to respond earlier, when I asked Dr. Pearse about flexibility. I just wanted to give you the opportunity to add any comments if you had any.

Mr. David Atlin: I was just listening attentively there. When I say “flexibility”, it's in the sense that land valuation changes. The principles don't change, but as the economy moves, as the body of knowledge moves, as the precedents change in the marketplace, as the objective evidence changes, how appraisers will deal with valuation will change. I just want to ensure that, at the end of the day, the program doesn't impose a methodology, but rather leaves that to the experts.

That's why I like regulation and our ability to be flexible. I wasn't challenging at all the principle of compensation. That's beyond my scope.

Mrs. Karen Redman: Thank you for that clarification. I didn't think you were challenging the actual principles.

Thank you, Chair.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Redman.

Boy, am I glad Mr. Trudeau resisted pressures to include property rights in the Constitution.

Mr. Laliberte, it's your turn, followed by the chair.

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Mr. Rick Laliberte (Churchill River, Lib.): Maybe both witnesses can wrap their minds around this one. How do the provisions of these extraordinary impacts, when you apply them under the issue of compensation, in crown lands, where there is no title to property owners but there are land users...? Most of our northern lands in this country are crown lands, but there is extensive land use on those lands—timber, mining, and extensive permits for outfitting, in many cases tourist outfitting. But there are also the traditional land users, aboriginal land users, and the berries that are crucial to wildlife, and harvesting for food, not necessarily for a monetary value. I had my first two mallards on Saturday afternoon. What kind of value do you put on those?

If this compensation and cooperation come into play, I don't know what percentage of our property in Canada is untitled crown land, but I think we should put a little bit of focus on that. I'd like to hear your views on this.

Prof. Peter Pearse: That's a very important issue, the extent to which the compensation provisions should apply to crown lands in Canada. There's no question that most land in Canada is crown land, and most of our major industries in the resource sectors depend on rights to crown lands, rather than on the private lands I have suggested should be the extent of application of the compensation in the Species at Risk Act.

The reason I suggest users of crown lands should be excluded—I don't suggest they all should be excluded, but crown land in general should be excluded—is that this whole species at risk policy in Canada is supposed to be a cooperative deal between provincial, federal, and territorial governments. All of them are committed to put in place regulations and policies to protect endangered species in Canada, to meet Canada's international obligations.

The Species at Risk Act provides that the federal government will have certain responsibilities in this, to the extent that critical habitat is found on federal lands, in waters where the Fisheries Act applies, in areas where migratory birds are involved, or other areas of federal jurisdiction. For the most part in Canada, lands fall under the direct responsibility of provincial and territorial governments, and to some extent aboriginal governments, all of whom are committed to protection of species at risk.

The federal government is empowered under the act to apply the regulatory restrictions that trigger compensation on provincial and territorial lands, where the minister deems that the protective measures taken by territorial and provincial governments are inadequate. In these circumstances it would be incongruous for the federal government to determine that the actions of a provincial or territorial government were inadequate and then compensate them for it. My report recommends that provinces and territories should not be compensated for their inadequacies.

The other question that remains is, what about the private users of provincial and territorial crown lands? There I've recommended that they should be compensated wherever they have a legal interest in the land that is encroached upon. In many cases in Canada resource industries work and operate under ranges of licences, leases, and permits that do not provide any kind of interest in the land. In fact, they are well known in provincial governments to be very frail forms of rights. Even certain long-term forms of rights, in the forest sector particularly, don't give the users an interest in the land, but they're just a licence to go and cut timber up to a certain amount in a certain place over a certain period.

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In those cases, the provincial governments themselves frequently apply regulatory restrictions to protect fish, water, wildlife, aesthetics, or whatever, and they never compensate for them. There is no legal encroachment going on. The contract does not leave the holder immune from governmental interventions.

In this case, I've said wherever no contractual or legal rights are infringed, there should be no compensation. Wherever legal interests are infringed, they should be compensated. I'm saying the private holders of rights, not the owner of the land, should be compensated.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: In terms of compensation, have you touched on NAFTA's chapter 11? We have huge multinational operations happening in these crown corporations. If they pull out this trump card of NAFTA, it's their money and their income that will be affected because of these measures. Have you looked at that?

Prof. Peter Pearse: Yes, I have. I'm afraid chapter 11 is a very complicated legal question and one in which I cannot give you the final and definitive answer. I can tell you that, as far as I understand it, chapter 11 really refers to expropriation of property. That's not what is at issue here. It could be at issue if some kind of regulatory intervention was deemed to be tantamount to an expropriation, to use the language of NAFTA. In general, we're talking about a regulation that falls short of expropriation.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: Would both gentlemen, again, tackle this one? Maybe there shouldn't be just one model to deal with compensation. To the south, you a lot of title crown land, as we've heard through many issues. In the north, you don't necessarily have that.

I come from a region where villages are from 100 kilometres to 200 kilometres apart. Nobody has ever lived amongst us, except the history of us living up there. But now you have an issue where we don't have legal interest in the land. We don't have any right to compensation. To the south, title crown land for agricultural purposes has been taking place for the last few hundred years, but in the north, it's totally different. Shouldn't this compensation be dealt with in a different way in the north, as it is to the south?

Prof. Peter Pearse: When you're speaking about the people, are you referring to aboriginal people?

Mr. Rick Laliberte: Well, anybody—anybody who lives in the north and doesn't necessarily have title. They live in villages but the land use is off the land. You know, life doesn't come from the water and sewer lines you're connected to. They're just the means for utilities. Life is off the land, off the waters, off the air. So how do you define that? You try to make it monetary, and I'm trying to say that in the north sometimes monetary isn't the issue.

In terms of the compensation challenge, there's not a huge amount of real estate activity in our communities. Mortgages aren't even touched by our banks. It's a whole different environment, and maybe compensation and cooperative measures should be looked at in a whole different light.

Prof. Peter Pearse: The reason I asked whether you were speaking mainly about aboriginal interest is that I have a special section in my report that deals with what I regard as important special arrangements for aboriginal lands.

But I also suggest in the report, as a general matter, that—

Mr. Rick Laliberte: Maybe I'll give you another example.

The Chair: This is your last question.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: Yes.

An example is the deal with carbon sinks. There's a wealth of interest on carbon sinks because of the Kyoto protocol. Automatically carbon sinks come into manageable lands, so the forest management leases are the ones that seem to be given the credit for this. The huge Weyerhaeusers, the Tolkos—all these management leases are being held by them—seem to be willing to grab this credit.

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What I'm saying is that a lot of those traditional land users, a lot of those villages, have land use abilities, or should have land use influences, just like counties or rural municipalities to the south. To the north we don't have those. Maybe that's something that should be looked at in this country to work with that sense, a different structure.

Trying to provide a southern solution in a northern environment doesn't work, and that's where this compensation seems to be going, as I see it.

Prof. Peter Pearse: I know that is a frequently expressed view. I'm certainly sensitive to the tendency to extend regulations and arrangements that are designed for the provinces up into the territories. This does present some difficulties.

I would just like to emphasize in this connection that my report suggests that compensation should be restricted to people whose legal rights to land are encroached upon, not to others. I did hear from many people who suggested that not only should landowners be compensated but also workers in the industries and communities that are adversely affected and so on.

But I know of no precedents in any expropriation law or anything else for compensating people other than the people whose property rights are adversely affected. That doesn't mean to say that communities and workers and others don't suffer sometimes from these problems, as we've seen in agriculture and fisheries in Canada. But it seems to me that those problems often call for government assistance, but it should be not in the form of compensation. It should be in the form of economic transition assistance or other kinds of educational or training assistance and that sort of thing.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Laliberte.

I have a couple of questions. In your ten commandments, Dr. Pearse, commandment four refers to extraordinary sacrifices. Could you give us a definition of extraordinary?

Prof. Peter Pearse: I've tried to start with the dictionary definition of that word. It certainly means unusual and significant.

My deliberations on this issue have driven me to chose the number of 10%. If anybody's property is devalued by more than 10% of the total value of the property, I have suggested that this is a significant impact that should be eligible for compensation.

The Chair: That 10% ought to be defined or arrived at by a technician in which discipline?

Prof. Peter Pearse: The professional independent appraisers.

The Chair: Thank you.

You spoke earlier of the importance that compensation shouldn't blunt cooperative efforts. That strikes me as being a very important point. Actually, the more I hear you speaking on that theme, the weaker becomes my belief in compensation. Land ownership is a pleasant feeling, and a reality to some extent, but at the same time it's also an illusion, if one carries it to its extreme significance. Nobody really owns land, quite frankly. But that becomes a discussion that fringes on the political, and we shouldn't pollute the air in this committee.

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I would rather ask you, if there was no compensation at all, would this enhance the acceptance of this bill? Because there then would be no absolute reason for blunting cooperative efforts.

Prof. Peter Pearse: I certainly agree with your conclusion. I would be the first to agree that you could make a strong case, on well- and long-established government policy, that there should be no compensation. You can also make a persuasive case for full compensation.

What we're talking about here is a change in policy, and I'm urging the government to be cautious in making the change. Some people are suggesting that I'm too cautious and some people are saying that it is too generous. I'm suggesting that this 50% sharing of significant losses meets the criteria that were set out in the act. It's significant, but it is not so much as to blunt incentives to cooperate.

Mr. Caccia, you've touched on what is clearly the most difficult and delicate part of the whole task that was assigned to me. In the course of my investigations, when I was having conversations about this issue, I felt that people were usually thinking about compensation in principle, in isolation. I always found myself having to bring up this whole question about the broader context, and tradition, and established policies, and all of the qualifications of the context within which this little provision for compensation finds itself, and the fact that if this really works, it'll all be irrelevant. If we really get this policy working well, we won't resort to these mandatory interventions that invoke compensation.

It would be, clearly, a much better scheme in almost everybody's opinion, not just mine. It would be so much better if we could preserve incentives to cooperate, and do it that way rather than resort to regulations and compensation.

It's a compromise. It's aimed at the balancing of two opposing interests at stake here. As I say, it's probably the most difficult part of my assignment.

The Chair: But you see, don't you think that you put your finger on the issue in your last sentence in reply to Mr. Laliberte, when you said that, actually, the role of governments, as an alternative to compensation, ought to be to institute programs and initiatives that would deal with those affected by a certain measure, and thus ensure their shift to other activities, ensure their income, ensure their employment in other sectors, rather than the compensatory approach?

Prof. Peter Pearse: Absolutely.

The Chair: Isn't that the solution to the dilemma that you just defined?

Prof. Peter Pearse: Yes, and I'm very glad that you raised that. I feel that I should have discussed that earlier on.

In many cases, compensation would be better in forms other than money. That's particularly true, incidentally, with aboriginal people—and I make that point in my report in the part that deals with special arrangements for aboriginal people—but also in the case of other private owners and non-aboriginal people in Canada, and companies dependent upon the resource industries.

For example, farmers have frequently made the point that even full compensation for a piece of property that is somehow made unavailable for their use doesn't fully compensate them for the viability of the whole farm operation, and that they would much prefer to have compensation in the form of access to other land. Timber companies point out the same thing. They would much prefer, instead of compensation in the form of money, compensation in the form of access to other timber elsewhere to make up for it, to keep their operations or their enterprise whole in that sense.

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So I ended up recommending here that there should be no restriction on the form in which compensation is paid. But following the principles of expropriation, normally, as I understand it, the principles nowadays work in such a way that the government must offer a cash settlement first. Then, if both parties agree, they can discuss and decide on a settlement of equal value in kind or in some other form. In many cases, I think both parties would find that would be a preferable solution.

The Chair: What would happen to landowners who are negotiating for compensation and yet proceeding, at the same time, with their activities, disregarding the legislation? What would be the role of the minister?

Take the situation whereby one province does not implement the provisions in the act because the federal minister has permissive but not mandatory powers to pursue Bill C-5. You may have a situation in which a province remains completely inactive. What would happen then?

Prof. Peter Pearse: Let's look at the first case, where, say, a company was damaging critical habitat and a regulation was brought in to prevent it from doing so. That regulation was then was challenged and was before the courts or something, and the company went on damaging the habitat. The question is whether or not the company should be liable for prosecution while it was pursuing or negotiating a deal. I was pressed by many people to ensure that they would be exempt from prosecution while a deal was being pursued or negotiated.

My report rejects that and suggests that it would be inappropriate and imprudent, because it would encourage dragged-out negotiations and regulations and legal proceedings, or it could. It would invite that, which would not be a good thing.

My report therefore recommends that the minister use his discretion on that matter, and if the company was seriously endangering critical habitat, he should prosecute, after due notice, even though a final settlement had not yet been reached.

The second case that you mentioned, Mr. Caccia, was the case of a province deciding not comply. That may not be altogether hypothetical, because there are widely differing positions on this among the provinces. That's one of the reasons I've urged the government to be cautious about implementing these arrangements.

The act does empower the federal government to act if provinces don't, so I guess the answer to your question is that there is nothing in the legislation to prevent the federal minister from taking whatever action he deems necessary in order to protect critical habitat when a province doesn't cooperate.

I think your point really was the discretionary element and whether he should be required to intervene as opposed to having the discretion to intervene.

I don't know. Canada is such a complicated place politically that I think you can sometimes get cornered by legislation. I really don't have an opinion on that.

The Chair: Thank you. That's very helpful.

I sense that Mr. Mills would like a second round of questions, and maybe other colleagues do as well.

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Could I ask you, Mr. Mills, to take the chair after you've finished your questions. I have to go to House for Standing Orders. Please go ahead.

Mr. Bob Mills: Let me use a couple of examples from the real world. A farmer in my constituency, or his family, has owned this piece of land for 104 years. For 80-some years now they have protected close to 100 acres of this land because of its natural beauty, the wildlife that's on it, and so on. He is doing that with no compensation—nothing. He loves it. He wants to leave it for his grandchildren. He fears this legislation is going to somehow stop him from being able to do that, and he suggests that he would plow it down rather than let the government take it over.

I have another example from when I worked for the Canadian Wildlife Service as a field biologist responsible for Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. In the winter we plotted out the breeding areas for ducks and geese, and then we went out in the summer and offered farmers a cheque to not drain hay, do whatever to that habitat, until a certain date. They were compensated, given a cheque on the spot when they signed the agreement. They were happy, the wildlife were able to reproduce, and all was well.

A round table was held on Saturday in a rural community, not in my riding but close to it, and a bureaucrat from the government said “Bill C-5 is about to pass, it'll be the way it is, and there will be no compensation, because the government may put it in the regulations or something”. You can imagine what was the feeling of those 90 farmers in that room, when they heard the government official saying this, toward Bill C-5. That's the communication that's happening out there.

Now, it seems to me, then, because it's in the regulations and we don't know what that means, that it must.... You know, if it's in the regulations, it's “Trust us, the government”. If it's in the actual bill, then at least it's spelled out and at least the farmers know, “Yes, there is”, or “No, there isn't”.

I guess my perspective, from knowing them pretty well, is that if it isn't, I know what sort of actions will be taken. It will be the same as the U.S. It will be a piece of legislation that just won't work, and it certainly won't save any endangered species.

That's how important, I believe, the compensation issue is. Like it or not, that's the reality on the ground.

Prof. Peter Pearse: I'd like to comment on your general point about distortion of information and the way the message gets out. I've certainly found a lot of that. There's a great deal of anxiety among property owners, ranchers, and farmers across the country, partly because they've been bruised so much recently by regulatory interventions, not so much by the federal government but by provincial governments, over recent years.

I kept running into the view being expressed that the government's going to take the land away, but you see, everything I'm dealing with is specifically, explicitly, to deal with situations where the government does not take land away. If the government takes the land away, it's an expropriation and that's not what I'm dealing with. We're dealing with the situation in which you keep the title to the land, but we want to restrict you on the way you use it.

A related matter has to do with your example about the protection of wetlands and waterfowl. Everybody agrees, especially people on the prairies who have worked most closely with these arrangements for protecting wetlands and waterfowl, that the way you described it is the way it should work. People should get fair incentives and monetary payments for undertaking works in the public interest. Everybody wants it to work that way. This compensation is really only meant to be a last resort when you can't do it that way, if for some reason you can't get a deal or the incentives aren't good enough, or people don't like the government in principle so they aren't going to do any kind of a voluntary deal. They're just going to obstruct it, in which case, as a last resort, hopefully very rare, the government will invoke regulatory restrictions and then offer some compensation to blunt the burden.

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Mr. Bob Mills: I agree with that, but it's communicating it.

The Chair: But the knowledge of compensation could lead to some perverse behaviour.

Prof. Peter Pearse: Yes. This gets back to the issue about blunting the incentives to cooperate. The very last thing we want to do is put in place a program that will encourage people to go for the regulatory restriction in order to get the money. We've had government programs in the past that do invoke “farming for money”, as they call it in the prairies.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Comartin.

Mr. Joe Comartin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In reading your report, Dr. Pearse, I took some exception to your comments about compensating communities in the broader scope of that as opposed to individual landowners. Then I was trying to conceive a hypothetical for you today as to where in fact that would ever occur. That is, species would be designated, habitat protected and in effect it would have a very negative impact on the whole community. I couldn't come up with a hypothetical. Is that lack of creativity on my part, or in fact could we get into that situation with the legislation?

Prof. Peter Pearse: I think we should be very careful to recognize that this can happen, and many experts would suggest to you that it is likely to happen. If there is any doubt about that I urge you to look at the experience in the United States over the spotted owl. There are whole regions of the Pacific northwest of the United States where communities have suffered terribly as a result of the invocation of the U.S. Endangered Species Act over the spotted owl. Whole communities have found that their economic base has been displaced and it's been a very difficult experience for them.

We have some species, in one or another categories of endangerment in Canada, that are a bit like this in the sense that they take vast areas of habitat in order to protect them. In my province it would be the woodland caribou. I can tell you that the forest industry of British Columbia is very anxious about the prospect of having to protect the woodland caribou, which occupies enormous ranges. It depends on old growth timber and involves protective measures that would almost undermine their whole access to the resource base.

I think there are other examples as well that could involve substantial social dislocation. It could happen even in fisheries. I don't think it's beyond the realm of the possible that it could be a very serious disruption in certain cases.

This brings me, if I may, Mr. Comartin, to take advantage of your question, to urge on you something else that I think you should be bearing in mind in all this. I talked about governments being cautious in all of this. What I found is that the federal government really did not have a very good handle on how big this problem is. I can tell you that in talking to some of the experts in the wildlife field in Canada, outside Ottawa, I got the impression that many of the experts think of the task of coping with the increasing number of endangered species as very daunting. This could be a huge issue.

We don't have very good information as far as I know. The government does not have very good information on how big the problem is or how much it is going to cost. I think we should have that information before we get too casual about fully compensating for any efforts the federal government may invoke. It could be a very substantial issue in Canada.

The Chair: Mr. Comartin, very briefly.

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Mr. Joe Comartin: This is more of a statement. I have to go speak to a bill, Dr. Pearse, or on this issue I may take you on. My understanding of the spotted owl is that the information is not entirely accurate, that a great deal of it is anecdotal, that the economic downturn that occurred in the forestry industry in the Pacific northwest was unrelated to the spotted owl. I don't have time to discuss it with you at this point, or perhaps find you some of the studies. Maybe we can communicate at some point in the future.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): We have no one else on the list. Are we okay?

I'd like to thank our guests for being here.

I'm sure, Dr. Pearse, that all of us, as we go along with this bill, will have questions for you and requests for advice. Again, I think all of us appreciated your statements. They provoked a lot of discussion. I guess it comes back to my question—communication is the most difficult aspect of this whole bill, and I think you identified that as well. Thank you.

I'd like to let the committee know that the meeting after question period has been cancelled. So we will meet tomorrow. And there will be no Monday meeting next week. That has been changed to May 29. But that will come to your offices.

Adjourned.