CLAR Committee Meeting

LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON BILL C-20, AN ACT TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE REQUIREMENT FOR CLARITY AS SET OUT IN THE OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA IN THE QUEBEC SECESSION REFERENCE

COMITÉ LÉGISLATIF CHARGÉ D'ÉTUDIER LE PROJET DE LOI C-20, LOI DONNANT EFFET À L'EXIGENCE DE CLARTÉ FORMULÉE PAR LA COUR SUPRÊME DU CANADA DANS SON AVIS SUR LE RENVOI SUR LA SÉCESSION DU QUÉBEC

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, February 24, 2000

• 0938

[Translation]

The Chairman (Mr. Peter Milliken (Kingston and the Islands, Lib.)): Order, please. We can now begin.

[English]

Our first witness this morning is Alliance Quebec.

Cameras, adios. Sorry; I keep forgetting about that.

Mr. William Johnson is appearing for Alliance Quebec.

Please come and have a seat, sir, at the table. You're welcome to the committee.

Mr. Butcher and Mr. Housefather are with him. That's great.

Thank you very much, gentlemen. Please have a seat at the table.

Will cameras please leave? Sorry; we're in session.

I want to thank you for taking the time to appear before the committee this morning. We'll just wait until the room is cleared.

We look forward to hearing your testimony. Under the rules adopted by the committee, you'll have 10 minutes to make your presentation, followed by a maximum of 35 minutes of questions from members of the committee.

Mr. Johnson, I presume you'll be leading off for the group.

• 0940

Mr. William Johnson (Past President, Alliance Quebec): Yes, I will. Thank you very much for receiving us.

Honourable members,

[Translation]

Honourable members, thank you for having us here this morning.

[English]

I will first introduce Anthony Housefather, who is the first vice-president of Alliance Quebec, and Bill Butcher, who is the chairman of our board. We will all be answering your questions and making a presentation.

Alliance Quebec first of all congratulates the government on the clarity bill, which recognizes the errors of the 1995 referendum campaign and acknowledges the demands of most federalists in Quebec for a clear framework that safeguards our constitutional rights as recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada.

In 1995 the secessionist Government of Quebec held a referendum that was intended to lead to a unilateral declaration of independence. An ambiguous question was posed that referred to an agreement between three separatist leaders. The people of Quebec then voted in confusion, with most under the illusion that secession was a right, that a referendum could activate that right, and that a majority yes vote would be followed naturally and normally by Quebec's independence, with its borders intact.

What dangerous illusions. How close we came in 1995 to the most serious crisis, because illusions rather than clarity were permitted to prevail.

It took courage to present Bill C-20, because after decades of mythmaking on the part of separatists and of pusillanimity on the part of federalists, the people of Quebec had been so brainwashed, misled, and confused that they truly believed in the fairy tale of secession as told by Jacques Parizeau and Lucien Bouchard. For Bouchard, as he revealed in 1995, a referendum was a baguette magique, a magic wand that made everything possible, and of course the peuple québécois would then live happily ever after.

There are unpalatable truths that must be told. The first is that Quebec does not have a right to secession, either under Canadian or under international law, or under any other law, if there exists such a thing. As the five eminent experts on international law consulted by the Quebec government in 1992 replied unanimously:

[Translation]

under international law, the right to secede did not exist.

[English]

As for the argument that Quebeckers constitute a people with the right to self-determination, the five experts pointed out that the right of peoples to self-determination never includes the right of secession, except in cases of colonies. They said

[Translation]

the Quebec people does exercise its right to self-determination within a Canadian whole, and has no legal basis for invoking that right to justify possible independence.

[English]

This doesn't mean Quebec would be maintained by force in Canada if it were truly the will of Quebeckers to secede from Canada. What it does mean is there are two ways, and only two ways, to secede. One is through a negotiated agreement that leads to an amendment of the Constitution of Canada to permit secession.

[Translation]

The second way is the way of revolution: de facto control of Quebec's territory by the Quebec government, to the exclusion of control by the federal government. Both ways are strewn with pitfalls that I would call fatal in each case. The first way seems to have been rejected under Bill 99 now before the National Assembly, which proclaims that the present Quebec territory is indivisible. Clearly, a government of Quebec could not decide to sign a secession agreement giving up the territory of the Cree, the Inuit, the Montagnais, etc.

[English]

By the same token, the road to independence by revolution of excluding federal jurisdiction from the territory of Quebec would never succeed either, because the aboriginal nations, the English-speaking community, and all the ethnic minorities of Quebec would refuse to be taken hostage by an outlaw government and would defend effectively their right to remain under the Constitution of Canada.

The aboriginal peoples have stated clearly, three of them by referendums, that they will remain part of Canada even if the rest of Quebec secedes. It has been recognized even by separate constitutional law experts such as José Woehrling and Monsieur Turp that they would be supported by the international community in their assertion of their right.

Let me quote Professor Turp:

The native nations are in a position similar to that of the Québécois when it comes to invoking international law in support of the claim that they have the right to self-determination. In view of the “nation” status of the native communities, unequivocally affirmed by their representatives and explicitly recognized by Quebec in the resolution of its National Assembly (and implicitly by Canada, excluding Quebec, in the Constitution Act, 1982, where the term “peoples” rather than “nations” is used), they may justifiably invoke for their own benefit the same international instruments as the Québécois—that is, the U.N. Charter and the international human rights covenants—to affirm their right to freely determine their political status and ensure their economic, social and cultural development. The native nations of Quebec may thus claim that they meet the sole condition for enjoying this right and that they may therefore invoke the right to self-determination for their own benefit.

• 0945

I continue. This is wonderful prose.

Such a right would allow the native nations to decide their political and constitutional future as freely as the Québécois, whether they choose creation of free and independent sovereign states, association or integration with an independent state, or acquisition of some other freely decided political status. In other words, by virtue of their right to self-determination, the native nations of Quebec could decide to attain sovereignty, to remain integrated with Canada, to stay with Quebec if it becomes sovereign, or to remain within Canada even if Quebec chooses sovereignty.

Thank you, Mr. Turp.

Mr. Anthony Housefather (First Vice-President, Alliance Quebec): Following the 1995 referendum, there was a drastic change in attitude amongst federalists within Quebec, particularly within the English-speaking communities. Our trust in elected politicians was weakened, unity groups were formed, rallies were held, and the battle moved to the municipal level—the level of government closest to the people.

Thousands of concerned citizens attended local council meetings, begging their municipal governments to defend their right to stay Canadians, insisting that their local leaders stand up for their constitutional rights, which many felt their federal and provincial representatives had failed to defend. I can tell you, as a councillor within Hampstead, a suburb of Montreal, that thousands of people within our community wrote to us asking us to protect their rights.

It is a credit to municipal councils that they responded. More than 48 municipalities within Quebec, representing a population of nearly 1 million people, passed resolutions supporting their citizens' right to stay part of Canada, whatever the results of future referendums, and demanding that the Government of Canada take appropriate steps to defend the rights of their citizens. These included the communities of Town of Mount Royal, Côte-St-Luc, and Hampstead in Mr. Cotler's riding. They included the cities of Roxboro, Pierrefonds, and Dollard in the county of Monsieur Patry.

These resolutions were followed by resolutions of support by hundreds of cities across the country in many of your ridings and culminated in the largest rally held in Quebec during the 1997 election campaign, staged in the Raymond Bourque Arena in Saint-Laurent.

Mr. William T. Butcher (Chairman of the Board, Alliance Quebec): Now let us add our own voice in the name of English-speaking people we represent.

We repeat what we said last week before the committee of the National Assembly studying Bill 99. Alliance Quebec states solemnly, without reservation or qualification, we are part of the population of Quebec, but we are not part of a mythical peuple québécois that has a right to secession. We, like the Crees, will not be shuffled from one jurisdiction to another. We have a country—Canada—and we will not be deprived of our country except under the rule of law.

Any attempt to base secession on Bill 99 without an enabling amendment to the Constitution of Canada would be unconstitutional, revolutionary, and illegitimate. We would resist such secession by every non-violent means possible. It would not succeed.

Moreover, should there be someday negotiations over the secession of Quebec, the boundaries of ex-Quebec would be on the negotiating table, and we would ensure that the Canadian people in Quebec, where they are now in a majority, as well as the aboriginal nations, would not allow their part of Canada to be removed from the Canadian flag and the Constitution of Canada. Let no one, either in Quebec or in the rest of Canada, have the slightest doubt.

[Translation]

Mr. William Johnson: There you are, we are now ready for another question.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Housefather and Mr. Butcher.

[English]

Mr. Hill.

Mr. Grant Hill (Macleod, Ref.): Thanks, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for your testimony, gentlemen.

You've stated that you support the clarity bill. You've also been very public in your condemnation of the question that was asked in the last referendum.

I've tried to figure out how that question could have been posed to make it clear, if the very question were asked. In my mind, there were two components to that question. One, did you in Quebec want to be part of some new association, some sovereignty association, some new economic arrangement? I would ask that question as a solitude, yes or no. Then I would follow that with another question: if that proposal fails—whatever it is, and my colleagues from the Bloc have a host of proposals they might present—would you like Quebec to become a sovereign country, yes or no?

• 0950

Both those things then would give the two proposals, but it would make it very clear whether or not sovereignty was an option supported by the majority. Would that sort of approach to a desire to have two things suit you?

Mr. William Johnson: What would be necessary is that they be isolated.

In Switzerland, which has had more experience with referendums than all the other countries in the world combined, you cannot ask a double question, because with a double question, people can be voting for one or the other, or they can be voting for one on the assumption that the other would be available, and it might not be. So at least they must be isolated.

I would suggest the question Jacques Parizeau said during the 1995 campaign he would be posing—

[Translation]

are you in favour of an independent Quebec as of such a date?...

[English]

is clear.

There could be a follow-up question. That's possible.

Concerning the question as you put it, I can look at it, and I'm sure there are all kinds of variations, but there has to be the intent not to confuse the people—not to go by polls that show if you ask it this way, you'll confuse people, and they'll give the answer you want.

That's why this bill is so important. There has to be a question that is clear and candid. There was not in 1995 and there was not in 1980 either.

Mr. Grant Hill: Yesterday we had a senior politician come before us and say this bill takes away one of the really good tools a Prime Minister could use in the event of a secession vote that was positive: confusion, ambiguity, ingenuity. There were some positive things in there, to be frank, such as consultation and a referendum across the country.

Since I criticized the old question as confusing and ambiguous, I can't imagine somebody hoping confusion and ambiguity would advance the cause of democracy. Do you have a comment?

Mr. William Johnson: Yes. I would like to say that as a journalist for thirty-some years, I observed Mr. Clark in action, and I was very much aware of his constant attempts to win nationalist support in Quebec. Both before he became Prime Minister and during the time he was Prime Minister, when he took a separatist as his constitutional affairs adviser, and afterwards, Mr. Clark never succeeded in winning any support in Quebec. He is defending the indefensible and trying to give it some kind of semblance of reason, but I think it's simply an opportunistic gambit that will give him nothing.

Mr. Anthony Housefather: Also, on behalf of our community, the reason so many English-speaking people have left Quebec over the last 25 years is largely as a result of the confusion and the ambiguity of the situation. I have strong hope that this type of clarity bill will ensure the future of the youth of our community and encourage them to stay in Quebec, because we now know we're not going to be tricked out of our country.

Mr. Grant Hill: Might I note that I did not use the name of the politician who was here—

Mr. William Johnson: Yes. I did.

Mr. Grant Hill: —and did not intend to.

On the question of the majority, 50% plus one was the bar on the last two referenda.

Mr. William Johnson: No.

Mr. Grant Hill: That is a debatable point, and maybe I shouldn't express it that way. Let me say the bar is not specified in this bill. Should it be?

Mr. William Johnson: No, because first of all, a referendum is not a magic wand. It doesn't become magic at 50% plus one or anywhere else. As they said in the white paper, la consultation populaire au Québec, in 1977, which I covered as a journalist, it's a consultative mechanism, and therefore there is no need to put a victory margin or to say what percent of the population has to vote. It gives information. That's what it is.

You could have a referendum and say, “Are you in favour of annexing Labrador?”, and 99% of the people could say yes. Would that mean something happens at 99%? No. It would mean 99% of Quebeckers want to annex Labrador. It expresses wishes, desires, and preferences. It does not change anything in the real world.

Why not 50% or anything else? Because not only is the question important but the campaign. In 1980 they asked a very complicated question, and then they campaigned on something else, the new agreement. In the final week they sent a pamphlet to every home that said, “Vote yes so that we can have real negotiations”,

[Translation]

to unblock negotiations.

[English]

They didn't mention secession. They didn't mention sovereignty association.

In 1995 there were three mass publicity campaigns. The first was

[Translation]

"Yes to the forces of change",

[English]

“Yes to the camp of change”, not to secession, independence, or sovereignty.

[Translation]

The second was "Yes, we have the right to be different",

[English]

“We have the right to be different”, not “We have the right to be independent” or “We have the right to be sovereign”. The third one was

[Translation]

"Yes, and it becomes possible",

[English]

and you saw a picture of a man at work, or you saw a picture of a dove flying, or you saw a picture of the map of Quebec. It didn't say what it was.

• 0955

They did not campaign fundamentally on secession, so no matter what the percentage was, 99%, they would not have had a mandate for secession.

So clarity is not only in the question. It's not only in the percentage. It's in the campaign and what we know people understood of the question and what they were answering.

Mr. Grant Hill: Thank you.

The Chair: Monsieur Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Johnson, I imagine that your testimony here is probably your swan song. You are joining us here today as a former president.

Mr. William Johnson: I still am, I'm still president.

Mr. Daniel Turp: You were introduced as the former president.

Mr. William Johnson: I remain president until the end of May, until the next elections.

Mr. Daniel Turp: I imagine it's a swan song in a way, and like the Equality Party, Alliance Quebec is invited by our Reform friends who, like you, seem to be advocates of partition and think that partition is a good idea.

Mr. William Johnson: I'm against partition, especially of Canada.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Partition seems to be a good idea when it comes to Anglophones in Quebec and Aboriginal people in Quebec. But Mr. Johnson, can you tell us clearly whether partition would be a good idea for the Francophone minorities outside Quebec and for Aboriginal people outside Quebec if their province, Manitoba, Ontario or British Columbia, wanted to separate? You hold the same opinion regarding the Francophone minorities and the Aboriginal nations of Canada as you do about the Aboriginal nations and Anglophone minority of Quebec?

Mr. William Johnson: Absolutely, Mr. Turp. And I'll tell you why. I do not advocate what you did in the speech that I quoted, namely that the Aboriginal people have the right to secession. They have the right to remain in Canada, they have a right to decide on their own future within Canada.

In fact, you know that your theses have been rejected by five highly renowned international experts. So no, I'm against partition, especially of Canada. I'm against any partition, but I'm saying that if Canada is divisible, Quebec is as well.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Since the clarity act apparently allows another province to secede, are you telling me that this would apply to all provinces?

Mr. William Johnson: Absolutely.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Are you telling me that the Aboriginal peoples of Ontario and British Columbia and the Franco-Manitoban minority, for example, would have the right to secede from Manitoba?

Mr. William Johnson: Not seceding from Manitoba, remaining in Canada. That's not secession.

Mr. Daniel Turp: But could the Francophone minority of southern Ontario and northern Ontario...

Mr. William Johnson: Remain in Canada.

Mr. Daniel Turp: ...join Quebec if Quebec became sovereign? Can the Francophone minority of Ontario join Quebec?

Mr. William Johnson: A province does not have the right to secede.

Mr. Daniel Turp: It does according to the clarity act.

Mr. William Johnson: No, no, no.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Oh yes.

Mr. William Johnson: Not the right. The bill recognizes that a province can do so. That is not a right. It would be negotiated, but it is not a right. The minorities would have the right to remain in Canada if this was compatible with the geography, etc. Yes, it's the same principle. They would not secede. On the contrary, they would refuse to secede. You're confusing things.

Mr. Daniel Turp: But answer my question. If Quebec was a country, would the Francophone minority of Ontario have the right to choose whether to remain part of Canada or become part of Quebec?

Mr. William Johnson: But it would have the right.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Yes, yes, yes, yes.

Mr. William Johnson: It would have the right.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Yes, yes, yes, yes. It's the same thing. No double standards, Mr. Johnson. Tell me whether the Francophone minority of Ontario would have the same right to secede as the Anglophone community of Quebec would have to remain in Canada, as you claim.

Mr. William Johnson: Exactly, precisely, yes.

Mr. Daniel Turp: It would have the same right?

Mr. William Johnson: It would have the same right to remain in Canada.

Mr. Daniel Turp: No, no, no, no. That's not what I said.

Mr. William Johnson: If Ontario seceded.

Mr. Daniel Turp: No, no. Would the Francophone minority of Ontario have the right to join Quebec if Quebec became a country?

Mr. William Johnson: It would have the right to remain in Canada. That is its right.

Mr. Daniel Turp: You don't want to answer my question.

Mr. William Johnson: But, Mr. Turp...

Mr. Daniel Turp: You don't want to answer my question. When it comes to double standards, you're the one who has a double standard.

Mr. Anthony Housefather: As you understand, the borders of a province are protected when that province is within Canada, as you always say.

• 1000

Therefore, if Ontario does not secede and remains within Canada, its borders will be protected and the Francophones of Ontario will not vote for secession from Ontario. In any event, I'm sure the Francophones outside Quebec have no interest in being part of an independent Quebec.

Mr. Daniel Turp: It's so interesting to see that the borders of Ontario are entitled to be protected, but not those of Quebec. Not those of Quebec, right, that's your thesis? That's your reasoning?

Mr. Anthony Housefather: As long as Quebec remains in Canada, its borders will be protected. That's clear in the Constitution.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Would the aboriginal nations of other provinces have the right to leave their provinces if they wanted to?

Mr. Anthony Housefather: It's not a matter of leaving their province...

Mr. Daniel Turp: They should be allowed to leave Quebec but not the other provinces, right?

Mr. Anthony Housefather: No, no, they remain in the province of Quebec. You're talking about the former Quebec. If Quebec seceded, then this would be settled either through negotiations under the rule of law or in a revolutionary manner. I said that one way or another, Aboriginal nations will remain in Canada because that's what they want. It would be the same thing if Manitoba or Ontario decided to secede.

Mr. Daniel Turp: But if the Aboriginal nations wanted to separate from Ontario or British Columbia, that wouldn't be allowed, right? Only when it comes to Quebec.

The Chairman: Order, please.

Mr. Blaikie, you have the floor.

Order, order. Mr. Blaikie has the floor.

[English]

Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg—Transcona, NDP): Well, Mr. Chairman, at the risk of sounding like a former Prime Minister who appeared before, I think we should change the subject.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Bill Blaikie: There may be more wisdom in Mr. Clark's advice than the government was prepared to admit.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Bill Blaikie: I'd like to ask a question of Mr. Johnson.

With what we have before us, we can quarrel about the details or the principles, what's sometimes referred to as plan B. Certainly a number of people have come before us and argued plan B, yes or no, but the real solution is to have a plan A, a plan that would not change the minds of people who are committed to a sovereign Quebec, but would change the minds of people who sometimes vote for a sovereign Quebec, either as a negotiating tactic or because they're uncertain or because they feel the rest of Canada isn't as interested as it should be in the renewal of Canadian federalism in a way that would meet some of Quebec's aspirations within Canada.

So I wonder, what is your group's plan A?

Mr. William Johnson: Mr. Blaikie, I prefer plan C, C for clarity, and that's what we're discussing.

It's a condition. The people have the right to know the law. The people have the right to know the law in writing. They have the right to know also what the federal government would do with its constitutional responsibilities in the case of secession. They did not know that in 1995. They did not know that in 1980. Next time they will know it. It's essential.

You say, what about plan A? I will tell you right now, if you're reading, for example, Alain Dubuc's series of nine different full pages—today is number six—in La Presse, he says for the future, we're in a deadlock. Since 1960, Quebec has been able to say no, no, no, no, no. It's never been able to say yes. The deadlock is in Quebec; it must be resolved in Quebec. And there's no way Quebec can resolve its own internal deadlock until it comes to terms: will it remain within Quebec or Canada?

What has been proposed in constitutional negotiations, certainly since 1964, is this. Quebec says, “I'm demanding this and this and this now. Give me that, then I will demand this and this and this.” And then when the BQ comes in, they will demand secession. We're not going to transform this country, which is working well, to please one leader of one party one day, who tells you, “I will be asking for something else next year.” That's what Bourassa did with the Meech Lake agreement. He said, “I'll be coming back for more.” Then we're going to transform the whole Constitution, and when he's out of office, the BQ will come in and say, “We want the whole country.”

Quebec has to make up its mind. It has to be done in clarity. Until then, there is no possibility of substantial constitutional changes.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: So in other words, you don't have a plan A?

Mr. William Johnson: I answered, sir.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Yes, well—

Mr. Anthony Housefather: Can I just make a comment? Part of plan A historically has been defending the country and talking about what a wonderful tapestry of multiculturalism and bilingualism Canada is. We believe strongly in and we are defenders within Quebec of talking about what kind of great country Canada is from coast to coast to coast. That is part of plan A. That's not plan B.

• 1005

If you're talking about radical constitutional change, I agree with Mr. Johnson: you're not going to get radical constitutional change until the issue is settled once and for all. You can have étapisme. You can have administrative agreements, as the Liberal government has done, with Quebec, which has pleased many Quebeckers. But you're not going to have a Meech Lake or a Charlottetown that's going to solve a framework for the country until Quebec is clear about what it's going to do.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: I have just a final comment. Again, you certainly don't have a plan A in the sense most people mean when they say “plan A”. The other thing is I would quarrel with your version of history, only in the sense that it's not only Quebec that has said no, no, no—I'm not too sure what you're referring to—but also the rest of Canada has on a number of occasions said no, certainly to Meech Lake, for instance.

Mr. William Johnson: Absolutely.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: So to characterize the no or the negative as only being on the Quebec side is to misrepresent some of the problems we've had.

Mr. William Johnson: Mr. Blaikie, the rest of Canada was undergoing constitutional change, or accepting it, to please Quebec, but they saw this was not leading anywhere. This was only the latest demand of an endless series that was coming, and they saw even the people of Quebec were rejecting it. They knew when these agreements were made and the Constitution was changed—

Mr. Bill Blaikie: They didn't reject Meech Lake. Maybe Charlottetown, but not—

Mr. William Johnson: No, you're right, Meech Lake it didn't reject. Charlottetown it did.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Don't make generalizations then.

Mr. William Johnson: Wait a minute now. Only the Liberals backed Meech Lake before the National Assembly. All the other parties and almost everyone who appeared—all the unions, the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste, and the others—all rejected it until it was in danger of being rejected by the rest of Canada. Then all of a sudden they said, “Oh, we must save it. Look, we're insulted it's been refused.”

Of the presenters in June—let's see; that was 1987—85% were against Meech Lake, almost all. The Chamber of Commerce and Alliance Quebec favoured it at that time. It wouldn't today.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Bachand.

Mr. André Bachand (Richmond—Arthabaska, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Supreme Court opinion may have created a precedent for one of the first times where a province, whichever it may be, decides to secede. First of all, in addition to indicating a process, the Supreme Court recognized a geopolitical space. It talks about a province and without going too far, it recognizes that the referendum will take place within it.

It does indeed refer to borders in the list of negotiations. But that's the only place where it refers directly to what is called, or what you call, or what others such as the Reform Party call the partition of Quebec. It's not in the sense of partition, it is in the sense of Aboriginal rights recognized for the First Nations. Nowhere is this recognized directly or indirectly. So this is something new.

Whether one is for or against partition, it must now be recognized that the court acknowledges that a referendum for secession takes place in a limited territory which is legally, politically and geographically recognized. So that's the first step.

Having said that, some people won't see things the same way we do and that's okay. We've heard interesting things from people who met with us and who are not invited by the opposition parties. Amongst others, Professor Morissette—I don't want to generalize about all Liberal witnesses; he's neither a Conservative nor a Bloc Québécois member—recognizes that Quebec is not divisible in the sense that partitionists say it is, except with regard to the Aboriginal issue because of past, present ones and probably future agreements.

However, my question is this: if Canada is divisible, it is. If Quebec is divisible, the Court refers to First Nations rights. Is a municipality divisible?

Mr. William Johnson: Let me say one thing before I answer your question. You stated that we're not talking about minorities. Four fundamental principles that were recognized...

Mr. André Bachand: No, no, what I'm saying, Mr. Johnson, and pardon me for interrupting you, is about the rights of minorities. Indeed, that is referred to.

Mr. William Johnson: But here the four principles...

Mr. André Bachand: When referring to the territorial issue, no, certainly.

Mr. William Johnson: To consider secession, the Supreme Court stated that there are four principles at stake that must be respected. The fourth principle is the rights of minorities. So don't say that we're excluded.

Secondly, when you talk about a municipality, you're talking about a creature of a provincial government. So yes, a provincial government can divide a municipality as it sees fit. Of course, people have rights to, political rights.

• 1010

But in response to your question, no, I don't know where that leads us, but yes, a municipality is divisible and it can be divided by the provincial government.

Mr. André Bachand: For example, if 51% of municipality XYZ decides, on a clear question and with that majority, to remain within Canada, according to your partition argument, could the remaining 49% hold another referendum? I realize that all of this is completely stupid.

Mr. William Johnson: Oh, we've just found...

Mr. André Bachand: Indeed, I was going to share the stupidity with you a little bit just the same. I'm a generous guy by nature. But where does this notion of partition stop, if we don't stick to the bases legally recognized by the Supreme Court?

Mr. Anthony Housefather: Mr. Bachand, I believe that we're trying to follow the same bases that are recognized by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court referred to the borders of Quebec which would be at stake in the event of secession. That will be on the negotiating table. There's not even a city councillor in such a case. I wouldn't say that if my municipality was in an isolated region of Quebec where all other municipalities had voted yes, I should have the right to remain in Canada. It's not in that sense. But there are many territories within Quebec. If you were to do this by federal riding, by provincial riding, by municipality, by region where the majority, not just 50% plus, but 99.3% had voted no in a referendum... The municipalities that surround us voted no at the rate of 90%, these municipalities that are in federalist regions. You have to look at a map of Quebec logically and this would be very painful because I would hope that Quebec would remain within Canada in its entirety.

Mr. André Bachand: That's indeed what we're hoping for. But what I mean with regard to partition, Mr. Chairman, is that you apply it after a winning referendum on independence...

Mr. William Johnson: According to certain criteria.

Mr. André Bachand: According to your own criteria, regardless of your criteria. Others could then say: "Could we also apply partition after a winning referendum for your side, but a winning one also for some federal ridings?"

We know that the same argument that Mr. Housefather used is that there is part of Quebec where a majority would be prepared to go for independence. Do you recognize that automatically?

Mr. William Johnson: Mr. Bachand, there are two ways to secede, one by negotiation and here a referendum held in a municipality would be part of the political statements, the facts and the data. Another way would be through revolution, by occupying the territory. We're saying that an outlaw government of Quebec would not occupy the territory of the Outaouais, the Island of Montreal, or the Aboriginal nations.

Mr. André Bachand: But answer my question. If part of a territory, as Mr. Housefather quite correctly pointed out...

The Chair: The answer is finished because your time is expired.

Mr. Cotler.

[English]

Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.): I have a question for Mr. Johnson.

The Supreme Court of Canada said there is a duty on the federal government to negotiate if there is a clear question in favour of secession and if there is a clear majority in support of that clear question.

Mr. William Johnson: [Inaudible—Editor].

Mr. Irwin Cotler: I haven't finished my question.

This bill seeks to implement the requirements of clarity and of the Supreme Court in legislation. My question therefore is, would you support the notion that if there is a clear majority in favour of a clear question on secession, there would be a moral and legal obligation on the part of the federal government and the rest of Canada to enter negotiations on secession?

Mr. William Johnson: Yes. I have no problem with the moral, and I suppose legal. I have no problem with that whatsoever. It's respect. If there's a substantial answer, we negotiate.

As Prime Minister Trudeau said in, I think, 1978, in a New Year's interview, if a great majority of Quebeckers vote for secession, someone is going to have to negotiate with them on what terms they will remain within Canada. Precedents have been set. We would negotiate to see if we could come to a common agreement on the terms of secession.

I can tell you now, there never could be a common agreement. Bill 99 shows it. They say the territory is indivisible. They still publish in Quebec this year, last year certainly, a map showing the broken line with Labrador. They are still challenging the lines set in 1927 by the supreme court at the time, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. So how could they ever agree to lose the lands of the Crees, the Inuit, and whatever, which they would—and international law would support it—in the terms?

• 1015

So on the one hand we would negotiate, we would see if we could understand each other, but then we would come to the obvious conclusion that we would not reach a negotiated agreement that would lead to the secession of Quebec, because the terms would be refused by the people of Quebec. It would mean losing too much of their territory.

The Chair: Mr. Patry.

[Translation]

Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Johnson, to follow up on what Mr. Cotler just asked you regarding this moral and legal obligation to undertake negotiations in order to deal with the clear expression of will following a very clear question. In your opinion, who are the political actors in this scenario? The Supreme Court of Canada refers to political actors, but in your opinion, who are they?

Mr. William Johnson: Obviously, it would be the Government of Quebec, both chambers of the Government of Canada, all the provinces, the provincial governments, which are designated in the Constitution, and these could be joined brothers too, such as representatives of Aboriginal nations, Anglophone minorities of Quebec, Francophone minorities in the rest of Canada. But first and foremost, it would be the provincial governments and the federal government.

Mr. Bernard Patry: Thank you, that's all.

[English]

The Chair: Madam Meredith.

Ms. Val Meredith (South Surrey—White Rock—Langley, Ref.): Thank you.

Mr. Cotler actually asked my original question, but your response has me asking another. If there is a clear question and if a clear majority choose to secede from Canada, you've indicated that you don't feel any negotiations would ever be acceptable to the English minority and the aboriginal community.

What if, in a negotiated agreement with the new nation of Quebec, or whatever they call themselves, they were prepared to concede some of the concerns you or the aboriginal community would have? Why do you automatically say the process could never work, if you don't give it a chance? Wasn't that one of the things the Supreme Court said: there would have to be goodwill, good intentions—

Mr. William Johnson: Good faith.

Ms. Val Meredith: —yes, good faith in those negotiations?

Mr. William Johnson: That's correct.

Ms. Val Meredith: You, sir, don't really show much good faith in entering that—

Mr. William Johnson: I'm saying yes, we would negotiate. If Alberta held a referendum on the triple-E Senate, we would have to negotiate it. Would those negotiations ever succeed? I think it's not saying we have bad faith to tell you right now Quebec would never accept it and they would not succeed.

I'm for negotiations in good faith. Yes, let's negotiate in good faith. But I can tell you right now, no Quebec government would ever accept to lose territory, and that would be a condition of good faith. They say so in Bill 99. I'm not presuming.

I gave the example that they're still challenging the line of 1927. There's no court to appeal to, they're not going to send in the army, but they still publish maps to challenge it—a line almost in the wilderness.

Ms. Val Meredith: You, sir, are assuming an end result that isn't there. You're assuming that the new nation of Quebec—and I don't want to support the concept of separation—wouldn't arrange the same terms, the same conditions, the same understanding, with the aboriginal community as Canada has with them. You're assuming something that isn't in fact a fait accompli.

Mr. William Johnson: Madam, I'm willing to withdraw all the assumptions. I'm just agreeing though with Jean-François Lisée, and I think anyone who has any common sense and has studied Quebec, that these negotiations could never succeed. But if that gives offence and shows bad faith, I'll withdraw it.

Mr. Anthony Housefather: Ms. Meredith, may I just say something? I think perhaps, from your preamble to your question, we understood Mr. Johnson differently. What I think he was saying was he didn't feel there would ever be an agreement with the separatist Government of Quebec that had conducted the referendum. I don't think he felt there couldn't be an agreement with the aboriginal communities or the English-speaking minority of Quebec.

I'm sure that, much as it would be painful and horrible, if there were a fair and rational settlement and we remained in Canada, many of us would accept it, with pain. But I think what he's saying is, given right now the firm, concrete positions the Government of Quebec has set out in Bill 99, which I'm sure you've reviewed, it would be very difficult, based on those parameters, to have a settlement. It doesn't mean that maybe one day in the future, with a more reasonable Quebec government, that couldn't happen.

Ms. Val Meredith: In follow-up to that, I would express this. You referred in your comments, Mr. Johnson, to the rest of Canada. If you were making these assumptions or going down that route, you would have to add that there may not be a rest of Canada. If you think the rest of Canada would remain as it is now with the separation of one of its main provinces, that may not be the case either.

• 1020

So if we're going to look at assumptions and look at the future and what is likely to happen, we'd better be really open-minded as to what the end result will be if Quebec ever chooses.... Hopefully they will never reach that point, but if they ever did, the whole parameters of this country would change completely upon that decision having been made.

Mr. William Johnson: You are so right. We should be open-minded. I totally agree.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Guimond.

Mr. Michel Guimond (Beauport—Montmorency—Côte-de- Beaupré—Île-d'Orléans, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Johnson, I think that you gave us bad news earlier when you told us that in May you were going to leave public life, or at least the presidency of Alliance Quebec...

Mr. William Johnson: Yes, that's right.

Mr. Michel Guimond: ...because I think you represent a monument of democracy.

Mr. William Johnson: Thank you, Sir.

Mr. Michel Guimond: You're living proof that Quebeckers are a tolerant, democratic people...

Mr. William Johnson: Hold on.

Mr. Michel Guimond: ...a tolerant, democratic and respectful people, given all the venom you've spat at Quebec over the past several years.

Mr. William Johnson: When? Quote something.

Mr. Michel Guimond: My question is as follows. I'd like to hear your views about the right of Quebec Anglophones to remain in Canada. I'll give you a very simple example, that of the Gaspé.

Between Bonaventure and Chandler—you're very familiar with Quebec because it's your country as it is mine—let me take three villages. I'll take the village of Saint-Godefroi, followed by the village of Shigawake—Hope Town, and the village of Port Daniel.

As you've probably guessed, Shigawake—Hope Town has an Anglophone majority. If the Anglophone Quebeckers of Shigawake—Hope Town decided in a referendum with a clear question and a clear majority to remain in Canada, how is this compatible... Because earlier you said that this had to be compatible with geography. What are you going to tell the anglophone Quebeckers of Hope Town who want to remain in Canada? How will this be cut out? Because you asked a question. Earlier, Mr. Bachand asked you "Is a municipality divisible?" One could go so far as to say "Is a street divisible?" We could push this to the extreme. On my street, there are twenty houses. If twelve citizens of these houses decide to remain in Canada and eight decide to remain in Quebec, does that mean that my street will be part of Canadian territory, the next street will be part of Quebec, the next one part of Canada? How will this right work out? By what right will they remain in Canada?

Mr. William Johnson: Mr. Guimond, regardless of the place, be it Rapide-Blanc, where I have lived, Parent, Saint-Hippolyte, or any other place, I will maintain the same thing, which is that there are two ways of bringing about secession: a comprehensive negotiated settlement followed by a constitutional amendment, or the revolutionary option that I think the Quebec government seems, increasingly, at least it appears that way to me, to be proposing, that is, occupation. I believe that they now realize that they do not have a right to secede. The actual territorial occupation—

Mr. Michel Guimond: What about my example of Hope Town—Shigawake?

Mr. William Johnson: Okay. Territorial occupation, if the first option is chosen, will obviously depend on the negotiations that will draw the boundaries of the new Quebec. It will be by agreement and it will be approved by both sides.

If the revolutionary option is chosen, well, there are obviously many places where the Quebec government will not have a real presence. I myself cannot tell you what will happen in Chandler or elsewhere.

Mr. Michel Guimond: And so, what will emerge from this are principalities, enclaves, in fact, if I understand you correctly.

Mr. William Johnson: No, no, not at all. That is not what I said. That is why I said that, if geographically possible... For example, along the borders, in the Outaouais, the Outaouais is a very clear case. The island of Montreal is a very clear case.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Are you for or against the partition of Quebec, Mr. Johnson?

Mr. William Johnson: I am against the partition of Quebec, I am against the partition of Canada, and it is the partition of Canada that could unfortunately lead to the partition of Quebec. But we are not partitionists; they would abandon Canada. We are not the ones who are partitionists; we want to remain in the province of Quebec forever, we want to stay where we are. The real partitionists are those who want to get out of Canada.

The Chair: Mr. Bachand, a very short question.

Mr. André Bachand: Thank you for being so understanding, Mr. Chairman.

I have a question that we have already put to some of the witnesses. Following a clear Yes vote, a clear majority as you understand it, how do you see the role of the elected federal representatives from Quebec here in Ottawa and, if we maintain the status quo, the role of the Quebec Members of Parliament in evaluating a clear question or a clear majority, in the vote to be held in the House of Commons?

• 1025

Mr. William Johnson: I see it as a question of acting in good faith, in the eyes of Canadians, including Quebeckers, and acting in good faith in the eyes of the world, in the eyes of the international community.

They will therefore have to pass judgment, they will have the facts before them and they will reach a decision based on these facts. The people and the international community will at that point be able to pass judgment on their good faith.

Mr. André Bachand: The Quebec problem of negotiating for the...

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Housefather, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Butcher, we are very grateful for the testimony you have given us today.

[English]

We thank you for taking the time to come to the committee, particularly on short notice. I'm sure, from the questions you got, all the members enjoyed their opportunity to ask questions.

Mr. William Johnson: Thank you very much. It was a very pleasant experience.

• 1026

• 1028

[Translation]

The Chair: Our next witness is the Honourable Joseph Facal, Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs of the Province of Quebec.

Mr. Facal, our committee welcomes you. It is a pleasure to have you with us here today. We really appreciate your taking the time to appear before the committee today. I am sure that the members will have many questions.

According to our rules, you will have ten minutes for your presentation, following which there will be 35 minutes for questions by members. You have the floor, Mr. Facal.

The Hon. Joseph Facal (Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Government of Quebec): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

On October 30, 1995, 2,308,360 Quebeckers voted Yes in answer to the question you now know so well. Today the federal government would have you—the 301 elected members of the federal Parliament—wield the power to decree that these 2,308,360 people did not understand the aforementioned question and that they must therefore be protected from themselves.

As we say in French, "Père, pardonne-leur car ils ne savent ce qu'ils font."

[English]

“Father, forgive them, for they do not know what they are doing.”

[Translation]

That is the Bill C-20 message being sent to Quebeckers.

[English]

That's what Bill C-20 is telling Quebeckers.

[Translation]

Thus it is believed that this Canadian disorder may be swept from sight, while ignoring the fact that more Quebeckers voted Yes than there are voters to be found in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, all rolled into one. C-20 will not sweep sovereignty away, nor the idea that Quebec will one day become a country. How simplistic! Yet as the Government of Quebec stands represented here today, it acts in the same capacity as previous Quebec governments have done, regardless of their constitutional options, as a government deriving its legitimacy from the National Assembly, the sole depository of the Quebec people's right to choose their political status by themselves.

• 1030

C-20 is unacceptable for so many reasons: this bill seeks to subject the people of Quebec to a federal trusteeship; it negates basic democratic principles; it is an insult to the intelligence of all Quebeckers; it installs a system of arbitrary power; and lastly, it bears within itself the seeds of bitter disillusionment for you.

Quebec's existence as a political entity dates from before the creation of the Canadian federation. Quebec exercised its right to freely choose its political status when it contributed to the formation of Canada in 1867. This must always be borne in mind.

By adhering to this federation, the people of Quebec neither renounced its right to choose another political status nor sought to subject its destiny for all time to a Parliament of which the majority of members originate from outside Quebec. Yet clause 1 of Bill C-20—which indirectly dictates the referendum question—allows a majority of MPs from outside Quebec to rule that a question is not clear enough to be acted upon, despite the will of the National Assembly and of the people who, having deemed the question clear, would have answered Yes to it.

Some will still maintain that the Quebec National Assembly remains free to ask any question it wishes. Not so! It is not so because C-20 renders the 1980 and 1995 questions unacceptable, as well as the Brussels question evoked by Robert Bourassa.

In clause 2 of the bill, the federal Parliament invests itself with the power to decide whether the majority obtained is inadequate, even if the people of Quebec were to accept the results and rally to them.

Finally, clause 3 confers upon the legislature of any other province an absolute veto on the future of the Quebec people through the amendment formula contained in a Canadian constitution of dubious legitimacy, since it was imposed on Quebec and never ratified by a Quebec government. Three clauses, three schemes for derailing a democratically expressed determination.

C-20 also questions the universally accepted rule in democracy of 50% plus one, despite the fact that all referendums held in Canada to date have been based on the very same rule. Canada has also recognized many countries created as a result of referendums held on the basis of this rule, which in fact is the standard rule by which the United Nations operates when it supervises referendums on accession to sovereignty. Imposing any other rule would be tantamount to giving more weight to a federalist vote than to a sovereignist vote, which amounts to discrimination on the basis of political opinion. This would compromise the principle of the equality of voters.

C-20 states that Quebeckers must be protected against their government but also against themselves, because they would be unable to weigh the issues set forth in a referendum question. By the same token, it becomes more important to take into account the opinion of a Manitoba or Saskatchewan MP, who would know better than the Quebec electorate what is clear and what is not. *ucThe MP*uf would understand.

Members of the federal Parliament, do you realize what a ridiculous situation the authors of C-20 have created for you? Do you realize that you are on the eve of enshrining a legislative principle by which the judgment of elected members will be deemed superior to that of those who elected them?

Bill C-20 is also an insult because it is a grotesque distortion of the Supreme Court's opinion. Nowhere in the reference does the Supreme Court confer upon the federal Parliament the right to oversee the content of a referendum question authorizing Parliament to rule upon the clarity even before the National Assembly has adopted the question. Nowhere in the reference does the Supreme Court give the federal Parliament the right to impose a question that must expressly exclude any reference to an offer of partnership. Nowhere does the Supreme Court give authority to the federal Parliament to determine a posteriori and of its own accord the required majority. Nowhere does the Supreme Court give authority to the federal Parliament to unilaterally dictate the content of post-referendum negotiations.

The federal government played with fire when it made its reference to the Supreme Court. It got burned, because what it got was an acknowledgment of the fact that the territory of Canada can be divided based on provincial territories, a recognition of the legitimacy of the sovereignist option, the creation of an obligation to negotiate on an equal footing, and an admission that, in the case of bad faith on the part of the federal government, international recognition of a sovereign Quebec would be facilitated.

• 1035

Today, the federal government is asking you, members of Parliament, to blot out its mistake by rewriting the opinion.

The sponsor of Bill C-20 has also strongly emphasized respect for the rule of law. Yet the true rule of law precludes resorting to arbitrary power. As it stands, Bill C-20 is a monument to the use of arbitrary power. It aims to empower the House of Commons to declare a question unclear on the basis of "any other views it considers to be relevant". Whose views are we talking about?

Likewise it would empower you to assess a requisite majority in light of "any other matters or circumstances [that you may deem] relevant". What are the criteria for relevance?

What will the new rules of the game be if the 50%-plus-one rule no longer stands? Fifty-five percent, 60%, 65%? Faced with such random guidelines, how are citizens to conduct themselves? The message that Bill C-20 sends to electors is that votes only count when you decide to recognize them.

Bill C-20 creates illusions: that the territory of Quebec would be divisible and that votes may be counted according to ethnic, linguistic or geographic criteria. This is just plain false.

On the day Quebeckers decide to form a new country, Bill C-20 will not stand in their way. You are deluding yourselves if you think otherwise. The Soviet Union tried this in 1991 and the rest is history.

Not only is Bill C-20 unacceptable for Quebec, but it is also unacceptable for all parties represented in the National Assembly.

The Quebec government does not recognize any legitimacy on the part of the federal government when it comes to such interference in Quebeckers' right to decide for themselves what their future will be.

The National Assembly will adopt the question it wants to adopt. As in the past, the Quebec people alone will decide what constitutes clarity. The victorious option will be the one that wins 50% plus one of validly expressed votes. Who fears Quebeckers' democratic determination?

I remain firmly convinced that in the wake of a positive result, voices will resound throughout Canada for respecting Quebeckers' decision and the need for negotiations carried out in good faith in the best interest of all parties.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Facal.

We will have questions now. Mr. Hill, you begin.

[English]

Mr. Grant Hill: Thanks, Mr. Chair.

Thanks, Mr. Facal, for coming before us.

The official opposition invited every province to come before this committee. Due to time constraints and other constraints, you were the only one to take that invitation. For that I'm pleased.

On the issue of the clarity of the question, you have stated your position that the question in the prior referendum was neither confusing nor ambiguous. I took the opportunity to run that question by a pollster and asked this pollster from Quebec whether or not he could ask that kind of question and have it be considered a legitimate question in a poll. His response to me was he could not do that. It was, in his words, “a loaded question”—loaded in that there wasn't one issue you could answer yes or no to.

I asked him how you could pose that question in a way that it would not be a loaded question, and his answer was that it would have to have two components to it. Such a question would say: “Do you, as a Quebecker, want to have a new association with Canada?” I won't presume to say what that new association would be. The response would be yes or no. The second question would be: “If that new association failed, would you wish to take Quebec out of the federation of Canada, yes or no?” He said that question would satisfy the pollster's need to not have a loaded component to it.

I wonder why such a question would not be posed for Quebeckers to respond to.

A voice: Good question.

Mr. Joseph Facal: Let me first of all thank you for the very gracious invitation extended, if I'm correct, to all provincial governments. I wonder why we were the only ones to answer the bell. Thanks anyhow. Thank you very much.

[Translation]

Mr. Hill, your question is based on the premise that the 1995 question was confused, deliberately confused. I do not agree with this premise.

• 1040

Mr. Hill, between 75% and 80% of Quebeckers go to the polls in Quebec elections. Ninety-three percent of Quebeckers voted in the 1995 referendum. They were perfectly aware of what was at stake.

In the days leading up to the 1995 referendum, I very clearly recall having seen the current Prime Minister of Canada, in a televised speech, look Quebeckers straight in the eye and say: "Think about it. To stay or to leave—that is the decision you are being asked to make. Your choice is irreversible." He appeared to have understood the question.

In fact, all this arguing about the clarity of the question is intended to promote the false and insulting idea that only the Yes side did not understand the question.

I would also remind you that, a few days before the referendum, thousands and thousands of Canadians travelled to Quebec by plane, by train and by car to tell Quebeckers how much they loved them and that they should not leave, that they should remain in Canada. They too seemed to have understood what was at stake in the question.

Moreover, if the 1995 question was so confused, why do federalists constantly repeat that Quebec clearly chose Canada at that time, and that sovereignists are therefore wrong to be so stubborn as to want to hold another referendum?

I would also add that the requirement for clarity is set out in the Supreme Court's opinion, but you will not find, in this same opinion, any criticism of the wording of the 1995 or 1980 questions.

Furthermore, I would like to remind you that, a few minutes ago, you referred to the possibility of a question containing two parts, which would clearly distinguish sovereignty from a possible association.

Mr. Hill, did you know that in 1991 two Balkan countries, Croatia and Macedonia, which are in fact two former republics of the Yugoslavian federation, achieved the status of sovereign state as a result of referendums based on a two-part question?

In the case of Croatia, for example, you will be interested to learn that the question reads as follows:

Should Croatia, as a sovereign and independent country, guaranteeing the cultural autonomy and all the civil rights of Serbs and of members of other nationalities in Croatia, be permitted, with other republics, to form a confederation of sovereign states?

In the case of Macedonia, the question was:

Are you in favour of Macedonia becoming a sovereign and independent state, with the right to join a union of sovereign states of Yugoslavia?

In short, once again, we have a question that included a part on achieving sovereignty and a part on subsequently joining a broader confederation.

Mr. Hill, did you know that the Canadian government considered this process to be perfectly transparent and quickly recognized these two countries? Why would something that is good enough for the Balkans not be good enough for Quebec?

Mr. Grant Hill: Tell me, if the question is not adequate for a poll, it is not adequate for secession. Who is afraid of a clear question?

Mr. Joseph Facal: Excuse me, I did not fully understand your second question.

Mr. Grant Hill: If the question is not adequate for a poll, it is not adequate for polling, it is not adequate for secession, and who is afraid of a clear question?

Mr. Joseph Facal: Mr. Hill, when a poll is conducted and people are asked, "Are you in favour of a clear question?", it goes without saying that the vast majority of people will want a clear question. No one wants a question that is deliberately unclear or obscure.

My argument is that Quebeckers fully understood the question in 1995. That is why they voted in such great numbers.

Do you realize that the logic that the sponsor of Bill C-20 would have you accept is that Members of Parliament from Manitoba, Alberta or Saskatchewan have some insight that would allow them to determine clarity, while Quebeckers, for their part, who have been immersed in this debate for 30 years, are not able to grasp clearly the issues?

• 1045

With all due respect, I submit that, in this respect, Bill C-20 is profoundly insulting to the intelligence of Quebeckers, who understand perfectly what is at stake: to remain a province or to become a country. Moreover, the Yes side was perfectly clear on the meaning of the question. We always said that it was a referendum to achieve sovereignty and to offer a partnership; the nuance being that sovereignty is decided on by only one party whereas partnership is the result of negotiations, which require at least two parties.

The Chair: Mr. Turp.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, on behalf of my 44 Bloc Québécois colleagues, I would like to thank the Minister for appearing before this committee. I have two questions for the Minister. I would like him to explain to us all—and in particular to the very courageous Dennis Mills, who told us the other day that the 50%-plus-one rule would be enough to incite...or to oblige the Canadian government to begin negotiations—why Quebec is in favour of the 50%-plus-one rule that Quebeckers were expected to follow in past referendums. That is my first question, because I think that this still needs explaining, especially to the Liberal majority, because opposition parties seem convinced that this rule applies universally.

My second question is about territorial integrity. I would like you to explain once more, to the people here, the Quebec government's position on territorial integrity in the light of the Supreme Court opinion, as well as the way international law is applied to issues of territorial integrity.

Mr. Joseph Facal: To say the least, both your questions go the very heart of the issue. Let us take them in turn.

First, the 50%-plus-one issue. It must be clear that whenever a threshold is set, let us say, hypothetically, at 66%, it means that two sovereignist votes are needed to match one federalist vote: two thirds and one third. This means that votes do not all have the same weight. This calls into question the sacred principle of equality among voters. This would involve discrimination based on one's expressed political opinion. This is inconceivable for a country that, like Canada, prides itself on teaching democracy to the rest of the world.

Let me also remind you that the 50%-plus-one rule also applied to the referendums of 1980 and 1995. I do not think that those in the No camp contested this rule at that time. I would contend that if the last referendum had not been such a tight race, you would not be hearing these voices that now clamour and plead for the threshold to be raised.

Let me also remind you that in Canada's history, never has a referendum been held with a rule other than the 50%-plus-one rule. Nonetheless, I recognize—and I agree that for both sides the result should be as clear as possible—that this is not the issue we want to deal with here. The issue before us is the rule, and let me tell you that in Canada, this rule has been followed in every referendum.

Also, please note that this is the rule usually applied to referendums elsewhere in the world. There are many instances of this: for Puerto Rico and the United States, in 1998, the 50%-plus- one rule applied; for the referendum in New Caledonia, it was 50% plus one; for the one in Bermuda, in 1995, it was 50% plus one; the 1961 Jamaica referendum followed the 50%-plus-one rule; and, of course, in the Maastricht referendum, the referendum on the Northern Ireland peace accords, the one on monarchy in Australia, and so forth, the 50%-plus-one rule was applied in every single case.

• 1050

And I will go even further. Some will say: "Certainly, but in some of those cases, the referendums did not deal with sovereignty". Let us take another look. Since 1991, the United Nations has organized three referendums on sovereignty. The Eritrea referendum in 1991, over secession from Ethiopia, followed the 50%- plus-one rule. Last year's referendum in East Timor followed the 50%-plus-one rule. The 50%-plus-one rule will apply in the referendum that will be held this year in the Western Sahara. But despite all of this, Canada is now claiming itself to be above the rules that apply to referendums supervised by the United Nations.

And further, it must be clear that Bill C-20 does not replace the 50%-plus-one rule by another, clearer rule. It replaces it with something completely arbitrary: total discretionary power to a House of which 75% of the members come from outside Quebec, with all due respect.

For instance, Bill C-20 tells us that all other relevant factors will be taken into account. Which factors? In my view, this looks typically like starting a race without having set a finish line. This is mind-boggling! A total lack of respect. A profound contempt for democracy.

I expect there will be some who will bring up examples of qualified majorities because in certain conditions, such as parliamentary votes, or union agreements, or agreements among political parties, or sales of condominiums or golf courses, qualified majorities often apply. This is not the same situation, it is not the same thing at all. First of all, a company is not a democracy.

A referendum is a consultation process with its own logic. All citizens must vote, as equals, on a clear question. Why, for instance, does a qualified majority rule apply to certain parliamentary votes? It is for the very reason that parliamentary logic has it that you can have 100% power with only 38% of the votes. Thus, to ensure that parliamentary votes truly reflect the will of the people, a higher threshold is required, which is obviously not the case when all citizens, as equals, are consulted on one single question.

The Chair: Mr.—

Mr. Joseph Facal: Mr. Turp also asked a question about territorial integrity.

The Chair: Yes, but each person has five minutes to put questions. Mr. Hill had eight minutes, Mr. Turp has already had seven minutes. With such long answers, the problem is with the answers.

A Voice: [Editor's note: Inaudible].

The Chair: Yes, perhaps we should better continue with Mr. Blaikie. With such long answers, we will run into problems.

[English]

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Facal, you've talked at great length and in fact just answered a question about 50% plus one. As the NDP member on this committee, I've tabled an amendment to Bill C-20 that would have the effect of establishing 50% plus one. But I get the impression that even if Bill C-20 did incorporate 50% plus one, you wouldn't support it anyway. Would I be correct in that assessment?

Mr. Joseph Facal: You would be absolutely correct. There are so many things wrong with Bill C-20 that even a positive amendment based on your undoubted good faith would certainly not be enough.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: So what's really at issue here is not 50% plus one. I mean, for some people who support the principle of the bill, they say the Government of Canada has the right to do this, but the way they're going about it or the details of what they're doing are debatable. But the principle of whether or not they have the right to do it is another matter. Therefore, your objection to this is not really on the details. All the details could be cleaned up and the principle of the thing would remain. You would still regard this as an unacceptable intrusion or whatever on Quebec's jurisdiction or sovereignty.

Mr. Joseph Facal: You are correct.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: I think that needs to be clear.

• 1055

Even though I might agree with you on 50% plus one, one of the things I found disagreeable, if you like, was this sense you have that the rest of Canada.... The people in Saskatchewan and Manitoba you referred to somewhat derisively—you know, how could they know more about the minds of Quebeckers than anyone else? It's not that they presume to know more about the minds of Quebeckers. It's that they will be a party, through their elected representatives, to any negotiations that come about between Quebec and the rest of Canada, no matter how those negotiations come about.

Therefore, it seems to me that as members of Parliament from other parts of Canada, all we are doing is assuming our responsibilities when we accept the principle of the bill, even though I find the way it's been gone about quite offensive in terms of procedure and some of the things that have been left out—for instance, aboriginal peoples, etc. But the principle is that the rest of Canada and its representatives have some responsibility in determining what conditions would create an obligation to negotiate secession—not to negotiate anything, but to negotiate secession.

So are you really saying that the rest of Canada, as a party to that potential future negotiation, should have no internal conditions whatsoever as to what would bring them to the table? Is that really the position of Quebec—that the rest of us are just non-actors in this negotiation or potential negotiation?

[Translation]

Mr. Joseph Facal: Mr. Blaikie, I am quite ready to recognize that the Quebec sovereignty issue also matters to Canadians in other provinces. But that is not the issue. In the next Quebec referendum, I am convinced that those in the rest of Canada who wish to keep Quebec in the Confederation will be campaigning. They will be campaigning for the No side. They will be spending money. They will tell us whether or not they think the question is clear. There will be a campaign and those who are opposed to our proposal, because they want to keep Canada the way it is, will have the right to be heard.

The real issue is the fact of withdrawing a sacred prerogative from the National Assembly, namely its right to set the rules, and of putting it under a trusteeship entirely held by a Parliament in which Quebeckers are in a minority. However, I recognize that you are perfectly entitled to wish that Quebec would remain in the Confederation and to campaign for that. I do not recognize that the federal Parliament has any right to impose legislative shackles in order to stop Quebeckers from exercising their right to freely decide about their future without outside interference.

Let me remind you that Quebec existed even before Canada was born, and it is through exercising its right to choose its own future that Quebec became a part of Canada. Why could Quebec not exercise the same right to leave Canada?

[English]

Mr. Bill Blaikie: One last supplementary, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: I think we'll pass, Mr. Blaikie. Well, if it's a very short supplementary, all right, but no speech.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Okay.

Your predecessor as Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Monsieur Rémillard, made an entirely different argument. I presume he's as conversant with Quebec history as anyone else. What do you have to say to the argument he made, which I presume you've been briefed on, that this bill actually confirms Quebec's self-determination, confirms Quebec's right to secede, and is therefore desirable?

[Translation]

Mr. Joseph Facal: I find it extremely difficult to follow Mr. Rémillard's intellectual contortions. Please, Mr. Blaikie, let us read Bill C-20. Section 1 of Bill C-20 gives the federal Parliament absolute and total control over referendum matters.

Subclauses (1) and (2) of clause 2 remove a universally democratic rule and replace it with something completely arbitrary. I have great difficulty seeing where Mr. Rémillard is coming from and where he is going. On the contrary, I think Bill C-20 is a mechanism that, in an insidious way, is designed to make it impossible for Quebec to obtain the status of a sovereign state. It also aims to increase the conditions that would make negotiations in the event of yes vote as problematic as possible, because of course, the federal government is now terribly concerned with this requirement to negotiate and trying to get out of it by increasing the conditions, making the negotiations problematic.

• 1100

So, I do not see how Mr. Rémillard can claim that Bill C-20 strengthens Quebec's ability to be autonomous. It is exactly the opposite. And I must point out that I was much more impressed with the arguments put forth by Mr. Ryan.

The Chair: Mr. Bachand.

Mr. André Bachand: Thank you ahead of time, Mr. Chairman, for the seven minutes you are going to give me. I am not asking for eight, just seven.

Mr. Facal, thank you very much, and perhaps to conclude the remarks on Mr. Rémillard, there is a rumour. There is a rumour to the effect that he would perhaps like to be a senator here in Ottawa. Perhaps. I am not saying it is true, it is a rumour.

Mr. Facal, we did in fact ask the Government to invite the provinces officially and even for the committee to travel. But unfortunately, that cannot be done. I am not being critical, but I know that the provinces have not been able or have not wanted to be present. I am not condemning them, but I know that the opposition parties in the other provinces and in Quebec have not attended this committee.

Despite the fact that we are a federalist party, our job is very difficult here, I must admit. We would have liked to have a bit of help; at least some moral support.

Mr. Facal, my question is simple. It is a question Mr. Turp also raised regarding the divisibility of Quebec territory. We did not talk about Canadian territory, but the Supreme Court recognizes it explicitly. So it is no longer an issue.

As I pointed out this morning to Mr. Johnson, we heard from a witness whom you know very well and who is surely one of your close friends. Professor Morissette acknowledged that Quebec, in his view, on the whole, is not divisible in the partitionist sense except for the First Nations issue. The issue has been raised here often. So I would like to hear your comments on that.

I would ask you my second question right away because I not sure whether or not I have seven minutes. What we have also pointed out, and I would like to hear your comments on that, is that the provinces and the First Nations have relinquished their legally recognized constitutional prerogatives, once again in the opinion of the Supreme Court. They have bestowed their prerogatives as political actors or partners in Confederation on the federal government, and I would like to hear your comments on that.

Mr. Joseph Facal: First of all, with regard to the Aboriginal issue, the question that was in fact raised is the following, "given the recognized rights of Aboriginal peoples in Quebec, could they remain in Canada?". I certainly agree that the Aboriginal peoples have certain rights that have been recognized by the international community and in international law.

However, all legal documents on international law indicate that these Aboriginal rights must be exercised within sovereign states and that the recognized rights of Aboriginal peoples do not challenge the territorial integrity of a country. Not in Quebec, Canada, the United States, Australia, Latin America or any other constituent states that have Aboriginal minorities.

However, we have always said that the Aboriginal peoples, in the event that Quebec becomes an sovereign state, would receive an explicit, formal, and solemn guarantee that existing rights would be entrenched in the Constitution of a sovereign Quebec and that these rights could not be amended without their consent.

Moreover, you will find it spelled out in the Act respecting the future of Quebec that we made public during the 1995 referendum.

• 1105

I am often told that the question comes up particularly regarding the Aboriginal people living in Northern Quebec. Fine, let's look at it. They signed the James Bay Agreement. Section 2.1 reads as follows:

In consideration of the rights and the benefits herein set forth in favour of the James Bay Crees and the Inuit of Quebec, the James Bay Crees and the Inuit of Quebec hereby cede, release, surrender and convey all their native claims, rights, titles and interests, whatever they may be, in and to land in the Territory and in Quebec, and Quebec and Canada accept such surrender.

Are you aware, Mr. Bachand, that the agreement was also approved to legislation adopted by the federal Parliament in 1977? So there are some profound consistency problems in the partitionists' game. We heard some very interesting testimony last week in Quebec in committee when we were studying Bill 99. The comments were made by Ghislain Picard, the Chief of the Quebec Assembly of First Nations, who dismissed both Quebec and Canada in making the following remark. Why do you assume that in the event of Quebec's sovereignty we would necessarily choose Canada over Quebec? Bear in mind that it is within this federal system that the unique regime of Indian reserves was imposed on them. So as far as Aboriginal peoples are concerned, Quebec feels that it has no lessons to learn from anyone, and especially not the federal government. I want to remind you of something on the same issue. The government members will undoubtedly be happy to learn that in October 1995, the Privy Council had conducted a study, a copy of which was obtained and quoted by La Presse. This study concluded that the Aboriginal peoples would not have the right to separate from Canada, nor the right to separate from Quebec, if Quebec were to secede from the rest of Canada. So the question has been resolved, without the least bit of ambiguity.

Now for your second question, as to whether the provincial governments have abdicated their responsibilities by entrusting them to the federal government, as you understand, if I were to say yes, I would be passing a harsh judgment on my counterparts in the other provinces. I think it would be better for me to simply speak on behalf of the Quebec government. For the rest, obviously, in the event of a yes vote, Quebec expects to be dealing with people prepared to negotiate in good faith, and it would be extremely presumptuous for us to tell the rest of Canada how to set up its negotiating team.

The Chairman: Mr. Cotler.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: Good morning, and welcome to the committee.

We have heard testimony from constitutional experts who appeared before the committee, including Professors Gil Rémillard, Yves-Marie Morissette, Michel Lebel and Peter Hogg. They are among the most renowned experts in constitutional law and human rights, and they said, and I quote:

The federal government has the right to take a stand on the question and the referendum majority in order to determine whether or not it is required to negotiate secession. In no way does this act infringe on the jurisdiction of the National Assembly.

Mr. Rémillard added, and I quote:

Not only does this federal bill not affect Quebec's jurisdiction, but in some ways it confirms it. The bill also confirms Quebec's right to separate from the Canadian federation.

Mr. Facal, my question is this: would you say, with regard to the testimony of these experts, if I can use your own words:

[English]

“Forgive them, Father, for they know not what they do”?

[Translation]

Mr. André Bachand: And we were talking about 50% plus one. I can give you the answer. Both were talking about a basis of 50% plus one.

Mr. Joseph Facal: I will leave your internal squabbling to you. I will answer Mr. Cotler. Mr. Cotler, the premise of your question is interesting, but after that, with all due respect, you were off track.

• 1110

The issue is not whether or not the federal government is entitled to have an opinion on clarity. Of course, it has never hesitated in the past to say what it thinks on the issue. That is not what is at stake here. What we are talking about here, is whether or not it is legitimate for Bill C-20 to give the federal Parliament the right to rule unilaterally on the clarity of the question. That is where I stop following you. What is at issue here is knowing whether or not it is legitimate for Bill C-20 to give the federal Parliament the right to impose its question. What is also at stake here is whether or not it is legitimate for Bill C-20 to remove the goalposts and decide after the fact if 53, 57, 52 or 59 is enough. That is unacceptable!

You really have to be taking people for fools, and I am saying this respectfully, if you claim that the National Assembly remains free to ask any question it wants.

Mr. Cotler, if Bill C-20 had been in force in the past, the 1980 question would have been out of order. If Bill C-20 had been in force in the past, the 1995 question would have been out of order. If Bill C-20 had been in force in the past, the Brussels' question referred to by Mr. Bourassa would have been out of order. You are saying "where", "how"? Well, let's read this.

Subclause (1(3)) clearly dictates the wording of the question: "Do you want Quebec to cease to be part of Canada and become an independent state?" This question rules out an offer of association or partnership, which has been at the heart of the sovereignist option for 30 years.

When René Lévesque left the Liberal Party of Quebec, he founded the precursor of the Parti québécois and the sovereignty association movement. From that point on there was an association and partnership dimension to the sovereignist vision. No one can claim that it is a last-minute trick. Sovereignists have been talking about that for 30 years, and Quebeckers understand it fully.

The Chair: Okay. Mr. Patry.

Mr. Bernard Patry: Thank you Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Excuse me, Mr. Drouin first.

Mr. Claude Drouin (Beauce, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your presentation, Mr. Facal. I'd like to go back to the Aboriginal issue. Bloc Québécois witnesses, like Professor Andrée Lajoie, André Tremblay from Pro-Démocratie, which I think you have funded with a $300,000 subsidy, and Marc Laviolette from the CNTU have told us that if Canada is divisible, so is Quebec.

Ms. Lajoie said that, in the case of Aboriginal nations occupying the same territory they occupied when settlement began, yes, of course, if Canada is divisible, Quebec is also divisible.

Mr. Tremblay, from Pro-Démocratie, said that if Quebec can call for self-determination as a people, the Aboriginals can certainly claim the same right.

The Aboriginal representatives that appeared before us, in particular the Grand Council of the Crees, told us that they would undoubtedly exercise this right to self-determination. And moreover, in response to Mr. Guimond of the Bloc Québécois, who asked them to compare Bill C-20 to Bill 99, they said that Bill 99 should be thrown out.

Mr. Facal, you say that the Quebec people have the right to choose to remain in or leave Canada. Why has your government stated that the Aboriginal peoples do not have the right to choose to remain in Canada, as 96% of them so clearly indicated in 1995 they wanted to do so? We are not talking about 50% plus one, Mr. Facal: it's 96%. Is it that you feel they are less of a people than Quebeckers? And if yes, why?

Mr. Joseph Facal: With all due respect, you are making a classic mistake. You are confusing the right to self-determination and the right to partition. You are mistaken. The Quebec government has always recognized Aboriginal autonomy and even wants to broaden the sphere of autonomy that it is prepared to recognize. But "autonomy" is in no way equivalent to "dismembering Quebec territory". It is a pure sophism to maintain that if Canada is divisible, the territory of Quebec is too.

You must remember that the Canadian State is, territorially speaking, a federation. It is divided into provinces and territories. There are consequences that flow from this choice of organization.

Mr. Claude Drouin: That, Mr. Facal...

Mr. Joseph Facal: With respect to the rest of Quebec's territory, do you know...

Mr. Claude Drouin: You are a good federalist, André, a good federalist.

• 1115

Mr. Joseph Facal: Mr. Drouin, do you know what is contained in section 3 of the Constitution Act of 1871? To ensure that the Privy Council briefings were not entirely off track, I will read it to you:

The Parliament of Canada may from time to time, with the consent of the Legislature of any Province of the said Dominion, increase, diminish or otherwise alter the limits of such Provinces, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon to by the said Legislature...

I will spare you the rest.

That means that as long as Quebec is part of Canada, its territory cannot be amended without the consent of the Quebec National Assembly. The Constitution is formal in that regard and when Quebec becomes a sovereign country, we will be under the aegis of international law and the rule that applies is what is called possidetis juris, which more or less means, "You shall have what you had", meaning that the new state will keep the borders that it had when it seceded from the previous state. I remind you that that is the rule that has been applied in all of the recent cases of accession to sovereignty, and I could go even farther. Are you aware that it is also the Canadian position...

Mr. Claude Drouin: I would just like to add...

Mr. Joseph Facal: It is also the Canadian position. Did you know, for example, that when...

Mr. Claude Drouin: Mr. Facal, you have answered...

Mr. Joseph Facal: Mr. Chairman...

Mr. Claude Drouin: ...my question and you have raised other questions.

The Chair: Order.

Mr. Claude Drouin: If I may, if you say that Aboriginal peoples must deal with their right to self-determination within an existing country, why is the same not true for Quebec? Can you name an international instrument that gives Quebeckers a choice that would not be given to the Aboriginal peoples?

Mr. Joseph Facal: Mr. Drouin, the Quebec government is not of the opinion that the right to self-determination confers the right to secession. The Quebec government has always said that sovereignty was a political and not a legal matter. We have always said that if the democratic will of the people living in the territory of Quebec is clear, if the process for accession to sovereignty is transparent and if there is international recognition by other countries, there will be a new country and the law will recognize this. Constitutional law, like international law, does not prohibit or encourage sovereignty, which is purely a question of fact.

The Chair: Mr. Patry, one short question, please, and I will conclude the questioning.

Mr. Bernard Patry: It will be very short. The comments will perhaps be a bit longer.

Thank you for coming, Mr. Facal. Mr. Facal, in response to my colleague, Mr. Hill, concerning the clarity of the question in 1995, which, in his opinion, was not clear, you stated that you did not share his opinion and that the 1995 question was, in your opinion, very clear. If that is the case, who better to quote than the premier of the day in Quebec in 1995, Mr. Parizeau. Mr. Parizeau wrote an open letter to the Supreme Court of Canada, which was published in Le Devoir on September 3, 1998, and I quote: "It is often said that the 1995 question was not clear. That is true." So Mr. Parizeau has told us that it was not clear.

If I may, I would also like to make a comment to refute what you said about the referendums in Puerto Rico and East Timor. In the case of Puerto Rico, you say that the American rule is 50% plus one, but tell us if you are aware that the American Congress insisted, in a bill, that in a future referendum, it must clearly indicated that in the event of a 50%-plus-one vote to join the United States, Puerto Rico would be entering into a permanent union without the possibility of leaving it. In that case, your own example clearly shows that it is easier to join than to leave a country.

As for East Timor, you have just told us that the 50% rule applied. I believe it was article 6 of the Convention between Portugal and Indonesia, and the validity of the referendum was left up to the Secretary General of the United Nations to decide. My question is very clear. Why do Quebeckers not deserve respect? You mentioned respect often, respect means clarity.

Mr. Joseph Facal: When quoting Mr. Parizeau, please quote him in full. What Mr. Parizeau has always maintained and continues to maintain is that the question was not simple, but that it was clear. It was not simple because the project was two-fold, which does not mean that it was unclear.

• 1120

You have challenged a number of international examples I referred to. Let's take the example of East Timor. What are Canadian peacekeepers doing in East Timor? Are they there to ensure that the democratic will of the people is respected, or are they there to impose internal Indonesian law?

You see that your legal approach will get you nowhere. You are trying to use legal and legislative terms to codify something that in fact will be automatic, if it is what Quebeckers want, if the process is transparent and if other countries agree to recognize that a new country has just joined the community of the world.

Quite frankly, if you want to talk about the clarity of the question, in conjunction with the Aboriginal issue, let's make a comparison.

Mr. Patry, your own government, more specifically the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, organized a referendum, not ten years ago but three weeks ago, on February 5, 2000, for the Montagnais band in the Lac-Saint-Jean region. I'll read you the question and you can tell me if it is clear:

Do you accept and approve the settlement agreement dated, for reference purposes, the 14th day of December, 1999, between the Montagnais band of Lac-Saint-Jean and Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada?

And there is a second part, because obviously, when you are the ones organizing it, a second part is allowed.

The second part asked...

An hon. member: There was an agreement.

Mr. Bernard Patry: Mr. Minister, there was an agreement.

Mr. Joseph Facal:

Do you agree to sanction, pursuant to sections 38(1) and 39 of the Indian Act, the absolute transfer to her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada by the Montagnais band of Lac-Saint-Jean all rights and those of its members pertaining to all parcels of reserve lands on concession IX of the Ouiatchouan township?

That was the question, was it clear?

Mr. Patry, Quebeckers have been debating among themselves whether they want to remain a province or become a country for 30 years. Do you not think that after 30 years we have more or less covered the issue and that our people now know what the issue is? Why don't you respect the intelligence of the Quebec people, its democratic sense, its ability to make a decision on its own? And why are you preparing to be an accomplice in an exercise that is designed to give very respectable member of Parliament from Prince Edward Island or Saskatchewan, spontaneously, an intellectual capacity that is superior to the people of Quebec to determine what is clear and what is not?

In fact, that is what you are imposing, it's a straitjacket, shackles.

Mr. Bernard Patry: Mr. Facal, you are simply making it a political point of view...

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chair: Order. Order.

No, time is up.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Point of order, Mr. Chairman. Point of order.

The Chair: Point of order? Yes.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Chairman, I think that my colleague Mr. Patry, still had some more wise questions to ask. I'm asking for unanimous consent of the committee. I am convinced that all committee colleagues will agree to extending the committee's deliberations for another 15 minutes.

Point of order, I'm asking for unanimous consent to extend the committee by 15 minutes so that you can continue to ask further questions.

The Chair: Is there unanimous consent to extend the meeting by 15 minutes?

Mr. Michel Guimond: Agreed? Agreed?

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Bernard Patry: ...Mr. Facal here. Absolutely. Of course. But it is up to the chairman to decide. We have other witnesses after.

The Chair: Agreed?

Some hon. members: Yes.

Some hon. members: No.

The Chair: No, we do not have unanimous consent.

An hon. member: Oh, that's too bad.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Facal.

[English]

Mr. Joseph Facal: I was just getting warmed up.

[Translation]

The Chair: Yes, I know, I know. And we greatly appreciate your appearance before the committee this morning. Thank you. You have assisted the committee with your responses and your presence.

Mr. Joseph Facal: Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you very much for the very warm welcome. I would like to thank all the parliamentarians, and in particular Mr. Hill, who was kind enough to invite us. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

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• 1129

The Chair: We are ready to begin. Our next witness is Mr. Michael Oliver. Mr. Oliver, thank you for coming this morning. Welcome to the committee. We appreciate your having taken the time to come to Ottawa today. As you have perhaps already seen, witnesses have 10 minutes for their presentation, and after that there will be

[English]

35 minutes of questions from the members. So you have the floor, sir, for your ten-minute presentation, if that's satisfactory.

Mr. Michael Oliver (Individual Presentation): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

I am appearing before you as a Canadian, a Quebecker, and above all an individual. I do not want to speak on behalf of the Anglophone minority in Quebec, nor for any other particular association.

• 1130

As you must know, I have an academic background in political science. I was research director for the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission, so I have always been interested in following issues like the ones before your committee this morning.

[English]

I'm going to make my presentation to you in English. Let me just assure you that I'll be very happy to respond in French to any questions that may come afterwards.

I'm aware that the committee has had a good deal of testimony on Bill C-20, and I have no wish to cover ground already worked over. Let me simply say by way of introduction one or two words on the general nature of the bill.

Many criticisms made of Bill C-20 are groundless. It has been called undemocratic, in that it proposes decisions that will affect Quebec but will be made by a body with a majority of non-Quebeckers. Yet as long as Canada exists, the Parliament of Canada is a body capable of making within its jurisdiction democratic decisions for any part of the country.

It is understandable that indépendantistes should assert that only Quebec-made decisions can be deemed democratic for Quebeckers. It is less comprehensible that Canadians who accept Canadian federal democracy should use language that way. I'm referring particularly to a petition against Bill C-20 that is circulating among persons and groups of social democratic persuasion with whom I am normally sympathetic.

It has also been charged that Bill C-20 is the House of Commons' final authority to approve the question that Quebeckers will answer in any future referendum on secession. This charge is also false. The Quebec National Assembly may put any question it likes to its voters, but it cannot oblige the rest of Canada to negotiate secession unless the question is clear and approved by a clear majority.

The Supreme Court has, with great good sense, denied both Quebec's constitutional right to a unilateral declaration of independence and Canada's right to ignore a clearly expressed and clearly approved desire to secede. But it has left to the political processes of a democratic federal state the setting of the stage and the conducting of the negotiations that would then be required. Clearly, such negotiations will be complex and delicate. Bill C-20 purports to establish some preliminary ground rules.

I see no sufficient reason to oppose the passage of the bill, but it causes me concern both by what it covers and what it does not cover.

First, what it covers. It makes of the process of dealing with the proposal for secession of one of Canada's major components—I would say one of its defining components—a matter to be handled just as one would any other constitutional amendment. It follows the Supreme Court, but with little attention to the nuances of the court's treatment of the problem.

An earlier witness, Mr. Jack Jedwab, pointed out that it took thirty years after Confederation to reach agreement on asset divisions between Quebec and Ontario. There is nothing in Bill C-20 that suggests more urgent attention will be given to negotiations following a clear secession referendum or that special procedures might have to be adopted to deal expeditiously with it.

The clarity bill also gives the impression that the federal government will be the manager of the negotiating process. My reading of the Supreme Court reference decision is that all parties are enjoined to negotiate with full respect for the fundamental constitutional principles that underlie the Canadian state. Yet the tone of Bill C-20 is “Here's how we will handle things. This is the way things will be done.”

It's hard to pin down all the elements in the bill that aggregated give this impression, but I refer you to the questions asked by Mr. Lorne Nystrom on the factors the House of Commons would take into account to determine whether there was a clear majority. He pointed out that there were inter-relations between the size of the vote and the turnout of voters that would complicate any determination of clarity, and that a future and much less scrupulous House of Commons might refuse its clarity imprimatur on grounds that would seem flimsy to a disinterested observer.

• 1135

This brings me to what the bill does not cover. It does not have anything to say about the possibilities of deadlock and the ways out of deadlock. Given the complexity of the issues at stake and the large number of interests that will be involved—Quebec, nine other provinces, the territories, the federal government, native peoples, various spokesmen for civil society—failure to reach any agreement will be a constant danger.

If we thought that Meech Lake and Charlottetown negotiations were too complicated, imagine the possibilities for dissension that negotiating secession opens up. And no Canadian governments are likely to be able to get away with the kind of executive federalism deal that broke the Czechs from the Slovaks in their secession.

We cannot hope to find a way out of the impasse of negotiations by turning for help to some Canadian body. The Supreme Court has wisely said that even when questions of law arise, the court will not be likely to intervene. It has declared the negotiating process to be political. I suspect one can go even further and say confidently that a decision by a Canadian court on any aspect of the secession issue will be perceived by the people of Quebec as lacking impartiality once a clear majority have said yes to a clear question about secession.

What I do not find in Bill C-20 is any recognition that a clear approval for secession in Quebec will in fact, and regardless of the niceties of constitutional law, alter people's views on Canadian institutions and procedures. If it is true, as the Supreme Court holds, that a positive referendum vote for secession does not of itself assure that separation will inevitably result, nevertheless it will be a transforming moment and will mark our entry into what one British legal scholar has called a “meta-constitutional realm”.

The Supreme Court, it seems to me, had more than an inkling of the kind of transformation that a yes vote would produce, for it not only wrote that negotiations would have to be purely political, but also that a failure in them would quite likely have international repercussions. Any party in a negotiation that showed unreasonable intransigence and lack of good faith would lose credibility in the international community. This loss would be of great import, for a breakdown in negotiations would probably not lead to a simple return to the status quo ante.

It would quite possibly provoke a unilateral declaration of independence if Quebec thought it could convince the world that the rest of Canada was not negotiating in good faith. Even though UDI has been declared illegal by our Supreme Court, it could be successful if Quebec were recognized by enough states and by the United Nations. The outside bodies would not ignore the opinion of our Supreme Court, but they would note also that the court had enjoined negotiations. Were Canada to be seen to be stalling and blocking negotiations, the will to recognize Quebec would be strong. Were Quebec to be seen to be refusing to negotiate or negotiating in bad faith, its chances of winning international recognition would be reduced.

This being so, all parties in secession negotiations would have an interest in making sure they were not enmeshed in a deadlock in which they could plausibly be accused of acting in bad faith. Almost inevitably, such an impasse would threaten sooner or later, and the problem of how to break out of it would become urgent. Help from outside Canada in the form of good offices, mediation, or even arbitration would promise either a resumption of fruitful talks or, if that were impossible, at least a clearer perception in international circles of where intransigence lay.

Some recognition in international judgments of the reasonableness of the negotiating process will be important, and should, I argue, be expressed in Bill C-20. At least there could be recognition that after clear approval of a clear question, negotiations will be much more complex than those needed for ordinary constitutional amendments, and that Canada will be prepared to invite UN assistance rather than remain deadlocked in disagreement.

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It would also diminish the perception in Quebec that Ottawa intends to insist that Quebec continue to do things its way if Bill C-20 evoked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights when it speaks of assuring minority rights in a separate Quebec.

Incidentally, were I speaking to a committee of the Quebec National Assembly on this topic, I would urge that they invite international observers to verify any future secession referendum.

Those of us who believe that Quebec is crucial to Canada's well-being would prefer to see the question of Quebec's secession simply go away. The argument that it would be wise to prepare ourselves to face secession negotiations without confusion and misapprehension is, however, a strong one.

Bill C-20's intent is reasonable. One might have hoped, however, for a better product.

Let me finish with two quick comments.

First, I would have preferred the House of Commons were debating a bill that addressed some of Quebec's aspirations for greater recognition and autonomy rather than laying out rules for coping with secession. That preference, however, doesn't infirm Bill C-20.

Secondly, had I been commenting on the bombastic bill now being debated in the Quebec National Assembly, a bill that pretends that Canadian federalism does not exist, my remarks would have been even nastier.

Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Oliver, for your comments.

Questions? Mr. Hill.

Mr. Grant Hill: Thanks, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Oliver, for coming.

Do you feel that this bill follows the Supreme Court reference in both its intent and spirit?

Mr. Michael Oliver: Broadly, yes. I think I said in my initial remarks that I felt that the Supreme Court had a little bit more of a sense of the delicacy and complexity of the process than I find expressed in Bill C-20, which really looks as if it's sort of setting out some preliminary ground rules for an ordinary constitutional amendment. That is not what is going to happen.

If by any chance there were 50% plus one—and I'm sure that's enough—in favour, with a good turnout in Quebec, then I think we would be in a situation where a different process from that of an ordinary constitutional amendment would have to be embarked upon.

I've said, though, that I believe that the bill is wise in attempting to remove possible confusion and misapprehension. I think a better bill would have done a better job.

Mr. Grant Hill: Do I understand you to say that 50% plus one in your view would be the minimal trigger point?

Mr. Michael Oliver: Yes.

I have a great deal of discomfort about changing horses in midstream. In the past two referenda there has been no doubt that 50% plus one was going to be it. Newfoundland came in with 50% plus one. I think there's a whole series of reasons why, including the fact that I think in the international community we would be seen as changing the rules in the middle of the game, and that wouldn't help our case.

I think the 50% plus one is one we should stick to. It's probably wise if the number isn't mentioned in the bill. If they were going to insist upon a larger percentage, I think it would have made the bill a very bad one. If it had said that 50% plus one was enough, I would have been happier.

Mr. Grant Hill: Thank you very much.

[Translation]

The Chair: Yes, Mr. Guimond.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Oliver, we would have liked to hear you much longer than this. Thank you for your testimony. Unfortunately, the committee will have to call a halt to these proceedings because the Government has tabled a motion to muzzle us. In no more than 10 hours, our work will have to come to an end. This is quite unacceptable, and I am convinced that you—who as you said were on the research staff of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission, which if I remember correctly was established on November 14, 1962—must also be extremely disappointed by the fact that we have not had time for a more in-depth study of this bill, which is so important.

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Mr. Oliver, I will read you an excerpt of a speech by Premier Jean Lesage before the Canadian Club of Calgary on September 22, 1965. Mr. Lesage said:

I have often expressed the wishes of Quebec, which constitutes a base for French-speaking Canadians. We want the two ethnic groups who founded this country to be on an equal footing. We want to assert ourselves in a way that reflects our culture and our aspirations. In a future Canada, we want Quebec to have a status that reflects our special characteristics.

Those are the words Mr. Lesage used in 1965.

You are a democrat, Mr. Oliver. In your opinion, does Bill C-20 recognize the sovereignty of Quebec's National Assembly? Would you, would Quebeckers, agree to have Quebec's National Assembly subordinated to the House of Commons of Canada by Bill C-20, through our elected representatives, through a party in power, through an opposition party, a third party, a single member who because of his party just squeezed through with enough votes?

Mr. Michael Oliver: No. I think you're going a little too far in criticizing this bill. I said myself that it did illustrate some desire by Ottawa to set the rules of the game, to manage negotiations, as it were, and I do find that regrettable. However, I see nothing in the bill that represents encroachment on provincial jurisdiction; there is shared sovereignty, as in every federal state. I see no encroachment on Quebec's jurisdiction. There may be many defects in this bill, but that is not, in my opinion, one of them.

Mr. Michel Guimond: But clause 1 states that, if a referendum is called, the question shall be submitted to the 301 members of the House of Commons, who will determine whether it is clear. Don't you consider that to be an encroachment? Don't you find...

Mr. Michael Oliver: I believe that Canada, as the Supreme Court has pointed out, has a duty to request that a clear question be approved by a clear majority. In my opinion, Quebec cannot just put any question, and with a majority response declare that this Parliament is obliged to negotiate the end of the country, an important country, a country that is dear to many people. In my view, it is eminently fair and acceptable for the people who are to negotiate on both sides to agree on the clarity and on the clear will underlying the negotiation process.

Mr. Michel Guimond: So if I understand correctly, you have just said that Quebec's National Assembly cannot formulate just any question.

Mr. Michael Oliver: It can formulate just any question, and the result would be valid in Quebec. However, Quebec could not bind entities outside Quebec to respond as it wishes to just any question. In those circumstances, the question should in my view meet the needs and fulfil the meaning of...

[English]

It must also fulfil the sense of a defensible basis for negotiation in the other party's negotiations.

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I would simply then say very firmly that Quebec has a right to have a question put to a referendum on anything it wishes, but that it does not by that fact bind any other body outside Quebec to a certain set of procedures. That is something they have to agree to, and which the Supreme Court has said they have no obligation to agree to unless there is a clear question. That means that people have to be satisfied, generally, that it is a clear question and that it has been given a clear majority.

The Chair: Mr. Blaikie.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Perhaps I should say to Mr. Oliver that it's too bad that right in the middle of your presentation we're having this kerfuffle in the House, which means there are not as many people here to hear you as there might otherwise be. But that's all part of what's going on in this committee.

Unfortunately, we don't have the opportunity to take some of the recommendations and suggestions that people like yourself and others have made as to how the bill could be improved. Unfortunately, we won't even have the time to absorb and to think about the many suggestions that have been made by those who are in support of the principle of the bill but say nevertheless that the bill could be improved in many ways, because we are being pushed to the wall. It appears that the government is not prepared to entertain any amendments whatsoever. So this is very sad.

I want to follow up on a couple of things you said. In a way, by seeming to require the ordinary process of constitutional amendment for any secession following a clear question and clear majority.... I was listening to you talking about the international community. You are one of the first ones to talk in any depth about how the international community would be involved in this.

You seem to be saying, but I don't want to put words in your mouth, that actually using the ordinary constitutional amendment process really sets up the country for a fall, or sets it up for a very difficult situation. Given what we know about the difficulty of getting unanimity, and given that unanimity would probably be the amending formula in this, because it would involve changes to the Senate, etc., etc., it's almost a recipe for either the intervention of the international community or an appeal to the international community at some point by Quebec if the usual difficulty of acquiring unanimity were to obtain in any future negotiation.

Mr. Michael Oliver: You have, I must say, grasped exactly what I was trying to say, Mr. Blaikie.

I think I am diametrically opposed to what Mr. Clark, if I read correctly in the papers, was saying yesterday, where he felt it would be in the interest of Canada to have some confusion and a prolonged process that led nowhere. I personally think that would be disastrous. I do so because I think we're absolutely silly to believe that if there has been a a successful referendum vote in Quebec, everything will go on as it did before. It won't. This will be something that will be looked at all over Canada, yes, and all over the world. The notion that we move into a meta-constitutional situation is one that I think we should contemplate. I can give anyone references to an article on this concept if they wish.

We certainly have no interest at all in appearing not to be in good faith, appearing in Canada not to be really doing our best to avoid any kind of deadlock. And we're not going to appear that way if we follow the normal constitutional amendment procedure.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: If we gave our usual....

Mr. Michael Oliver: That's right. So yes, I think your interpretation is exactly what I was trying to say.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: You said that if you were speaking to the Quebec National Assembly you would be suggesting to them that they invite the UN to supervise a secession or—

Mr. Michael Oliver: No, not to supervise. I said international observers.

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Mr. Bill Blaikie: International observers. Sorry.

Mr. Michael Oliver: That's right. That's a very different thing. I don't want to hand over jurisdiction.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Yes. I just wanted to be clear about that.

Mr. Michael Oliver: We supported.... In fact we sent Canadian international observers all over the world to difficult political situations. The theory is that if there is an international understanding that this was a legitimate process that was undertaken, then there will be international support for the result.

If this is something Quebec really wants the international community to think is a legitimate option that is being made, it would be very much in their interest to call in international observers. And it would be in our interest to bring in international mediation if necessary. The Secretary General of the UN time and time again names very able people who are not closely involved with the interests of any party to intervene in difficult problems and deadlock.

I think we may as well face the fact that it would be wise for us to make quite sure that we use every means so that the international community cannot perceive that Canada, ignoring the injunction of its own Supreme Court, is bogging down a set of negotiations.

The Chair: Mr. Scott.

Mr. Andy Scott (Fredericton, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Dr. Oliver, I would agree as well that the prospect of a post-referendum ten-year constitutional conference would probably only appeal to Mr. Clark. It certainly is of no interest to anyone I know.

I also want to recognize your contribution to the country. It's not an opportunity we often get. As a student and a Canadian, I have to recognize how much.... You mentioned your academic background. I would say that your contribution to the country also needs to be acknowledged here.

I'm going to appeal to your academic background a little bit here in terms of the idea of referendums. Am I safe in assuming that most times referendums, regardless of how they are structured, are not binding, generally speaking, but are rather consultative?

Mr. Michael Oliver: Well, they used to make a distinction between a plebiscite and a referendum. It used to be, in the old literature on political science, that a plebiscite was simply non-binding and a referendum was binding, but that usage seems to me to have really sort of gone by the board. The term “referendum” is used, I think wrongly, if we go by those old definitions, to apply to a consultation that has no legal binding force.

Mr. Andy Scott: As is the case of a referendum in Quebec.

Mr. Michael Oliver: As is the case of a referendum in Quebec.

Mr. Andy Scott: What's the reason for that? I call on your expertise in this area. Why, in your mind, would the Government of Quebec in this instance not want this to be binding? What are they reserving? What are they holding back? What is the qualification on that outcome that would cause it not to be binding?

Mr. Michael Oliver: That would cause them...?

Mr. Andy Scott: That would cause it not to be binding. In other words, what is the reason that people hold back some right to assess?

Mr. Michael Oliver: Well, the real reason is that coming to good decisions takes deliberation, takes reflection, takes interchange, takes dialogue, particularly when there are two parties involved, and this you cannot get by even the most carefully worded referendum question. All a referendum can do is set the stage for these kinds of negotiations and discussion, which is needed. It cannot create a fait accompli. It cannot create a conclusion.

Mr. Andy Scott: In and of itself.

Mr. Michael Oliver: In and of itself.

Mr. Andy Scott: So the Government of Quebec has held back that right to exercise judgment in the same way that this legislation would give the Government of Canada some right to exercise judgment in the exercise of its obligations according to the Supreme Court.

Mr. Michael Oliver: Yes, I think that's a reasonable parallel.

Mr. Andy Scott: Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Cotler.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: I'd like to welcome not only a distinguished scholar and academic, Dr. Oliver, but the first witness before this committee who actually taught me as a student at McGill. For any errors in my subsequent career, I alone am responsible.

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Let me go to a concern you expressed, which I think is an important one, with regard to the bill. To follow up on Bill Blaikie's question, the bill doesn't say anything about deadlock or about the complexity of the negotiations that could produce a deadlock.

As you put it, the Supreme Court has said it will not intervene. But while the Supreme Court has said it will not intervene, it did put forth a framework of principles to guide the negotiating process, and I think we've ignored it in this committee thus far. Those four principles are important: federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and the rights of minorities. And it also identified the subject matter that would be the object of the negotiations, including—and I think this is important—the rights, interests, and territorial claims of the aboriginal peoples of Canada, among other subject matters.

These principles and the subject matter are referred to in the bill. So the bill therefore is not just about the requirements of clarity to trigger negotiations, which has been the substance of much of our discussion. It is also about the legal framework of principles to conduct the negotiations. This brings me directly to my point and question.

One could look at this bill not only as a code of conduct to legitimate a right to negotiate secession, but a code of conduct for the negotiations themselves. Now, admittedly it's not a full dispute resolution mechanism, but it is a framework of principles to conduct the dispute. Since the bill purports to implement the Supreme Court decision, my question is whether the bill could have gone that much further than the Supreme Court decision to also include a dispute resolution mechanism, and whether adopting the bill would not otherwise preclude setting forth such a dispute resolution mechanism separately in legislation that would be more specifically appropriate for that purpose.

Mr. Michael Oliver: First of all, may I say that I am always delighted to see some of my former students do well. I was delighted when Mr. Cotler became a member of this august body.

In reply to his question, I think it is true that the Supreme Court very wisely set a framework for negotiations. But it also seems that it set that for all parties. One of the things that still worries me about Bill C-20 is that the federal government has now said “Look, the Supreme Court has said this. Okay, now we're going to take over and we're going to see that everyone follows the rules the way the Supreme Court laid them down.”

I think Bill C-20 is legitimate where it lays down in advance that the federal government has to have certain procedures for seeing that a question is clear and that it considers it clear and that there is a proper majority as the conditions for going into negotiations. But the negotiations themselves, it seems to me, should be following the rules set down by the Supreme Court for the whole process, and not a set of procedures that are specified unilaterally by the Parliament of Canada.

So I'm not sure, Mr. Cotler, that I would really like to have seen this kind of question put into this bill. I think this is a bill that should have been dealing with the procedures the federal government considers to be appropriate for its participation, and that it should be guided, as it says it will be guided, by the decision of the Supreme Court in terms of the details.

The Chair: Are you finished with your questions, Mr. Cotler?

Mr. Irwin Cotler: Yes, I am.

The Chair: Fine.

I want to thank you, Mr. Oliver, for your attendance this morning. I think we've completed the questions and members have to dash off for a vote in the House. And it's of importance to this committee, so I think members will want to attend this. I'm sorry to end this so quickly. We thank you very much for your attendance and your answers.

Mr. Michael Oliver: Thank you for the opportunity to be here. Thank you.

The Chair: Thanks very much.

We'll suspend until after the vote.

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[Translation]

The Chair: Order, please. There is a quorum, and we have to hear our next witness.

[English]

Our next witness is

[Translation]

Professor Emeritus Maurice Pinard of the sociology department at McGill University.

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Professor Pinard, welcome to our hearings.

[English]

We want to thank you for taking the time to appear before the committee this afternoon. We're looking forward to your testimony, sir.

You will have, as you've probably seen this morning, 10 minutes for your presentation,

[Translation]

after which there will be 35 minutes for questions by members.

The floor is yours, and thank you again for being here today.

Mr. Maurice Pinard (Professor Emeritus, Sociology Department, McGill University): Mr. Chairman, as requested, I have brought both French and English copies of my brief. I brought 30 copies.

Since my brief is fairly long, I will obviously not be able to read all of it. I plan to summarize it, and I hope to keep the summary down to under 10 minutes. We will have an opportunity to discuss my points in greater detail afterwards. I would have to submit this brief because it is on the long-standing confusion among many voters regarding the sovereignist option. The confusion has been clearly illustrated many times by polls and studies.

[English]

of social scientists all over Quebec and even outside Quebec.

This confusion bears on four main points: first, the meaning of the terms used in the various studies to refer to that option; second, the consequences that are tied to each of these terms; third, the divisible or indivisible character of the two parts, the two elements, of the sovereignty partnership option; and fourth, the understanding of the referendum question of 1995 itself.

[Translation]

I will go over each of these points in turn. First, there is a great deal of confusion surrounding the terms used: separation, independence and sovereignty ultimately refer to the same phenomenon, secession—in this case, Quebec's secession. Yet as recently as in 1999, a CROP poll showed that 46% of Quebeckers understood the terms "Quebec sovereignty" and "Quebec independence" to mean something different. Also, the terms "Quebec sovereignty" and "Quebec separation" meant something different to 47% of Quebeckers. In fact, it was almost a 50/50 split: about half the population thought these terms meant one thing, while the other half thought they meant something different. So today, the situation has not changed substantially from what it was in 1980 and in 1992. I cannot, at the moment, give you the figures for polls taken in those years.

Given the results of these polls, it is not surprising that support for secession in Quebec varies with the terms used. When questions that included the term "separation" were replaced by questions including the term "independence", support for sovereignty increased by an average of 4% over the recent period. In other words, use of the term "independence" leads to 4% more support.

And when we replace the term "independence" with "sovereignty", we see the same phenomenon. On the whole, support for sovereignty is about 4% higher than support for independence. That means that support for "sovereignty" is some 8 percentage points higher than support for "separation".

The figures are even stronger on the NO side. Opposition to separation is about 7 percentage points higher than opposition to independence. When the term "sovereignty" is used, opposition drops by another 4%.

Thus, more people support independence than separation, and more people support sovereignty than independence or separation.

There's also confusion about the consequences these options would have. Though the term "separation" is fairly well understood, the term "sovereignty" is not. Many people believe that a sovereign Quebec would maintain political ties with the rest of Canada; they believe that it would remain a province of Canada and continue to elect members of Parliament to Ottawa.

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When a poll specifically stated that a sovereign Quebec would no longer be a part of Canada, YES respondence dropped by 2 to 8 percentage points, while NO respondence increased by 4 to 18%. The difference between the YES and NO represents the number of undecided people. We find a correlation here: the closer the option comes to sovereignty, the higher the percentage of undecided voters.

Some differences also result from misunderstandings. Many people presume that not only sovereignty, but independence itself, would be accompanied by partnership, even though no such partnership is mentioned in the question. Some also believe that "sovereignty" is only a short form of sovereignty-partnership, and that sovereignty will not be effected in the absence of a partnership.

Many believe that sovereignty-partnership causes even more confusion than sovereignty. Many people find it difficult to understand the difference. When people were asked in 1980 if Quebec would remain a province of Canada with sovereignty-partnership, 53% believed that it would indeed remain a province of Canada, or did not know.

That figure had dropped considerably by the 1995 referendum: only 15% of people believed that Quebec would remain a province of Canada, while 9% did not know—so by 1995, 24% thought it would remain a province of Canada or did not know, as opposed to 53% in 1980. That represents one quarter of respondents. Only 75% of respondents realized that Quebec would no longer be a province of Canada.

My third point is the divisible or indivisible nature of the two components of the sovereignty-partnership option. We have noted several times that support for this option was primarily conditional: the option was supported only if a partnership was certain. Many people believe that sovereignty and partnership are indivisible, and referendum questions have never clearly specified spelled this out.

Let us now consider the position of the Parti Québécois, which maintains that the two components of sovereignty-partnership are indeed divisible. In other words, if partnership cannot be achieved, there will be sovereignty anyway. In 1995, only about 50% of respondents realized that sovereignty did not necessarily mean partnership. The others believed that sovereignty would not be declared if partnership could not be achieved.

In general, the confusion worked in the sovereignists' favour both in 1980 and in 1995. Here is the question that was asked in 1995: "Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for new economic and political partnership?". If they had asked a different question instead, such as "Do you want Quebec to become a sovereign country, regardless of whether the negotiations on economic and political association with the rest of Canada succeed or fail?", support would have dropped by 5%, even though this question was still in line with the referendum question. With the second question, however, people were clearly told that sovereignty would go ahead whether negotiations succeeded or failed. Support immediately fell by 5%.

We should also point out that soft NO and soft YES voters constitute a specific target group, and are the most confused of all when responding to an ambivalent question. In a poll I did among soft NO voters, no less than 60% were confused, believing that Quebec would remain a province of Canada.

Claims have been made that the situation is not so much a case of confusion as of strategic voting. Hard-line sovereignists state that there is no confusion; there are only strategic voters. This may in some cases be true. Approximately one-quarter of the people who planned to vote YES in 1995 said it was to "bring about changes to current federalism while keeping Quebec in Canada". It may be just as confused voters as strategic voters.

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However, our analysis suggested that there was confusion, even pronounced confusion, among those who, it initially seemed, could be nothing other than strategic voters. They had less education, were less interested in politics, and tended to agree with the statement that "the more time goes by, the less you know what you are voting on."

Moreover, it is a crucial point in the strategy versus confusion argument when a respondent states that if Quebec were to become sovereign, not if I vote YES, we will get somewhere. If Quebec becomes a sovereign country, if sovereignty-partnership is implemented, will Quebec still be a part of Canada, will Quebec still be a province of Canada?

This response cannot be interpreted as the expression of a strategic position. The respondent believes that after the fact Quebec will still be a province of Canada. This is not a strategic vote, but simply a statement of fact. When support was at its lowest level, people who were confused about the question... As I said earlier, at the end of the 1995 referendum campaign, if you remember, I pointed out that 24% of respondents did not know the right answer to this question, that Quebec would no longer be a province of Canada.

In brief, our results and the results of other experts have shown that there are many more confused voters than there are strategic voters. Part of this confusion arises from the fact that more educated and more politicized voters, particularly members of elites and political elites, can vote strategically and when they do so are strategic voters. We all know some people who voted YES, saying: "I'm voting YES, not because I want Quebec to be a sovereign country, but because the process will lead to something else."

But most voters are not members of elites, political or otherwise. They're much less educated, frequently not very educated at all, and often not politicized. Most take no interest in politics and make no statements on politics; we never see their names in the papers or in any other media. This group is much larger and forms the main body of voters. They are much more numerous than strategic voters.

My fourth and last point, on which I will be very brief, is how well the 1995 referendum question was understood. Given the results I have discussed with you today, it is hardly surprising that in September 1995 only 46% of voters considered the referendum question clear, while 53% considered it ambiguous. In 1999, we had identical results, with a higher percentage of people stating that the 1995 question was not clear.

So what can we do to ensure there is no ambiguity next time around? It's quite simple, really. First, the question should have only one component. Second, it should be simple, and use terms that are understood not only by members of elites, but by as many people as possible.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Professor Pinard.

Mr. Jaffer, I believe you have questions.

Mr. Rahim Jaffer (Edmonton—Strathcona, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your contribution today, Mr. Pinard.

You have talked a great deal about the 1995 referendum question, which many people consider confusing. The statistics you have covered today are extremely interesting. In your view, would Bill C-20 and the process it establishes to ensure the clarity of the question solve the problems you have identified in your presentation today?

Mr. Maurice Pinard: The first thing I would say is that the Supreme Court opinion stressed the question should be clear. I don't know whether you are aware of all the data. They do want a clear question. In my opinion, from a strategic standpoint, Bill C-20 could influence the way the Quebec National Assembly formulates the question.

Mr. Rahim Jaffer: I have another question; we have not had a chance to hear your opinion on the clear majority. Do you believe that a qualified majority for a referendum should be established, or whether that percentage should be left at 50% plus one? It could of course be a referendum in any of the provinces. I would like to hear your views on this.

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Mr. Maurice Pinard: I have no particular knowledge about this. As you probably know, I can simply shed light on what the population thinks about the majority. Over the past two years, poll after poll has established that a very high percentage of the population—60 to 70%—believes that a 50% plus one majority is not enough.

In December, when Bill C-20 was introduced, that percentage dropped somewhat. In two polls, there was a very slight majority in favour of 50% plus one, while other polls showed the contrary. At present, there have not really been enough polls for us to see what people really think about the 50% plus one threshold.

Though I myself am not an expert, I can give a personal opinion. In my view, a decision as important as secession, or independence, cannot be made without very broad consensus among the people. This makes sense if only because it would prevent an erosion of the majority very soon after the referendum.

For example, here is a scenario that could very easily happen: if the YES side won by 50% plus one, and very soon after people were asked how they would vote if there were a new referendum, the YES vote might very quickly drop below 50% plus one. The percentage needs to be higher so that it becomes more stable.

Moreover, the higher the percentage of people who vote YES, the greater the chances that next phase of the process will go forward in a climate of compromise and mutual understanding.

This, in my view, is our weakness. Ideally, the Canadian Constitution would provide for rules applying to referenda, as in the Jura region of Switzerland. The Constitution of the Berne Canton did provide such rules, and those rules were binding on the residents of the Jura and on other citizens in the Canton of Berne.

[English]

Mr. Rahim Jaffer: Do I still have a bit of time, Mr. Chairman?

The Chair: Yes. Another question is fine.

Mr. Rahim Jaffer: My last question is with regard to this: in trying to establish a clear question within a province that is going to have a referendum, one of the arguments we in the Official Opposition have made is that obviously there needs to be some input and involvement with other provinces in the country. Especially if you want to take into consideration that if, in fact, there would be a yes vote for secession in any province and that other provinces would negotiate in good faith, it's very important that the process of establishing that question be clear and that the other provinces say that it's clear.

My question to you is, what would be your thoughts surrounding the involvement, either in negotiations or in establishing that question, of other provinces? Do you think this particular bill, from what you've seen, addresses those concerns?

Mr. Maurice Pinard: Again, ideally our Constitution should foresee the whole process, including how the question should be framed, by whom, and who should be involved in framing it. We don't have that.

But even if we don't have that in the Constitution, I think—I'm an idealist, I suppose—the question should reach the greatest consensus possible among both those who are for sovereignty and those who are opposed to it. Ideally, this would be the best solution possible, so that then the outcome.... And then, the Constitution should also foresee or some agreement should have been reached before as to the majority necessary.

This, then, would be like it was in the case of the Jura. All of this was established. Once the figures were what the constitution of the canton de Berne said, then everything proceeded rather smoothly. We don't have that. I don't see how we could reach that easily, but ideally this is what we should have.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Turp.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for coming here today, Mr. Pinard. Here is my first question: have you ever studied the confusion and misunderstanding relating to the NO side in the 1980 and 1995 referenda, for example in the light of remarks by Pierre Trudeau during the 1980 referendum campaign, or in the light of remarks by Jean Chrétien and other federalist leaders during the 1995 referendum campaign? Have you ever looked at the confusion and misunderstanding surrounding the No option?

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Mr. Maurice Pinard: The confusion I noted then and have indicated in my brief was found not only among YES voters. There were also NO voters who believed that if the YES side won, Quebec would still remain a province of Canada. This is something that both YES voters and NO voters were confused about. It's not healthy, either for the YES or for the NO side.

Moreover, I am not sure I would call the aspect you refer to "confusion". Just as some people might have been wrong about what Mr. Chrétien, the Liberal government or the federal government would do if the NO side won, there are also voters who might have been unsure about what the Parti québécois government would do if the YES side won. Would they go ahead with sovereignty without negotiations, or not? Would they do what Mr. Parizeau had said, and immediately declare sovereignty? How could a partnership have been established? The YES side said there was no doubt a partnership would be negotiated. So were people who believed that confused? No, not necessarily. But it was far from certain that partnership would happen.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Do you concede that both YES voters and NO voters were uncertain about whether there could have been a renewed federalism? So the people who voted NO might have voted YES if they had seen that the kind of reforms proposed were not like those implemented in 1982, for example, when the Constitution was patriated unilaterally, or in 1995, when there was no real right of veto enshrined in the Constitution? You see, I think there is double talk here: the people voting YES are confused, but those voting NO are not confused.

Mr. Maurice Pinard: No, I don't agree. That is not what I said. I said very clearly that both YES voters and NO voters are confused. The aspects you raise have nothing to do with confusion, however. They have to do with expectations, the expectations that voters have.

Will Mr. Trudeau do as he says? Will Mr. Parizeau and Mr. Bouchard do as they say? That is the kind of assessment people are required to make, as in every election. Will this or that party follow through on its promises, or not?

With hindsight, the NO voters might have changed their votes to YES, but the same kind of switch could have happened if the YES side had won. If I had known what was going to happen, I do not know for sure that I would have voted YES. This is not confusion; this is an assessment people make about the future and expectations, and is quite different from the confusion I was talking about earlier.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Well, you must concede that people who voted NO in 1980 and 1995 might perhaps have voted YES if the question on renewed federalism had in fact led to renewed federalism. As to that, a lot of people who voted NO were confused, or had expectations that might have caused them to change their vote to YES eventually. Perhaps the 1995 results might have been different, and more than 50% plus one of voters would have voted YES, if they had realized they were being misled. However, the implication is that only those who voted YES were misled.

Mr. Maurice Pinard: I completely agree with you that people who voted NO might or might not have been misled. I agree with that.

Mr. Daniel Turp: I am glad to hear it.

Mr. Maurice Pinard: But if I may, I would also like to point out that, if the opposite happens, should the YES side win one day, people would also have been misled. However, that cannot be called confusion.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Here is my other question for you: you talked about a broad consensus being required to achieve sovereignty. Many people say that without this broad consensus there should not even be a referendum. Mr. Dion says that, you say that, and others say it too. So if I understand correctly, this consensus is a very important aspect of Canada's and Quebec's future, of the referendum, and of this bill?

As a pollster who read the polls in December, do you think there is a consensus in favour of passing Bill C-20? Is there a consensus on Bill C-20?

Mr. Maurice Pinard: It is my very clear impression that there is no such consensus. However, I also have the very clear impression that there will rarely be a consensus in this House, as there rarely is in any legislative assembly in the world.

• 1255

Mr. Michel Guimond: No, no. In Quebec.

Mr. Daniel Turp: I'm not talking about the House. I am talking about Quebec in general: the Parliament of Quebec, civil society, its intellectual and cultural communities, and so on.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Labour as well.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Labour as well.

Mr. Michel Guimond: The Union des producteurs agricoles.

Mr. Maurice Pinard: There is also the business community, which came to tell you the opposite. There is no consensus on that, but this Bill is not a decision about sovereignty. Like all bills everywhere, there is either a consensus on them or not. I don't know whether...

Mr. Daniel Turp: You would agree with me that there is no consensus on this Bill in Quebec.

Mr. Maurice Pinard: There is no consensus on this Bill in Quebec, any more than elsewhere in Canada. But there is no consensus on any bill passed by this House.

Mr. Daniel Turp: But that is strange, when there is consensus

[English]

The Chair: We'll go to Mr. Blaikie.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, Monsieur Pinard might want to expand on that last point, because we certainly are told over and over again by people who are opposed to Bill C-20 that there is a consensus in Quebec against Bill C-20.

You might want to comment on that, Monsieur Pinard.

Secondly, I just very swiftly read your paper. It seems to me that you've done a lot of thinking and research about the fact that not all people who vote in elections or on particular questions are always voting with the same thing in mind as their neighbour. We know this in the ordinary course of politics.

I'm sure of that, even though my colleagues from the Bloc, and Monsieur Facal, this morning, maintain that Quebeckers always know exactly what they're voting for. If they are like that, they're unlike any other human beings on the face of the earth, because all the rest of the world.... We're talking about the rest of Canada, but in the rest of the world, particularly the rest of Canada, they don't always know what they're voting for—and sometimes they don't get what they voted for.

I've seen many occasions where the people have voted...like, for instance, thinking when they voted Liberal in 1993 that they were getting a party that was opposed to free trade. Instead, they got a party that became an uncritical cheerleader for free trade, signing free trade agreements with everybody they could get their hands on.

There's a dimension of uncertainty in voting and in questions and, for that matter, in elections. It just seems to be left out of the analysis of those who are against the bill.

Mr. Maurice Pinard: There are two questions. I'll start with the last one. Certainly, if I understand you well, there is a lot of confusion and uncertainty. The two things are not the same.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: That's right.

Mr. Maurice Pinard: Among many electors, and in particular among the less politicized, less educated voters, there is a lot of uncertainty about what they are voting on. Or they have beliefs that they are voting on something that is not what the program of the party is. There is confusion there too. Ideally, again, it should not be there. In an ideal democracy, people should be informed as clearly as possible, but the program of a party is not one item and cannot be only one item. We cannot have a referendum on every one item of the party elected. Unfortunately that's the weakness of our system of democratic government: some people vote on the basis of confusion.

The difference with a referendum like the one we're talking about—a referendum on sovereignty—is that if they make an error, they can correct it in the next election, if they think they have been fooled and so on.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Right.

Mr. Maurice Pinard: As for the first part of your question, the consensus in Quebec, well, as Mr. Turp was saying a few minutes ago, there is consensus in Quebec. There's consensus in Quebec among some parts of the elites that have made statements about it. There is not complete consensus among them. As I mentioned, the business groups are not in agreement with the unions on this Bill C-20. That's part of it.

But what about the population of Quebec? I've said there is no consensus. I know of only four polls that have been carried out since this bill was deposited in the House of Commons, and of these four polls there is complete disagreement as to whether the population is in agreement or not.

• 1300

There's a poll by Léger and Léger asking—I'm summarizing the question—do you approve of the federal proposal to set the rules for the next referendum? As a social scientist, I don't think this is a good question. This is not what is happening in this chamber, for example, as Mr. Oliver, my former colleague, was saying. You then get the answer that people disapprove that Ottawa sets the rules for the referendum, as if no one in Quebec is going to follow their own rules.

But then when you ask people if they are in agreement with the intention of the federal government to clarify the conditions of a future referendum, you get 58% in agreement with that and 27% against, so the polls.... And we have very few; now we have to wait in a situation like this, so that things reach the population, not the elites in the population, and so that we see what the opinions would be about the bill. So far the polls are divided, and it depends largely on the questions that have been asked.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Bachand.

Mr. André Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is true that the questions asked in polls are often not clear as well. So you are quite right, Mr. Pinard.

Earlier, in answering a question asked by my colleague from the Reform Party, you were not clear—to use the fashionable word of the day—on the issue of the majority. However, you mentioned the Swiss Jura region two or three times. So you would like some aspect of a majority, you would like... the majority is an important point, of which there are two in the Supreme Court opinion: a clear question and a clear majority. So, in the end, a majority is 50%, not 50% plus one, but 50% of... the importance of the referendum process, if we just consider this purely from a grammatical point of view. However, what would be the rule for you,... in all the studies you've done, with the margins of error or margins of confusion, why do you... [Editor's note: Inaudible] Particularly in the case of the margin of error, because voters are always right: Vox populi, vox Dei (the voice of people is the voice of God). But, in your view, what majority would be required to eliminate any margin of confusion, using your principle of a clear question, which you did discuss at some length?

Mr. Maurice Pinard: I'm not a constitutional expert, but I would like to hear from such experts at much greater length before making up my mind about what the majority should be. I think it is clear that the majority should be more than 50% plus one on such a fundamental issue, and that if we were discussing a new constitution for Canada, I would insist that matters of this sort be mentioned in the constitution, and that the figure be higher than 50% plus one, without having an opinion myself as to what the percentage should be.

The other thing I would like to say is that the clearer the question, the less important the problem of a very strong majority. If the question were very clear, I think it would be quite a while before we would need to wonder whether or not there was a clear majority.

Mr. André Bachand: Unfortunately, as you point out, the bill also contains other matters. However, I would like to come back to this point. Unfortunately, people looking for clarity from the federal Parliament have been disappointed. Moreover, I think that most of the political parties, at least on this side of the table—at least the Reform Party and also the NDP, which put forward an amendment—acknowledge that there should be a figure: whether it be 50% plus one, 55%, 66% or 50% plus one of the absolute vote, in the end. So there are all sorts...but there is no clarity regarding the majority, which is something people would have liked to have seen.

Mr. Maurice Pinard: I think my answer will be similar to what Mr. Derriennic told you. If we were to provide for a percentage, that would be something...here I may be contradicting what I said earlier, and I'm saying something that would be too binding. I don't think it is a bad thing, in light of the question to be asked, in light of the majority obtained, that the legitimacy of the referendum will mean that there may be considerable variations in the majority required.

• 1305

Mr. André Bachand: One final comment, Mr. Chairman. Knowing what the majority is—and there are many examples of this—may be an incentive for people to get out and vote or not. There is an objective that has to be achieved. When we are in an election campaign, we know that we have to get at least one more vote than our competitors.

By having an objective, people mobilize. Don't you think that knowing what the majority is—whatever it is for the time being, for the purposes of our discussion—makes these people more aware of the issue and their role as voters? Whether the majority is 50% plus one or 66%, don't you think that knowing what the majority is means that there is a whole different dynamic involved? If the figure is 50%, that is half. If it is two thirds...

Having a set majority, one that is written down, could reduce misunderstanding, confusion and so on.

Mr. Maurice Pinard: You certainly have a point about specifying the majority. There would be some positive aspects to that. However, given that the majority would not be set by consensus, particularly not by a consensus that has any teeth, I don't know whether we can get into that process at the moment.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Drouin.

Mr. Claude Drouin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your presentation, Mr. Pinard. We have read your text. We heard you say today that the 1995 question was not clear. I'm pleased to see that Mr. Turp is present and that he was able to hear you today.

You know, the Bloc greatly simplifies the argument that the 1995 question was confused. They said that here in committee. They think any reference to the amount of confusion calls into question Quebeckers' intelligence... That's it. You're insulting Quebeckers' intelligence. How do you respond to these accusations, or to this pathetic argument?

Mr. Maurice Pinard: Someone recently wrote, and quoted me, that it was not a confused vote or a strategic vote, but that it was an idiotic vote or a strategic vote. I am sorry, but I did not use the term "idiotic vote". I would not use it. There is always confusion, depending on people's education and level of political awareness, as I have already said. Some people are much less informed about these issues. They are confused. That does not mean they are idiots.

Mr. Daniel Turp: [Editor's note: Inaudible]

Mr. Claude Drouin: Please. We're trying to listen to the witness, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Maurice Pinard: So the fact that a person is confused does not mean that his or her vote is idiotic. I am very confused about Einstein's theories. I would not want anyone to conclude that I am an idiot as a result.

Mr. Claude Drouin: Thank you.

Today, Mr. Facal, the Bloc, the Conservatives, excuse me, Mr. Bachand have acknowledged—

The Chair: This is a question period.

Mr. Claude Drouin: Mr. Chairman, they have acknowledged that the Supreme Court has required the Canadian government to negotiate. Do you agree that this means that, on the next question, if there is one, we won't have to talk about negotiations, given that the Supreme Court referred to them, and that our friends opposite agree? So the question could be much less confusing. It could state: "Do you want to stay in Canada, yes or no?" Since there is an obligation to negotiate, I think this would be much clearer, and you wouldn't have to spend a long time studying the question to determine whether or not it is confusing.

Mr. Daniel Turp: That is Guy Bertrand's question.

The Chair: Order. You have the floor, Mr. Pinard.

Mr. Maurice Pinard: I'm having difficulty because of the noise. Could you repeat the question, please?

Mr. Claude Drouin: Given that the Supreme Court calls for negotiations in the case of secession, will we be able to remove any reference to negotiations from the next question, if there is a next question? This would make the question much less confusing and Quebeckers would be able to decide clearly whether or not they want to remain part of Canada.

• 1310

Mr. Maurice Pinard: The obligation to negotiate does exist, but we need to ask what has to be negotiated: secession or partnership? Here again, there is a great deal of confusion in the Parti québécois, and after a YES vote, people would say: "We have been deceived".

There is a reference only to the obligation to negotiate. No, it is not an obligation to negotiate, but an obligation to negotiate secession. There will be no obligation to negotiate a partnership.

Mr. Claude Drouin: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Madam Redman.

Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You've already said, Monsieur Pinard, that you're not a constitutional expert, but if the sovereignists asked a referendum question on a mandate to negotiate, in one, do you think the result ultimately would lead to constitutional deadlock?

[Translation]

Mr. Maurice Pinard: Certainly. A question involving a mandate to negotiate in some ways complicates things and makes them even more confusing. However, at the same time, to what does an obligation to negotiate lead? Your Bill says that in such a case, there would be no negotiations with a question of that type. So the deadlock would be even more complete than with other questions.

Does that answer your question?

[English]

Mrs. Karen Redman: So in your opinion, is it productive for the federal government to refuse to negotiate on the basis of such a question, which is pursuant to Bill C-20?

Mr. Maurice Pinard: To refuse to negotiate on a mandate to negotiate...? Well, if by that...people want to follow that with proclaiming independence after, yes.

Mrs. Karen Redman: Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Cotler.

[Translation]

Mr. Irwin Cotler: Mr. Pinard, I would like to point out an error in the English translation of your brief, because I think it is quite important. I'm referring to the fourth paragraph on page 1 which, I think, is the opposite of what you mean. Paragraph 4 reads in English as follows:

[English]

It is thus not surprising that support for secession increases when questions featuring the term separation are used instead of the term independence....

Reading in French, the translation, it seems, would be that support for secession increases when one moves from the term “separation” to the term “independence”. I just wanted to enter that for the record because I thought it would be misleading to leave it otherwise.

Mr. Maurice Pinard: Thank you very much. Unfortunately, I saw the translation job very late last night and I couldn't examine it.

[Translation]

Mr. Irwin Cotler: It's just for—

Mr. Maurice Pinard: No, there is an error in the noun.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: I have just one question.

The Chair: Your five minutes are now up, but you will probably have another chance later.

Mr. Guimond has asked for the floor for five more minutes.

Mr. Guimond.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Professor Pinard, you are a professor emeritus. I think that in our schools and universities in Quebec, the title of professor emeritus conveys a certain recognition from society. I congratulate you on that. I'm sure you earned it.

Did you understand the 1995 referendum question, Professor Pinard?

Mr. Maurice Pinard: Completely and perfectly.

Mr. Michel Guimond: By definition, a sociologist specializes in the study of people and groups in society. Could you give us some examples of groups in society that did not understand the question, in your view, given that you have said that it was a confusing question and that the process was confusing?

Is there a link with the salary level? Is there a link with the level of education? I don't know.... Your paper boy who delivered the newspaper at your house, if he was 19 at the time of the referendum, in 1995, would he have understood? How about a taxi driver? Other professors emeritus, would they all have understood?

Firstly, if you say that it was confusing and that you understood it perfectly well, this must be due to the fact that you are an intelligent professor emeritus. Could you give us examples of people who would not have been able to understand it, and would you establish a link with this and their social standing?

Mr. Maurice Pinard: I must not have been clear, because I insisted on more than one occasion in my presentation—

• 1315

Mr. Michel Guimond: Forty-eight percent of your presentation was clear; 22% wasn't very clear, and then there was another 12%.... It's because there was a sea of statistics and, personally, I'm not smart enough to understand all of them. So, back to the questions. There are some individuals who did not understand.

Mr. Maurice Pinard: I will answer. The answer is quite simple, and all pollsters know it. The better your education, the better you would have understood the question. Secondly, and even more important than that, it's not only education, but the more people are politicized, the more they are interested in politics, the more they discuss and talk about politics, the more they watch and listen to political programs, etc., in other words the better their political understanding, the more they understood. So you have people in our polls, and I find this astounding, who have a university background, and who did not understand the question. I think that the percentage is much smaller among people with a college or CEGEP or university background, of people who did not understand, than among those who have minimum education.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Pinard, your statement is contemptuous towards ordinary people. What you are saying is condescending and pompous.

The Chair: Order, order.

Mr. Maurice Pinard: My dear sir, as I said earlier, if you were to tell me—

The Chair: Order. Mr. Guimond.

Mr. Michel Guimond: [Editor's note: Inaudible].

The Chair: We have a witness, and.... Order, Mr. Guimond.

Mr. Michel Guimond: [Editor's note: Inaudible].

The Chair: Mr. Guimond, we will have none of that.... Order, order.

Mr. Maurice Pinard: ...[Editor's note: Inaudible]...I gave you an example, and Einstein's theories, I don't know them, not at all. Not only—

Mr. Michel Guimond: [Editor's note: Inaudible].

Mr. Maurice Pinard: Fine, so that's it.

Mr. Michel Guimond: You deserve them, your mentors.

Mr. Maurice Pinard: Thank you, sir.

[English]

The Chair: We will not have any witnesses insulted in this committee.

[Translation]

Order. Order.

[English]

We will not have any witnesses insulted in this committee. I made that clear at the beginning. We will not have that.

Mr. Cotler.

[Translation]

Mr. Irwin Cotler: I only have one question to ask. Bill C-20 requires that there be a clear question, and some of the independentist witnesses, if I can use this term, state however that no matter what the question asked on a referendum on sovereignty, and they use the word "sovereignty".... We could use the word "independence". Mario Dumont has said that he has never been a sovereignist. The voters, especially for a third referendum, will understand that the basic goal of the Yes supporters, is to separate Quebec from Canada. Do you agree with them? If not, could you explain why?

Mr. Maurice Pinard: Unfortunately, I don't agree. Unfortunately—and the polls reflect this—there is less confusion since 1980. I gave figures. We described close to 50% of the respondents as confused, because they thought that we would remain a province of Canada after the fact. This figure dropped to 15%, those who believed the same thing in October of 1995, at the very end of the referendum campaign. This continued to rise, but it diminished to 15%. And there was also 9% of the people who said they didn't know whether or not they would remain a province. So, 24% of the people didn't know the relatively simple answer, in my opinion, as to what would happen after sovereignty. We would no longer be a province of Canada.

It has dropped. It started up again, but there is less talk about it, these idiots, or however you want to describe them, these ignoramuses, who don't understand the issue, since the referendum, are talking less and less about it, show less and less interest in it, and aren't listening about these things on the news. So this confusion has reappeared and is increasing, not like in 1980, but it's around 35% to 40%. When there is a referendum, it will drop again. It could drop to below the levels of 1995. It all depends on the question, obviously, but it will drop again. However, there will still be people who are confused, even with the clearest possible question. It's impossible to eliminate the confusion altogether.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: So, after 20 years of talking about it, after two referenda—

Mr. Maurice Pinard: Unfortunately, and some people find this hard to believe that ordinary people don't follow these issues as much as they themselves do and remain confused right up until the end.

• 1320

The Chair: Professor Pinard, thank you very much for your testimony this afternoon. You have helped us with our debate on this bill, and I'd like to thank you on behalf of all of the members of the committee. Thank you very much. And thank you as well for your patience. I recognize that we were running late, and we began your testimony late.

Mr. Daniel Turp: We are going to vote, as has been our habit, lately. We did not hear the beginning of the testimony. Should we go and vote, as we have been doing lately?

The Chair: Is there a wish to vote, among the...?

Mr. Daniel Turp: Yes.

The Chair: Agreed.

Mr. Daniel Turp: And sir, our next witness could begin his presentation, and we could—

The Chair: Agreed?

Mr. Daniel Turp: Yes.

The Chair: No?

[English]

The Chair: Does everyone want to go or to stay?

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Let's go and vote, now.

[English]

The Chair: Well, I'm reluctant because we are under a time limit now, as the honourable member knows. I think it might be worth proceeding with our other witness if we're going to get all the witnesses in before the time is up. I assume everybody wants to get more witnesses in.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Mr. Chairman, when we come back, now it is 1:20 p.m., the vote will last around 15 minutes.

The Chair: Yes, but we have—

Mr. Daniel Turp: And we have time before 3:30 p.m.. Our next one is only at 3:30.

The Chair: Yes, but the Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure has to meet, as well.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Look, what is scheduled, first of all, is a testimony. And then we should just go and vote. We'll be back in 15 minutes, and we can hear the next witness.

[English]

The Chair: I'm in the hands of the committee.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Drouin: Mr. Chairman, we all agree on the timetable. Out of respect for our witnesses.

Mr. Michel Guimond: You are the ones who have ordered the gag. We were ready to continue working, I mean to go and vote. Let's not hear your old argument again, Claude. We're running late.

The Chair: Mr. Bachand,

Mr. Daniel Turp: We won't be able to vote.

The Chair: You may remain here, or vote.

Mr. André Bachand: Yes, and we can also go and have a cup of coffee. We could go and have a coffee. But no, I think we should go and vote. We went to vote this morning, and it didn't take that long either, so without showing disrespect to the witness, I think that we're going to vote. They are after all important votes, but we are committed to being here.

The Chair: We will resume when five members are present, two of them from the opposition, after the vote.

• 1324

• 1340

The Chair: Order. We can resume. Our next witness

[English]

is Mr. Robert Young.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Do we have quorum, Mr. Chairman?

The Chair: Yes, reduced quorum, that's five with two members from the opposition.

Mr. Daniel Turp: There are not very many Liberals.

[English]

Mr. Young is a professor at the University of Western Ontario in the Department of Political Science.

Mr. Young, welcome to the committee. We thank you for taking the time to appear before us today. I don't need to explain the rules, as you've seen several of our witnesses, so you may begin your 10 minutes. We're delighted to have you here, sir.

Mr. Robert Young (Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Western Ontario): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Honourable members, I'm very happy to be here before you today. I consider it a great privilege to appear before this committee as it considers an historic piece of legislation.

I would also note that among the shrunken audience Monsieur Facal has left us sits my dear old mother. I am very grateful. She has made an exception from her usual interest in golf and the weather channel to come to hear you, and I'm very grateful that my brother has escorted her here.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Where is your mother?

[Translation]

Hello, Ms. Young.

Mr. Robert Young: Yes. I'm here because in 1995 I published a book called The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada. It was published simultaneously in French, La sécession du Québec et l'avenir du Canada, and it was very well translated. Right away, you will notice two things: first of all, I say the same thing in French as in English, and vice versa.

Mr. Daniel Turp: I know that it's a translation.

Mr. Robert Young: Secondly, I prefer a neutral and correct terminology, I prefer the word "secession", for example, to "separation", and I'm pleased to see that in Bill C-20 the word "secession" appears 22 times; and the word "separation" does not appear. There is an exception to this neutrality, and I will come back to this at the end of my presentation.

This book is an attempt to predict what exactly the results of a Yes vote would have meant, in 1995. The approach is based on real politics. I am not a normative thinker, but rather a pragmatic political analyst. This book was very well received in Quebec. My predictions were viewed as reasonable, of course there were critics, specifically the political scientist Stéphane Dion, but in general, it was well received.

Recently, I published a second edition. Here it is, and it is now more extensive and I predict now that if there were a Yes vote in the future, it would take place in a much more complex and difficult political climate than previously. If Quebec were to opt out of Canada, the process would be much slower and more costly than it would have been in 1995. This book was written before the Supreme Court's opinion, and before the bill to give effect to the requirement for clarity, Bill C-20.

I'd like to talk today about the link between the Supreme Court's opinion and the bill. But first, I'd like to talk about democracy. What's most striking in this bill is the fact that it accepts, in principle, that Quebec could become a sovereign state. This is so central, so much at the core of the bill, that we often forget that this is in fact the point of this bill. And what's remarkable is that there is not one similar case in an established democracy where a federal government accepts that a province would become sovereign. This is remarkable because this is a piece of legislation.

There have been statements made previously, particularly by Mr. Dion and by Mr. Rock, that Quebeckers would not be held in Canada against their wish. But this is a law. This is very important because there have also been statements made which contradict this. Remember the referendum campaign of 1995: the issue of democracy was brought up by sovereignists and by Reform Party, and the question was never clearly answered.

• 1345

I quote Mr. Bouchard in his speech in reply to the televised address given by Mr. Chrétien across Canada. Mr. Bouchard says:

[English]

One supreme and fundamental issue that Quebec and Canada share and cherish is democracy. With respect to the decision that will be taken by the majority of Quebeckers next Monday, I expect this common value of democracy to prevail. I am reassured by the citizens of Canada that I have met who are saying that Quebeckers can decide their own future and that such a decision should be accepted by the rest of Canada.

[Translation]

There was never a clear answer.

Mr. Manning, in the House, asked day after day:

[English]

They think they can vote for separation and still enjoy the benefits of federalism. That is why we asked the Prime Minister to make clear that yes means separation and only no means federalism. I will again ask the Prime Minister sincerely, as we are not playing games here, why is he so reluctant to make that distinction crystal clear?

[Translation]

There was never an answer.

The Prime Minister, in a televised interview on October 26, said, when asked if he would accept a Yes vote:

No, I didn't recognize anything. You don't know the result, and neither do I. Quebeckers will have expressed their opinion. The mechanisms, subsequently, well it's all very nebulous.

Fine. With this bill, there is a formal commitment to accept a Yes vote. There is recognition of Quebec's right to secede. It is in fact a framework, it's clear and it's no longer nebulous, and it's democratic.

[English]

Now, in the time remaining, I will turn to the details. As the Supreme Court noted, and as the sovereignists claim now, the devil is in the details. This basically involves the nature of the question to be posed, clause 1 of Bill C-20, and the level of support required, clause 2.

There is only one question to be posed here, in my opinion. Do these clauses of the bill fairly implement the letter and the spirit of the decision in the secession reference? This is on the assumption that all players here accept the authority of the Supreme Court of Canada and the legitimacy of its decision in the reference. If so, the only question is implementation.

I trust that all players do accept this legitimacy and authority. Even Professor Henri Brun, arguing in Le Devoir yesterday that Bill C-20 is unconstitutional, did so with reference to the judgment itself. There may be in Quebec no consensus about Bill C-20, but I would submit that there is a consensus in support of the judgment of the Supreme Court.

If this is accepted, then we can refer very briefly to the case. The core of the decision is that a UDI is illegal, that secession requires negotiations, and that secession requires a constitutional amendment. This enabled the court to reject two absolutist propositions: first, that the rest of Canada has an obligation to accept Quebec's terms; and second, that the rest of Canada can ignore a clear expression of Quebec's will.

This brings us to the nature of the question. A clear question of course was unspecified in the decision, but in paragraph 93 the judges wrote that a clear question is necessary to pursue secession. In the summary, which in many respects is clearer than the judgment itself, the court wrote that what was needed was “a clear expression of a clear majority of Quebecers that they no longer wish to remain in Canada”.

I submit that clause 1, providing for the House of Commons to decide the clarity in advance, is a fair implementation of that view.

The size of the majority is likewise unspecified, but in paragraph 76, the court wrote, “Canadians have never accepted that ours is a system of simple majority rule.” Majoritarianism is constrained by other constitutional principles, which they elucidated.

This is clear as well in paragraph 87:

The referendum result, if it is to be taken as an expression of the democratic will, must be free of ambiguity both in terms of the question asked and in terms of the support it achieves.

Clause 2 of Bill C-20 provides for the House of Commons to judge and make a decision about the adequacy of the support level. I think this is a fair interpretation of the court's writings.

• 1350

Finally, the court stressed that both these matters are political. This is very clearly stated in paragraph 100. The level and the clarity of the question are political matters, so is the content of the negotiations, and so is the timing of the clarification itself. This is even more clear in paragraph 153, again, in the summary.

So this is a political process. It's a process that has started here, I'm pleased to be part of it, and I would be happy to hear your views and answer questions, such as I may, but I would like to return, if I might, to the one aspect of the text that I feel does not reflect the spirit of the judgment or the neutrality and objectivity which is best brought to this question.

In the preamble, there is a phrase that says, “Whereas any proposal relating to the break-up of a democratic state...”. I find “break-up” to be a most unfortunate term. Even worse is its translated form, “démembrement”. These terms have no legal, constitutional, recognized meaning, and I submit they are contrary to the spirit of the Supreme Court decision. I would suggest substituting some form of wording that involves secession.

Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Young, and for your timeliness as well.

Mr. Hill.

Mr. Grant Hill: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My thanks as well to Mr. Young for attending here today.

You made a distinction between the phrases “secession” and “separation”. I wasn't sure which one you favoured. Could you just let me know which one you favour and why?

Mr. Robert Young: I favour the term “secession”, and I therefore used it to title these works and others because it has a clear and precise meaning in international law, which is that a portion of a sovereign state becomes itself a sovereign state, withdrawing from the predecessor state.

Mr. Grant Hill: Do I sense that in that word there is less of an inflammatory component to it? Is that also part of your choice?

Mr. Robert Young: I believe that it is less inflammatory than the term “separation”, although there are aspects of the term “separation” that are more disagreeable. It picks up a metaphor of a marriage: it implies that two units are going to separate. In reality, Quebeckers have lived here side by side with people in the rest of Canada under six constitutions for hundreds of years, and nobody is going anywhere. We may have a secession in which Quebec becomes a sovereign state, but this is not going to be a separation in the way that we speak of separation in cases of separation and divorce. I find it a slightly misleading term.

Mr. Grant Hill: On the issue of the questions asked in years past in the previous referenda, there is a debate as to whether or not they were unambiguous, not confusing, well understood by the people that they were being posed to. I'd specifically like to know your position on the clarity of the previous questions.

Mr. Robert Young: It's clear to me that the questions could have been clearer. I do believe, however, that the question that was posed was as clear as some that have also been posed, although on far less important matters.

What I found difficult and what I think the electors might have found difficult were the various emphases placed by the yes side on sovereignty on the one hand at one time and on partnership on the other hand at other times. If you analyse closely the discourse around the referendum issue, there were certainly mixed emphases on the yes side, just as there were mixed emphases on the no side.

• 1355

Mr. Grant Hill: I had an opportunity to ask a pollster how he would pose such a question if he were doing a poll, and he said that he would split the question into two sections. One would be on an association of whatever kind: yes or no, would you prefer to have Quebec join the rest of Canada in another association? Then it would say this: if this fails, would you prefer to have Quebec secede from Canada—I'll use your favourite phrase here—yes or no? He said that's how he would handle it in a poll.

Would that suit your idea of clarity in a question, so that it couldn't be ambiguous, couldn't be misunderstood?

Mr. Robert Young: Well, there is an inherent ambiguity in these matters because they have to do with the future. I think that a short, clear, two-part question arguably would leave the voters more certain about what it is they are voting for. But there's a sense in which, in human life, the future is uncertain and indeterminate and it's very hard to know what one is voting for, no matter how clear the question is.

In 1995, for example, it's clear—and you've heard some figures on this from Professor Pinard—that many voters expected that they would retain passports and continue to send members of Parliament to the House of Commons and so on. Now it's entirely possible—perhaps not very probable—that had the yes prevailed, some scenarios could have led precisely to those outcomes.

In fact, there is a very well-known piece of work by Patrick Monahan, no supporter of secession, who traced all the possible paths that could follow a yes vote—this is 1995 we're talking about—and many of them led back to Quebec staying within Canada, some of them, of course, only after Ottawa had refused to negotiate or had put new matters onto the table.

Personally, I find that opening up the motives of people when they're casting a ballot is not terribly fruitful, although I must say that I could see the case for a clear, simple question about secession and sovereignty.

The Chair: Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Professor Young, thank you for coming. First of all, I notice and I acknowledge the fact that in your opinion there is no consensus on Bill C-20. As an observer of Quebec's political scene, I believe you are right in recognizing that there is no consensus, and we have said it over and over again before this committee, that when there is no consensus on a bill as important as this one, well then there is a problem with the legitimacy of such a bill. Mr. Facal said this morning that we mustn't have people thinking that bills which are not perceived as legitimate could have any real impact in things.

I have two questions. The first one is: you recognize that you read carefully everything that's produced on the subject, whether this is written in Quebec and in Canada, laws and everything else. Personally, when I read this bill, my perception is that things are quite negative. In the wording, you stated that it was a bill that accepted the principle that Quebec could become a country. However when you look at almost all of the clauses, subsection 1 (4),

(4) For the purpose of subsection (3), a clear expression of the will of the population of a province that the province cease to be part of Canada could not result from...

(6) The Government of Canada shall not enter into negotiations...

In section (2): "except where it has determined pursuant to section 1".

Subsection 2(4):

The Government of Canada shall not enter into negotiations...

Subsection 3(1):

3. (1) It is recognized that there is no right...

The wording of this bill is completely negative. It's not so much that they don't recognize Quebec's right to secession, but basically this is a bill that says that the federal government will not move forward if certain conditions aren't fulfilled. So, I'd like to have your comments on this, on this very negative wording that you find in almost all of the provisions of this bill.

And this is my second question: you referred earlier to what Patrick Monahan wrote: according to him a two-part question would not be inconsistent at all with the Supreme Court opinion although the bill seems to suggest otherwise. What do you think about that?

• 1400

[English]

Mr. Robert Young: To take the second question first, and to cite your preamble, I certainly could not pretend any more to read everything that is written on this issue in Quebec and elsewhere. I don't think anybody could.

I have skimmed Monahan's recent work. If he thinks the double-barrelled question is acceptable, that's his opinion. It seems to me that in the spirit of the Supreme Court judgment, which I find to be an entirely remarkable judgment, a clear, straightforward question is more in accord with the position the judges have taken.

As for the negativity of the bill, drafters are drafters. I would have had a preamble that emphasized much more strongly the fact that this bill accepts in principle that Quebec can secede and become a sovereign country. It's true that there are many conditions about the nature of the question in particular, but I personally don't find that those are unreasonable, again, in the context of the Supreme Court decision, which stated very clearly and repeatedly that there are interests at stake other than those of Quebec, that there are principles that need to be respected. I don't find that the fine print about the question and the support level contradicts what the court has held.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Mr. Blaikie.

[English]

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Professor Young, one of the criticisms that has been made of the bill is that it doesn't, or that it seems not to—let me put it that way—permit referendums on other questions. Now, that's not the way I read the bill. It seems to me that the bill addresses only those referendums on which a Quebec government might want to request negotiations for secession.

But there is nevertheless the problem of how you would envision other referendums transpiring. For instance, could you have a referendum about new arrangements within Confederation, about a more asymmetrical relationship between Quebec and the rest of Canada or between Quebec and the rest of the provinces or whatever? In your view, would all these things still be possible in the ordinary course of political life? They just wouldn't be referendums that would have any chance of creating a situation in which the obligation to negotiate that the court talked about would be created...? Is that a fair reading?

Mr. Robert Young: I think that's a fair reading. This bill, as I read it and understand it, has to do with referendums that have as their object the intention of a mandate to negotiate secession. I don't see that it in any way prevents the Government of Quebec or the National Assembly of Quebec from asking any question of its population that it wants to.

It could—

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Wouldn't that be questioning negotiations on some non-secessionist proposal on the basis of that referendum?

Mr. Robert Young: Absolutely.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Yes.

Mr. Robert Young: Now there may be a point where a question is worded in such a way that it seems to propose major constitutional changes, or even minor ones, but then there's a sort of slide in the wording into what would happen if these are not accepted. I think that Parliament, since secession would have been part of that referendum question, would then have to decide on the question.

But I think that if the National Assembly were tomorrow to put on the table the package of powers, for example, that Jean-François Lisée has argued that the Quebec government should seek, and as long as there is no mention of anything to do with secession if they're not accepted, then the referendum would proceed, period. Parliament would have nothing to say about it.

• 1405

I don't see any constraint here on the ability of the Quebec National Assembly to ask any question it wants, even a question to which the House of Commons has said it will not reply. They could still pose the question. It just wouldn't be responded to by the Government of Canada.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Even then, all the House would be enabled by this bill to say is not that it would not reply but that it would not see this question, if it were responded to by a clear majority, as sufficient or as creating an obligation to negotiate secession. It might, but it wouldn't have to. That's the only thing this bill asks it to pronounce on.

If there was the kind of referendum you just referred to, the House wouldn't be required to make a ruling on whether or not it was going to reply to that. It would either reply to it or it wouldn't in the ordinary course of political life, so to speak.

Mr. Robert Young: Yes. I don't think this bill impinges on any proposals of the Quebec National Assembly except those that involve the prospect of negotiating secession.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: You mentioned Mr. Lisée. It seems to me that one of the things he pointed out, and it's been pointed out since by a couple of other witnesses, is that by requiring that secession take place—although I realize this is what the court said—through an ordinary constitutional amendment, this is construed by some to say, look, yes, it's in favour of secession in principle, and it's a process for achieving secession, but by having the constitutional amending process at the end of this process, knowing what we know about Canada, it's like saying it'll never happen.

You may have been here this morning when retired Professor Oliver said this would also have the potential of creating a situation for an impasse. When you got into the constitutional amendment part of the sequence, if you like, that would actually create the conditions of bad faith that might actually enable Quebec to appeal to the international community.

Do you have any opinions on any of that?

Mr. Robert Young: I have a great many opinions, actually, but I'll try to be brief.

In my view, the court was crystal clear in saying that secession would require a constitutional amendment, that otherwise one is moving outside the framework of the law, which is precisely the reason why it declared that a unilateral declaration of independence would be illegal.

In my view, secession could only be accomplished using section 41 of the Constitution Act, the section that requires unanimity, because there would undoubtedly be interference with the Office of the Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec and because the Supreme Court Act would have to be amended.

Now, there was disagreement about this. Professor Hogg seems to take a different view at times. In my view, unanimity is the formula that applies.

There are three considerations here. First, no matter how clear things are rendered by the clarity act, there would be considerable economic uncertainty and turmoil in the wake of a yes vote. Even if there was an 80% yes vote, strong consensus among Quebeckers, and acceptance of the result by the Quebec Liberal Party, there would still be enormous economic uncertainty. That creates a big incentive to settle the matter and settle it fast.

So even though unanimity might be required, I don't see that unanimity could not necessarily be achieved. I think it might be achieved. I think in the wake of a big yes vote, the attitude of voters in the rest of Canada would be to say, “Let's amend the Constitution, let's have Quebec become sovereign, and let's get on with life.”

Mr. Bill Blaikie: What if it's close?

Mr. Robert Young: So it's not inconceivable that unanimity could be achieved.

Another interesting provision here, however, is that Quebec would also then have a veto over constitutional renewal. Until it becomes legally sovereign, it is still a province of Canada and must agree to the constitutional changes on the table. I think this is an interesting conundrum.

Third, the constitutional changes that I think would accompany the secession of Quebec would be absolutely minimal in order to maintain the status quo as much as possible. Again, I think that would help make such amendments saleable. I think the Canadian public doesn't look at just process; I think they also look at product.

• 1410

I had to try to sell the Charlottetown accord, and that was tough sell. I mean, that was a mess to try to sell.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Tell me about it.

Mr. Robert Young: So I think part of this rejectionism we've seen has to do with the content of what's on the table, not the way it was placed there.

The Chair: André Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. André Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a few questions that we often ask our witnesses, and sometimes, we get answers, sometimes, we don't get answers, sometimes we get answers from one side, and from the other... This is why we hear a number of witnesses; to take advantage, afterwards, of the funnel effect.

You brought up two or three elements of the bill which reflected, at that time, faithfully or correctly, the judgment or the opinion of the Supreme Court. When I read it the first time, and after rereading the opinion a number of times, it refers to participants, it mentions political actors, participants in Confederation, democratic representatives, etc., I have asked this question to all kinds of people, among them, a representative from Western Canada, and this is the question that I'd like to ask you quickly. The provinces, according to the Supreme Court opinion... Do you believe that the provinces and the federal government are on a level playing field or that the federal government has the authority to assess the question in a province's reference and process and can decide what constitutes a majority, by taking the matter under advisement, and afterwards saying go, no go, we will negotiate with all the other partners of Confederation? I'd like to know what you think, and then where this is found in the Supreme Court opinion?

Mr. Robert Young: Obviously if you want to amend the Constitution, it would be sensible to consult the other provinces on the issue of the majority. That's obvious. However what I find striking in this bill, is that those actors that are mentioned most often are the other parties in the National Assembly. In my opinion, when the federal government—the House of Commons, more exactly—looks at the clarity of the question and the level of support, they will first turn to the Liberal Party of Quebec and to Action démocratique of Quebec. Is there a consensus between and among Quebeckers? Also, obviously, it would be very important to consult the provinces, and even if they do not have an actual legal right to participate in constitutional amendments, there would probably be some consultations with Aboriginals.

Mr. André Bachand: I will repeat my question, Mr. Young, because I'm not entirely satisfied with the answer, or rather, because it isn't clear. It could be that I wasn't clear either. Where does it say, in the Supreme Court opinion, that only the federal government will decide officially, through a vote, wether or not the question is clear before a referendum; who will determine if the question is clear after the referendum; who will determine if there was a clear majority after the vote; who will take into account the opinions of others, since, according to the spirit of the Supreme Court opinion, as far as I am concerned, there was not special role given to the federal government, either directly or explicitly? Have the provinces not now given the federal government the power to analyze a request by a province for a constitutional amendment? I don't see that in the Supreme Court opinion.

[English]

Mr. Robert Young: It is not explicitly laid out in the judgment what the nature of the consultations might be, and I think this falls into the category of matters that the court would say are political, to be decided politically. The court does say, however, that these decisions or these views and negotiations themselves, if they are to occur, must be taken by two majorities, by Quebec and by Canada as a whole.

• 1415

Now, this is obviously a difficult situation, because Quebeckers are represented in Canada. It's not as though we have a government for the “rest of Canada”. If there were a government for the rest of Canada, it would be entirely clear who would have the obligation to determine whether the question was clear and whether there was adequate support, and then to launch into negotiations.

The court flounders around a little bit and says there would be an obligation on two majorities, majorities in Quebec and majorities in the rest of Canada, “whatever that may be”, it says at one point, in terms of majorities in the rest of Canada.

But if there is an organ that can purport to decide whether or not to enter into negotiations, it seems to me it must be the Parliament and the Government of Canada, in full consultation, of course, with provincial governments and taking into account the view of other actors.

Mr. André Bachand: One last question? It will take 15 seconds.

The Chair: No, there's no time.

[Translation]

Mr. Proulx.

Mr. Marcel Proulx (Hull-Aylmer, Lib.): Good afternoon, Mr. Young. The Bloc, in reaction to Mr. Bernard Landry, or perhaps on orders sent by remote control by Mr. Landry, often emphasize the fact that they would like a sovereignty partnership; not independence. Mr. Bouchard said that partnership was a skeleton, Mr. Dumont said, in January, that he had never been a sovereignist. Is it realistic to conceive of a partnership skeleton without a sovereignist leader? Are the Bloc's proposals, and what they have to say about partnership, are non starters or unrealistic?

[English]

Mr. Robert Young: This is a question that in some ways might be better directed to people who have had much more to do with the authorship of the partnership proposals.

In my experience, I have maintained, often in difficult fora, that a full-blown partnership of the kind found in the June 12 agreement of 1995 is highly unrealistic. It is unrealistic for two reasons—one, because a yes vote and a successful secession would be a shocking, galvanizing event that would make the creation of a new economic and political superstructure very hard to achieve.

The policies in the two states I think would tend to diverge fairly rapidly. The major problem is the rule under which decisions would be made.

If the partnership is going to have important functions, there are two rules that can govern decisions—proportionality, in which case Quebec would always be in a minority on issues where there was a conflict of interest; and parity, which would put the majority in the partnership, the rest of Canada, or Canada as it would be, at the mercy of a Quebec veto.

Now, I don't think either side would accept such decision rules, so I think a partnership could have very little political and economic substance. I have always thought that.

[Translation]

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Scott.

Mr. Andy Scott: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Young, I'd like to talk a little about your writings around the 1995 referendum and the things that have happened since. I found it interesting yesterday, when Mr. Rae was here, that he spoke about the fact that prior to 1995 there seemed to be a sense among the political leadership in much of the country that the idea of separation or secession or a positive vote was something people just didn't want to think about.

There seemed to be a political movement around at the time that it would be intrusive to do what Bill C-20 does in terms of putting some kind of conditions on the national government's reaction to the referendum, or that it was some kind of slippery slope towards a “road map”, which I think was the phrase used by others.

• 1420

So in some circles, that seemed to be the prevailing thinking at the time. However, I've noticed a significant change in the way people are thinking about it subsequent to 1995, given the very stark reality of a very close referendum.

Have you discerned the same thing I have in your familiarity with the issues? Have you discerned the same movement among thinkers in terms of their thoughts about this, in particular amongst the political leadership in the country?

Mr. Robert Young: I think it's fair to say that you're partly correct. I don't think it's true that before 1995 there was a complete absence of effort to think through what might happen after a yes vote. Several books that were published on the topic at the time, and many articles—I can think of Gordon Gibson's work—were very sensible at the time.

I do think, though, there was a reluctance on the part of those who were in command of the no campaign to even contemplate that Quebec could become sovereign. I think at that time, for staunch federalists, it was literally unthinkable. There were some reasons for this.

At any rate, it simply could not be contemplated. I think that's basically the reason why the yes forces in 1995 were able to make headway in public opinion during the campaign by suggesting there would be very little economic damage as a consequence of a yes vote, that the partnership would protect Quebeckers from the transition costs.

The only way Ottawa, or the no side, could counter that argument would be by specifying that Quebec would secede if there were a yes vote and that there would be no partnership. This, they could not bring themselves to do.

Mr. Andy Scott: Is it safe to say, then, that having faced that very close result, the arguments against bringing some structure to this, bringing some stability to this, have to some extent been removed by virtue of the closeness of that result?

Mr. Robert Young: Not in my view. Partly because of the very close outcome in 1995, the chances of a divisive, costly, and messy secession have increased very much.

I predicted in 1995 that if there was a yes vote, there would be a quick, clean secession, a sharp economic downturn, and that would be it. I think the chances of that happening now, when you have new leadership, when public opinion is hardened, when there have been new measures introduced by both sides, are very much less.

We have partitionists, for instance, who didn't exist in 1995 in any organized form. A very quick secession wouldn't have allowed them to organize, but now the borders are on the table.

So I think the chance of a messy secession after a yes vote in the future has gone up substantially. I think that is a good reason for the clarity bill, because at least it tries to constrain some of these wilder possibilities and provide some certainty.

Mr. Andy Scott: Thank you very much.

The Chair: Mr. Hill.

Mr. Grant Hill: I hope this doesn't sound impertinent, Mr. Young, but were you consulted on this bill prior to public knowledge about it, prior to Parliament's knowledge about it?

Mr. Robert Young: I'm a political scientist, I'm not a political insider. No, I have not been consulted on this bill at all. I've often been consulted on what would happen after a yes vote, which is a very dismal prospect, and one that I'm hoping to move my research away from—

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Robert Young: —but I don't write legislation.

Mr. Grant Hill: Might I say it's a shame you were not? I found your testimony to be quite useful.

Thank you.

Mr. Robert Young: Thank you. I did make one suggestion.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: We're a parliamentary committee; we're not open to suggestions.

The Chair: Further questions?

Thank you very much, Mr. Young, for your attendance today. We appreciate very much the assistance you've given the committee and the patience you've shown in waiting for us to hear you. We recognize that we were running a little behind schedule as a result of certain events elsewhere.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Robert Young: Thank you very much, members.

• 1425

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Just a minute.

[English]

I believe at the moment I am going to recess the committee so that the steering committee may meet. I believe, in light of the proceedings in the House this morning, we ought to have a discussion in camera as to how we're going to proceed with the rest of the day, and that's what I intend to do now.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Chairman...

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Chairman, with respect, I would like to point out that yesterday in the minutes, you told me... I'm sorry, it was Monday, in the minutes, and it appears at line 1535, you told me that each motion that was tabled pursuant to subclause (a) could be introduced and debated only after the witnesses had been heard. So, it was introduced. We now have other witnesses. We will continue our discussions afterwards, you are certainly welcome to continue your comments after the witnesses.

I want to tell you, Mr. Chairman, that I do not feel bound, not at all, by the fact that the government decided to limit the debate to 10 hours as of 12:10, and that I wish to maintain my right to continue to speak to the motion that was introduced by Mr. Alcock. I also wish to maintain the right, my right, to speak to the motion that is now before us, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

Mr. Reg Alcock (Winnipeg South, Lib.): Mr. Chair, just as a point of order, I'm a little uncertain—

Mr. Michel Guimond: There's no point of order.

Mr. Reg Alcock: There is a point of order.

The Chair: Let's hear it.

Mr. Reg Alcock: The question is this. If Mr. Guimond is beginning to speak as though he is speaking to the earlier motion, then the point of order I would make—I wasn't certain, since I missed the earlier part of the statement—is that he no longer has the right to do that. Motions in the House take precedence over motions in committee, and the motion in the House has made void the motion he is currently debating.

I would recommend, Mr. Chairman, given what has taken place in the House, that the committee convene the steering committee so that we have an opportunity to discuss the ramifications of the vote that took place in the House.

The Chair: That's what I intend to do. I'll deal with the point of order at the conclusion of the steering committee meeting.

I'm going to recess the full committee now. We'll have a steering committee meeting, and when it's finished we will resume the committee and I'll deal with the point of order Mr. Alcock has raised.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Chairman...

[English]

The Chair: I'm sorry, Monsieur Guimond, but that's what I intend to do, and as chair, I—

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: A point of order, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Go ahead.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Chairman, with respect, I must tell you that you have before you, and the committee is now considering, a motion that I introduced on February 21st titled "Notice of Motion".

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. Michel Guimond: The motion said:

That the motion related to time allocation for the clause-by-clause study, adopted by the Legislative Committee on February 14th 2000, be rescinded.

I believe I am also entitled to speak to this motion which is before the committee.

The Chair: The steering committee will discuss that in a few minutes.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Yes, but Mr. Chairman, why can't we discuss it here in public, in front of everyone? Why do that behind closed doors, at night, in an office where there are no television cameras? Why don't we bring everyone together here, the whole committee, to discuss this matter?

[English]

The Chair: Because it's perfectly normal,

[Translation]

as you know, Mr. Guimond, to discuss organizational details at a meeting of the steering committee which is a sub-committee of the committee and that is what I would like to do for a few moments. Perhaps we will come to an agreement, perhaps not. I don't know, but I think we should have that discussion before resuming debate. We will have an opportunity to continue the discussion here, before and after our next witnesses appear at 3:30 p.m.. So—

Mr. Michel Guimond: Can your decision be appealed by a recorded division?

The Chair: Yes, of course.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Could I have a recorded division, Mr. Chairman?

[English]

The Chair: Sure.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Mr. Chairman, I would like to add something to that point of order, and reiterate with my colleague—both for our viewers and for my colleagues here—that the Liberal majority on the committee does not seem to wish to discuss the issues before it. This demonstrates just what a mockery of parliamentary democracy this is.

[English]

The Chair: Order.

Mr. Reg Alcock: This is simply dishonest.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: The procedures you are imposing on us are making a mockery of democracy.

[English]

The Chair: Order. Order, please.

That is not a point of order. It is perfectly normal....

Order! I have the chair. I have the floor. The chair has the floor. I will adjourn the meeting if we do not get order.

I am suggesting we go into a steering committee meeting immediately. If there is not agreement to do that, we'll have a vote on it. Then, if we don't go, we don't go.

Is that the wish of the committee, that we have a vote?

• 1430

[Translation]

Some Hon. Members: Yes.

Some Hon. Members: No.

Mr. Daniel Turp: No, no. Now we will see Liberal members voting for a decision that will prevent us from discussing and debating these procedures before our audience.

[English]

The Chair: All right. We're going to have a vote on whether we go into steering committee. That's the question before the committee.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: Point of order. I asked our clerk for a recorded division.

The Chair: A recorded division. Very well.

[English]

(Motion agreed to—yeas 8; nays 2)

The Chair: We'll therefore recess, go into steering committee, and resume at the call of the chair.

• 1431

• 1539

The Chair: Order.

This afternoon we will hear from the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, represented by Ms. Okalik Eegeesiak.

• 1540

According to the rules under which we're operating here, you'll have 10 minutes for your presentation, and then there will be a maximum of 35 minutes of questions from the members of the committee. So you have the floor for the next 10 minutes. Thank you very much for your attendance. We appreciate it. We look forward to your remarks.

Ms. Okalik Eegeesiak (President, Inuit Tapirisat of Canada): [Witness speaks in her native language].

Thank you very much for the opportunity to present our views on Bill C-20 today. I understand there was somebody who wanted to switch presentations with me. I remind you that we did have some timing and scheduling problems already, and we felt this was our time. We remind you this is our time.

I'll say a few words about our organization before I get into the substance of our presentation. The Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, or ITC, represents all the Inuit of Canada. The presidents of Inuit land claims organizations in Labrador, Quebec, Nunavut, and the Northwest Territories sit on the board of directors of ITC, and it is through this organization that the Inuit of Canada speak with one voice on national issues.

I'd just like to point out a member of one of our Inuit associations, Peter Kritaqliluk from Aklavik. He's sitting in the audience.

Thank you very much for coming, Peter.

We do have some delegates from NTI, Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, as well as ITC technicians and Makivik technicians. As well, sitting with us and supporting some of our views is the Nunavut government.

It was ITC that represented Inuit in the constitutional reform leading up to the Charlottetown Accord, and it was through a special committee of ITC that Inuit participated in a series of first ministers conferences during the 1980s on entrenching aboriginal rights in the Constitution.

I will also take the opportunity to say a few words about ITC's relationship with the new Nunavut Territory. Inuit across the country strongly supported the creation of Nunavut, and we believe it is one of our most important accomplishments to date. However, I must emphasize that close to half of Canada's Inuit live outside this new territory. In other words, it is important for people to remember that Nunavut and its various institutions cannot be taken to represent the interests of the Inuit in Canada.

With respect to Bill C-20, ITC sees two very distinct sides to the proposed legislation. On the one hand we see that Bill C-20 would ensure a clear referendum question and that it would set out the conditions and process under which the Government of Canada would discuss the possibility of Quebec secession. But most important, Bill C-20 would protect Canada from any unilateral declaration of independence by Quebec. Inuit strongly support this dimension of Bill C-20. Indeed it will be comforting for Inuit both in and outside Quebec to know the next referendum cannot lead to a situation where the future of Canada and Quebec can suddenly be decided overnight through a simple political declaration.

We also see a second side to Bill C-20. It is one that reflects how Canada sees itself as a federation, how it constitutes itself as a country, and if necessary how it would reconstitute itself as a country without Quebec. This is found in the clauses that highlight the need to make use of the constitutional amending formula and that establish the process the federal government would use on behalf of all Canadians to respond to a proposed referendum of secession and its possible outcome.

Unfortunately these clauses fail to explicitly recognize the role, status, and rights of Inuit and other aboriginal peoples in matters concerning the nature of Confederation and the future of the country. ITC is deeply troubled by this omission. From an aboriginal point of view, this is a dark and demeaning side of Bill C-20. While the architects of the proposed legislation may have tried to address issues relating to referendums on Quebec sovereignty, they have, inadvertently or otherwise, created an entirely new set of problems with Canada's aboriginal peoples.

• 1545

The preamble and subclause 3(1) of Bill C-20 reaffirm that the secession of a province could only be accommodated through an amendment to the Constitution, and that this would require the necessary negotiations. The wording then goes on to explicitly highlight the role of federal and provincial governments in these negotiations.

Subclauses 1(5) and 2(3) of Bill C-20 set out the processes by which the House of Commons will respond to a proposed referendum on secession and its possible outcome. In doing so, these subclauses indicate that the House of Commons shall take into account the views of the players in the constitutional amending formula, as well as of territorial governments and opposition parties in the legislature of the province that is proposing to secede from Canada.

Unfortunately neither the preamble nor the subclauses mentioned above explicitly acknowledge the role of aboriginal peoples. This is difficult to understand, given the precedents of the mid-1980s and early 1990s, when we were fully recognized as participants in the constitutional reform processes and related first ministers conferences.

This is even more puzzling when one considers that in addition to the House of Commons, the Senate, and the provincial legislatures, the Constitution explicitly identifies aboriginal peoples as having a role to play for certain constitutional amendments. This role can be found in section 35.1 of the Constitution Act, 1982. By comparison, again, the Constitution makes no mention of the territorial governments or provincial opposition parties in its amending procedures. In this context, the aboriginal peoples have a higher standing than the territorial governments in terms of being explicitly identified in a constitutional amending procedure.

In saying this, ITC is not arguing against territorial participation in constitutional issues. On the contrary, we believe the role accorded these governments by Bill C-20 is both valid and necessary. We are, however, questioning the conspicuous omission of the explicit role of the aboriginal peoples in the proposed legislation.

We realize some people may be tempted to point to the wording in the clauses of Bill C-20 mentioned earlier and argue there is nothing that precludes a role for aboriginal peoples. Anyone making such an argument will have totally missed the point of ITC's presentation. The current wording in Bill C-20 gives no assurances that aboriginal peoples will have any role, and it belittles our place in Confederation and reduces us to being just another interest group.

It may be questionable for a government to ignore aboriginal peoples in issues and processes where we have no recognized role, but when a government goes out of its way to openly disregard the role of aboriginal peoples that is recognized by constitutional provisions and convention, it sends out a very alarming message: not only is the government not willing to respect the role of aboriginal peoples in Confederation; it is seeking to lessen it.

Unfortunately our omission from Bill C-20 is in keeping with a pattern that has become all too obvious over the past dozen years. We were explicitly excluded from a constitutional conference held under section 49 of the Constitution Act, 1982, for the purpose of reviewing the amending formula. Shortly afterwards we were shut out of the discussions that produced the Calgary declaration. We later requested participation in the social union process to re-balance and renew the workings of the Canadian federation. Our demands were ignored, and the social union framework was signed without our input. And now we see our role in the evolution of the country has been brushed aside in Bill C-20. The pattern of exclusion has now reached glaring proportions.

ITC will also make a few observations about subclause 3(2) of Bill C-20. It is the only clause that makes direct reference to aboriginal peoples, but we have to ask ourselves how much comfort it will provide the Inuit of Nunavik and other aboriginal peoples living in Quebec. I remind you there is also a responsibility for those aboriginal peoples living outside Quebec whose claim settlement boundaries or political boundaries may be affected by the secession of Quebec.

• 1550

Taken in the context of a bill that fails to explicitly acknowledge our role in the Canadian federation and in constitutional matters, subclause 3(2) may represent nothing more than a directive that aboriginal interests should not be totally ignored if it ever becomes necessary to conclude an agreement on the terms of secession between Quebec and the rest of Canada.

Whatever the case, it is clear this subclause fails to guarantee that unless agreed to otherwise, the aboriginal peoples in Quebec and their lands, territories, and resources will remain part of Canada. Failing this, the subclause then falls short of giving any assurances that the Inuit of Nunavik and other aboriginal peoples in Canada would be a full party to the negotiations and agreement on the terms of secession.

Finally, the subclause does not even guarantee that there will be a full-fledged consultation process with aboriginal peoples living in Quebec. All it states is that the federal government must address aboriginal interests and rights in its negotiations on terms of secession with Quebec. The history of Canada is littered with such vaguely worded assurances.

Our concerns with the lack of assurance in subclause 3(2) are not purely hypothetical. Sovereigntists have long argued that Quebec will be able to simply assume the federal responsibilities and obligations to aboriginal peoples flowing from its fiduciary relationship, treaties, land claims agreements, and the Canadian Constitution. Or at the very least, they suggest federal responsibilities and obligations will be transferable to Quebec on a bilateral basis. They tell aboriginal peoples in the province they will have nothing worry about, since Quebec will fully respect their rights in carrying out the responsibilities assumed or transferred from the federal government.

The purpose of this observation is not to question the sincerity of sovereigntists on this matter. Rather it is to highlight the fact that neither the sovereigntists nor Bill C-20 give assurances that the different aboriginal peoples living in Quebec will be the ones to determine their future and that of their territories in the event of Quebec's secession from Canada.

Because of our concerns, ITC is requesting that, at a minimum, the committee recommend that Bill C-20 be amended to provide for the following three points.

The sixth paragraph in the preamble and subclause 3(1) must be amended to explicitly state that the aboriginal peoples of Canada would be fully involved in the required negotiations for an amendment to the Constitution of Canada authorizing the secession of a province.

Secondly, subclauses 1(5) and 2(3) of the proposed legislation should be amended to explicitly require the House of Commons to take into account the views of aboriginal peoples of Canada and in particular the views of those aboriginal peoples residing in the province whose government is proposing a referendum on secession or whose land claim boundaries or political boundaries may be affected by the secession.

Thirdly, Bill C-20 must be amended to clearly indicate that the Government of Canada shall not negotiate terms of secession that will alter, erode, or jeopardize the rights of any aboriginal people, including their status as Canadian citizens and their fiduciary relationship with the crown in right of Canada, without their explicit consent.

Likewise, the proposed legislation must ensure the Government of Canada will not enter any negotiations that foresee the removal of lands, territories, and resources of any aboriginal people from Canada without their explicit consent. Where an aboriginal people does provide such consent to the federal government, Bill C-20 should confirm that the aboriginal people in question will be a full party to the negotiations and terms of secession.

Thank you. That's the end of my presentation. I guess we have time for questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Hill.

Mr. Grant Hill: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much for your presentation.

Just for information, could you tell me how many Inuit live in the northern part of Quebec that you represent?

Ms. Okalik Eegeesiak: I believe there are about 9,000 Inuit, approximately 25% of the Inuit in Canada.

• 1555

Mr. Grant Hill: All right. One question a lot of presenters have been asked is, if Canada is divisible, do you believe Quebec is divisible as well?

Ms. Okalik Eegeesiak: Yes, we do. And Quebec Inuit want to stay in Canada.

Mr. Grant Hill: Do you have any idea where a boundary would reside for the Inuit staying in Canada if Quebec decided to secede?

Ms. Okalik Eegeesiak: From the 55th parallel up.

Mr. Grant Hill: So you'd take the 55th parallel and everything to the north?

Ms. Okalik Eegeesiak: Yes.

Mr. Grant Hill: We were told by one of the Quebec politicians today that particularly the James Bay natives had signed away a lot of their rights in relationship to the James Bay hydro development. Have the Inuit signed away any of their rights with any of the mineral resource or hydro developments in the north at all with Quebec?

Ms. Okalik Eegeesiak: I'll get Michael to help me out with that question. Michael is a technician from Makivik.

Mr. Michael McGoldrick (Special Assistant and Political Adviser to the President, Makivik Corporation): Just for clarification, Okalik is the president of the national organization, so her knowledge and ability to speak specifically to Makivik is limited. I work also for Makivik and help out with national issues, so perhaps I can help here.

The claim is similar to most other land claim agreements in Canada. Specific rights are confirmed by the land claim agreement and are constitutionally protected. But there's the question of extinguishment as part of those agreements, and of course the rights as citizens remain and are in fact confirmed with those agreements.

The treaty rights remain very much there. In fact it's a lot easier to identify the rights in terms of a treaty than the general aboriginal rights, which aren't specified in the document.

Mr. Grant Hill: I'd like to make sure I have you pinned down specifically. The minister read a specific agreement today that the James Bay Cree had signed in relationship to a hydro development. And it was specific. It said all interests in land and so on had been given up. No such agreement has been signed between the Inuit in the north and Quebec that would have that carry on for the Inuit?

Mr. Michael McGoldrick: The Inuit did sign an agreement, and not all rights are forever gone. The treaty replaces the rights that were addressed with new rights and new relationships. So it's not a question of a blank slate.

Mr. Grant Hill: I'm still not sure I understand. This is probably due to my inexperience in this area. The treaty rights then were signed at what date?

Mr. Michael McGoldrick: The object of the treaty was to allow development of the territory for hydro projects and whatever else, so the rights the Inuit were exercising to prevent that were accommodated and extinguished and then replaced with the treaty rights. So when there's a document saying all rights and interests in the land have been removed, there's another part that says these other rights and interests to the land now exist.

Mr. Grant Hill: Okay, I think I—

Mr. Michael McGoldrick: I might add that's in terms of ownership. The right of a people have not been extinguished. Human rights aren't extinguished—the right to self-determination, the right to represent yourself, the right to live on the planet earth. It was the ownership question and the aboriginal title to those lands that were altered. But there's no question that people somehow, by signing a treaty, become a different kind of people in terms of their human rights and their right to self-determination.

Mr. Grant Hill: Then I would take it the ownership of the land, the title to the land, has been given up with the agreement for the resources.

Mr. Michael McGoldrick: I'd have to read the agreement to remember the exact wording, but the process of land claim agreements throughout Canada, according to federal policy, is extinguishment of aboriginal rights to the land—to the land. There are other rights that aren't necessarily specific for the land and its use, and in turn, they are replaced by treaty rights.

That's always been contested by all of the aboriginal peoples in Canada, but it's clearly part of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, which the Inuit are signatory to.

Mr. Grant Hill: Thank you.

[Translation]

An Hon. Member: Yes, Mr. Bachand? The other Mr. Bachand.

• 1600

Mr. Claude Bachand: Yes, Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to welcome Ms. Eegeesiak to the committee. I am always happy to see her. We sometimes find ourselves at social functions together. I believe that the last time we met was at the Museum of Civilization, in Hull. We were sitting at the same table, and enjoyed the event very much.

I found your presentation extremely interesting. However, in my opinion, the extinguishment of Inuit land entitlements is along the same lines as what happened to the Cree, as far as I know. We will check, but I'm fairly certain that this is so. At the time, Canada required the extinguishment of such land entitlements to sign, so we will check. But as far as I know you are quite right, land entitlements were extinguished.

Now in your presentation, I was struck by—let us not call it a threat—the issue of partition for Northern Quebec which you claim would apply to territories north of the 55th parallel. We often hear this, partitionists repeat it all the time, but I would like to elaborate on your thinking.

As I understand, you are saying this is a very serious threat, and you subscribe to the notion that if Quebec were to separate from Canada, the Inuit and the Cree would also have the right to separate from Quebec. But let us take this a step further. Can Aboriginal and Inuit communities in other parts of Canada also separate from Canada? Can Inuit communities in Labrador (which I will not name) which say they would like to remain a part of Quebec if Quebec separates, also get their way?

If we go so far as to say that a new country can be partitioned, with no regard for international law, then we should apply the same reasoning to Canada. That would cause a great many more problems because you might end up with a completely fragmented country. If you allow Inuit and Cree communities in Quebec to leave a sovereign Quebec, then you must also allow Inuit and other Aboriginal communities in Canada to leave Canada. That is where this argument takes you.

What do you have to say about that?

[English]

Ms. Okalik Eegeesiak: My response to the first question is if Quebec separates and it is for sure that Inuit want to remain Canadians, you leave the Inuit Canadians. There's no question that Inuit don't want to be Canadians. We do want to be Canadians. We are Canadians.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Yes, but now, if I were to take that even further, I know that you want to remain Canadian, but if there are other Inuit or other Aboriginal communities in Canada who decide, following the separation of Quebec, either to leave Canada or to join Quebec, then we must also allow them to do that. That is not unilateral. There has to be some give and take.

If you agree with the concept of the partition of Quebec, then you must agree with partition in the rest of Canada for Aboriginal and Inuit communities. And, there is wishful thinking. There is wishful thinking and intentions on the part of certain Inuit and Aboriginal communities who would like to become completely sovereign and to leave Canada. So if we let Quebec do that, then we will have to let the others do it as well.

[English]

Ms. Okalik Eegeesiak: My only response to that is we Inuit count ourselves as one people. We're not broken up into communities. We're not broken up into provinces, only by the fact that there are boundaries fixed by governments. We are one people. We want to stay Canadians, and we are Canadians. We do not want to be broken up. We do not say we are a nation in one community, another nation in another community, another nation in a different province. We maintain that we are one people.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: One short final question, Mr. Chairman. A very short one.

I understand about the Inuit, now, but as to the other Aboriginal peoples, there are 60 Aboriginal nations in Canada. Sixty. So do you think that one Aboriginal nation should be allowed to leave Canada? If, in a sovereign Quebec, the Cree were to decide to leave Quebec, could the Haidas or the Nisga'a also leave another part of Canada?

[English]

Ms. Okalik Eegeesiak: That would be up to them, not to me.

• 1605

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Therefore, you recognize that this is a possibility if you say that it is up to them to decide. It's a possibility.

[English]

Ms. Okalik Eegeesiak: Not for Inuit.

The Chair: Mr. Blaikie.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It just reinforces, I say with apologies to the witnesses, my frustration with the way this committee is going to hear Ms. Eegeesiak come before this committee and express eloquently the fact that the Inuit would like to stay Canadian and would like to continue to help build this country, but at the same time they are dismayed, mystified, offended, insulted, and whatever by the absence in Bill C-20 of any recognition of them as the constitutional political actors they are, both in the strictly constitutional sense and in the conventional political sense.

It reinforces the tragedy of this committee that it now appears we will not even be able, thanks to a combination of government time allocation and Bloc filibustering and all the other ways in which this committee process has been so terribly, terribly inadequate, we won't even get.... Here we are listening to the Inuit, and before that the Grand Council of the Crees, and before that the Assembly of First Nations, and it's a bit of a sham, because you know what I tell the witnesses? We're not even going to be able to consider the amendments I have moved on behalf of the NDP, which are the very amendments you have suggested. Not only are we not even going to get to vote on them; I'm not even going to get to move them. They're not going to get to be debated. These people here are not going to get to be counted as to where they stand on these amendments.

We weren't able to get any indication from the government, when we thought we were going to have a debate and vote on the amendments, of whether or not there was going to be support on the government side, collectively speaking, for these amendments. Now we'll never know. Isn't that convenient? Isn't that convenient for the government and for the Bloc, who I would submit so far are very alike, despite their differences, when it comes to the way in which they have treated the opportunity to deal justly with aboriginal peoples in Bill C-20?

I agree with the amendments you've brought forward. They're very similar to the amendments we have brought forward and argued for in the House and here. I don't think the sham should continue any longer. The fact of the matter is we are now in a position where we will not even be able—no one will be able—to move such amendments. So you're speaking into the black hole that we call the Canadian Parliament, where nothing really constructive can happen, because the government has made up its mind, the opposition obstructs irrationally the irrational totalitarianism of the government, and nothing constructive is able to happen in the cracks that exist, if they exist at all, between those two solitudes.

So I just say I apologize, on behalf of the process, to all the people who have come here thinking they were actually coming before a parliamentary committee with the thought that maybe a bill can be changed, a bill can be improved. In the report stage, when we get to the House of Commons, it will probably be a zoo too. There will be hundreds and hundreds of amendments, and all the substance and everything else will be lost in all the parliamentary games. But somewhere in the melee that happens at report stage, there will be amendments that reflect your concerns, and hopefully by that time we will have been able to persuade the government to have the moral and the political courage to vote for them.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Bachand.

Mr. André Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Indeed, I must say that if ever the government refuses to amend the bill to include Native peoples, when I see the way my NDP colleague continuously raised our awareness about the Native issue, I am convinced that the NDP would feel that such an omission would be enough to withdraw its support from the government.

• 1610

Having said that, I would like, yes, of course, I have a question, but you are the third Native group to make us aware about this omission in the bill. For many other reasons, we refuse to support the bill, but I must tell you, that you have to go much further in your amendments, and I have made that suggestion to the First Nations, to the Cree, and now to the Inuit. You are being recognized, once again, probably, but explicitly in the opinion of the Supreme Court and you must take advantage of that. As far as I'm concerned, you are a major political actor, in the same capacity as the provinces; that is what I think. Your amendments do not go far enough. The bill does not go far enough, for you or for the provinces. Once again you are allowing the federal government not to let you be, as an Aboriginal people, on equal footing with the federal or provincial governments, because this involves an amendment to the Constitution. But having said that, it seems to me that you are trusting the government. It might be a good thing to have faith in our institutions, but are you saying that 156, 158 members of Parliament will decide on your behalf, officially, whether the question is clear, and that the provinces will, on your behalf, before a referendum vote, decide whether after the vote the question is still clear, whether the majority is clear, and it's up to the federal government to decide whether or not you will be negotiating. And at that point, your role becomes more equal. So this is a warning to you, who are fighting to be considered equal within the Canadian federation, and I believe that the amendments must go further than what has been suggested by your group, but having said that, what I hope for you and for us is that, at the very minimum, the government remedy this glaring omission that affects both Aboriginal peoples and the provinces. I would like to hear what you have to say about my comments. Just one more question, Mr. Chairman. You know, we will soon be at the end of this wonderful open and democratic process, and that is why we feel more like making comments than asking questions, but I would still like to hear what our witness has to say.

[English]

Ms. Okalik Eegeesiak: Thank you for those supportive comments, as well as Mr. Blaikie.

Part of the issue here is, you're right, these are our minimum recommendations. With regard to the issue of the Supreme Court reminding the government that we have to be involved, we remind them of that constantly and consistently. How we are approaching our minimum recommendations is that, as always, they don't work for us, but we work with government.

We look for ways every day to have a better relationship or a better partnership with government, as they have also promised in Gathering Strength and still have yet to fully initiate and implement with Inuit. We search for ways to work with them, as opposed to against them through the courts, first, before we go to the courts. This is one of our ways of addressing our minimum recommendations with regard to this bill and our participation.

The Chair: Mr. Cotler, are you going to ask a question?

Mr. André Bachand: [Inaudible—Editor].

Mr. Irwin Cotler: I just want to say to Mr. Bachand I prepare my own questions.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. André Bachand: Thank you, sir. You're doing well.

The Chair: Order! À l'ordre!

Mr. Cotler.

• 1615

Mr. Irwin Cotler: Just to follow what Mr. Bachand and Mr. Blaikie were saying, I would just reiterate what I said in the presence of the other witnesses who came here representing the aboriginal peoples and that is that, and I think I could speak for the government on this because this is in the Constitution, that we recognize the aboriginal peoples as political actors, that this is not something that I have to say there in section 35.1 of the Canadian Constitution as you've pointed out. It's there in the aboriginal jurisprudence as you made reference to.

I don't see any issue here of whether or not aboriginal peoples are political actors. They are political actors.

I would repeat as well that we will be giving careful and close consideration to the amendments that have been proposed by you and the previous groups who came before us. I regret frankly that there wasn't a clause by clause today. I think it would have given us an opportunity to consider that but I'm hoping that I don't yet have, if I may say to my colleague Mr. Blaikie, the full cynicism of the black hole of Parliament, maybe because I've only been recently elected but I still like to consider that there will be an opportunity at report stage and otherwise where these amendments can be considered.

The Chair: If you'd like to comment, feel free.

Ms. Okalik Eegeesiak: So our recommendations will be fully approved if you feel that strongly that we are part of the Constitution and we have to be involved in this process.

Thank you very much.

I'm done.

The Chair: Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Ms. Eegeesiak, as was the case with your colleagues, the Cree, who appeared yesterday, we in the Bloc Québécois would like to say, and I think that I can speak on behalf of my colleagues here, that it is always very moving to hear you speak in the language of other people of this country and I would like, in your language, in the language of your people, your nation, to say: [Editor's Note: The Member Speaks in Cree].

Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much for your appearance before the committee today. We appreciate the time you've taken to come. I want to apologize for the mix-up apparently that occurred about Monday which you told me about just before the meeting and we thank you for your patience in waiting today to give your testimony.

Thank you very much.

Ms. Okalik Eegeesiak: There seems to be a question as to the role of ITC ## in the regions and the ## organizations and the agreements that we have with both the federal government and the territory and provincial government and I brought a pamphlet on ITC, what we do at the national level and there is some information about population and the communities and when the land claims were signed.

I'll just leave them here for your information.

The Chair: Thank you very much. The clerk will take them. Thank you very much.

Our next witness this afternoon is Mr. Gordon Gibson a senior fellow in Canadian Studies at the Fraser Institute.

Mr. Gibson is under some time constraint so we're going to move smartly through his testimony, so I warn you, I won't be allowing a lot of overruns on question time and of course I know Mr. Gibson won't overrun on his 10-minute presentation time.

Mr. Gibson, thank you very much for coming today and we hope that we can move smartly through your testimony so that you're able to catch the flight I know you have to catch later this evening and we look forward to your remarks.

You have the floor, sir.

Mr. Gordon F. Gibson (Senior Fellow in Canadian Studies, Fraser Institute): Mr. Chairman, thank you. I will be as expeditious as I can.

You've had many distinguished witnesses. I have read as much as I could. I will try not to repeat too much.

Mr. Chairman and committee members, it's a pleasure to be here. I begin with the presumption that this bill is well-intentioned, intended to be for the advantage of Canada and on the surface it is unobjectionable and even marginally helpful.

It is also unquestionably popular in ROC, in the rest of Canada for reasons I'll get into and therefore very difficult for ROC politicians to oppose. But on closer examination and as with most things constitutional, I believe that this bill

• 1620

On closer examination, and as with most things constitutional, I believe that this bill, if passed, will provide a classic example of the law of unintended consequences, most of them negative. Specifically, in my view, this bill is unnecessary, will be ineffective in the real world, increases dangers of miscalculation by Quebec voters, stands as an excuse for failure to take genuinely constructive action on the unity file, is polarizing, and, for the first time, provides for separation in law with dangerous potential consequences.

In consequence, and after arguing the above case, my advice is simply to declare this a useful debate and let the bill die through the argument. First, the bill is unnecessary. I'll be glad to be questioned on this, but I say that it adds nothing useful to the Supreme Court decision, and it clearly adds nothing to the existing powers of Parliament, so why the bill? A careful reading of Mr. Dion's statement is not persuasive to me. There may be other reasons.

My second point: the bill will be ineffective in the real world. Here are two examples. I ask you to imagine that this bill had been law at the time of the referendum in 1995. Imagine that the referendum has passed by 50% plus one and you are Paul Martin telling a New York banker on the phone at midnight, when the votes are counted, that there is no problem, we have a clarity act. Imagine the politely stifled giggle at the other end and the cry of “sell the loonie!” as the phone is hung up. In other words, 50% plus one is important, no matter what this bill says.

Imagine the response to the theoretical question proposed by Jean Paré of L'actualité—and of course the referendum law would have to be amended to give these three choices. His question was, do you prefer (a) separation and independence, (b) the status quo, or (c) a sovereign Quebec in a new constitutional union with Canada? He says that 50% for the new union would be more than possible and that there's a high risk that the status quo would get less than 15%.

I don't know what you think of Mr. Paré's views on that, but in my opinion this point says that this bill gives the false security of a Maginot line and all the protection of a firewall made of paper.

My next point is that it increases the dangers of miscalculation by Quebec voters. I've argued to you that 50% plus one on any sovereignty-tinged motion is an item that is important and that changes the world. Ask yourself about the strike-vote scenario. This bill will make it easier for the average Quebec voter to say never mind, the federal government will make sure as a result of the clarity act that nothing happens, so I can afford to support my negotiators by giving them a strike vote. And yet, I argue that at 50% plus one the black hole opens, and it's more likely to open with the comfort of Bill C-20.

My next point: the bill stands as an excuse for failure to take genuinely constructive action on a renewed federation. Several witnesses before this committee have deplored the lack of a plan A. I know that's not what you're in business for, but I would like to deplore that lack too. Every poll for a generation has shown that this is what two-thirds of Quebeckers want, and I have to ask, why can't Quebeckers—and British Columbians, for that matter—hear some dialogue on plan A?

The intransigent stand of Ottawa on plan A is boxing in the Liberal Party of Quebec, and it's boxing in federalist nationalists. It's even boxing in some of those sovereigntists who would just as soon see a renewed federation. Why does this kind of dialogue await the urging of Jean-François Lisée? Why can't it be brought forward from this place?

My next argument: the bill is polarizing, in two ways. It's polarizing in ROC versus Quebec and it's polarizing inside Quebec, with the plan B folks versus the sovereigntist folks. Both polarizations, in my view, harm Canada.

I'd like to define polarization, because in British Columbia we have been the experts since 1933. We have had polarized politics, so-called free enterprise versus so-called socialism, us versus them. In this kind of atmosphere, the middle ground is frozen out, moderate options are denied, and as the sides change from one extreme to another, you get a serious and recurring policy lurch, which is not a good way to run a government. There's a concentration on win-lose, not on win-win.

• 1625

When one side gets in, the argument goes something like this. There was what we called a coalition in British Columbia during the 1940s. The coalition was the Liberals and the Conservatives. They became extremely arrogant as a political party. They were set up to keep the NDP out and they won by massive margins. My old boss, Art Lang, with whom I first came to Ottawa, used to tell this story. There was a coalition minister who would get up on the stage—and have a drink or two before—during election campaigns and say, “The issue is simple. You'll have us or you'll have worse.” That's what you get in polarized politics. Does that sound like “You'll have plan B or you'll have worse”? I think it does.

So the polarization in ROC versus Quebec, that's the first one I speak of. There's a strange ambivalence in ROC. You see bumper stickers that say, “My Canada includes Quebec.” You also hear the same people say that Quebec is the squeaky wheel that gets all the grease, and that annoys them. You hear people in British Columbia say that in B.C. we have almost 60% of the population of Quebec and we don't get 10% of the helpful attention. This gets noticed over the years.

ROC listens to Bill C-20 and says, hey, government, you're laying down the law to Quebec, you're saying to put up or shut up, good for you. On the other side, Quebec listens to the government on Bill C-20 and they hear something different. Now obviously Quebec is not a monolithic thing, but the main message is this: go ahead and do whatever you want on the unity file and we will change the rules as required to make sure nothing happens.

So once again, the middle ground, which is plan A, which is cooperation, gets frozen out. Inside Quebec, the polarization is plan B versus sovereignty. It's a dilemma for federalists. I have visited Quebec three times, at some length, since this bill was introduced. The federalists don't dare propose constructive change in the federation for fear of rejection and therefore a loss of credibility. It's a dilemma for sovereigntist nationalists who don't dare relinquish the only real lever, even upon the advice of Mr. Lisée, and it's a dilemma for both in the sense of not daring to cooperate.

I hope that all of this friction is what I call an unintended consequence, because any measure that unnecessarily sets one Canadian against another is bad, and that surely can't be intended—but the above polarization is a real and observable phenomenon already.

My final point: the bill, for the first time, provides for secession in the law of Canada, with dangerous potential consequences.

Point one: what is lawful becomes respectable. During my lifetime, the following were all illegal: abortion, gambling, homosexuality, Sunday movies, and sports. The first three were not only illegal, they were seriously frowned upon. All were legalized. All became mainstream and respectable.

Was the law to some extent following society? Yes. But did change in the law accelerate the trend to respectability? Without doubt. And Bill C-20, I say, will help to make notions of secession respectable outside Quebec.

Point two: British Columbia has a small secessionist movement. At last polling, about 15% thought the province should consider the secessionist option. This is consistent with 130 years of B.C. history. The Nova Scotia legislature did vote once for secession. The B.C. legislature did so twice.

Point three: British Columbians love Canada, but they don't like Ottawa. On virtually every file where the national capital is involved it's considered part of the problem, not part of the solution.

Ottawa only does four important things in British Columbia. First, Ottawa extracts about $20.5 billion annually and sends about $16 billion back, including paying our share of the military and embassies and so on. This is a net loss of about 4% of our GDP from a province whose GDP per capita has fallen to only 95% of the Canadian average. We are no longer a have province. Quebec, of course, also not a have province, is, on net balance, subsidized to about 2% of its GDP.

Financials aside, Ottawa operates three major programs in British Columbia: aboriginal, fishery, and immigration. All are disasters. And of course, under our current parliamentary structure, British Columbia has virtually no clout in Ottawa as long as we are fractious enough to elect opposition members. It's inconceivable that even a British Columbia provincial government—of course we're famous for our political jokes and have elected many of them—could run these three files so badly. People in B.C. know this.

• 1630

Now, notwithstanding our view of Ottawa, British Columbians love Canada, but those ties, I suggest to you, are ties of sentiment and inertia, not practicality. British Columbia could afford independence far more easily than could Quebec.

Point four: Bill C-20 will apply as much to B.C. as to Quebec, but in B.C. clarity as to wording would be no issue. Bill C-20 adds nothing to Canada, not even in remote theory, but it subtracts something. It makes separation lawful and therefore puts it on the road to respectability. When you pass this bill, as I assume you will do, you set a time bomb ticking on Canada's west coast that we will all have to try to control—but why do you want to start the clock on the respectability of separation?

My conclusion? Bill C-20 adds nothing useful to Canada. On the other side of the ledger, it gives some a false sense of security. It polarizes and thereby poisons the civil dialogue. It sets free unpredictable forces outside of Quebec that may return to haunt us. This is a bill best forgotten.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Gibson.

Ms. Meredith.

Ms. Val Meredith: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Coming from British Columbia, I appreciate your comments, Mr. Gibson. I want you to deal with the bill. I know you think it's best forgotten and left alone, but it doesn't reference the bar. You have alluded to the 50% plus one, that it would certainly send a message if it were in the affirmative and that it would certainly be very hard for any government to ignore. Do you feel that not mentioning the 50% plus one, or not setting a bar, is an adequate response to that?

Mr. Gordon Gibson: I would answer that in two ways. First of all, I am firmly of the belief that 50% plus one changes the world. The day that happens you are into negotiations, whether you want to be or not. So in that sense, it's perhaps.... I'm not saying that it's an irrelevant question; it's an important question. But that's really my answer to it. Were I the government, I would maintain the ambiguity of not having named a number, I have to say.

Ms. Val Meredith: If you were the government, you would leave the ambiguity in...?

Mr. Gordon Gibson: Yes—

Ms. Val Meredith: And not mention a number...?

Mr. Gordon Gibson: —but I would make it very clear that 50% plus one changes the world.

Ms. Val Meredith: Okay.

Mr. Gordon Gibson: I would not take the position that this would inevitably lead to the end of Canada. Now you might perhaps argue that this bill doesn't inevitably lead to the end of Canada, that it only leads to negotiations. I would be happy to dialogue on that and maybe we would come to an understanding.

Ms. Val Meredith: We've had many expressions of what it would mean. Some have said that it would not mean anything, that it wouldn't matter if 95% of the population of Quebec chose to support a referendum, the government would be in no way obligated to do anything more than talk. Others suggested that there would never be any acceptance of any negotiation, that it would be a failed exercise before it even starts.

We've also had the dialogue here about how if Canada is able to be partitioned, so then should Quebec be. Do you buy into that argument or do you feel that we should just stay away completely from that discussion?

Mr. Gordon Gibson: Once you open the question of territory, you open an even wider black hole. I think you have to respond to extremely strong suggestions of local sentiment; I think everybody would be wise to do that. In my opinion, territorial boundaries are extremely sensitive and should not be used as bargaining chips. Really, when you come down to it, it's one more reason not to talk about plan B. There are so many dark alleys here. I've done a lot of writing about it.

Mr. Dion, in his testimony to this committee, made the case that the federal government would have the upper hand in any unilateral declaration of independence, for example. Well, maybe, but maybe not. There are a lot of possibilities that he didn't mention in his testimony. The sole use of discussing territoriality, I think, is to encourage people to stay out of this black hole. For that reason, I'll discuss it, but if we ever get into that hole, this is going to be one big mess.

• 1635

Ms. Val Meredith: There has been an assumption around this table that in the event Quebec were to decide to secede from Canada, what you referred to, ROC, would exist, with just the omission of Quebec. My final question is this: do you feel that the rest of Canada would remain as an entity, with just Quebec being on their own, or do you see changes to the rest of Canada, to the other parts of Canada?

Mr. Gordon Gibson: I see no possibility whatsoever that ROC would carry with the existing Constitution minus Quebec. I would give it 50-50 that ROC would carry on in some kind of loose confederation—the other 50% that it would break up into two or three other states, of which certainly B.C., Alberta, and Ontario would be viable. The others would have to find partners.

Ms. Val Meredith: Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Turp.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I would like to thank Mr. Gibson for appearing before this committee. He is one of the last witnesses we will be hearing from, the 38th, if my memory serves me correctly. We should have had 45, but there will only be 39.

What I've always appreciated about Gordon Gibson is his interest in Quebec. This interest stems from a will to understand Quebec, to go there, to talk to Quebeckers and to find out what they think by actually talking to them rather than simply finding out about them through the pages of the Globe and Mail, the Vancouver Sun or now the National Post. I think this is why you're not convinced about the value of this bill, and that you are probably aware of the fact that, in Quebec, there is a consensus against the bill. There is no unanimity.

My colleague Blaikie has implied that at times there are dissenting opinions. This is true, there are dissenting opinions, we would have to agree to that. However, there's a very big consensus in Quebec against this bill, and you have probably realized this during your recent trips to Quebec.

I'm also happy to see that elsewhere in Canada, there is an observer of the political scene who has pointed out that Stéphane Dion's arguments are not convincing, that the arguments that he presented here and elsewhere do not convince him, nor do they convince many people in Quebec.

In framing my question, Mr. Gibson, I would like to use your own words because I find them interesting. They more or less follow along the same lines of what our friend Bachand has often said here: "Bill C-20"—and I will use your words—give "a false sense of security".

But I would like to hear what you have to say, and I hope that you're going to be able to say it, about whether or not this creates a sense of real disempowerment in Quebec. We now talk about empowerment a great deal, but, in Quebec, there is this feeling that this bill is about disempowerment. Mr. Ryan talked about custodianship. Is that the feeling you got after visiting Quebec these past few weeks?

[English]

Mr. Gordon Gibson: Certainly I would not be so bold as to supplement anything that Mr. Ryan said. I read his testimony. I was very much impressed with it. I agreed with most of it.

There can be no question but what the bill is an attempt to change the balance of power in the minds of Quebeckers, if that's what you mean by disempowerment. Whether that will be successful or not.... I presume that's the calculation. I think it's very much a roll of the dice. We haven't seen how this plays out in the end. We've seen some polls that have indicated a slight increase in the popularity of the government. On the other hand, the sovereignty polls remain very weak. But these things go up and down. It's too early to tell how it will impact on that, I think.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Mr. Gibson, you have written interesting books. I really liked Thirty Million Musketeers. You have promoted your plan A for a long time. What do you think of Stéphane Dion's plan B and its end result, Bill C-20?

[English]

Mr. Gordon Gibson: I don't know all of the details of Mr. Dion's plan B. I've given my opinion on Bill C-20. Certainly my opinion is plan A. A good deal of deep decentralization is what is required. I can't go further than that.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: If I may, Mr. Chairman?

It seems to me that plan B was comprised of several components: there was this whole debate on territorial integrity, this debate on the refusal to allow Quebeckers to speak on the international scene and to contradict them on the international scene and now Bill C-20.

• 1640

Do you think that this will help plan A, whether it be your plan or any other plan, be more palatable to Quebeckers?

[English]

Mr. Gordon Gibson: My guess is that a significantly decentralist plan A would have a chance of getting the support of Quebeckers—at least that's what the polls tell us. That is what the Léger and Léger polling cited in Lisée's latest book tells us. The far more difficult problem is for a significant plan A to get the support of Ottawa.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Of the Liberal Party?

Mr. Gordon Gibson: I simply speak of the city. There are many people here I don't know.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Blaikie.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I must say, though it's not the first time I've been wrong, that I kind of half-expected Mr. Gibson to come here and be in favour of Bill C-20, so I'm surprised—not pleasantly or unpleasantly. It's just one of those things. Sometimes you predict that people will have a certain view and they don't.

He started out by talking about ROC, which is the way he likes to talk about the rest of Canada, and the difficulty that ROC politicians have with Bill C-20.

I think we saw a good example of that—I don't know whether you saw it—yesterday when Mr. Clark making arguments not dissimilar to yours. The Reform Party hauled in Mr. Lowther, who is Mr. Clark's potential opponent in Calgary Centre, and who was allegedly going to really make life tough for Mr. Clark because here was Mr. Clark going to be sort of supporting the separatists. I think that was a foreshadowing or an example of the type of politics you were alluding to there.

But I wonder whether part of the problem that you have with Bill C-20 is that it of course applies to all the provinces, not just to Quebec. I wonder whether this is an outcome of the doctrine of the equality of the provinces. Certainly at one point in the debate about Quebec separation, it would have been taken as a given among Canadians that it was really only Quebec that had the status of a province that would separate. You really weren't thinking about Manitoba and British Columbia and whatever.

Yet the bill we have before us never mentions Quebec: it talks about provinces. This is one of the unintended consequences, if you like, to use your own phrase, of the emphasis on the equality of the provinces, which comes out of the Trudeau years and out of the Reform mentality, such that we couldn't conceivably have an asymmetrical Bill C-20, that is to say, a bill that referred only to Quebec.

Would that have been any better? It wouldn't have put the time bomb under the rest of Canada, like you've referred to.

Mr. Gordon Gibson: In my opinion, asymmetry in operational terms is fine, but in legal terms it is almost never justifiable, and I wouldn't argue for it in this bill either.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: In terms of your plan A, part of the problem with coming up.... I argued for this. The NDP recently went through an exercise where we came up with our own version of a plan A. I think there has been a lot of good work done in more than one political party. The problem is, we don't all agree on what a good plan A is. Your plan A is probably too decentralizing for me, and the NDP plan A has aspects that you don't like—and the Liberals don't have a plan A, but anyway, that's another matter.

It seems to me that the real problem is in trying to meet that sort of symbolic, constitutional dimension of Quebec's aspirations within Canada, which sometimes has gone.... It has been called

[Translation]

two nations.

[English]

It has been called special status. It has been called distinct society. In the Calgary declaration, it was called unique character. It has been called all kinds of things. Does your plan A include something like that? Does it try to meet that need? Or do you just think it's a sort of uniform decentralization that doesn't do that?

• 1645

Mr. Gordon Gibson: My plan A has three broad aspects. One is institutions of the federation. The second is the balance of powers. The third is what I call constitutional security and identity.

There are two ways, in my opinion—and let me use a business analogy—to envisage Canada. One is that Canada is a merger of its constituent parts, which then disappear and submerge their identity. The other is that Canada is a joint venture, wherein the constituent parts retain some measure of their identity and retain in particular, as lawyers doing joint venture agreements will know, a veto over major decisions. To me, Canada has evolved into having more of the characteristics of a joint venture. Therefore, to me, the constitutional veto is important and I endorse it. I think the current formula as set by the Parliament of Canada is not a bad one, incidentally.

Then you get to the question of the expression of identity. How do you do that without asymmetry?

My solution to that—we can debate whether it would work—is a sufficiently deep devolution of power, like, for example, a complete devolution of powers over language to all of the provinces. It might only be used by one, but at least you've retained that legal symmetry and allowed more flexibility to the part of the country that's very concerned about one particular thing for it to deal with that one particular thing. Whether at the end of the day Quebec would, as a province, be satisfied in being treated the same as all the others, even if this gave Quebec all it wants, I don't know. To me, it would be rational to be, but people are not always rational in politics. It's the best solution I can give.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Bachand.

Mr. André Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Gibson, thank you very much for testifying here. I have made this point today, as I have just about every day, that it is not easy for a federalist party to be against the bill. We have good days; we have bad days. Sometimes things go well; sometimes they don't. It is clear that the fight will continue in the Senate, that is for sure. We will not give up.

Following along the lines of where Mr. Blaikie was heading... You said that C-20 was a time bomb for all of the provinces. Indeed, the word "Quebec" does not appear in the body of the bill and I have raised this issue in the House on several occasions during the debate on C-20. Essentially, the Liberals have understood one thing. Had the bill been focused solely on Quebec, even if Quebec had been mentioned in the title, in the preamble or in the Supreme Court opinion, it wouldn't be a time bomb. It was a bomb, in the political sense of the word, that would have immediately gone off in Quebec. The reaction would have been absolutely vicious because their polls showed that putting the word "Quebec" would be seen as a direct federal interference in the province of Quebec's decision making. So they as my grandfather used to say, lost their balls—I don't know how that's going to be translated—as far as this issue is concerned and he decided to sidestep the question in the bill.

As for the other aspect, you come from western Canada. You talk about provinces. It is absolutely unreal to see how your province, the provinces in the country, have failed to realize to what extent their jurisdiction, their constitutional power, has been diluted. They have turned over their say in the matter to the federal government, the issue is now in the hands of 160, 155 federal members of Parliament. It is the federal government, Mr. Gibson, who's going to be deciding whether or not the question is clear, whether the majority is clear, and will be telling you, in British Columbia: "You negotiate or you do not negotiate". It's the federal government who's going to be telling you this, when in fact the Supreme Court said that this is not how things should unfold.

I would like to ask you—and I know that C-20 is not always a topic of conversation in the Tim Hortons of western Canada—, but which message could you give to the people in the rest of Canada, in the rest of the country, with respect to C-20? You have said that it's very popular. Everyone is in favour of virtue, clarity, clear majority, etc. What message could you help us convey to the people outside of Quebec, or throughout Canada, finally, about the uselessness of Bill C-20?

• 1650

[English]

Mr. Gordon Gibson: I have to report to you, sir, that first of all, in British Columbia the fact that it would in some way circumscribe any question we might ask is no problem, because any British Columbia separatist would simply ask “Do you want to leave Canada?”, and I take it that's a clear question.

It doesn't circumscribe the much more likely thing we would like to do, which is to take advantage of the part of the Supreme Court decision that indicates that other partners in Confederation would have to respond positively to a constitutional initiative. The bill doesn't cover that, so that's no problem.

As for my view of how most people in British Columbia think about Bill C-20, there are not a lot of them who think of it at all, but those who do are inclined to say hurray for the federal government; they're finally drawing the line in the sand with Quebec.

That is part of the polarization of which I spoke. That's not a useful new thing to introduce into a relationship.

Mr. André Bachand: Thank you, sir.

The Chair: Mr. Alcock.

Mr. Reg Alcock: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Gibson. It's always interesting to meet a former western Liberal colleague. I also am from the west, although not quite as far west as you are. You have a manner of speaking in which you seem to create stories or images that I find very helpful. It's an interesting way to deal with questions, but I'm just trying to pick my way through what the position is.

You started off by saying that you thought the court had made a reasonable decision, and that it was sufficient, that we didn't need the bill. Then you described a scenario that could occur, should there be a vote to separate in Quebec, with the image of Paul Martin on the phone to New York, saying, look, I have this tool, and closing it out by people selling the loonie.

It strikes me, if you accept the court decision, that the other scenario is that a vote takes place, legitimized by the court decision you support—clear question, clear vote, obligation to negotiate, obligation to sit down—and that produces the worst scenario. There's no framework for that discussion. There's no involvement of the partners. There's nothing predictable, and in my experience, New York, London, Zurich, and Tokyo like predictability.

So which would be the worst scenario?

Mr. Gordon Gibson: Every analysis I have made of this suggests to me that if and when we ever get a vote that calls into the question the continuity of Canada, the financial circumstances will rapidly become so painful as to dictate very rapid resolution of the questions.

Now, the difficulty, as you indicate, is that the modalities of negotiation are unknown. Think of Pierre Trudeau's famous phrase, “Who speaks for Canada?” Once there is a vote, 50% plus one, does a prime minister from Quebec any longer speak from Canada? Does he have to have a coalition government? Does he have to form a council of premiers?

So you are into serious mechanical problems, and you have an outside world that says, well, we want this done right now or we are selling that loonie and we're not putting any more dollars in there. Interests rates then go up and things become quite painful.

That, to me, has always been a reason why we should do, in advance, a lot of talk and a lot of modelling about what we'll do if it ever comes to pass.

I don't mean to be noisy about it, and I don't mean to alarm people, but in 1995 there was no federal contingency plan except whatever existed in the bowels of the Bank of Canada, where there was something. That must never happen again, because if and when we ever get to that situation, it ain't the clarity act that's going to bail us out. It's the fact that somebody has thought ahead and they know exactly how to deal with these problems and who the players are going to be. They'll be on board with a concept.

Mr. Reg Alcock: But is there not a difficulty, given your acceptance of the court decision and the dictates of the court decision around the question and the majority, in not having a process to define that at the time the vote is taking place, and adding to the confusion?

• 1655

Mr. Gordon Gibson: You speak of my “accepting” the court decision. I didn't know I had an option.

Mr. Reg Alcock: Oh, oh. That's a very good response.

Mr. Gordon Gibson: No, what I'm saying is, the more important confusions will be that once you get into that mess, how do you get out of it? The clarity bill says on its face that Quebec can ask any question it wants, so it will, if it ever comes to that, and it'll get an answer. That's the reality that confronts you. Now you'll have to deal with that, and you'll have to deal with it very quickly.

Mr. Reg Alcock: [Editor's Note: Inaudible]...to negotiate on any question.

Mr. Gordon Gibson: I suggest that Ottawa would negotiate if there's a requirement to negotiate. It doesn't matter what it is. If the world is starting to go sideways very quickly, everybody will need to negotiate.

Mr. Reg Alcock: If.

Mr. Chair, I think Mr. Cotler also has an interest in this question.

The Chair: Mr. Cotler.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: Mr. Gibson, I thought your presentation was a thoughtful and provocative one. We would require more time than we have to join issue on it.

I want to address myself to one particular aspect of it, and that's where you say you oppose this legislation because, among other things, it legitimizes the right to secession. Are you suggesting that Quebec has no right to self-determination or to secession or that the right to secede should not be part of our Constitution?

You said also the Supreme Court decision was sufficient. But even without this bill, the Supreme Court had already legitimized, if you will, the secessionist enterprise under certain conditions. I find it hard to see why you say the bill legitimizes this process when that process had already been legitimized by the Supreme Court.

Mr. Gordon Gibson: The court did indeed say that, sir. I agree with you. I would not dispute your view, as I understand it, and certainly the view of Mr. Dion, as articulated, that Canada is one of the few countries in the world that has taken the position that its constituent parts do have the right, under certain terms, to separate.

What I'm saying is that an affirmative act of the Government of Canada to spell out how that is done gives it an additional level of respectability that I think is unfortunate.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: Well, if there is a measure of respectability, I think that has already come from the Supreme Court of Canada. That, I think, brings us to the point that if there is a right to self-determination and secession, is it not appropriate to have a legal code of conduct as to how to get there? In other words, the substantive right to secession has already been determined by the Supreme Court. The procedural norms have already been set down by the Supreme Court. That is to say, it's the federal government's duty to negotiate if the question is clear and there's a clear majority in support of that clear question on secession.

Having set down already the substantive right, having set down the procedural norms, and having said that it is now up to the political actors to make those specific determinations, is it not only, as many of the constitutional experts who've come before this committee have said, including Peter Hogg, a right of the federal government, as one of the designated political actors, but indeed also its duty to give expression to those very clarity principles as set forth by the Supreme Court in terms of a legal framework or road map towards the negotiation of secession?

Mr. Gordon Gibson: We could have a useful debate on that, Mr. Cotler, if we could find a way to deal with everything, if we could find a way to say, now, these are going to be the negotiating parties; there will be a premiers' council called together within x days; there will be an international arbitrator appointed to look at the debt, and so on.

If you thought it wise to get into that kind of specific modality, I'd be glad to have that intellectual debate with you. I might indeed agree with you at the end of it; I'm not sure. But the court laid down very general guidelines, and in my opinion, it is unwise for the government to give further blessing to that. I think it should have left that sleeping dog lie there and said thank you very much.

The government, in my opinion, would have been wiser not to go for the court reference at all, because you always roll the dice there. They were surprised in the end. But never mind; that's what we have now. I just think they should have left that dog lie.

The Chair: Mr. Gibson, I know it's time for you to go, but Mr. Hill has a question, I think, or he's going to make a comment.

Mr. Grant Hill: Is the time too tight for you?

The Chair: We have a taxi waiting.

Mr. Gordon Gibson: Lots of time.

The Chair: You're all right, then.

Mr. Grant Hill: One thing you haven't addressed is something that, to my mind, is pivotal to this issue. The question in the past referendum was ambiguous and confusing, to many minds. The Supreme Court said a clear question was necessary for the negotiation to take place.

• 1700

This bill, imperfect though it is—and I think your criticism can be taken a long way—is going to give us a better question than we had before, in my view. I believe the discussion and debate we're having around this table and in the newspapers and in Le Droit will give us a better question, no matter what comes out of this.

Would you agree with that position?

Mr. Gordon Gibson: I agree with you that the debate is very helpful. I would not agree that the bill will, in the end, make any difference to the question, because my argument is that if a question with any tincture of sovereignty attached to it ever gets more than 50% plus one, you are into a new world, and I don't know how that world will unfold. The only thing I know is that a lot of control is lost at that point.

To me, then, the bill adds nothing to that. But the debate's been wonderful.

Mr. Grant Hill: Because I trust the Quebec people, who are democratic, who truly pay attention to democracy, I trust that this debate is going to generate a far different question that the ones we've had in the past. Because I'm certain of that, I think this bill could be set aside now and we will end up with a different question than we had before.

Voices: Hear, hear!

The Chair: Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Did I in fact hear that the bill could be set aside, did I understand correctly? This is good news from the Reform Party and, as a matter of fact, I think that you are right, Mr. Hill. It's a question of having confidence in a people, in its capacity to determine, on its own, its future as it has tried to do, and as it has done up until now, with respect to being part of the federation. Mr. Gibson, isn't confidence something that is earned more by respect than by laws?

[English]

Mr. Gordon Gibson: Well, Mr. Turp, I don't quite know what you're asking me to say. Obviously I think trust is better than lies. I don't differ with you on that. But I don't quite know where that gets us.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: I don't know if you understood.

[English]

I said not “lies” but “laws”, as in legislation. That's what I was mentioning.

Mr. Gordon Gibson: Okay.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Do you think the confidence or the trust of Quebeckers could be obtained not by legislation but by respect?

Mr. Gordon Gibson: I think respect is the ultimate foundation for law—mutual respect, mutual consent of the governed. This is the basis for a civil society. There's no question about that.

If your point is that this legislation does not increase the level of trust, I would agree with that. I would reiterate my own point that I think the level of trust would be better increased by a willingness to entertain a dialogue about a renewal of the federation, one that said I understand the difficulty, the complexities, and the worries of all the parties that if they take their cards a little bit away from their chests, somebody might exploit them, but this is an issue that has tied our country in knots for over a generation. I've grown old watching the political process, watching this damn problem engage the energies of all of our leaders and tie our country in knots. It seems to me we have to do something better. To me, that's something along the lines of plan A, not plan B.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Do you think this bill entertains or favours a dialogue between Canada and even Quebec federalists?

Mr. Gordon Gibson: I've given my view that this bill polarizes and thereby poisons the dialogue.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Gibson, for your time today. I hope you catch your flight. We've ordered a taxi for you. I hope it's out there.

Mr. Gordon Gibson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you again for your testimony. We appreciate very much the time you've taken to be here.

• 1705

• 1707

The Chair: Order, please.

Our next witness is Frances Abele, a professor with the School of Public Administration at Carleton University.

Thank you very much for coming this afternoon, Professor Abele. We appreciate your attendance very much. I think you're our last witness this afternoon.

I don't know whether you're aware, but our rules give you ten minutes to make a presentation to us, followed by 35 minutes maximum of questions from the members.

We look forward to your remarks. You have the floor.

Ms. Frances Abele (Individual Presentation): Thank you very much.

Thank you for hearing me at the end of a very long process. I want to speak to the question of the process, mainly the process you're considering as it affects aboriginal people.

For most of the 20th century, Canadian governments and very many Canadians dealt with aboriginal peoples in one of two ways. I think most people assume that indigenous peoples were doomed to extinction, that they would disappear as peoples and assimilate into Canadian society.

Federal and some provincial policies, however, went farther than this. Active efforts were made to destroy the traditional institutions of governance, religion, and cultural transmission and to assimilate individuals, especially children, into the broader Canadian society.

Sacred ceremonies were outlawed and driven underground, while a serious effort was made to prevent aboriginal children from learning their own languages and the skills their ancestors had used for survival.

Until the amendment of the Indian Act in the early 1950s, it was illegal for Indians to raise funds for the purpose of collective political representation. In many places, people living on reserves required a pass from an Indian agent in order to work for wages off the reserve. Until 1960, status Indians were not allowed to vote in federal elections on the apparent reasoning that one could not at once be aboriginal and Canadian.

The federal government recently apologized for this phase in our history in the statement of reconciliation that formed part of its response to the final report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. The rest of the federal response, contained in the document Gathering Strength, attempts to identify the specific steps that will be taken towards the establishment of a healthier relationship between aboriginal people and the rest of Canada.

• 1710

The federal response to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples and the policy statements of many other governments, including the Government of Quebec, acknowledge that the political struggles of the last 30 years have turned matters around.

We have launched in Canada a courageous experiment in recognizing and nurturing aboriginal self-government within the country of Canada. This complex, difficult, and risky work has caught the imagination of the world.

The establishment of a Nunavut government, the signing of the Nisga'a treaty, and the evolving institutions of Nunavik and many other initiatives all indicate that serious work of good faith continues as the reality of the diversity of self-governing aboriginal nations, peoples, and communities is recognized.

This work is in the spirit of the final report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, which recommended a respectful and future-oriented renegotiation of the relationship between aboriginal peoples and the rest of Canada.

It is also, of course, in the spirit of the policy of the Government of Quebec on aboriginal policy, which, since 1984, has recognized the existence and the rights of aboriginal nations within Quebec. It was the first provincial government to do this.

In light of the important progress in recent times, it is ironic and remarkable that Bill C-20 does not include the aboriginal peoples as full parties to any of the processes and discussions that will have a fundamental bearing on their lives. The principles of negotiation and consent of the government animate the bill.

While there is heated debate about the bill itself and about many specific points, such as the way in which a clear majority is to be determined, no one can doubt that Bill C-20 envisions no forced assimilation and no ethnically based domination—except, of course, of the indigenous peoples who live in Quebec, whose fate will be decided by others.

I cannot believe this outcome is the intention of the Government of Canada. It will be necessary to amend the bill to ensure that the right of consent to government and the right to negotiate are also extended to the indigenous nations. This means they must be involved as equal partners in every stage of the process outlined in the legislation.

I think such amendments are congruent with constitutional law—indeed, they merely give flesh-and-bones expression to it—and also with federal and provincial policy.

I would like to conclude by reading a short passage from the statement of reconciliation:

Reconciliation is an ongoing process. In renewing our partnership, we must ensure that the mistakes which marked our past relationship are not repeated. The Government of Canada recognizes that policies that sought to assimilate Aboriginal people, women and men, were not the way to build a strong country. We must instead continue to find ways in which Aboriginal people can participate fully in the economic, political, cultural and social life of Canada in a manner which preserves and enhances the collective identities of Aboriginal communities.

I would say about this only that the statement of reconciliation began a process, an important national process, and this is no time to quit.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much for your presentation, Ms. Abele.

Ms. Meredith will be the first questioner.

Ms. Val Meredith: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Ms. Abele, for attending. You obviously are concerned about the lack of consultation as identified in Bill C-20 for the aboriginal community and the Inuit community. Do you have any other concerns with the legislation? Are you concerned about the lack of clarification as to the bar, as to a clear majority? Are you comfortable that the clear question is not really defined?

Ms. Frances Abele: Well, I came here on a mission. I wanted to raise the issue of the participation of first nations and Inuit. I have views on the other matters, but I know you've heard from a lot of people on these questions, and I don't think I have much to add to the discussions you've had.

• 1715

But I do urge you to consider the constitutional question I raised with regard to participation. I wasn't speaking merely of consultation but also of participation.

The model for that is the treaty process that began the relationship between Canada and first nations, and indeed between Quebec and first nations. That nation-to-nation negotiation, the principle of negotiating freely to reach an agreement, is the one I'm drawing to your attention.

Ms. Val Meredith: If Quebec is successful in a referendum that enables them to negotiate to leave Canada, do you then believe the first nations people should also be able to negotiate as a “nation”, to use your reference, to leave the province of Quebec and remain with Canada?

Ms. Frances Abele: Yes. The same rights apply to them—at least—as to the people of Quebec.

Ms. Val Meredith: We heard in testimony earlier today that the aboriginal communities, particularly in the James Bay agreement, gave up their rights to the land in that treaty process, which would maybe call into question whether or not they actually have the ownership of the land in order to remove it or to keep it in Canada, as it would.

Do you have any comment on that?

Ms. Frances Abele: Yes. In my view, the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement has to be considered a modern treaty. It's protected in the Constitution Act of 1982, and it's recognized in that way. What it does is set out the terms of the agreement between the Cree and then the Naskapi of northern Quebec and the other signatories to the agreement. No one who signed that gave up being aboriginal.

Ms. Val Meredith: No, but what they did is extinguish their title, or I guess their claim to the land, because there was an extinguishment of land titles.

Ms. Frances Abele: There was an extinguishment of some land rights. What they did was clarify the title to the land. Some of the land, some of their original territory, remains in their ownership, but another part of it they have agreed to share.

Ms. Val Meredith: Your response to that, then, is that they didn't, in this James Bay treaty, extinguish all of their inherent rights.

Ms. Frances Abele: No, they didn't extinguish any of their inherent rights. What they did was reach an agreement about land rights and other political matters with the other interested parties.

Ms. Val Meredith: Thank you.

The Chair: Monsieur Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Mr. Chairman, I have no questions for the moment.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Blaikie.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: I'm glad Professor Abele had a chance to clarify that about the James Bay agreement, because a couple of times it's been suggested that somehow something was given up. The fact is, it was a treaty, and one of the signatories to the treaty was the federal government with the James Bay Cree, with the Naskapi. The separation or secession of Quebec, to the extent that it would change the treaty, would require the agreement of all the signatories to the agreement.

So just by virtue of that agreement alone and by virtue of the constitutionalization of that agreement in section 35 of the Constitution, the aboriginal people of Quebec are a political actor, and a constitutional actor. That's why I was so taken aback by the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs at the beginning of this process, when he said, well, the reason he hadn't put the aboriginal people on the list of people to be consulted was that they weren't constitutional actors. Yet when we pressed him, he had included the territories, who aren't required for a constitutional amendment. So it wasn't clear just what kind of thinking the minister was engaging in there, except the usual oversight that is so common.

I find myself kind of reliving history here. The reason that aboriginal rights—unfortunately, the wording is “existing” aboriginal rights, because that was put in at the last minute in 1982—are in there at all is that in a previous constitutional debate, that was the price of NDP support for the patriation package, that there be a recognition of aboriginal rights.

• 1720

Yet here, many years later, we find history repeating itself. I hope it repeats itself in the sense that I hope the Liberal government eventually puts it in, having left it out, in the way that they put it in having left it out in the patriation package. But we're not at that point in this process, and this Liberal government doesn't seem to crave the kind of broader-based legitimacy that Prime Minister Trudeau sought at that point by wanting to have as many political parties on side as he could in order to legitimize the patriation process.

Here we seem to have a government that is more willing to go it alone, to not entertain any amendments, and to just be kind of closed-minded about it. So I'm very happy that you were able to come here, and on a mission, as you said. I hope your mission succeeds, because your mission is my mission on this committee on behalf of the NDP. We've moved amendments, or we've tabled amendments, I should say; it looks like we're not going to be able to move these amendments in committee at this time. We're going to have to deal with them in the House eventually and that will be a much less satisfactory process.

I'm not grilling you. I agree with you. I take your point about assimilation and a lot of bad karma coming home to roost in all the suits against the churches and the government over the residential school question. It certainly is a social tragedy, and it is having consequences that extend far beyond anything the people had in mind at the time.

Feel free, Ms. Abele.

Ms. Frances Abele: I'm very glad to live in a country that is unwilling to live with that legacy, that is unwilling to say, well, that happened and you have to live with it. We're in the process of inventing a new way of living together so that people can live in their collectivities and be Canadian.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: You wouldn't know that from Bill C-20 so far.

Ms. Frances Abele: No. The bill lacks consistency with the rest of federal Liberal policy. It contradicts the response to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Gathering Strength.

The Chair: Ms. Redman.

Mrs. Karen Redman: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much for coming here today. Obviously you've made studying aboriginal issues your life's work, and it's very impressive.

When Phil Fontaine was here before the committee, he made this statement on behalf of the Assembly of First Nations:

...we fully, thoroughly and completely endorse the spirit and the intent of Bill C-20. Legislation that protects Canada, and assists First Nations, in resisting any attempt to affect the constitutional, governmental or territorial integrity of Canada without full participation and consent of all Canadians and of First Nations, is welcome.

I'm wondering if you would support the view expressed by the Assembly of First Nations with regard to the spirit and the intent of Bill C-20.

Ms. Frances Abele: Again, I didn't come here to offer a general comment on the bill. I must say that I'm in the process of making my mind up about it. I am a passionate Canadian. I also live in Quebec. I want very much for us to invent a kind of Canada where everyone is at home. Whether this bill at this time is the right measure is a matter of political judgment.

Mrs. Karen Redman: This morning we heard from Minister Facal from Quebec. He's the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs. When we asked about his government's position on aboriginal peoples' rights to self-determination in a sovereign Quebec, he made a startling statement to the effect that international law says that aboriginal peoples must settle this right to self-determination within the existing state, but that this rule did not apply to the people of Quebec, that they had the right to exercise a right of self-determination. I'm wondering how you would react to this.

Ms. Frances Abele: What's the right that doesn't apply to the indigenous people of Quebec? I couldn't quite hear you.

Mrs. Karen Redman: I'm sorry.

His view was that within international law, in regard to aboriginal peoples' right to self-determination, to be sovereign, they have to deal within the existing state to do that, whereas the people of Quebec are not bound by this, as they have the right to self-determination. So he's really talking about having two rule books, one for the aboriginals and one for the peoples of Quebec.

• 1725

Ms. Frances Abele: Well, that's not an interpretation that I would support, but I'm not a lawyer. That doesn't seem likely to be true to me.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: That's to your credit.

The Chair: Are there any other questions?

[Translation]

Mr. Turp.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Am I to understand that this is one of the last interventions, Mr. Chairman?

The Chair: At this time, yes.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Ms. Abele, as I politely told you earlier, you are the witness who is going to be privy to much more of a statement than a question on the work of this committee because this is one of the last opportunities we will have to speak here in committee.

To all of those citizens in Canada and in Quebec who have been listening to us, to all our colleagues who have participated in the work of this committee, I would like to remind you that the work of this committee is drawing to a close and that Bill C-20 will be passed by the committee as a result of another closure motion, at 12:15 today, which means that we will have to conclude our work by 10:15 p.m., in less than five hours.

The Liberal Party of Canada has accustomed us to this type of practice. It has already applied closure 63 times during the course of this session and it is still difficult to get used to this. It is almost impossible to get accustomed to this type of practice which is undemocratic.

This motion, the one which was carried at 12:15, is, as my colleagues have already pointed out, basically antidemocratic. Moreover, this motion compelled all of the opposition parties on this side of the table to leave the House of Commons together, at noon. This process which was imposed on us by the Liberal majority of this committee is also antidemocratic because it only enabled us to hear from a total of 39 witnesses, when in fact 45 were to have been heard or should have been heard. This motion also deprived all those people who asked to appear before this committee to be heard. It also prevented the committee from travelling to Quebec and the rest of Canada to hear the testimony and opinions of citizens who are unable to travel to the federal capital.

In addition to the legal or political parliamentary institutions, democracy is the power that the people give themselves in order to decide on their future. We often forget about this, as if democracy were immutable and did not to have to be defended day after day. Democracy, Mr. Chairman, is always fragile.

The bill currently being discussed in this room is designed very specifically to restrict the power of the Quebec people to make their own choices, to be masters of their future. Not only does Bill C-20 seek to disallow the decisions made by democratic institutions that Quebeckers have created for themselves over the years, but it also seeks to disallow, one day, the referendum results obtained by the people of Quebec.

The Prime Minister of Canada, Jean Chrétien, and the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Stéphane Dion, may well indeed repeat throughout the country that Quebec is free to make its own choice, but their bill says exactly the opposite. As Claude Ryan, a Quebec federalist, told this committee, Bill C-20 creates a custodianship system for Quebec.

Mr. Chairman, Parliament is an instrument of the will of the people, or it should be. This is an institution to serve the people which should never be used to serve a party. Over the past few days, this institution has been held hostage by the Liberal Party. It has been used to serve one party, a party that has applied closure numerous times to speed up the debate, a party that has rushed witnesses, rushed us, the members, here, a party that is probably holding in store, the parliamentary secretary probably already has this in the works for us, as it has become so foreseeable in this Parliament, other closure motions for report stage and third reading.

• 1730

[English]

The Chair: Mrs. Redman, on a point of order.

Order, please.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: A party that is turning Canada, Mr. Chairman, into a republic—

The Chair: Order, please. Order.

Ms. Redman.

[English]

Mrs. Karen Redman: Out of respect for our witness, my question would be, respectfully, to Mr. Turp: where's the question?

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Ms. Redman, we are in a period...we too have the right to make comments. I wanted to say that you are transforming your party, this country, into a republic where everything is gagged. That's your democracy, a gagging democracy. This does not do you any credit. This does not do any credit to a party that uses Parliament in an abusive way. This is a democracy, a republic where everything is gagged.

The Chair: The five minutes are up.

[English]

I think we've come to the conclusion of the questions, Ms. Abele. Thank you very much for your appearance this afternoon. We want to thank you for having taken the time to come here, and we appreciate all that you've said. I think it has been helpful to our committee.

Mr. Reg Alcock: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I truly agree with your thanks, and I would also like to point out that the staff from the ministry are here should there be a desire to debate anything substantive this evening.

The Chair: I thank Mr. Alcock for that.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: There is a motion.

Mr. Michel Guimond: We are talking on the motion.

[English]

The Chair: This afternoon we had a point of order by Mr. Alcock concerning the motion that the committee has been discussing, or at least that one of the members has been debating, at various opportunities when we've had breaks in the evidence before the committee.

[Translation]

Mr. Guimond was almost the only participant in this debate. I believe that Mr. Hill already said something about Mr. Alcock's motion. However, this motion, in my opinion, is not debatable by the committee.

[English]

This motion has been superseded by events in the House this morning, in the motion that was passed, and accordingly I rule the motion that Mr. Alcock had moved out of order, really. It has been superseded by events, and accordingly the debate on that motion is over.

[Translation]

Mr. Guimond, I believe that you have another motion that you would like to move. The motion, and we have received a notice of this motion, reads as follows:

That the motion related to the time allotted for the clause-by- clause review, adopted on February 14, 2000, by the Legislative Committee, be rescinded.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Yes.

[English]

The Chair: I think Monsieur Guimond will speak first to the motion since he's moving it.

[Translation]

Mr. Guimond.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In order to understand the context of this motion, I think that it would be appropriate to refer to the motion that this motion seeks to rescind because when, as you correctly read, the motion on time allocation for the clause-by-clause review adopted by the Legislative Committee on February 14, 2000 is rescinded, I thought it would be appropriate to inform all of our colleagues here as well as our television audience. What exactly is this motion that I have asked to rescind all about?

Mr. Chairman, the motion tabled by Reg Alcock reads as follows, and once again I refer to the minutes prepared by the clerk of the committee, Mr. Marc Toupin, where it is stipulated:

That, during the clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-20, no more than one hour be allotted for reviewing each clause and its subclauses, and that one additional hour be allotted for reviewing the preamble.

You will certainly recall, Mr. Chairman and dear colleague, that this motion was put to a vote and adopted in the following manner.

• 1735

The colleagues who voted in favour of the motion, and I will say who they are for the benefit of those who do not know how the vote went, are all from the Liberal majority, and the individuals who voted in favour of the motion were Mr. Alcock, Mr. Bonin, Mr. Cotler, Mr. Drouin, Mr. Mills, Mr. Patry, Ms. Redmand and Mr. Scott, for a total of eight members from the Liberal majority who voted for this motion moved by Mr. Alcock.

Those who voted against the motion included Mr. Bachand, Mr. Bellehumeur, Mr. Blaikie, Mr. Hill, Ms. Meredith and Mr. Turp, representing six votes. And it is for this reason, Mr. Chairman, that I am very pleased to speak on the motion that I have just introduced and that you have dealt with correctly. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that you have demonstrated a strong sense of democracy and you have shown that you have a very good knowledge of the Standing Orders by deeming this motion to be relevant and debatable.

Today, therefore, I would like, to a certain point, to talk to my colleagues, on behalf of the opposition because I feel that I am the only member of the opposition—the first member of the opposition, I should say—who is talking about this motion. Right now?

[English]

Mr. Bill Blaikie: It'll probably be the last, too.

Mr. Michel Guimond: I don't know.

[Translation]

And, Mr. Chairman, why are we against this motion? Because, if you look at the wording, we will be setting aside only one hour to review the preamble of such an important bill, we will be providing one hour, allocating one hour to review each clause in such an important bill. Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, I would submit that this is a denial of democracy. We know that the sole objective of this motion was to shorten the length of the debate on the bill, which has found no consensus in Quebec, and I think that my colleagues here have heard witnesses and the witnesses have come to the realization that Bill C-20 has not got any consensus in Quebec.

In addition, we are opposed to this motion moved by Mr. Alcock because we feel, in all humility, we of the Bloc Québécois, and, at any rate, all of the opposition parties agreed with us, that nothing justifies the government's eagerness to adopt this bill so quickly after holding such a small number of hearings and after listening to such a small number of witnesses, Mr. Chairman.

For your information, I think that it would be appropriate at this point to remember that the committee refused to travel to Quebec and to Canada to hear witnesses. If this bill is so important, if they wanted to describe it as the bill on clarity, why did they refuse to have this so-called clarity radiate in all regions of Quebec and in the other provinces and territories of Canada?

I am convinced that there would have been citizens, ordinary citizens, people who are constituents, who would have appreciated submitting their briefs to this travelling committee which would, at any rate, have been in complete compliance with our rules because we have many House of Commons committees that travel and we, in the Bloc Québécois, have always agreed to let these committees travel and hear the opinions of people in the regions.

Mr. Chairman, when I tell you why this motion is unacceptable and, earlier, I mentioned that we had heard from such a small number of witnesses, I would remind you, Mr. Chairman, that the number of witnesses was limited to 45. Throughout the course of this exercise, we have, in Ms. Abele's testimony, heard from 39 witnesses, what kind of situations were these witnesses put in, what did we ask them to do? We rushed them along and we asked them to appear on very, very short notice. We asked these witnesses to provide bilingual copies of their presentations. But given the very short notice, because this motion also wanted to hurry everybody up, they were unable to provide copies in Canada's two official languages, in French and in English.

• 1740

Mr. Chairman, we feel that we should have taken the time needed to hear the citizens who wished to provide their opinion on this bill. This is not a bill, Mr. Chairman, that can be dealt with in one day, in one night or in one week, and it certainly is not a bill which, as Mr. Alcock's motion suggests, can be discussed on a clause-by-clause basis with only one hour for the preamble, one hour for clause 1, one hour for clause 2 and one hour for clause 3.

As far as we were concerned, this was not an issue of accommodating the witnesses. We wanted to respect the witnesses' right to be heard, to be listened to by members of Parliament, and to be listened to by the Liberal majority government.

Mr. Chairman, this is a very important bill that questions the rule pertaining to the exercise of democracy in Quebec. Consequently, I feel that it is understandable, desirable and even reassuring to note that citizens wanted to be heard on the matter.

The motion tabled by Mr. Alcock, Mr. Chairman, merely provided additional proof of the government's arrogance and that it was not interested in hearing what people wanted to say about the bill. Perhaps the government is afraid of being contradicted.

[English]

Mr. Reg Alcock: Mr. Chair, on a point of order, I don't want to take issue with what the member is saying, but we did offer clause-by-clause debate tonight with the ministers, and we have the officials standing in wait for this very debate.

Mr. Michel Guimond: That's not a point of order.

The Chair: This doesn't sound like a point of order. It sounds like a point of debate.

Mr. Reg Alcock: Oh, I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Mr. Guimond.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Therefore, and I would repeat, we have just had a flagrant demonstration of this by Mr. Alcock's latest point of order. I would ask the question again and I will let you judge for yourself. Perhaps the government is afraid of being contradicted? And this is how Mr. Alcock has answered my question; he raised an irrelevant point of order.

Mr. Chairman, with all due respect for Mr. Alcock, I feel that his motion was not justified because there wasn't any pressing need to adopt this bill now. We are still convinced that the time allotted to this committee in order to hear witnesses was antidemocratic.

I hope that you will take note, Mr. Chairman, and I hope that you as well as the people who are listening to me now have realized, that had this motion been adopted, less than two weeks would have elapsed from the time that the committee began its work to the end of the period allowed for hearing witnesses. This is unacceptable, Mr. Chairman.

Nothing explains why this committee, which held its first meeting on the evening of Monday, February 14th, Valentine's day,—what a wonderful Valentine's present—had to conclude its work nine days later. Moreover, because the government was in such a rush, the committee was unable to hear from some witnesses, and that's the analogy I was making earlier, Mr. Chairman. We were to have heard from 45 witnesses in accordance with a duly adopted motion and, at the end of this exercise, we will have only heard from 39. Why did we hear 39 witnesses? Because the witnesses were rushed. The government felt an urgent need to rush this bill through, in accordance with the antidemocratic motion moved by Mr. Alcock, one hour for the clause-by-clause consideration.

• 1745

The Chairman: I know that it may be tempting for some individuals to say that if the clause-by-clause review did not take place, it's because of the Bloc Québécois. Of course, it's the fault of the Bloc Québécois, but perhaps we should remember how the government has wanted to steamroller democracy. That hurts, it really hurts.

[English]

Mr. Reg Alcock: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I'm not certain on this issue of points of order.... I don't always get this right. I would simply like to agree with what Mr. Guimond was just saying.

A voice: Which was...?

The Chair: Well, it doesn't sound like a point of order to me.

[Translation]

Mr. Guimond.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Chairman, obviously the parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs may well try to use dilatory tactics to try to distract me, to try to make me loose my composure. You know, you have got to know me, Mr. Chairman, you know that I am someone who always keeps his cool, who never gets angry. Obviously, I would like to take the opportunity to thank the parliamentary secretary for helping me develop my ill-tempered nature. I appreciate that he is helping me develop my character, but I just want to tell him that he won't make me loose my train of thought in this debate. Up until now, Mr. Chairman, we have not talked about hockey, nor have we talked about the thickness of the ice on the Rideau Canal. We have, and I have kept my word, held a very pertinent debate, and the parliamentary secretary can use all of the dilatory tactics that he wants, all of the dilatory tactics that have been suggested by the government whip, by Minister Dion's office, he can try as hard as he would like, but I have been conditioned to never loose my composure. I simply want to inform him about this and I will be like this until 10:15 this evening, and he can be sure of that.

I was saying, Mr. Chairman, that we in the Bloc Québécois have had to complain in answer to the steamroller that the government has literally passed over the backs of the opposition this morning, at noon, at 12:15, where we saw, in this House, something that is not seen very often.

I'm eager to discuss the matter with the authors, Mr. Montpetit and Mr. Marleau, of the book House of Common's Procedure and Practice. I'm anxious to discuss the matter with them and find out whether or not there has often been a case where all of the opposition parties, except for the independents, have left in order to object to a motion that was a steamroller such as that one.

Mr. Chairman, we feel that the committee, if it had adopted the motion moved by Mr. Alcock, which I am discussing right now, would have held sham hearings, pseudo-hearings, token hearings, as we say back home.

Mr. Chairman, even the prime minister, and I can understand, I can understand why the Liberal majority in this House is conducting itself like that, the leader of their party, not the parliamentary leader, but the leader of their party, Prime Minister Chrétien himself, affirmed last week that he didn't have any time to loose with that, that he didn't want to spend the night dealing with it. In other words, he made me think of the Minister of Health, when questioned on the rights of people who had been infected, was told that he was anxious to move on to another issue. Send another file, let's move to another file.

Well Mr. Speaker, we opposition members do not feel that we are wasting our time by listening to the public's views on Bill C-20. That's why we would have preferred much longer hearings. For his part, the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs justified his bill by stating, and he talked about himself because we know that the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs loves to quote himself. He highly values the cult of his personality. We know him.

• 1750

It has become ridiculous. This is a well-known fact throughout Quebec. He told us:

We have improved Canada in a variety of ways and will continue to do so. We will be able to do so even better if no one in this country any longer threatens others with the possibility of separation.

That's what he stated in Hansard on December 14th.

Mr. Chairman, notwithstanding the motion tabled by Mr. Alcock, there is no sovereignist threat as some members of the government claim. Rather, as the justices of the Supreme Court rightly pointed out, there is a legitimate will on the part of Quebeckers to try to achieve sovereignty.

Mr. Chairman, the only argument put forward by the government to explain what it's trying to do through this bill is its desire to put an end to the sovereignist threat. There is no sovereignist threat. There is the will of the people of Quebec to choose their political future freely and democratically.

The inexplicable haste of the committee in conducting these hearings will precisely prevent Quebeckers from explaining to the government and members of this committee why Bill C-20 is unacceptable to Quebec and why the bill denies the rights of the people of Quebec.

The gag that the Liberal majority on the committee has attempted to impose on us through this motion means that members of the committee would not have an opportunity to express their views at length on the provisions of this bill. No one would have been able to hear more Quebeckers tell us why the fundamental rights of Quebec and the prerogative rights of its National Assembly should be protected, as they are being denied in Bill C-20.

Mr. Chairman, this will is nothing new. Since 2:30 p.m. on Monday, I've been trying to illustrate that this will is nothing new. We in the Bloc Québécois did not get up one morning and say "Gee, I think I'll become a sovereignist this morning". It is part of the logical evolution of a people.

Mr. Chairman, since Monday at 2:30 p.m., I've been trying to convince you to adopt motions that would respect this will that is rooted mainly in the ever-changing modernization of the State of Quebec and the will of the people of Quebec to take charge of their own destiny.

Mr. Chairman, I explained where we stood around 1997 when there were significant reductions in transfer payments to the provinces by the federal government for the funding of social programs. I told you that even if we had this motion before us, these unilateral cutbacks could lead to a demand by the provinces of Canada for intergovernmental talks on the issue of social policy.

Mr. Chairman, I also told you that the Quebec government had advocated Quebec's capacity to exercise its rights to opt out with compensation for Canada-wide social initiatives. This right to opt out represented a way of reconciling, on the one hand, a vision endorsed by the provinces with an anglophone majority, who are in favour of federal involvement and national standards on social issues and on the other hand, a vision that requires respect for the autonomy of Quebec on these issues, a notion defended by successive Quebec governments.

• 1755

Mr. Chairman, I could explain to you how this motion is part of the federal government's whole approach over the past few years. I could tell you that the annual first ministers' conference held in Saskatoon in August 1998 led to the adoption of the Social Union despite consensus among the provinces.

Mr. Chairman, I could also tell you how this framework agreement has been deplored by more than one observer. In particular, I could quote Mr. Claude Ryan, who testified before this committee and who commented on the framework agreement of the Social Union. He said that this was the third time in the past 30 years that, after having been part of a common front with the other provinces and territories, Quebec was later left by the wayside by its partners. Indeed, according to Mr. Ryan, the first such abandonment took place in 1981, during negotiations on patriating the Constitution, and the second in 1990, with the failure of the Meech Lake Accord.

Mr. Chairman, I could conclude this very succinct, fragmented and very episodic overview that I have just presented, because in any event, it was interrupted six or seven times and I must admit, Mr. Chairman, that it's very difficult to keep one's train of thought in those circumstances. Therefore, this all leads me to explain the political and constitutional status of Quebec. I've come to the conclusion, and you will see the link that I will make between this motion that we deemed.... That's why our motion seeks to cancel the motion tabled by Mr. Alcock. This is where I will show you the link between this motion, Mr. Alcock's motion and the analogy that Bill C-20 is exactly the same sort of thing as the unilateral patriation of the Constitution in 1982.

So I now come to my conclusion about the political and constitutional status of Quebec. Dualism, or the presence of two distinct national communities, was a central feature of Canada's institutional evolution starting with the British regime. For French Canada, the Constitution Act of 1867 was to ensure respect for the development of this dualism, but over the years of federal experience and the evolution of relations between French and English Canada, demands for equality arose among francophones. With regard to Quebec more specifically, it sought to gain respect for the autonomy promised by the 1867 regime, autonomy deemed essential at the time for the full development of the French Canadian nation within the new entity.

In the 1960s, the Quiet Revolution led us to the realization that reform of the constitutional status of Quebec was essential in seeking genuine equality between the two major political communities of the federation.

Mr. Chairman, I don't think that the motion tabled by Mr. Alcock, nor mine that seeks to cancel his, is part of this attempt to find true equality between the two major political communities of this federation. I really don't think so.

As this fundamental demand grew deeper, so did the emergence of the identity of the Quebec people. Various attempts to renew federalism in the past 35 years all ended with the refusal to accede to Quebec's demands that are based on its particular situation.

In 1982, an important change to the Constitution established in 1867 was made without Quebec's consent. This was referred to as a power grab, Mr. Chairman. Attempts to repair this situation, Meech and Charlottetown, failed, thus illustrating the rest of Canada's refusal to recognize the specific nature of Quebec in even the most minimal way. Nonetheless, the defence of the right of the Quebec people and its attempt to affirm its existence gradually formed the heart of the institutional and democratic life of the state of Quebec.

At the dawn of the third millennium, the quest for equality of the people of Quebec remains just as important.

Mr. Chairman, it is inconceivable to us to have to observe Canada's inability to recognize Quebec.

• 1800

An Hon. Member: It's unbelievable.

Mr. Michel Guimond: This will of Quebeckers to legitimately and democratically form their own country also finds its origin in Canada's inability to respond favourably to the expectations of the people of Quebec and the traditional demands of its successive governments, be they sovereignist or federalist.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that the papers that the parliamentary secretary is giving you do not concern me. I'm convinced that if the parliamentary secretary had something to say to the public, he would attempt to use dilatory tactics, he would raise a point of order and he would try to make me lose my concentration. But now, he seems to prefer to change his tactics and give you papers at least.

In any event, that doesn't make his motion any more acceptable, and that's precisely why, Mr. Chairman, we have asked and we were currently discussing our motion to cancel his. He wanted to limit the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill to a single hour, and preamble to one hour as well. That's why it doesn't make sense, Mr. Chairman, and that's why there will be no clause-by-clause consideration this evening.

Some time before entering politics, Pierre Elliott Trudeau wrote the following assessment of the situation in Canada:

The rational compromise on which the nation was based in 1867 was gradually replaced by a kind of emotion-based brew in which one third of the population was considered a fairly negligible quantity. The stability of the national consensus depended on the fact that Quebec could do nothing about this.

Mr. Trudeau said that before entering politics.

In the same text, Trudeau points out that despite the work of certain labour organizations, among others the CSN which testified before us in addition to other labour confederations, that:

Despite the work of certain groups in Quebec as well as the faculty of social sciences at Laval University led by Father Georges-Henri Lévesque to reestablish the consensus, these warnings went unheeded. Ottawa did not change.

This observation remains true today, Mr. Chairman. Despite good intentions at the outset, Pierre Elliott Trudeau's career became something quite different, as he did what he used to denounce before entering politics.

Canada's inability to respond to Quebec's expectations and to the aspirations of the Quebec people does not date back to the Trudeau era only. The attitude of the Trudeau government towards Quebec simply aggravated the relations between Quebec and Canada, with the increasing exclusion of Quebec, the unilateral patriation being the high point of this disrespectful attitude toward Quebec.

This lack of respect for Quebec's will was not the first such instance, nor the last, and that's why, Mr. Chairman, in continuing my presentation, my discussion of the notice of motion that seeks to cancel Mr. Alcock's motion, I believe that it would now be relevant to explain how Bill C-20 is in many respects similar to the power grab of 1982.

As you will recall, on the eve of the referendum of May 20, 1980, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, in a vibrant speech, made a commitment to Quebeckers to renew federalism in depth if they chose to remain within Canada. His call was apparently heard and 59.1% of Quebeckers rejected the sovereignist option.

In 1980, faced with the ongoing constitutional impasse, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau tabled in the House of Commons a resolution dealing with a joint address by the Senate and the House of Commons to Queen Elizabeth II with a view to a unilateral patriation of the Canadian Constitution, to which would be added a Charter of rights and freedoms.

Before I go any further, Mr. Chairman, I would like to refer to André Patry's analysis of the Constitution Act of 1867 and its consequences. Mr. Patry tells us that this legislation, which is the legal basis of our federation, results from a series of facts that it is essential to recall.

• 1805

Around 1860, there were on the one hand the provinces and British colonies in the Atlantic Region that expressed a desire to unite, and on the other, the province of Canada which, as a victim of this chronic dissent, considered the possibility of solving its internal problems by joining the Atlantic provinces and British colonies. Canada sent a delegation to the meeting held by these provinces and colonies in Charlottetown in order to discuss with them the possibility of creating a single state that would encompass all the territories under the aegis of the British Crown.

At the Quebec Conference of 1864, a federation project was adopted that was refined at the London Conference of 1866. But at this meeting, there were only three provinces: Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. With the agreement of the Colonial Office, these provinces drafted a final federation proposal that was enacted on March 29, 1867 and came into force on July 1 of the same year.

From a political standpoint, what were these provinces that decided to unite at that time? These were not mere colonial outposts such as the ones England established in Africa and Asia. Nor were they territories governed from London by decree. These three provinces were legal entities that each had a constitution, a responsible government and their own institutions. They were genuine powers. They could even pass protectionist trade legislation to shelter their industries from foreign competition, including competition from British industries. Moreover, they were allowed to participate in British delegations during talks with foreign states whenever their interests were at stake.

These provinces were therefore entities that were capable of expressing their will and being heard, a right which they exercised in 1867. That year, in London, they freely determined how they would be associated. They opted for an aggregative type of federalism...

aggregative, Mr. Chairman, in the sense of centralist spirit

and provided for the eventual admission of other provinces and British colonies within their union. The imperial government ratified their decision.

The preamble to the Constitution Act of 1867 is clear. It states that the three provinces that were already autonomous expressed their common will to federate into one Dominion.

Into one Dominion is underscored.

This was a contract, a pact agreed to by parties that have the capacity to do so, with the approval of the imperial Parliament. But this pact, once it became law, contained no provisions regarding its amendment, and this deficiency would end up being a problem.

Around 1925, the problem of amendments to the 1867 act with regard to the division of powers became serious. A movement began advocating the sole intervention of the federal government to amend this distribution of powers. In the House of Commons, Ernest Lapointe, Acting Prime Minister, asked Arthur Meighen, Leader of the Opposition, a question that has remained very relevant to the majority of Quebeckers.

Lapointe's question was as follows. Confederation became a fait accompli and the new Parliament met in 1867. Did he believe that two years later, let's say in 1869, this Parliament could have been justified in amending the Constitution Act or asking the imperial Parliament to amend it without the consent of the first four provinces? If that could not be done at the time, how could it be done 25 or even 50 years later without the consent of the parties that signed the Confederation pact?

• 1810

That's interesting, Mr. Chairman. It's the Acting Prime Minister who put the question to the Leader of the Opposition. This was certainly during a debate.

The Leader of the Opposition answered him. The Minister of Justice clearly demonstrated that amendments that concerned other parties to the contract were out of the question without their consent. This notion of the paramountcy of the rights of the founding provinces in the federation has always been supported by a great many jurists and political scientists and accepted by the bulk of the Quebec public.

In 1931, when the federal government led by R.B. Bennett decided to endorse the proposal for the Statute of Westminster developed in the preceding years by Great Britain and its Dominions, it was forced in April of that year to reformulate it and to add, at the request of Ontario and especially Quebec, section 7, which gave the imperial Parliament the power to amend the 1867 Act and froze the division of powers set out in that same legislation.

It is this provision of the Statute of Westminster which, between 1940 and 1964, forced Ottawa to obtain the consent of all provinces on four occasions before asking the British Parliament to amend the institutional division of powers and therefore, in 1964 and in 1971, prevented the federal government... we remember that

from proposing constitutional changes because of Quebec's opposition to the proposed amendments.

In 1981, it was therefore clear that Ottawa could not bring home the 1867 act, much less amend the division of powers without the consent of all provinces, because the federal proposal was in fact an amendment to section 7 of the Statute of Westminster, and yet it stated on two occasions in the address from the Canadian Parliament to the British Parliament that it had received the consent of all the provinces.

Unfortunately, from a legal standpoint, two facts conspired to weaken Quebec's position, which was clearly hostile to Ottawa's illegitimate and dangerous initiative. The rejection by the Quebec Court of Appeal...

one of whose members was obviously quite stubborn

of the Quebec argument and the improper wording of the Supreme Court opinion requested by Quebec, which referred to the need for prior consent of the provinces, which would more correctly have referred to the prior consent of all the provinces in keeping with the firm and solid constitutional conventions, what was called unbounding, resulting from the intergovernmental conferences held between 1940 and 1964.

The omission of this key word by Quebec naturally made the Supreme Court's task less onerous. By limiting the scope of the preamble of the 1867 act, which clearly indicated that this act was a pact freely signed by three parties, the Supreme Court was able to declare sufficient the consent of a majority of provinces, even in the absence of one of the founding provinces of the federation, whose specific rights in the areas of education, language and civil legislation were restricted by the constitutional proposal presented for its consideration.

In accordance with our legal tradition, the Constitution Act of 1982 is legal. It applies throughout Canada, but at the political level, of which the legal aspect can only be the expression as well as the guarantee, the 1982 act is legitimate and, in its opinion, the Supreme Court could not forget this.

I would now invite members of the committee to listen carefully because it must be understood, Mr. Chairman, that this last part, as I said, represented the opinion or analysis by André Patry of the Constitution Act of 1867 and its consequences.

• 1815

Since I have finished this analysis, I would now invite members of the committee to listen carefully to an analysis made by Lise Bissonnette ten years later, in 1992, of the effects of patriating the Constitution.

Mr. Chairman, if you would continue to follow me, I will demonstrate that Bill C-20 is in many ways similar to the power grab of 1982 and from that starting point, all the motions that were tabled before this Committee aimed at rapid adoption of Bill C-20 behind closed doors skew the process that was shoved down our throats from the outset. This is why we tabled this motion to cancel the motion tabled by Mr. Alcock.

Ms. Bissonnette states:

Normally, while lighting the candles of 1992 and by showering the millions for the 125th anniversary of Canadian Confederation, one would have predicted a big party for April 17, the tenth anniversary of the proclamation by the Queen of England and Canada of the Constitution Act of 1982.

But that would mean remembering that the current Prime Minister was there. I can still see in my mind's eye the form signed by her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, with Prime Minister Chrétien by her side, accompanied by André Ouellet, all true defenders of Quebec.

Symbolically "patriated" from Great Britain and amended, Canada's fundamental law celebrated its tenth anniversary as discreetly as possible. At most, it may have occupied the thoughts of unfortunate provincial and federal bureaucrats who perhaps gave up their Easter holidays to rework it, with one eye on Quebec's referendum timetable and the other on the demands of the West, the East, and the Aboriginal populations. Nobody was in the mood for a party, since the Constitution's popularity was at its lowest point ever.

For foreigners who are flabbergasted by the potential breakup of a country that is apparently blessed by the gods, the history of the last ten years will provide some answers. The Quebec-Canada division was consummated,

in 1982, during the unilateral patriation of the Constitution.

in the very act of patriation by and for English Canada alone. It was in the proclamation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom that the new Canada appeared. The two dynamics were contradictory and an explosion inevitable.

according to Ms. Bissonnette.

We'll let others mull over the length of the "knives" of political conspiracy that isolated Quebec during the 1981 negotiations on patriation. It's quite possible, as former members of the Trudeau government say, that a separatist Quebec government would never have signed a patriation agreement that consolidated the federation for a long time to come. We will never know. What we do know is that the nine other provinces and the federal government, fully aware of the risks, placed their bets on creating a new Canada without Quebec's signature. They believed, because a Quebecker who was the Prime Minister of Canada...

Mr. Trudeau,

told them, and they preferred to follow him rather than think for themselves, that Quebeckers would soon forget the incident.

It was forgotten. The motto we have in Quebec is a beautiful one: Je me souviens. I remember.

They thought that the following April, they would prefer to focus their passion on the hockey playoffs rather than yell about the parchment brought by Elizabeth II.

But one never gets rid of a substantial problem by hiding it under the rug. The patriation of 1982 was a profound breakdown. It told Quebeckers that their century-old perception of Confederation had been a mistake. It was not a "pact" between two nations since one of them could simply do without the other and renew the fundamental law. The Supreme Court confirmed this in the case of the Quebec veto which never existed except by custom. There is no need to be part of the constitution industry to understand these things, to feel the loss of the control and leverage that we were suddenly told were imaginary.

• 1820

At the time, Ms. Bissonnette used to say, I'm originally from the Québec region:

One can watch a Canadians-Nordiques game and understand that at the same time. No one is that stupid. Neither is it necessary to understand all the nuances of the eroding powers of the National Assembly to know instinctively that Quebec did not have the "power" to stop this machine, that it was not, in the Canadian entity, the indisputable keystone that it always believed it was.

It was 1982, and not the trials and tribulations of the decade that followed that made the Canadian Constitution a foreign document to a majority of Quebeckers. This is a most unfortunate fate for a law which, in most countries, is the most cherished by its citizens, the very basis of their patriotism.

And I ask the great patriotic Canadians opposite if they are proud, if they are happy that Quebec, since 1982, under federalist premiers like Robert Bourassa... Are they happy, our friends opposite, that Quebec has still not signed the Constitution? In other countries, people are proud of this document; does it concern you that there are still people who say that this country is not their country? You are great Canadians, I am convinced that as great Canadians, you would like us to be like the Americans who hold their hand over their heart when they sing the national anthem. Are you happy that Quebeckers for the most part are not satisfied with the current federal system that does not work?

There will always be renowned university professors who will tell you that they have conducted every study imaginable, that they have massaged all the numbers right down to the last decimal point, you could bring in as many as you want, but it won't fly, we won't swallow it. You can see that it is not working. You are unable to propose anything else. You hold a knife like Bill C-20 to our throats.

Mr. Chairman,

True sentiment of decolonization...

[English]

Mr. Dennis J. Mills (Broadview—Greenwood, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond:

of beginning a new era...

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Mills.

Mr. Dennis Mills: Mr. Guimond asked us a question, and I presumed he was going to give us an opportunity to respond.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Can I comment on his point of order?

The Chair: Oui.

Mr. Dennis Mills: Sure.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Mills will be able to comment, at the end of my speech, on the comments I have made.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Dennis Mills: Okay. So you do not—

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: As I was saying:

True feeling of decolonization, of beginning a new era: the speeches of the day are full of euphoria that distanced a reserved and often hostile Quebec even more.

It wasn't the old document brought back from the British archives, but the newly transplanted Canadian Charter of Rights that seduced Canadians and gave them a sense of belonging more than ever before. Rarely has such a dry document had such a marked effect on the imagination of a people. Before the Supreme Court even started bringing down decisions on the constitutionality of legislation in light of the Charter, before the practical effects of this new regime made themselves known—it was still too early to evaluate them—the Charter became virtually sacred. Those who had fought against it, in English Canada, out of concern about the supremacy of judges over legislators, only succeeded in reinforcing this infatuation. Because Canadians were entering a period of absolute disenchantment with federal and provincial legislators, and they warmly welcomed the idea of a "citizens' sovereignty", introducing the rights that judges would force governments to respect.

• 1825

While Quebec was opting out of the Charter up until 1986, in respect of all its legislation by invoking the famous "notwithstanding" clause, Canada was making the Charter a contemporary symbol of citizenship. That explains the virulent opposition to the Meech Lake Accord: the smallest threat of infringement on the Charter, in an amended Constitution, was unacceptable. That is exactly what was feared with the "distinct society" clause. Quebec's decision to invoke once again the "notwithstanding" clause in 1988, albeit selectively to protect the language law, ran counter to the new Canadian ideology. Under these conditions, the collapse of the Meech Lake agreement was inevitable.

English Canada started to nuance its passion for the Canadian Charter of Rights. Minority representatives and traditionally disadvantaged groups were afraid of not being able to assert their equality rights, not having the means to take the long road to the Supreme Court (what's worse, for budgetary reasons, the federal government had just eliminated the Court Challenges Program that these groups had access to). Quebec's use of the "notwithstanding" clause was parallelled by equally effective resistance by the other provincial governments who were opting out of the Charter by delaying procedures and fighting its provisions ad nauseam, as we saw in the case of school rights for Francophone minorities. But opposition took shape especially the left. The Charter is the freedom of the strongest, and claiming that it increases citizens' participation in the political process is a "joke", wrote the well- known political scientist Philip Resnick in The Mask of Proteus, which examined the most recent ideological changes in the Canadian State. English Canada's infatuation with the Aboriginal cause also put a damper on the unconditional attachment to the Charter, since Aboriginal leaders were challenging it. In some circles, it was called a "white" document, a document that was too European or too American, a colonial text.

But on the whole, the transplant took well. Even in Quebec that is refusing to have anything to do with the Canadian Charter, and where legal experts are debating the excessive influence of common law in jurisprudence favoured by the Supreme Court, they got into the game. After a slow beginning, remedies are sought more and more often. If a Quebec constitution had to be written, a Charter of rights would be an important part of it, there is no doubt about that.

Natural, normal and healthy, the debate that should have taken place in 1982 had hardly begun in 1992.

Ten years later, Ms. Bissonnette said:

But we can see to what extent things were spoiled 10 years ago. It was a settling of scores that can be traced back to linguistic clauses in the Charter; Mr. Trudeau's entourage recognizes today...

[English]

Mr. Reg Alcock: I have a point of order, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Mr. Alcock.

Mr. Reg Alcock: Mr. Chair, I notice the difficulty the member is having understanding this particular point. We do have officials here from the department who would be more than willing to come to the table and spend some time on that specific point, if he would like that.

The Chair: I'm sure Monsieur Guimond appreciates the offer,

[Translation]

but it is not a point of order.

Mr. Guimond, you have the floor.

• 1830

Mr. Michel Guimond: Yes, I will resume and say to Mr. Alcock that at 10:20 p.m., once I have finished my presentation, I would be more than pleased to discuss this with the learned officials who are here, who will certainly be able to shed some light on the situation for me.

But to that end, however, I would invite them to listen carefully, to take notes and to prepare a critical analysis of my comments, and since I do not claim to have inherent knowledge, I think that I am essentially perfectible and I will appreciate hearing the comments of our learned officials.

So Mr. Chairman, as I was saying:

It was a settling of scores that could be traced back to linguistic clauses in the Charter; Mr. Trudeau's entourage recognizes today that the clauses were the main reason for the exercise. Countering Bill 101, as you will recall, was equally if not more important than fine-tuning citizens' rights to equality. And patriating the Constitution without Quebec was a victory over a spurned Quebec nationalism. Instead of recreating a country, where the Charter could have been its common basis, one is favoured at the expense of another. And that has obviously given birth to two.

I think it would be worthwhile to reread that, because what I am explaining there is that the objective of patriating the Constitution was to recreate a country. And in passing, I could touch upon why despite the patriation of the Constitution, which in a legal sense, confirmed the independence of Canada from the British Crown—that is the meaning of the unilateral of patriation of the Constitution—why Queen Elizabeth II of England is still the Queen of Canada today while Canada achieved its sovereignty in 1982 with the unilateral patriation? I'm going to ask our learned officials to explain that to me.

Why did the Americans decide that the British Crown would have no control over the American people when they wrote their Constitution? Why are the Queen of England and all other related aspects still in the picture? Why, despite the fact that Canada became independent in 1982,—perhaps Mr. Cotler could respond at 10:20 p.m.,—why Canada, with the unilateral patriation of the Constitution in 1982,... Based on my understanding, the exercise confirmed the independence of Canada from the British Crown and the Constitution was patriated. But what I do not understand, is why the Queen of England is still the Queen of Canada? And why do we still have a Governor General and Lieutenant Governors in Canada with everything that represents, whereas the Americans cut the umbilical chord with the British Crown when they sought their independence and today, the Queen of England has no control over the American people.

And once again I would like our great Canadians, our great Canadian federalists, our real Canadian people, to look at the issue, to ask themselves this question.

So, patriating the Constitution without Quebec was a victory over a spurned Québécois nationalism. Instead of recreating a country where the Charter could have been its common basis, one is favoured at the expense of the other. And that has obviously given birth to two.

In 1996, Trudeau picked up his pen to denounce Premier Lucien Bouchard in a letter that he pompously entitled I accuse. Here is Mr. Bouchard's response:

Pierre Elliott Trudeau's letter rehashes old arguments, but in 1996, it sheds light on the dangerous paths that his successors have attempted to use.

There will never be a single and definitive reading of the history of relations between Quebec and Canada over the past 30 years. The debate among the actors, then among historians, will continue to rage. That is normal.

• 1835

It is however interesting to note that one of the main actors, former Prime Minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, considers that there is only one acceptable reading of this controversial history: his. In the open letter that he addressed to me, says Mr. Bouchard, Mr. Trudeau does not limit himself to reiterating for the umptieth time his version of the facts. With his haughty certitude, he states that the sovereignists' interpretation is necessarily demagoguery.

Mr. Bouchard then says:

Which puts me in rather good company. In fact, for several years, Mr. Trudeau has been following in the footsteps of all Quebec premiers in his condemnation and his I accuse reeks of déjà vu. Moreover, his diatribe is seriously out of sync with the current Quebec context, raising old quarrels at a time when Quebeckers and their government agree on quite different priorities: employment, education and public finances.

Mr. Chairman, that is why I said earlier on that there is no separatist threat. The Quebec government had decided that health, employment, education and public finances were priorities. But the federal government, by introducing Bill C-20, wanted to renew hostility, kick-start the constitutional industry, and it will be judged for that.

Mr. Bouchard also said:

It would be futile to debate the past with Mr. Trudeau if it weren't possible to also clarify the present and the future. Inasmuch as Mr. Trudeau successors seem to want to follow in his footsteps, it seems like a good time to pick up on some of these themes and learn some useful lessons.

In the "contempt" chapter in Mr. Bouchard's letter:

Mr. Trudeau criticizes me for "preaching contempt for those Canadians who did not share (my) views". None of the quotes he attributes to me support that accusation. I believe that the legitimate interest of the two peoples who make up Canada are contradictory and cannot be reconciled within the federal framework, as Canada's recent history has clearly shown. The desire of the sovereignist movement to establish a partnership between our two sovereign peoples shows moreover our interest in a good neighbour policy and mutual respect.

In democratic debate, there is a difference between clashing ideas and contemptuousness; a difference that Mr. Trudeau unfortunately covers quite lightly in his comments, namely with respect to those he calls French-Canadians and who do not share his views.

By way of introduction to a text published four years ago, he shamelessly picked up a phrase from the first article he ever published in Cité libre in 1950, where he stated: "We are turning into a disgusting lot of blackmailers".

Mr. Trudeau said that in 1950. He was talking about Quebeckers.

Updating this verdict, he added in 1992: "Things have changed since then, but for the worse."

So, Mr. Chairman, so that we understand clearly, in 1950 Trudeau said, in reference to Quebeckers: "We are turning into a disgusting lot of blackmailers." In 1992, he said: "Things have changed since then, but for the worse." So, Mr. Chairman, imagine this description coming from former Prime Minister Trudeau. It is quite rare for a political figure to express on more than one occasion and with so much life experience such disdain for his fellow citizens.

• 1840

In his text last Saturday, he accuses Jean Lesage, René Lévesque and Robert Bourassa of every possible evils. He is particularly innovative when he tries to make Mr. Bourassa partially responsible for the collapse of the Meech Lake Agreement.

Mr. Trudeau, who omits to refer to his own role and to that of Jean Chrétien in the collapse of Meech, did not hesitate at the time to state, "Meech terrifies me..."

Mr. Chairman, I remember that during the Meech Lake discussions, I had spoken to a lot of my fellow citizens, and people were saying: "Yeah, Meech must be good for Quebec." So I said: "On what basis are you saying that Meech must be good for Quebec?" Meech must be good for Quebec because Trudeau is opposed to it. If Trudeau is opposed to it, it is because it is good for Quebec.

We have examples in history of a government becoming totalitarian because it makes decisions on the basis of race and sends the others to concentration camps. He called the Prime Minister and premiers who signed the agreement "eunuchs" and "cowards". They were guilty in his eyes of amending "his" Constitution of 1982 which was, he said, using a reference to a sinister ideology of the 1930s, supposed to "last one thousand years".

As for Mr. Chrétien's role in torpedoing the agreement, there is hardly a better witness than his current Minister of Finance, Paul Martin,...

Oh! I am going to offend the Liberals, Mr. Chairman. You are going to see what I mean, watch for the points of order and the interruptions, the cries from the other side of the House because I am discussing Paul Martin. There are people who want to position themselves in the event of a future leadership race. There are people who will not accept anything bad being said about Paul Martin.

...there is no better witness than his current Minister of Finance, Paul Martin, who trailed him in the Liberal leadership race. He accused his adversary of the time of "having campaigned for a year at the expense of Quebec, by telling English Canada that there would not be a problem in Quebec if the Meech Lake Agreement failed." Mr. Martin found it "unacceptable for Jean Chrétien to refuse to say anything good about Quebec."

There is no doubt that during debates in recent years, Quebec representatives have from time to time erred in their judgment, strategies or tactics. We will leave it up to historians to sort it out. They did, however, have the courage, and I am thinking specifically of Brian Mulroney, to try to forge a Canadian compromise that would include, not exclude Quebeckers. Mr. Mulroney paid a huge price for his attempt to get Canada out of the "mess" he inherited, as he so rightly said, from his predecessor.

And that is so, Mr. Chairman, even if the Bloc Québécois did contribute to the Conservatives' demise in the 1993 election, when they ended up with only two members of Parliament. I must admit that at least Mr. Mulroney does not deserve to be criticized for not having tried.

On the other hand, Mr. Trudeau considers personally that he has never made a mistake in his Canadian policy, despite the traumatic situations he pushed his country into.

Even today, Mr. Chrétien and a number of other federal supporters, like Minister Dion,

have a very arrogant attitude regarding the intelligence of Quebeckers. The same people who put the word "separation" on every telephone poll in Quebec are now claiming that the Yes voters did not understand the question and did not know that if they voted Yes, Quebec would become sovereign.

Mr. Chairman, that is an insult to Quebeckers' intelligence. I can tell you that I have trouble accepting it because I have enormous respect for the 2,361,741 people who voted Yes.

• 1845

And as Mr. Facal said this morning, it isn't true that the 301 members of the House of Commons, including the 226 from outside Quebec, including even the members of the Bloc Québécois, have a better understanding than the people who take a stand democratically in a referendum, exactly as Mr. Facal pointed out this morning.

In response to Mr. Trudeau's famous I accuse, Mr. Bouchard stated:

There is no doubt that some people, knowing they were voting for sovereignty, hoped that the process triggered by a YES vote would give rise to an eleventh-hour awakening of Canada that would modify the outcome. Sovereignist leaders do not share that analysis, but voters have the right to their views—like a significant proportion of NO voters in 1980 and 1995 were entitled to bet that their vote would lead to greater autonomy for Quebec, even if Mr. Trudeau and Mr. Chrétien were strongly opposed.

Remember Mr. Trudeau who said: "A vote for the NO side is a vote for the YES side." Already we see...

An Hon. Member: It was clear.

Mr. Michel Guimond: ...the clarity: "A vote for the NO side is a vote for the YES side. But yes to what? Yes to renewing the Canadian federation. Oh, really? And how did this renewal of the Canadian Constitution manifest itself? Through the unilateral patriation of the Constitution in 1982. That's a nice example of democracy, Mr. Chairman!

Mr. Bouchard also said:

But it is worrisome to see federalist leaders likening that hope, that bet, to ignorance or stupidity. Their blinkered attitude, like that of Mr. Trudeau in the 1970s, can only lead to new disillusionment.

Let's now examine the betrayal.

On three occasions in his text published last Saturday, Mr. Trudeau accuses René Lévesque of having "betrayed" his allies in Canada in 1981. In his English text, he uses the same term in reference to me.

This is Lucien Bouchard speaking.

Even though it has been quite widely used to describe the events surrounding Mr. Trudeau's referendum promise in 1980, and the attitude of English Canada during the negotiations in 1981, the word "betrayal" is not part of my vocabulary, and contrary to what certain federalist leaders including Daniel Johnson have claimed, I have not used it.

It is interesting to note, however, that the leaders of the NO side, in 1995, Daniel Johnson, and in 1980, Claude Ryan...

and the latter appeared before this committee and started by saying... He did not want there to be any ambiguity with respect to his political views. Mr. Ryan was honest. He started his testimony before this committee which is studying Bill C-20, this legislative committee, where the government wants to gag us.

An Hon. Member: Mr. Ryan has always defended Quebec. He can never be criticized for that.

Mr. Michel Guimond: The government wanted to table a motion that would prevent us from proceeding to clause-by-clause consideration of the bill, which we had to oppose.

Mr. Ryan...

[English]

Mr. Reg Alcock: I have a point of order, Mr. Chair. Again, I note the confusion. I have indicated that the minister is willing to come down and debate this. I know the member's a little afraid to debate the minister, but I promise him, he would be rational. He'd be reasonable. He'd help the member maybe understand this point.

We have officials here, and we could certainly help him understand what he's misunderstanding.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bill Blaikie): It sounds to me like the same non-point of order we had once before.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: Yes, Mr. Chairman. And I just wanted to say—

[English]

Mr. Reg Alcock: There's no reason to be afraid of debating with the minister.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: I just wanted to tell Minister Dion's Parliamentary Secretary that we are not afraid of debating the content of this bill. And I hope that during the report stage in the House, the government will give us the time we need to discuss each of our amendments, and that it will give each of our colleagues, the 301 members of the House of Commons, the time they need if they want to speak out so that they can legitimately address each of the amendments that will be tabled by each party.

• 1850

If the Parliamentary Secretary is in a position to guarantee that democratic spirit, this friendly offer he has made to offer up the Minister as a sacrificial lamb, to give us an opportunity to question the Minister.

[English]

Mr. Reg Alcock: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the member saying that. I understand a little bit better now. I think, though, his preparation for that debate would be enhanced if he allowed the officials who are sitting here to come forward. A great many of them are waiting to comment and to offer advice to the member on how this bill might be improved. If he wasn't so afraid to debate these things, I think they would be more than willing to sit down and talk with him.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bill Blaikie): I think this is the same point of order.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Chairman, we are going to get involved in a type of debate that we sometimes have in Quebec: "My dad is stronger than your dad." Who did not want to hear from a number of citizens and groups? What side did not want this committee to travel to Quebec and to all regions of Canada?

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to start debating that. I can tell you that we are going to do that in the House when our 301 colleagues will have an opportunity to express themselves and discuss each amendment. At any rate, we know that the Privy Council henchmen will be in the Government lobby and that they will have an opportunity to speak, as we have seen Privy Council henchmen suggest questions during the debate. We've seen how that occurs.

As for me, in all good faith, I initiated my questions. I initiated my debate. In short, Mr. Chairman, I was in the process of saying:

It is interesting to note, however, that the leaders of the No side in 1995, Daniel Johnson, and in 1980, Claude Ryan, in well though- out texts recently used this term to describe the consequences of Mr. Trudeau's actions.

The term referred to here is "betrayal".

Last July, in the Foreign Policy Review, Daniel Johnson, Junior, wrote the following:

And Daniel Johnson, Mr. Chairman, as far as I know, is not a member of the Bloc Québécois. He's not a member of the Parti Québécois. He does not contribute to the Parti Québécois' election fund. He does not contribute to the Bloc Québécois' election fund. He is not known to have much in common with sovereignists. We acknowledged that... I see my colleague from Hull—Aylmer listening attentively, he is letting me speak. I appreciate his open- mindedness and his solicitude. He is close to Liberal circles.

I am going to ask him to nod, because he will only have an opportunity to speak at 10:20 p.m., when I have finished speaking, but he will agree with me that Daniel Johnson, when he wrote in the Foreign Policy Review, said this:

The patriation of the Constitution in 1982 resulted in the exclusion of Quebec and prevented Quebeckers from participating in an important stage of Canadian self-identification. That created in Quebeckers a feeling of betrayal and isolation that continues to exist today.

Last November, according to Mr. Bouchard

in The Gazette, Claude Ryan concurred: "A great many Quebeckers, including a number of federalists, had the feeling they had been betrayed."

No one should be surprised by the Quebec sovereignist opposition to the steps taken by the premier of the day. However, the harsh assessments by these federalist allies in Quebec considerably undermine Mr. Trudeau's claims and shed light on federal post- referendum action of the past and present.

• 1855

In his book, Regards sur le fédéralisme canadien, published last spring, Claude Ryan sums up the events of 1980 as follows: "When he committed himself a few days before the referendum, in a speech delivered at Montreal's Paul-Sauvé Arena, to reform the federal Canadian system, many people, including the author of this book (i.e., Claude Ryan) had understood that what he had in mind was an operation that would be designed and carried out along with his referendum allies. (...) But Trudeau had his own agenda, which was not that of the Quebec Liberal Party."

Mr. Chairman, this committee is here to consider Bill C-20. However, we have been gagged. Our right to take the time for proper clause-by-clause discussion of this Bill has been taken away. They decided to limit us to an hour per clause, and that is why are speaking now. We are opposed to it because an attempt is being made to gag us, Mr. Chairman. That is the only reason.

I am convinced that if the government had not behaved as it has, we could have considered Bill C-20 in far greater depth. However, Mr. Chairman, we will consider this bill in-depth anyway. We will do it at the House of Commons, in Committee of the Whole.

Thus, the leader of the No camp in 1980 was completely left out of Mr. Trudeau's post-referendum constitutional operations. Mr. Ryan has a nuanced vision of the contents of the 1982 reform, but he strongly challenges the method used, and he opposed it in the National Assembly. Last Saturday, as he had done in the past, Mr. Trudeau

in his "I accuse",

tampered with dates and votes. In his book, Mr. Ryan judges severely attempts to "give the impression that a majority of the parliamentarians siting in Québec City and Ottawa had approved of his plan." He concluded...

The Chair: Order, please. Order.

Mr. Daniel Turp: There's too much talking.

The Chair: Would the Committee like to suspend the meeting for about 15 minutes so that we can eat? I know that the honourable member who has the floor, Mr. Guimond, may be starving. Other members around this table are also very hungry. If everyone agrees, we could have a short break.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Yes, Mr. Guimond.

Mr. Michel Guimond: I greatly appreciate the offer you have just made, and I believe it clearly demonstrates your enormous respect for human beings, including myself. I have been detecting the aroma of the meal that awaits us.

However, Mr. Chairman, I cannot give my unanimous consent because I have so much to say, and so little time in which to say it. I would request your permission to continue, Mr. Chairman. My colleagues are quite free to do as most of our colleagues are already doing, they can eat. They have enough respect for me not to eat in front of me, not to eat at the table. But I would like to continue, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: And we will no doubt be very pleased to hear you, Mr. Guimond. Please continue.

Mr. Michel Guimond: As I was saying:

Thus, the leader of the No camp in 1980 was completely left out of Mr. Trudeau's post-referendum constitutional operations. Mr. Ryan has a nuanced vision of the contents of the 1982 reform, but he strongly challenges the method used, and he opposed it in the National Assembly.

In his book, Mr. Ryan therefore concludes that Mr. Trudeau was giving in to a distortion of history.

In the same way, the leader of the No camp in 1995, Daniel Johnson, is today

that is, during the 1995 referendum campaign,

so cut off from the current thinking in Ottawa that he has to point out to his allies of yesterday, through the media, that they are "off the track" and are taking approaches that run counter to the fundamental orientation of the QLP, particularly with respect to the territorial integrity of Quebec.

This is what we call partition.

• 1900

Is history repeating itself?

asks Mr. Bouchard.

In 1981, many Liberal voters felt, shall we say, "taken in" by Mr. Trudeau. They had not understood that the proposed changes would be carried out unilaterally, against the will of the Quebec Liberal Party and of the National Assembly. In 1995, Mr. Chrétien promised that a No would bring about the "essential changes". How will No voters react when they suddenly realize that the proposed changes aim at modifying unilaterally the rules of Quebec democracy and at carving up Quebec's territory?

About Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Mr. Bouchard states:

The former Prime Minister of Canada is not content to denigrate the constitutional efforts of his Quebec counterparts and their successors. He maintains that he alone can define what "Quebec's traditional demands" consist of. Thus, he maintains that they "consisted essentially of one thing: respect for the French fact in Canada, mainly in the areas of language at the federal level and of education in the provinces where Francophones were a minority."

Mr. Bouchard states:

These aims were certainly commendable and were supported by Quebeckers. But any desire to reduce Quebec's demands to just these elements is so remote from the historical reality of the post-war period that it would be tedious to refute it point by point.

Let us note simply that at the time when Mr. Trudeau was passing his very necessary Official Languages Act in 1969, there were three political parties in Quebec: the governing Union Nationale, which had been elected on a platform of "Equality or Independence"; the Quebec Liberal Party, which had just adopted a platform proposing "special status"; and the newly founded Parti québécois, which advocated "sovereignty-association". By denying the existence of Quebec's historical demands, Mr. Trudeau is behaving like the pharaohs of Ancient Egypt, who, when they were dissatisfied with history, erased and caused to disappear from their kingdom any disagreeable inscription, mention or reminder.

There is, however, an important lesson here. In his crusade on behalf of official languages, Mr. Trudeau created a huge misunderstanding between our two peoples. He led Canada to believe that the adoption of institutional bilingualism was going to settle the Quebec problem. Nothing could be further from the truth. Millions of Canadians invested their political energy and good faith in that hope. The frustration Mr. Trudeau brought about in English Canada is one of the most disastrous factors in our recent history.

Today, Mr. Chrétien and his Minister Stéphane Dion are striving to convince Canada that recognition of the distinct nature of Quebec, accompanied by some further assurances,

such as Bill C-20,

could settle the Quebec situation. In Quebec, federalist and sovereignist opinion leaders, as well as the opinion polls, vigorously contradict these outdated and erroneous assertions. It would be tragic, for Canada and for Quebec, if a second misunderstanding of that scope were to prevent a more lucid reading of events and destroy for a generation what reciprocal good will still remains.

Mr. Bouchard states:

Mr. Trudeau maintains that through my referendum arguments, I have "tarnished Quebec's good reputation as a democratic society."

One could retort quite curtly that the Canadian prime minister who suspended civil liberties in 1970—opening the way to imprisonment of some 500 citizens, including some poets, without cause but for a mere crime of opinion, without any charges being laid, without recourse, and condoning 3,000 searches without warrant—is in no position to give lessons in democracy.

• 1905

To return to the constitutional questions, Mr. Trudeau has even acknowledged that his 1981 operation was designed as an offensive that would not have to respect the democratic rules, and conceded that it could cause irreparable harm.

Thus, when his biographers,

Mr. Trudeau's biographers,

Stephen Clarkson and Christina McCall, asked him why he had not retained the services of the respected mandarin Gordon Robertson to advise him on the Constitution in 1980-81, Mr. Trudeau gave his revealing reply: "Let's just say that during that final stage I thought it would take almost a putsch,

That is Mr. Trudeau speaking.

"...I though it would take almost a putsch, un coup de force, and Gordon (Robertson) was far too much of a gentleman for that. Gordon was a mandarin devoted to the common good and who feared that irreparable damage would be done to the social fabric. And so I chose someone else."

That is a quote from Mr. Trudeau's biographers, who are citing Mr. Trudeau himself.

We have heard groups like Alliance Quebec talking about revolutionary government, Mr. Chairman. Bill Johnson and Alliance Quebec have no lessons to give us in democracy.

Mr. Trudeau's disdain for democratic forms is also evident in his recounting of the events of November 4, 1981. Above all, the stubbornness with which he persists in considering normal and legitimate the goings-on during the night of November 4 commands admiration. A simple test, however, is sufficient to break through the artifice. Try to explain to any outsider that 11 first ministers were invited to a conference crucial to the country's future and that, during the final night, ten of them got together to design an accord that, far from satisfying the eleventh, took away part of what he already had. You will not find one who will believe that a democracy could act in that matter, regardless of the circumstances or alliances.

But let us follow for a moment the wobbly thesis of Mr. Trudeau. He accuses René Lévesque of having "betrayed" his allies. What had the Quebec leader done to earn that rebuke? He agreed to submit a key aspect of the new Constitution to a referendum.

Thus does he reproach René Lévesque. Because he wanted Canadians and Quebeckers to express themselves, through a referendum, on their fundamental law. According to the former prime minister, that is why all the players in the drama—-his allies and his adversaries—-agreed on an understanding that excluded that Mr. Lévesque, his province, and his people.

Mr. Trudeau urges us then to choose between a democrat who would have abided by the will of the people and a federal prime minister planning "almost a putsch, un coup de force".

as he said to his biographers.

The choice is easy. If Mr. Lévesque were the only one in Ottawa to believe in democracy, he was surrounded by many others when he returned to Quebec.

Since that time, Quebeckers have continued to make that choice. When he was elected in January 1980, before the "coup de force", Mr. Trudeau had swept 74 seats in Quebec, with 68% of the vote. After the coup de force, in the next election, his party plummeted to 17 seats and 35% of the vote. Admittedly, there were several factors in that reversal. But one of them was the promise of Mr. Mulroney to correct the error committed in 1981. Never since 1980 has the party of Pierre Elliott Trudeau managed to win a majority in Quebec. Should we not see that as a signal?

• 1910

Mr. Chairman, I would like to tell the Liberals that this is exactly what will happen to them at the next elections, if they pass Bill C-20. It will happen to you in Quebec, and elsewhere as well. What you seem to be forgetting, Mr. Chairman and colleagues, is that the motto Je me souviens is not just a random phrase.

We have an excellent motto, and we apply it often. We applied it when we booted the Liberals out in 1984; we applied it when we booted the Conservatives out in 1993; we applied it when we elected so many members of the Bloc Québécois in 1993 that this party became the Official Opposition, without even asking for that status. We assumed our responsibilities, but during the 1993 election campaign we never said: Vote for a member of the Bloc Québécois and we will become the Official Opposition. We simply became the Official Opposition because so many of us were elected. It was brought about by the British parliamentary democratic process, on which this Parliament is based. That is how we became the Official Opposition.

And I want to tell you that I am making a speech tonight to protest against the antidemocratic motion tabled by Mr. Alcock, a motion aimed at restricting the work and clause-by-clause debate on this bill. The motion restricts clause-by-clause consideration to one hour per clause and one hour for the preamble. That is why, Mr. Chairman, I will continue speaking for the next three hours. This is something we will remember. We will. The federal Liberals of Jean Chrétien and Stéphane Dion will have to deal with it and pay the price for the repercussions of their decisions. In a democracy, Mr. Chairman, you cannot but agree with me.

Today, the temptation to commit a tour de force is unfortunately still present in the federalist universe constructed by Mr. Trudeau.

You must bear in mind that the current prime minister, Jean Chrétien, is Mr. Trudeau's heir. Trudeau was Chrétien's mentor for a long time. And Minister Dion is also cast in the same mould as Pierre Elliott Trudeau.

On the night of the referendum of last October, speaking to the nation and fortified by a vote of 50.6% for the No, Mr. Chrétien declared: "In a democracy, the people are always right. Tonight there is just one winner, the people. Tonight more than ever,

said Mr. Chrétien,

we have every reason to be proud of democracy in Canada.

He added:

This is Jean Chrétien on the night of the 1995 referendum: "Quebeckers have spoken and we must respect their verdict."

Some days later, however, he declared that had this result had been in favour of the Yes, he would not have respected the verdict of those same Quebeckers.

What a great democrat Mr. Chrétien has shown himself to be. He is quite right to be proud of Canadian democracy, but it probably does not apply to him.

Since then, Mr. Chrétien and his ministers have been trying to find ways to cheat on democracy in Quebec, to alter the threshold required to respect the verdict.

We see yet another illustration of this with Bill C-20. In one clause, the bill stipulates that elected representatives in the House of Commons—that is, a House of Commons with 301 members, the great majority of whom are from outside Quebec—would have the authority to determine what was a clear majority, an acceptable threshold.

But it took a great deal of courage for Minister Dion to refuse to express what percentage would constitute an acceptable majority in his bill. Why did he not put a number to it—52%, 55%, 60%, 65%, 66.6%? Why did Mr. Dion fail to do what Dennis Mills, MP for Broadview—Greenwood, in downtown Toronto, did by firmly stating he is in favour of the 50%-plus-one rule?

• 1915

An Hon. Member: What a democrat! Well done!

Mr. Michel Guimond: And I feel that Mr. Mills—you will agree with me, Mr. Chairman, because I know that you know him personally and have a great deal of respect for him and his ideas—should be congratulated on having had the courage—

An Hon. Member: Well done! What a democrat!

Mr. Michel Guimond: ...to break away from the party line.

An Hon. Member: He had the courage.

Mr. Michel Guimond: We saw it, Mr. Chairman. The committee saw how Mr. Mills, after expressing his view, was victimized and tortured by Minister Dion's henchmen. He spent lots of time on the phone. And I won't even mention how he was hauled over the coals by journalists, who really did their job.

The next day, we had the comments verbatim in Alexandre Sirois' column. I'll use the English expression, because I'm sure he is bilingual enough to understand. His words were given "in brackets". In brackets! Those were his words!

I would have expected that—and this can still happen—at report stage in the House, Mr. Stéphane Dion would table an amendment. And I hope that Minister Dion will have the courage to say: "Dennis Mills, a member of this House, has persuaded me." In so doing, it took courage, but he has persuaded me that the 50%- plus-one rule is immutable, an essential democratic rule.

An Hon. Member: Inviolable.

Mr. Michel Guimond: And I would like to congratulate Dennis Mills, who is a great democrat.

Some Hon. Members: Congratulations!

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Chairman, I could have said a great deal more on this, but I do want to finish my speech within the three hours remaining, and will therefore unfortunately have to come back to my text. I say unfortunately, because I am finding our discussion—or should I say my monologue—absolutely riveting.

So as I was saying, Mr. Chairman, some days later Prime Minister Chrétien declared that if the result had been in favour of the Yes, he would not have respected the verdict of those same Quebeckers.

Since then, Mr. Chrétien and his ministers have been trying to find ways to cheat on democracy in Quebec, to alter the threshold required to respect the verdict.

Inspired by Mr. Trudeau's remarks in 1980 on the divisibility of Quebec, Mr. Chrétien and Mr. Dion are playing a dangerous game with the health of our common democracy and with Canada's international reputation.

Mr. Chairman, you know that my comments are directly related to the motion tabled by Mr. Alcock and supported by the majority members on this committee. The purpose of the motion is to limit clause-by-clause consideration to one hour per clause. You know that the purpose of my statements is to have that motion withdrawn. I'm trying to persuade the committee.

Mr. Chairman, you remember that:

Inspired by Mr. Trudeau's remarks in 1980 on the divisibility of Quebec, Mr. Chrétien and Mr. Dion are playing a dangerous game with the health of our common democracy and with Canada's international reputation. Quebeckers, though, have always respected the rules of democracy. They have acted as a people, in solidarity with decisions taken by the majority. Let us consider for a moment what would have occurred if they had, on the contrary, followed the logic of Trudeau, Chrétien, and Dion.

Mr. Bouchard tells us what would have happened:

In 1865, the parliamentarians of Lower Canada—Quebec at that time—endorsed Confederation by a vote of 37 to 25. According to the Trudeau/Chrétien/Dion rule, around 40% of Quebec then would have stayed outside of the new Canada.

• 1920

In the August 1867 election that ratified Confederation, only 55% of Quebeckers voted for the pro-Confederation Conservative Party. According to the Trudeau/Chrétien/Dion rule, the remaining 45% would have "partitioned" themselves—as would the 48% of Newfoundlanders who voted against joining Canada in 1949.

This is an interesting point, Mr. Chairman. During the referendum on joining the Canadian Confederation, 48% of Newfoundlanders voted No. So why were those 48% of Newfoundlanders not given the opportunity to partition themselves? A good question, isn't it?

Mr. Bouchard continues:

These major decisions, however, concerned "our children and our grandchildren", to repeat the argument invoked by Mr. Dion in support of his thesis of a higher threshold. These decisions profoundly affected the identity of the citizens concerned. Each time, however, Quebeckers respected the verdict of the majority.

In 1980, sovereignists held their first referendum. At the time, the region of Saguenay—Lac-Sain-Jean voted yes, as did 40% of the population. It did not occur to any Quebec democrat to decree that those territories could proclaim themselves independent. And rightly so. It is the people in their entirety who decide.

Mr. Chairman, unlike what Alliance Quebec and the Equality Party seem to believe, the decision to make Quebec a sovereign country or to remain in Canada cannot be decided street by street. It cannot be decided house by house. It cannot be decided by a grandmother living in the basement who wants to remain Canadian, and by a grandson who lives upstairs with his parents and wants to become sovereign. It is not decided by individual family members. That would be ridiculous, an aberration, Mr. Chairman.

Yet that is exactly what the Equality Party is asking us to believe. They want us to believe that such decisions should be decided by individual regional county municipalities. Look at what they answered when I mentioned the people of Shigawake and Hope Town. Shigawake and Hope Town could remain Canadian territory. Saint- Godefroi, just beside them, would be part of Quebec. A little further down, Douglastown, beside the Gaspé, would be part of Canada. L'Anse-à-Beaufils would be part of Quebec. That makes absolutely no sense, Mr. Chairman.

It is the people in their entirety who decide, not regions, neighbourhoods or linguistic groups,

but the citizens who make up the people of Quebec.

Similarly, in 1995 all the regions in Quebec save the Outaouais, the Beauce and part of the Island of Montreal voted Yes. No one suggested that "Yes" regions be "partitioned out of Canada". For the Quebec people and for all the political parties represented in the National Assembly, the cardinal rule demands that a majority of the people rules, whether by one vote or by 26,000. On October 30, sovereignists were in the minority and respected the verdict.

But that doesn't mean that our profound will, a will that is deep in our souls and in our hearts to form a sovereign people, that does not mean that with... How many times have people said: "Well, you had a NO in 1980, and you had a NO in 1995". Does that mean it's all over? That is not the question here.

The will to have confidence in ourselves and take charge of our own future, to say that we are capable of managing our own affairs, is something that comes up frequently. That is the question which was put in 1995. That question will be put again, Mr. Chairman. Quebec's movement towards sovereignty is irrevocable. Everyone on the Privy Council who is listening to this, all those Privy Council henchmen, should take it as read.

• 1925

You can try to straitjacket Quebeckers with Bill C-20 and other bills like it, you can bring on Bill C-20s, cases full of Bill C-20s, but you will not decide for the people of Quebec. And it does not matter what the Supreme Court opines. Nine wigs will not decide for six million tuques!

Some Hon. Members: Right on!

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Chairman,

In so doing, the Quebec people followed the example set by Canada, which in recent years has recognized a large number of new countries within their original boundaries. All these people included in their midst linguistic or regional minorities democratically and legitimately opposed to the sovereignty of their new states. In these cases, Canada proposed neither changing the rules of democracy nor changing boundaries. Why should Quebeckers, who turned out for the October vote in the exceptional proportion of 94%

why should those Quebeckers,

not be entitled to the same respect for democracy?

About Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Mr. Bouchard states:

The former Prime Minister has taken up his pen to remind us of him. That is his right. Beyond the battles waged by ego and among historians, let us seize the opportunity he has given us to remind ourselves that the 15 years which have passed since his last "coup de force" have not sufficed to repair the wrong he caused.

And I say to you sincerely, Mr. Chairman, that if Bill C-20 is passed, this will be a continuation of the insult to Quebec, and a continuation, in a different form, of the strongarm tactics used in 1982. This has been going on for 18 years, Mr. Chairman. There must be some reason for it.

Why has this Constitution not been accepted in the 18 years since 1982? Why have a high percentage of us in Quebec wanted to become sovereign for the past 30 or 40 years? Well,...

[English]

The Acting Chair (Mr. Dennis Mills): Mr. Guimond, I'm sure you realize that close to 3 million or 4 million Canadians from coast to coast are listening to your speech. We're getting calls that some of them would like to take a dinner break. Would you like to take a dinner break? They're so fixated on what you're saying....

Voices: Oh, oh!

The Acting Chair (Mr. Dennis Mills): What do you think? Do you want to take a 15- or 20-minute break so that people across Canada can go and have a quick dinner as well, after which they can come back?

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: You're going to realize, Mr. Chairman, that before I became a member of Parliament, I worked in labour relations for 16 years. I spent nights negotiating and arguing; I spent nights without eating, just drinking coffee and water.

I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate you as well, that I thank you for your offer, but I will not accept it, and I think it would be advisable for me to continue. You will see, Mr. Chairman, and the people listening to us will see as well—-the 3 to 4 million people you mentioned earlier—-that I am a tough customer.

Some Hon. Members: Oh, Oh!

Mr. Michel Guimond: I am tough.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Prove it, Guimond.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Chairman,

At a time when there are those in Ottawa who inspired by his theses,

the theses of Trudeau,

and are considering following in his footsteps, it is good to see where his past behaviour has led us, Canadians and Quebeckers, Anglophones and Francophones.

In Quebec, leaders such as Jean Lesage and René Lévesque, Daniel Johnson Senior and Junior, Jacques Parizeau, Claude Ryan and Brian Mulroney are undoubtedly not perfect. Their work and their laws may not last for "a thousand years".

Like those of Mr. Trudeau.

But, all of them respected the democratic process and its verdict. All of them abided by the decisions of the majority. All of them have sided with the will of the Quebec people.

• 1930

All of them, at one time or another, have been repudiated, scorned and accused by Pierre Elliott Trudeau.

Mr. Bouchard reminds us that:

Only six days after being sworn in, I have been admitted into that club of democrats by Pierre Elliott Trudeau.

And Mr. Bouchard concluded his response to the famous I accuse of Mr. Trudeau as follows:

With them, and with all Quebeckers, I plead guilty.

Mr. Chairman, let us now listen to what Mr. Claude Morin, the former minister of governmental affairs in the René Lévesque government, wrote at the time of patriation in response to Pierre Elliott Trudeau as well:

In the newspapers of February 3 last, Pierre Elliott Trudeau was on the war path again. This time, the target was Premier Lucien Bouchard, who, I suppose, symbolizes for him what he has fought against in vain throughout his life: Quebec patriotism. But the premier is not his only target: doubtless furious at the result obtained by the sovereignists in the October 30 referendum, and frustrated that he had not been asked to take part in the campaign...

Now that is interesting. Why was it that Mr. Trudeau was not asked to come and campaign in Quebec during the 1995 referendum? He was a great Quebecker, someone who had left a monument behind him, someone who had an important policy, someone who had had the support of Quebekers, someone who had been elected and reelected many times by Quebekers. Why was he not invited, in 1995, to came and campaign beside Daniel Johnson, Junior, together with Mr. Chrétien? That is an interesting question.

I apologize for this digression and I come back to my text.

...frustrated that he had not been asked to take part in the campaign, still disturbed to see that his 1982 "achievement" was being called into question and concerned about the opinion of future generations, he used this opportunity...

Mr. Morin is commenting on the essay entitled I accuse.

...he's taking this opportunity to present once again his own interpretation of history in which—but this is not new—he has a monopoly on the truth.

In his article, Mr. Trudeau puts forward an abbreviated version of Quebec's political demands and offers a picture of the 1980-81 constitutional negotiations which is not very accurate, to say the least. He also discusses the Meech Lake Accord...

But Mr. Morin says he does not feel the need to talk about that here.

...many of the people who are involved and who witnessed these events are still around to set the record straight.

Mr. Trudeau says that the genuine historical demands of French- Canadians amounted to one main thing: respect for the French fact in Canada. Then, referring to a statement made by Jean Lesage in July 1960, he reduces the latter's demands to two points: patriation of the Constitution and respect for the language and education rights of Francophone minorities outside Quebec. That is all.

According to Mr. Trudeau,

says Mr. Morin,

these points could have been dealt with under the Fulton-Favreau formula in 1964 and the Victoria Charter in 1971 but, he charges, both solutions were repudiated by Premier Lesage and Premier Bourassa, who had nevertheless negotiated and accepted them: failing to live up to their word, they abandoned the traditional proposals of Quebec and caused the talks to fail. Similarly, and in the Trudeau version of the facts, the 1980-81 federal initiative was an attempt to follow up on Quebec's "genuine historical demands" (...), but this time René Lévesque was opposed.

• 1935

In other words, Quebec's representatives themselves, by not keeping their word, have always been responsible for their failures. They are the ones who abandoned Quebec's traditional demands, whereas Ottawa and the other provinces, for their part, were being open and were prepared to meet these demands.

According to Mr. Morin,

Mr. Trudeau caricatures Quebec's positions and conceals the most important point: Quebec's demands and its suggestions for reforming federalism focused first and foremost on the division of powers, a position that was and remains founded on the sociological and verifiable fact that Quebeckers constitute a people.

Everyone remembers that:

In the 1940s and 50s, Maurice Duplessis demanded respect for what he called provincial autonomy and was opposed to Ottawa's systematic takeover of provincial powers. In fact, Duplessis has gone down in history mainly as a defender of Quebec's rights and therefore of its powers.

We need only think of what Mr. Duplessis said, Mr. Chairman: "give us our booty" with his verve and his mimicking style, Mr. Duplessis said "give us back our booty".

Mr. Trudeau seems to be the only one who did not remember that.

In July 1960, shortly after he was elected, Jean Lesage adopted a position similar to that of Duplessis and even went further: he called for an end to joint federal-provincial programs, in return for compensation. He repeated this many times, as we see from his many public comments on the matter. However, he did not stop there. For example, on September 20, 1964, in a speech to the Quebec Liberal Federation, he said: "Our province has special features and a unique character, which it must safeguard and which it is entitled to promote".

Mr. Lesage said:

As far as possible, contemporary Quebec must have and control the economic, social, administrative and political levers which alone will enable it to achieve its legitimate aspirations as an adult people.

In the same speech he said that the Canadian constitutional framework should evolve in such a way that "our community can achieve the objectives it freely sets for itself as it sees fit".

Daniel Johnson, Senior, took up the same theme in a presentation he gave at the Canada of Tomorrow Conference held in Toronto, November 27, 1967. It was entitled "What does Quebec want?"

Let's think about this famous slogan "What does Quebec want?" It's another way of asking what's wrong in Quebec. You are never happy. You are a bunch of whiners. What is your problem? Why have Quebeckers not been satisfied for 40 years? Is it some deep-rooted malaise? Is there something wrong with us? We aren't satisfied because the system—and I hope you all understand this—does not work. The system does not work and Quebeckers have understood that the only way to get out of... the only way of getting a system that works for Quebeckers is to leave the current system.

So, Daniel Johnson, Senior, in his...

The Chair: Order, please. Mr. Proulx, on a point of order.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask our colleagues from the Bloc Québécois whether we might not proceed with the clause-by-clause study of the bill? They could debate it with Minister Dion, who's prepared to come here with his advisers. Or are the members of the Bloc Québécois afraid of debating with Mr. Dion?

• 1940

The Chair: I do not interpret that as a point of order. It is a question, but it is not a point of order. Mr. Guimond has the floor.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would just like to point out that we are considering a motion that was passed by the committee, in which it was decided , in order to avoid debate, that the clause-by-clause study would last only one hour for each clause, and that there would be only one hour set aside for studying the preamble.

Mr. Chairman, this motion was like a knife to the opposition's throat, and that is why I am speaking today on behalf of the opposition. If the government had not tabled this motion, if it had agreed to allow us to have a real debate, we would not have had to talk in this way today and to use the rules of procedure as they're set down, as they were passed by the opposition and by the Government. Perhaps I should say, as they were passed by Parliament?

Thus, I must discuss the motion that I put forward, which I would like to reread. I move that the motion on time allocation for the clause-by-clause study of the bill, passed by the legislative committee on February 14, 2000, be rescinded. The reason I asked that Mr. Alcock's motion be rescinded is that I felt one hour for the clause-by-clause study was not enough to allow us to have a serious debate on the clauses in this bill, which is a very, very serious bill for the future.

That is why I tabled this motion, to rescind the gag order imposed by Mr. Alcock. But this is to be expected, Mr. Chairman. The eight members of the Liberal Party are going to take turns interrupting me in this way, asking why we do not debate the bill clause by clause. However, my answer will always be that I am consistent in my thinking.

[English]

Mr. Reg Alcock: On a point of order, Mr. Chair, I'm sorry, but I think Mr. Guimond misunderstood. The question was not why we cannot have debate; it was why he is afraid to debate the minister.

The Chair: Sorry, I've lost the train of thought on that one, but I don't think it's a point of order. It sounds like a question, to me.

[Translation]

Mr. Guimond has the floor.

Mr. Michel Guimond: We will see who is afraid of whom during the next stages of the bill in the House. Let the government give us all the time we want to study Bill C-20, let the government allow all opposition colleagues in this House to speak on this bill, let the government allow us to study each of the amendments put forward by each of the opposition parties in this House. And then we will see who is afraid of whom. If the government starts talking about who is afraid of whom, let it not rush this bill through, let it take the time to have a debate. The people of Canada will decide and will be able to tell who is afraid of debating, who is afraid of debating with whom.

So, as I was saying, in a speech entitled "What Does Quebec Want?" made in Toronto on November 27, 1967, Daniel Johnson Senior said:

In order to be anchored, Quebeckers want to be responsible for their decisions, when it comes to realizing their full human potential, (in other words in education, social security and health in all of their various forms), when it comes to asserting themselves economically, in other words the power to put in place the economic and financial tools that they deem necessary for their cultural development, and this is not only in the arts and literature, but also in the French language and in increasing the influence of Quebec in its relations with other countries and international organizations.

• 1945

In February 1969, Jean-Jacques Bertrand stated that "what is important [...] is to be able to live together in French, to build a society that reflects Quebeckers, and to be able to organize their collective life based on their culture. And this will only be possible when the government of Quebec has the powers required to accomplish the tasks that Quebeckers expect of it."

At his first constitutional conference as premier of Quebec, on September 14, 1970, Robert Bourassa stated: "I believe that we need to have an in-depth discussion of the distribution of powers, which is a central issue."

Robert Bourassa announced, and I think it's worthwhile to repeat it here: "We need to have an in-depth discussion of the distribution of powers".

There you have, according to five federalist Quebec premiers, what was required in order to renew the Canadian system. Instead of taking out the most important elements from Quebec's political history, Mr. Trudeau should have recognized the coherence in the opinions of these five premiers. He also should have detected that they all have a common denominator.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I'm not sure if my colleagues fully understood what the five above mentioned federalist premiers, Maurice Duplessis, Jean Lesage, Daniel Johnson Senior, Jean-Jacques Bertrand and Robert Bourassa, said.

Mr. Morin also says:

Mr. Trudeau [in I Accuse] also should have seen that the various positions of these premiers all had one common denominator: Quebeckers are a people, they want to be recognized as such and they demand that, in the distribution of powers and institutions, the political system recognize in a concrete manner this ideal. The sovereignist movement gained momentum precisely because, from one conference to the next, the federal leaders would not respect this legitimate and positive demand.

Mr. Trudeau himself was aware of both the existence and the nature of these aspirations when he suggested to Quebeckers, in May of 1980, that a No vote in the referendum would mean a Yes to a renewal of the system. Except that he was playing on words, as we learned after the fact. In fact, he took care to express his commitment in such a way that Quebeckers read into it an acceptance, after all those years, of their demands for a new definition of the relationship between Quebec and the rest of Canada.

We know what followed. In the momentum of the No victory, Quebec found itself faced with a process whose aim was not to respond to its aspirations, but in fact to do precisely the opposite. Even though the Quebec government did everything it could to counter the federal assault, in the end, Ottawa and the nine English provinces came together, in November of 1981, to impose, without any member of the Quebec delegation present (which was what the federal government wanted), a Constitution which, among other things, denied Quebec's distinct character, diminished its collective rights and unilaterally reduced its linguistic powers. Thus the greatest constitutional change since 1867 took place illegitimately and at the expense of the one Canadian group to which commitments had been made in the hope of having them vote No.

• 1950

Mr. Trudeau [in I Accuse] tries to show how Quebeckers are responsible for what happened to them in November of 1981, perhaps in an effort to exonerate himself in the eyes of historians. So, he accuses René Lévesque of having destroyed the common front that he had managed to establish between eight of the provinces during the post-referendum discussions and which had managed, with some success, to counter some of Ottawa's endeavours. This argument doesn't hold water.

Mr. Claude Morin says:

After the No win, the Government of Quebec was in a weak position. Which is precisely why Ottawa was in such a hurry, after the referendum, to bring the provinces together for another round of constitutional talks. According to the federal plan, these talks would be brief and were to finish three months later, in early September of 1980. It was, we were to understand, to take advantage of the circumstances to amend Canada's Constitution as Mr. Trudeau wished, and not to respond to Quebec's demands. Faced with this more and more obvious intent, the Government of Quebec had few means to defend itself. In fact, it only had one: to bring about the creation of a common front of provinces who would oppose specific federal proposals. That is precisely what happened. In the months that followed, a common front constituted the single greatest hurdle to Ottawa, so much so that the talks which were only to last three months, stretched out over 18 months.

Why wouldn't René Lévesque have used the common front to his advantage which, as Mr. Trudeau admitted it, was working wonderfully for Quebec?

Mr. Morin continues in his article by as follows:

Mr. Trudeau claims that the provinces that were allied with Quebec broke away when René Lévesque accepted, on November 4th, 1981, his proposal to hold a referendum on the federal constitutional amendments. Let's examine this more carefully.

Even before the November 1981 conference began, the common interprovincial front had virtually ceased to exist. In fact, given the Supreme Court opinion, which came down at the end of September and according to which too few provinces supported the federal plan, in October the federal government was looking to lure away three or four of the provinces from the common front. Representatives from Ottawa entered into negotiations with these provinces in the hope of striking a compromise that would suit them. However, this compromise would maintain the changes to which Quebec was opposed. The federal representatives did meet with some success, because one week prior to the November conference, the Toronto newspaper The Globe and Mail provided information on the bilateral discussions that were underway, which resulted in half of the provinces who, up until then, had been members of the common front, practically crossing over to side with Ottawa by the outset of the November 1981 conference.

This, Mr. Chairman, is a classic story. First of all, you have to understand why the leak occurred in The Globe and Mail. There are a whole bunch of similarities. You know, and we've often heard it said, that history repeats itself. I think that this is yet another case. I don't think that we should be surprised that half of the provinces of the common front switched over to side with Ottawa. In fact, on the morning of November 4th, one of them, Saskatchewan, presented a lengthy compromise that the Quebec delegation had never even heard about, and which obviously, had nothing to do with Quebec's demands.

Mr. Claude Morin asks:

Jean Chrétien advised them not to worry about it; according to him, it was an issue between Quebeckers and did not concern them.

How could René Lévesque have broken apart a common front that Ottawa had already managed to sabotage?

• 1955

It's also important to know that in November of 1981, the English- speaking provinces were of the opinion that the constitutional discussions had already carried on too long. Public opinion was pressuring them to reach an agreement on the spot. It was workable, but only if they ignored Quebec's demands.

Mr. Morin says:

Jean Chrétien advised the provinces who were concerned about our delegation's negative reaction that they shouldn't worry about it; according to him, it was "an issue between Quebeckers" that did not concern them and that he and Mr. Trudeau would know how to handle.

Which brings us now to the famous referendum proposed by Mr. Trudeau. René Lévesque knew he could no longer count on the common front and he was conscious of the fact that the English- speaking provinces wanted to finish things up at the conference, and so he said he was open to the idea put forward by Mr. Trudeau around noon on November 4th. Because there remained a number of issues pending and because they wanted to reach an agreement before the end of the conference, Mr. Trudeau proposed that for now, the Constitution be patriated as is, which did not raise any problems, and that there be a two-year period to continue discussions on the Charter of rights and on an amending formula; if there was no agreement between the governments, a referendum would take place at the end of this period.

Mr. Chairman, the speech that I am making on this motion that I tabled and which amends the motion that has already been passed by the committee, and I've come back to this at least 50 times since the beginning of my presentation, around 5:30 or 5:35, I can't remember exactly when, but I'm sure that somebody here must remember. I am speaking with all my heart, with all my soul, and I'm trying as best I can to fulfil my role as a parliamentarian by adhering to the democratic rules of this Parliament, and I must say that this is very difficult and that it also brings to mind a theme that we've often talked about in Canada, and that is the two solitudes: Quebec on the one hand, and the rest of Canada on the other; a Quebecker who speaks to the rest of Canada who is not listening.

Mr. Daniel Turp: That's exactly right.

Mr. Michel Guimond: That's what we have before us here this evening in committee, and I can testify to this fact because I have lived it. I will be able to testify to this fact afterwards, because what this represents is Canada's two solitudes.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Precisely, and I was thinking the same thing myself.

Mr. Michel Guimond:

So, right from at the beginning of the afternoon, it was plain to see that it would be a very strange referendum: contrary to what Mr. Trudeau had said a few hours previously, this consultation would not take place until after all the provinces had given their consent to the federal project which was being discussed and would only serve as an instrument to ratify a done deal!

Mr. Chairman, when I hear colleagues... I will just finish with this sentence.

René Lévesque rejected the process outright, in essence a scheme, that had been drafted by the Prime Minister.

When I hear a colleague say: "Yes, you're doing this, but you're not on television", I have to say, Mr. Chairman, that this is not something I'm doing because I am or because I am not on television; I'm doing this out of conviction. Everything I've said... I'm even ready to agree that we turn off the cameras. That's not really the issue. I would even be ready to... I am doing this out of my conviction. I might have considered it if this type of offer has been made to me, I could at least have considered it, but that does not mean that I would have done it. But I just want to say that I am not doing this because of the cameras. I am doing this because I have a role to play, I have a job to do and I'm doing this to better myself. As I said earlier, given that I'm not perfect, I can improve myself. And that's one reason that I'm happy that the cameras are here because I will be able to go and get the cassettes. I'm going to go and listen to them and I'm going to see how I can improve myself. I'm interested in seeing how I act and if I'm capable of keeping cool despite the intense stress, despite the insults, despite the interruptions, and despite the points of order which are completely irrelevant.

• 2000

But fortunately Mr. Chairman, you are the custodian of democracy in this committee, and I would like to pay tribute to you. I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that for the 37th Parliament, if the current Speaker did not decide to run again... I'm full of respect for Mr. Parent, but I just wanted to tell you that if he decided not to run again, as rumour would have it, I am convinced that you would make an excellent Speaker.

I am sure that there will be more than 44 of us, members of the Bloc Québécois, to hear what you might have to say about your candidacy if you decide to stand for Speaker. There will probably be 55 or 60 members from the Bloc Québécois. We will examine your candidacy based on its merit, Mr. Chairman.

If the common front was still as solid as some would have believed, then how is it that you can blame its collapse on René Lévesque's accepting, at noon, a referendum which he formally refused only three hours later in the presence of the other provinces which were in agreement with him on this issue?

Mr. Claude Morin explains:

Did Mr. Trudeau change his mind? Did he intentionally express himself the way he did at lunch, knowing that he would come up with a different proposal when the sitting resumed? Only he can explain this. Whatever the case may have been, these actions, for which Mr. Trudeau was congratulated by some columnists at the time, was then hailed by observers and by the media, mostly anglophone, as the sign of an incredibly astute political coup. If such is the case then, does this behaviour mean that any means, even immoral means, even antidemocratic means, are appropriate when they're used against the representatives of a Québécois government, under the pretext that they are sovereignists?

Basically, if we are to believe Mr. Trudeau [in I accuse], what happened to Quebec in November of 1981 was entirely the fault of Quebec and its representatives: they allegedly bungled the deal and they acted in bad faith. They are the ones who did not keep their word and there's no reason for anyone in Canada to feel badly or to feel that they have to make up for anything.

How then do you explain that Ottawa and all the provinces, in 1987 with the Meech Lake Agreement, had planned to right the wrong done to Quebec in November of 1981? And, why was there talk again of redress during the Charlottetown Accord debate in 1992?

If the federal action in 1980 and 1981 was as fair as Mr. Trudeau claims, then why did Jean Chrétien, his successor and his accomplice at the time, implicitly admit the opposite in promising that from now on no constitutional changes would be made without Quebec's consent? (Unless it is done through a simple act...)

The Chair: Mr. Proulx, on a point of order.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: In the spirit of saving money, could we have consent to turn off the cameras? The member opposite said earlier that he was ready to continue his speech without cameras. We could save the Government of Canada some money. It costs a lot. There are probably three or four camera operators.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Chairman, the member for Hull—Aylmer seems to have a great concern for democracy. While we're at it, to save money, why don't we just close the whole Parliament for a year or two. That would save a lot of money. While we're at it, why don't we just shut down the whole Parliament? We could save a lot more than just the salaries of the four camera operators who are doing a wonderful job.

• 2005

What a great democrat, the member for Hull—Aylmer. History will remember him as a great democrat, Mr. Chairman, who, in order to save a few bucks, wanted to let these people go home. Why don't we just close down Parliament for two years?

So, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Trudeau likes to claim...

The Chair: In my opinion, there is no consent for the proposal. Maybe yes, maybe no, but I believe not.

Ms. Marlene Jennings: The member is not being consistent with what he said.

Mr. Michel Guimond: I understand, you don't need to listen Mr. Bonin, which is what you've been doing since the beginning.

The Chair: Order, order.

Mr. Michel Guimond:

Ottawa's insistence, in its current propaganda...

The Chair: Order, order. It's difficult to hear Mr. Guimond, and he has the floor.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Chairman, have you observed a dominance, a theme, a thread, when it comes to the level of calm that we have a right to expect in the committee, and a lack of respect for order and decorum? Have you noticed, Mr. Chairman, the unacceptable in language? I get carried away, I get louder, I raise my voice and then I lose my cool. This always happens, Mr. Chairman, if you've noticed, when the Liberal majority opposite... I'm happy, now, because they are attentive. They are satisfied, and they are full. They've eaten well. Every time they try new stalling tactics to deprive me of my legitimate right to express myself. The member for Hull—Aylmer, a great democrat, found one way, and I propose, Mr. Chairman, that we follow this through to the next logical step. We will see what will be their next stalling tactics, which measure, proposed by the hatchet men from the Privy Council and from Minister Stéphane Dion's office, will be used next by our eminent strategists opposite. So I will resume slowly, Mr. Chairman, and we will see when the next one pops up. And from whom, this next tactics? There are some colleagues who still haven't used any, but probably because these members refuse to play this game. These colleagues know the Standing Orders and they know that when a member has a right to express himself or herself on a motion, they must let the member speak, even if they say things they don't like, even if they say things that they wouldn't qualify as interesting, because after all the word interesting is subjective. What interests one person may not interest another. Which is why in legislation, there must be objective criteria. I said this to my former professor, Mr. Rémillard, who testified here before this committee, the same committee which tabled, last February 14th... I've almost got that feeling that I'm singing the song "there's a hole in my bucket", and that I have to go through it each time. This committee tabled a motion that is unacceptable, and I must ask that this motion which takes away our right to express ourselves on the bill in the clause-by-clause consideration, be rescinded. The government has issued a gag order, they are trying to gag us. They are trying to ram this through. Well then, they will have to live with their decision, and they will have to live with the consequences.

I will get back to my text, Mr. Chairman, until the next stalling tactics. We're waiting for it. We are like goalkeepers. And we can get these pucks, so come on—shoot.

Trudeau likes to claim that in signing an agreement with the seven other provinces of the common front on April 16, 1981, René Lévesque dropped Quebec's right of veto. As usual, Mr. Trudeau preferred to "forget" certain things, because they made his demonstration impossible.

• 2010

After the failure of the Victoria conference of 1971...

This is of course Claude Morin speaking. Claude Morin was an important player at the Victoria conference of 1971; he was an advisor to Premier Bourassa. Mr. Bourassa states:

After the failure of the Victoria conference in 1971, the notion that some provinces could have a veto lost all attraction for most Anglophone provinces. The notion became so unpopular that in 1980- 81, only Ontario and New Brunswick still believed that the right to veto should exist. Ottawa was in favour of the veto, but in view of the other provinces' inflexible attitude, Quebec felt it would be wise to take precautions. Otherwise, it might have been left without any protection, with absolutely us guarantee that Ottawa would stand firm against the pressure exerted by the majority. Mr. Trudeau did give us to such pressure with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, when he agreed to include a notwithstanding clause to which he was in fact opposed.

In signing the agreement of April 16, 1981, the Quebec delegation explained to its partners that, if the agreement were broken, it went without saying that Quebec would use its veto. But the most significant point was that, after heated discussions, René Lévesque had a very important clause included in the accord, which contained two inseparable components: the right to opt out, with compensation. With that, Quebec had a veto over any possible attempt to restrict its areas of jurisdiction. In other words, even if the accord did not offer all the guarantees Quebec wanted about such institutions as the Senate, it still had protection with respect to the division of powers. Could it have done better in those particularly difficult circumstances, which were not after all unfamiliar to Ottawa?

When it became clear in early November 1981 that the coalition would not survive, and that the April 16 accord was therefore obsolete, Quebec returned to its traditional stand on the veto. Other governments took a different view, however. Ontario, which would normally have a right of veto, decided to renounce it, thereby implying that Quebec should do without one as well. These events culminated in the "night of the long knives", an expression invented by the media, where Ottawa and the English-speaking provinces agreed on a package deal which bore no resemblance to the renewed federalism promised in May of 1980. Moreover, without notifying the Quebec delegation, Ottawa and the other provinces modified the amending formula in the April 16 accord: the right to opt out was retained, but—and this is one essential "detail" that Mr. Trudeau omits—it was neutralized by eliminating the reference to compensation, something that Quebec considered indispensable, as the other parties knew full well.

Claude Morin states:

Mr. Trudeau again makes a mockery of reality when he tries to absolve himself by claiming that Quebec voluntarily renounced its veto.

The "night of the long knives", as it was dubbed by the media, has been interpreted in different ways, with some interpretations placing Quebec in a deeply unfavourable light. For example, some say that the Quebec delegation was wrong to accommodate its people at the Plaza de la Chaudière, a hotel in Hull, while the federal delegation and the delegations of the other provinces stayed in Ottawa, where it was easy for them to get together. This observation is ludicrous, for three reasons: a) the other provincial delegations were not all staying together, but were scattered in a number of different hotels in Ottawa; b) every delegation knew how to contact every other delegation, including the Quebec delegation (they had been consulting one another for months); c) Quebec also had a room at the Château Laurier which, when necessary, could be used for meetings.

• 2015

Some have also said that, on the evening of November 4, the Quebec delegation should have been making some attempt to find out if by any chance the others were not secretly plotting together. The preceding paragraph shows how easy it was to contact the Quebec representatives at any time. But were the Quebec delegates supposed to do the rounds of Ottawa restaurants, bars and hotels to unmask illicite political plots?...

Yet others say that, in any case, there would have been no point in inviting Quebec delegates to the final meetings, since they would have rejected out of "separatist" dogmatism, any compromise reached by Ottawa and the nine English-speaking provinces. Obviously, our delegation would never have agreed to any constitutional reform that contradicted referendum promises. However, it would have been far more courteous—not to say more intelligent—to give Quebec an opportunity to express the exact reasons for its dissident view.

Though it is impossible to cover all the details in a few pages, we must hope that the facts outlined here will help put the events of 1980 to 1981 in context. One thing has remained clear and indisputable: 18 years ago, Mr. Trudeau and his then-partner Jean Chrétien, were the main force behind an unprecedented anti- Quebec operation.

That, Mr. Chairman, is how Claude Morin sees the unilateral patriation of the Constitution in 1982. He also gives us an opportunity to see some of what went on behind the scene.

Mr. Chairman, you know that it is my duty to speak tonight, because the government has decided to curtail our clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-20 by restricting debate to one hour for each clause and one hour for the preamble. That is why I have had to table a motion to ask this committee to cancel Mr. Alcock's motion, which had been adopted on division.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I come to the core of the problem. I would like to read you the words of Fernand Dumont, one of Quebec's greatest philosophers. I am very happy to be speaking tonight about Fernand Dumont, because he is from my riding. He's from the neighbourhood of Montmorency in the town of Beauport. Many people in my riding are extremely proud of him. Mr. Dumont states:

The failure of a Canadian political community is a tragedy for everyone. In an English-speaking continent, the French-speaking nation could have found solid support in Confederation. In the same way, English Canadians could have built with us a society in which we would have all have felt at home, proud of our differences and of the things we had in common. But we did not succeed. And we do not see how a hasty attempt to patch things up can make up for this historic failure.

NATION, STATE: these may be apparently simple words, but they become very ambiguous in use.

Fernand Dumont states:

I will not spend too long on semantics here. We could put different words to the distinctions I will suggest, but the essence of the matter lies in the distinctions themselves.

We understand a nation to be a community that has inherited a historic way of life. The resulting collective reference assumes such points of reference as language, religion, legal institutions, organizations and sometimes political status. (...)

French is not spoken only by Francophones in North America. Catholicism has been a distinct feature of our nation, but no longer applies as broadly as it once did. The state of Canada cannot be identified as a single nation, anymore than the state of Quebec. However, such references are encountered in a national community; they are maintained both by historical memory and by day-to-day social interaction.

• 2020

By contrast, the State is primarily defined by citizenship, at least in a democracy. It provides a concrete foundation for the rule of law. It guarantees the equality of fundamental rights, thus confirming the individual's public status. [...]

Nation and State therefore provide two different means of societal cohesion. The distinction is one of principle, and one of fact. There is no mandatory coincidence between the two: there are some nations who do not have States, and there are some States with more than one nation. In fact, such plurinational states are in a majority in today's world.

However, and this is where I introduce an observation pivotal to the rest of my thesis, both nation and State are founded on forms of solidarity woven by history.

This is clearly evident in a nation that essentially has no other base. It is also true for the State—

The distinctions I have proposed, which do not apply solely to our situation, would lead me to deny a Quebec sovereignty plan that would lead to a nation State. There are anglophones and francophones in this province, and the francophone nation is not found within Quebec's borders alone.

If we apply the same criteria, a Canadian confederation is in itself perfectly justifiable, but under the conditions that flow from my previous comments. Confederation was to have guaranteed the protection and development of the nations that belong to it. In our case, the francophone nation—which has a long history of alternating between attemptive assimilation and seclusion in folkloric reserves—was perfectly within it right of finding within Confederation an opportunity to develop freely, without becoming lost in it. This would have enriched all members of the Confederation, without breaking it up.

Fernand Dumont states:

This first condition ties in closely with the second one: Confederation was slowly to become a genuine political community. This was a requirement that neither overdue constitutional patch-ups nor sentimental references to the Rockies and Canadian passports would meet.

A political community, as I have stressed, is the product of a history of a gradual settling of solidarities. However, the history of Canadian Confederation is one of failure to build a political community.

The Union of the two Canadas was the final attempt to assimilate francophones. Quebec entered into Confederation after the failure of that system. Its intent was to stabilize the executive council, strengthen the position of British colonies vis-à-vis their US neighbour, and promote economic development, particularly by building railroads. Commercial interests prevailed.

Initially, Quebec's minimal powers and provincial politicians' dependence on federal politicians prevented the friction that was to be manifested—with increasing insistence—later. The fathers of Confederation—both anglophone and francophone—hoped to found what they called a new nation. That expression came up frequently in their public statements.

Quebec francophones were, hypothetically, subjects of two nations.

How is the ambivalence resulting from that status resolved? The emphasis was on the cultural character of the francophone nations, on "our language, our institutions and our rights", as previously established. If I understand correctly, the other nation was to be a political nation. Effectively, the powers Quebec still held were primarily cultural, with jurisdiction in the areas of education and social assistance, which were to be entrusted to the Church and held separate from politics. As we can see, with this curious arrangement the francophone nation remained largely outside of the new nation, which was defined primarily by politics.

• 2025

Mr. Dumont states:

These factors pertain to the structures of a confederate system. But I would reiterate that a political community also relies on the symbols of an initial consensus. In many cases of autonomy and independence, we find a celebration of founding origins: autonomy of the Swiss Cantons, the Magna Carta, the US Declaration of Independence, the French Revolution, and the Belgium Revolution of 1830 are all examples of this.

Yet we find no such process at the birth of Confederation. The Fathers of Confederation refused to hold a referendum, which in the circumstances would have been not only a democratic process but a founding act similar to those we find in other political communities. The vote of elected parliamentarians prevailed. Jean-Paul Bernard, an excellent historian, calculated that among the 49 representatives of francophone ridings who voted, 25 voted yes and 24 voted no to confederation.

The least we can say is that consent for this new nation, for this nascent political community, was fragile indeed. This was a community that could celebrate its origins only with discretion...

suggests Dumont.

The events that followed further illustrated and highlighted the initial failings of the confederation structure and symbolism.

The initial years of Confederation marked the beginning of a long list of encroachment on the educational rights of francophones in other provinces. The rights of Quebec's English majority had been carefully guaranteed, but those of francophones in the rest of Canada were much less protected. The federal government consistently failed to fulfil its responsibilities. Think of all the battles that were fought—so many today appear unlikely or ridiculous. We fought for bilingual money, bilingual stamps, and somewhat fairer representation of francophones in the federal public service.

This is something officials should know all about, Mr. Chairman. Fernand Dumont states:

...and somewhat fairer representation of francophones in the federal public service.

Mr. Dumont put this very politely indeed. I would very much like to know the percentage of francophone officials in many departments here in Ottawa.

Canada's long delay in achieving independence from Britain was also significant in impeding the gradual establishment of a Canadian political community. The French Canadians who demanded a greater autonomy, and even independence from Canada, thereby hoped to strengthen the Canadian State, so that its citizens could have their own identity.

Mr. Chairman, you might perhaps ask Mr. Bonin to take a nap outside the room. I find it very distracting to watch him sleep, particularly since I am beginning to be a little tired myself. There, he has opened his eyes now, but he was sleeping a few moments ago. I can continue now.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bonin is a member of Parliament. When I mentioned Mr. Bonin, I wanted to be quite clear he is a member of Parliament. He was sleeping.

The Chair: No, no, he was awake.

Mr. Michel Guimond: He was sleeping. I have excellent eyesight, Mr. Chairman, and I saw him sleeping, just as clearly as I saw senators sleeping during the Speech from the Throne. It's exactly the same thing. Right, I can go on.

Fernand Dumont states:

True, the Canadian Constitution was patriated a short time ago. It was patriated late, and without Quebec's participation. In essence, this was a repeat of the failure of the founding act of 1867. Moreover, we still have the symbols of an external reference: Canada's head of State is still a foreign queen, represented in Canada by a governor general. You may say that those symbols do not hinder our decisions in any way. Yet if those symbols have no importance, I do not see why they persist; if they endure, it is because many consider them indispensable.

• 2030

Official bilingualism, more often than not practised superficially and sparingly, could not change such a long-standing and well-established tradition. It should come as no surprise that official bilingualism is so poorly accepted in so many places. The multiculturalism policy confused things even more, to the point where the average person can no longer find him or herself in the many official definitions of political and national allegiances. Now all we have to do is add "distinct" society to the mix, and the political community will be a total mess.

Given these brief reminders, many will not fail to object that that is history, that we have to live in the present and face the future.

Fernand Dumont tells us that he comes back to that:

I come back to that again: a political community is not improvised, we cannot make in one shot what history denies.

That, I hope our Liberal friends facing us will remember if they adopt Bill C-20, that is a phrase I hope they will recall: " we cannot make in one shot what history denies.

We can develop all the "asymmetric" or "co-operative" federalism mechanisms we want, build up all the metaphors or recipes we want, we will only succeed in bringing the old divisions to the surface.

The failure of a Canadian political community is a tragedy for everyone. In an Anglophone continent, a Francophone nation could have found within Confederation a solid base in America; similarly, English Canadians could have built with us a state where each of us would have felt at home, proud of both our differences and our similarities.

That reminds me, during the 100th anniversary of Canada's Confederation... I was young because I was born in 1953. I was barely 14 years old. It was the year of Expo 67 and during the centennial, the theme of... because the people of Canadian unity were already very active. The theme of the centennial was Canada, Stand Together, Understand Together. Canada, restons ensemble, comprenons-nous ensemble. Do you people find that right? Do you find that things have been going well, you people, since 1967? Were you afraid of losing the referendum of October 30, 1995? You were literally afraid, and that's why you want to hold C-20 to our throats. You were frightened enough that you are trying, by any means possible, once again, to scare people.

But I want to tell you that the people of Quebec have been vaccinated against fear. You will no longer be able to scare us, you will no longer be able to get us down on our knees. We will stand up, as we stand up before you, here this evening, and as you will find us standing in the next election campaign, in the next referendum campaign, you will find us standing, the MPs of the Bloc, as a block in the House of Commons. I hope we will have time to discuss each of our amendments that we will suggest. You will see. They will be deep-reaching amendments. They will not be numerous, but they will have weight. They will be heavy in meaning. They will have legal value and not be empty phrases. You will see.

This is what Fernand Dumont tells us:

It seems to me that we can discern the reasons in favour of Quebec's sovereignty without giving in to bitterness about the past, or to some narrow nationalism.

• 2035

If we have not managed, during our history, to create a real, basic consensus in Canada, we have to arrive at a logical conclusion: there are in fact two political communities in Canada.

I'm sorry to tell you this, but I don't know if you are aware of this, there are in fact two political communities. And that is simply a statement of fact. There are two political communities, yours and ours. We don't do this to insult you, it's simply an observation.

In the rapid succession of images in "asymmetric federalism", for example, I cannot help but notice that we sneak around the association of two political communities.

In addition, with the multiplication of commissions and committees, what does English Canada want? A more centralized central government, a state that would emphasize the cohesion of the other political society. Whatever positions we arrive at in this drift, the trend on either side is clear. Why not make law what is clear in fact?

In recalling a few primary principles, I was underling something obvious: the political community must respect and promote the development of nations that, without identifying themselves with it, contribute to its vitality

We have never stopped saying, and even more so since Mr. Lesage started the Quiet Revolution, that the political community of Quebec is the foundation essential to the survival and development of the French nation in America.

In this regard, Quebec's situation is radically different from that of small European nations. There, the nations are part of a mosaic where diversity is the rule, where the identity of each guarantees the identity of the others. In North America, we are a very small French population on a continent that is otherwise Anglophone. The support of a specific political community is glaringly obvious.

Fernand Dumont continues:

Nevertheless, one question has often been asked during debates in the last few years: how, we are told, has the renaissance you have had in Quebec since the Quiet Revolution been held back or favoured by your belonging to Confederation? It is worth thinking about.

A lot of the energy spent during these years was devoted to jurisdictional challenges, denouncing the muddle of programs, the more or less adequate reconciliation of different aims. It would have been a lesser evil if it had only been a waste of time and resources that could have been put to better use. There is something worse: the effect of these fights ends up making us lose sight, because of strategies between administrative bodies, of the problems themselves.

For example, the media talk more about jurisdictional conflicts on professional training than about appropriate measures to be taken in cases of extreme emergency. If we look at the big challenges we face, one by one, from under-development of Quebec regions to the deficiencies in sports to our cultural heritage, the diagnosis is the same: attention and debates are being diverted to power struggles. It leads us to believe that for certain authorities, it is a useful alibi.

• 2040

Let us go back to the question that is often raised to oppose the sovereignist position: was Confederation an obstacle to the Quiet Revolution? Let us not forget what was in fact the main element of that revolution: the affirmation, as never before, of the state of Quebec, of the Quebec political community.

The key sectors of collective life—education, health, social assistance, the environment, economic development—have clearly become political responsibilities, says Fernand Dumont.

For a long time, the Francophone nation was based on survival. The nation was its customs: a language, institutions, all governed and guaranteed by religion. Here [in Quebec] the church, during a century...

You know, Mr. Chairman, we have a judeo-christian tradition in Quebec. You know that for a century the Church was exercising a strictly political responsibility.

At the beginning of the 60s, that responsibility went to the state of Quebec: that was a decisive change that contributed to the consolidation of the original political community.

In the last analysis, the question is whether Confederation has served us or not in our evolution over the past 30 years and suggests a conclusion to us: the changes have been made through exhausting confrontations with the federal government; they have entailed the progressive confirmation of a Quebec political community; the awareness of a need for a growing role for the State went hand in hand with a strengthening of public spirit.

Global standardization, yes or no.

In Canada as elsewhere in the world, on many sides we hear that the problems of political communities exist in a different context. It's true, and the question of Quebec's sovereignty must not be isolated from the changes in the contemporary world.

One does not need to be a great scholar to see the broadening of economic ties; we sometimes conclude that it is not the time to limit political communities.

Incidentally, if we use this to argue for keeping Confederation and the current structure, the argument can be turned around: why stop on such a good road? If we don't pay attention, this rhetoric will lead us back to having Canada annexed to the United States, an old temptation that resurfaces periodically in history.

Yes, the economic spaces are broadening and so are the cultural spaces, the areas of information, and the mobility of populations; do the legal communities simply have to follow the trend?

As they become more complex, Fernand Dumont tells us, as they unify in a certain way, these spaces do not become abstract territories where groups and individuals would merely become atoms. New powers appear and extend their hold, often without democratic controls. There are still inequalities, privileges and resources.

Cultures are concrete entities, as are solidarities, that cannot be stretched to infinity without losing all their substance and their scope. Even economic growth is not dependent solely on the flow of capital or supernational powers left to their own initiative.

For example, manpower training or research and development are linked to the possibilities and the needs of given societies. Schooling meets obstacles and benefits from facilities that are not the same everywhere. In some countries, we may want a social security and health care system that are not adopted by other countries, for cultural reasons or because we have preferred uses for our resources.

• 2045

All that goes against the standardization of political communities. To the extent that the economy, information, and population mobility go beyond frontiers, it is up to the political communities to strengthen their presence according to the diversity of needs, cultures and possibilities of dialogue. Otherwise, we will not have an economy, information or immigration that has a human dimension. We are therefore correct in placing Quebec's eventual sovereignty in the context of the great urgencies of contemporary civilization.

Once again, Confederation, as a project for a political community, was not fatally doomed to fail.

In this case as in others, history has not managed to overcome a basic disagreement. Right from the start of the agreement, we have bypassed the democratic process that could at least have been a promise, a memory that we could have called upon despite the crises that followed.

I fear that today we are trying to repeat that initial mistake. Commissions, committees, meetings where citizens without mandates, economic powers and others who are supposed to represent the population work on patch-up jobs and manipulating opinions; democracy is not well served.

That is not how to fix constitutions, much less political communities. Under the current circumstances, the divergences are not due only to the presence of Quebec; by creating commissions and committees, no doubt to gain time because of a failure to take charge of the situation, the federal and Quebec governments have opened Pandora's box.

Despite the more or less shrewd barriers built around them, the problems are now in the public domain. They will not nicely retire into the shadows through a number of improvised decisions in some temple, says Fernand Dumont. Here as elsewhere, democracy is fragile. There are times, in the history of societies, when remembering is essential. For Canada as for Quebec, that is where we are now.

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to give you a look, because we are still discussing the motion I tabled, Mr. Chairman, I would now like to offer a look at Canadian constitutionalism, a thought by Jean-Claude Germain, who is trying to understand the rationale behind the tabling of the clarity bill.

Mr. Jean-Claude Germain asks the following question. It is a delightful text, and you will see that he makes a rather sweeping statement then gets down to specifics.

A voice: A funnel.

Mr. Michel Guimond: That's it, it's the funnel principle.

Look at the first question he asks:

What are the tactical motivations that pushed Jean Chrétien to want to adopt a law on clarity?

The strategic principle in question here is that there is no reason why what worked once will not work a second time. In other words, Prime Minister Chrétien is basing his current decision on a previous experience that goes back to the repatriation of the Constitution in 1982.

Let us remember that he was Minister of Justice in 1982 and therefore an important player.

We will remember that the adventure started with a judgment by the Supreme Court that unilateral repatriation of the Canadian constitution, as Pierre Elliott Trudeau wanted, was legal but contrary to the customs and traditions that require the agreement of the provincial governments to proceed with constitutional amendments, therefore illegitimate.

• 2050

Jean-Claude Germain tells us:

"I jumped on the word legal and forgot the rest". Jean Chrétien, who was the federal minister responsible for the case, brags about it in his autobiography, where he even indulges in a philosophical reflection: in politics, intelligent reasoning is often less important than the impression created on the citizen.

Since it worked once, it should work a second time! Especially since one again the adventure begins with a judgment by the Supreme Court that says that the Government of Canada has an obligation to negotiate with the Government of Quebec after a referendum that would have provided a clear majority to a clear question.

Jean-Claude Germain tells us:

Jean Chrétien already expects to write in the follow-up to his memoirs: "I jumped on clarity and I forgot the rest!" This means the basic foundation of democracy, which is the equality of the vote of every individual, the future of Quebec and the future of Canada.

For Jean Chrétien as for Wilfrid Laurier, Quebeckers don't have opinions; they only have feelings or impressions. If we use this reference grid, we have to conclude that Quebeckers currently feel and have the impression that Jean Chrétien...

I simply want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I am quoting an article by Jean-Claude Germain. I would simply like to say that I am not the author because that might raise a storm of protest. I want to be honest. Jean-Claude Germain tells us:

For Jean Chrétien as for Wilfrid Laurier, Quebeckers do not have opinions; they only have feelings or impressions. If we use this reference grid, we have to conclude that currently Quebeckers have the feeling and the impression that Jean Chrétien is rambling, Jean Charest is quibbling and Stéphane Dion is freaking out!

That's the end.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention that my speech is still related to the motion that was tabled by Mr. Alcock and that I have to oppose this motion, which is why I am speaking. I think that to understand well what I have been talking about since the beginning, even since Monday at 2:30 p.m., you should know that in his statement of principle adopted on January 30, 2000, at our congress, the Bloc Québécois asserted that any decision regarding the Quebec nation could only be centered and based on the Quebec state and its National Assembly.

This same declaration recalled that the Bloc Québécois' mission is to represent and defend the interests of Quebec and all Quebeckers in all its parliamentary and extraparliamentary activities. This mission made it imperative that our participation in the work of the Commission des institutions de l'Assemblée nationale du Québec to support Bill 99 and to invite the National Assembly to proclaim its supremacy over any other institution, especially the House of Commons of Canada that is seeking to usurp the freedom of the people of Quebec to decide on their future and their political status.

In addition, the Bloc Québécois invites all political parties in the National Assembly, all institutions in the civil society and all citizens of Quebec to support the bill presented by the National Assembly. Faced with the new strong-arm tactic represented by Bill C-20, it is important that Quebeckers, through their institutions and their representatives, show solidarity and defend the higher interests of Quebec. Quebec is the master of its future. It must bet on freedom.

You know, Mr. Chairman, that each day the Bloc Québécois confronts the opponents of Quebec sovereignty in the House of Commons, but now it faces the opponents of democracy in Quebec. In fact, Bill C-20 is a real attempt on Quebec's right to freely choose its political future and to exercize the right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada to seek sovereignty.

• 2055

Under cover of a law that recognizes Quebec's right to secede, the federal legislation is in fact a law whose purpose is to prevent holding a referendum and to put an end, as the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs said in the House of Commons, to any threat of separation.

So this law is not aimed at recognizing, as did the Supreme Court in its reference of August 20, 1998, the legitimacy of the sovereignist project, but is intended instead at creating barriers that would deny the right of the people of Quebec master its destiny and deal with human issues. The Bloc Québécois is fighting Bill C-20 without mercy and is using, as we see tonight, all democratic means to get this bill withdrawn and challenge its legitimacy.

In addition, among the means used, we have called upon Professor Henri Brun, who gave judicial advice on the concept of a majority in the reference to the secession of Quebec:

In this case, more specifically, the issue is how we define the concept of "majority" that the Supreme Court of Canada used in its reference of August 20, 1998, to qualify the results of a Quebec referendum that would bring about an obligation on the Canadian side to negotiate secession with Quebec. Is it an option that would give more votes to the sovereignist than the federalist option (50 per cent of the votes) or something else?

In our opinion, the majority that the Supreme Court is talking about in this context is the greatest number and nothing more. There is an obligation to negotiate on the part of Canada as soon as more people have voted for sovereignty (more than 50 per cent of the voters) than against. This is so because the word "majority", if it is not qualified by other words, means exactly "the greater number", in other words more than 50 per cent of the whole of two numbers, and because the Supreme Court, when it speaks of a majority in this context, only qualifies it with the adjective "clear", which only insists on the actual presence of an the thing qualified and in no way modifies that thing. In other words, the Supreme Court, if it had wanted to speak of something more that the two scores in a referendum, would have qualified the word "majority" with something other than "clear", and that is not present in any relevant passage of its reference.

Following the logic of the Supreme Court of Canada, it is important to remember here that this clear majority, whose advice, as is noted many times, is required condition for Canada to have an obligation to negotiate but not the required condition to become sovereign (or secede from the Canadian federation). To become sovereign, normally it would be required that Quebec and Canada negotiate an amendment to the Canadian constitution. Or, for Quebec to proceed unilaterally, it would be necessary either for Canada to have refused to negotiate, or for the negotiations to have failed for reasons attributable to Canada, from the international community's point of view. It is therefore not surprising, in this context, to conclude that the rule of the Supreme Court is one that the highest of the two results for each option (more than 50 per cent of the votes cast): what is at stake is to know when Canada is legally obliged to negotiate and nothing else. A possible ascension to sovereignty will depend on these negotiations or on an unilateral act on Quebec's part and the evaluation of the international community.

• 2100

Let us now look at what the Supreme Court of Canada said.

In its reference, the Supreme Court often expresses itself on the conditions necessary for Canada to be required to negotiate with Quebec. Globally, these conditions can be summarized by saying that the people of Quebec must have clearly state in a democratic fashion its democratic will to see Quebec leave the Canadian federation. That is what gives rise to Canada's obligation to negotiate.

If that phone call is for me, Mr. Chairman, could you take a message and I will call back later.

Some voices: Oh! Oh!

Mr. Michel Guimond: I cannot go answer the phone because I am reading.

Throughout paragraphs 87 and 88 of the reference, but also in paragraphs 92, 100, 139, 149, 151, 152 and 154, The Court uses various expressions that we believe we have summarized accurately in the phrasing of the next to last sentence.

This global condition that we have expressed would become manifest with the holding of a referendum with a clear question and whose results would be clear. On this last point, the only one that interests us here, the Court goes a little further by stating that a clear result, a result that assumes that a clear question would obligate Canada to negotiate, would be a result that would give a clear majority to the sovereignist option.

The Supreme Court, throughout its reference, often expresses itself about the nature of this referendum result that would create an obligation to negotiate. But in no case, with one exception, does it deviate from the expression "clear majority". And in that only case, it goes even further, saying that it is to prevent the reader from attributing a meaning other than the ordinary one to the words used. The Court specifies that it is speaking of a clear majority in the qualitative sense of that expression.

To better understand what the Court meant by "clear majority", it is therefore to the ordinary meaning of these two words that we must look.

The dictionaries, whether general or specialized in law or political science, whether Canadian, Quebec, French, American or English, all define the word "majority" in the same way: this noun designates the greatest number, which, when we are talking of two numbers, necessarily means more than 50 per cent. In other words, the option that receives the majority is the one that receives more votes than each of the competing options, which necessarily means more than 50 per cent of the votes expressed when there are only two options. To mean that more than simply 50 per cent of the votes is required, the word "majority" must be qualified to produce this effect.

Mr. Brun said that many works

...distinguish between an absolute and a relative majority (or simple), reserving the first to cases where more than 50 per cent of the votes are obtained. But, once again, this distinction is of no relevance in cases where the choice is between two options only. The majority resulting from a referendum on Quebec's sovereignty will never be relative or simple, so it would have been completely useless for the Court to add the adjective "absolute" when it talked about the majority that would be the result of such a referendum. Some of the works cited even go to the trouble of specifying explicitly that the absolute-relative distinction is in effect irrelevant where there are only two options.

• 2105

Most, on the other hand, indicate specifically that the rule of the greater number means, in such a case, 50 per cent of the votes plus one.

Mr. Brun tells us that a number of works:

allude also to the possibility of "reinforced" or "qualified" majorities. It may be an increase in the required percentage, beyond 50 per cent, or a reference, in calculating the percentage, to the number of people who had the right to vote rather than the number of people who exercised that right. In either case, it is however necessary that the word "majority" be explicitly qualified, as is the case, for example, in paragraph 38(2) of the Constitution Act of 1982.

The Supreme Court, when it discusses the idea of majority in terms of a referendum result on Quebec sovereignty, in its reference only uses the word "clear", which does not, as we will see, of a nature to change the requirement of an ordinary majority to one of a reinforced or qualified majority. On one occasion, it is true that the Court refers to an "enhanced majority" (par. 77). But there it is not talking about the context for evaluating what is to be expected from a referendum result for it to have the effect of forcing Canada to negotiate. The context instead is one of evaluating of everything that must be done before reaching sovereignty. To achieve sovereignty, according to the Supreme Court, more than a simple majority is required to obligate Canada to negotiate; a complex constitutional amendment is required, or the support of the international community.

The adjective "clear" is a common word whose understanding in law or in politics in no way suggests having to look it up in dictionaries specialized in those disciplines. In our context, it means what is obvious, manifest; that whose existence is not subject to debate. To qualify the concept of majority only with the word "clear" therefore cannot in fact transform was is up to then a simple or ordinary majority, which means a majority or more than 50 per cent of the voters, into a qualified or reinforced majority of those who could have voted or of more than 50 per cent of those who actually did. The use of the adjective "clear" only underlines the real and not just apparent presence of a majority of more than 50 per cent of the votes cast. The word "majority", without a qualifier, as, as we have shown, its own meaning; adding the word "clear" only reinforces that real meaning.

Professor Brun tells us:

It is true that the Court, in its reference, sometimes speaks about the majority of Quebeckers or the majority of the population of Quebec, and not about the majority expressed during a referendum. But these words, in context, clearly refer to the results of the referendum. And in fact that is what the reference specifically says in the main relevant passages.

And there, professor Brun refers us to paragraphs 100, 148, 150 et 153.

• 2110

We therefore think that the clear majority that the Supreme Court talks about as the trigger to require negotiations is the majority of 50 per cent plus one obtained at a referendum and not the approximate evaluation of majority support for sovereignty within the entire population of Quebec regardless of the results of the referendum. On the other hand, we must admit that the word "clear" must have a function. In our opinion, it expressly opens the door for Canada to challenge the reality of a majority of more than 50 per cent of the votes in favour of sovereignty; it opens the door to the possibility of arguing that because of certain circumstances around the referendum this majority of 50 per cent of the votes is apparent but not real. That is what the Supreme Court seems to be suggesting, and nothing else, when it specifies that the word "clear" in the expression "clear majority" is used in the "qualitative" sense of the word. The clarity of the result does not have to flow from the quantity of the votes exceeding 50 per cent but rather from the quality of the referendum process leading to that 50 per cent.

As for the factors that would justify pretending that a majority is not really a majority of more than 50 per cent of the votes cast, The Supreme Court does not say very much. It often repeats that the voice of the Quebec people must not be ambiguous, which, in terms of the process, does not add much more precision to the requirement for clarity. It does however mention must be that of a democratic will, which suggests that the process must be consistent with the principles of liberty and equality.

On the negative side, the Supreme Court does not offer examples of cases where challenging a referendum result with fore than 50 per cent of the votes in favour of the sovereignist option would be justified. It limits itself to indicating that the political imperatives in this regard will be determined by circumstances. We can imagine, of course, that the presence of fraudulent maneuvers or serious irregularities could make such a challenge credible. Nevertheless, it is at its own risk that Canada could decide, on that basis, to refuse to negotiate. Without proving that such charges are real and serious, Canada would at least have to prove to the international community that there are reasonable grounds to believe in the reality and the seriousness of such facts, otherwise Quebec would be able to proceed unilaterally, under the aegis of the international community.

Here is the conclusion of this excellent legal opinion by professor Henri Brun of Université Laval:

In our opinion, the "clear majority" stated by the Supreme Court as a condition that would obligate Canada to negotiate with Quebec is nothing more than the result of a referendum that would give more than 50 per cent of the votes cast to the sovereignist option. That flows from the meaning of the noun "majority", unqualified, and that the modifier "clear" changes nothing in terms of this reality.

We therefore have to conclude that a refusal to negotiate based only on the fact that a majority in favour of sovereignty would not have reached 60 per cent, or 55 per cent, even 61 per cent of the votes cast would be an unconstitutional act. Such a refusal would not be consistent with the constitutional obligation to negotiate that, according to the Supreme Court of Canada, both from the principle of democracy and from the constitutional amendment procedure. Such an attitude on Canada's part would normally be condemned by the international community and would be of such a nature as to legitimize Quebec's accession to sovereignty by an unilateral declaration.

That is the opinion of professor Brun.

The adjective "clear", on the other hand, explicitly underlines the fact that a majority of more than 50 per cent of the votes cast must be real and without doubt. The emphasis that the Supreme Court puts on this by repeating it is such that Canada could be tempted, if necessary, to pretend that that qualification was absent.

• 2115

From a rhetorical point of view, it could be seen as an invitation to claim that this majority in favour of sovereignty is not real. From the point of view of political reality, this opening could not, however, be translated into a refusal to negotiate unless Canada could convince the international community that there in this case circumstances that were of a nature sufficient to invalidate the result of the referendum. Without that, the refusal to negotiate would legitimize a unilateral approach under the aegis of the international community.

Now, Mr. Chairman, since we are still discussing the validity of the government's decision to gag our clause by clause study, and given that we have not been able to do a serious clause by clause study of this bill, I believe it would be relevant to know what professor Andrée Lajoie, who testified before us, before this committee, thinks of the expression "clear question" in the reference re the secession of Quebec.

To summarize my thinking, I would first like to say that professor Lajoie tells us that the Supreme Court has not defined, or, more specifically, has refused to define what constitutes a clear question. There are excellent reasons for that, not all of which are explained but which nevertheless imply serious consequences.

A close re-reading of the reference of the Supreme Court in the Quebec Secession Reference leads to the conclusion that not did the Court not define what is a clear question, nor under what condition a question would be clear, it expressly refused to do so.

To the best of my knowledge, the Court uses the expression "clear question" only four times: in paragraphs 93, 100, 148 and 153, the latter two summarizing the first two as a conclusion. In the same sense it uses the "clear expression" four times, (87, 88, 92, 151) or "unambiguous" (three times: 87, 100, 104) and, with a related but different meaning, "clear referendum result"(151).

Essentially, its reasoning puts the issue of a "clear question" as an issue of legitimacy in the referendum process (87, 88, 150), a legitimacy that triggers the obligation to negotiate, which is then imposed on the provinces and on the federal government. (88, 151). But the Court bases this obligation to negotiate on the fact that secession is in its opinion a constitutional change (84, 87, 88, 92, 194): it deems it to be a special case—no doubt extreme—to classify as a constitutional change "by conferring a right to initiate constitutional change on each participant in Confederation", a right that imposes a "corresponding duty on the participants in Confederation to engage in constitutional discussion in order to acknowledge and address democratic expressions of a desire for change in other provinces"(69).

The obligation to negotiate is therefore not reserved for a referendum on an eventual secession, but applies more broadly to any initiative (not necessarily by referendum, as long as it is democratically expressed) for a constitutional change emanating from a participant in Confederation, and also as long as the process used "ensures that there is an opportunity for the constitutionally defined rights of all the parties to be respected and reconciled" (76). In summary, a referendum on secession is a special case for triggering a constitutional change process, subject to the democratic principle that is imposed on such changes (88).

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It is in this context that the Court, applying this principle to this specific case, then propounds the "clear question" as a condition for the legitimacy of a specific way of modifying the constitution through a referendum on secession (84, 87), a specific process that would trigger, like other attempts at constitutional amendments also subject to the democratic process (76), the requirement to negotiate on the part of the other participants in Confederation (87,88)

In none of the paragraphs quoted above where the Court refers to a "clear question" or a "clear expression" or the "unambiguous" will of Quebeckers have the judges defined or clarified what they meant by these expressions, nor what eventual condition(s) the question would have to meet this clarity requirement imposed as a requirement for sufficient legitimacy to trigger the negotiation process implied by any constitutional change. Of course it must be a "democratic expression" (69, 87), but this reference does not allow much clarification, given that the Court itself has already given at least three definitions of "democracy" since 1984...

Moreover, it says that "The Court has no supervisory role over the political aspects of constitutional negotiations. Equally, the initial impetus for negotiation... on a clear question for secession, is subject only to political evaluation... Only the political actors would have the information and expertise to make the appropriate judgment as to the point at which, and the circumstances in which, those ambiguities are resolved one way or the other". This statement, first made in the body of the text (100), is stated again in the conclusion (153).

Since the meaning of a "clear question" cannot be found in the constitutional reference, I believe we can exclude at least two, based on the requirement for clarity imposed by the Court.

The first meaning to be excluded is the one that would require a clear question to deal only with secession and mention it explicitly. Such a constraint is in fact excluded, on the basis of the clarity condition imposed by the Court, regarding the intrinsic requirements to any constitutional change (76): on this basis, I cannot see how to claim that a clear question could deal only with secession, to the exclusion of any other less extreme constitutional change, without saying, by definition, that the latter are "not clear" and therefore illegitimate.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Alcock has a a point of order.

Mr. Reg Alcock: Mr. Chairman, I notice our friend is beginning to look a little uncomfortable. He looks as though he's feeling a little ill.

I'm quite serious about this. This is a friendly point of order.

Would you like a little recess?

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: No.

[English]

Mr. Reg Alcock: We'd be prepared to grant it, that's all.

[Translation]

The Chair: Sir, you have the floor.

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Mr. Michel Guimond:

The second meaning the one where clarity implies only one meaning for everyone, and this second exclusion also flows from the intrinsic requirements to any constitutional change that the Court says are the basis of the clarity obligation in the specific case of a referendum on secession. In fact, other previous constitutional changes on which the Court has often had to rule have never been commented on by the Court regarding their lack of clarity, even though their wording was less than unambiguous. We only have to recall the Constitution Act of 1982, which introduced the Canadian constitution, not only the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but other changes, such as "free and democratic society" and "ancestral rights", to mention only those two, are so ambiguous and full of different meanings that the Court has not stopped giving different, even incompatible, interpretations to them.

Given these circumstances, who would pretend that in 1982 all Canadians, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, including MPs, had the same understanding of the expression "aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms" (without discussing the concept of a treaty...)? Or that by the same token, the expression free and democratic society meant the same thing for all Canadians of all political stripes and all MPs of all parties? However, no one, especially not Prime Minister Chrétien, who we believe played a role in this process, has attacked the legitimacy of this constitutional change that would modify the Canadian constitution to the extent that we know, because the text was not clear enough. So to maintain that to be clear—and therefore legitimate and valid in terms of the democratic principle that underlies our Constitution (61 et al.)—a text must be unambiguous, would mean that all the constitutional amendments of 1982 are invalid: we cannot believe that the Court intended to arrive at that conclusion.

The reasons for this silence and its implications.

We will already have understood that the Court had excellent reasons for not defining the expression "clear question"... It explained some and let others to which I have referred transpire, but there are others, much more basic ones, that can be used to justify its position.

The reasons the Court overtly expresses to refuse to specify what it means by a "clear question" have to do with its self-limitation in making law and the jurisdictional boundaries it draws between questions that belong to its role and those that it considers belong, on the contrary, to "the political aspects of constitutional negotiations" (100), deferring them to "political actors" identified only by the fact that they "would have the information and expertise to make the appropriate judgement as to the point at which, and the circumstances in which, those ambiguities are resolved one way or the other" (100) "in the circumstances under which a future referendum vote may be taken" (153). Despite the ambiguity—if not the absence—of criteria to separate "the relevant aspects of the Constitution" from "the political aspects of constitutional negotiations" (100), in my opinion the Court is perfectly justified in using its discretion in the matter of deciding what powers it should exercise in order to determine those on which it can bring some light. Not only can it not give a definition of a "clear question", because, according to it, in law such a task is not within its jurisdiction, but because it is in fact an impossible task.

In fact, the meaning of the words and the statements is not given objectively, once and for all, it is construed according to the context in which they are used. More specifically, the process that gives them meaning does not occur unilaterally in a social vacuum, but within a community to which the author speaks: the use of language implies dialogue. As a result, it is not only the author who determines the meaning of the words, but also those to whom the message is addressed. That is not to say that the reader of a text, its addressee, has full latitude to attribute any meaning whatsoever to it. But it is up to that addressee to determine it, within the maneuvering room attributed to him or her, and his or her context.

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Because the limits of the interpretation of a text depend not only on how it is stated, nor even less on the intention of its author, but on its compatibility with the "common" meaning attributed to it by the reference community that interprets it. This is especially true of legal texts, which generally have the effect of constraining those under the jurisdiction of the court or at least modifying their previous position significantly: the legal community that interprets it will not allow the selected interpretation to be incompatible with its values and its major interests. But that is equally true of any other text, and especially those whose political ramifications put them in the forefront of social issues.

In other words, in the context of a referendum question, this principle becomes even more obvious: the meaning of a question addressed—and therefore its degree of clarity—depends on those to whom the question is asked: in this case, Quebeckers. When it is asked, and as it is addressed to Quebeckers, it is up to them to decide if they believe they understand it and can answer, and no one else can decide that for them. The only definition of clarity is the one that suits them, and the meaning that others, to whom the question is not addressed, might eventually give it is not relevant.

In concrete terms, it is up to the political actors in Quebec to frame the question for Quebeckers, who will have to decide for themselves whether or not it is clear. Faced with such a question, the federal Canadian political actors from Quebec would be able, as individual Quebeckers, to evaluate for themselves the clarity, and, as such, would be entirely free to express themselves and to try to influence their fellow Quebec citizens or to adopt another position during this dialogue. If, during this exercise, their interpretation of this clarity, or of the meaning of the question, coincides with the "common" meaning then given to it by the reference community that legitimately interprets it because it is the addressee, there will be no problem. If the opposite is the case, the results of our research lead to the conclusion that it is not their interpretation of the question or their evaluation of its intrinsic clarity that would prevail, but that of the other Quebeckers dominant in the community.

Hence, at the next step when, once the referendum is over, they would be called upon, this time as Canadian federal political actors that are part of the "other participants in Confederation", to evaluate whether the necessary clarity required to trigger the obligation to negotiate had been met, they will have to refer to the previous evaluation of the Quebec addressees.

And they will have to do it in exactly the same way as any other Canadian participant who is not a Quebecker: their personal opinion on the clarity of the question is no longer relevant at this stage of the debate. In acting otherwise, by refusing to respect the collective position of Quebeckers on the clarity of the question, the political actors in the ROC would expose themselves to the judgment...

Some voices: Oh! Oh

The Chair: You may continue.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Acting otherwise, by refusing to respect the collective position of Quebeckers on the clarity of the question the political actors in the ROC would expose themselves to the judgment of the international community on their willingness to negotiate in good faith, as the Court itself indicated(152, 154).

We will have understood that in a social context the meaning of words is constructed through a process that involves both the author of the text, its "addressee" and the relevant reference community that interprets it. Under these circumstances, no matter where it comes from, any attempt, necessarily reductionist, to impose a single meaning, is both illusory and doomed to failure.

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A few examples spring to mind. The eventual presence in the question of the terms "secession", "independence" or "country" has appeared to some federalists as a guarantee of clarity. However, does "secession" in itself exclude the ultimate conclusion of a treaty? How can one claim that without refusing in advance such negotiation as those the reference of the Supreme Court imposes? Since when can a Parliament bind its successors and forbid the eventual setting up of new constitutional structures? In addition, what does "independence" refer to? For Stéphane Dion, then professor of political science at the Université de Montréal, they were, in 1994, synonymous.

And here, Mr. Chairman, I would like this to be clear. Look at what your mentor, Stéphane Dion, then a professor in the political science department at Université Laval, in 1994, here is what he thought of the term "independence": he said it was synonymous with "sovereignty", «secession» and "separation".

Can the word describe the current relationship between Canada and the United States, in general and in the context of NAFTA specifically? If not, would it apply to a Quebec that would join NAFTA after seceding from Canada? Finally, what is a "country": a place of birth, a region, a territory? Larousse gives us three meanings, and even Vigneault adds winter... Are France and Germany not recognized as countries by the members of international community now that they are integrated into the European Union?

In summary: the Court has stayed well away from defining what is a clear question, and its silence in this regard prevents us from defining the meaning the Court would give it. But the reasoning on which it bases the requirement for clarity—knowing the requirements of democratic validity that apply to any constitutional change, within which it places a referendum on secession—allows us to exclude certain elements from this eventual context. So neither the requirement to make the question only about secession nor that of ensuring only one meaning for everyone (as though all previous amendments, including those of 1982, could only be interpreted one way) can be included in the requirements for clarity.

In fact, the Court, which has expressly refused to clarify its concept of clarity, has well understood that such a requirement was an illusion since the meaning of words is a social process in which the intended audience and reference community participate as much as the authors. In this case, there is no magical term that would be understood by everyone in the same manner, and it is up to Quebeckers, to whom the question is addressed, to decide on its clarity. If the federal political actors or the other participants in Confederation refused to recognize the collective evaluation of Quebeckers regarding the clarity of the question, they would expose themselves to the judgment of the international community regarding their good faith in terms of the negotiations imposed by the Court.

As Francis Hammon emphasizes, for a question to lead to unambiguous support, it would be necessary for citizens to be perfectly informed of the consequences of an eventual accession to independence, which are in any case subject to the negotiation to come: that is an internal contradiction that even squaring the circle would not solve. The Court was right in avoiding that trap: objectively, there is no question that is unequivocally clear. We will have to live with that and respect the collective common sense of those to whom it is addressed when it is addressed to them.

• 2140

Mr. Chairman, you know that the discussion we have had since 5:30 is centered on—and if I have not repeated it 50 times, I have not repeated it once... You know that I have to speak tonight to support the notice of motion that I presented and that reads as follows: "That the motion related to the Clause by clause review, adopted on February 14th, 2000, by the Legislative Committee, be rescinded". Mr. Chairman, I had to table this motion because the Liberal government had decided to gag us. The Liberal government had decided, through a motion presented on February 14th, presented by Mr. Alcock, Parliamentary Secretary to Stéphane Dion, the following motion to limit debate on this bill to one hour per clause, one hour only for the preamble, on this bill that is so important in the eyes of the government.

We therefore had to, and it is for this reason, Mr. Chairman, that the clause by clause discussion was not held tonight. It is not because we were afraid to debate with Stéphane Dion. We believed, and we continue to believe, that the sovereignty of Quebec is a legitimate objective. We believed, and we continue to believe, we hope that the government, during the next phases in the House, will show openness and will give a chance to all colleagues in the House to discuss—all colleagues without exception—that the 301 members of the House of Commons will be allowed to speak on Bill C-20. Moreover, if this government is democratic, as it seems to indicate, I hope it will give us permission, in the House, the possibility, in the House, to debate all the amendments we will table. We will satisfy ourselves with tabling only a few, but you will see that they have been thorough and I am convinced that we will have time to debate them in the House.

We should ask ourselves, Mr. Chairman... Earlier, I said to you: «What does Quebec want?» We know that Quebec is one of the 10 provinces of Canada, that its total population is about seven million people, that it represents about 25 per cent of the total population of Canada. We know that its population is about 83 per cent Francophone, i.e. people who speak mostly French at home, and that it also includes 9 per cent who are Anglophones, as well as 7 per cent who are allophones, which means individuals whose main language at home is neither French nor English.

On Quebec's territory, there are also 65,000 people belonging to 11 Aboriginal peoples. In the rest of Canada, the population whose mother tongue is French represent one million people. The total population of Aboriginal peoples living in Canada is about 600,000 people in 600 bands.

The sovereignist movement in Quebec, Mr. Chairman, has always based itself on the necessity of defending the French language and promoting Quebec culture. The French language has become extremely fragile because it is in the minority on the North-American continent. The assimilation of Francophones outside Quebec has reached alarming proportions across Canada. Although this is a weighty trend that has long existed, the most recent statistics on that topic are simply dramatic. For example, half the people outside Quebec whose mother tongue is French live in Ontario. But among these 500,000 people, only 300,000 say they speak mostly French at home.

• 2145

That is an assimilation rate of 40 per cent. The situation is even more serious in the other provinces, except in New Brunswick, where the assimilation rate is only 7 per cent. That is where we find the Acadians, who represent one-third of the population. Even in Quebec, although Francophones are in the majority, the French situation remains precarious. Two conflicting linguistic legislations are in force. On the one hand, the Canadian government promotes bilingualism across the country, which in fact means quasi-unilingualism in English outside Quebec, except in New Brunswick, I agree, and relative bilingualism in Quebec. The Quebec government, for its part, aims at guaranteeing that French will be the common language of the citizens of the province, especially through the promotion of French as the language of education, work and signage. In fact, French is the official language of Quebec. We must however underline the fact that the Quebec Anglophone community has always had recognized rights to have and to develop its own institutions, especially in the education and health fields, and that it is perfectly possible for an Anglophone to live and even to work in English in Montréal. Whatever Keith Henderson says, who testified before us this morning, whatever William Johnson says, who testified before us this morning. I challenge these Anglo-Quebeckers to say if the Francophones outside Quebec, those in Saskatchewan, in British Columbia, who have fought, who have not stopped fighting, week after week, to have their schools and have their children educated in their mother tongue, French, we, the sovereignists, do not have a lesson in democracy to learn from William Johnson and Keith Henderson about the way the Anglophone minority is treated in Quebec. Let them give the equivalent in the other provinces. That is what we are asking.

Mr. Chairman, for our part, we believe that all citizens, whatever their community or origin, have a right to freedom of expression. In this matter, Quebec has in fact one of the most progressive charters of rights. But this freedom of expression by individuals can, in our opinion, coexist harmoniously with the legitimate promotion of the use of French, which, in the North- American context, requires appropriate legislation. The Canadian government, it seems, is not of this opinion.

Another indication of the precariousness of the French fact is the limited capacity of the Francophone majority to integrate immigrants. Canada has one of the highest immigration rates in the world, thanks to which Quebec and Canada now have a demographic growth rate that would otherwise be absent. But the assimilation of immigrants, whether in French or English, is only about 40 per cent in Quebec. Since assimilation means changing the language spoken at home, and if it were not for the very great mobility of Anglophones in the other Canadian provinces, this assimilation would tend to increase the proportion of Anglophones in Quebec. The different measures put in place by successive Quebec governments, sovereignist or federalist, have in fact slowed down the linguistic integration of immigrants into the Anglophone community. But these things are constantly being challenged or even annulled by the economic, political and cultural pressures on the people who have adopted Quebec.

In short, even if there has been remarkable progress, the linguistic situation is still worrisome. Even more so because Quebec does not have all the tools, legislative and administrative, with which it could make the necessary corrections.

Let us now ask the question, Mr. Chairman, as we discuss this motion, is Canada a multinational State or a Nation-State? Quebec's precarious linguistic situation is aggravated by the fact that Canada does not recognize the national character of the French language and the national character of the Quebec culture, which includes those of the Anglophone minority, of the Aboriginal peoples and those of Quebeckers of all origins.

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We believe that the cultural and linguistic diversity of Quebec is compatible with the existence of a common national language that is the language used by Quebec citizens of different languages, and a common national culture based on institutions in which all participate, and democratic values that are shared by all.

But the Canadian government does not recognize that that language and that culture are those of one of the founding nations of the country. For it, French is a cultural trait of some of its citizens, a trait that can be the subject of individual rights, but that cannot be looked at from the point of view of the rights of a people.

Moreover, this government is engaged in a process of nation building which consists of building a single civic identity without taking into account the multicultural character of the country. The citizens of a multinational State can obviously have a common civic identity, but that identity would not be viable without a recognition of the different nations that make up the State.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that is enshrined in the Canadian constitution is of individualist inspiration and says nothing about the social and democratic rights or the existence of the people of Quebec. Canada is increasingly trying to deny its character as a multinational State and transforming itself into a federation of 10 provinces having the same administrative weight.

The process of nation building translates itself into what is commonly called cultural diversity but the Aboriginal and Quebec nations do not themselves benefit from any real political recognition, except for a symbolic recognition of the Aboriginal peoples in the Constitution Act (1982) and a strategic recognition of certain individual Francophones in public administration.

Mr. Chairman, I believe we have heard testimony from a certain number of Aboriginal nations that clearly came to tell us that the unilateral repatriation of the Constitution did not sit any better with them than with us Quebeckers.

The Canadian government has implemented a multiculturalism policy and an official bilingualism policy according to which the entire country is officially bilingual. The multiculturalism policy is based on the principle of the equality of all cultures in Canadian territory. Even if the Canadian multiculturalism policy officially promotes the linguistic integration into one or the other of the official languages, immigrants mostly integrate into the Anglophone community in Canada and bilingualism is mostly a fiction outside Quebec.

The nation of Quebec is a pluralistic, multiethnic and liberal society. The majority of Quebeckers have always accepted the cultural diversity and cohabitation it allows. In addition, they have long considered it an advantage to belong to both Quebec and Canada, and to thus be part of a multinational state. They would therefore have liked to find a solution that, within the federal context, would have taken into account the specific needs of Quebec, but Canada does not adequately protect the French language outside Quebec and refuses to fully recognize the authority and autonomy of the Quebec government in linguistic matters on Quebec territory.

In addition, it seeks to deny the existence of many nations within itself. Canada is, in fact, a multinational state, but now Canadians aspire to making a Nation-State. Those are some of the reasons that bring a growing number of Quebeckers to choose the road of political sovereignty.

The slowness of the sovereignist process in Quebec is in itself a testimonial to its democratic character and its real desire to accommodate the vast majority of Quebeckers. It is based to a large extent on using referendums, but these are, in fact, only the culminating point of long negotiations that now stretch back more than 30 years.

• 2155

A brief reminder of these negotiations may help to understand what the people of Quebec want, and that is what I have done since I started speaking on Monday at 2:30.

Let us now examine the coming of the next referendum. If there is no significant change in federal policies, it seems increasingly possible that those in favour of sovereignty will win the next referendum. And that is why I believe that the government has imposed Bill C-20 on us, because it knows full well that Quebec's march to sovereignty is irreversible.

It could happen within a few years. Or this victory, if it happens, may not be favoured by all the communities that make up Quebec's society. What then is the political setting? We believe in the concept of citizenship defended by the partners for sovereignty. We also opt for Quebec citizenship based on solidarity and active co-operation where the differences between citizens are neither erased nor set apart, but invested in a common project: the evolution of Quebec. Differences of opinion, different lifestyles and values are the mark of any democratic society and not an impediment to mutual respect. Even if disagreements persisted in a sovereign Quebec, individual liberties and the equality of all Quebec citizens would be enshrined in its constitution.

In this constitution, we would also enshrine the collective rights of the Anglophone minority and of the Aboriginal nations because, in addition to being full-fledged citizens of Quebec, Anglophones and Aboriginals have specific needs and rights.

Historically, the minority nation Anglophone has contributed to the building of contemporary Quebec, and it will keep the right that has been guaranteed to it, to create, maintain and develop its own institutions.

The 11 Aboriginal nations living on the Quebec territory have a right to governmental autonomy that will have to be officially recognized. Quebeckers must not make the same mistakes as Canadians regarding their minority. They must protect the rights of their minority Anglophone nation, as well as those of the Aboriginal nations.

The Quebec government in fact committed itself to this in 1995, and I am convinced that the IPSO, the Intellectuels pour la souveraineté, would never have agreed to support the sovereignist project if they had not been assured that such were the intentions of the Quebec government.

In addition, if the opinion of the minority must not determine the orientation of the majority, it must be heard and listened to. In that sense, the proposed political and economic union with Canada included in the sovereignty project for Quebec would allow citizens who believe themselves to be first and foremost Canadians to belong simultaneously to a political entity whose territory corresponds to what is now Canada.

Let us now look at the sovereignty of Quebec from a legal international perspective. If the Canadian constitutional order cannot legitimately provide a framework for Quebec's accession to sovereignty, can this process be taken over and governed by international law?

The right to self-determination inscribed in the United Nations Charter and interpreted by the UN declaration on friendly relations of 1970 deals essentially with colonial peoples, even though some have read into it a limited right to sovereignty.

But in practice, international law recognizes that a people can become sovereign if the process is democratic, and if it manages to control its territory and its population. The process of achieving sovereignty is therefore, first and foremost, a political and not a legal fact. International law does not authorize sovereignty, but does not forbid it either; it recognizes it.

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It is in that sense that we can claim that the Quebec sovereignist approach is in agreement with international law, just as the independence of a number of states since the end of the World War II has agreed with international law, and, more specifically, since the beginning of this decade, when, let us recall, 21 new states became sovereign.

Certain current members of the Canadian government maintain that Quebec cannot rely on international law to unilaterally declare sovereignty, and they maintain that it would be illegal according to international law. In this manner, they hope to make the population believe that such behaviour is morally reprehensible. But they are contradicted by most of the international jurists who have expressed an opinion on the subject.

International law does more than avoid pronouncing itself on this issue: it acknowledges sovereignty. These jurists therefore implicitly recognize that the process of acceding to sovereignty goes beyond the strictly legal framework and that such a process can sometimes be politically legitimate and morally justified.

As we have indicated, Quebec will do everything in its power to avoid an unilateral declaration of sovereignty.

Let us now look at Quebec's moral justifications. Quebeckers have always talked about getting along with their partners in the federation in the context of an agreement amongst peoples. And when we will have reached sovereignty, it will not be the politicians who will speak: it will be the people. They believe in the principle that we can belong both to the people of Quebec and be part of a multinational state. For them, Quebec is a multinational entity between two founding peoples that were then called "French Canadians" or «Canayens» and "English Canadians" Now, we talk instead of a Quebec people and a Canadian people.

The Aboriginal people were here long before, and independently of the creation of Canada in 1867. If they were not one of the founding peoples of Canada, it is because they were wrongly excluded. I remember that we heard the testimony of Phil Fontaine yesterday, who was looking at the painting above us, the one of the Fathers of Confederation. He looked at it and remarked, quite correctly, that there seemed to be some empty chairs in the background. I am convinced that those empty chairs should have been filled by Aboriginal peoples.

It can also be said that Acadians are a people in Canada. That is now the incontrovertible reality in Canada. If Quebeckers are open to the idea of belonging to a sovereign multinational state, they have always come up against the refusal of Canadians to recognize the existence of the people of Quebec.

This refusal has existed since the beginning of the federation, in 1867, and it is expressed as much on the constitutional level as on the political and administrative levels. Canada refuses to put its multinational character in the constitution. It refuses to give Quebec full control of its cultural powers: language; communications; culture and economy.

These jurisdictions should in any case belong solely to the government of Quebec on its territory. The federal government also refuses to limit its own spending power. And there, Mr. Chairman, on the limits on spending authority, next Monday, the 28th, during the budget speech, we will see Paul Martin, the Minister of Finance, bust his britches saying he has accumulated a surplus of $95 billion over the next five years when it is only a demonstration that the government is taxing too much and that this government has been taking money out of the pockets of the unemployed and has cut transfers to the provinces.

Is it normal and acceptable that a government accumulate surpluses of $95 billion over the next five years?

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Mr. Chairman, the Minister of Finance, on Monday, February 29, during the Budget Speech, will be busting his britches about new spending, creating new programs, once again by rolling back exclusive areas of jurisdiction for the provinces, as we have seen in what is coming up in the area of parental rights, as we have seen in the millennium scholarships. When one has the cash, it's easy to ride roughshod over the jurisdiction of the provinces.

Mr. Chairman, the Canadian government also refuses to recognize explicitly the real imbalance in the division of powers; an imbalance that would reflect the fact that Quebec is one of the two founding peoples of Canada. Although Quebec has its Civil Code, its language laws, and recently a certain control over its immigration, in the main, on the constitutional and political level, it is the principle of equality between the ten provinces that prevails; as a result, Quebec cannot have a special status within the Canadian federation.

The sovereignist approach in Quebec can also be explained by the fact that the Canadian government has, through numerous policies during the last 30 years, favoured the economic development of the Toronto region, at the expense of all the other regions of the country. We can certainly understand the need for unequal development when a community is in an outlying area, when it does not have sufficient citizens, when it does not have enough diversified economic resources, but on the other hand, the situation in Quebec cannot allow for such an unequal development.

Mr. Chairman, since it is 10:07, and that I have been speaking since 5:30, and that I am exercising my democratic right to speak before this committee since Monday at 2:30, I believe, Mr. Chairman, that it is time for me to conclude.

Before I conclude, I would like to thank the support staff that has worked very hard in this committee, the interpreters, the television people, the people who televise the debates, the pages, all the people who, in good faith, have worked in this committee.

I want to tell you that I have found this experience relevant in presenting my position, but I remain very disappointed that the government is using its Parliamentary majority to prevent debate, to stop real discussions on this Bill, and I invite it, the government, to seriously think about what will happen next in the House regarding this Bill. If debate was turned down this evening on a clause by clause basis, it is simply because Mr. Alcock, Parliamentary Secretary to Minister Stéphane Dion, had tabled a motion to limit the discussion to one hour per clause and one hour for the preamble. It is for that reason only, Mr. Chairman, because like my colleagues, and that is the intent of the motion I presented and about which I started to speak at 5:30, I wanted that motion to be withdrawn so that we could debate freely and have a debate about ideas.

I would like to remind you that during the presentation to this committee only a few days ago, the Clerk of the Privy Council and the Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs was wondering who was afraid of clarity. Speaking for members of the opposition, and for the members of the Bloc Québécois, I ask the minister the following question: Who is afraid of democracy?

• 2210

But on the same occasion the Minister said that he had never been afraid. However, his actions, his decisions, his speech and his attitude prove the opposite. Once again, the federal government has belittled the opposition and the opinion of Quebec in the management of Canadian affairs. The Liberal government has just gagged us to quickly impose a bill that it describes as a clarity bill. But nothing is rushing it.

Once again, in Quebec there is a broad consensus against this project. Once again, there is Canada on one side and Quebec on the other. For those to whom Canada is dear, I want to tell you that there is nothing to be happy about. If you think things are going well in Canada now do you think that it's going well with what we have just done? Do you think it's going well? Is everyone happy? Is everyone satisfied? Are you proud to belong to the most beautiful country in the world?

Since 1995, Canada has been terribly afraid, because it has seen that despite repeated assurances from their Prime Minister, Quebeckers almost voted for the sovereignist project. That fear changed to real panic when there was a love-in organized in Montréal a few days before the referendum. Fear, because the rest of Canada knows very well what modern Quebec wants, and even faced with an incontrovertible verdict for a desire for change on the part of Quebec, the federal government would not concede anything. This fear therefore needs a champion who, under the guise of clarity and everything that seems at first blush reasonable, will try to calm those fears and then undermine and disavow Quebec's ultimate legitimate tool in its struggle for recognition: democracy.

Sad times, Mr. Chairman. Stéphane Dion is the bearer of this fear, and bill on referendum clarity is its incarnation. The rest of Canada is afraid of the question Quebec would ask itself. Let us disavow it, says the minister. The rest of Canada is afraid of majority rule, let's change it, says the minister. The rest of Canada is afraid of the legitimacy of the National Assembly, let us deny it, says the minister again.

The essence of the federal bill on clarity can be summarized by the idea of a basic fear o democracy, popular suffrage and the freedom that all Quebeckers can and want to exercise in the name of what they are: a people. This basic fear permeates all the actions of the federal government in the adoption of the clarity bill. Although he has said, since his arrival in the government, that public debate on the referendum rules are necessary, Stéphane Dion is seeking to adopt the bill in all haste. Although he has said that it was the fight of his life, Jean Chrétien is now trying to silence the debate. Like a bulldozer, the federal government has first flouted one of the basic rules of Parliament by publicizing its bill without informing parliamentarians. Like a bulldozer, it has stifled debate in the House on second reading by limiting the debate. Like a bulldozer, it has organized its parliamentary committee to see as few witnesses as possible and to get it done as quickly as possible, whereas in the National Assembly a public notice must be sent out and any witness who wishes to be heard may be. The legislative committee issues no public notice and will have heard only 39 witnesses from all of Canada, and that only because those witnesses found the time to testify within the 10 days the government allowed them.

But what are Jean Chrétien and Stéphane Dion afraid of? Of democracy, of course. They are afraid of the consensus of the three political parties represented in the National Assembly that are demanding the withdrawal of their bill. They are afraid of the majority of federal MPs from Quebec who are demanding the withdrawal of their bill. Finally, they are afraid of the groups in Quebec's civil society that are asking for the withdrawal of their bill, forever.

• 2215

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let us recall the wise words of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the former American president and defender of democracy during the Second World War, which Mr. Chrétien and Mr. Dion should ponder: "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself".

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

[Translation]

The Chair: Order.

[English]

Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

[Translation]

The Chair: Order please.

[English]

It being 10.15 p.m., it is my duty, pursuant to the order adopted earlier this day in the House, to interrupt the proceedings on the said bill, if required for the purposes of the order, and in turn, every question necessary for the disposal of the said stage of the bill is to be put forthwith and successively, without further debate or amendment.

Accordingly, pursuant to Standing Order 75(1), consideration of the preamble is postponed.

[Translation]

Are we voting by role call on each vote?

The Clerk of the committee: On each vote, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Very well.

[English]

(Clauses 1 to 3 inclusive agreed to: yeas 8; nays 6)

The Chair: Shall the preamble carry?

(Preamble agreed to: yeas 8; nays 6)

• 2220

The Chair: Shall the title carry?

(Title agreed to: yeas 8; nays 6)

The Chair: Shall the bill carry?

(Bill C-20 agreed to: yeas 8; nays 6)

The Chair: Shall I report the bill to the House

[Translation]

without amendment?

[English]

(Motion agreed to: yeas 11; nays 3)

The Chair: Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Mr. Chairman, at the conclusion of our work, I would like to repeat the thanks of Mr. Guimond, but more specifically the staff at the table, Mr. Frappier; the staff at the console, who recorded the debate. I would also like to thank the researchers, Mr. O'Neal, Ms. Dunsmuir, our clerks, Ms. Verville, Mr. Toupin for your very professional work.

I would also like to thank the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Milliken, who has ensured fairness during the debate. We are grateful to you, Mr. Milliken. You will also allow me, Mr. Chairman, to tell our colleagues from the Liberal majority that we will have a very bitter memory of this evening, which deserves to be remembered like another night of the long knives, the night of the gagging.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Mr. Bachand.

Mr. André Bachand: I will not underline the negative aspect. I would in fact, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your work, not always an easy task. I would also like to thank the people around you who have worked so hard, as well as the members of the different parties who co-operated in this difficult exercise.

There is one thing I will recall. This afternoon I had the opportunity to have a discussion with a ministerial MP. It is time, as Mr. Gibson said, that we lower the volume a little. For the last 30 years, this country has been characterized by its debates and its divisions. Perhaps we could look at what unites us instead of what divides us for a change.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Alcock.

Mr. Reg Alcock: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

On behalf of our members here and Stéphane Dion, to the staff who have worked so hard to bring us to this point, to you and the staff at the table—the interpreters, clerks, and everyone else who has made this work possible—and to the witnesses who came forward to share with us their thoughts, I would like to add our thanks.

I'd also like to add my voice to that of Mr. Bachand's. It's a difficult issue. It's an issue that has divided Canada for a very long time. Think of the country we could build if we could put it behind us.

Thank you.

• 2225

[Translation]

The Chair: As Chairman, I would like to thank all the members who have expressed their support for the work of my colleagues at this table, and also to all the members of this committee, who have worked hard over the last few days and two weeks to complete our work tonight, even with all the difficulties. I appreciate everyone's co-operation.

[English]

Thank you for staying so late so often to complete our work. It's been difficult, and I thank you.

I declare the meeting adjourned.