NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, October 23, 1997

• 1533

[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Good afternoon, everyone.

Gentlemen from National Defence, before we get you to start, we just have a few housekeeping duties to perform.

The clerk has just handed everyone a copy of a report of the steering committee. Could we just have somebody propose that we adopt it? Has everybody had a chance to read it?

Okay, it's proposed. Do we need a seconder? No? Okay.

(Motion agreed to—See Minutes of Proceedings)

The Chairman: This afternoon we are receiving representatives from National Defence to talk to us about national defence.

You have between 15 and 20 minutes for your presentation, and then we will go to questions from the opposition and the government side.

What I would like you to do first of all, Monsieur Bon, is introduce the people who are here with you, and then you can start.

• 1535

Mr. Daniel Bon (Director General, Policy Planning, Department of National Defence and Veterans Affairs): With me are Major-General Lloyd Campbell, who's in charge of force structure and many other things in the Department of National Defence; and Brigadier-General David Jurkowski, who is the chief of staff for J3. I'll let him explain what J3 is.

Brigadier-General D.M. Jurkowski (Chief of Staff, J3, and Director General, Military Plans and Operations, Department of National Defence and Veterans Affairs): Operations.

The Chairman: Simple enough.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Bon: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, the Parliamentary Secretary,

[English]

the fundamental mission of the Canadian Forces is to defend Canada and Canadian interests and values while contributing to international peace and security. Capable armed forces remain essential to national and multilateral responses to possible challenges to sovereignty and transgressions of international law and order, as well as to the fulfilment of our commitments to the global community. That is why our defence policy calls for the maintenance of multi-purpose, combat-capable forces.

Our first specific role focuses on Canada. The Canadian Forces must be able, one, to ensure the defence of Canada's national territory and areas of jurisdiction; two, to provide aid of the civil power should civilian authorities be unable to cope; and three, to assist civil authorities in a variety of activities, from fisheries patrol to environmental surveillance and search and rescue, as well as in national disasters and other emergencies.

Our second focus is the defence of North America. The partnership that exists between Canada and the United States to ensure the defence of North America is not simply an artifact of geography; it is also representative of our shared values, mutual trust, and close friendship. For Canada, this means doing our share of the monitoring of the sea and air approaches to the continent as well as our share of the defence of the continent itself, if ever it were necessary.

Our third mission is to contribute to world peace and stability. We see no near-term threats of a global conflict, but the world is definitely not a peaceable and stable place, and efforts to promote international peace and stability in the post-Cold War era continue to have mixed results.

Conflict persists within and between states. These conflicts are often caused by boundary and resource disputes. The rise of various forms of extremism also leads to ethnic strife, and in some cases to the collapse of effective governance in some countries. Beyond this, environmental degradation, mass migrations, terrorism, and international criminal activities are both consequences and causes of tensions and conflict. These are serious impediments to progress towards a more secure and stable world.

But most worrisome, perhaps, is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including ballistic missiles.

All this helps explain why the government decided in 1994 that the Canadian Forces should be able, first, to participate in a full range of multilateral operations through the United Nations, NATO, other regional organizations, and coalitions of like-minded countries; second, to support humanitarian relief efforts; and third, to contribute to arms control activities and implementation of other confidence-building measures.

[Translation]

Are we able to meet these commitments? In light of the budget cuts experienced by us, some have called into question the capability of the Canadian Forces to carry out the policy. It is true that the defence budget has been under pressure since 1989.

The White Paper of 1994 assumes defence expenditures for the year 2000 that are nothing like what had been assumed in the 1987 White Paper. Even looking back less far than 1987, in dollar terms our budget will be 23 percent lower in 1999 than it was in 1994—$9.2 billion as opposed to approximately $12 billion.

• 1540

In fact, after inflation, it will be 30 percent, instead of 23 percent, lower. So it will not surprise you to hear that the defence policy set out in 1994 called for some drastic reductions and other transformations.

We have been through nine successive years of cutbacks, the last four of which were part of an ongoing major, five-year downsizing, re-engineering and restructuring effort. From 88,800 personnel in 1989, the regular Force will be reduced to 60,000 by 1999, a decrease of 32 percent.

Also by 1999, civilian employees will have dropped from 36,600 in 1989 to 20,000, a decrease of 45 percent. In total, our restructuring efforts will achieve personnel reductions, both military and civilian, of over 45,000—a 36 percent reduction.

Between 1991 and the end of 1996, the number of generals and admirals alone was reduced from 125 to 82—a reduction of 36 percent. It will stand at fewer than 65 by 1998.

We had 52 bases, stations and detachments in 1994. By 1999 this number will be down to 26. The number of headquarters is being cut from 18 to 12 and we are on our way to achieving a 50 percent reduction in resources devoted to headquarters by 1999.

All around, new ways of doing business are being developed to improve efficiency and productivity. Services are being obtained at the lowest possible cost, the number of personnel devoted to support activities is being reduced, and alternative service delivery—for example, privatization—is being tested as a way of providing non-core services.

[English]

Now that you are suitably impressed, let me give you the good news. Cuts are not made in just any old way. We are cutting the tail in order to add to the teeth. Even as we cut to 60,000 regular force members, the white paper calls for 3,000 soldiers to be added to the army's field force. As a result, three new regular force light infantry battalions have been stood up. That is intended to help make it possible to deploy, on overseas operations, contingency forces of up to a maritime task group, a brigade group plus an infantry battalion group, a wing of fighter aircraft, a squadron of tactical transport aircraft, and a joint headquarters. Were these forces to be deployed simultaneously they could total about 10,000, in some circumstances perhaps more. Of course sustaining such a commitment would require at least a degree of mobilization.

In a low-threat environment what we could sustain is a smaller part of this force, specifically up to two ships, one battle group as well as one infantry battalion group, one squadron of fighter aircraft, a flight of tactical transport aircraft, a communications element, and a headquarters element; in all, about 4,000 personnel.

The 1994 white paper also called for an affordable equipment program. The emphasis has been on extending the life of stocks we already hold and purchasing only new equipment considered most essential to maintaining the core capabilities of the Canadian Forces and best suited to the widest range of defence roles. For new equipment the white paper calls for search and rescue helicopters, new armoured personnel carriers—200 of them are currently on order—new ship-borne helicopters, and if the government approves this buy, the four British Upholder submarines.

[Translation]

The 1994 White Paper was written at a time of great uncertainty in the international arena, and no one really knew how long it would remain valid. It is proving quite enduring. In fact, the Prime Minister reaffirmed his support for it last April, in response to the report he had just received from the Minister.

• 1545

In short, Canada's defence policy set out in 1994 remains current and appropriate today, and the Canadian Forces remain capable of carrying it out.

[English]

I will stop here. I hope I have been able to give you a broad overview of Canadian defence policy. After the two generals have made their presentations, I'll be glad to take your questions.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Bon.

[English]

Who is next?

[Translation]

Major General L.C. Campbell (Director General, Strategic Planning, Department of Defence and Veterans Affairs): I'll begin.

Mr. Chairman, committee members, as Mr. Bon mentioned, my name is Lloyd Campbell. I'm currently Director General of Strategic Planning for the Canadian Forces and for the Department of National Defence.

Over the next 10 minutes or so, I intend to provide you with a brief overview of the Canadian Forces and to indicate the missions as set out in the White Paper, then to review the structure of the sea, land and air forces.

[English]

My presentation you have on paper. It's also available electronically up on the wall in live and living colour.

[Translation]

As Mr. Bon indicated, the mission of the Canadian Forces is to protect Canada and to defend Canadian values both in and outside Canada, while making a contribution to international peace and security.

The duties performed by the Canadian Forces and by Emergency Preparedness Canada, one of our services, are to defend Canada, to defend North America in partnership with our U.S. allies, to contribute to international security, in particular with NATO and U.N. member countries and, lastly, to promote effective emergency preparedness measures here in Canada.

[English]

In terms of the vision, as mentioned, we're looking at multi-purpose combat-capable armed forces. The two bullets down below describe really what kinds of forces we are looking for.

First of all, to be able to carry out combat operations as part of an alliance or coalition: This is actually quite a meaningful statement, because what it says is that we do not expect, nor do we plan, to have all of the capabilities that would be found on a modern battlefield—land, sea or air. We anticipate that if we are asked to participate in combat operations, it will be as part of an alliance or coalition where we'll be able to play a part.

The second one, called “Operations other than war”, speaks to everything from humanitarian operations up to United Nations operations. Clearly, while we will normally do those within the context of an alliance, there will be circumstances here in Canada, but even abroad, where one might be forced to do those unilaterally.

So those are the two planning contexts within which we operate.

The basic structure of the forces: The Chief of the Defence Staff, General Baril, is charged with the command control and administration of the Canadian Forces. He is our chief. He has three environmental chiefs of staff who support him—chief of maritime staff, chief of land staff and chief of air staff—and their three commands. Then there are a number of staff officers within the headquarters: the deputy chief of staff, who is principally in charge of operations; assistant deputy minister personnel, who is a military officer but who fulfils a personnel function for the department as well; Canadian Forces northern area, which I'll speak to later, and then commanders of deployed forces.

In terms of the forces themselves, the Maritime Command is about 10,000 persons at the present time. Basically, as could be expected, the navy is based on both coasts, principally in Halifax and in Esquimalt on the west coast. The naval reserve headquarters is located in Quebec City, the chief of maritime staff of course here in Ottawa.

• 1550

Overall, the navy is in quite good shape, equipped with fairly modern patrol frigates, the new maritime coastal defence vessels. Of course, the problem there is in the area of submarines.

On the land force side, we have about 20,000 personnel altogether with a reserve of around 17,500. The next slide shows there are four main land force areas in Canada: land force western area, headquartered at Edmonton; central area, headquartered in Toronto;

[Translation]

the Quebec sector, land forces,

[English]

headquarters in Montreal; and land force Atlantic area, which has headquarters in Halifax. The chief of land staff is here in Ottawa.

This slide shows the disposition of our land forces across the country. They are largely centred in three main brigades, one in Edmonton with units in Winnipeg as well. One is centred in Petawawa, not far from Ottawa here in the valley. The third one is located at Valcartier, near Quebec City. The major training area is in Gagetown, in the province of New Brunswick. There is also a staff headquarters and so on at Kingston, which is our deployable joint force headquarters and also divisional headquarters.

On the air side, the air forces have taken major reductions, from over 20,000 about three years ago down to around 14,000 today.

The next slide shows you the disposition of the air forces. Both coasts have maritime air forces. Canada, I'm sure you'll recognize, being a unified force, all air support to the land forces and to the maritime forces are provided by the air force. The maritime forces of Sea Kings and patrol aircraft are located at Greenwood and Comox on the coasts. We have tactical helicopter squadrons located with the brigades. We have a number of transport aircraft, largely in Trenton and Winnipeg, and search and rescue units at Greenwood and Comox, and our two fighter bases remaining are 4 Wing in Cold Lake, Alberta, and also at Bagotville in the province of Quebec.

The northern area I mentioned is headquartered in Yellowknife. It's very small. It has about 65 people in the headquarters. The main force, if you want to call it that, are the Canadian Rangers. They're largely unpaid, mostly aboriginal but not totally. They are people who work as liaison, scouts and guides in the north. They are a very dedicated bunch of people and a very cost-effective investment for us.

In terms of capital equipment priorities, these will again be no surprise. The submarine replacement was already mentioned in terms of maritime forces. We will require eventually a replacement for our current replenishment ships, which we'll actually be looking at doing two things with: not only replacing the replenishment ships but also looking at providing a sealift capability so that we can principally transport land forces better than we can today, and the maritime coastal defence vessels. That program is being introduced currently.

On the land force side, we have a number of new armoured personnel carriers and other vehicles coming in to support the army. We have modernized or are in the process of modernizing our remaining Leopard tanks, and there is a great focus on improving the actual protection that we're providing for soldiers out in the field, because they are, of course, put in harm's way on a regular basis these days.

On the air force side of things, SAR helicopters have already been mentioned, but of course maritime helicopters, upgrades to the maritime patrol aircraft...the F-18 itself, our fighter aircraft, needs reworking. Having retired the 707, we now need to replace that capability and we look at doing that with the Polaris, our current airbus, but with some modifications. There are some changes involved in the command and control structure as well with NORAD that are shown.

The final series, military satellite communications, are very much a part of our program in terms of strategic mobility.

The joint space project is one that sees us not crossing into the next frontier but merely using space for those kinds of capabilities that land forces, or forces stationed on the ground, need. These are communications, surveillance and so on, and finally, improvements in our various command and control systems.

This should bring me to the end, so I'll turn it over to General Jurkowski to give you a pitch on employment.

• 1555

[Translation]

Brigadier General D.M. Jurkowski (Chief of Staff J3 and Director General, Military Plans and Operations, Department of National Defence and Veterans Affairs): Thank you. Mr. Chairman, committee members, as has already been mentioned, I am Brigadier General David Jurkowski, Chief of Staff J3 for National Defence Headquarters Operations.

Over the next 12 minutes, it will be my pleasure to provide you with an overview of the Canadian Forces' current commitments both in and outside Canada.

[English]

Today there are approximately 2,300 Canadian Forces personnel, committed to 15 peacekeeping and other missions around the world. Before I highlight each of them, I ask you to note these two rather busy slides. From left to right, the three columns depict UN mission acronyms, code words for our Canadian contributions to each of those missions, and the numbers of people deployed to each one.

Let me start with our largest ongoing operation. You will recall the UN Security Council resolution of December 12, which authorized the establishment of a NATO stabilization force, or SFOR, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Canadian contingent of this force occupies the western, largely Muslim, part of the southwest multinational division area of operations. The Lord Strathcona Horse Royal Canadians from Edmonton make up the bulk of the 1,240-strong Op Palladium force.

Canada heads the multinational air movement detachment in Rimini, Italy. This detachment, comprising 13 airmen and women, coordinates the round-trip theatre-level tactical airlift into Sarajevo.

Also supporting SFOR is a detachment of six CF-18 aircraft from 416 Tactical Fighter Squadron Cold Lake, located at the United States Air Force base in Aviano, Italy. Conducting combined day and night multi-roled operations since August 15, 1997, the Op Mirador force is equipped with precision-guided munitions and is poised to conduct missions in direct support of SFOR ground troops and air combat missions to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. By mid-November the Canadian contingent in Aviano and command element in Vicenza, totalling approximately 115 people, will redeploy to Canada.

[Translation]

We are also committed to other, smaller U.N. missions.

[English]

In the UN preventive deployment in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, or Fyrom, the CF are represented by one officer, who acts as a UN military observer for one year in Skopje, Macedonia.

In the UN mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada contributes a senior staff officer to the office of the UN co-ordination of humanitarian relief in Sarajevo.

Since January 1997 Canada has participated in Op Noble, the UN-sponsored mine action centre in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Two CF de-mining specialists based in Sarajevo are responsible for training local authorities to clean up the approximately 8 million mines still in the country.

Canada has deployed an officer for one year to monitor the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula in Croatia, with the military observers in Prevlaka mission.

Our next-largest UN mission is Op Constable. Canada first deployed to Haiti in May 1995. The July 30, 1997, UN Security Council resolution established the UN transition mission in Haiti, with a four-month mandate to assist the government by supporting and contributing to the professionalization of the Haitan national police. Canada provides up to a 650-person force from the second battalion of the 22nd Regiment in Quebec.

[Translation]

The Canadian Forces are also taking part in this mission, deploying nearly 2,230 personnel in the Middle East and Far East.

• 1600

[English]

Following the 1973 mid-east war, the UN Disengagement Observer Force was established in 1974 to supervise the ceasefire between Israel and Syria. Today 188 personnel serving on the Golan Heights provide logistics support and communication detachments to all UNDOF units.

The multinational force in observers is a non-UN mission charged with observing and reporting on the adherents of the 1979 Camp David accords, a tripartite agreement between Israel, Egypt and the United States. Canada's 28 personnel man selected staff, air traffic control and administrative positions at the MFO headquarters in El Gorah, Egypt, under Op Calumet.

The UN Truce Supervisory Organization was established in 1949 to supervise and ensure compliance with the general armistice agreement between Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Today you will find 12 military Canadian observers in UNTSO.

The UN Iraq-Kuwait observer mission was established at the end of the Gulf War to monitor the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait. We have four UNMOs, military observers, in Op Record.

The UN Special Commission was established in April 1991 and, under the terms of the ceasefire agreement, is charged with the inspection and destruction of Iraq's ballistic missiles and nuclear, biological and chemical, or NBC, munitions and production facilities. Today three CF personnel are assigned to Op Forum.

The UN force in Cyprus was established to maintain the status quo at the time of the 1974 ceasefire agreement. Since Canada withdrew its troops in June 1993, two personnel have been assigned to UNFICYP headquarters on Op Snowgoose.

The CF are also involved in Asia, with the Cambodian Mine Action Centre. This governmental institution co-ordinates all de-mining activities in Cambodia. Canada provides seven personnel to train Cambodians in various de-mining skills.

[Translation]

Although the Canadian Forces have left Europe, Canada is still an active member of NATO. In addition to the various NATO exercises and staff positions, we are maintaining significant contributions to the alliance,

[English]

specifically, one ship to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic and on occasion one ship to the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean. The NATO Airborne Early Warning Force, or NAEWF, based in Geilandkirchen, Germany, involves some 200 Canadian Forces personnel.

As already mentioned, the 1994 defence white paper also committed Canada to world-wide multilateral operations, and to that end we are prepared to deploy a joint task force headquarters with one or more of the following elements—as listed.

[Translation]

Canada is also actively involved in a number of audit and control programs throughout Europe and in Canada.

[English]

The NORAD agreement continues to serve as the cornerstone of Canada-U.S. defence co-operation. The ability to control access to our air space, sea approaches and land areas remains a fundamental pillar of both our security policies.

In the Canadian NORAD region Canada continues to assign its four operational CF-18 squadrons to continental air defence. CF air crews man U.S. Air Force AWACS aircraft based at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma and Elmendorf, Alaska, and Canadians also serve in key command and staff appointments throughout NORAD.

In 1991 the NORAD mandate was enlarged to include counter-drug operations. NORAD assigned aircraft, and Canadian naval vessels are now part of the ongoing co-operative effort to stop drugs from entering North America.

The CF conducts other national duties.

First, in surveillance operations over Canadian territorial waters and throughout Canadian air space, DND dedicates some 245 ship days and 640 flying hours each year for fishery patrols, Department of Fisheries and Oceans science support and RCMP support missions.

The CF contribution to the national SAR program includes specially equipped aircraft and highly trained crews and an international satellite system. DND resources co-ordinates some 8,000 SAR incidents each year, 2,000 of which are actual rescues. The national SAR mission is handled by the regional rescue co-ordination centres at Halifax, Trenton and Victoria.

• 1605

To assist SAR operations in the event of a major air disaster, or “MAJAID”, in a sparsely settled area, the CF has a contingency plan. An initial response with SAR technicians and survival equipment will be launched within two hours of a MAJAID declaration. Within six hours, follow-on flights of personnel and equipment accommodating the treatment of up to 100 victims will be launched. This plan was enacted for the first time in October 1991, when a Canadian Forces Hercules aircraft crashed just south of Alert.

[Translation]

The Canadian Forces have been asked to assist civil authorities on three occasions in the past 30 years: the Montreal municipal police strike in 1969, the FLQ crisis in 1970 and the Oka crisis in 1990.

[English]

Assistance to the civil authorities embodies operations in a wide range of armed and unarmed support to other government departments, Corrections Canada, provincial and municipal authorities including police forces, non-governmental authorities, and international sporting events in Canada. The most recent example of course was Op Assistance—the support to the Manitoba floods by some 8,500 CF personnel.

Joint Task Force II is an extremely capable, flexible and highly trained CF unit that provides armed assistance to the RCMP and the Solicitor General in the counter-terrorist and hostage rescue role. JTF II replaced the RCMP Special Emergency Response Team in April 1993. In addition, a CF NBC response team is also on call to deal with terrorist threats involving NBC agents.

The 1994 white paper tasks the CF to be ready to deploy, for limited periods, selected specialized elements of the CF in the humanitarian relief roles. In June 1996 the Disaster Assistance Response Team was created to fulfil this requirement. It consists of medical personnel, transport and signal units, and engineer support. Within 48 hours of a government decision, the DART will depart the Trenton airhead for the mission area. In the fall of 1996, the DART formed the basis for Op Assurance in support of the Great Lakes region of Africa.

In conclusion, the business of defence is brisk these days. Despite reductions and substantial reorganizations, we continue to participate in many operations and exercises both in Canada and with our allies. As you can see, your armed forces are extremely active and, I might add, highly capable.

This concludes my presentation.

The Chairman: We'll now go to questions. But before I do that, would it be possible to have a copy of your presentation in writing, without the acronyms? The reason we decided to have this session this afternoon is that most of the people sitting around the table here have no military background. I noticed, while the three of you were giving your presentation, that you were using all kinds of acronyms. I looked around at the faces and you could see some blank stares. So if it would be possible to have your presentation—put in the acronyms if you want, but give their definition so the people around the table will be able to understand what we're talking about.

Yes, Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, I think it might be also helpful for some of the newcomers to get definitions as to the level of troop strength or equipment that's involved—for instance, in an infantry battalion, brigade, even down to a company, as well as a wing of fighter aircraft—so that everybody understands exactly how many personnel we're referring to.

The Chairman: Exactly. That was my next point, David, but thank you very much for bringing it up.

Would that be okay?

• 1610

MGen L.C. Campbell: We actually have that available and can provide that very quickly. Of course in trying to trim things back to fit within 10 minutes you end up by cutting a lot of things out, but in fact that is available and I'm happy to provide it to you.

Mr. David Pratt: I'm referring to DND—

MGen L.C. Campbell: No comment.

The Chairman: What you can do is have it sent to the clerk, and the clerk will hand it out to each of the members.

MGen L.C. Campbell: I'd be very pleased to do that, sir.

[Translation]

The Chairman: We can start with Mr. Hanger of the Reform Party.

[English]

Mr. Art Hanger (Calgary Northeast, Ref.): Thank you, gentlemen, for your presentations. It certainly has been somewhat enlightening for me.

I'm curious. I had the opportunity to attend NATO headquarters in Brussels a short time ago, and I was briefed there by an air force colonel about Canada's commitment to NATO and what kind of deployment scenarios we are committed to respond to. It was explained to me in this fashion: that the first response would be rapid response of one fighter squadron and one brigade group.

MGen L.C. Campbell: Battle group.

Mr. Art Hanger: Okay, battle group, although I think the term “brigade” was used. In any event, that was for rapid response.

Then I believe the next step, which would be in something like 7 to 14 days, would be a requirement of an additional battle group as well as another fighter squadron. That's Canada's commitment, I'm told.

I have since heard several times that Canada isn't capable of moving that quickly to bring those kinds of forces to play in a theatre across the water, that in fact it would take a minimum—and I think the white paper sort of reflected that too—of 90 days to scrape together that kind of equipment and personnel and place them into a conflict area somewhere in eastern Europe. Is that correct?

MGen L.C. Campbell: Perhaps I can start, and then General Jurkowski may have something to add.

The issue of strategic lift is obviously one of great importance to us. Over the past year we did a fairly major study into the ability to move our Immediate Reaction Force Land, which would be the army contribution to this crisis kind of situation, and the Rapid Reaction Force Air, which is the fighter contribution to it, to see whether indeed we could do that within the very tight time constraints that NATO is demanding given the strategic situation that prevails.

We have been able to demonstrate that we can do that. We had to do some adjustments to how much kit the army wanted to take with them in their initial deployment, but by scaling that back a little bit, remembering that this actual commitment of the IRFL is one of showing the flag—the intention in the NATO environment is for it to show the flag, rather than to be involved in heavy combat operations from the beginning—it is doable.

What is not doable for us is in fact to be able to deploy the land force and the air force units simultaneously. So there has to be a sequencing in there of carrying that out.

My staff is also carrying out a follow-on study, which will address the broader issue of moving larger formations. That's where you really run into the difficulty. Moving a brigade with over 6,000 people and all the equipment that's associated with it is not an easy task. That is where truly we would have some challenges and where we would have to rely on the ability to get commercial sealift and other kinds of additions. We simply don't have those kinds of ships available.

I mentioned in my presentation that we are looking at an afloat logistics and sealift capability. Whether it's a leased option that we will go to or we in fact will end up by buying a multi-role vessel that would be able to do this, that's the approach we've got.

So we can make the NATO commitment for rapid reaction. We can't do it simultaneously.

• 1615

Mr. Art Hanger: Is it the intent of the armed forces, as far as policy is concerned, to be able to do it?

Mr. Daniel Bon: Sir, one thing that one has to consider is also the international environment. To a degree, one could ask whether the sort of timeframe that was mentioned to you is entirely realistic given the threat we are looking at.

The Canadian government, when it published its 1994 white paper, obviously had a reading of the situation that is perhaps more in tune with current reality in eastern Europe and the sort of reality that NATO is facing than the one that some planners in NATO exhibit these days.

MGen L.C. Campbell: The one other point that plays here is that we in Canada, unlike any other ally in the NATO environment except for the Americans, who are quite different from us in size and capability, are the only ones that are faced with this issue of the Atlantic Ocean. So for the Europeans to meet a seven-day requirement....

There are reasons why they wish to keep the readiness requirements for these forces quite tight, because it helps them to defend their forestructure. But, for us, the fact that we have the Atlantic Ocean between us and where the potential deployment areas are puts us in a kind of unique and difficult circumstance, as I'm sure you can appreciate, sir.

Mr. Art Hanger: I certainly can.

Do I still have time?

The Chairman: No. We can come back.

Hec.

Mr. Hec Clouthier (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Lib.): I'd like to thank the two generals and Mr. Bon for coming here.

I might be a little bit biased, but my riding is Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke and in that riding is CFB Petawawa. I was born and raised there. My grandfather helped clear the area back in 1906-07 to start the military at CFB Petawawa. So I guess I do have a great deal of knowledge of what the armed forces can do and what they have done.

I would like to make a few remarks. I come from the field of business, and I've a great deal of empathy for the military, because a lot of your equipment is rather draconian, outmoded, outdated. It must be very difficult for the morale of your troops to being maintained, with some of those young soldiers—and I speak with some of them each and every week—operating equipment that is much older than they are.

Having said that, there is the fiscal responsibility not only of the government but also of the country, that we can't spend money we don't have.

What do you believe is the avenue that we should pursue? Reduction of troops I don't like, but it might be something we cannot avoid. As a result of that, we might spend more money on upgrading the equipment and have faster, sleeker, better equipped forces. Or have you any other ideas on that?

MGen L.C. Campbell: First, I was at Petawawa about a month and a half ago, and the morale of the troops up there certainly struck me as being quite good. They're pretty keen to get on with doing things, and they have some new equipment that is coming on line, particularly with the light armoured vehicle reconnaissance they've just taken delivery of.

In essence, the question you pose is almost what I would call “force development 101”. It's the balance between the forces that you invest in for an insurance policy, just in case—and I would class these as being highly combat-capable forces—and the forces you need to use on a day-to-day basis.

In the strategic planning environment we are always trying to strike a balance in this area, because for the $10 billion, or slightly less than that, that Canadians invest in defence, we recognize that when you ask us to do something today we have to respond, and we can't simply say don't call us unless it's really a critical emergency.

The happy event happens when forces just in case and the forces you can use on a day-to-day basis turn out to be the same. That is why, to the maximum extent, we are trying to make sure that what we do invest in in equipment and in training and in all of these other areas in fact is usable across a broad spectrum of operations. In fact, that's the whole theme behind our structure.

• 1620

So it's very difficult to answer the question as to whether it's modern equipment or it's well-trained personnel. You need to have a balance of both. There are ways, I think, we can still make adjustments in our personnel strengths by better use of alternative service delivery, better ways of structuring ourselves, and, to use that horrible word, doing business differently. We can do some things I think will allow us to get on.

Mr. Hec Clouthier: Having said that, General, I liked the term of reference “the business of defence” from General Jurkowski at the end. I come from the field of business. I believe there are some business opportunities.... I don't want to be trying to say, listen, we should commercialize the land forces, the army, but I believe there are some business opportunities not only on base, because CFB Petawawa, for instance.... I'm in the lumbering industry, and I know we have dealt with CFB Petawawa in lumbering. I know they have a forest up there called the Petawawa National Forestry Institute we're working with for ecotourism.

But is there anything in the policy planning to get more into the business arena to try to recoup some funds? Let's face it, that would be propitious for DND also, if they could get that mindset, thinking, listen, if we can bring it in, let's do some business.

MGen L.C. Campbell: We absolutely agree with that. We have already actually brought in a number of alternative service delivery options, but in fact as we speak we're under way with a new study that is really looking again at the whole issue of what is core and what is non-core to the armed forces, what absolutely has to be done by people wearing uniforms like this and what can be done by someone else. At the end of the day we need to be able to change totally the mindset of how we deliver capability out to the field. In the same way as business had to reorganize itself with just-in-time deliveries and a variety of other things like that, really those same concepts are applicable to us.

We're not unique in that regard. Other nations are looking at this. So 100% accepted.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Hec.

[Translation]

Mr. Dumas.

Mr. Maurice Dumas (Argenteuil—Papineau, BQ): Sirs, first I would like to congratulate you on the visual presentation of your remarks.

I have one question. As soon as it was elected in 1993, the present government cancelled the purchase of the helicopters ordered by the Conservative government that preceded it. What were the immediate and long-term effects of cancelling that purchase?

Mr. Daniel Bon: It wasn't a matter of cancelling a purchase that would have been made the following year. There were plans to buy a helicopter at a later date and the helicopter in question was selected. We are still considering replacing the helicopters and the decision has to be made fairly soon. However, the cancellation will undoubtedly have some effects from the standpoint of the helicopter's delivery date. The two Air Force officers may be better informed than I am.

[English]

BGen D.M. Jurkowski: One thing I could add, sir, is that I think what you're getting at perhaps as well is whether or not operations can still proceed safely, or efficaciously. That certainly is the case. In fact, I was flying in a search and rescue helicopter the other day, and they run a very safe operation. We will never allow anything to go airborne unless it is safely. It just takes more man-hours to keep them airborne. So there's a cost balance thing that is the effect. But in terms of safe operations, it continues.

[Translation]

Mr. Maurice Dumas: Am I entitled to a second question?

The Chairman: Certainly.

Mr. Maurice Dumas: Your brief mentions assistance to civil authorities.

• 1625

You talk about three occasions: the Montreal municipal police strike in 1969, the FLQ crisis in 1970 and the Oka crisis in 1990. I see that these three events occurred in Quebec. Does that mean that you did not have to intervene in the other provinces?

BGen D.M. Jurkowski: That's only a matter of history, really. Unfortunately, I noticed the same thing, but we're prepared to go anywhere in Canada.

[English]

As we already indicated, there's another slide in there, sir, and although it's not strictly under the aid of civil power, there are other areas in which assistance to the civil authorities will or might involve the joint task force. It's a very sensitive issue, because they could be involved, and they may very well have been involved, in areas about which not many people know.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Bon: I wouldn't want to give you the impression that those were the only three operations that were conducted. In fact, a certain number of operations of this kind have been carried out in other provinces since Canada was founded. It just happens that the last three were conducted in Quebec.

Mr. Maurice Dumas: Could that mean that we could expect a visit from the army if Quebec became sovereign?

Mr. Daniel Bon: That's a question you'll have to put to the government. In fact, a number of years ago, General de Chastelain offered a very good answer to that question when he said that, in the event of a yes vote in a referendum, the Armed Forces would expect the situation to be resolved in the way the governments tell us, that is to say in an entirely civil, polite and organized manner following negotiations. So there's absolutely no reason to expect that.

Mr. Maurice Dumas: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Dumas, the army intervenes in these kinds of cases at the request of the Solicitor General or of the provincial government concerned. The army cannot enter any province uninvited; the government in office, that is to say the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice or the Solicitor General asks it to intervene.

Mr. Maurice Dumas: Yes, I remember, Mr. Chairman. I received a visit during the FLQ crisis in 1970.

[English]

The Chairman: Mrs. Beaumier.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): Thank you.

I would like to thank the member who was otherwise occupied today. If everyone here knows the answers to all of these questions except me, please just say boo and I'll stop.

When we talk about the armed forces and you talk about your gross budget, there is in fact income the armed forces receive for the Government of Canada, such as for your UN peacekeeping troops. We do get money from the UN. When you're talking of the overall budget, is that a gross amount, or in your budget are some of the moneys received because of Canada's activities in international peacekeeping taken off, or is it on top of...? Do you get the money? Does the government get the money?

I'll tell you why I'm asking this question. I've been in Gaza, I've been in Bosnia, and I've been extremely proud. You're certainly some of our best ambassadors there. The one thing you do extremely poorly is public relations. I think these kinds of issues should be brought to the attention of the Canadian public.

I understand also we are experts in land mine removals. Do we receive income on that? Are we marketing that? Are we marketing our peacekeeping abilities?

MGen L.C. Campbell: Perhaps I could start. We have been for some time—principally our assistant deputy minister of finance—in contact and discussions with Treasury Board and Finance officials about revenue sharing. Currently we do not get recompense for the majority of these funds. I suppose the position the finance department would bring to it is that our baseline or our reference-level funding was structured, at least once upon a time, to fund us adequately for these kinds of events. Clearly, in a major confrontation—and I would class even the deployment in the Gulf War as that—external funding is a possibility.

• 1630

We are continuing to work with Finance, because we would very much like to get some of that back.

By the way, we're also looking at better marketing of our own internal training facilities, because we do have excess training capacity. We are renowned in the world for our training capabilities, and of course the NATO flying training in Canada is just one such proposal. There are many more. In fact, my division of the headquarters is dealing with a foreign military training working program right now to try to see how we can better market ourselves and to take advantage of some of those capabilities.

Agreed.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Thank you. That's basically all I wanted to know for now.

Mr. Dick Proctor (Palliser, NDP): One of you mentioned environmental degradation. I was pleased to have a few weeks ago a briefing with some of the minister's staff and some of the military folks, some of whom are in this room. I asked a question about the DEW Line and clean-up there, and I believe I was assured that all was well. I was subsequently a bit chagrined to find out from a lengthy documentary on CBC radio that all was not well with regard to the clean-up and PCBs.

I wonder if I can get some answers this afternoon as to what is happening. I know that the Americans essentially walked away. I know that the clean-up costs are very high and you're talking here today about nine successive years of budget reductions. What are we doing and what are we going to do in the north?

Mr. Daniel Bon: I don't think that any of us three are particularly well equipped to answer your question, but we'll try.

There is a commitment on the part of the department to clean up the DEW Line. The question of the American contribution is separate from that. Perhaps there is also a difference of view between some environmental groups and us as to exactly what has to be done, but the commitment is to clean it up and to return it to a state where it would be acceptable.

We can undertake to have a response to you.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Okay. Is there—

MGen L.C. Campbell: There is a note actually. I think it is in the background package.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Is there a timeframe for that clean-up to be completed?

Mr. Daniel Bon: I think it is over a period of ten years, according to the note you have in the package.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Mr. Clouthier talked about life in Petawawa and the morale there being pretty good. Part of my riding includes 15 Wing Moose Jaw, and I can assure you that the morale is not good at 15 Wing Moose Jaw these days.

The NATO flight training plan, we were told much earlier on, was supposed to be announced by September 11. It's now October 23. The civilian workforce is extremely restless. Many of them know that there's going to be no place for them in the new flight training program there. They would like to get on with their lives, but they feel as if they're being held almost captive while the consortium headed up by Bombardier decides who among the civilian workforce will be kept and who will be let go. Apparently there's supposed to be a certain number of people for the consortium to choose from.

Can you shed some light on when the folks might know about what is going to happen, when the agreement is going to be signed, sealed and announced?

MGen L.C. Campbell: I'm not able to do the latter, unfortunately, because it's not fully within our hands.

The program, NATO flying training in Canada, certainly has the utmost support from the department. It is one of those multi-department things, because Public Works and Government Services Canada is also in fact the main contractor involved in this. The main delays till now, which have delayed us this fall, have been associated actually with Bombardier itself and the ability to define accurately all the costs associated with the program and put properly in place a contract the Government of Canada will be able to sign.

• 1635

We certainly are confident it will go ahead. From the point of view of resource management within the department, we're 100% supportive for the very reasons that were mentioned over here, that in the longer run, from a Canadian perspective, it will save the country money. It will also provide an extremely good product for us. I think at the end of the day the citizens of Moose Jaw will benefit too, although having lived through these closure situations myself as a base commander in Europe I understand the angst, the great difficulty this puts on individuals.

Mr. Dick Proctor: You mentioned the Gulf War, and I just wondered if there's anything on the Gulf War syndrome you can tell us today. Where are we on that? Is compensation coming for some of those folks?

MGen L.C. Campbell: That is not a question I'm prepared to answer, but I'm sure the assistant deputy minister for personnel will be visiting here at some time this fall in the context of quality-of-life issues and other things and I'll convey that question back to General Kinsman. In fact, we can get you an update on that, sir, even before then.

The Chairman: Dave.

Mr. David Pratt: I would like to address the issue of the future of NATO. I had the opportunity recently to attend a North Atlantic Assembly meeting in Bucharest. It was very enlightening for me, I must say, with the number of countries represented there and the types of issues under discussion. It's clear the alliance seems to be changing in very dramatic ways. It has over the last number of years and will continue to, with the addition of new members and the types of issues and discussions that are taking place, above and beyond those that involve defence.

I wonder if you could provide any thoughts on whether or not it's time, in this country, to have a debate on the future of NATO and Canada's role in it.

Mr. Daniel Bon: I think I'll let you decide if it's time for a debate or not.

Mr. David Pratt: You're on the administering side of the government's defence policy, and I would be interested in knowing whether or not reacting to the changes to NATO that are taking place is going to require a significant reallocation of resources within the forces.

Mr. Daniel Bon: The white paper of 1994 was in fact leading from that point of view. It was ahead of NATO. It was calling for NATO to become a different organization, to recognize that the Cold War was over and that there were perhaps other things NATO could do to serve the global community better.

That said, the white paper also made it a point to indicate that a lot of things have happened in the past 10 years since 1987. We are not very good at predicting the future and we don't know what things will look like 20 years from now. Therefore we very much want NATO to remain what it is in terms of a defensive alliance. But we certainly want this de-emphasized in the present and to do a little of what we do with the Canadian Forces, where they are forces intended to defend Canada and help NATO if a war ever were to break out, but in the meantime there are all sorts of other things they can do. NATO is in the same situation.

Another thing that is central to our approach to NATO is that we want the resources that used to be earmarked for the more military, the more muscle-bound roles to be shunted to the new activities, so the cost of the alliance does not become that much higher by the addition of what we used to pay plus the new roles we are taking on as we enlarge. Canada has been quite active in trying to ensure that and to have its voice heard in NATO.

• 1640

Mr. David Pratt: There has been some criticism of the equipment that the troops have at their disposal in Bosnia. I'm just wondering if, from your standpoint collectively, you feel that our troops that are in Bosnia right now have the tools to do the job they're there for.

MGen L.C. Campbell: I guess if you go up to Cold Lake or to Bosnia or to sea with ships and ask people if they've got 100% of what they need to do the things they want, no one will ever say they do.

My reliance in this to some extent would be on General de Faye, whom I worked for a little while ago and who is an army officer of great renown, who testified here probably a year and a bit ago and made it quite clear that, from the army perspective, they do believe we're adequately protected for the missions we're doing.

One of the concerns that have been there is individual protection. In the kinds of things we put our soldiers, sailors and airmen into these days, shall we say a non-shooting war, in many ways you're more vulnerable than when you know somebody is actually going to be trying to hurt you. So we owe these individuals the best protection individually that we can get them. So a great deal of investment has been put into simple programs, I suppose, called “clothe the soldier”, and things like this. It's to provide people with proper helmets and proper protective vests and proper comfort items, like gortex suits and so on, to keep them dry and so on.

So my own sense is that, yes, they are adequately equipped for the missions we're doing, but there's a lot that can be done. Of course the new armoured personnel carriers we have already on order, and we hope to get some upgrades to our other armoured personnel carriers. Other equipment programs are fundamentally important to our long-term health.

Mr. David Pratt: When will the APCs be received?

MGen L.C. Campbell: The first light armoured vehicle reconnaissance models—we're ordering about 200 of those altogether—are mostly in play already. The first of the 240, of the first tranche of the next buy, should be about a year and a bit down the line. Of course the next two slices of that have not yet been approved, but hopefully they will be between now and the turn of the century. So it will be over the period of the next five to six years.

Mr. Art Hanger: I appreciate David's comments about NATO and Bosnia. I too have a number of questions I would like to ask about that, but I don't think there's going to be enough time. So I'm going to concentrate on the white paper.

I find the white paper of 1994 to be a really interesting document. It's really explained a lot to me about the military and the direction, at least as far as the recommendations are concerned, in which the military should be going. I think the message here is to the politicians, not to the military themselves, and what the politicians are going to do about ensuring that some of these recommendations are going to go forward.

It talks in philosophical terms on one side but then in operational terms on another, such as that the basic mission of the Canadian Forces must remain war fighting and preparation for war fighting. Maybe it sounds simplistic in a way, but when you look at some of the actions that are being taken on the political end, it doesn't seem as if we're going in that direction at all.

Recommendation 2 was that the basic mission of the Canadian Forces should be to fight a limited conventional war of high-intensity, air-land battle in coalition with our allies.

Then recommendation 3 talks about the regular forces and the reserves, the recruiting and the training aspects of it, and on and on.

Recommendation 6 is probably one on which there is going to be debate. It is that the government should cut back drastically on peacekeeping commitments and allow the military to concentrate on preparation for the basic mission of the Canadian Forces: fighting a limited conventional war.

I see all those things, and there's obviously going to be a price tag attached. I don't know, maybe you gentlemen could put a price tag onto what this white paper is saying.

• 1645

And if there is a price tag attached and this is the direction we're going in—and I have other questions about whether we are or not—why are we cutting back, or putting on hold at least, the training procedures? They are going to save the taxpayer $134 million. Why are we going in those directions, where we're even jeopardizing, in a way, the support program to assist our troops in their moves, by cutting their support program in half again, and on and on and on?

If we're only giving lip service to this, then the white paper is for naught. But if we are truly following this white paper, then tell me, can you say recommendation 6 is actually being adhered to and these are the steps we've taken?

Mr. Daniel Bon: Sir, are you reading from the white paper or from a representation of the white paper?

Mr. Art Hanger: A representation.

Mr. Daniel Bon: Okay, because I did not recognize the white paper in some of what you read.

It's a question that any of us here will obviously have difficulty addressing, because it's a political question, which you can address with the minister. But let me tell you one thing that's important to situate what you said.

In terms of process, the white paper was done with full consultations, full advice, and full knowledge of where the budget was and where it was going. At the time that the white paper was being written, we were also looking at the program review of the government. Whereas we obviously could not publish the defence budget figures that were going to be published in the budget of the following February, we knew as we were writing what the limits were.

On that basis, there were consultations with the military advisers of the minister to see what we could do and what we could deliver. The two were proceeding in parallel. Certainly the intention was to have a set of commitments that matched the resources that were forecast as being available in the coming years.

Mr. Art Hanger: Okay. If that's the case, then, you have a bottom line that you're attempting to achieve, dollars and cents-wise, which in a way is going to predict what action you're going to be taking. The bottom line is going to be imposed upon you, as various restraints are in the budget. So when you follow that bottom line, what is it going to be, first of all? What is our bottom line going to be?

Mr. Daniel Bon: In terms of budget?

Mr. Art Hanger: Yes.

Mr. Daniel Bon: We are going to a budget that will reach $9.2 billion in 1999.

Mr. Art Hanger: So we have a long way to go yet.

MGen L.C. Campbell: But it actually starts to increase, with inflation compensation.

We are also in discussions with Finance and Treasury Board about the whole issue of inflation compensation and the compensation for personnel cost increases, because clearly if our personnel costs increase at a rate that is greater than our budget growth, then it's quite simple to see that in the long run, the amount of money available for capital, training, and other aspects of the program simply won't be there.

To follow up on what Daniel said, I was involved in both the white paper development and the force structuring process involved in that, and in some ways it was a suit cut to fit the cloth.

We believe that in fact the white paper is affordable. We're currently working on a number of scenarios that derive from the kinds of missions that you see when you read the white paper, in terms of task force deployments and so on, in order to make sure that in fact we are concentrating the resources we have on the right things and we're not buying stuff that doesn't fit the requirement. Going back to the issue here, every place that we can take money out of support, where it's not required that it be provided by the military, we do so.

• 1650

Of course I'm always accused of being an eternal optimist, but I am optimistic, personally, that at the end of the day we will be able to make this thing work. We have our work cut out, because we have a lot of capital equipment programs that we're trying to jam into a very short period of time, and that is going to be extremely difficult for us to do. But I think we will do it.

The issue of army restructuring is important, because to some extent there is a bit of miscommunication out in the public in this regard. All of the elements of the Canadian Forces have had to tighten their belts, the army of course being part of it. If you look at those who wear this colour of uniform, the reductions have been significantly greater: from over 20,000 personnel back in 1994 down to about 14,000 today, a tremendous reduction in size.

We are working with the army to sort this thing through. What I can tell you is that the last part of the organization that will be cut in order to live within the budget is the operational forces. We're doing this whole process with the white paper and the missions fully in mind.

The Chairman: The five minutes have been getting longer and longer. We're up to 8 minutes and 27 seconds.

Mr. Jordan.

Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds—Grenville, Lib.): I have just a quick question, so maybe there's time.

With the theme of changing realities and the changing role of the military, as well as the need for flexibility in skill base and scope of operations—and also recognizing that there's a learning curve, and that as you change, you learn more about change—perhaps the white paper, as a guide.... That was three years ago, and maybe things have changed from there.

I certainly respect the notion of core and non-core activities classifications, but is there an opportunity here to revisit the role of reserves in terms of the human core? The nature of what they do might be better suited to...I don't use the term “part-time” in any derogatory sense, but a well-trained reserve force, because I know in my riding, the presence of that helps in a lot of ways in society. If it can cover both bases, that would be important.

MGen L.C. Campbell: That's a very good point, and we would 100% agree with that issue.

The question that you run into really goes back to Mr. Hanger's point about rapid response and so on. We need to assess what is the realistic requirement for our forces in this day and age in the ability to respond to things. You find there are two requirements: there is a requirement for having ready forces that can deploy quickly and respond to international crises and so on, but there is also a requirement for forces that can be built up later on.

So we're in the midst of a process of a mobilization planning exercise. Mobilization planning may sound like a bit of an anachronism in 1997, but it's extremely important that we figure out how best to employ the reserves and where they fit into the overall puzzle. We are spending quite a lot of our resource on reserves. They do play an important role in communities, and if we don't take advantage of that human resource, then we're making a great error.

So I 100% support that, and we'll be looking at it in the context of our major review of force structure over the next few months.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Mr. Chair, if I have any time left, I'd be willing to give it to Mr. Hanger, if he wants it.

The Chairman: Well, what I was going to do is go to Mr. Price and then back to Mr. Hanger.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, PC): It's working; you're going to get time. It's working, because you've just answered one of my questions.

I just have one simple question. On the new frigates, you're still operating with the old Sea King helicopters, which are not designed for those ships at all, really, because you have the latest technology in your frigates. On the new helicopters that you will be looking at—or that you should be looking at, anyway, at this point, and that we should be hoping to get fairly soon—are you looking at rescue capabilities in these helicopters? Are they going to be multifunctional?

• 1655

MGen L.C. Campbell: Well, with the current Sea King, if you think back to about a year ago, a very dramatic rescue in the open ocean was performed by that aircraft.

Mr. David Price: But it's not really designed—

MGen L.C. Campbell: Exactly. There was only—

Mr. David Price: There's a safety factor that comes in there.

MGen L.C. Campbell: There's a safety factor and a size factor that are involved in this process. You can only stick so much stuff inside the airframe that you buy. We really do need to—within the context of the amount of capital budget we are going to have available, and the other competing demands here—look carefully at what kind of aircraft we buy, what kind of operating procedures we need to be involved in, whether we can afford—

Mr. David Price: You haven't really completed that.

MGen L.C. Campbell: No, and quite honestly, from the point of view of strategy some of this will depend on what aircraft is chosen for the search and rescue aircraft. I don't know the answer to that at all, but it will impact—

Mr. David Price: But you would like to see the air and sea rescue capabilities in the Sea King replacements?

MGen L.C. Campbell: Going back to my comment that if you can only afford so many forces it's nice to have forces that can do more than one thing—absolutely; yes, sir.

Mr. David Price: Okay, thanks.

The Chairman: Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon E. Benoit (Lakeland, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My first question comes from something one of you gentlemen said, and I'm sorry, it's getting late in the day and I don't remember which one of you it was. It was along the line that you think maybe now is the time to de-emphasize our involvement in NATO so that we can concentrate more on our defence here at home. That's really paraphrasing, but does that accurately reflect what you said, first?

Mr. Daniel Bon: I hope that's not what I said. The issue is not to de-emphasize. In today's world, the Canadian Forces are unlikely to be asked tomorrow to go and fight a major war in Europe. There are other things they can do, and deliver value for the dollar that paid for them. But it remains absolutely certain that if there were a requirement for the Canadian Forces to go to fight alongside the allies, that would be their first priority.

Mr. Leon E. Benoit: Do you feel, then, that it would make better use of our resources to focus our activities more here in Canada? Would that be a better use of resources in terms of meeting Canada's number one priority in terms of the military defending Canada?

Mr. Daniel Bon: Not at all. The best value for the dollars we invest in the Canadian Forces is to be able to deliver exactly what is needed at any given time. If it is in Canada, then it is a Canada-centred mission. If it is abroad and it is with the UN, then it is a UN operation. If it is with NATO, it is a NATO operation. If it is with the United States, then it is a North American mission. The best value for the taxpayer is multi-purpose Canadian Forces, and that's what the white paper calls for.

Mr. Leon E. Benoit: But in terms of what's happening right now, and the number of resources that are targeted at NATO, and compared to the number of forces that are actually active or actively focusing right here in Canada, do you think the relationship is reasonable now, or would you move more to NATO or maybe more back to Canada, in terms of doing the job?

MGen L.C. Campbell: Perhaps, sir, I could touch on this. What was clear out of the white paper was that we would not actually parcel forces up as being NATO forces, UN forces, or defence-of-Canada forces. For the most part—and there are, I suppose, some unique circumstances—the same forces that would be used in a NATO operation are the forces we employ on UN operations and to some extent here in Canada as well.

Mr. Leon E. Benoit: In terms of getting those forces ready, though, to defend Canada, do you believe it's best done the way it's done now—you know, the number that are involved in NATO now remaining in NATO—or can that be done better with more resources actually here in Canada?

• 1700

MGen L.C. Campbell: But we don't have very many forces, on a day-to-day basis, that are committed to NATO. We have forces in Bosnia, which are, in the context of the Bosnian operation, UN-NATO combined. We have a small number of folks in NATO headquarters and with the NATO AWACS program. But the majority of our forces actually are here in Canada and participating in either UN or domestic operations on a day-to-day basis.

Mr. Leon E. Benoit: That's the second part of the question. Some of our resources, people, and equipment are involved in UN operations still. Is the involvement in NATO and the UN outside of Canada interfering with having our military ready to defend Canada, or is it actually helping?

Mr. Daniel Bon: You seem to be assuming a major threat to Canada, and I don't—

Mr. Leon E. Benoit: The possibility of a major threat.

Mr. Daniel Bon: If there were the possibility of a major threat to Canada, then there would be a major threat elsewhere, and perhaps the best defence of Canada, as it was during the Cold War, would be in fighting a war in Europe.

Mr. Leon E. Benoit: Possibly.

Mr. Daniel Bon: So in terms of your question, yes, the balance that the white paper suggested in 1994 is quite appropriate to the current situation.

MGen L.C. Campbell: But the point you're getting at here is extremely important. The high rate of what we call “operational tempo” that particularly existed in the 1993-94 timeframe—it's a little less today, but still serious—that is, of units rapidly rotating through NATO missions, has an impact on their ability to operate and train, particularly at brigade level and higher in the case of the army. It's less of an issue from an air force and a navy perspective. It's more of an issue from the land force point of view.

In the minister's report to the Prime Minister last spring and in the work we've been doing in response to the Somalia inquiry, we've made it quite clear that we need to actually put more emphasis on this whole business of training above unit level. So the army will be doing more of this, and more funding has been put into it to try to make that happen.

That was to try to answer the issue you're getting at, sir.

Mr. Daniel Bon: If I may, I'll just add one thing. Our commitments to NATO and to the UN did not prevent us from putting 8,500 people in the field in Manitoba during the floods.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

John.

Mr. John Richardson (Perth—Middlesex, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to put a couple of things in perspective. The white paper was not a stand-alone document. There was a flow there. The joint committee of the Senate and the House of Commons did an intensive review of the forces both in Canada and out of Canada, and met with many foreign countries and their defence chiefs of staff and/or defence ministers. When that was finally put together, it triggered the white paper, which is traditionally done by the department, but it wasn't out of sync with the findings of the joint committee's review of the force structure in Canada.

As the major-general just mentioned, we've gone full circle by drawing out and also stringing out the people in the forces, more particularly the land forces, because the professionalism is being lost. The land forces are based on the divisional level concept, and by operating on the divisional level concept, we saw that expertise at the higher level going, and going fast. Instead of working at the company level, which was happening in the peacekeeping operation, they'd be hived as companies or company groups.

• 1705

So I would just ask if I'm wrong in stating that it's.... I'm so pleased to hear they're getting back to the RV concept and the divisional training concept to train staff officers and senior officers in combat arms. Is that going to be a projection, that the training process is going to be cycled every two, three, or five years to see that senior officers get a chance to practise their craft at the level at which they normally would be fighting?

MGen L.C. Campbell: I wouldn't want to comment on the specifics of the timing there, but let me talk about one of the tasks that's in the Defence Planning Guidance, which is our five-year plan, which deals with simulation and training.

You may ask yourself, what does simulation have to do with brigade and divisional training? But the reality is that today, even our major allies such as the United States don't very often deploy full land-sized forces out into farmers' fields and operate them as major units, because it's very difficult to do, it's very costly, it's very disruptive to environments, and so on.

So a tremendous investment is happening south of the border in dealing with distributed interactive simulation and the use of embedded simulation in weapons systems, so that you can actually train commanders and field grade officers in the higher level of operations without actually having to deploy large-scale formations out there.

I have made the point in the Defence Planning Guidance and in presentations I've given that we must get on board with that kind of technology, because if we don't, we won't be able to train with the Americans, who are our major ally, and if we can't train with them, we certainly won't be able to operate with them. So it's extremely important that we do that, and that's the direction we're heading in.

Mr. John Richardson: Can I have a follow-up question?

The Chairman: Oh yes.

Mr. John Richardson: I'm pleased to hear that, but I thought in about 1995 you were in the mode of looking at buying simulators for training.

MGen L.C. Campbell: We have some.

Mr. John Richardson: That's good.

MGen L.C. Campbell: We have a facility in Kingston today. We've set up staff in the headquarters. In fact, General Jurkowski may wish to comment.

Do you want to touch on anything in that?

BGen D.M. Jurkowski: I don't know too much about that area right now, but I can add something else.

Not only are we gaining some ground in Kingston with simulation; from time to time we have people go out of the country, to the United States in particular and to other areas, to participate in large-scale, joint, combined exercises—involving a lot of staff and real-world facilities such as communications systems, satellites, and what not—and exercise a force operating process. We actually, at least unofficially, qualify our senior people, general officers, who get that kind of experience in conducting a very large-size operation. So that's another area in which we're operating.

MGen L.C. Campbell: This summer I myself participated in Exercise Global, which is a United States navy-sponsored exercise, attended by the vice-chief of naval operations. My syndicate leader was a guy named James Schlesinger, who some of you may have heard of before. So it was a fairly high-level program, but that whole business was the summation of a major three-week, computer-assisted, worldwide exercise, which then looked at the broader implications from a commander level: “So what? What does this all mean? What are the various ethics of things such as information warfare, for example, today?” and so on.

To me, that kind of training is the key to the future. We are spending resources there. Our effort has not been as co-ordinated as it should be, and that's why we've put it in the Defence Planning Guidance, to bring it all together.

Mr. John Richardson: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Art Hanger: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I've been down to Kingston and I've looked at the simulators they have for the combat forces, I guess it would be—the land forces there—but they're a bit archaic, are they not?

MGen L.C. Campbell: You're talking about the JANUS system they have there?

Mr. Art Hanger: Yes.

MGen L.C. Campbell: They're not state of the art, I wouldn't say, but it is the technology that is largely being used as a modelling tool. There's a difference between modelling tools, of course, and how you use things beyond that, and how we use things beyond that is probably more of an issue.

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Mr. Art Hanger: There's nothing that beats the realistic aspect of getting your hands on and actually working it in the field, as opposed to on a simulator.

I'm kind of curious here. The defence budget is going down to $9.2 billion, so there are going to be more cuts yet—maybe another $1 billion?

MGen L.C. Campbell: The majority of the reductions—in fact, all of the reductions—are in the program right now, to 1999, but some of them are still working their way through the system. We haven't yet got there. For example, on personnel we're at about 61,000, and we're on our way to 60,000.

Mr. Art Hanger: I've talked to military personnel of various ranks, and they keep talking about these gaps that exist within the structure, the system—the holes, if you will. Everything is not coming together as it should be. I haven't been quite able, to be honest with you, to clarify in my own mind exactly how that all fits together, but I will.

I was also talking to a commanding officer in one particular base, and he said something to me that's stuck in my mind ever since. It deals basically, too, with the contents of the white paper.

The white paper specifies that there's a need for training such that our armed forces can fight a limited conventional war of high intensity. Is that really the direction in which the military is going, or are they going the other way?

And I guess the bottom line is this. If we're still going to cut down to $9.2 billion, will the military be capable of fighting a high-intensity limited conventional war, which I understand was one of the recommendations in the white paper?

MGen L.C. Campbell: I think we all have the same questions about whether there are gaps, overlaps, places where we are spending money that we don't need to, to do that, and whether there are places where we actually have to concentrate. I mentioned one of those being strategic lift, for an example.

I believe I mentioned that we are working on a very detailed set of scenarios that try to take something as simple as deploying a naval task force and putting it into an operational context, trying to figure out what kind of hypothetical enemy with very realistic capabilities would exist there, what kinds of missions we would be asked to do, and therefore what kinds of capabilities will we need to have. How do we mobilize to get those? Where do we have those?

I suspect when we finish that exercise, which we will be doing starting really now but over the course of the next year or so, we will find gaps. We will also find places where the current technology that would allow us to operate in a certain environment may be beyond our capability—beyond affordability. But to me that does not—when you go back to that basic mission that said operate within the context of a coalition or alliance—mean that we're not capable of being there. What we do have to have are forces that have equipment that is capable of operating in that kind of environment.

Mr. Art Hanger: That's right, and I guess that's the other point in question. Sure, we can commit ourselves to different theatres, if there is something happening in the Middle East or if there's something happening over in Europe and we jump into the fray, so to speak, but if we don't have dependable equipment and can keep up, if you will, to the other forces that are there, then what's the point?

I almost get that sense that that's where we sat when we were part of the coalition in the Gulf War. We were there, but our presence was sort of “Well, you stay out there so you're not getting in the way, at least.”

MGen L.C. Campbell: You put me in a very difficult position as an airman and a fighter pilot, of course, because my own sense is that certainly on the air force side of things we were extremely capable there. You have to remember, though, that the mission given to us by the government in the beginning was air defence—that is, not offensive air support. It was an air defence mission.

The air defence mission in the Gulf War disappeared almost after about day two of combat, because the Iraqi air force simply disappeared as well. So to some extent the mission didn't materialize, and it took us quite some time, but we had to then generate first of all the political will, I suppose, to change the mission, but secondly, on the military side, the logistics issue of getting weapons into the theatre to then take over a ground bombing campaign.

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Of course, at that time we also did not have precision-guided munitions, which limited our capabilities. We do have those now, and it makes quite a significant difference in capability. Of course, the navy at the time was certainly not in the background. It was quite upfront in the Gulf itself. My own sense is that we were playing a fairly significant role, albeit not with land forces.

BGen D.M. Jurkowski: If I could just add, I was involved in it not directly but indirectly here in National Defence headquarters during the time, and I second what General Campbell says. We had excellent equipment. In fact, in some areas we had equipment that was superior to those of our allies in that area. We weren't stuffed off to the side; we played a very important role.

Mr. Art Hanger: You're not talking about land.

BGen D.M. Jurkowski: No, I'm talking about certainly in the air and on the navy side.

Mr. Daniel Bon: One thing I would like to add, sir, is that I think there is perhaps too much of a tendency in Canada to think of the Canadian Forces as being mini U.S. forces. I think the Canadian Forces are in fact recognized as a fairly modern fighting force. When you compare it to nations more the size of Canada—middle powers—I think you will see that we are not that much out of line.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): Go ahead, Art. This is an enlightening discussion. I don't want to interrupt it, but I think we should wind things up very soon.

Mr. Art Hanger: Sure.

Getting into Canada's capabilities again, and looking at what's happening in Europe, for instance, there isn't a military operation in Europe that isn't being downsized right now—not one. Canada has committed herself to supporting the other member nations in NATO.

Now, this is my understanding, and you can certainly correct me if I'm off base here, but if we hadn't been in Germany previously, in Lahr, and had that equipment stationed over there, we wouldn't be playing too much of a dance with any of those in Europe. To even repeat that or duplicate it now, if you will—we would have a hard time doing that.

Mr. Daniel Bon: Well, that may be so, sir, but Europe is not the only place in the world where we could operate. It was in Yugoslavia, but it could have been somewhere in Asia, it could have been somewhere else, so it is largely irrelevant where the equipment is.

Mr. Art Hanger: My point is not so much where that equipment is, but what we have here.

MGen L.C. Campbell: The issue of stationed forces here.... Having been the last commander of the Canadian fighter wing in Solingen, I had of course tears in my eyes when we closed. But I've often looked back at that and wondered, had we been there today, what I would be doing with the forces I had at my disposal. In fact, the world there has changed significantly, as has the strategic warning that is available that would allow us to change.

If we think back to 1953, when Canada first deployed forces into the European environment, although it was under different circumstances than today in terms of the ability to generate weapons systems, we nevertheless did so in about a nine-month period, and stayed there for forty years thereafter.

But the sense is that we can generate forces, and that's why we are putting together this mobilization plan I talked about earlier. We really need to have some sense of how, if we were in a different mode—that is, instead of this downsizing mode that we have been in, but in the mode of having to re-create forces and regenerate forces—how would we do it? What kinds of capabilities could we have, and how would we get them to where it mattered? Important issues, really.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): Okay. Hec, a real fast one.

Mr. Hec Clouthier: Considering the fact that Canada is recognized worldwide in the peacemaking or peacekeeping roles, and thinking along where Art is coming from—you might say, you're thinking crazy, Cloutier—but could it be possible that we could put together a quick response team to go to some of the other hot spots in the world?

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What would be your professional opinion on Bosnia and the Middle East? It just seems to me that, jeepers, they've been fighting and they're continuing to fight, and I don't know how much good we're really doing over there, other than perhaps stopping some killing. But as for doing the peacekeeping and peacemaking and getting things in line in other countries, say in Cambodia, and as you did indicate, in 15 other hot spots throughout the world, could it be possible or do we already have the capability of putting together a quick response team to go immediately for a month or a month and a half to some country, whether it's in Africa or Haiti or South America, and perform a humanitarian role and do something right? Perhaps even, again, thinking of the business side of it, not a mercenary force, but maybe getting paid for it, other than the UN....

I don't know, I just think that sometimes in Bosnia and the Middle East we're just spinning our wheels. I haven't been over there, but....

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

BGen D.M. Jurkowski: In general terms we can put together a force. It depends what it is. My main area of expertise, before this new incarnation in which I just found myself a short three months ago.... I'll speak for a minute on the fighter forces. We could muster a force very quickly with some modifications and some extra training, and we could move a force into a given area worldwide in very short order. On the ground too, that is certainly possible, and we think of those things.

On the business side, I'm not sure what you're getting at there, sir, but—

An hon. member: I'm not sure he knows.

Mr. Hec Clouthier: I know; I want the money.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

BGen D.M. Jurkowski: In any case, within limits—

Mr. Hec Clouthier: I think of the money as one way that we are...I'm not saying wasting, because I guess it is a bit of a humanitarian effort. It just seems as if.... I'm sure you people in the military know. Over in Bosnia or in the Middle East, are we really accomplishing that much?

Mr. Daniel Bon: I don't know that the countries we go to have any money to pay us, for one thing.

Mr. Hec Clouthier: Well, that's a secondary thought, though. What I'm thinking of is, maybe because we have such a good reputation worldwide, whereas the Americans and some other countries do not—they're perceived as imperialistic—Canada could go to these different hot spots. I'm just thinking of something like, again, Bosnia and the Middle East. It just seems to me as if sometimes we're not—

BGen D.M. Jurkowski: Sir, I would hate to think what would be going on right now in Bosnia or Haiti, for that matter, if Canadians weren't on the ground. That's a very good example. I really firmly believe—and you can see it in the faces of the people there—that they really do contribute. They mean the difference between some people getting killed and not getting killed, just by dint of their presence. So in a sense there is value added to this planet.

Mr. Daniel Bon: And Canada sees it as its contribution to the global community to provide forces for such operations. To a degree there is a reimbursement from the international community; in other words, the UN does pay back for peacekeepers. It doesn't pay back a whole lot—it is a marginal amount—but our contributions on one hand and the payment we get through New York take care of your question.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): I don't see any other questioners and we're losing quorum here, so I would like to take this opportunity to thank our witnesses for their presentations and also for their responses to the various answers.

Thank you, Mr. Bon, Major-General Campbell, and Brigadier-General Jurkowski.

I'd also like to remind the committee that next Tuesday, October 28, we have a meeting at 3.30 p.m. with the minister, and next Wednesday at 3.30 p.m. a joint session with foreign affairs, and attending at that time will be ambassadors from various countries. I have a notice here as well that next Thursday there will be a steering committee meeting at 11 a.m.

With that, I adjourn the meeting to the call of the chair.