NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, May 6, 1999

• 1517

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): I call this meeting to order.

There's some positive news coming out of the G-8 summit. Who is going to begin? Mr. Archambault? I gather you're replacing Mr. Wright.

[Translation]

Mr. Guy Archambault (Deputy Director (Balkans), Southern Europe Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and ladies and gentlemen.

[English]

As Mr. Chairman said, the G-8 foreign ministers held a meeting in Bonn today. Mr. Axworthy was there. It was a very successful meeting and important progress was made.

Seven basic principles were agreed on for a political solution to the Kosovo crisis. They are as follows: one, immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo; two, withdrawal from Kosovo of military police and paramilitary forces; three, deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences endorsed and adopted by the United Nations capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives; four, the establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations, to ensure conditions for people and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo; five, the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations; six, a political process toward the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region and the demilitarization of the UCK; and seven, a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.

[Translation]

I've given copies of this statement to the clerk.

• 1520

As you know, Canada has always supported a diplomatic solution to the conflict so we were very satisfied with the results of this meeting which meets our objectives. First of all, the G-8 endorsed the five demands of the international community and NATO's five demands. As the G-8 includes Russia, that's an important development. Second, Russia is fully committed and has participated very constructively in today's meeting. Third, the plan opens the way to a UN commitment in this matter, which has always been one of Canada's objectives.

On the other hand, the absolute consensus of all the G-8 members which occurred at the meeting will certainly help the diplomatic process along.

[English]

However, for these diplomatic efforts to ultimately succeed, the regime of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav regime, must offer a response that will meet the United Nations' and NATO's five conditions, which have also been accepted by the G-8. We need a serious response from the Yugoslav regime. While the regime refuses to compromise and continues its intolerable policy of ethnic cleansing, we will continue our three-pronged approach.

First, we will continue the military action, which is aimed at maintaining the pressure on the regime and aimed also at degrading its machine of war and repression. Second, we will of course continue our humanitarian action, which is the object of a concerted effort within the international community and in Canada, a concerted effort including CIDA, the Department of Immigration, the Department of National Defence, and of course the Department of Foreign Affairs. Third, we will continue, of course, to participate in the diplomatic efforts to find a solution.

Thank you.

[Translation]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Lieutenant-General Henault.

Lieutenant-General Raymond R. Henault (Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, National Defence): Thank you, Mr. Graham. Mr. Chairman, members of both committees, I wish you a good afternoon. My comments will be brief and will have to do with the events or developments over the last 48 hours.

[English]

In terms of the military situation, the military and NATO air forces have, as we're well aware, continued their strikes against Kosovo and in Yugoslavia along the same lines as what I have reported to you previously. Although weather has been a limiting factor, there were nonetheless 600 sorties or so flown in the last 48 hours, of which 92 were strike sorties, striking in fact 40 different targets throughout Yugoslavia. All of the NATO aircraft returned safely.

[Translation]

The NATO targets have not changed much since our last meeting. They're still the assembly areas, air strips, electric systems, bridges and so on. I won't give you a detailed description of the targets.

[English]

To date, the NATO aircraft have flown about 16,000 sorties, of which about 5,500 have been strike sorties.

On Tuesday of this week I was asked by the honourable Mr. Earle about the alleged use of graphite bombs. I have tried to obtain some information about this particular weapon. Let me say first of all that our allies will neither confirm nor deny the actual use of those particular weapons—“soft bombs”, as they are called—as it is a highly classified weapon. Therefore I can only report on the open source information, l'information de source ouverte, that I was able to get for you in this respect.

Unfortunately, the open source information does not cover the environmental impact, Mr. Earle, so I'm not going to be able to give you anything more concrete in that respect. I do refer you to what's called the Federation of American Scientists website, which offers the six pages that I've had distributed to you of unofficial technical data on this particular weapon. It's the best source of information we have at the moment.

[Translation]

Unfortunately, the document is not translated but we'd be pleased to have it done for you if you so wish, Mr. Laurin. We can get it to you next week.

Mr. René Laurin (Joliette, BQ): I'd appreciate it.

• 1525

[English]

LGen Raymond Henault: In general terms, as you'll see in the document, this weapon disburses chemically treated carbon graphite filaments, which basically short-circuit electrical power equipment. It normally targets the actual distribution sites or the transmission sites themselves.

Again, I don't have a whole lot of technical data. It is called a soft bomb because of the effects that are largely confined to the targeted electrical power facility. Of course the advantage of this particular weapon is that it minimizes one more time collateral damage, which of course has been the objective of NATO air forces throughout this particular air campaign.

In terms of Canada's contribution, our CF-18s, which now number 18 in Aviano, flew 22 out of 32 planned sorties over the last 48 hours and successfully conducted strikes against airfields and bridges throughout that period.

Turning to our preparations for deployment of our land peacekeeping forces, those preparations continue as scheduled. To give you a feel for the deployment schedule itself, I can report to you that the rail movement of equipment—that's the movement from the western part of Canada to the Port of Montreal—is planned to begin by about the end of next week. That's all the equipment except for the eight Griffon helicopters, which will actually self-deploy. That is, they'll fly from Edmonton to Montreal. That will be followed by, after the consolidation in the Port of Montreal, a sea lift to Europe, which is expected to start on May 25. In fact the loading of the ships will be done between May 22 and May 24.

[Translation]

The contingent expects to be in the country about three weeks later and ready for operations by June 27 at the latest which is earlier than the deadline we had committed to, in other words 60 days after our deployment was announced.

I can also tell you that the reconnaissance contingent,

[English]

or the advanced reconnaissance team, is now in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia and doing the coordination with the U.K. forces, the other NATO commanders who are in theatre, and preparing itself to deploy and integrate into the U.K. brigade.

The commander of that force, Colonel Mike Ward, left on Tuesday. He will be back early next week and will report to us his findings and confirm to us the composition of the force that's going over there.

In terms of refugee movements, our refugee reception here in Canada is now going well, as I think you have seen. It's under way at both Greenwood and Trenton, Trenton being the first base at which we received refugees.

[Translation]

For your information, there are about 900 members of our Canadian Forces involved in refugee reception in close co-operation with our partners from Immigration Canada who are directing this project as well as Health Canada.

[English]

Our forces at CFB Trenton and CFB Greenwood have reported good success in all aspects of the refugee reception so far, in the actual receiving from the chartered aircraft that are bringing them over from the former Macedonia, in the actual processing of the refugees, which has gone well so far—and I know Mr. Le Bane will talk about that—and in terms of transportation and long-term accommodation, and so on. To date we have in excess of 500 refugees received under this particular program, and there are more coming today, somewhere in the neighbourhood of 250 or so—Jeff will have the exact numbers—arriving again in Trenton today.

I just remind you that the flights into Canada are alternating between Trenton and Greenwood to allow processing to go on over the 48-hour period after the actual aircraft arrive. That's to assist both our own staffs at those particular bases and wings of the Canadian Forces, and also the Immigration Canada and Health Canada staffs, to actually do the processing and do all of the administrative work that has to be done prior to their move on to sustainment bases or integration into the community.

The on-scene commander in Trenton in particular reported that the first flight into Trenton on Tuesday was very successful. It was a very emotional undertaking, I think, at the time. Certainly Madame Robillard reported back that she was quite moved by the whole situation. I know Jeff again will talk about that. To our advantage, the good condition of the refugees, to date anyway, the clear weather, and a good deal of flexibility on the part of all who are concerned has helped to make this a very successful initiation, if you like, of this particular project.

• 1530

Finally, to close off, I'd like to provide you with a costing update so that you're familiar with the costs that have been incurred so far in our operations in the Balkans.

[Translation]

As of April 30,

[English]

the incremental costs to date have been $35.7 million or just about $36 million to the Canadian government. The total cost since March 24, I should say, which is since the initiation of Op Allied Force, is now $15.2 million for Canadian Forces operations. That includes $5.5 million for the original six plus six, the 12 F-18s that were in theatre as of April 30. All of these costs, by the way, are as of April 30, 1999, and for 12 F-18s. We'll report to you the incremental cost of six more F-18s on the next go-around. That $5.5 million includes about $2.5 million for the expenditure and replacement of munitions so far.

The projected cost, for your information, of the six additional F-18s over a period of six months is $3.1 million, or just about $3 million, for that period.

[Translation]

Ladies and gentlemen, that concludes my presentation. I'll now give the floor to Jeff LeBane to tell you about Immigration Canada's role.

[English]

Mr. Jeff LeBane (Director General, International Relations, Citizenship and Immigration Canada): Mr. Chair and deputies, good afternoon. It's my first time here to provide you with an update on what Citizenship and Immigration Canada is doing overseas.

Since April 30, when Madam Ogata made her appeal for temporary safe haven outside of the European region, to which Canada responded that we would take 5,000 refugees, I can report to you that to date, in our first two flights, we've brought to Canada 464 persons to provide them safe haven as refugees. They come as refugees. They have the opportunity to remain in Canada, to become landed immigrants and stay. If they choose to go back to Kosovo at such time as they can, the Government of Canada will fund that. And that is a commitment in response to a request from Madam Ogata at the UNHCR.

The profile we are developing on these persons is that of the first two flights, approximately 30% are children and minors. A significant number, about 8% to 10% are aged, elderly persons. They are generally, to date, in good medical condition. Of those who have medical problems, many are suffering from hypertension. But generally they are in good condition.

As was noted, we will be having these flights on a daily basis until we reach our commitment, which at this point is 5,000, and we will alternate between Trenton and Greenwood. Last night, of the approximately 265 people who arrived at Greenwood, we were able to do initial medical and security profile screening in one hour and 40 minutes. You can appreciate how fatigued they must have been.

We have a second program as well, which is a family reunification and special needs program. On April 9, 1999, Madam Ogata said there may be special needs and family reunification cases that require permanent resettlement to Canada—a distinction as refugees. We've had requests from Canadians for family members abroad now numbering 1,236 persons, both in Albania and in Macedonia.

Our minister, Madam Robillard, committed that from the point in time that we were able to locate these people and interview them, we would resettle them to Canada on a minister's permit. Our biggest challenge is trying to locate these people. In Macedonia, about 45% of the refugees are not in UNHCR camps; they're spread through the country. So it's a challenge for us. In Albania the situation is even more uncertain.

• 1535

Of the approximately 1,200 persons who have been identified in Macedonia and in Albania, we have now interviewed 450 of these people, and 159 have come to Canada, for a grand total of 623. We have no limit on family members overseas and we're adopting a very generous attitude to who comprises a family.

In the field, we have in Skopje six Canadian immigration officers and one medical officer. In Tirana, Albania, we have four immigration officers as well. They are working on a seven-day basis and we are having flights until we meet the emergency humanitarian evacuation as quickly as possible. We are working closely with UNHCR, and the International Organization for Migration is our key partner in the field. They are organizing the flights to Canada for us, both in terms of the emergency humanitarian evacuation and the family reunification program. On the family reunification program, where there is time we are also working with the International Committee of the Red Cross to provide travel documents.

I'd be very pleased to answer your questions.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you very much.

We'll go to questions now. Again, members, try to keep it to one-minute questions, and don't bunch 12 into one minute, because I'll cut off the answers after about a minute and a half to two minutes. We can get around for a second round, but we're not going to....

[Translation]

Mr. Turp.

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): The chairman wants to be strict today. I have two questions for Mr. Archambault and one for Mr. Henault.

The political agreement whose text I've just seen is a bit different from the one you had shared with us in a dispatch; the one you have given us is a bit more complete. It would seem to me that the most difficult aspect is the makeup of the security forces and NATO's participation. Earlier, in the House, I got an answer from Mr. Chrétien spelling out that, according to Canada, there was to be a NATO force. Could you tell us a bit about that and more particularly about that provision, as Mr. Lavrov, the Russian ambassador to the United Nations, has just said that the devil isn't in the principles and that the negotiations on this matter are still extremely difficult and delicate. That's my first question.

My second has to do with the sequencing, or the order in which things are happening. Do you have any information on how things are going to develop over time, especially the resolution from the Security Council? When do we expect the Security Council to be presented with a resolution?

Mr. Henault, just for the information of all of my colleagues, I'm putting the same question to you that I already put the last time concerning the situation in Kosovo and the Yugoslav troops. Have there been any troop movements or troop reinforcements? What is the state of the Yugoslavian army in Kosovo, because the withdrawal does pose the question of whether Yugoslavian troops are present in force in Kosovo or not?

Mr. Guy Archambault: Concerning the makeup of the force, the result of the G-8 meeting is the result of negotiation and compromise on different texts that were proposed by different countries. However, this is great progress because Russia was opposed to any kind of military presence only a few weeks ago. Our position is still that NATO must be at the heart of this military presence.

However, despite the G-8 agreement, the key will be an agreement by the Yugoslavs. What is fundamental in the G-8 agreement is that it increases pressure on the Yugoslavian regime as well as the isolation of the Yugoslavs. Of course, the exact makeup of the force remains to be negotiated. No decision has been made. The preliminary step is to have it accepted by the Yugoslavs and we're not there yet.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Has the Yugoslav government been presented with the agreement?

• 1540

Mr. Guy Archambault: Presented with... I believe the Yugoslav government is aware of the agreement. It is very well informed about what's going on. It has rather regular contact especially with the Russians. We have not yet submitted the agreement to the government, but I don't think that is the important element. It knows full well what the conditions are and can meet them as of today.

As for what you call sequencing, at the G-8 meeting it was decided that the ministers would entrust the political directors of the eight countries with the pursuit of negotiations to arrive at a resolution for the Security Council. That would be a first stage, and it could happen rapidly, which is what we are hoping for, or less rapidly. Once there's a resolution from the Security Council, the Yugoslavs will have to accept it. It will be a rather difficult stage to go through, but the sooner the better.

After that, there will be a very complex sequence that will get under way. When must the Yugoslav troops withdraw? When will NATO have to stop bombing? Are we going to send monitors, as a first stage? Will the peacekeeping force start to deploy? These are all questions we are discussing, but no decision has been taken yet.

What is fundamental is that it requires the political will of the Yugoslav regime. Once it finds the will to put an end to the ethnic cleansing campaign and accept a peacekeeping force, things will fall into place. They'll be able to be discussed and resolved very quickly.

LGen Raymond Henault: Naturally, we don't know the exact number of Serbian troops in the theatre, but according to what we can make out through our air equipment, the number seems to have stabilized over the last few weeks. They can still get reinforcements and provisions, but with difficulty because the roads and railways have been damaged. They have problems operating as easily as before. They continue their counter-insurgency operations, as they call them, against the KLA.

On the other hand, what with NATO's ongoing aerial strikes and an increase in air operations over Kosovo, where the troops have been deployed since 24-7, the Yugoslavs have been forced to change their tactics slightly and disperse their forces which has led to difficulties the Yugoslavs did not have before this in that theatre of operations. We also know that their communications have been made more difficult than they were before because of the strikes on the telephone transmission systems, radio relays and so on.

Finally, I would say that according to NATO intelligence sources, their morale seems to be low, which seems logical since the forces are being struck constantly. They are forced to disperse. They are having a hard time communicating amongst themselves with all of the NATO operations. So, their operational capacity seems to be diminishing because of the constant air strikes.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Could I make a remark? Mr. Archambault said that Yugoslavia had to accept the Security Council resolution. I would like to specify that they do not have to accept the Security Council resolution. They will have to respect the Security Council decision. It is mandatory. It is binding.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): That depends on whether it comes under chapter 7 or 6.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Yes, and I suppose it will come under chapter 7.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): We'll come back to that.

Mr. Guy Archambault: I entirely agree.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): That will have to be specified.

[English]

Madam Finestone.

Hon. Sheila Finestone (Mount Royal, Lib.): Thank you very much.

I'm interested to note that the people who are coming here you found in good medical condition, although they might be suffering from a bit of hypertension. I had thought that there had been a change of opinion through the UN voice that most people wanted to stay, and we would only accept serious humanitarian or emergency cases. So I want to understand why the difference and the pursuit of the 5,000 mark, given the change in the language that was used and the directions that were given.

• 1545

Secondly, when we say “the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unimpeded access”, etc., and “in order to implement these principles there are political directives to prepare for elements of the United Nations Security Council resolution”, are we waiting for a UN Security Council resolution prior to proceeding into Kosovo? And will it be under the mandate now of the UN rather than NATO?

The third part of this is that the implications for the return are not very positive. I was with Mr. Axworthy and with 15 member donor countries, and the discussion was how do you return when it is land-mined, with anti-personnel land mines everywhere, and most of the villages have been destroyed? So where are we returning them, and to what?

The last case, Mr. Chairman, I really want to ask about is I have had a request for a visitor's permit of a United Nations ex-staffer or staffer, who is a Montrealer and lives in my riding. This is a cousin of a Montrealer who lives in my riding. The office of Immigration Canada first of all was extremely rude, secondly advised us that no one except Kosovo refugees would be accepted, and they're not interested in issuing visitors' visas. This young woman is in Belgrade, and there's absolutely nobody to talk to because they're not interested. I don't think this is fair to Canadians who have visitors who wish to come. The application was before the war started. I'd like to know what you're doing about that kind of request for visitors' visas.

Mr. Jeff LeBane: Maybe I could start with the last question.

Our mission is closed in Belgrade. For immigration, family reunification cases, visitor visa inquiries, persons can direct questions and queries on those cases to our program in Vienna and to Bucharest.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: That's where she is.

Mr. Jeff LeBane: In Bucharest.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: She's in Bucharest, right.

Mr. Jeff LeBane: Okay, in Bucharest.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Yes.

Mr. Jeff LeBane: Okay, I don't have the particulars—

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: That's all I need to know, thank you.

My second question was on why we're taking up to 5,000 with the change.

Mr. Jeff LeBane: Prior to April 20, Madam Ogata was trying to achieve a safe haven as close as possible to Kosovo to facilitate the return of persons. She had made an appeal to European countries. They're in the midst of responding to that. But at the same time, in the month of April 100,000 refugees poured out of Kosovo. While trying to respond to facilitate these people to return, because of the sheer volume of numbers she's asked Canada, Australia, the United States, traditional countries of resettlement and reception, also to participate in the safe haven process.

So it was a very significant change from her initial request of April 4 and 5. On April 9 she was hoping for a European safe haven program, but I think the UNHCR was overwhelmed by the numbers pouring out of Kosovo, and they continue in great numbers. So she is looking for a safe haven program outside of Europe.

Going back to April 9, she has always said that in unique cases, special needs cases, family reunification cases, there was a legitimate role for resettlement, as distinct from safe haven. She has not retracted on that. And in those cases we work very closely with the UNHCR.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Thank you.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you very much.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Excuse me. I'd like the answer to the anti-personnel mines if that's included.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): It has to be very short, as we're well over five minutes now. We're trying to keep it to one-minute answer and one-minute questions.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Then it's the UN and NATO difference.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I don't know how someone's going to explain that in a minute.

Mr. Guy Archambault: On the question of the force, the agreement at the G-8 today calls for the deployment in Kosovo of a force endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, which means that it would be called for by a resolution of the United Nations. That's the plan.

• 1550

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Okay.

Mr. Guy Archambault: In terms of land mines and the complexities in the return of refugees, you are absolutely right: this will be an extremely complex operation; we have no doubt about that. That's also why we think it's important to have a NATO corps, because we believe only a strong NATO presence would have the strength and the organization to take on these extraordinarily complex tasks, including the mining.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: As a point of information, seeing how Canada's played such an important role in anti-personnel land mines, one of the issues that was raised the day before yesterday is the fact that in none of the peace agreements is the fact even being discussed of the impediment under the anti-personnel mine situation and that it should be written into any peace accord. So I would like to know at some point in the near future if our foreign minister is taking that issue into the negotiations and suggesting that the peace accord include the anti-personnel land mines. The reason is that the people who laid those mines are in the enemy forces, but if you're going to have reunification, you have to have some kind of resettlement with some kind of interrelationship with the people, and if you make the people who laid the mines come and help remove the mines as part of the peace agreement, you're starting at least to put people together so that they can work on a common goal, which is food and shelter.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Mr. Laurin.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: My question is for Mr. Archambault, and it has to do with the draft agreement we were given.

You said that this draft did not have to be approved by Belgrade and would be imposed by the United Nations, consequently, by the Security Council. So this is no longer a package deal to be negotiated with Belgrade. We must realize that these conditions will be imposed upon Belgrade, but if the Security Council is to impose them, China's approval is required. What do we know about China's position on these conditions? The agreement says that the chairman of the G-8 shall inform the Chinese government, but what is the status of the relations with China regarding these agreements?

This also supposes the establishment of an interim administration. Does such an interim administration mean that the currently recognized Kosovar leaders will have to be removed?

Mr. Guy Archambault: We realize that China could be an obstacle. For that reason, the international community is undertaking diplomatic efforts targeted at China. When the Chinese prime minister visited Canada last month, we discussed the matter with the Chinese. We hope that if all the other members of the Security Council are in agreement, China will not stand in their way. We are going to work hard to convince the Chinese not to block this agreement.

Obviously, since Russia has a greater interest in the Balkans, we can hope that the Chinese will not object. We will do everything possible to convince them.

Mr. René Laurin: There still haven't been any talks?

Mr. Guy Archambault: No, there have not been any talks with the Chinese on this matter. The talks are going on within the G-8.

Mr. René Laurin: And what about the interim administration?

Mr. Guy Archambault: You mentioned the role of the Kosovars. That is another one of our concerns. At present the Kosovars are relatively scattered. We have news of Mr. Rugova. His role as a Kosovar leader is no longer what it was. Obviously, we are going to encourage the Kosovar leaders to be constructive, as they were in Rambouillet. So, members of NATO and of the G-8 are concerned and aware that we must continue talking with the Kosovars, and we are doing so. Mr. Rugova is currently visiting the Italians, and several Kosovar leaders have visited Italy and the United States.

They are still being given the same message: try to stick together and agree amongst yourselves because we are going to need you once there is a peace accord.

• 1555

At present, the Yugoslav regime is the main obstacle, because they are the ones who must withdraw their troops and end the ethnic cleansing. You're quite right to say that this is an important point.

Mr. René Laurin: I have another question for Mr. Henault.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Pardon me, Mr. Laurin, but your time is up.

Mr. Earle now has the floor.

[English]

Mr. Gordon Earle (Halifax West, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank Lieutenant-General Henault for providing the information on the soft bomb.

The last time Mr. Wright was here we talked a bit about the visit by Reverend Jesse Jackson and him taking a letter back to the President of the United States from Mr. Milosevic. It was my understanding from media reports that the letter may have requested a face-to-face meeting between the President and Milosevic. Mr. Wright said he could imagine what the President's response would be.

While I understand that may be an answer, I still wonder if there's anything further in that regard, and whether there has been a request by Milosevic to meet with President Clinton. If so, is that being followed up or urged as perhaps a way to discuss some of these things and perhaps get closer to a settlement?

Mr. Guy Archambault: I'm sorry, I have no further information on that. I saw the media reports about that letter. We haven't heard about it in recent days, which may be an indication that it hasn't been the object of a very serious follow-up, but I could check and try to find out through our embassy in Washington what's going on with that letter.

Mr. Gordon Earle: It would seem to me that's a key piece of information, if that in fact has happened. To me, whether one trusts or distrusts Milosevic is beside the question at this point. The fact is, if there has been an effort or a request made for a meeting, if one is seriously interested in exploring all avenues of peace, then that should be followed. Perhaps Canada should be taking the lead in pushing to see what actually exists around that letter and what their response has been and why.

Mr. Guy Archambault: I will try.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you very much.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To follow up on the land mines—

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): You get a decoration, by the way, Mr. Earle, for respecting the time allowed, a Kosovo hearings decoration first class.

Mr. David Price: General Henault, we hear of a lot of skirmishes right now along the border, particularly the Albanian border. There is a neutral zone there, and we have heard of the laying of land mines. Have they gone into the neutral zone with land mines, and are both the Serbs and the KLA doing it?

LGen Raymond Henault: I'm not aware of where the land mines have actually been sown. As you may be aware, and I know you are, NATO forces are not allowed into the buffer zone, so there's no way of verifying whether there actually are land mines being laid there.

Mr. David Price: But they're coming back and forth across it. There have been skirmishes across the border.

LGen Raymond Henault: There have been skirmishes between the Serbs and the KLA; you're absolutely right. You can only assume that they may have used those types of weapons or land mines, but I couldn't confirm it for you, and I don't think anybody will be able to confirm it until we are actually able to get into the border zone again and find out. When I go back I'll check to find out if there are any more bits of information on that, but everything I've seen so far has not led me to believe there are necessarily any land-mining operations going on in that part of the border region.

From a military perspective and knowing how military tactics are undertaken, I would see land mines more being put into a defensive area, for example, as the Serbs establish defensive locations or defensive areas because of the assumption they have that NATO will invade, which of course has never been indicated. That's where you would expect land mines would be sown, and not so much in the skirmish area, because that would be as much to the disadvantage of the Serbs as it would be to the KLA. That's very much a personal opinion. I don't have any more information on that.

Mr. David Price: Regarding the HMCS Athabascan, could you tell me how many Sea Kings we have on there now? And if we do go into the stop-and-search situation, are we going to have some backups? How are you going to get the extra Sea Kings over there that you will probably want to have?

LGen Raymond Henault: HMCS Athabascan is currently equipped with one Sea King, and that's its normal complement for deployment. If a requirement is felt to replace the Sea King or to add to the Sea King, that will be done through normal maritime ways of doing it. They would take another ship, or whichever AOR is on that coast would take a Sea King alongside, for example, and then fly it onto the ship.

• 1600

At the moment one is considered to be sufficient. Until there is a requirement or a need identified for an additional one, there isn't any intent to increase the numbers at the moment. That is quite possibly an easy, relatively simple to-do from our perspective.

Mr. David Price: If this peace accord doesn't work, there is a good chance we will go into a stop-and-search mode. Are there not plans being made right now to get another Sea King over there so the ship is fully equipped?

LGen Raymond Henault: The navy would go ahead and do that, and the air force of course would go ahead and do that fairly quickly. At the moment there hasn't been an identified requirement from the commander of Standing Naval Force Atlantic to do that. So there is no current plan on the books to actually put another Sea King into the region.

Mr. David Price: Okay.

[Translation]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Mr. Laurin, there still is some time. You may ask the general your question.

Mr. René Laurin: Thank you very much. I hardly recognize you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a question about the information that the army is giving us.

I am still somewhat puzzled after learning that two Apache helicopters may have been shot down, or maybe they weren't, and that the crashes are always during training exercises. You would think that the training is more dangerous than combat itself, because they haven't started fighting and they've already lost two helicopters.

Is that information reliable? Aren't we being manipulated when they tell us that we don't lose wars, that we win them all, and that when we lose a plane, it's because of an accident, not because of enemy fire. Just how reliable is this information?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I believe I'm going to withdraw my permission.

LGen Raymond Henault: All I can tell you, is that given our information sources, we take it for granted that the information is completely reliable. The Americans are the ones who have the Apaches. They are going to investigate the crashes using the flight safety system that they have already set up. Eventually they will provide us with the information through open sources, as we do in the case of our own flight safety system.

I can assure you that in the army, the navy and the air force, particularly in circumstances such as the air campaign, we train just as hard and in the same circumstances as during combat operations themselves. As we say in English, “we train as we expect to fight”.

The circumstances are difficult, and they train to the maximum of their capacities. Training always includes risks. These training operations are not without risk, just as the operations themselves are not without risk. There is always the possibility of a crash.

To date, we have carried out approximately 16,000 sorties, and only one plane has been shot down, and two planes have been lost, over Yugoslavia or the Adriatic. Even at that, this is a record in terms of flight and air operations safety. So I don't believe that the crash of the two Apaches is necessarily out of the ordinary.

Mr. René Laurin: I have a short question, Mr. Chairman.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): A very short one.

Mr. René Laurin: Have the plans to take refugees been changed, or will refugees also be coming to bases in Quebec?

LGen Raymond Henault: Are you asking me?

Mr. René Laurin: Yes, or perhaps Mr. LeBane.

LGen Raymond Henault: At the press conference we had a few days ago, Ms. Robillard clearly stated that bases in Quebec certainly could be made available to CIC to accept refugees. We chose the Trenton and Greenwood air bases for the main arrivals because these bases are close to major highways and facilities where we can house the refugees, particularly when they first arrive.

• 1605

Once we have identified places in Quebec where the refugees can be housed, some of them will be transferred there, probably from Trenton, but they could also be transferred quite easily from Greenwood, using military planes or civilian chartered aircraft.

I know that we intend to send refugees to Quebec when the time is right. I'll let Jeff take over so that he can confirm it.

[English]

Mr. Jeff LeBane: And I know the Government of Quebec has indicated their intent for some of these refugees to come to Quebec.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): Lieutenant-General, let us say we do get some tangible results from the diplomatic efforts being conducted right now. Is it a safe assumption that all of the Canadian troops and equipment that are in the pipeline from western Canada to the Balkans will continue along their way and they will find their way into the Balkans in theatre within the next, whatever it is, six to eight weeks?

LGen Raymond Henault: Yes, I see no reason why it would change, because the intention, of course, is to put those troops and the helicopters into theatre to support a peacekeeping operation or an operation that would support the reintegration of the refugees back into Kosovo and so on. The composition of the force was designed initially to support a peacekeeping operation as integrated into the U.K. armoured brigade. So we could not foresee any change to that.

The U.K. armoured brigade is also considered to be one part of what we call the enabling force that will provide the backbone for the integration of a peacekeeping force into Kosovo. So no matter what happens at this stage of the game, unless there's an entire turn of events here, there is every indication we will continue to be utilized as was initially envisaged.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): General Henault, I might ask a question of you and then of Mr. Archambault.

You said our operations are being interfered with by the bombing, and I can understand that. It seems to me that the operations that are destroying Kosovo are paramilitary operations. They're burning houses, looting, shooting unarmed civilians. So you can bomb all the troops you like, but I don't see why you're not stopping that from happening. You may be interrupting their communications, but it's not as if it was a war they're fighting. They're just shooting unarmed people, and they seem to be able to do that.

I seriously doubt the answer to Mrs. Finestone's question. From our experience in Bosnia, they sowed land mines all over the place. It had nothing to do with military strategy. It had everything to do with a scorched earth strategy: let's destroy this. I would be very suspicious if the Serbian forces presently in Kosovo aren't saying that if they're not going to be there, nobody's going to be there, and they're going to make it impossible for anybody to live there for the next 50 years. They've been sowing mines all over the place. Why would you think otherwise?

LGen Raymond Henault: Your point is very valid. There's no way we can get inside Mr. Milosevic's head, nor can we get inside the heads of his commanders.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: You saw his head in Bosnia. You saw his head in Croatia. Why would you not know where his head is now?

Excuse me. I'm sorry for hitchhiking on.

LGen Raymond Henault: We have no way of knowing what he's doing with the land mines and how he's sowing land mines, so I really can't comment on that. You can only assume he's doing it.

What I commented on more was the sowing of land mines during skirmishes along the border. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense to me militarily that they would do that. They're not land-mining, unless they're land-mining routes of approach and routes of departure for the UCK, which are the same routes the Serb forces are using. So that was really the basis for my comment. It had nothing to do with inside Kosovo.

Having been to Bosnia myself, and I can appreciate your comment, I can only assume that land mines are sown in virtually every front and back yard. So our great task is that we have to try to clear all of those land mines.

Where we are disrupting his operations and where it does make a difference, in my view, is in the consistent 24-hour, 7-day attacks on fielded forces. And those fielded forces include direct-fire weapons, whether they be tanks, heavy artillery, or guns of all kinds that we know have been used to shell innocent civilians in the mountains. So that has to be disrupting his way of doing business and it has to be disrupting what he's doing to the Kosovar refugees, of course. It is making a difference, in my view.

Not only from a Canadian point of view, but also from a NATO point of view, we said right at the outset of the campaign that we couldn't stop the individual vehicle with paramilitaries in it from going into a front yard and slaughtering people. We aren't able to do that with an aircraft flying 500 miles an hour above 1,500 feet. So we'd have no delusions about that. But we are trying to do what we can to take out the concentrations of forces in order to reduce what I've already talked about in terms of the slaughtering of innocent people.

• 1610

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you.

Mr. Archambault, just quickly on the political solution, would it be wrong to assume that one of the serious bones of contention in the resolution, apart from the makeup of the force, which will clearly be very delicate, will be whether the intervention will be under article 6 or article 7 of the United Nations charter? If it's chapter 6, my understanding is that there will be less constraint or less force to the intervention than under chapter 7. Obviously the Russians will be arguing for chapter 6 and we'll be arguing for chapter 7, and there will be a tug-of-war.

It seems to me that what this means is that if in fact the bombing is going to continue until either this is in place or Mr. Milosevic starts to withdraw his forces, the ending of the bombing is not in any immediate sight. It's going to be some time before these complicated negotiations will be resolved. Or is that a misapprehension on my part?

Mr. Daniel Turp: Mrs. Finestone might want a course in international law on the charter. Do you have it now?

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: One is peacekeeping and one is peacemaking, is that it?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): We're going to give you a charter and a—

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: I have both, but that doesn't mean I understand it all. But I'm learning. With two professors, what more do you want?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I'm not trying to complicate this for you.

Mr. Guy Archambault: Up to now this has not been a major issue, and I don't know if it will be. I must admit I'm not an expert on peacekeeping missions.

As for being far from a solution, it's very difficult to predict. My suspicion is that the regime will crack suddenly, and given the fact that it's not a transparent regime, we may have no sign of it in advance. Maybe one day we'll have a surprise. I hope this will happen. Maybe it's close to cracking, maybe it's not at all. Yugoslavia has to decide that the end of the conflict is more important than the pursuit of their ethnic cleansing policy, and they're not there yet. It's very difficult to know what's in their minds. Maybe they're very close to there. I don't know.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Anyway, I suppose there will be more intense bombing.

For the second round, Mr. Turp, Mrs. Finestone, and Mr. Price all wanted to have another crack. But then I think we're going to have to draw it to a close.

Mr. David Price: Mr. Chairman, mine was the exact question you just asked, so I'm clear.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Maybe I asked Mrs. Finestone's as well. I know she was anxiously trying to get to the root of articles 6 and 7 of the charter.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: I have to go back to university. That's for my next life.

It's mind-boggling that eight nations can't fight one little country with all this gun power and everything else. It's disgusting.

What's happening with access to the Voice of Europe, the Voice of America, and the Voice of Britain, all of those broadcasts on short-wave radio that essentially should be helping the general population either understand or move to remove Mr. Milosevic? The graphite bomb you talked about, does that interfere with the reception of radio waves? Are they being cut off from any international voices so that they'd not know better what's going on? If you bomb the television station, you may be bombing access to disinformation, but you're also bombing access to any kind of information. Now that I've heard about this graphite bomb, what does it do to the access to radio or television?

LGen Raymond Henault: Again, I'm not an expert on the graphite bomb. I have the same information you have. All I can indicate on the graphite bomb is that, the way I understand it, it's designed primarily to disrupt electrical power, as opposed to the transmission of radio or television.

• 1615

Nonetheless, we have been trying to disrupt his own television transmission capability, because his television stations are not the same as Canadian television stations. They're state-owned. They're used for propaganda and for a number of other perhaps less desirable purposes. So for those reasons they have been targeted in the past.

In terms of the use of world transmission media and so on, I would not be able to tell you categorically what the international community is doing to transmit images into the region. But I do know from the open press information I've seen so far that CNN, NBC, and a number of other stations are also available and can be picked up right in downtown Belgrade. So the images and information coming out of NATO and other briefings are obviously available to the people of Yugoslavia.

That's about the best I can give you, I think, at the moment, other than to tell you that there have been some leaflet drops. We saw those at the outset of operations. We also saw more leaflet drops in the last little while, where leaflets were dropped along the northern borders with Hungary or other countries. Those are done very surreptitiously. We're not involved in those necessarily. NATO is the agency that does that. But that does provide the people of Yugoslavia with allied information, if you like, on what is going on.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: I have two questions for Mr. Archambault.

Does the international civil and security presence involve the OSCE? A little while ago you spoke of verifiers who might precede the entry of a military security force. Would the OSCE play a role?

The last sentence of the first paragraph refers to a “comprehensive approach to economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.” Does this refer to the German stability pact? Does this last sentence specifically refer to this pact?

Mr. Guy Archambault: The OSCE will certainly be involved in the civil aspects. We always think of the OSCE when we speak about building institutions or organizing elections. There was obviously the KVM, which came from the OSCE. You probably recall that the Rambouillet agreements referred to a force called the KIM, the Kosovo Implementation Mission, which was under the auspices of the OSCE and which played a role similar to that of the high representative in Bosnia. The Rambouillet agreements constitute a standard, an objective. Therefore, I think that everyone would agree that the OSCE play an important role, however, not in the military aspect. I don't think that many people are considering the possibility on an OSCE military force.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Moreover, the word “military” is not mentioned. That's interesting.

Mr. Guy Archambault: No, the word “security” is used.

Mr. Daniel Turp: And the stabilization pact?

Mr. Guy Archambault: Are we referring specifically to the stabilization pact? I don't know whether those who negotiated this document were thinking of that, but this certainly corresponds entirely with that framework. The stabilization pact is a German idea that corresponds to this approach, on which everyone agrees. The Germans are proposing this idea of a stabilization pact. The Americans also have some ideas. One thing is certain, everyone agrees that it will require a comprehensive approach including reconstruction and confidence elements, etc.. The stabilization pact is fully within that approach. Will the plan be implemented in the end or who will have the most impact? I cannot give you any assurance in this regard. The stabilization pact is being developed. It's a new idea.

[English]

The Co-Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): I don't think we have any other questioners.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: I would like to make a very general comment.

• 1620

We are now into, I hope, a new phase of the conflict, of the crisis, and on behalf of my party, I would like to thank those people who have come before this committee in the past weeks to brief us, as we wished. To those who are only here occasionally, I would like to mention our appreciation.

I would like to point out Ms. Corneau's presence, and quiet strength. Since you are still here, Mr. Henault, I would like to express our appreciation for the quality of your statements and answers.

LGen Raymond Henault: Thank you very much, Mr. Turp.

[English]

The Co-Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): Make it very brief, Monsieur Laurin.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: General, why are troops now being rotated after six months, rather than after three?

LGen Raymond Henault: In which respect, Mr. Laurin?

Mr. René Laurin: We read in the newspapers that our troops were going to Kosovo for three months and then coming back, but that they will henceforth have to serve there for six months instead of three.

LGen Raymond Henault: The planned tour for the contingent in the former Macedonia has always been six months.

Mr. René Laurin: That's fine, but what about those who were there before?

LGen Raymond Henault: Those who were there before?

Mr. René Laurin: There were a certain number that were there.

LGen Raymond Henault: That was in a different context. It was with the OSCE, in a context of active support to forces already on the ground. I don't remember the name of the force, but it was called Op Guarantor. There were two elements, one at the Kumanovo airport, not far from Skopja, and the other in Skopja. Given the conditions under which these people were working, and given the need to rotate troops quite quickly, we decided that their tour of duty would be three months. That is quite common when conditions are very difficult.

Mr. René Laurin: Were the F-18 pilots there for three months?

LGen Raymond Henault: That is correct.

Mr. René Laurin: And they will now be spending six months there?

LGen Raymond Henault: We decided to rotate F-18 pilots after three months, to give operational exposure to as many people as possible. We were in theatre for an undetermined period of time, but the time periods were quite short, six months at most.

At the moment, because of the uncertainty about the length of the operation, we are examining all the options. Is it worth extending the tours of duty, not only for pilots, but also for maintenance workers and others, in order to maximize our in-theatre capacity?

Pilots have a different rotation, because they have to maintain their Canadian qualifications as well as their combat qualifications. The rotations are different for certain trades. They vary from two to three months. I should mention in passing that the rotations have not changed for the F-18 pilots—for the time being, they are three months. We are looking into the possibility of extending them to six months, but that has not yet been presented to the Minister. We had planned on a six-month tour of duty for the troops in Macedonia.

Mr. René Laurin: Why is that?

[English]

The Co-Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): Thank you, Mr. Laurin, for those questions.

We have to wind up this briefing now. I'd like to thank our witnesses for their cooperation. I think Mr. Turp expressed all of our feelings in that regard. Thank you very much.

The meeting is adjourned.