FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Monday, March 16, 1998

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[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills (Red Deer, Ref.)): Order, please.

I would like to congratulate you, Mr. Giroux, on your new appointment. We welcome you here today and we look forward to hearing your comments.

Mr. Giroux, if you could just give us a brief outline, we would look forward to questions from the committee.

Mr. Bernard Giroux (Ambassador of Canada to the Union of Myanmar): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My comments will be on the situation in Burma and also the various Canadian policy decisions that have been taken, just to provide a context. Then I would be pleased to answer questions.

I'm appearing before this standing committee in my capacity as Canada's ambassador designate to the Union of Myanmar. I was appointed to this position by an order in council dated October 30, 1997.

I am concurrently the Canadian ambassador to the Kingdom of Thailand and to the Lao People's Democratic Republic. I have not yet had an opportunity to present my credentials in Yangon, although we have requested dates to do so. I am one of ten ambassadors resident in Bangkok but accredited to Myanmar and waiting to present their credentials. The longest has been waiting for one year.

I would like to begin my presentation with a point of clarification. For the sake of consistency and to avoid confusion, throughout my presentation I will refer to Myanmar by its more usual name, Burma. Although the military government arbitrarily changed the name in 1989 to Myanmar, it remains a practice in English to call the country “Burma” and in French “Birmanie”.

Canada recognized Burma at the time of its independence in 1948 and established diplomatic relations in 1958. Throughout the course of this 40-year bilateral relationship Canada has never had a resident diplomatic presence in Rangoon. For their part, Burma opened an embassy in Ottawa in 1966, closed it in 1978, and reopened it in 1986.

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I have not yet had the opportunity to travel to Burma, but my predecessor travelled to Burma nine times during the course of his three-year posting. During each of these visits, he requested— but usually was not granted —meetings with the military government leaders. He also met with leaders of the democracy movement, although this became increasingly difficult to arrange as access to them was further restricted.

The political officer of my embassy responsible for Burma travels there on average every three months.

Canada's bilateral trade with Burma is minimal and has remained limited over the past few years. Our exports in 1997 were $3.5 million; our imports, $19.9 million. Burma's main trading partners in 1997 were Japan, Singapore, Thailand, and China.

For most of the past 40 years, Canada and Burma have limited relations due initially to Burma's self-imposed isolation and then later due to Canada's human rights concerns.

Notwithstanding the country's wealth of natural resources, economic stagnation in the 1970s led to significant economic decline throughout the 1980s. This culminated in student-led demonstrations calling for democracy. In July 1988 the government ordered troops to fire on demonstrating crowds. Thousands were killed or injured.

A civilian leader was installed briefly, but continuing protests prompted the military to seize power again and vest all control in the State Law and Order Restoration Council— known by the ominous acronym, SLORC —a 33-member military council. Amongst its first acts, the SLORC dismantled the socialist one-party structure and promised national elections.

When elections were held in 1990 they resulted in an overwhelming victory for the National League for Democracy and its Secretary General, Aung San Suu Kyi, a victory all the more remarkable given that Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest in 1989.

The SLORC refused to recognize the results of the 1990 elections and transfer power to the NLD, insisting that the election had been held to select an assembly to draft a new constitution.

After spending six years under house arrest, Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi was finally released in 1995. The military government has ignored her calls for a political dialogue and has refused to meet with her directly.

The optimistic assessment that Aung San Suu Kyi's release heralded positive change has dimmed. Under the SLORC, Burma has one of the worst records in Asia on human rights and democratic development. The military retains control through a pervasive and oppressive security apparatus network.

The SLORC remained in power until last November when it dissolved and renamed itself the State Peace and Development Council, known by the more benign acronym, SPDC. Although the names and some of the faces have changed on the ruling military council, to date there has been no significant change in its policies.

Another important factor is the situation of Burma's ethnic communities. Burma is a multicultural society with more than 130 recognized ethnic groups. Burmans represent 69% of the population; Shan, 8.2%; Karen, 6.2%; Arakanese, 4.5%; and other groups making up the remaining 12%.

Since attaining independence, inter-ethnic relations have not been easy. Some of the major ethnic groups established their own armies and fought the central government for greater autonomy or independence.

In 1991 the SLORC began concluding ceasefire agreements with these groups, and to date 15 of the 16 main groups have now signed agreements. The main exception is the Karen, who live in eastern Burma. Fighting between government and Karen forces has caused hundreds of thousands to be internally displaced within Burma and has prompted many to flee to neighbouring Thailand for refuge.

Currently there are more than 115,000 Burmese living in camps along the Thai-Burma border. In addition, there are up to one million Burmese living and working in Thailand illegally. The economic crisis in Thailand is now creating new concerns for this community.

Another serious concern for the international community is the control of narcotics originating in Burma. Many Canadians die each year from heroin overdoses, and more than 60% of the heroin entering Canada originates in Burma. To date, the Burmese government has not demonstrated a genuine commitment to control the production and trafficking of narcotics.

Burma's military leaders have made no effort to improve the current situation and have repeatedly failed to respond to the international community's attempt to open channels of communication.

This failure was demonstrated again last year when the Hon. Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, met with Burma's Foreign Minister, Ohn Gyaw, and presented him with a list of eight actions the Canadian government proposed the military regime take to improve the human rights situation. These measures were: the commencement of a serious dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi about the political and constitutional evolution of Burma; the release of political prisoners as a prerequisite for a free and open political dialogue; a clear timetable for a constitutional process; the return to Burma of the International Committee of the Red Cross; agreement to the visit by the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, with the full cooperation he needs to facilitate his work; sufficient progress in the dialogue with the UN Secretary-General; concrete action by the SLORC to reduce the production and trafficking of illicit drugs and a commitment to participate actively in international and regional drug control efforts; and finally, development of a package of Canada-Burma bilateral human rights activities, including the establishment of a joint committee on human rights. The SLORC did not respond in any way to these proposed actions.

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What has been Canada's response to developments in Burma? Following the brutal crackdown on demonstrators in 1988, Canada suspended all bilateral aid to Burma. No military sales are allowed and Canada does not support multilateral assistance to Burma through international financial institutions.

Canada shares the international concern over the deteriorating political and human rights situation in Burma. We have repeatedly condemned all actions by Burma's military regime that deny the human rights of the people of Burma, including freedom of assembly and expression. Canada has co-sponsored tough resolutions on Burma, adopted by consensus at both the UN Commission on Human Rights and the UN General Assembly, deploring the continuing human rights violations in Burma.

In August last year, after the unproductive meeting between Mr. Axworthy and the Burmese foreign minister that I just mentioned, Mr. Axworthy announced further measures, including withdrawal of Burma's general preferential tariff eligibility and placing Burma on the area control list. This latter action requires that all Canadian exports to Burma have an export permit. Permits are approved on a case-by-case basis and will generally be granted for humanitarian goods but denied for all other goods. Furthermore, no Canadian government export programs are open to Burma, including the program for export market development.

At the time he announced these economic measures, Mr. Axworthy also urged the Canadian business community to refrain from entering into further investment agreements or commercial ventures until improvements were evident in Burma.

With these measures, Canada joined the European Union and the United States in imposing measures to protest the deteriorating human rights conditions in Burma. In March 1997 the EU withdrew Burma's eligibility for tariff exemptions under the general system of preference, and in April of the same year the U.S. announced a ban on new investment in Burma.

Although Canada does not have a bilateral aid program, we have provided assistance through multilateral agencies and non-governmental organizations to assist Burmese refugees who fled to Thailand or Bangladesh. From 1992 to the present, Canada has provided $685,000 to assist Burmese refugees in Thailand. Most of these moneys have been used to provide food and medical supplies to refugees, but we have also supported small self-help projects through a Canada fund administered through the embassy in Bangkok.

On March 11, 1998, Burmese military forces, supported by a group of Karens allied with them, destroyed the Huay Kalok refugee camp in Thailand. This was the second attack on refugee camps in the last 15 months. Current reports indicate that four people were killed, 39 were wounded, and thousands of refugees were left without shelter. Canada was appalled by the cross-border attack on Burmese refugees in Thailand, a painful reminder of the Burmese government's continued abuse of its citizens. In addition to transgressing international boundaries, the attack represents another unacceptable violation of basic human rights.

Canada has also provided $8.4 million in relief to Burmese refugees in Bangladesh. These refugees are Muslims known as the Rohingyas and live along Burma's western border.

Canada has adopted a regional approach to the problem of drug production in the Golden Triangle through the UN international drug control program. This program provides countries in the region with assistance in developing drug control programs. Canada provided $500,000 to the UNDCP last year.

In conclusion, Canada has employed those means directly available to us to leverage positive change in Burma. During Team Canada's visit to Bangkok in 1997, Prime Minister Chrétien called on the Association of South-East Asian Nations to use its influence with the Burmese military regime to encourage negotiation with Aung San Suu Kyi and the democracy movement.

At the ASEAN Regional Forum on Security, Mr. Axworthy has for the past two years addressed the full range of our concerns with Burma. At Canada's initiative, the P-8 foreign ministers' meeting at the Denver Summit in June 1997 issued a strongly worded statement calling on the Burmese military regime to enter into meaningful dialogue with leaders of the democratic opposition and urging the ASEAN nations to press for a return to democracy in Burma.

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The communiqué also stressed that the international community holds the Burmese regime accountable for the safety of Aung San Suu Kyi. We have conveyed this message directly to all the members of ASEAN and have worked with other concerned nations at the United Nations in New York to strengthen support for the Secretary General's effort to open a dialogue with the Burmese military regime. Canada will continue to use every opportunity to press for reform and a return to democracy in Burma.

I would be pleased to answer your questions.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Thank you very much.

Could we start with Mr. Grewal, please?

Mr. Gurmant Grewal (Surrey Central, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador, I welcome you to this committee. I know you have covered these issues very well. We have the same issues on the table every time we talk about Burma— the human rights issues, which you have very well explained, and the Canadian government's position —and it seems to me you have a thorough understanding of these issues. We are also concerned about Aung San Suu Kyi's position and the National League for Democracy's position with respect to human rights.

I'm a little concerned about the situation of Burma being admitted to ASEAN. Since March 1997, along with the U.S.A., we have had a position that we want to ban new investments and so on, but in July 1997 Burma was admitted to the ASEAN.

Also, there is the situation of the P-8 Denver Summit, at which we issued a strong warning to Myanmar on this issue. What is your position? What is the actual timeframe during which you will be discussing these issues with the government?

If I can also add on the drug situation on the Burma border, which is a main source for the North American market for drugs, what would be the timeframe during which you are planning to discuss this issue with the government, during which it will be taken seriously?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: On the first point, in terms of the timeframe, the embassy travels to Burma to meet with some officials. That takes place at a lower level because I have not yet been able to present my credentials to the senior general, Than Shwe, or engage either cabinet members or leaders of the military council. This is difficult, but most of the ambassadors who are resident in Bangkok have had to wait close to a year before being asked to go to Yangon to present their credentials and to engage the senior leaders of the military— and also members of cabinet —on the issues I talked about.

My formal request was made at the end of December. Hopefully, it will be less than twelve months, but it could be as long as that before I go. That doesn't mean we're not doing our work, though. People go, but at a different level, and clearly our message of concern about the situation in Burma cannot be brought to the attention of the leadership.

On the question of drugs, Canada works with the multi-year UN drug control program. In various parts of Burma, for example, they're trying to find alternate crops for the people to grow, crops that are better than poppies. At the last meeting that I attended with the senior manager of the UNDCP, they explained their five-year program to me. It is a very long-term program, and I cannot point to a date by which this problem will be resolved or seriously dealt with.

Mr. Gurmant Grewal: Would you like to explain to the committee what you think of the issues of paid restitution or paid privileges under the general system of preferences, and also the ban on new investments?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: In terms of the general preferential treatment, as a matter of principle, the government took the decision to withdraw that benefit. There is a large volume of Burmese exports to Canada that do benefit, but as a principle, we withdrew that advantage. For the years to come, this is not an instrument that can be used by Burma.

In terms of investment, I would like to point out that there is no Canadian government policy banning investment in Burma right now. Our foreign minister requested that companies refrain from doing business in Burma, but right now there is no ban on investment.

Mr. Gurmant Grewal: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Madame Debien.

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[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien (Laval East, BQ): Good morning, Mr. Giroux and welcome to the committee.

In describing the situation in Burma, Mr. Giroux, you said that the country had one of the worst human rights records, in addition to the fact that it exports heroine. You said that it was very difficult for Canada's representatives, which include those who lived in Bangkok before your appointment, to meet with the SLORC authorities.

As you mentioned and as we know, all of Canada's efforts to make Burma listen to reason have failed. My only question has to do with the nature of your mandate in Burma. Is the fact that we have diplomatic representation in Burma not a way of supporting that country or its regime? Similarly, I am wondering whether Canada really needs to beg for accreditation from Burma. Those are my questions; I am trying to understand why Canada has any representation in Burma. It is a well-known fact that since Burma was accepted into the UN in 1961, and was therefore supported as well by the international community, the SLORC has been running the show.

Mr. Bernard Giroux: The nature of my mandate is to continue the efforts begun by Canada years ago with a view to making certain changes. Sometimes this is a very thankless task, and one that does not always produce short or medium-term results, or, in the case of the SLORC, long-term results.

Having said that, I think it is part of Canada's policy to continue working on these issues. Despite the lack of results, I think it is important that we continue our efforts. We have a responsibility as a member of the G-7. Other countries with ambassadors in Yangon or Bangkok with responsibility for Burma continue to try to persuade the leaders of the country that they must make some major changes.

The nature of my mandate is similar of that of my predecessors. I hope my efforts will be somewhat successful, but I am well aware that I could work for three or four years to the best of my abilities and that, in the end, very little will have changed. However, that is the very nature of diplomacy.

Does having representation in a country imply support for its regime? I do not think that is the case at all. We have relations with States, and we have recognized the State of Burma. Our government has diplomatic accreditation for relations with this country and, so far, it has decided to maintain its diplomatic relations with Burma. As long as this continues to be our policy, the ambassador living in Bangkok is responsible for diplomatic relations with this State.

As far as begging goes, to my knowledge, no country that has requested accreditation for its ambassadors has made any compromises. In my case, I can assure you that no compromise has been made. We are following normal diplomatic procedures. I received my credentials from the Governor General and copies were forwarded to the office of General Than Shwe, who is the person in charge of the committee to which I must present my credentials. No measure, initiative or action has been taken, and you may rest assured that we would not even consider making any compromise whatsoever to allow me to present my credentials in Yangon.

Ms. Maud Debien: I would just like to make a little historical correction, Mr. Giroux. You said that Canada recognized Burma's independence from Great Britain in 1948. However, since that time, many things have happened, and a great deal of water has gone under the bridge. It is a well-known fact that the regime in place at the moment is not a legitimate authority. So this distinction should be made.

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The government accepted the country's independence in 1948. However, since that time, Burma has been ruled by an illegitimate government, a military junta. So, we should not say the two are similar. I think there is an important distinction to be made between recognizing a legitimate government in 1948 and recognizing the current government.

Mr. Bernard Giroux: As I was saying, Ms. Debien, the fact is that the government recognizes the State—

Ms. Maude Debien: Exactly.

Mr. Bernard Giroux: —of Burma.

Ms. Maud Debien: Right, that is very important.

Mr. Bernard Giroux: That is not the same as saying that that is a good government. I agree with you on that.

Ms. Maud Debien: Absolutely.

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): Except that this is recognition of the government.

Ms. Maud Debien: There is a recognition of the government as well.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Maintaining diplomatic relations means recognition of the government.

Mr. Bernard Giroux: But Canada's policy is to recognize the State. We may decide to carry on diplomatic relations with governments of different stripes, but the basis of our relationship is our recognition of the State of Burma.

Mr. Daniel Turp: I will come back to this a little later.

Ms. Maud Debien: Thank you.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Mr. Laliberte.

Mr. Rick Laliberte (Churchill River, NDP): Good afternoon, Mr. Giroux.

Just since your appointment in October, have you had an opportunity to travel to the Burmese refugee camp where you stated there was the recent attack, with 4 refugees getting killed and 39 wounded? Have you been at that camp to witness—

Mr. Bernard Giroux: I personally have not yet travelled to the refugee camps.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: While your credentials are under scrutiny by the present Burmese form of government, recognized or not, have you had a chance to discuss or plan any strategies with other states or ambassadors, probably in Bangkok, or some sort of strategy to try to get a dialogue going with the present government to address human rights and the issue of a democratic government there?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: On the first point, the Burmese government has agreed to my credentials. They are not questioning whether or not I will be ambassador. This process took a number of months in 1997, but they agreed to my appointment as ambassador to Burma. Now what has to be done is for me to travel physically to Yangon to present my credentials to the head of government.

I just want to clarify that they are not questioning whether I should be ambassador. The issue is the timing; when I will be allowed to go to Burma.

On the second point, on a regular basis I have discussions with ambassadors who have been accredited and who have presented their credentials in Yangon on what actions are being taken or contemplated by these countries. About strategy, the Canadian government adopted economic measures against Burma in August 1997. Some of them are similar to some of the policies adopted by the EU. It's different from the American policy, because they have imposed a ban on new investment as of April 1997.

So I have had some discussions with some of the ambassadors, but I have not yet met with any of the ambassadors who are resident in Yangon and who interface with the government on a daily basis. As a strategy, I'm working from a position of the policies approved by the government, but as I said to a previous question, I have not been able personally to engage the leadership, the ministers, of the Burmese government.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: To our understanding the Government of Canada has not provided direct financial assistance to the democratic movement. In light of the Americans' position on banning investment, and since we see from a list of joint ventures that some Canadian corporations are heavily into the mining industry in that area, would it be your position at some point, once you analyse the situation, to recommend banning investment there? Is that the position of an ambassador, once you witness or find more evidence for a need for that?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: As an ambassador I'm asked to provide policy recommendations to the Canadian government. That could be one option.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Mr. Reed.

Mr. Julian Reed (Halton, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador, I think we all share a great deal of admiration for the mission impossible you're undertaking. I guess the greatest virtue someone in your position must have is patience, which has to last over your full term there and so on.

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I'm just wondering if you have any idea yet how much of the Burmese economy is dependent on the drug trade. Do you have any way of knowing or estimating that?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: I don't have any scientific— I'm an economist by training, so I have to be careful in assessing it and providing you with an answer.

The numbers I have seen are that the cash value of the drug trade would be around $600 million U.S. But we're talking about what is being traded in Burma. We're not talking about the retail value of that drug when it hits markets around the world. That's one number I have seen from one of the studies of the UN drug control program, I think it was, when it tried to identify what it was worth and implicitly what could be needed in terms of measures to substitute for the type of income that would be generated.

But it is a proxy. It is not a solid analysis that would enable me to say this is the size of the problem and this is the value.

Mr. Julian Reed: Right.

I had just one other question. It involves access to Aung San Suu Kyi. Is there any way of accessing her and her movement?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: There are different ways. One is what my predecessor did, going over and meeting with her, though it has become more difficult in the last year. When Mr. Von Nostitz, who was my predecessor, went to Yangon in March 1997, he met with her for the first time. He was to have a follow-up meeting and he was prevented from meeting her. He returned in May and he tried to meet her. Again the road to her house was blocked, so he couldn't meet with her.

It is a well-known fact that she is sometimes allowed to attend functions. I know lunches and dinners are given in Yangon and they provide an occasion for other diplomats and other people to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi. But formally going over to her compound and meeting with her is becoming more and more difficult.

Mr. Julian Reed: Do we know how widespread her movement is, her democratic following?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: I think the fact that she won the elections in 1990 is a good indication of the level of support she has across the country. When you look at the measures taken by the SLORC and now the SPDC to prevent her from travelling around the country, I interpret that as an indication of the very wide support she has in the country.

Mr. Julian Reed: Pardon my ignorance on this, but what kind of majority might she have had? Somebody said 85%.

Mr. Bernard Giroux: I don't know the number. I could check and get back to you, but I don't know the number.

Mr. Julian Reed: I heard a ghostly voice from behind me saying 85%, which is overwhelming.

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien: This is in fact quite important.

[English]

Mr. Julian Reed: I have no further questions. I just want to wish you very well in your endeavour, because I think you're walking into one of the toughest jobs an ambassador has to face at the moment. Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Bob Mills): I might ask a question. To follow up on that access question, obviously if we're doing business there and there are business investments there, the business community must have access to get in and out. Could you describe the ease of movement in and out of the country?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: I would like to clear up a point. The Canadian government does not do business and does not support any business with the Burmese government. My commercial people at the embassy in Bangkok are not accredited to Burma. They do not provide any advice, any assistance. No financing is available.

This having been said, if a business person from Canada or any other country wants to go to Burma, the person has to apply for a visa to visit the country. I know a number of people who are going into Burma and doing business.

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The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Were we not part of building a pipeline into Thailand?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: No, Canada is not involved in building. There is a Canadian company that has a contract in Thailand—

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Oh, yes, that's what I mean.

Mr. Bernard Giroux: —for the feed into the power plant in Thailand for that natural gas, but we have not financed the process.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): No, I didn't mean that, but Canadian expertise and money is involved in doing that.

Mr. Bernard Giroux: Well, there is a company that has a management contract for a portion of pipeline in Thailand.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Right.

What about the relationship between Thailand and Burma? What sort of relationship do they have?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: It's a fairly tense one. They share a long border. There are always some security concerns on the part of the Thais.

In terms of trade, the border is now closed between Thailand and Burma. It was closed in December 1997, presumably because the Burmese government is changing its tariff system. As you can imagine, it's a fairly porous border and there's a lot of trade going back and forth that is not recorded, but all the official border points are closed and they've remained closed.

Along that border, trade goes on. The fact that Thailand has entered into a significant contract for the purchase of natural gas is one indication of the economic relationship between the two countries. There are also consumer goods from Thailand that do find their way into Burma. Jewels, some natural resources, and some mining products also do cross into Thailand. So there is a fairly significant trading relationship.

The Thai military are always concerned. A large number of troops are deployed along the border. A lot of illegal logging goes on on both sides of the border, which often results in some clashes between the two countries. But on a quarterly basis, the chief of the army in Thailand goes to Burma to meet with his counterpart to discuss, I would presume, mostly military issues, but they could also talk about some other issues. We don't see as many Burmese travelling to Thailand, in terms of senior Burmese officials, but there's a regular flow of visitors from Thailand to Burma. And I think that will increase as a result of Burma joining ASEAN.

Given, as I said earlier, the economic relationship between the two countries, Thailand, I am confident, will be playing a role to try to bring about some changes. But the leverage of Thailand is limited, and in terms of internal affairs, the ASEAN countries have always refrained from intervening in what are considered domestic issues. So it's a fine line, but the new government of Prime Minister Chuan is led by the democrats, and they have stated publicly that they want to engage in a broader discussion with the leadership in Burma, hopefully to lead to some changes.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): The economic meltdown that's occurred everywhere else, particularly in Thailand, has that had much influence? It would seem to me that might change the relationship a little bit as well.

Mr. Bernard Giroux: It does have an influence in that the value of the kyat has plummeted, as the Thai baht originally plummeted. Now the baht is going up, but I don't have recent information about the value of the kyat in Burma. But certainly it is linked to the way the baht is going.

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The most difficult issue we will have to face in terms of Thailand-Burma relations is the illegal workers. There are about one million illegal workers from Burma, who were working mostly in construction projects. And there were a lot of projects. A lot of the construction activities have stopped now in Thailand, but a lot of the low-paid jobs, the really difficult jobs, were done by Burmese earning about $5 to $6 a day. Given that to a large extent the construction has stopped in Thailand, there is a significant problem in terms of these Burmese who can no longer work. The Thai government is trying to entice them to return to Burma, but most do not want to return because the economic conditions in Burma are much worse. So they're better off in Thailand, even though things are very difficult.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Thank you very much.

Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: You are an experienced diplomat, Mr. Giroux, a career diplomat. Why, at this time in history, are we appointing an ambassador to Burma? That is what I find very surprising. There has never been one, and repression there is greater than ever. Why, at this time, is it necessary to appoint an ambassador, or in any case accrediting an ambassador to Burma? That is my first question. What is the strategy underlying this accreditation?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: There has been an ambassador accredited to Burma since 1978. Since then, we have always had an ambassador. There has never been an ambassador who lived in the country, and I will not be living in Yangon. I live in Bangkok. I am the Ambassador to the Kingdom of Thailand and to Laos, and I have a third accreditation to Burma.

Initially, 20 years ago, the Ambassador to Malaysia was accredited to Burma. After that, it was the Ambassador in Bangkok and then the Ambassador to Bangladesh. In 1994, responsibility for Burma was once again transferred to Bangkok. We have never had an ambassador who lived in Burma, but in the past 20 years, Canada has had an ambassador accredited to Burma.

Mr. Daniel Turp: In this context, in the case of a regime of this type, which is not developing as Canada would like, is it desirable to maintain the accreditation?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: As I was saying earlier in response to another question, our job is sometimes difficult and thankless. However, Canada's policy is to continue making these efforts. If it is decided that the work I am doing and the work done by my predecessors did not produce any results, that is a harsh judgement, even though it is quite accurate. However, the government's policy is to continue working. We hope that at some point we will manage to make some progress and bring about some changes.

We are not alone. If—

Mr. Daniel Turp: How many accredited ambassadors are there?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: I could not tell you. I could get that information for you, but I don't have the exact figure with me.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Do all western States have ambassadors accredited to Yangon?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: Yes, almost all of them. I know of those who are waiting to present their credentials and those that are represented in Burma. All the G-7 countries have an ambassador living in Yangon. Most of the countries of the European Union have ambassadors in Bangkok who are responsible for Burma. The ASEAN countries have ambassadors, because there is a rule that they must all have ambassadors to the various member countries.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Are there any exceptions to the rule? Are there any states that do not have an ambassador or that do not have an accredited ambassador?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: I'm thinking out loud here. There may be some, including the Czech Republic or some of the countries with representatives in Bangkok. However, most of my colleagues in Bangkok, who are not from countries that belong to ASEAN or members of the G-7, are accredited to Burma. We regularly discuss the situation when someone comes back. The European Union ambassador is accredited. He is been there, he lives near me, and we spoke to each other about what was going on. He told me he was not able to see Aung San Suu Kyi and he explained why. So, while the situation may not be discussed every day, it is definitely discussed every week.

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Mr. Daniel Turp: My second question is about our economic relationship. The balance of trade is very unfavourable to Canada. We import a great deal from Burma, but our exports, while they do not appear numerous, do come from a number of companies. I would like you to confirm for me whether or not these companies are continuing to export to Burma. The nature of the exports of one of these companies should be of concern to us.

More than a half dozen companies that are mentioned, including Leeward Capital, International Panorama Resource Ltd., Mindoro Resources Ltd., Indochina Goldfield and First Dynasty Mines, have joint ventures with the government, the SLORC and Nortel. The problem is that Nortel sells communications equipment, despite the fact it is illegal to own a fax machine or a modem in Burma without the government's consent. Does this not cause a problem? Does this not show that there should be some government intervention to prevent these Canadian companies from dealing with this government?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: If Nortel wants to export equipment, it will have to obtain an export permit beforehand. As I said in my opening remarks, the permit will not be granted. That is the position the government would take. In other words, these sales would not take place.

As for the other companies you mentioned, it is true that a mine has been developed in northeastern Burma. In the current context, a Canadian company that wants to do business in Burma and invest capital there may do so. There is no ban on investment in Burma at this point, as I said before. So the company may do so. However, if this Canadian mining company wants to develop the mine and purchase Canadian equipment, it would have to comply with the export permit approval process, and the same rule would apply.

Clearly, if a Canadian company has capital that it got on the foreign markets, and if it buys equipment from another country that has no restrictions, the project might go ahead. The company might be able to invest in Burma. However, this would be done without any financial assistance from the Export Development Corporation, without any insurance for political risks and without any support from the Canadian embassy in Bangkok, which is responsible for Burma.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Do you know whether Nortel is exporting to Burma and has obtained the necessary permit in recent years?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: Before these measures became effective on August 7, 1997, it was not necessary to get an export permit. To my knowledge, no permits have been issued since August 7, 1997.

Mr. Daniel Turp: I see.

Mr. Bernard Giroux: Let me correct something. Some permits may have been issued for the export of pharmaceuticals or medicines.

Mr. Daniel Turp: But Nortel does not export those products?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: No.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Can your embassy in Bangkok provide support to the Democratic League or to other international human rights organizations, and is it doing so?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: No, we are not doing that at the moment. The support provided by the embassy is in the form of assistance to refugees in Thailand.

Mr. Daniel Turp: So the international organizations do not get any assistance and are not seen as a direct or indirect opposition force?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: No.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Mr. McWhinney.

[Translation]

Mr. Ted McWhinney (Vancouver Quadra, Lib.): The delay in presenting your credentials to the president of Burma has not in itself hampered diplomatic activities there, has it?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: Yes, it has hampered them.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Why?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: Because I cannot go to Burma to meet with the leaders of the SLORC or the SPDC, or with Cabinet ministers to raise issues of democracy, the treatment of the Burmese and human rights matters. I cannot travel in Burma until I have presented my credentials.

• 1615

Mr. Ted McWhinney: But are such delays not normal in diplomatic circles, even in Ottawa?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: No, they are not normal. Let me give you an example. I am an ambassador to three countries. I arrived in Bangkok at the end of August, 1997, and I presented my credentials to the President of Laos on October 1, and to the King of Thailand on October 27. It took two months. Normally, we can expect to wait two to three months before presenting our credentials and starting to work without any restrictions as an ambassador.

The fact that I could easily wait one year causes some problems. It may not necessarily be that long, but I can tell you that the ambassador who has been waiting the longest at the moment is from Sweden. He has been waiting 12 months to present his credentials in Burma.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: But there are stories of this type in diplomacy. It is an excessively long period compared to the normal timing.

Mr. Bernard Giroux: Yes, it is excessively long. Why? The last two ambassadors who presented their credentials just before I left Bangkok, two weeks ago, had been waiting for 13 months and 14 months.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Did we never have a full-time ambassador in Burma?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: No, never.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Never. You will recall that this is a lesson that should be learned from the American experience with the former Soviet Union: lack of direct diplomatic representation means that our country is not well understood in Burma and hampered our ability to influence events there. Did we never consider, even when U Thant was the Secretary General of the United Nations, appointing a full-time ambassador to Burma?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: I don't know, but I think we must understand that Burma became isolated after Ne Win took power in 1963. Burma became a closed country, and this really restricted its international relations. Very few countries opened embassies there. As far as I know, Canada has never considered opening an embassy in Yangon.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: But we did have good relations in the 1960s, when U Thant was the Secretary General of the United Nations, did we not?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: Once Ne Win took power, even though U Thant was the Secretary General of the United Nations, I don't think we had significant, warm and effective diplomatic relations, because of the policy of isolationism of the regime that took power in 1963.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: The fact that we do not have an effective trading relationship with Burma is definitely a consequence of the lack of direct, permanent diplomatic representation there, but it is also a cause of this. In some respects, do we not find ourselves in a sort of vicious circle here?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: Opening an embassy does not automatically mean that trade relations will improve. There's another series of factors that must be considered. Economic considerations are not the only elements that determine whether or not an embassy should be opened.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: There is no point in asking any questions. Is there a trade code designed to protect foreign investment?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: No, no such instrument is in place to help Canadian companies do business there.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Thank you.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Mr. Cannis, please.

Mr. John Cannis (Scarborough Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, welcome.

What is the term of your appointment? Three years?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: It's an order in council, so it's at pleasure.

Mr. John Cannis: It's at pleasure. So hypothetically speaking, three years from now you could be back here still not having seen the representatives over there and presented your credentials.

I was going through the material you provided us with in your presentation, and I just picked up on the comment that was made with respect to assistance to companies doing business with Burma. You stated that there is no assistance, yet there seems to be a considerable amount of activity. Doing business at their own risk, I assume, is the attitude of Canadian companies doing business in Burma.

• 1620

Mr. Bernard Giroux: Yes, I'm aware of one company that is developing one project in Burma at its own risk. When you say investments, though, I hear resources.

Mr. John Cannis: Would you say that one of the reasons why you and other people in your position have difficulty meeting with the leadership and presenting your credentials is the fact that there is no support system, no activity to enhance trade?

In looking at some of the numbers you stated, they're pretty flat over the past couple of years. I'm just looking at your fax sheet here under Canadian trade statistics, though. I agree with you that from 1990-1992, imports were very flat. But in 1993, they went up by almost six times, they doubled again in 1994, and there was a slight drop in 1995, although exports have been almost steady. So they haven't really been flat.

Mr. Bernard Giroux: But it's minimal when you look at figures of $1 million or $2 million. Even $20 million in exports is not very significant.

When there were no restrictions, companies clearly had to take into account the conditions, and I'm certain that a number of companies preferred not to do business in Burma given the conditions that have been prevailing for a number of years. They preferred to look at other markets in which they would stand a better chance of not only getting the order, but of getting paid. I think that's basically because of the conditions prevailing in the country, though.

Mr. John Cannis: So you're saying it's not the payment, but more so the conditions.

Mr. Bernard Giroux: I think it would be both, because economic conditions in Burma are pretty grim.

Mr. John Cannis: But you're looking at a population of—

Mr. Bernard Giroux: The population is 45 million.

Mr. John Cannis: —45-plus million. Certainly that would be an enticing market.

Just as a last point, would you suggest that the Canadian government, in supporting efforts there, would enhance looking at the human rights abuse and advancing the cause and making some headway?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: No, I think the policy of the government is to put pressure on the Burmese government to make changes. If significant changes are made, maybe we could then look. This is a hypothetical situation, a question, but I think the sequence is there. There have to be significant improvements in the conditions in Burma before we will consider—

Mr. John Cannis: I'm just thinking of a comment that was made by certain people— people I don't want to mention —in referring to Cuba as an example: if we work with an island like Cuba and enhance trade, we can indeed help the people overcome and the violations can be addressed. As we've said in the past, trade will help alleviate some of these problems. Would that philosophy not apply here as well?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: I think you have to look at what has happened in Burma in terms of the evolution of the conditions, the degradation of the conditions, and the fact that we have now taken economic measures. I think we need to go down that road and apply pressure. We have to see how successful we're going to be, but for the foreseeable future I think this is the policy the Canadian government will follow.

Mr. John Cannis: I wish you good luck.

Mr. Bernard Giroux: Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Just one other question, Mr. Giroux. We were very surprised, and we were not alone, at Canada's attitude toward China and the link drawn between trade and human rights in China. In addition, we were very surprised at the attitude adopted by the government at the United Nations. I'm thinking specifically of the resolutions regarding human rights and China. I would like to know what attitude you think Canada should adopt regarding matters related to the link between human rights and trade, and the attitude Canada should adopt regarding resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation in Burma.

Mr. Bernard Giroux: Canada has always supported resolutions that were quite hard on Burma, with the exception of last year. In that case, the language was changed to reflect the fact that Aung San Suu Kyi was able to hold her convention at the end of September and the fact that she was able, on occasion, to leave the residence in which she had been confined. This represented a major step forward. Clearly, Canada does not think it is adequate.

• 1625

We did not support the resolution, because the Canadian government felt that the progress made was clearly inadequate. So, with the exception of this occasion, we have always supported resolutions that were quite tough on Burma.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Do you know what resolution on Burma the Commission will be studying this year?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: Since I was travelling across Canada last week, I do not have the most up-to-date information on this. In light of our policy last year, if there were to be a resolution that seeks to congratulate the Burmese government on some initiatives, including the fact that Khin Nyunt spoke to some leaders of the National League for Democracy, which is a major step forward. I think Canada would maintain the same position, and would not support such a resolution.

As regards China, I should point out that my responsibilities are limited to Burma, Thailand and Laos. I will try to answer all questions to the best of my ability, but I do prefer to stick to Burma. It is difficult for me to say what we should do in China, because that is not my area of expertise. I know this is an extremely complicated situation, and I'm not familiar with all aspects of it.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Spoken like a diplomat!

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): We're going to have to close fairly soon, but I will ask Mr. Laliberte to keep his question rather brief.

I do want to remind members that we are going to meet at the end of this month with a number of Burmese parliamentarians in exile. So we will have an opportunity to talk to them further about some of these issues.

Mr. Laliberte.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: In a number of comments that have been made, it's uncertain— Maybe just to clarify in my mind —you referred to the State Law and Order Restoration Council as an entity and the National League for Democracy as a recognized elected body, with a leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. Who is the leader of the SLORC? Has there been a consistent leader, or is that the problem? Is it somebody who's imposing their will militarily—

Mr. Bernard Giroux: Than Shwe is the leader of the military regime. So the SLORC/SPDC has changed their name; it's a different bottle, but the same wine. Than Shwe is the senior general—

Mr. Rick Laliberte: All along?

Mr. Bernard Giroux: —all along —who was ruling under the SLORC and is now ruling under the SPDC. He is part of the military council that is running Burma.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: For diplomatic purposes, why don't you bring him from under the rug, so to speak, and put him there, and say that's the culprit, as opposed to a body that's a military council. Maybe put the person. In all of these documents, I couldn't find his name and I had to ask. That's why I'm asking.

Mr. Bernard Giroux: He's also the head of state. The leader of the now SPDC is the head of state of the Government of Burma, and I am accredited to that person, to the head of state. That's why I have to present my credentials to that head of state.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Madame Debien begged for a tiny question.

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien: Has the current crisis in Asia had any impact on Burma? We need only think of Thailand, where the situation exploded. Given Burma's geographic proximity, has the Asian crisis had as serious an impact on Burma as on other southeastern Asian countries?

Mr. Daniel Turp: That is good question for an economist.

Ms. Maud Debien: Yes.

Mr. Bernard Giroux: I will answer the question, because it relates to Burma, and I must be aware of what is going on. I think we must realize that Burma's foreign trade is extremely limited. Burma has almost no foreign borrowing.

• 1630

One of the main reasons for the problems experienced by Thailand, Indonesia and Korea in particular, is the irresponsible borrowing that took place over a number of years, without any exchange coverage. At some point, you have to pay up. In this regard, Burma is not vulnerable in the same way as most other ANASE economies are. Obviously, the country does have some exports. It trades with neighbouring countries, and there definitely will be an impact on exports, even though they are limited. However, the scale of the crisis in Burma cannot be the same as in Thailand, which is beginning to climb back out of the whole. Burma did not experience this low point, but it never experienced a high point in terms of growth either, as did most ANASE countries.

Ms. Maud Debien: Thank you.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Mr. Giroux, on behalf of our whole committee, I would like to thank you for appearing before us. I think we all wish you the very best of luck. Keep in touch with us. Thank you very much.

Mr. Bernard Giroux: Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): The meeting is adjourned.