FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, February 26, 1998

• 0912

[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): I'd like to call this meeting of the committee to order and welcome the Canadian Council of Churches.

I understand, Ms. Somerville, you are going to introduce the participants. Archbishop Peers will be speaking on your behalf and then we'll answer questions. Normally we try to keep the introductory statements to about 10 or 15 minutes, and that leaves more time for statements, because at 10.10 a.m. we move to another group.

Members will recall that at 11 a.m. we will have our briefing on Iraq, which should take us to noon. We have some business as well, some petite cuisine, in terms of the resolutions the steering committee adopted the other day.

Yes, Ms. Folco.

[Translation]

Ms. Raymonde Folco (Laval West, Lib.): Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I don't believe you mentioned the fact that there will be a vote in the House at 10:00 a.m.

The Chairman: I didn't mention it because I was unaware of it. How much time will we have once the bells start to ring? Fifteen or thirty minutes?

Ms. Raymonde Folco: I believe it's fifteen minutes.

The Chairman: Fifteen minutes. Okay.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Robinson.

[Translation]

Mr. Svend J. Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): The vote on Mr. Assadourian's motion will be at 10:50 a.m.?

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Assadourian has a motion he wants to put forward in respect of his previous motion. We'll have to deal with that at 10.50 a.m.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Okay, thank you.

The Chairman: Do you want to be here for that?

[Translation]

Mr. Svend Robinson: When we return from the vote.

[English]

The Chairman: I thought you might like to be here for that.

Ms. Somerville.

Ms. Janet Somerville (General Secretary, Canadian Council of Churches): Mesdames et messieurs, ladies and gentlemen, good morning and thank you very much for this opportunity to speak to you about a subject that really burns in our hearts. It's a hope and a longing that really burns for us personally and evokes a tremendously strong common response from the 19 churches we 7 people are representing this morning. And that is the hope and the longing that in our lifetime the last nuclear weapon will be disabled and dismantled and the human family will reject as unthinkable, as unchooseable, the nuclear option, as something that simply must not be inflicted by some human beings upon others. So thank you very much for allowing us to come to speak with you about something so important.

• 0915

For us who are here this morning in our capacity as representatives and spokespeople for the churches, this issue is an issue of obedience to the God of life, to the God who commands that we choose life. Those of us in the Roman Catholic tradition read that this morning as the first reading for the second day in Lent, the command in Deuteronomy that we “Choose life, then, that you and your descendants may live—”.

And for you, the labour of working toward the abolition of nuclear weapons will be a high, difficult and complex labour of statecraft. We're here to cheer you on in that direction.

Our delegation this morning includes Monsieur Gérald Baril, the associate general secretary of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops. I apologize that I didn't get back to Janice Hilchie in time to have a name made for Mr. Baril—

Mr. Gérald Baril (Associate General Secretary, Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops; Canadian Council of Churches): But I was given one. Thank you.

Ms. Janet Somerville: Hurray!

Voices: Oh, oh.

Mr. Gérald Baril: Bravo.

The Chairman: We're faster at making names than at taking collections.

Voices: Oh, oh.

Ms. Janet Somerville: Next is Mr. Ernie Regehr, policy and public affairs director for Project Ploughshares, which is a 26-year-old institute for the study of conflict resolution, disarmament, the whole ball of wax, and which has been working with the Canadian Council of Churches for more than a quarter of a century. Ernie was instrumental in beginning the process of study and consultation among the churches that are members of the Canadian Council of Churches, which has resulted in this morning's delegation.

Also with us are Bishop Telmor Sartison of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada, who came from Winnipeg to be with us today; Archbishop Michael Peers, the Primate of the Anglican Church of Canada; the Very Rev. Bruce McLeod—who needs no introduction for most of you—the former moderator of the United Church of Canada; and Mr. Joe Gunn, also from the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, who is the co-director of the office of social affairs of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops.

We are not alone this morning, we seven. We are speaking for the leadership of 19 distinct Christian denominations in Canada, whose leaders' names appear on the letter to the Prime Minister, which is the basis of our words to you this morning.

The Canadian Council of Churches only has 19 members so this is an astonishing participation rate. It is not automatic that the member churches of the Canadian Council sign letters that we write or positions that we take; it's a matter of deliberation and choice by each church. On this topic there is a strong, common, deeply felt unanimity, and I am delighted to bring that letter to your attention.

We have asked Archbishop Peers to open for us.

The Most Reverend Michael G. Peers (Primate, Anglican Church of Canada; Canadian Council of Churches): Thank you very much for this opportunity.

We briefly want to make some of the points that appear in the letter, and I and Monsieur Baril will quote some of those points, because they are the significant ones, for which the leaders who are representing their churches affixed their signatures to the letter.

• 0920

Our church communities rejoiced with all Canadians at the moment in Ottawa last December when the foreign affairs minister signed the landmines treaty on behalf of Canada. I can tell you, as a person who spends some time with international church leaders, that was a great time to be a Canadian and to be in such gatherings. It was a milestone event.

Canadian church communities, responding to God's call to all people to be agents of love and healing in a world that still knows great pain, participated in that movement. As church leaders, we believe that obedience to the same call of God requires us now to raise our voices in urgent appeal, first to our own communities, then to all Canadians, and to the Parliament of Canada to bring a new commitment to what we believe to be one of the most profound spiritual challenges of our era: the challenge to rid the world of the plans and the means to nuclear annihilation.

The willingness, indeed the intent even, to launch a nuclear attack in certain circumstances bespeaks a spiritual and moral bankruptcy. It is an extraordinary affront to humanity for nuclear weapons states and their allies, among whom we are numbered, to persist in claiming that nuclear weapons are required for their security.

Nuclear weapons do not and cannot deliver security. They deliver insecurity and peril through their promise to annihilate that which is most precious, life itself, and the global ecosystems upon which all life depends. Nuclear weapons have no moral legitimacy, they lack military utility, and in the light of the recent judgment of the World Court, even their legality is in serious question.

The spiritual, human, and ecological holocaust of a nuclear attack can be prevented only by the abolition of those weapons, and it is our common duty to pursue that goal as an urgent priority.

[Translation]

Mr. Gérald Baril: The Canadian Churches have long worked for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

In 1982, we leaders wrote to, and met with, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to affirm that "nuclear weapons in any form and in any number cannot ultimately be accepted as legitimate components of national armed forces." In 1988, we sent the same message to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, stating that "nuclear weapons have no place in national defence policies".

Since then, we have welcomed the substantial progress that has been made to end the nuclear arms race and reduce the size of the superpowers' nuclear arsenals. But these steps, important as they are, are not nearly enough. The end of the Cold War has created an unprecedented opportunity to start the process toward the final elimination of nuclear weapons—and the World Court has confirmed that it is a legal obligation.

We are therefore especially disturbed by the refusal of nuclear weapons states to even begin negotiations on the abolition of nuclear weapons and to set clear timeframes and objectives—and we are profoundly disappointed that Canada has to date chosen to publicly accept that refusal. Indeed, nuclear weapons states continue to take steps to maintain and improve or modernize their nuclear arsenals for the indefinite future.

[English]

Archbishop Michael Peers: It's our sincere belief that Canada has much to contribute to the effort to make nuclear abolition a reality, even though we are compelled to note that Canada continues to support and seek the illusory protection of nuclear weapons in a number of ways. Our position as an advocate of nuclear disarmament in the UN General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament, and other forums is compromised by this fact.

• 0925

The time has come. This is a time for Canada to take a strong and principled stand against the continued possession of nuclear weapons by any state, affirming abolition as the central goal of Canadian nuclear weapons policy and adding Canada's voice to the call to begin immediately negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention.

[Translation]

In support of this goal, we believe Canada should immediately take the following actions:

- urge all nuclear weapons states, as interim measures and as a sign of good faith, to take all their nuclear forces off alert status and to commit themselves to no-first-use of nuclear weapons;

- renounce any role for nuclear weapons in Canadian defence policy, and call on other countries, including Russia and Canada's NATO allies, to do likewise;

- review the legality of all of Canada's nuclear-weapons-related activities in the light of the International Court of Justice ruling of 8 July 1996, and move quickly upon completion of this review to end all activities determined to be questionable legality;

- embrace publicly the conclusions of the Canberra Commission Report of 14 August 1996, including in particular its recommendation that the nuclear weapons states "commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of nuclear weapons and agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement", and that the non-nuclear states support this commitment and join in cooperative international action to implement it;

- and, to bring an end to all of this, urge all states to negotiate by the year 2000 an agreement for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.

[English]

The goal of peace and the respect of creation, which lies at the root of our concern, moves us through to make specific proposals and suggestions about how those take on a real life in our country and in the views that our country espouses in the world forum.

Those are the key points of the message that the churches agreed on and signed. Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

We're open now for questions or observations from the members of the committee.

Mr. Grewal.

Mr. Gurmant Grewal (Surrey Central, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome the Canadian Council of Churches to our committee. We now have an additional dimension to the committee, apart from the political and social aspects of nuclear weapons.

I would like to know from the Canadian Council of Churches what is the role of the overall Christian community in other countries in pursuing this goal with other nuclear states and governments. Particularly, can I be updated on the role of the Vatican on this issue?

Ms. Janet Somerville: Joe, would you like to start with the role of the Vatican, since Mr. Grewal particularly asked about that?

Mr. Joe Gunn (Director, Social Affairs Office, Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, Canadian Council of Churches): The Vatican has established a consultative committee for disarmament issues, with the presence of Mr. Doug Roche, a Canadian who used to sit in this House and was Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament. That committee has been trying to encourage the work of the Vatican in working towards and for disarmament. They do that because of the role they can play in several international fora. There have been on a number of occasions statements by the Holy Father as well as by the Commission for Justice and Peace, which has followed this issue very carefully. Indeed, we feel very much at home in making this kind of presentation as the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, because it is in keeping with the positions that we see coming from the Vatican, which we've encouraged from them.

• 0930

His Excellency Bishop Telmar Sartison (Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada; Canadian Council of Churches): In the Lutheran World Federation, which has 55 million members in 122 different countries, the federation was instrumental in the landmines issue and they are also supportive of this intent we voice here.

The Chairman: Are there any other comments on what goes on in other countries with affiliated churches? Archbishop

Archbishop Michael Peers: I think, as well, the World Council of Churches, which groups largely Anglican, Protestant and Orthodox Christians, has held these positions for a long time and certainly through its representation at the United Nations has sustained this same argument.

Mr. Gurmant Grewal: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): I would first like to thank all of you for coming to Ottawa to make this presentation. It's interesting, as you have pointed out, that there is such a consensus among the churches of Canada, and that your Council reflects a consensus on the issue that, as I understand it, did not just emerge in 1998. It considerably predates the period when work began afresh to develop a Canadian government position on the issue.

I really liked the letter you re-read, which presents the essential points of the various positions and makes some very interesting recommendations—recommendations that are often made to us by other organizations. In its upcoming proceedings, I believe our Committee should be guided by the content of this letter.

What strikes me, though, is that you have used a very relevant expression to describe nuclear weapons and what they are capable of doing to humanity. You refer to a spiritual, human and ecological holocaust. This indeed is an extraordinary image with which to describe what could happen should these nuclear weapons be used.

My first question concerns the theological basis for that assertion. You represent a number of churches. What biblical texts are you relying on to assert that weapons such as nuclear weapons should be eliminated? I don't know whether Catholics, Anglicans and other denominations will agree on where we can find that in the Bible, but I would certainly be interested in knowing.

You also say—and I think it's important to point this out— that Canadian policy in this area is ambiguous. I would like you to state in the presence of government Members the reasons why you believe this policy is ambiguous, and after that you may wish to make some comments.

I also have a third question. We will soon be travelling to the United States, specifically to Washington and New York. We will be discussing these issues with American officials. I would like to know what position American churches have taken on this issue. Also, what kind of relationship do you have with American churches, particularly on this issue?

[English]

The Very Reverend Bruce McLeod (Canadian Council of Churches): Mr. Chairman, I can perhaps begin to respond to that question in terms of the biblical texts.

We come here not as political experts or as experts in foreign policy. We come out of our communities that read the hard texts of the Bible, hard in a rich part of a hungry world, every week. The texts that underline this particular letter would run right through the Bible, beginning with God's declaration that the world is good. A good world was placed into our hands, a world blessed by the presence of God and by the purpose of God, that we live together on this earth and make it a home.

• 0935

This comes right from Genesis, right from the very beginning. It is our understanding as we read the Bible—and it's hard for us to read these texts sometimes—that God loves the world, not the church particularly, the church only insofar as it's available to the direction of God's love for the world. We can't pray to God privately, when we lift up our hands and even make minimal contact, our arms by reflex action have to get out and around the world that God loves today. The whole prophetic tradition of the Bible teaches us that God is first met hearing the cries of oppressed and helpless people and running to their aid in the books of Exodus and Moses. And the prophets regularly are the ones who speak out to us that they want not prayers in churches or in Parliament but justice running down like waters and righteousness like a mighty stream; and they want the poor, and the helpless and the children and the widows, these sorts of people, the vulnerable ones, who are the ones where God's presence is met—

As Jesus teaches us, it's not a matter of doing these things with poor and helpless people, children under the threat of the bomb, so God will be pleased. God's presence, Jesus teaches us, is found in those issues of helplessness, of poverty, of homelessness. This is found in Matthew 25, verses 31 to 46. That's where we meet God. And so today as we look at the world, which is still living in the shadow of teetering bombs, teetering nuclear capability—of course there's been progress made but there are children still— Remember ten years ago children had nightmares, woke up, wondering if the bomb had been falling.

I am going after this meeting to a grade 5 class in this city, which represents in that school, Carson Grove, 62 different country backgrounds. They want to know what our country is doing. Are we still going to be a part of unleashing or threatening to unleash this kind of nuclear holocaust? I have to explain it to them.

The biblical texts say that God wants us to be able to make those explanations and be aware that to do nothing about this nuclear threat is to leave God's children in terror for generations to come.

Ms. Janet Somerville: To respond to your question about our relationship with American churches on this issue, we do have regular contact with the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., which has often taken initiatives encouraging American foreign policy away from its reliance on the nuclear threat. But in this particular process, which began in December with a study day led by Ernie Regehr, we didn't consult the American churches. Today's speech is from 19 Canadian churches and has not been thought through with our American partners.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: I would also like you to address the matter of the ambiguity of Canadian policy in this area.

[English]

Bishop Telmor Sartison: I have one more response to the previous question. Our sister church in the United States, which is a 5.5-million-member church— I was there when their 65 bishops signed a document for President Bush at that time about the Gulf War. I was there when they admonished their government in connection with the landmines issue and I know that they currently are working towards nuclear disarmament and pushing their government on that issue. So I can speak about that particular group.

In terms of the ambiguity, I think it's a political ambiguity that arises out of political causes. I think as Canadians we're unwilling to step out far enough ahead to give the kind of leadership that many people in our world are looking for, and one of the reasons I'm here today is to encourage this government and this country to take advantage of a window we have as Canadians to enter into that arena and give that kind of leadership.

• 0940

In July of this year I attended the Lutheran World Federation, which is a gathering of all these people. We gathered in Hong Kong. We gathered there the day after Hong Kong was turned over. We had a 14-day assembly. We do that every 7 years. We chose Hong Kong particularly because of the political reality there at that time.

Our little church in Canada has 200,000 members. We're talking about 55 million members in the rest of this Lutheran World Federation, but Canada has an extraordinarily strong voice in that assembly, and I think Canada has an extraordinarily strong voice in the political assemblies of the world. If we have any ambiguity, it's because we as a country are unwilling to take this step, which is considerably in front of the major players. But a lot of people out there are looking for somebody like Canada, somebody who has this window, to take advantage of the leadership and help us.

Mr. Ernie Regehr (Policy and Public Affairs Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies; Canadian Council of Churches): Mr. Chairman, may I make a very brief comment about the ambiguity in Canadian policy? It's an ambiguity of long standing. You will recall the debates of the late 1950s and early 1960s about the nuclear role for Canada. It's deeply embedded in our relationship with the United States, of course. During the time of the Cold War the United States depended on Canadian territory and certainly Canadian solidarity for the pursuit of its national security, the way it understood it at the time and the way in which it used nuclear weapons at that time. Canada has always understood its own security and well-being on the continent to be linked to those of the United States in particular.

I think the opportunity to remove some of that ambiguity is now politically available in a way in which it hasn't been for a long time. Canada now understands its own security to be directly related not to the fate of a single superpower but to an international order which is just and stable and which meets the basic needs of people around the world. When that happens, Canada's own security, Canada's own economic viability, is supported.

We have an opportunity to delink our own security directly from dependence upon the United States, and an opportunity now to give leadership to an international community that wants the peril of nuclear weapons, that Damocles sword that continues to hang over it, renewed. We will find alliances in parts of the world that formerly, during the period of the Cold War, we had difficulty in approaching.

The Chairman: Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to join in welcoming our witnesses and thanking them not just for their collective leadership, as the Canadian Council of Churches, but also for the individual vision and leadership the people at this table have demonstrated over many years. I'm probably the only member of this committee who goes back to the early 1980s. I recall vividly the eloquence and passion with which the leadership of the council spoke on this issue at that time, and I thank them for continuing that today.

I was just listening to the last exchange. When we talk about the ambiguity of Canadian policy, I don't think there's any particular ambiguity about it. The word “hypocrisy” is the one that comes to my mind. You're perhaps a little more charitable than I am on this front, but when I look at your brief and you talk about how the Canadian government condemns any reliance on nuclear weapons by non-allied countries but it continues to treat those same weapons as a useful or even necessary element of Canada's defences and those of its allies, I don't think there's anything particularly ambiguous about that at all.

I might just note that it's good to have this kind of exchange with the council. I'm from British Columbia, and some of you may know that earlier this week the premier, Glen Clark, engaged in a remarkable experience, a dialogue with some 40 church leaders. In fact, I think it was Archbishop David Crawley who opened that session. I think we should be doing more of this kind of exchange.

Of course it always helps when I agree with what you're saying. For a committee, it always helps to have God on your side, and the power of 19 signatories certainly is really quite amazing.

In asking my questions, let me be very clear that today I speak on behalf of my colleagues, on behalf of Alexa McDonough as leader of my party, Dick Proctor our defence critic, and each and every member of our caucus, in saying, without any hesitation, that we fully support the objectives in this letter. We would have been proud to sign a similar letter ourselves and are working towards these objectives.

• 0945

I want to ask just a couple of questions. One is about NATO.

NATO appears to be more and more archaic and irrelevant. As you look at the policies of NATO and the first-use policy it continues to cling to in the face of all of the evidence, I wonder whether you have any thoughts you want to share with us about this institution? It's an institution that is now expanding eastward, draining the badly needed resources of eastern European countries that are desperately trying to rebuild their economies, destabilizing the relationship with Russia. If NATO is not prepared to review its policies with respect to nuclear weapons, do you have any thoughts about Canada's involvement in this organization?

Ms. Janet Somerville: As a council of churches, we have not been able to broaden our analysis that 19 churches would subscribe to such detail. But I would invite Ernie and Joe particularly to comment.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: I think the ambiguity or, more directly put, hypocrisy of NATO is that it's the leader of a group of countries that is heavily exercised on the problems of proliferation. It's very concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states. But the expansion of NATO and its persistence in maintaining nuclear weapons and declaring itself to be willing to be the first to use nuclear weapons over an expanding territory is the proliferation of the nuclear umbrella and expansion of nuclear protection, which is a perverse term to use for nuclear weapons. But it is expanding that precisely at the time when it is most concerned and worried about other people trying to creep under their own version of a nuclear umbrella.

This is one of the great perils NATO is visiting upon us. It is insisting upon the moral legitimacy of nuclear weapons and the political and military utility of them, and the rest of the world is not deaf to that. It understands that and, not surprisingly, aspires to some of the same benefits it sees as accruing.

I think it's fundamentally impossible for NATO to continue to expand its territory and insist upon its right to use nuclear weapons. It's a tension that will break. I think it is terribly fearsome that the way in which it will break is that the floodgates of proliferation will open and there will be neither the technical means nor the moral legitimacy to control the spread of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Svend Robinson: You refer in your appendix that one of the examples of concern around nuclear cooperation is the fact that Canada hosts visits by nuclear-armed submarines. I take it this would mean we will be hearing shortly from the Nanoose Conversion folks. Again, as a British Columbia member of Parliament I want to draw your attention to the fact these nuclear subs are coming in at Nanoose.

I take it you would agree, then, with the objective of the Nanoose Conversion Campaign to end Canada's involvement in that particular treaty. Would that be a fair assumption from Ms. Somerville?

Ms. Janet Somerville: I think that's a perfectly legitimate deduction from what we have said.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Finally, I wonder to what extent you as a council have attempted to reach across faith boundaries and communicate with other faiths around these issues, which are really global issues. Has there been any dialogue with, for example, the Canadian Jewish Congress, Muslim communities and others to try to broaden, to the greatest extent possible, the voice of faith communities in Canada on this issue, which goes to the survival of our planet?

Ms. Janet Somerville: I'm carrying with me, and might just make available to Mr. Graham before his 11 a.m. meeting, a letter specifically on the Iraq situation signed not only by some of the Christian leaders present here but by leaders from Muslim, Zoroastrian, Buddhist, Sikh and other faiths.

• 0950

The particular exercise you're seeing now came out of a specific work of the Commission on Justice and Peace, whose focus was on an official declaration by each member church that this is our policy, that nuclear abolition should be central to Canada's foreign policy in relation to this whole question. Because it was that particular kind of ordered, rather formal procedure, it didn't do the other, the lateral outreach, which we had done on many questions, including Iraq, and which we will do again.

Mr. Svend Robinson: And which you could still do with this.

Ms. Janet Somerville: Yes, that we certainly could do with this one. If there's a moment when the committee would like to invite an interfaith delegation, I'd be happy to help organize it. It would not be difficult. There is strong consensus across very many divisions on this question.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Before I pass to Madame Beaumier, by all means please do give us a copy of your letter, and I'll make sure it's distributed to all members of the committee. Thank you for bringing it with you.

I might say, Mr. Regehr, that one of the witnesses—I believe it was on Tuesday—made exactly the same point as you did, that it's very difficult to maintain the integrity of the NPT when in fact the nuclear possession states themselves are not living within either the moral or legal framework of the agreement itself. I think that's something the committee definitely will want to look at in the course of our study. Thank you.

Ms. Beaumier.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): Thank you.

I think I'll begin by telling the Very Reverend Bruce McLeod that it was a little humbling for me to hear you. I finally now realize that I cannot take total credit for my social conscience. I guess that's where it came from.

However, we like to talk about the hypocrisy of this group and that group. We're all very sanctimonious and we sit here— and everyone else is hypocritical, except us, of course.

First of all, I believe Canada's nuclear disarmament policy is going to change or we wouldn't even be having these hearings. To call names to groups that were before us, who did what at the time felt right, seems counterproductive. But what I want to know is, are American Christians different from Canadian Christians? Are issues of nuclear disarmament more important to them?

I would be interested to hear the church's position on Iraq. I was out on an anti-war demonstration and it was quite a motley crew. I didn't see any church people out there.

So would we Canadian Christians be fighting this hard if in fact we were the world power who had this arsenal and, of course, trusted our own good judgment and our good standards that we wouldn't misuse these weapons? I think it's very easy for us to go— at the meeting I was at, it was “down with the U.S.A.” Does anyone think of what a mess we'd be in if it actually were to ever occur?

Would we be fighting this as hard if we in fact were the number one power in the world? Of course, we would know we would never be the perpetrators or the original sinners in the nuclear situation in today's world. That's a fairly important question to me.

Ms. Janet Somerville: I too think it's a very important question.

Maybe at this time Joe or Gérald would like to comment on what a major preoccupation for the American Catholic bishops was the anti-nuclear pastoral letter they worked on for years, and perhaps your church is an international church.

Mr. Joe Gunn: I would maybe make a couple of points.

Indeed, in the United States one of the major issues in bringing up a kind of ethical, moral position on this issue is the fact that there is a very mighty industry. We used to call it “the military industrial complex”. There are lots of towns where there are lots of workers who are quite dependent on military industries. So the issue has to be put forward in terms of conversion, which the churches refer to as taking your swords and changing them to ploughshares.

• 0955

Now, those are complex issues that also do not escape Canadian members, who have to look at the same kind of industries that exist in our own communities. It's a difficult one.

I find it particularly interesting that some of the bishops I work with, where there are military operations in their own communities, have still made these positions, have still taken positions, when necessary, to follow church teaching around peace. That's kind of stepping out on a limb, because they definitely hear from people about that.

In the United States, it's been a larger problem, perhaps, but it's still there. It's important to see that the church leadership, which is perhaps less prone than other groups to be moved by polls, tends to take stands, point out what should be the steps, and then try to encourage people to reflect and follow through with some kind of change of heart.

These are complex issues, but they have been followed through. For example, around the landmines issue with the United States, among Catholic bishops there was a huge campaign on to try to make sure the position to sign the Ottawa treaty was accepted, even though the government didn't. There was some opposition to that, but the churches as a whole went ahead with that very strongly.

So you don't always win the question, but it doesn't mean you don't take the position you need to.

I hope that's somewhat helpful.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: I wanted to know if American Christians were different from Canadian Christians. We talked about the nuclear industry, the industry of war, in the United States. I guess the answer is, “Depending on the price”?

Would we as Canadians be this gung-ho on this nuclear policy if it were a big industry in Canada?

Mr. Joe Gunn: I guess the real point is that we're not. We saw in the disarmament work of our country that there is a role that has now been proven to be successful for middle powers to meet with other kinds of countries. Even if the world's superpower isn't going to be able to come along at this point, you can still make a difference.

That's why it's interesting that this group has decided to come before you at this time. We see there being a window of opportunity. We see our government has proved it is possible that the support of the Canadian people can be there, that we can sway people in other churches and other countries, and that particularly right now there is a window of opportunity with the review of NATO and the hearings of this committee. That's why we're here.

The Chairman: Bishop Sartison.

Bishop Telmor Sartison: My first response is that if we were the nuclear superpower, I would hope we would be speaking out.

Second, with respect to that, I meet with these folks, in my narrow brand of experience, every January for a five-day conference. They wave the flag as hard as anybody, these 65 people who are responsible for the church as bishops. On Sundays we have to take time off to watch play-offs for the Super Bowl. But they are also very adamant and very clear about critiquing the policy of their government, as I referred to earlier. They're not afraid to do that. They feel it's part of their call.

I want to make two other comments vis-à-vis, for example, the texts we referred to earlier. I think the primary text is Jesus himself. When you think about Jesus and what we know about him, where would he be on this issue? That's not very hard to discover.

The second thing I want to say is one of the most shocking books I've read recently—and it's taken me a long time to get to this book—is Nevil Shute's On the Beach. I don't know if any of you have read it. If you want to read something that is apocalyptic in nature about this very issue, it's kind of scary.

An hon. member: I saw the movie.

Bishop Telmor Sartison: The book is worse.

The Chairman: I think we're going to move on. I have three more people, and we're almost out of time.

Ms. Augustine.

Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke—Lakeshore, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to add my voice to my colleagues' in welcoming you to this committee. I'm particularly pleased because I'm always asking where is the church leadership in any specific public policy area and in social justice issues. I'm therefore very pleased that you're presenting.

• 1000

I could make a long speech about my own position in all of this, but I think what I want to do is give you a few questions that have been posed to us by people who are speaking on the other side of the argument, as it were. However, I want to begin by saying that when our ambassador on disarmament came to speak to us in reference to the Canberra Commission, he said it was achievable, it was doable, it was useful, and it was a good document. We also heard from the non-proliferation folks that Canada is taking quite a leadership role in several groupings, and that we're doing all that is possible in that area.

At the same time, I think what is left with us—and some of the things we have to grapple with in terms of how we respond—is the whole business of the absence of war, and whether the absence of war, that is, a major war between east and west, as it were, could in some way or other be attributed to the fact that those weapons are there. I remember reading one quotation, one piece from which I can quote a sentence: “Better a world with nuclear weapons but no major war than one with a major war but no nuclear weapon”.

I would just like you to speak about that from your perspective, because as a committee I think we have to grapple with how we respond to both sides of the argument. I'd therefore like to put this forward. And it's not that I am saying this is my opinion, but I'm telling you this is a consideration that we all have to address in terms of our response.

Thank you.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: Mr. Chair, I'd be happy to take an initial crack at it.

No major wars? Well, the world has been plagued with major wars throughout the Cold War period. In fact, our centre studies and monitors the occurrence of war, and has for the last 15 years. In fact, if you look at the facts, you find there has been a steady increase in the number of wars. They peaked around the early 1990s and continue on. These are major wars, and they include millions of deaths per war.

Nuclear weapons do not deter war. That begs the question of whether or not they deterred war between the United States and the Soviet Union, of course. They didn't deter war between Germany and France during that period either. There were other conditions that prevented war between those two traditional enemies. It is possible, and in fact necessary, to create the kinds of conditions and relations between states that make it unthinkable and impossible for them to perceive of a circumstance in which the resolution of a political conflict could reasonably be resolved by war, conventional or otherwise. If major states go to war with each other through the use of the conventional fire power that is available, it would be utterly devastating to them, and counterproductive for them to do that.

The question, then, is whether or not we are using the world's resources properly when we are contributing in the neighbourhood of $1 trillion a year to the maintenance of this kind of a military stand-off between states in order to prevent war. The real work of war prevention is the building of societies that meet the needs of their people, that respect the rights of their people, and that respect the rights of their neighbours. The use of their resources toward that end is what will prevent war between the industrialized countries.

It's really unthinkable that the major countries of Europe would seek a military means of resolving the disputes between them. What we need to do is to use the resources that are now wasted on these extraordinary military preparations for building the same kind of secure and stable social and economic and political orders in those parts of the world where war continues to be rampant and unchecked, and where nuclear weapons do not deter or contribute to any dampening of the pursuit of war.

• 1005

The Chairman: We're going to have to draw this part to a close, because we have the Nanoose Conversion Campaign, who have come from Vancouver, and if I don't move to them quickly we'll leave them only 35 minutes. It's with apologies to the Canadian Council of Churches, because we appreciate that your position is very important.

I must say, speaking for myself personally, I think everybody on this committee agrees with your moral position on ending nuclear threat and the threat of nuclear war. What we're trying to grapple with is how we get from A to B. Maybe that's where the ambiguity arises. You can call it hypocrisy if you like. I have found that equally sincere Christians, if you like, have come before this committee and told us that Canadian nuclear policy as expressed today is the most effective way of achieving the end of a nuclear-free world, which we all seek. So within the framework of these discussions reasonable people will differ, and reasonably religious people will differ.

I hope we'll have an opportunity— If you have any observations for us which could help us, for example, on the very difficult issue of NATO's policy of first use— There's a strong argument we've heard for its moral ambiguity. Is it good because it prevents war? Others will say it's leading us down the bad path. If you have anything with which you could help us in any one of those areas and would like to write us about, the researchers would certainly take it.

We very much appreciate, Ms. Somerville and all the members of the Canadian Council of Churches, your coming before us this morning. We very much appreciate your advice and input, and I'm very sorry we don't have more time to spend with you.

Ms. Janet Somerville: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: I'm going to ask Mr. Norman Abbey, of the Nanoose Conversion Campaign, to come straight up to the table.

• 1008

• 1011

The Chairman: Members, can we start again?

I'd like to ask Mr. Norman Abbey from the Nanoose Conversion Campaign to start. As usual, I'll ask you to keep your introduction to about ten minutes. That way, there's time for members to ask questions.

Mr. Norman Abbey (Director, Nanoose Conversion Campaign): I'd like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for this opportunity, first of all, for convening these hearings and also for the opportunity to speak to the issue.

It's really the first opportunity we've had to speak directly to the government in the 14 years that the Nanoose Conversion Campaign has been concerned about various aspects of nuclear submarines and nuclear-weapons-capable submarines and ships that have actually been coming to Nanoose and the Strait of Georgia in British Columbia for actually 30 years now. Our campaign began in 1984, and this is really our first opportunity. I really appreciate the opportunity, and I hope it's the beginning of a real dialogue with the government that reflects the concerns of the Government of B.C., for one, and many people.

I'll refer to CFMETR, which stands for the Canadian Forces Maritime Experimental and Test Ranges at Nanoose Bay. It's an acoustic-instrumented test range for testing torpedoes. Basically, antisubmarine warfare is based on acoustics.

The Strait of Georgia is wired up with microphones on the bottom to track torpedoes and so on. It's used primarily by the U.S. navy. About 85% of the use at Nanoose is by and for the U.S. navy, but it's also used by other countries. Chile has used it.

One of our primary concerns is that this use in Nanoose by the U.S. navy ties Canada to the U.S. nuclear weapons policy in a number of ways. It's very closely associated with the Bangor facility in Washington, just to south of us, where there are about eight Trident submarines that are armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles.

They generally don't come to Nanoose, but there was one. A Trident submarine was there in 1995. This meant that we had approximately 200 nuclear weapons in the Strait of Georgia. The 24 ICBMs on Tridents have, I believe, eight warheads per missile, and so on.

Normally what happens is that it's just the attack submarines. One bit of progress was that, in 1992, President Bush had the nuclear warheads removed from the attack submarines.

So normally, we now feel that there are generally not nuclear weapons present in the Strait of Georgia. We don't know that, but we generally assume that.

It's not that they have gone very far away; when they were removed from the submarine fleet, they were stored ashore. So unless there's a contingency, or unless, as in 1995, we have a Trident submarine coming into Georgia Strait, we can assume that we don't generally have nuclear weapons actually present.

• 1015

Our concern about Nanoose tying Canada to U.S. nuclear policy is because Nanoose is essentially a satellite facility of the Keyport underwater warfare testing centre in Washington, which in itself is part of the Bangor Trident nuclear submarine facility. It's an integrated system that's close by, and it operates as a unit.

We've tried in many ways to get a discussion going. One of the first things we did was organize a big conference in Nanaimo. It was attended by Major-General Leonard Johnson of the Canadian Forces; Sister Rosalie Bertell, a scientist who's looked at health effects of radiation; and a number of people from across Canada, about 500 people. It generated recommendations and so on.

Over the years we've published newsletters and press releases, and in many ways we've attempted to initiate a full public discussion of all aspects of Nanoose. As well as the nuclear policy, there are economic and environmental issues, serious ones. It's been very frustrating for us to get that dialogue started. This committee, I hope, will be a start of that.

As for tying Canada to the first-use nuclear weapons policy the U.S. has, I won't talk too much about it unless you ask questions, but a very serious issue is the dangers of having floating, mobile nuclear reactors that don't have the containment facilities that Pickering, for example, does. You can't have a big containment dome on a submarine.

Studies have been done and recommendations have been made, and they've pretty much been ignored so far. There are the economics and environmental exemptions, and a number of related issues.

I'll just tell you our recommendation right off the top: We recommend that the Canada-U.S. Nanoose Agreement be cancelled, primarily because it ties us to U.S. nuclear weapons policy, but also for very many related reasons. We also advocate the phase-out of all nuclear reactors, both military and civilian, because of the inseparable links between reactors and weapons in the nuclear fuel cycle. Right from the word go, in the Manhattan project, Canada supplied uranium to build the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima. Some of that uranium was converted to plutonium at Hanford for the bomb that was dropped on Nagasaki, and that was the beginning of it all.

The most recent proposal is that we're planning now to import plutonium to burn in CANDU reactors in Canada. These kinds of decisions to get into this technology tie us all, and future generations for hundreds of thousands of years, to consequences of decisions we're making right now. The proposal to import plutonium into Canada means that plutonium and the by-products of it are going to be stored in Canada basically forever, and that's a decision that really needs a lot better discussion. That's one of the ways that weapons and reactors are inseparably tied together.

Hanford Nuclear Reservation, just to the south of Vancouver, is another one. We're downwind of it in British Columbia, all of us are. It's been leaking. It's getting into the water table, and that's something we have to keep a cap on for the next— basically forever.

So our other recommendation, in the short term, would be: do not go ahead and start importing mixed oxide plutonium into Canada. At the very least, postpone that decision until there's been a full public discussion of the consequences and everything. Certainly the last two or three premiers of British Columbia have asked for a full public review of all aspects of CFMETR.

I won't talk about the World Court decision. Certainly the threat of use is something— Nanoose is the practical and sharp end of our connection to the first use of nuclear weapons.

• 1020

I guess you've had a chance to read my submission. I would like to quote from Dr. Michael Wallace, who I would have liked to bring to this, but perhaps in the future, if there's a continued discussion, he could— Unfortunately he couldn't come because he had to teach today. His comment was that “If the Canadian government a) is really serious about incorporating the 1996 decision into policy and b) wants to move away from accidental nuclear war”—which is also enhanced by the operation at CFMETR—then the CFMETR lease should be cancelled.

I guess you know the Premier of British Columbia is in a court case right now. There is a jurisdictional battle over the seabed at Nanoose.

Norwegian professor of law Stale Eskeland wrote a paper on the World Court decision shortly after it came down. He words it even more strongly. He talks about the obligation of the government and cabinet ministers to avoid criminal liability. Once a court makes a new ruling, there's an obligation to bring policy into line with that. Certainly our operation at Nanoose and CFMETR is not in line with that.

Those are our main recommendations. We would like to see it cancelled, as would the Premier of British Columbia. We would like a full public review.

The related issues are that it is being subsidized to the tune of $18 million a year. There are environmental problems. Public safety is a really big one.

The Chairman: The details are dealt with in the paper you've delivered to us.

Mr. Norman Abbey: Yes. And the proliferation, the connection all the way from uranium mining to eventual burial at Hanford or wherever, is a related issue.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Abbey.

Mr. Grewal.

Mr. Gurmant Grewal: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome our witness to this committee, and I thank him for the excellent report, even though it's his first report to the government. I have basically a clarification required before I ask my question.

Is Nanoose only a testing facility? Does it have any diversified role or does it do any conversion of nuclear stuff?

Mr. Norman Abbey: Our objective is to convert it. Our middle name is “Conversion”. Certainly one thing Premier Clark has done is offered to work with the federal government. We would like to see it converted to—

Mr. Gurmant Grewal: No, what I want to find out is the purpose of the Nanoose agreement. Is it simply for a testing facility or is it also for use for conversion or storage or other things?

Mr. Norman Abbey: No, it's for testing. It's an acoustic instrument test range. Mainly they test torpedoes there. They come with submarines and they do various things, but it's a testing facility.

Mr. Gurmant Grewal: Have any tests already been done there? This is only a facility leased by the American government, as I understand it.

Mr. Norman Abbey: It's not exactly a lease. It's an exchange of notes between Canada and the U.S. It's called the Canada-U.S. Nanoose Agreement. It's just an agreement to cooperate and share the use of that range.

Mr. Gurmant Grewal: Has any testing been done so far?

Mr. Norman Abbey: Oh, yes, it's on a continual basis, 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday to Friday. There are not always nuclear submarines there, but when nuclear submarines do come there, we're downwind of a floating nuclear reactor. Nuclear weapons may or may not be on board. Usually I would assume there are not. But many nuclear weapons have been brought there.

Mr. Gurmant Grewal: Have any studies been done to find out any effect on the environment or fisheries, or about the leaking of water, as you mentioned?

Mr. Norman Abbey: One was done by Dr. Jackson Davis in 1987. Jackson Davis is a professor of biology in California. He did a study at Esquimalt, where the submarines also stop on the way. It's called Nuclear Accidents on Military Vessels in Canadian Ports: A Site-Specific Analysis for Esquimalt/Victoria. That was one of the first ones. It's very detailed. I have a copy. I would be very pleased to make it available to the committee.

Mr. Gurmant Grewal: Sure. We would appreciate it if you would kindly make it available.

• 1025

Mr. Norman Abbey: The Department of National Defence has also done an environmental study. Unfortunately, they completely excluded nuclear issues from that study.

Mr. Gurmant Grewal: Okay.

My final question is about the Pacific salmon fish war. Premier Glen Clark of British Columbia made an issue of the fact that he will not renew the agreement with the U.S. on Nanoose Bay because the terms of the Nanoose Bay agree— I think British Columbia had an upper hand because they could cancel it before the federal government could. As I understand it, there are two agreements. One is between the Canadian and U.S. governments, and one is between British Columbia and the U.S., or between the U.S. and British Columbia through the Canadian government.

My point is that in this case, if there is a problem in the future with the Pacific salmon fishery or trade issues, how can Nanoose Bay come into the picture? Are they tied in some other way?

Mr. Norman Abbey: Is Nanoose tied to salmon?

Mr. Gurmant Grewal: Salmon fisheries or international trade or trade with the U.S.

Mr. Norman Abbey: No. The second agreement you're talking about is the Canada-U.S. Nanoose Agreement. It's not a licence, not a treaty, but an agreement. It's an exchange of notes to cooperate and share the space.

The other agreement you're talking about is called an aquatic lands licence. It's a licence for the Department of National Defence to use the bottom of Georgia Strait. As it happens, the Province of British Columbia owns the mud on the bottom of Georgia Strait.

Mr. Gurmant Grewal: It's not the Canadian government that owns it, but the British Columbia government.

Mr. Norman Abbey: That's right, and that was sorted out by the Supreme Court in 1984. It's one of the rare black and white cases where B.C. is the owner of that, period.

A voice: The Georgia Strait case.

Mr. Norman Abbey: That's what Glen Clark did. He cancelled that licence. That's what the court case was about—the battle over the jurisdiction there.

No, there's no connection particularly between salmon and nuclear submarines, and we certainly wouldn't want to trade a salmon agreement with the U.S. We want both of those things. We want to be free of nuclear reactors floating around our neighbourhoods, and we want a salmon treaty with the U.S.

Now, Premier Clark has indicated that he does recognize that there are a lot of other issues. It's not just the salmon war, although it did come up as part of that.

Mr. Gurmant Grewal: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you.

[Translation]

Ms. Debien.

Ms. Maud Debien (Laval East, BQ): Good morning, Mr. Abbey, and welcome to our Committee. Mr. Grewal pretty well covered the questions I wanted to ask about use of the sea bed.

Did you say the Canadian Forces Maritime Experimental and Test Ranges at Nanoose Bay had signed an agreement with the Americans to allow them to send submarines into the Georgia Strait?

My first question is for information purposes. Can you tell us what the cruising speed—pardon the expression—is of these submarines coming into Canadian waters? Do you have any statistics or figures on the submarines entering the Georgia Strait?

I'll stop there for now.

[English]

Mr. Norman Abbey: On your first question, your assumption is right. The agreement does permit them to come there. In fact, it was by order in council, but I forget the date. Nuclear submarines of the U.S. navy, Great Britain and so on, do not need to get prior permission to come. They just come.

On your second question on the cruising speed, I'm sorry, but I can't answer that. I'd be really happy to dig that information up for you, though.

Submarines are obliged to travel on the surface of the water except when they're actually on the test range. That's the only time they're allowed to travel submerged. I would imagine they'd probably do 20 knots on the surface. I'm just guessing, though, so that's not a—

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien: No, no. My question related to how frequently they come in, rather than their actual speed. I was making a play on words earlier when I talked about cruising speed; my apologies. Do you know how often these submarines are coming into Canadian waters, into the Georgia Strait? Do you have any data on the number of times they come in?

• 1030

[English]

Mr. Norman Abbey: Yes. They've been coming for about 30 years. During that whole period 160 nuclear submarines have come to Nanoose.

In addition to the submarines, there are other vessels. We've had nuclear-powered aircraft carriers there, like the Nimitz, for example, and surface ships too. I don't have the figures with me on that. We used to count what we called “the nuclear ship days”. If a ship was at Nanoose when it was nuclear-powered or had nuclear weapons on it for three days, we'd count that as three nuclear ship days. When we averaged that out, up until last year anyway, we showed that there was a nuclear ship at Nanoose on one day out of every nine.

I don't know how useful that figure is, but the concern for us is on that any given day we don't know whether there's a nuclear reactor upwind of us in our neighbourhood. There may be one there right now. We just don't know until after it's gone.

Certainly the experience of nuclear accidents around the world has been disastrous. For example, the nuclear emergency plan that DND has for Nanoose describes what they call a worst-case scenario as being one in which the extent of the radioactive contamination would be less than 500 metres. It's been ten years now since Chernobyl, so to even suggest that a worst-case nuclear accident wouldn't have effects farther than 500 metres sort of borders on the criminal in some ways.

But I'm not sure if I'm answering your question.

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien: If I understand you, then, every nine days, a nuclear submarine comes into the Georgia Strait. Is that right?

[English]

Mr. Norman Abbey: Yes. Or a nuclear-powered vessel, not necessarily a submarine.

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien: Or a nuclear powered vessel. Thank you.

[English]

Mr. Svend Robinson: Merci, monsieur le président. Mr. Chairman, I will be brief.

As a long-time supporter of the campaign to shut Nanoose down and, in fact, as one who has a motion on the Order Paper of the House of Commons calling upon the government to give notice of termination of the agreement—I tabled that motion in the last Parliament, the Parliament before that and in this Parliament as well—I just want to thank Mr. Abbey and the Nanoose Conversion Campaign for their leadership on this profoundly important issue.

I wanted to ask, Mr. Chairman, through you, if we could perhaps ask our researcher to provide the committee with a bit of background and an update on the current status of the lawsuit that has been filed and ask if we could get copies of the pleadings, if there have been pleadings filed, and if we could also get an update on what exactly the status of that is. I think it would be helpful for the committee to have that information.

The Chairman: We'll do that for sure. No problem.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Do you think those pleadings and that actual lawsuit will have a bearing on this particular study? Or is it just more general information for our committee?

Mr. Svend Robinson: Sure it will, in terms of our possible recommendations around this specific issue.

The Chairman: Around this issue— okay. Thank you very much.

I wasn't able to get to either Mr. Assadourian or Mr. Reed.

Mr. Cannis.

Mr. John Cannis (Scarborough Centre, Lib.): I have just one quick question. You mentioned the last 30 years. When did this lawsuit start?

Mr. Norman Abbey: There have been a couple of environmental lawsuits attempting to get full public environmental hearings. You're referring to the one between B.C. and Ottawa, I think.

Mr. John Cannis: Right.

Mr. Norman Abbey: I believe it was initiated by Ottawa just in August or September of 1997.

Mr. John Cannis: And what were the grounds?

Mr. Norman Abbey: I guess the federal government was concerned when Premier Clark cancelled the permission for the Department of National Defence to use the sea bottom, which belongs to B.C. The essence of the test range is the microphones that are on the bottom of the seabed. It would be basically useless without that.

Mr. John Cannis: So if these tests have been going on for 30 years, why wasn't a lawsuit launched 30 years ago?

Mr. Norman Abbey: This is the first time the Government of British Columbia— there have been other routes that are perhaps more cooperative, more productive, than going through litigation. There have been many attempts by environment ministers, including the opposition parties in the B.C. legislature, to have a public discussion, a full public review, of all aspects.

• 1035

When you get down to law cases and law courts, in a way that's a sad way. There's an opportunity at Nanoose to, one, bring our policy in line with the World Court decision, and two, bring our policy in line with public opinion in B.C. and in Canada among many Canadians and church leaders and unions and the academic community.

It's a positive opportunity, and I don't think we should have to, but I believe the Government of B.C. has made honest, legitimate attempts to have that discussion, have a review, and resolve these matters in a better way than a court case. In fact, this court case was initiated by the federal government. I can't really answer the question as to why. I think there are better ways to do it.

The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): I have a brief point. I think the court case started from Mr. Clark, because of the fisheries dispute.

Mr. Svend Robinson: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, the federal government initiated the lawsuit. Mr. Clark gave notice of termination—

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: No. What I want to make clear, for myself, is that this started as a result of fisheries concerns, not necessarily concerns because of this test range. It was just in addition to the fisheries conflict. Am I right?

Mr. Norman Abbey: Yes. That's not something our campaign would have recommended. I mean, we want a salmon treaty, just as we all do, both federal and provincial governments. We all want that. In B.C. we want a full public review. We want that test range cancelled. We don't have a public safety plan there.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: But what I'm saying is that if the fisheries issue was not there, there wouldn't have been a debate on the issue we're discussing now.

Mr. Norman Abbey: Oh, yes, there's been a debate for 15 years.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: But this fisheries issue has focused it. That's what you're saying.

Mr. Norman Abbey: It put it on the front page of the newspaper, basically. The debate has been happening, although not at the government level. This committee is the first real opportunity to get started on that debate, and yes, I'm really happy about that.

The Chairman: Mr. Abbey, are you saying to the committee that Mr. Clark's position on closing the Nanoose Bay facility to the United States was not directly related to the dispute between the United States and Canada over the fisheries? I mean, my understanding—

Mr. Norman Abbey: No, I'm not saying that.

The Chairman: Okay. But you're saying that this has a longer history than that. It's been on the table for a long time, and this certainly has brought it to the boil.

Mr. Norman Abbey: Yes.

The Chairman: Okay. We've got it now. We've got your position.

Did you want to add anything, Mr. McWhinney? We have two minutes.

Mr. Ted McWhinney (Vancouver Quadra, Lib.): This is probably more correctly addressed to Svend Robinson, but I'll ask Mr. Abbey, because that's the protocol.

There's a fascinating reference in the Gazette this morning to a delegation—by your colleague Libby Davies—to Bangor in Washington to inspect nuclear submarine facilities, with an analogy to U.S. and other inspections of facilities in Baghdad and elsewhere. Are you in a position to enlighten us on this? Is your organization participating in that delegation?

Mr. Norman Abbey: I myself just found out about that—yesterday, actually. As you say, it's a very interesting thing. There are weapons of mass destruction, a lot of them in Washington state.

I'll try to be brief. Again, I can't give the scholarly presentation that Dr. Michael Wallace of UBC would. There are many experts around who could talk at length about that. But I'll say, yes, Nanoose Bay, the Keyport undersea warfare testing centre, and Bangor are geographically a unit. Keyport coordinates the visits of nuclear submarines to Nanoose. The ships come and go as if there's virtually no border at all. It's one operational unit, completely integrated.

This, I think, is the central part for this committee. All of the other issues aside, the operation of CFMETR is a service that sharpens the stealth capability of the U.S. nuclear navy, that enhances their capability to launch a first strike or the first use of nuclear weapons, or any kind of use of nuclear weapons. It's one thing. So the Trident submarines at Bangor are very much part of the same facility as Nanoose and Keyport, even though they don't actually come here, even though they may store some of their weapons ashore, or whatever.

• 1040

Mr. Ted McWhinney: So this is a courtesy visit. Do you know if it has been cleared with the U.S. authorities?

It's a photo opportunity in a way, Svend, is it?

Mr. Svend Robinson: It's a spontaneous inspection.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Is it a little bit like the Mexican sombrero episode in the Senate?

Mr. Svend Robinson: This is far more significant and meaningful.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Will it generate as much public attention?

On the litigation, though, in essence what you said was that your organization's legal involvement antedated Mr. Clark's.

It is true that in fisheries—I was parliamentary secretary there then—it did come up in the context of a retaliation, except that a province can't make a retaliation against alleged U.S. non-compliance with the Pacific Salmon Treaty, and that's when Mr. Clark intervened. But your position is that your organization felt that it had adequate legal grounds and is proceeding independently of that.

Mr. Norman Abbey: Absolutely. We would have never recommended that Premier Clark tie it to the salmon treaty. He did that, and in some ways it was good because it got a very much-needed discussion going. Unfortunately, the discussion centred on a war over salmon fishing, which was a red herring.

But the other issues are still there. They've always been there, and they still will be there.

In terms of court cases, litigation, very often it's normal, I suppose, for a higher court to make a decision, and then you have a whole flurry of court cases initiated to test where the limits of that or what the actual boundaries of that decision are.

If the Supreme Court says if you're totally drunk then it's okay to commit a crime because you're not responsible for it or something, then you get lower courts and lawyers fighting it out to see what that actually means in practice. I hope that process doesn't happen with the World Court decision. I hope we don't have to see court cases where community groups go to court to say Nanoose is illegal, for example.

In my view and in our view at Nanoose Conversion Campaign, the operation of Nanoose certainly contravenes the spirit and the intent of the ICJ decision. Now to go to court and see if a court would be convinced that it was legally in violation of that law—

Mr. Ted McWhinney: I think the judge is following a somewhat different judicial philosophy. The World Court judges envisage that their decision would be applied and tested in lots of low-level cases, and in their view there's a highly educational function in that. But from your viewpoint, it's very expensive. In fact, I'm amazed that you can support the legal costs for these sorts of operations. It's a rhetorical question.

The Chairman: Don't get into legal costs.

Mr. Norman Abbey: I'm sorry, I can't give you a scholarly answer to that, but I would hope that it would be cancelled. That's our recommendation. I think it's an opportunity— none of us really likes to have court cases.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Thank you very much, and thank you, Svend.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Abbey.

Very quickly, did I understand you to say earlier in your testimony that the position of your organization is that we should ultimately phase out domestic nuclear power as well, because it is an essential part of the feed chain to nuclear weapons?

Mr. Norman Abbey: Yes, all the way from uranium mining, and especially the short-term.

I don't know when this committee's final report is, but I think it's going to be a very important report because it's the first time of looking at these policies. There are some things that are happening in the near future. The MOX proposal in particular is coming right up, perhaps even before you submit your report.

The Chairman: Yes, we've heard a lot about the MOX proposal.

This is one of those seamless web problems we seem to be getting into in all our committee discussions, but thank you, Mr. Abbey. We appreciate your coming from Vancouver, and thank you for your evidence, sir.

Mr. Norman Abbey: Thank you.

The Chairman: That's the end—

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Can we get the text of the Agreement?

The Chairman: The Agreement? Yes, yes. We should be able to get it quite easily.

Mr. Daniel Turp: The treaty they are asking the government to cancel.

The Chairman: I will ask Mr. McWhinney if we can get a copy of it. You're talking about the agreement between the U.S. and Canada, are you not?

Mr. Daniel Turp: Yes.

[English]

The Chairman: It's a letter agreement.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Fisheries has been handling most of this. We'll sort it out.

The Chairman: We'll see if we can get it. There must be an exchange of letters.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: One of the ministers must have it.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: I would like to see the agreement they're asking the government to cancel.

[English]

The Chairman: Absolutely. We'll request it.

• 1045

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: I imagine this is a public document. There is no secret diplomacy involved here.

The Chairman: We will ask the government for a copy of it. It shouldn't be a problem.

[English]

Steering committees.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: I have another general request to make. Do we have the results of any opinion polls showing Canadians's views on nuclear disarmament? I would like to know whether our researchers could look into public opinion polls, and see whether the Department of Foreign Affairs has done any polling, so that we can have some idea of the public's reaction to the Canadian position on nuclear disarmament. I would like to have some material on this.

The Chairman: That's a very good idea. Thank you very much.

[English]

Now we'll just pass to our business meeting. Members, you have in front of you the report of the agenda and procedures committee, which is being distributed to you.

Do we have to adopt each one of these individually, Ms. Hilchie?

We've agreed we'll meet with the delegation from the Slovak Federative Republic. You'll see that's on Thursday, March 12. I trust there's no problem with that. That's a joint meeting with the Senate, I'm advised. That helps sometimes with these meetings in terms of attendance.

Next we agreed to meet with the Canadian Friends of Burma and the Burmese parliamentarians in exile. That'll be here on April 27. That should be an interesting meeting for members. I take it that's agreed by the committee.

In order to formalize our trip to Washington and New York in connection with the nuclear disarmament study, we had to make a formal request for the House leadership purposes. I trust the trip to New York, March 29 and April 1, is agreed to by everyone.

The members of the opposition have clearly indicated who's going, and I believe I now have the Liberal list as well, so we know which members will be going on that trip. If anybody wants to get the proposed agenda for that from the research officers, make any comments on it or add anybody, please do so.

You know that at the request of Mr. Mills and the Reform Party and various other members, we're not just looking into the nuclear issue when we're there. We will be discussing trade issues with our American colleagues as well. We expect to be able to spend some time on that.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Can we ask Senator Abraham, for example, to meet with us? Even if he can't, he's responded very positively on Bill C-110.

The Chairman: Yes, we're certainly going to bring up their Bill 110.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: If we could ask him, he responded very affirmatively. I wrote to him as you suggested and he's very encouraged. It would be a nice gesture to ask him even if he can't come.

The Chairman: I know Ms. Folco is following that issue very closely from the Quebec perspective—Bill 110, the immigration issue in the United States. You will recall we had a congressman from New York here who I met a couple of months ago. He's been very helpful. There are quite a few congressional allies. Some of you may have also noticed that the association of governors recently met and has appointed a committee to look into this too. Its members are equally concerned.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Many of us wrote, as you suggested. I wrote to every senator in the neighbouring states and they were positive, but Abraham was very positive. I think he should be rewarded in some way, even if it's just a gesture.

The Chairman: Great. We might also try to see the senator from Washington state, because she was supportive of us as well.

Then we agreed that as a rule for the committee we would give 48 hours' notice before new items of business were considered by the committee. That's to enable members to have an appropriate notice so they can come to meetings knowing what's going to happen. Is that agreed?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chairman: This is more problematic. I'd forgotten entirely about this.

Members, you'll notice the next item is that the procedures committee agreed we would deposit our recommendations respecting the Canadian veterans from Hong Kong as a report in the House. I'm sorry that Mr. Mills isn't here. He's interested personally in this issue, but I know all members are as well.

• 1050

I had the opportunity to speak to the minister last night, and he asked me if we could hold off on depositing the report until he has an opportunity to respond to our letter. He apologizes for the fact that it's taken so long, but there are internal issues that he has to resolve. He personally has assured me that the letter will be to the committee in the week when we come back after the break. We'll probably then go ahead and deposit it as a report, but as a courtesy, I think we should at least get the reply from the minister before we do that, since he's asked us to do so.

Is that satisfactory? Thank you very much. I appreciate that.

You will notice that the next item is the whole issue of human rights and their relationship or linkage to trade. This has been raised at many meetings of the committee. It has been referred to a subcommittee that will be chaired by Ms. Beaumier, and I think she intends to start that study shortly. I hope members will participate in that study, as it's going to be extremely important.

Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: When we discussed this issue at the Steering Committee, Mr. Speller left the impression that my colleague, Benoît Sauvageau, supported the idea that the Human Rights Sub-Committee should do this study. However, I have been told that Mr. Sauvageau would prefer that the full Committee examine this issue.

Since that is Mr. Sauvageau's position—although I was unaware of it when we discussed this matter at the Steering Committee—I would like to rediscuss the idea of having the full Standing Committee proceed with this study, since that is indeed the position that we expressed through Mr. Sauvageau when the matter first came up in the other Sub-Committee.

Also, I personally would like to know what your position is. Since we will be talking about trade and investment, do you think it would be useful for the full Committee to take part in that study?

The Chairman: My position was that since we have so much work to accomplish, particularly since the other Sub-Committee is considering reviewing at the trade issue in relation to the World Trade Organization, it made more sense to separate the two issues and referred them to two separate sub-committees. I personally intend to actively participate in the study on the linkages between trade and human rights. I believe the most efficient way of proceeding would be to debate this issue in the Sub-Committee and allow the full Committee to proceed with its own work on whatever issues it feels require more immediate attention.

We will need until the end of this session to complete our review of nuclear disarmament. If we want to start the other study, we will have to do so immediately. I hesitated before taking this position, but now that would be my preference.

[English]

I will ask Mr. Speller, though, Mr. Turp. I think you were just coming in when he made the observation that when we had this discussion at the steering committee, you had said Mr. Sauvageau was in favour of the issue of trade and human rights going to the human rights subcommittee, while the issue of trade generally—and particularly the relationship between the new World Trade Organization and some agricultural and other issues—would go before your subcommittee.

Mr. Turp has said he's not so sure that was Mr. Sauvageau's position, Mr. Speller.

Mr. Bob Speller (Haldimand—Norfolk—Brant, Lib.): What did Mr. Sauvageau want?

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: He wanted this issue to be reviewed by the full Committee. At least, that's what I've been told. I have not spoken directly to him, but his assistant has told me that would be his preference, just as our preference was for that study to go forward in the full Committee. You're right when you say that the Committee is very busy dealing with the nuclear disarmament issue, but the more I think about it, the more it seems inappropriate to entrust this study to a Sub-Committee.

• 1055

The trade dimension is so important that if people dealing with trade issues cannot participate on an ongoing basis, that dimension will obviously be neglected in the Sub-Committee work, even though the Chairman, myself or others may well attend from time to time. Logically, the full Committee should be the one to study an issue of this importance. Neither a committee whose priority is trade, nor a committee whose priority is assistance will be in a position to do a comprehensive review of the issue. It really should be handled by the full Committee.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Speller.

Mr. Bob Speller: If that's the case, I don't know why Mr. Sauvageau then approached me as chair of the trade subcommittee and suggested that we do it in terms of the trade subcommittee. We later then had a discussion and felt it would probably be more appropriate to go over to the human rights side and that we would split and we would pull people from the two committees, the trade subcommittee and the human rights subcommittee, who wanted to do that issue, to have it done there. But we never at any time had any discussions in terms of it going before the full committee. You were at the discussions too.

The Chairman: Madam Beaumier, did you want to add anything?

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: I think the one thing that my colleagues on the other side and I both agree on is that we view the human rights issue as extremely important. In the past history trade has dominated most of the committees. It's not that the trade implications shouldn't be considered in this report, but many of us feel that human rights have basically been put on the back burner because the trade issues are more burning issues and ones that appear to need to be addressed quickly.

When you look at the issues we have to deal with in foreign affairs, there are not just issues that come up on a weekly basis, but we have the MAI and we have to look at some of the provisions in the world trade agreement. We're also going to be changing the day so it doesn't conflict with many other meetings, and we are inviting a variety of people from the foreign affairs committee and perhaps the Senate to participate in the debates.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Ms. Debien, do you have any objection?

Ms. Maud Debien: I was going to propose a compromise.

The Chairman: You have no objection, but there appears to be some confusion.

Mr. Daniel Turp: No, no; she said: a compromise!

Ms. Maud Debien: Yes, I said I want to suggest a compromise.

The Chairman: Oh, I see. I thought you said you were confused. My apologies.

Mr. Daniel Turp: She understood perfectly, and that's why she is proposing a compromise.

The Chairman: Fine.

Ms. Maud Debien: We did discuss this in the full Committee, and ended up dismissing this suggestion, although I don't really know why. I will nevertheless bring it forward again, because it strikes me as the best possible compromise.

I propose that the two Sub-Committees—Human Rights and Trade Issues, International Trade and Investment—merge and form a single joint committee.

The Chairman: That would be us.

Ms. Maud Debien: The members of both Sub-Committees.

The Chairman: Yes, that's us.

Ms. Maud Debien: Only a limited number of members of the full Committee actually sit on those two Sub-Committees. There are very few of us in the Human Rights Sub-Committee, for example. Ms. Beaumier can confirm that.

The Chairman: That is a possibility I also had considered.

Ms. Maud Debien: And we actually discussed it.

The Chairman: After discussing it, we agreed with the Clerk that it would probably be a little too complicated. Given the comments everyone has made here, I will withdraw those two points from our agenda and bring them forward for review by the Sub- Committee on Agenda and Procedure. We will discuss this again and try to find some solution. Is that agreed?

Mr. Daniel Turp: Fine. We have to find the best possible solution, because this is a subject that interests a lot of people.

The Chairman: Everyone must be satisfied with the work we are proposing to undertake. This is very, very important work. So, it's essential that everyone be satisfied with the arrangements that are made.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Fine.

The Chairman: So, I am withdrawing those two points.

• 1100

[English]

I have one last item, arising out of a notice of motion which some of you may have received from Mr. Assadourian. Mr. Assadourian gave a notice of motion to the committee some time ago, I think on February 10. He wished to propose a notice of motion this morning about a proposed CANDU reacter sale to Turkey. I understand that rather than moving his original text, which has been distributed to members, he has an alternative text he wishes to propose on the same subject.

I give the floor to Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Obviously the motion I presented on February 10 created some discussion. The fact is that we've been discussing human rights in this meeting here. The motion, I have to say, has received wide support in the community. I'm happy that the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade will take this issue and discuss the issue with the members of the committee. It will also invite witnesses from the community at large so they can come and participate and bring forward their own expertise on this subject.

The other point I was made aware of at the beginning of this week is the fact that there is a legal challenge to the sale of CANDU reactors to China. It will affect CANDU reactor sales to any other country because of environmental concerns. That's something we have to address on this issue too.

For those reasons, I would like to propose a new motion to this committee. I hope people will work with me to bring this issue forward, human rights and trade relationships, to the committee. One thing I would suggest is that we put in a timeframe for the report of the subcommittee to come to this committee.

The motion as it stands says:

Whereas the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade has decided to refer the issue of the linkage between human rights and trade to the Human Rights Subcommittee for a full examination and report;

And whereas I have proposed a resolution to the Committee concerning the sale of CANDU reactors to Turkey;

And whereas the issue of human rights is inexplicably linked to the security and political stability of the region as a whole, particularly in relation to historic mistreatment of minorities, in addition to the relationship between neighbours in the region - Turkey, Iraq, Armenia, Cyprus, Syria, and Greece.

And whereas all these issues are of direct concern to Canadians and to our friends and our allies in the European Union and NATO and should be addressed in a coherent fashion in our foreign policy;

Be it resolved that the motion for which I gave notice on Feb. 10 be tabled in order to permit the issues raised therein to be discussed as a part of the Subcommittee's work and to be the subject matter of recommendations of the report to be prepared by the Subcommittee.

The Chairman: Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I must express my regret and disappointment that Mr. Assadourian has chosen to withdraw what I thought was a very thoughtful and good motion, a motion that would have provided clear direction to the government on this proposed sale of CANDU nuclear reactors. The effect of his substitute motion is to deep-six, to kill, the earlier motion.

Mr. Bob Speller: That's not true.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Well, it is, because the committee could take a stand on the original motion today, and now it's being put into the work of the subcommittee. I want to say that I oppose this proposal and I would have been quite prepared to vote in favour of the original motion.

Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I want to propose an amendment to the motion Mr. Assadourian has submitted. It is as follows.

In the third paragraph, after the word “minorities” in the third line, where it says “particularly in relation to the historic mistreatment of minorities”, I would add the following:

including the Turkish genocide of the Armenian people, the illegal Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus, and the brutal persecution of the Kurdish minority, including elected parliamentarian Leyla Zana

I have this written, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Did everyone on the committee get that proposed amendment? Mr. Turp.

• 1105

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Mr. Chairman, we are prepared to support the draft amendment brought forward by our colleague from the New Democratic Party.

We deplore the fact that Mr. Assadourian had to or decided to withdraw his original motion. We would have been that much more supportive of it given that he was asking us to officially acknowledge—as unfortunately is only very rarely the case—the genocide of the Armenian people. Under the circumstances, we, too, would have liked to see that debate go forward today, as was Mr. Assadourian's wish. But Canada's foreign policy does not seem prepared to acknowledge the fact of the Armenian genocide. My wish would be that Parliament and the Foreign Affairs Committee could one day decide to provide that acknowledgement.

[English]

The Chairman: Madame Folco and then Mr. Reed are next.

But Mr. Assadourian, I do want to draw your attention to a procedural issue here. Because the committee did not enraciné the decision of the steering committee to have this matter go to the human rights committee, in fact, I would suggest that maybe you might want to stand down this whole discussion, at least until this committee has decided whether we're going to go to the subcommittee or whether we're going to go to the full committee. Certainly this is an issue that is linked to that. There's no question about it. That would certainly be my proposal: to stand down the discussion of this matter.

The other reason I would make that recommendation is that it's now 11.05 a.m. and we have a joint meeting on Iraq with the defence committee, so we have a very limited time. We're keeping other members of the defence committee waiting—who are here now—just as we will the members from the department who are going to brief us on Iraq.

Very quickly, Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Reed, did you want to quickly add something?

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Very quickly, Mr. Chair, I didn't appreciate the points raised by the opposition, but that's fair game. But this resolution in no way excludes discussion of those issues in the subcommittee. I will never deny the fact that those are the issues that most people are concerned about, including the opposition, of course.

The presenting of this motion will give a chance to other Canadians to come here as witnesses and express their opinions to this committee, to the subcommittee, so that they can be taken into consideration when we draft the motion. It's not only about what the opposition says or what I say or what anybody says; it's about having all Canadians express their points of view on this issue. It's a very important issue. It's in no way diluting the meaning of the resolution; rather, it's just opening the doors wide so that people can come in and express their points of view, which they've done very beautifully up to now.

The Chairman: Mr. Reed, quickly.

Mr. Julian Reed (Halton, Lib.): I just wanted to back up Mr. Assadourian. There's nothing in this resolution that prevents a discussion of anything.

The Chairman: First, then, we'll vote on the amendment.

A voice: What about my suggestion, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Svend Robinson: I'd ask for a recorded vote, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Strange procedure— Mr. Assadourian's motion was drawing on, in essence, I guess, deferring to subcommittee. It's basically a procedural motion. Can you amend it subsequently?

The Chairman: I think the other problem is that it's now not in order because it's referring it to a subcommittee that doesn't exist. That's why I say we have to stand down the discussion. I'd like to stand down your suggested amendment and the whole discussion until we can decide which way we're going to go on the committee. Okay?

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Mr. Chairman, it's essential that the full Committee debate this resolution before the Sub-Committee that will be proceeding with this study is actually established. Do we agree on that?

The Chairman: What resolution?

Mr. Daniel Turp: The motion moved by Mr. Assadourian.

The Chairman: This one?

Mr. Daniel Turp: It will be put before the full Committee again so that we can discuss it, will it not?

The Chairman: Yes, the one that we are currently considering—not the motion of February 10.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Fine.

The Chairman: The one that shows today's date, February 26.

Mr. Daniel Turp: So, we will have another opportunity to deal with the amendment moved by Mr. Robinson.

The Chairman: Yes, but only once we have decided whether to refer the study to the full Committee or the Sub-Committee. Once we have made that decision, we will immediately go back to our discussion to decide the fate of Mr. Assadourian's motion.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Fine.

[English]

The Chairman: Okay.

Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I just wanted to seek clarification. So once it has been decided what route the committee will be taking to look at the issue of the linkage between human rights and trade, then this motion will come back before the committee and my amendment will come back before the committee.

The Chairman: Right. And your amendment. That's correct. If in fact we decide to refer it to the whole committee, Mr. Assadourian will have the opportunity then of changing his motion to say we're referring it to the whole committee. Okay? I think procedurally that's the way we should go. I thank everybody for the help and cooperation in dealing with that.

• 1110

We're now adjourned until the next full meeting of the committee. That will be on Tuesday following the break.

Members, immediately after the adjournment, we're reconvening in camera to hear our briefing—this was probably the last briefing—on the status of matters in the gulf. Unless the situation changes dramatically, if in fact we're just going to continue on with the status quo, we would assume that there's no need to have weekly briefings. I think members are interested in knowing exactly what is the result of Mr. Annan's visit and any other further details the department can furnish.

Thank you very much.

The meeting is adjourned.