NDDN Committee Report

This report focused on Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan. It shows that while the Canadian Forces are providing operational leadership for the military campaign in the south of Afghanistan and that Canadian troops are performing exceptionally well, the overall mission still faces enormous challenges. Although noble, the mission is decidedly complex. There are no short term fixes or simple remedies. Evidence presented to the Committee is unanimous in calling for a long-term commitment from the international community for perhaps a decade — or a generation.

It is clear to many that the military mission alone will not solve the Afghanistan problem. So, while it is acknowledged that the Canadian Forces are in Afghanistan to protect our national interests, they are contributing to the broader international effort to help Afghans rebuild their country, so that it never again becomes a haven for terrorists. Our military mission also supports our close allies and other international friends in the UN, NATO and the G-8.

The Committee found that JTF-Afg is the most combat effective, best trained, best led, best equipped and best supported mission of its kind that Canada has ever deployed. It is among the best national contingents in ISAF, but it cannot do the job alone. JTF-Afg represents the defence ‘D’ of the government’s ‘3D’ approach to complex conflict and post-conflict situations. The other two ‘Ds’ are diplomacy and development. The 3D approach is, in turn, part of the government’s overall ‘whole of government’ approach to modern crises.

We found three factors to be important when considering the mission. First, Canada is not acting unilaterally in Afghanistan and cannot simply ‘do this’ or change that’ on its own. Second, the mission is one of capacity building, helping Afghans build the capacity to do the work themselves. We also noted therefore, that there is no advantage in simplistically throwing Canadian money, people or equipment at problems faster than they can be absorbed and used effectively. Third, and perhaps most important, Canada has taken sides in this issue. The mission is not, and never has been, anything akin to a peacekeeping mission.

The mission is also characterized by three general threats. First, the main direct threat to the national security of Afghanistan, and to Canadian troops, is the Taliban who have continued to mount an insurgency against the Afghanistan government and use guerrilla warfare tactics against JTF-Afg, including suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices and ambushes with machine guns and rocket propelled grenade launchers. The second threat is a corrosive mixture of corruption, the illegal drug trade and continuing tribal warlord influence. A third threat was identified closer to home — our own national impatience with the pace of progress in Afghanistan.

The report identified a number of difficult challenges that remain to be overcome. Government and media have been less than wholly effective in providing ordinary Canadians and Parliamentarians with adequate information about Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan. Government could have done more and the media could have been much more balanced in its approach.

The military mission was found to be not as unbalanced as some have claimed. Balance is more accurately measured on the basis of effect. The military mission has always had a degree of balance unknown to most Canadians, based on the work of the Canadian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar and of the Strategic Advisory Team-Afghanistan, deployed within Afghan government ministries in Kabul.

Canada could do more in training the Afghan National Army because a competent and effective Afghan National Army that is capable of protecting its own country is, in a way, an ‘exit strategy’ or a prerequisite for foreign troops to leave Afghanistan.

Canadian troops with battlefield injuries are cared for by a world-class medical system based on multinational and allied support from the battlefield to Canada. The Canadian Forces ability to diagnose and treat psychological injuries has matured over the past decade and considerable attention is devoted to the care of those who have suffered operational stress injuries. However, more needs to be done to address the psychological impact on military families.

Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan have been provided with some of the best equipment in the world and, perhaps of more importance, the national defence procurement process has been dramatically successful in delivering new, important operational equipment quickly. One of the remaining requirements is for a medium-heavy lift helicopter, needed to increase the flexibility and speed of tactical deployment of combat troops and to reduce the need for road convoys that are liable to ambush and attack by improvised explosive devices. We encourage the government to expedite the delivery of these helicopters.

The Committee identified the need for more timely flow of development and reconstruction resources from CIDA, in the aftermath of combat operations that have displaced innocent civilians. We also highlighted the need for more attention to be paid to the handling and transfer of Afghan detainees. Finally, we remain concerned about the impact of accidental deaths of innocent Afghans in the course of ISAF military operations.

In the end, having heard so many things from so many people, we are left with the fact that Canada’s complex and noble military mission in Afghanistan is far from over. We know too that the rebuilding of Afghanistan will not be complete by the end of our military mandate in February 2009. The question is, therefore, when that deadline arrives, do we stay and finish the job or come home?