CHAPTER 3:
THE SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS

During the first two Summits of the Americas, ... the goal of the economic integration of the ... hemisphere was to increase the standard of living..., to improve the working conditions for every-one and to protect the environment better. ... The hemisphere adopted [a] 23-point ... plan to ensure tangible progress, not only on stimulating trade, but also fostering democracy, human rights, health, education, etc. Despite the comprehensive framework, ... eco- nonic integration and free trade dominated over all other issues. ... [C]oncrete results from the social development commitments are much harder to find. Gauri Screenivasan, 27:1620

The Summit of the Americas Process

Given that for the first time in history the Americas became a community of democratic societies, the Heads of State and Government of the region met in Miami, Florida, in December 1994 to pursue their mutual interest in the advancement of economic prosperity, democracy and security of the Western Hemisphere. At what has since become known as the first modern day Summit of the Americas, the democratically elected leaders of 34 countries of the Organization of American States (OAS) put forth a Declaration of Principles on fundamental social issues of the hemisphere (see Appendix 3). The four principles advanced were to:

1. Preserve and Strengthen the Community of Democracies of the Americas;

2. Promote Prosperity Through Economic Integration and Free Trade;

3. Eradicate Poverty and Discrimination in Our Hemisphere; and

4. Guarantee Sustainable Development and Conserve Our Natural Environment for Future Generations.

These 34 countries further backed up this joint declaration with a commitment to a Plan of Action, which envisions 23 objectives that would contribute to the pursuit of the four basic principles (see Box 3.1). In fact, their governments are currently engaged in numerous general undertakings, either in the negotiation, planning or early implementation stage, on each of these specific objectives. The Committee also understands that these objectives are being sought in different fora, based on their relevant competencies, with timetables for completion that are compatible with the region's common interest. Consequently, the free trade goal is being pursued by the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) process as organized within the OAS and comprising three key administrative components: (1) Trade Ministers of the Western Hemisphere; (2) Vice Ministers of Trade of the Western Hemisphere; and (3) 12 Working Groups, which were subsequently transformed into nine Negotiating Groups. Health and education objectives are being worked out by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO); environment and sustainable development issues are being pursued by the Unit for Sustainable Development and Environment; and the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD) has already experienced success with four interventions in defence of democracy to date, while the OAS Secretariat of Legal Affairs is engaged in providing better administration of justice. Finally, the Summit Implementation Review Group was created to monitor progress on the pursuit and attainment of these social objectives.

The Committee understands that, even though there may be no direct link between any two, these objectives can be complementary. For example, it is generally thought that the wealth created by free trade and greater capital market efficiency (resulting in part from the greater capital mobility across national borders) could lead to greater health service purchases and educational attainment in the developing regions of the Americas. This reallocation of activities could, in turn, have the effect of contributing to the principle of poverty eradication at least when measuring poverty in absolute rather than relative terms as will be established below. Furthermore, since wealth also appears to be positively correlated with a society's environmental expenditures and activities, the pursuit of economic prosperity through free trade may not only promote the economic component of sustainable development, but also its environmental component.

These issues are the topic of this Chapter. The following sections deal with two of the three non-prosperity objectives of the Summit of the Americas process, the eradication of poverty and promoting democractic principles, leaving the issue of the environment and sustainable development for Chapter 7. Next, however, we will broach the two remaining process issues relating to the role of civil society and the provinces in the FTAA initiative.

The Role of Civil Society in the FTAA

Canada has called for broad civil society participation in foreign policy development, particularly now that trade obligations are increasingly touching upon domestic policy matters. The FTAA process, largely at Canada's insistence, has such an engagement. An FTAA Civil Society Committee, situated in Washington, has been set up by the OAS which has invited people from across the hemisphere to submit their comments. That committee will consider these submissions and report to Ministers of Trade in November 1999.

Much as this may be, a number of officials from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) feel that the process, as presently set up, and in which they are participating, is not sufficiently transparent. It is unclear to some of them why an FTAA Civil Society Committee was created: Was it for organizational efficiency reasons? Or would this organizational filter enable the Ministers of Trade and their officials to indirectly screen out and cherry-pick amongst the comments and recommendations made from the outset, allowing them to side-step the more problematic issues of public concern? Moreover, this process, they claim, may not be effective because it appears to them that there will be no meaningful dialogue or consultation with decision-makers, negotiators or their officials. While most NGOs clearly understand that they cannot play a direct role in negotiating an FTAA, they are uncertain as to what contribution their efforts would bring.

We also recognize that our trade minister, at the Costa Rican ministerial meeting in March 1998, encouraged colleagues in the region to set up a committee on civil society participation for the FTAA. However, what happened was not quite satisfactory. What happened was that a collection of suggestions came forward and they were collected in an office in Washington. This is what the NGOs have called the suggestion box; there was no real formal mechanism to discuss these kinds of suggestions. So we would urge Canada to make that process a consistent, permanent, and transparent one with colleagues in the region. [Eleanor Douglas, 27:1640]

The Committee also heard claims that a less than full-hearted effort was being put into embracing civil society participation, particularly in Latin America where it was suggested that officials are proceeding slowly as this process is expected to only amount to an open invitation for critics of governments and trade. The flip side of this coin, however, suggests that government officials have a genuine concern that some NGOs and special interest groups only represent themselves and that the negotiating process runs the risk of being hijacked by these groups who would only like to sour its environment if given the chance. The Committee was further advised to consider sovereignty and political culture issues on this matter.

There is no question that issues of national sovereignty are critical to the larger process. There's also no question that we have very differing political cultures, and Latin America is not homogeneous. There is a wide range of civil society participation in different countries. ... I think we will see, by leaving each country to its own political traditions ... that each of those civil societies will work out their own dynamic within their own context. ... [W]e cannot force the Canadian political and civil society standard on other nations, and ours may not be the best model in any case. [Stephen Randall, 125:920]

In the interest of obtaining broad public input from across the Americas on matters of international trade and investment, the Committee recommends:

1. That the Minister of International Trade encourage and again, at the Ministerial Meeting to be held in Toronto in November 1999, urge his colleagues of the Americas to actively engage civil society in their respective countries in a meaningful consultation process.

In Canada, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) has called on the public to submit their comments on an FTAA; a notice in the Canada Gazette appeared in February 1999. DFAIT intends to organize these comments and make them available to the Minister and the relevant Canadian officials and negotiators of the FTAA. In addition, the Minister and his departmental officials have conducted informal meetings and discussions with various activist groups and will also sponsor a symposium on the FTAA to be held in November 1999 by various NGOs and its organizer, Common Frontiers.

Provincial Participation in the Implementation of the FTAA

In Canada, international treaties must be implemented in accordance with the division of legislative jurisdictions between the federal and provincial governments established in the Constitution of Canada. Where a treaty or an aspect of a treaty relates to an area under provincial jurisdiction, provincial participation is essential to adherence to the commitments under the treaty in question. Beyond a doubt, the best way of securing provincial cooperation is to involve them in the entire process of negotiating international agreements.

For now, the practice adopted by the Canadian government in this respect seems to meet the needs of the various components of the Canadian federation relatively well. The provinces are kept regularly informed of the progress of negotiations.

The Committee is aware that the Canadian negotiating team already includes a number of representatives of the various federal departments affected. The Government of Canada should agree with the provinces on a mechanism that would enable them to be kept fully informed of the content of the negotiations and offer them an opportunity to make their views known and to argue their interests within or to the negotiating team. The Committee recommends:

2. That the Government of Canada continue its practice of informing and consulting the provinces on issues relating to liberalization of trade within the Americas, and involve them in the negotiation procedure where it is desirable to do so, to protect their interests in their spheres of jurisdiction, while protecting the interests of the Canadian federation as a whole.

Wealth, Poverty and the FTAA

Trade is important to the prosperity and well-being of a nation and its citizens. All participants to the Summit of the Americas process widely acknowledge this fact and have committed their countries to negotiate greater economic integration within the hemisphere through the removal of a wide range of barriers to trade and investment. Friends and foes of free trade deals do not, in general, dispute the underlying premise of greater wealth arising from free trade. Although the foes dispute the well-being claim principally because more competitive economies linked by trade and investment, they assert, will force contractions in public policies and programs that will lower overall well-being. So such losses would presumably outweigh the wealth gains. Moreover, drawing from the Committee's hearings, opposition, in most cases of anti-free traders, and qualification, in some cases of pro-free traders, stem from the distribution of the wealth created. We are talking about the division and not the size of the economic pie. Only the most fervent of free trade advocates claim that free trade is universally beneficial to all members of society, while only the most indefatigable detractors assert that the wealth created by a policy of free trade remains solely in the hands of a few capitalists of export-oriented corporations and transnationals. The truth obviously lies somewhere between these polar opposites.

Providing an exact estimate on the values won and lost, and by whom, in an FTAA was not a part of the mandate of this Committee, even if such a calculation was at all feasible. However, as the Summit of the Americas process encompasses issues of poverty, the Committee is obliged to report on this aspect of wealth. Special attention must be paid to the wealth and poverty implications in this context because, unlike free trade between Canada and the United States, the smaller and developing economies of the Americas do not provide the same level of social benefits that may be needed to adequately compensate losers under a free trade regime. Some will likely fall beneath critical poverty thresholds.

In this regard, the Committee heard contradictory opinions on the impact of trade liberalization taken so far in Latin America. Some witnesses suggest a general improvement in wealth and a reduction in poverty throughout the region, while others maintain that the wealthy and middle class, especially those closely tied to the export economy, are benefiting at the expense of the increasingly marginalized poor. What was particularly interesting to the Committee was the evidence provided by one researcher in the field who stated that when you look at the wealth and poverty puzzle from an absolute standard you find:

Since the economic liberalization, formation of the MERCOSUR, and an official commitment to economic and financial stability, the standard of living of the lower class has improved substantially. People are eating better. Purchases of basic household appliances have increased, as well as energy consumption. ... I went to look at household goods in Brazilian IBGE, which is Statistics Brazil, ... and the consumption of fridges and stoves in the last 10 years for the lowest quintile of the population of income has increased dramatically. In 1987, among the households that had up to two minimum salaries - and a minimum salary I think in 1996 was at $112 - there were 60% that had a fridge. In 1996 it was almost 70%. [Annette Hester, 31:1655]

Yet, at the same time, this researcher noted that when viewed from a relative standard:

We measure income inequality in the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient goes from zero to one, zero being perfectly equal and one the most unequal. During the last 10 years, in 1987 it was 0.56 and in 1996 it was 0.58. So it is more unequal. ... What happens when you separate where it's gone up and where it's gone down. ... In all of the new areas in Brazil - the northeast, Belém, Fortaleza, Recife, Salvador - the Gini got better. ... Where it got really bad was Sao Paulo, Porto Alegre ... [Annette Hester, 31:1655]

These results led the researcher to conclude:

I know that the trade theory and everything will say the pie will get bigger. This system is really good at making the pie bigger, but it's really lousy at the distribution of this pie. [Annette Hester, 31:1700]

The Committee finds no fault with these conclusions, recognizing that poverty in Brazil may have declined in absolute terms in the past decade, but appears to have risen using a relative yardstick. Though the Committee would introduce a caveat with respect to any conclusions drawn on poverty based upon differences in the distribution of incomes as measured by the Gini coefficient, without first correcting for the differential impacts of being located at different points in the business cycle, changes in the economic structure of the country that are not related to trade, and changes in other social policy factors. In any event, the conclusions drawn by the researcher are probably generally true for most of Latin America, as Brazil's economy, while impressive throughout the first half of the 1990s, has been growing more slowly than the region as a whole. Consequently, this somewhat mixed result only serves to reinforce the Committee's view to take counsel from a learned moderate on the issue of free trade and its impact on wealth and poverty.

When we recommend to developing countries liberalization of any sort, be it trade or financial, this has to be tempered somewhat by the fact that these policies or recommendations have implications for poverty and development ... But the consensus ... is that the link between liberalization and development is not a very simple one. In fact, a lot depends on the initial conditions in the countries where liberalization takes place and also the quality of the social, economic, and political institutions that are managing this change. [Rohinton Medhora, 28:1620]

In the end, the Committee is not sure of what benefit comparisons of alternative trade deals from the past would be, or what conclusions one should resurrect from them. Most free trade deals are struck by countries of relatively equal social development in contrast to what would be achieved by an FTAA. The Committee can only conclude that, at this time, an FTAA is likely to bring general prosperity to the Americas; but whether or not this prosperity is fairly or equitably distributed throughout these societies in a way that would affect poverty one way or another remains open to debate. For this reason, the Committee would feel particularly disturbed if such a profound wealth generating reform as an FTAA was not leveraged to improve Latin America's large wealth and racial and gender inequality situation. Hemispheric political institutions must be devised and adequately equipped with resources to assure that an appropriate balance is found between economic prosperity and the eradication of poverty and discrimination as part of the Summit of the Americas process. In this regard, the Committee was told:

Issues like the environment, the role of education, mothers and implications for the health of children are all included in the bigger document and they are being discussed in all other forums in the hemisphere, such as PAHO, on the health of the hemisphere. [Kathryn McCallion, 23:1215]

These other institutions would include the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The Organization of American States (OAS), for example, has requested the IDB to double its lending for primary and secondary education over the next three years relative to the previous three years. The OAS has also instructed the IDB, ECLAC and the World Bank to cooperate in providing distance education using, amongst other means, satellite technologies. However, the Committee wants to know more about these institutions, their specific programs, effectiveness and funding arrangements to ensure that more than a lackluster effort is being put into the non-FTAA components of the Summit of the Americas process. Given the demand for greater action to be taken on these issues, the Committee takes counsel from its witnesses in ensuring the right initial conditions are set for free trade reforms to be complementary to poverty and discrimination eradication objectives. The Committee recommends:

3. That the Government of Canada examine the mandate and mission of the Pan American Health Organization, the Inter-American Development Bank and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, including their abilities to carry out their assigned duties and responsibilities relating to the five objectives set out in the Summit of the Americas Plan of Action with respect to eradicating poverty and discrimination in the hemisphere.

Democracy, Human Rights and the FTAA

The principles of democracy and economic prosperity are also inextricably linked through trade. There are at least three points where they intersect: (1) economic stability, provided in part by free trade, fosters political stability and vice versa; (2) economic prosperity through privatization and deregulation of economic activity required for successful implementation of free trade discourages "crony capitalism" practices of corrupt government officials; and (3) economic prosperity achieved from increased foreign competition as a result of free trade alters the incentives of commercial and government agents from coercive means towards offering financial incentives to condition people's work and investment behaviour, thereby demonstrating respect for human rights in a very tangible and mutually profitable fashion.

Consider the first intersection in more detail. Economic stability through free trade creates vested interests in avoiding political disputes and wars. The Committee heard of one such example relating to the MERCOSUR. In the context of trying to get a handle on the question of whether or not trade agreements were solely about trade, the answer obtained by one witness before the Committee was:

On another front, trade agreements are acting as a political force. The most current example that comes to mind is the situation in Paraguay, where recently the former president was linked to the assassination of the vice-president. In other times the assassination of the vice-president could have easily led to great political instability and even a coup. Fortunately, times have changed. Paraguay is a MERCOSUR member country and has signed the Ushuaia Protocol, which institutionalized the MERCOSUR's democratic clause. Consequently, in the event of a coup it risked jeopardizing its membership. As you know, a crisis was averted with the help of the Brazilian and Argentine presidents. This is just one of the many examples I could give where trade agreements are acting in the political realm. [Annette Hester, 31:1610]

The consensus view presented to the Committee appears to be that the political conditions in Latin America have substantially improved to the point where the implementation of specific economic endeavours, such as an FTAA, would strengthen and reinforce the democratic gains achieved so far.

At the beginning of the 1980s, Chile and Argentina had 24 unresolved border disputes, all of them fraught with the potential to break into open warfare. Of course they had military dictatorships at the time, which were ready to use their troops. They had a very militaristic approach to solving these problems. Now, 23 of the 24 have been resolved peacefully, and the last is on the way to resolution. That's just a good example of how they're dealing with their cross-border disputes. The most recent one to be resolved ... was the Peru-Ecuador dispute, which had broken into war in 1995 and was resolved late last year. There are only a few very minor ones left that don't contain any potential for open warfare. [Paul Durand, 25:1605]

In terms of the second intersection between economic prosperity and democracy, the problem of government corruption, or crony capitalism as it is often called, is to be fought both with political instruments and economic instruments. The former would include the modernization of the state through implementing a simplified and transparent bureaucratic code of procedures, and the latter would include deregulation and privatization initiatives. Both types of instruments are compatible and may, in fact, be important pre-conditions for successful implementation of free trade, thereby bolstering both the prosperity and the democracy principles. This relationship, as well as a sign of progress on this front in Latin America, was explained to the Committee in the following way:

Privatization is having the effect of creating a situation where there is less incentive and there are fewer opportunities for corruption because there is far less government activity. The deregulation has meant there are far fewer civil servants to withhold something in order to grant a regulatory favour. Demonopolization has led to more competition and by its very nature has created the conditions where corruption is now exposed.

One of the essences of the foreign investments that have been taking place in Latin America has been the importation, if you will, of these multicorporate ethics which are being applied in the business systems in these Latin American countries. In other words, some of the large transnational corporations simply will not enter into a country if they have to jump through corrupt means; and they make that known to the governments. [Bob Clark, 25:1635]

Human rights provide yet another linkage between democracy and economic prosperity, which was of central concern for many appearing before, or submitting briefs to, the Committee. Some witnesses were adamant that human rights issues should be directly addressed in any FTAA agreement. Here are a few samples:

The principal argument we make is that human rights treaties, including the Charter of the United Nations, should take primacy over all trade treaties. It's interesting to note that within Canada our trade laws, and all our laws, are subject to our Charter of Rights in the Constitution. No trade law, whether it's the Competition Act or the anti-dumping act or whatever you want, of any province or any federal government law overrides or is not subject to the Charter of Rights. What we're saying is that trade agreements must take recognition of our human rights legislation, our human rights treaties, ones that we've ratified, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and that these treaties should take priority. We believe the two should be carried on together and they should be compatible with each other. [Warren Allmand, 28:1535]

And

One of our concerns then, of course, is that we would like the protection of people's basic rights to be the overriding and overarching concern in any kind of trade agreement. ... Canada and other countries in the region who have not done so should sign and ratify the American Convention on Human Rights from 1978 and the San Salvador Protocol on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights from 1988. We realize these are not perfect instruments, but they are a start, and we would encourage the Canadian government to take a close look at them and ratify them. Concerning the San Salvador Protocol, 10 countries have ratified the protocol to date, which is just one short of the 11 required for this instrument to come into effect. ... The recommendation is that Canada should sign and ratify the two instruments. [Eleanor Douglas, 27:1635]

Yet other witnesses, equally perturbed over systemic Latin American violations, preferred that such rights be sought and preserved in parallel fora and institutions.

The underlying source and historical context of abuses of human rights in Latin America was well articulated and summarized to the Committee.

The trend towards sustainable social structures and economies has been dramatically positive in recent years, but these are relatively recent phenomena. We are not talking about societies that have shared our history of the development of democratic institutions, of an independent judiciary, of a viable democratic structure, and of a respect for human rights. Many of these countries are countries of conquest. Their historic evolution has been that of conquered peoples without the some kinds of institutions and accepted traditions of democracy and respect for individual rights that we take as natural. Not all of them are, but I think there are differences that are visible in the way people approach the whole notion of civil society, of engaging power that is outside of the institutional framework. [George Haynal, 25:1620]

The Committee sees at least three important ingredients presently lacking in Latin America to ensure an enhancement of human rights and democratic values: (1) civil society participation; (2) good political governance; and (3) the rule of law. The first ingredient, an active civil society, stems from the belief that everyone in society ought to be given the opportunity to be consulted, one way or another, by governments promulgating laws that affect them. Indeed, it is a virtual certainty that no law will ever meet universal acceptance and, thus, a healthy democracy will be characterized by a highly energetic civil society seeking out laws and codes judged, albeit subjectively, to contain unbalanced sets of rights and obligations. However, the Committee is of the view that Recommendation No. 1 in the context of the FTAA civil society process sufficiently addresses this aspect of the problem.

The second ingredient, good political governance, has partly been addressed by these societies themselves. A significant amount of deregulation and privatization of Latin American economies, along with the development of simple and transparent bureaucratic rules meant to weed out corruption, has already been undertaken. The Committee can only encourage Latin American governments to continue these efforts as it feels much more work can still be done in terms of instituting transparent bureaucratic codes of conduct. One witness, who also applauded the efforts of the Government of Canada for its role in ratifying the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) anti-bribery convention in 1998, was more to the point:

Another area where early progress could be made, in our view, and where Canada could play a lead role is transparency in government procurement and in other administrative processes. The transparency agenda relates to better governance; to fairer and more open processes and to less corruption; to a business environment that is transparent, where business is done with a high degree of integrity and where a legal system exists that gives confidence that the rules will be enforced consistently. [Robert Weese, 31:1640]

The Committee agrees with this assessment and will return to, as well as have recommendations to make on, this issue in its chapters dealing with government procurement and business facilitation.

Finally, in terms of the third ingredient, many Latin American countries have, for example, laws prohibiting the suppression of labour unions and the use of child labour, but these very same countries are fraught with those who engage in union-busting and children are routinely found in sweatshops a subject to which the Committee will return in Chapter 6. These facts suggest that there is not an absence of law in Latin America, but that there is no rule of law. The house of democracy must be built upon a strong foundation of respect for human rights and, as such, the equal application and enforcement of laws by independent police and judiciaries that is, independent from the legislature and its political masters are a democratic imperative. Which leads us to the original question with which witnesses before the Committee grappled: Whether or not an FTAA agreement should incorporate special enforcement provisions and institutions to sanction and curb human rights violations.

At first blush it may be tempting to include a "social or human rights clause" in the FTAA framework that would enable a supra-national FTAA institution to impose trade sanctions on countries whose governments have well-established systemic human rights violations records. However, such means for correcting the democratic failings of others is not without its own set of pitfalls. As one witness correctly put it:

I'm not suggesting that a democratic clause be included in the FTAA. As it stands, the MERCOSUR is a customs union among countries that share several commonalities, including stages of development, while the proposed FTAA is a free trade zone among several very diverse countries. I am afraid that this type of clause, if suggested by either Canada or the United States, would be seen as an imposition and could act as a deal-breaker. [Annette Hester, 31:1610]

The Committee is also mindful of the fact that while a free trade agreement is a political document concluded between sovereign governments, it is primarily an economic instrument meant to resolve or attenuate some economic problems. It is a very blunt instrument whose institutions have no track record and are not well equipped to cope with human rights violations. For example, just how a decision of sanction would come to bind the violating country's trading partners is at best vague, not to say anything about the allocation of the shares of burden and their enforcement. Clearly, the American Convention on Human Rights, enforced by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, is a far better social instrument for achieving these ends.

It has been suggested by some that Canada, because it has not ratified this convention, cannot act as an agent of human rights in the region. The Committee disagrees with this assessment. Canada has not signed the American Convention on Human Rights principally because, as it was drafted prior to Canada joining the OAS, existing Canadian legislation may not easily be made compatible with the convention. For example, Canada's hate and child pornography laws are not likely to square with the convention's reference to "freedom of expression," and nor would a number of Canadian laws do the same with respect to its "right to life" provision which begins upon conception and not birth. Short of signing the convention with a number of reservations or having it substantially modified, Canada can rely on its human rights record to be an effective advocate of human rights in the Americas.

At its very core, respect for human rights is not an economic problem but, as was alluded to above, is a problem of political and social culture. Human rights, concepts and norms, and universal access to justice and means of redress of any abrogations of these rights must be achieved through existing hemispheric processes and institutions. History further suggests that free trade can only, in an indirect way, foster better human rights records through a process of constructive dialogue. Moreover, the decisions of a hemispheric trade institution, using the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a guide, will increasingly favour conditions for the observance of human rights. The facts are that free trade leads to greater wealth and it is wealthy countries that, by and large, enjoy good human rights records.

For all of these reasons, the Committee believes that an eventual FTAA administrative body, like that of the WTO, should not become or be transformed into a human rights organization. We have already set up institutions for this purpose; if they are not functioning properly, they should be fixed. Redundant administrations are not the answer and the creation of new prescriptive trade-based human rights instruments to indirectly resolve these problems should only be adopted as a last resort. Consequently, human rights, which is of quintessential importance for all democractic societies of the Americas, is therefore best pursued outside of the FTAA process, but within and outside the Summit of the Americas process. This is the current hemispheric framework design, though the Committee is receptive to an effective and relatively costless means of achieving this democratic end within the FTAA agreement. The Committee, as it did in its Report on the WTO, recommends:

4. That the Government of Canada, in preparing positions for negotiating a Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement, assess their impacts on human rights, seeking to ensure that there are no conflicts with Canada's international human rights obligations or with measures to protect and progressively realize rights which are affirmed under international law. The Government of Canada should also encourage its negotiating partners to do the same and take advantage of these negotiations as a way of advancing respect for human rights throughout the Americas.

Finally, the Committee believes that Canadian companies doing business in Latin America and the Caribbean are also a means of promoting respect for human rights if they were to lead by way of example in their treatment of workers and local affiliates. The Committee is already aware of Canada's voluntary business ethics codes and the OECD's Anti-Bribery Covenant which, in our opinion, are sufficient and we recommend:

5. That the Government of Canada increase its efforts in promoting Canada's voluntary business ethics codes and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's Anti-Bribery Convention.